Marine Policy 28 (2004) 411–418

ARTICLE IN PRESS

*Correspondi

353-91-568569.

E-mail addre

(O. Tully).

0308-597X/$ - se

doi:10.1016/j.ma

Use of private access rights in fisheries: effective managementthrough public transferability?

Matt Bradshawa,*, Oliver Tullyb

aSchool of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, Private Bag 78, Hobart TAS 7001, Australiab Irish Sea Fisheries Board, New Docks Road, Galway, Ireland

Accepted 2 October 2003

Abstract

The aim in this paper is to put forward an approach to the issue of access rights that is suitable to Ireland’s crustacean and

molluscan fisheries. We begin by reviewing proceedings of a recent international conference on the issue of property rights in

fisheries. We then pose objectives for fisheries management to be met by our approach. Following this, we outline the present limited

entry initiative regarding crustacean and molluscan fisheries in Ireland. We conclude that—for fishers to operate with, but not

exchange licences like, owners—a licence should be returned to the issuing authority once it is no longer being fished by its holder.

r 2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Keywords: Access rights; Ireland; Crustacean and molluscan fisheries

1. Introduction

ygovernment has no other end but the preservationof propertyy

(John Locke [1])

yproperty is organized robberyy

(George Bernard Shaw [2])

Search any dictionary of quotations and you will mostlikely find variants of these two opposing views onprivate property. In the one view, represented by Locke,private property is a pillar of society necessary topreserve ‘y lives, liberties and estates y’. In the other,it is a divisive crime.A similar polarity seems to attend the debate about

private ‘property’ rights in fisheries. For example:

yproperty rights are absolutely fundamental y [to]the level of production, productivity and productiongrowth in economies y and, more generally, toalmost everything that people usually regard aseconomic progress [3].

ng author. Tel.: +61-15-087-2974368; fax: +61-15-

sses: bradshaw@bim.ie (M. Bradshaw), tully@bim.ie

e front matter r 2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

rpol.2003.10.015

ythe institution of private property y cannot on itsown be expected to maintain or improve thecondition of the marine habitat, contrary to the tacitassumption of much fisheries economics [4].

According to Symes [5], ‘[t]he case for rights-basedmanagement has been argued with a proselytising zealby economists and endorsed by fisheries administratorsand large-scale fishing interests–and rebutted with equalvigour by the social sciences and the small-boat sector’.He goes on to ask if some middle ground might usefullybe explored between these two positions. Such anexploration can be undertaken using an example. Thecase we present is a change in management underway inIreland’s crustacean and molluscan fisheries.In this paper, we first consider recent thinking

regarding private ‘property’ rights in fisheries (Section2). By way of simplifying what is a substantial andcomplex literature, we centre our consideration on theproceedings of the FishRights99 conference [6]. Thisconference gathered together many of the world’sleading thinkers on property rights in fisheries. Itsproceedings capture a wide range of views on this issue.Second, we discuss objectives particular to fisheriesmanagement (Section 3). We specify objectives regard-ing stocks, industry and government, as well as inrespect of the management relationship between

ARTICLE IN PRESSM. Bradshaw, O. Tully / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 411–418412

industry and government. We consider our objectives tobe common to many fisheries around the world. Third,we outline the situation regarding fisheries in Ireland(Section 4). This situation is set against the backgroundof the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). We specificallydiscuss the management change underway regardingcrustacean and molluscan fisheries in Ireland. Fourth, aclear industry preference for licences not to be privatelytransferable is presented (Section 5). Finally, we ask if itmight be possible to construct a middle position inIreland’s crustacean and molluscan fisheries thatcaptures both the public and private benefits of‘ownership’ by issuing each licence with a provisionthat it be returned to the issuing authority once itis no longer being fished by its holder (Section 6).This is a new proposal in Ireland, but we recognise thismay not be the case in a number of fisheries in othercountries. However, we consider that as privatetransferability has crept into a number of individualquota (IQ) systems around the world, it is a proposalworth reiterating.

2. ‘Fish rights’: which way to go?

Is private property a good or a bad thing? Thisquestion is easiest to answer at its extremes: if you madeit, yes; if you stole it, no. Much property, however, isacquired through a market, i.e., it is purchased. It is herethat Shaw’s ‘organized robbery’, quoted above, isrelevant. First, governments create licences, determinetheir conditions qua private property and regulate thegeneral operation of markets through which licences areexchanged. Second, free market exchange can be seen tolegitimise taking by haves from have nots. Leasing oflicences to access a fishery is a case in point.Private property, however, should not be dismissed

out of hand. Ownership of private property can delivercontrol to an individual of his or her labour. That fishersare secure in their occupation can lead to longer careersand investment horizons as well as to stewardship.There is therefore much to be learnt from both sides ofthe literature regarding ‘property’ rights in fisheries. Byway of summarizing this literature, we distill pointsrelevant to Ireland’s crustacean and molluscan fisheriesfrom proceedings of the FishRights99 conference [6].Over 45 papers are included in these proceedings.Collectively, they address a wide range of issues, fromtheory to practice, regarding the role of property rightsin fisheries, and include academic, industry and govern-ment perspectives, as well as cover institutional arrange-ments and administrative challenges. In producing thissummary we have been mindful of the Irish fishingindustry’s preference for non-transferable licences (dis-cussed below). Our summary is therefore not disposed toany individual transferable quota (ITQ) orthodoxy.

With this said, the main points for management ofcrustacean and molluscan fisheries in Ireland are asfollows:

* In most fisheries, the right in question relates toaccess rather than to species or areas.

* In some fisheries, privilege (e.g., in Canada) or permitare preferred descriptions to ‘right’ as they convey asense of the retention of responsibility to manage onthe part of the issuing authority.

* The position of proponents of the use of privateaccess rights in fisheries continues to be underpinnedby neo-classical economic theory concerned withefficiencies at the scale of the fleet.

* The link between the use of full private access rightsin fisheries and responsible fishing practice is ques-tionable (e.g., quota busting, high grading anddiscarding are evident in fisheries managed usingITQs).

* Many of the stated benefits of full private accessrights (e.g., exclusivity, security and durability) canbe obtained with a more partial and flexible ‘right’.

* Once introduced, private access rights are difficult toreverse.

* Private access rights systems in fisheries tend, in thefirst instance, to be biased towards existing boat/licence holders (excluding, e.g., crew).

* Transferability through a market is the major pointof contention regarding negative, particularly social,impacts associated with ITQs; in a number offisheries, IQs seek to avoid these.

* Private access rights can impinge on the ability ofpublic decision-makers to adjust a managementsystem.

* If left solely to the market, distribution of privateaccess rights risks being inequitable (e.g., financiallyunderprivileged fishers and the next generation offishers may be disadvantaged).

* Under a private access rights system such as ITQs,owners may not be operators.

* It is beholden on government to attend to socialjustice (e.g., regarding distribution issues) and eco-system scale objectives, the market will not addressthese due to it being oriented to narrow efficiency andindividualistic profit maximisation parameters.

* Any private access right should be granted with clearobligations (e.g., to comply with and participate inmanagement). Responsibilities beyond the careerhorizons of licence holders, such as for ecosystemhealth and stock sustainability, are in the hands ofmanagement.

* Concentration of quota into fewer, often non-fishing,hands is a concern in many fisheries managed usingITQs.

* Under full private ‘property’ rights, operators, co-operative industry bodies, processors, investors and

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Table 1

Principal components of a fishery and related key management

objectives

Principal components Key objectives

Stock Sustainable exploitation

Industry Viability and stewardship

Government Flexibility

Relationship between industry and

government

Co-operation

M. Bradshaw, O. Tully / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 411–418 413

public bodies alike may be required to bid for sharesto access a public resource.

* ITQs are static (e.g., allocated in perpetuity) com-pared with dynamic stocks, fishers, technology,management and government.

* ITQs preclude use-it-or-lose-it licence schemes.* Private access rights can impede individuals, often

with only base levels of formal education, fromsecuring their operation at a price relative to theirother sunk costs (e.g., a boat, fishing gear andelectronic equipment).

* Private access rights create winners (possession) andlosers (dispossession, of often artisanal operators,especially inter-generationally).

* Under a system of limited entry, without licencesreverting to the issuing authority (e.g., followingcessation of fishing by the holder), de facto transferscan occur.

* If de facto transfers occur, pressure is likely to beapplied to government to make these de jure.

* Private access rights tend to create a distinctionbetween capitalists (owners) and labourers(operators).

A number of papers in Shotton [6] rehearse argumentsfor and against rights-based management (e.g., [5]). Theprimarily economic case for ITQs emphasises theirability to address overcapacity, at the scale of the fleet,through the market. The operation of Adam Smith’s so-called invisible hand of the market means that the stateis not seen to be an agent in any rationalisation. Evenmore attractive to the state, perhaps, is that rationalisa-tion through the market does not directly cost itanything (there may, however, be indirect costs related,for example, to industry polarisation and ecosystemdegradation). Also emphasised is the ability of ITQs toweed marginal economic units out of the fleet, meaningthat only the most efficient operators remain. A fleetconsisting of a small number of large operators shouldthen lead to lower transaction costs. Non-economicbenefits of ITQs are argued to be less discarding ofcatch, greater stewardship and a simplified regulatorysystem.The case against ITQs has principally been made on

the grounds of natural and social justice. Objections onnatural justice grounds centre on the privatisation ofaccess to a public resource. Objections on social justicegrounds focus on concentration of ownership andcentralisation of operating units. Individuals andlocalities lacking resources are not favoured by ownersand fishers looking to maximise their economic returnsand operating efficiencies, respectively. Quota holderscan become fewer and larger, as can operators; andoperators are increasingly likely to be lessees. Progres-sion to owner-operation can become financially beyondmost crew. Small, artisanal and often pluriactive

operators may decline in number. It is these whotogether employ more people and are spread throughmore local coastal communities than large operators.They also harbour whatever ‘traditions’ might beassociated with the fishery. In short, labourers can endup working big boats and catching quota held bycapitalist owners.Finally, the literature indicates that ‘ownership’ can

lead to more environmentally responsible fishing in thelong-term. One caveat here, however, appears to be thatowners need to be operators. Before we discuss apossible middle position between private and publicownership, we next specify key objectives to be met infisheries management as these underpin any specificmechanism such as limited entry. Our proposal relatingto the system of rights emerging in Ireland’s crustaceanand molluscan fisheries can then be considered againstthis background.

3. Key fisheries management objectives

By way of simplification, we identify five key manage-ment objectives related to four principal components ofa fishery (Table 1).We consider similar components and objectives to be

common in a number of fisheries around the world. Forexample, sustainable exploitation of a fish stock is thecentral objective of many management systems. In theUnited States, for instance, National Standards forfisheries management have been written into statutorylaw. National Standard 1 states that:

Conservation and management measures shall pre-vent overfishing while achieving, on a continuingbasis, the optimum yield from each fishery for theUnited States fishing industry [7].

In Australia, on the other hand, the broader frame-work of Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) isused, within which fisheries management, among otherkinds of management, is assessed [8].Standards or criteria in most frameworks tend to be

worded generally. Common objectives include:

* that resources be managed sustainably;

ARTICLE IN PRESSM. Bradshaw, O. Tully / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 411–418414

* that biodiversity be maintained at the ecosystemscale; and

* that the precautionary principle be applied.

European Union (EU) objectives along these linesapply to Ireland. For example, EU Regulation No.2371/2002 regarding the conservation and sustainableexploitation of fisheries resources under the CFPcontains the following two objectives:

1. The CFP shall ensure exploitation of living aquaticresources that provides sustainable economic, envir-onmental and social conditions. For this purpose, theCommunity shall apply the precautionary approachin taking measures designed to protect and conserveliving aquatic resources, to provide for their sustain-able exploitation and to minimise the impact offishing activities on marine eco-systems. It shall aimat a progressive implementation of an eco-system-based approach to fisheries management. It shall aimto contribute to efficient fishing activities within aneconomically viable and competitive fisheries andaquaculture industry, providing a fair standard ofliving for those who depend on fishing activities andtaking into account the interests of consumers.

2. The CFP shall be guided by the following principlesof good governance:

(a)

clear definition of responsibilities at the Commu-nity, national and local levels;

(b)

a decision-making process based on sound scientificadvice which delivers timely results;

(c)

broad involvement of stakeholders at all stages ofthe policy from conception to implementation;

(d)

consistency with other Community policies, inparticular with environmental, social, regional,development, health and consumer protectionpolicies [9].

These objectives acknowledge that, as well as stock, afishery is also made up of people, principally fishers.That a stock be fished sustainably is therefore oftenassociated with the objective that operators be assistedto be viable economic units. Viability is set within thelimit of sustainability, but it is frequently the case thatmanagement needs, at the very least, to ensure that anylimits placed on fishing reduce the viability of industryas little as possible. More positively, some managementauthorities are also development agencies that seek todiversify and/or expand industry, to open up newmarkets, to increase returns to operators and so on.Socio-economic viability of localities associated withcommercial fishing can also be a concern of manage-ment agencies. For example, in Ireland, Bord IascaighMhara (BIM) is the agency within the Department ofCommunications, Marine and Natural Resources

(DoCMNR) responsible for management of so-calledinshore fisheries. Its overarching objective is to increasestandards of living in communities connected withcommercial inshore fishing. It is required to do so by:

2.1. Providing additional employment opportunitiesthrough diversification into new fisheries, aqua-culture and leisure/tourism activities.

2.2. Managing fisheries to ensure sustainability of theresource.

2.3. Increasing quality and value of the catch anddeveloping marketing opportunities.

2.4. Improving infrastructure at piers.2.5. Upgrading boats and improving safety stan-

dards.2.6. Providing a forum for resolution of issues at the

local level and consulting between the govern-ment and the inshore sector on future policyinitiatives and the possibility of devolvingpowers [10].

This last requirement points to an objective importantin many fishery management systems, stewardship.Ideally, industry will help government to look after aresource. Certainly, it is an aim in many fisherymanagement systems that industry play a part in co-operative decision-making, or at the very least beconsulted about management decisions. Most impor-tantly, any management system will succeed or failaccording to degree of industry compliance. The vastmajority of industry must abide by fishery regulations.Stewardship is the preferred way to achieve compliance,and is arguably more effective and less expensive thanenforcement.‘Flexibility’ refers to capacity to change a system of

fishery management. Bio-social systems are dynamic.Management systems nearly always need to be adjusted,and may not work. Management objectives may alsochange. Decision-makers need the ability to alter amanagement system to accommodate bio-social shiftsand/or new policy as well as to improve the effectivenessof management. This ability may be constrained byputting in place a management system that uses ITQs.Private access entitlements can sit like stones in a bio-social system in flux all around them. The legal existencein perpetuity of such entitlements ensures that they aredifficult to modify.Finally, ‘co-operation’ refers to a key relationship in

any fisheries management system, that between industryand government. Much has been written on differencesbetween so-called command and control systems,consultative management and co-operative management(e.g., [11]). In command and control systems, contactbetween industry and government often occurs throughenforcement. Few individuals concerned with Ireland’scrustacean and molluscan fisheries prefer ‘top-down’management. Instead, co-operative decision-making

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between government and industry is considered to resultin management that is both better informed and moreefficacious.The challenge, then, is to develop a management

mechanism that, at a minimum, does not lead tounsustainable exploitation, reduce industry viability,hamper the development of stewardship, becomeimmutable or work against co-operation. Obviously,however, the aim is to improve on this minimumposition. It is stated because it can be important to halta worsening situation in a fishery before it can beimproved. It may be appropriate that management beassessed, at least initially, according to this more modestaim rather than to expect immediate improvements. Wenext discuss the Irish context, within which our proposalin Section 6 is set.

4. The Inshore segment of the Irish fishing fleet

The CFP is the EU framework for management offisheries and aquaculture. All aspects of fisheries andaquaculture come under the umbrella of the CFP. Asfish are a mobile resource and can not be delimited to aparticular EUMember State, regulations under the CFPapply to all EU Member States. The CFP wasintroduced in 1970 [12], and was most recently reviewedin 2002. The current CFP came into force on January 1st2003.The EU’s Multi-annual Guidance Programme

(MAGP) was, until mid-2003, the principal means usedwithin the CFP to manage fisheries at the scale of anindividual Member State. Licensing policy regarding theIrish fishing fleet reflects Ireland’s obligations under thisprogramme. The purpose of the MAGP was to achieve asustainable balance between fishing capacity and fishstocks. The MAGP set fleet capacity/effort objectivesfor the Irish fishing fleet, and provided that they be metthrough either reduction in fishing effort or reduction infleet capacity by the end of set periods [10].The MAGP ceased due to re-measurement of the EU

fleet and development of an initiative that aims toapproach the offshore fleet at a scale between the EUand individual Member States. A multi-annual strategywill be continued in the form of fishery managementplans, and regional advisory councils will be establishedto fine-tune the CFP [11].The Irish fleet is divided into five segments: poly-

valent, pelagic, beam trawl, bivalve and inshore potting.The polyvalent segment permits access to all but pelagicspecies, except for vessels with active pelagic entitle-ments and vessels under 65 feet in length. The Irish Statehas authority, as do other EU Member States, tomanage fishing activity within 12 nautical miles of itscoast. Fishing activity within this area by vessels lessthan 12m in length is considered to be inshore. The

important fisheries in this area are in the inshore pottingand polyvalent segments of the fleet.The gross tonnage (GT) of the Irish fishing fleet, set

by the EU, is approximately 68,000. The inshoresegment comprises approximately 80% of the Irish fleetin terms of number of vessels—there are approximately2000 inshore vessels—but accounts for less than 16% oftotal fleet GT. Approximately 50% of these 2000 vesselsare open, i.e., they are punts or curraghs without decks,are less than 6m in length and have a capacity of lessthan two GTs. Such vessels mainly use static gear, i.e.,pots and fixed nets. A minority of vessels between 6 and12m use dredges to fish for bivalve molluscs, of whichKing Scallop is the most important. The averagenumber of pots per vessel is approximately 300, withthe majority of these being soft-eye creels. There are noquantitative data on the amount of nets being used.Potters fish mainly for brown crab, lobster, shrimp andwhelk. Landings from the inshore segment constituteapproximately 21% of total landings and are worthapproximately h38 million per annum. Over 3,700people with an estimated 11,800 dependants areemployed in the inshore segment, representing almost50% of total ‘onboard’ employment in the Irish fishingindustry [10,13].As GT is both limited and transferable, except in the

case of the new inshore potting licence scheme (seebelow), it has acquired financial value. At present, topurchase one unit of fishing capacity (i.e., one GT and4 kW of engine power) costs between h3000–4000. Thisis a substantial entry cost relative to the earning capacityof fishing vessels in the Irish fleet, although the majorityof vessels with fishing capacity did not purchase it in theprivate market but had it allocated under variousschemes, the first of which was in 1989. Prior to 2003,up to 50% of inshore vessels fished without capacity,either because they had sold it or could not afford topurchase it. A Scheme for the Licensing of Traditional

Pot Fishing Boats in the Irish Inshore Fleet (i.e., boatsless than 12m in length and less than 20GT) regularisedthe position of these vessels in 2003.A further step towards limiting entry to crustacean

and molluscan fisheries is now necessary in the form ofnot extending access rights to vessels without a trackrecord in them. Access would therefore move from thepresent situation, which is open in the sense that a largeproportion of vessels have broad licence entitlements, toone restricting access to a species group based onhistoric activity. Access entitlements in the new inshorepotting licence scheme are not transferable. Limitingentry with non-transferable licences is one way to ensurethat licences are placed and remain in the hands offishers. Care is required here, however, because marketscan be surreptitious. Experience in the polyvalent sectorin Ireland, as well as in fisheries internationally,indicates that even when transferability is not allowed,

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de facto transfers can occur. Regarding the new inshorepotting licence scheme, for example, leasing of licencesmay still be possible. We propose therefore that once alicence holder has ceased fishing, i.e., retired, his or herlicence should be returned to the issuing authority. Byrestoring licences to a public body, perhaps for reissue,the possibility of ‘under the table’ transfers would beremoved.

1 Inishbofin Fishermens Co-op.2Cleggan Inshore Fishermen’s Group.3East Waterford Lobster Co-op Society Ltd.

5. Limited entry and transferability: an industry view

An indication of the view of fishers regarding limitedentry was gained in 2000 as part of a conference todiscuss the management of the Irish lobster fishery [14].A paper prepared for the conference reported outcomesof a meeting with representatives of four key fishers’ co-operatives, or ‘co-ops’, regarding management objec-tives and acceptable measures in respect of the Irishlobster fishery (one ‘co-op’ from each of the Dingle, EastWaterford, South Wexford and West Galway [Clifdenarea] regions) [15]. Ten critical objectives/measures wereagreed, two of which are relevant here:

2. A licensed limited entry system should beestablished for all crustaceans, excluding shrimp6. Licence non-saleable or transferable [15].

A further indication of the view of fishers regardinglimited entry was gained in 2000/2001 through anindustry generated initiative that resulted in the docu-ment A Proposal for Licensed Limited Entry Fisheries for

Lobster in Ireland [16]. At the core of the initiative wasvoting organised by members of industry, throughfishers’ ‘co-ops’, regarding various aspects related topossible limited commercial entry to Ireland’s lobsterfishery. A total of 877 people voted, ‘representing themajority of lobster fishermen in the country’ [16].(Lobster is taken by more commercial fishers than anyother species in Ireland’s crustacean and molluscanfisheries.) This exercise resulted in the Irish Lobster Co-operatives issuing a joint proposal for the creation of alimited number of lobster licences, subject to thefollowing two conditions, among others.

* That the licence be renewed annually in order toallow a changing membership

* That the licence be non-transferable except within theimmediate family [16].

Industry maintained that access to a licence should beconditional on fishing that licence; in other words, thatwhen a licence holder retired from fishing, his or herlicence should be restored to the issuing authority forpossible issue to a new holder. The only exception notedwas in the case of immediate family being allowed tocontinue to fish the licence.

A total of 193 pages of the 211 page document wasappendices in the form of submissions from lobster co-operatives from around Ireland. The submissionscontain statements that flesh out the above twoconditions. For example, regarding the licence beingbased on use, the following statement is typical:

The recipient should be required to furnish proof atthe end of each season that he/she [has] utilised theirlicence personally, be it in the form of logbooks or

sales receipts. (No leasing or loaning licence.) Thiswill ensure that people holding a licence will have tofish them or forfeit them thus giving crewmen orothers a chance to apply for unused licences in thefuture1.

The preference in the submissions is clearly that alicence ‘should have no resale value, if not used by [the]licensee then [it] cannot be used by anyone else’2. ‘[T]hatlicences do not become a commodity to be traded’3 wasa commonly expressed opinion with a view to licencesbeing held by fishers rather than investors.With industry’s view clear, the requirement was to

match it with a management mechanism that willachieve the key objectives in Table 1, discussed next.

6. Adapting a management mechanism to Ireland’s

crustacean and molluscan fisheries

As part of the new inshore potting licence scheme, theMinister, through BIM and the DoCMNR, has under-taken to meet the wishes of industry concerningtransferability. Approval of the scheme by the EuropeanCommission is strictly on the basis that the scheme doesnot lead to increased fishing effort in the existingpolyvalent segment of the Irish fleet, now or in thefuture. Boats licensed and registered under the schemewill therefore be ‘ring-fenced’. The capacity of boatslicensed and registered under the new scheme is noteligible as replacement capacity in the polyvalentsegment. This means that neither the boat’s capacitynor its licence may be traded. The licence attaches solelyto the licensee, and is valid, in the first instance, for aperiod of two years. Renewal of the licence will have tohave regard, among other things, to national and/or EUfleet policy, and the sustainable management andconservation of resources. In the context of the futuregranting of any new licence to replace a licence grantedunder the scheme, priority consideration will be given toimmediate family members with an active history ininshore pot fishing [17].

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How, then, might individual, privately non-transfer-able, commercial fishing licences help to achieve the keymanagement objectives in Table 1? Obviously, limitingentry makes it possible to cap the number of operatorsin a fishery. This is an important part of controllingfishing effort. To be effective at the scale of a fishery,TCMs need to apply to a limited number of operators.For example, limiting the number of pots an operatormay use will not cap total number of pots if additionaloperators can enter the fishery. On the other hand,limiting entry and gear do not limit an individual’s effortin terms of number of pot lifts. This can be addressed,for example, by limiting days at sea. Regarding quotamanagement, setting a total allowable commercial catch(TACC) for a fishery without limiting entry may resultin a race for fish that does not produce preferable socio-economic outcomes (e.g., over-capitalisation, so-calledderby fishing, and possible temporal and industryconcentrations). The point is that, regardless of asso-ciated regulations, limited entry is necessary to definethe number of operators with a view to wrapping afishery in a package of limitations aimed at the effectivecontrol of individual as well as of total fishing effort. Onthe one hand, prevention of overfishing requires that amaximum limit be set regarding total effort. On theother, possible over-competition requires that a mini-mum viable operating unit be established regardingindividual effort.There are already many substantial and largely

unavoidable costs associated with commercial fishingin Ireland, in the forms of vessels, gear and equipment.It is the opinion of many in the industry that anadditional cost to access transferable licences is unten-able; licences, then, should be made available for use notexchange. Concern is not just that an additionalfinancial hurdle will be put in the way of aspiring‘owner’-operators, but that a number of insidious effectsattend the free market exchange of licences. Forexample, there is concern about who might buy intothe industry. Investors without industry roots are notconsidered to be desirable. There is concern, too, thattransferability will shift the emphasis from the perfor-mance of fishing to the management of an investment.This change can be sufficiently powerful to split families,for example, father from son. Industry in Ireland istherefore concerned about the possible divisiveness oflimiting entry using privately transferable licences.Alternatively, the introduction of licences that are nottransferable privately and are clearly and iterativelyassigned to an individual on the basis of he or shehaving fished in the previous year is supported byindustry. Industry is clear that licences should not becommodities but tickets to an occupation, and thatlicences are privileges, not rights, that should beavailable to be issued, not sold, to future generations.Licences should be limited, certainly, and should come

with obligations (e.g., to pay an annual licence fee, toprovide catch records, and to comply with andparticipate in management). Waiting lists and criteriafor qualification may well be required to manage publictransfer of licences. But, however onerous this coursemay be, in the view of industry it is the responsible onein the Irish context, compared with requiring lessees andpurchasers to make payments to owners.But what of the argument that some form of private

property right increases the likelihood of licence holdersbehaving responsibly towards a resource [18]? Recallingthe risk that second-generation fishers may be financiallypressed lessees rather than owners under, for example, aquota management system using ITQs, might it bepossible to encourage resource stewardship without fullprivate access rights? Property is held to have fourprincipal characteristics: transferability; exclusivity; se-curity; and durability [3,19]. Considering transferabilityfirst, we have noted industry’s concern in Ireland thatlicences not become commodities. Underlying thisconcern is awareness of the impersonalising propensityof financial gain. In a market, the price of a transactionis paramount. Through a broker, for example, buyerand seller may never meet. In such ways, a licence can besold out of a family and a community to an investoroffering the highest price. Industry is concerned thatlicences not be transferred out of fishing communities.We propose therefore that transfer be guided by someform of public decision-making committee made up ofindustry as well as government. Thus, our proposalregarding transferability is not that transferability bedisallowed, but that it be public not private.What of the other characteristics of private property?

In short, ‘yes’ fishers want limited entry, ‘yes’ they wanttheir own licences, and ‘yes’ they want these for theduration of their fishing lives. However, they seek toprofit by fishing licences, not by leasing or selling them.They consider that a long-term outlook regardinginvestment in fishing is adequately encouraged byissuing a limited number of individual, privately non-transferable fishing licences. Provided fishers operatewithin the rules of a fishery management plan, their useof a licence would be guaranteed. (Provision would bemade for illness, etc.) On a fisher’s retirement, thelicence would revert to the issuing authority for possiblereissue.‘Possible’ reissue of licences by a public authority

underscores one advantage of flexibility regarding amanagement system. In this instance, in the interest ofsustainable exploitation, decision-makers may under-take to reduce the number of licences in a fishery. Withlicences linked to holders’ fishing lives in terms ofduration, decision-makers are in a position gradually to‘drip’ effort in the form of maximum number ofoperators out of the fishery. This is a humane way ofadjusting this component of effort downwards, akin to

ARTICLE IN PRESSM. Bradshaw, O. Tully / Marine Policy 28 (2004) 411–418418

so-called grandfather or sunset arrangements. (Ifemergency reduction in fishing effort is required, TCMsor perhaps some form of buyout could be used.)Alternatively, should stocks warrant, decision-makerscould increase maximum number of operators in afishery by creating additional licences. The aim is thatdecision-makers, including both government and indus-try, retain the ability to adjust or even replace amanagement system to achieve sustainable exploitation.In the case of quota management systems using ITQs,however, legally intransigent private owner-stakeholderscan become impediments to any adjustment.Finally, co-operative decision-making may well be

assisted by operators being regulated using individual,privately non-transferable licences that applied for theduration of operators’ commercial fishing lives. First,the existing community of operators would be protected.Second, transition to the next generation of operatorswould then be co-operatively managed by industry andgovernment to ensure that appropriate individualsqualified for any licences being reissued. Operatorscould therefore both plan to fish in the long-term as wellas anticipate that the fishery would remain oriented tooperators, which could include their children. Theywould thus have a long-term interest in participating inco-operative decision-making and complying with man-agement regulations that were oriented both to theirown and to the greater good of their fishing community.Embedding obligations in often local fishing commu-nities in this way is preferable to encouraging individualsto comply with management simply to protect aninvestment or to avoid some form of penalty.

7. Conclusion

In this paper we have proposed a middle positionbetween private and public ownership of commercialaccess rights to Ireland’s crustacean and molluscanfisheries. Central to our proposal is that transferabilityof licences be public not private. Supported by theprevailing industry view, we contend that benefitsassociated with private property other than transfer-ability, namely exclusivity, security and durability, canbe gained by orienting a limited number of licences toindividuals’ fishing lifetimes rather than by allocatinglicences in perpetuity. On retirement from fishing, anindividual’s licence would return to a public decision-making authority, made up of representatives from bothgovernment and industry, for possible reissue. In thisway, Ireland’s crustacean and molluscan fisheries wouldno longer be open access, fishers and their next of kin

would be guaranteed use of a licence for their workinglives and licences would not become commodities. Thus,co-operative management would have no other end butto organise the preservation of the fishery.

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