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Using Complementary Research Designs: The Example of Effects of Social Embeddedness on Trust and
Cooperation
Werner Raub
Workshop on Social Theory, Trust, Social Networks, and Social Capital II
National Chengchi University – NCCUApril 2011
2
Overview
1. Theory• Trust problems in economic exchange• Embeddedness effects on trust
2. Empirical evidence from studies using different and complementary research designs• A survey on buyer-supplier relations• A vignette study on buyer-supplier
relations
3
Background: a rational choice perspective on embeddedness effects
“… while the assumption of rational action must always be problematic, it is a good working hypothesis that should not easily be abandoned. What looks to the analyst like nonrational behavior may be quite sensible when situational constraints, especially those of embeddedness, are fully appreciated […] My claim here is that however naive that psychology [of rational choice] may be, this is not where the main difficulty lies – it is rather in the neglect of social structure.”
Mark Granovetter (1985) Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness
4
Empirical evidence on embeddedness effects from complementary research designs• Aim: use complementary research designs
(survey, vignette study, lab experiment) for multiple tests of the same hypotheses (cf.: triangulation, cross validation)
• Similar perspective:• Sociology: J.H. Goldthorpe (1996) The
Quantitative Analysis of Large-scale Data Sets and Rational Action Theory: For a Sociological Alliance, ESR 12
• Economics: G.W. Harrison & J.L. List (2004) Field Experiments, JEL 42(4)
5
Bringing rational choice models and empirical research closer together
6
Some theory
7
8
“In the private banking world of those days, personal ties were of the greatest importance. Common ventures depended on mutual trust, and that trust had to be established by direct personal knowledge.” (p. 9)
Fritz Stern,Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire – 1
9
“In Bismarck’s world, then, Bleichröder was a welcome supplement to official channels (…) Bismarck used him freely and continuously as a special emissary, as an additional and informal link to foreign powers and statesmen. Statesmen always like to have a multiplicity of contacts – to solicit reactions, to convey hints, to reinforce threats or allay fears.” (p. 311)
Fritz Stern,Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire – 2
10
Trust Game as a stylized model of exchange
Trustee (supplier)
Trustor (buyer)
No trust Trust
HonorAbuse
2
1
R
R
2
1
T
S
2
1
P
PS1 < P1 < R1
P2 < R2 < T2
No trustNo trust TrustTrust
Abuse Honor
11
Substantive interpretation of the Trust Game for buyer-supplier relations
Moves of the trustor (buyer)• No trust: safeguard transaction with an
extensive but costly contract• Trust: use less extensive and less costly
contractual safeguards
Moves of the trustee (supplier)• Honor trust: deliver appropriate quality and
deliver in due time• Abuse trust: deliver inferior quality and/or
deliver with a delay
12
Extensions of the Trust Game
• More than only two moves for trustor and trustee (e.g., Investment Game)
• Incomplete information of the trustor on incentives or opportunities of trustee for abusing trust
• Ex post-problems due to incompetence of trustee or unfavorable external contingencies rather than abuse of trust (opportunism)
• Incentives and opportunities for “defection” of trustor (e.g., delayed payment)
• Etc.
Relation with Stern’s historical study on Bismarck and his banker Bleichröder
• Stern claims that interactions between private bankers involve trust problems.
• Stern likewise claims that interactions between states and between politicians involve trust problems.
14
Embeddedness mechanisms
Dyadicembeddedness
Networkembeddedness
Learning Common history of past interactions:information about the partner from own experiences
Information from third parties about their past experiences with the partner
Control Expected future interactions:opportunities for conditional cooperation via, e.g., “tit for tat”
Opportunities for conditional cooperation involving third parties: “voice” (reputation effects)
15
Research problem
• Distinguish between different embeddedness effects
• theoretically• empirically
• We neglect:• strategic network formation:
embeddedness is assumed to be exogenous
• “non-selfish utility”: focus on trust as a result of “enlightened self-interest”
16
“In the private banking world of those days, personal ties were of the greatest importance. Common ventures depended on mutual trust, and that trust had to be established by direct personal knowledge.” (p. 9)
Note Stern’s claim: dyadic embeddedness affects trust.
Fritz Stern,Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire – 1Trust and Embeddedness
17
“In Bismarck’s world, then, Bleichröder was a welcome supplement to official channels (…) Bismarck used him freely and continuously as a special emissary, as an additional and informal link to foreign powers and statesmen. Statesmen always like to have a multiplicity of contacts – to solicit reactions, to convey hints, to reinforce threats or allay fears.” (p. 311)
Note Stern’s claim: Network embeddedness allows for learning and control (informal reciprocity).
Fritz Stern,Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire – 2Trust and Embeddedness
18
Available formal theories
Dyadicembeddedness
Network embeddedness
Learning Adaptive learning models;information diffusion models
Learning and control
Models for repeated games with incomplete information
Control Models for repeated games with complete information
19
Examples of hypotheses
Effects of dyadic embeddedness:• Trust increases with positive experiences of
trustor with trustee (learning effect)• Trust and trustworthiness increase with
expected future transactions (control effect)
Effects of network embeddedness:• Trust increases with positive information of
trustor on trustee from third parties (learning effect)
• Trust and trustworthiness increase with sanction opportunities of trustor (e.g., “voice”) involving third parties (control effect)
20
Empirical evidence
21
Evidence from a survey, a lab experiment, and a vignette study
Advantages Disadvantages
Survey Actual interactions Measurement problems; less control over variables
Lab experiment
Control over incentives and embeddedness variables
Abstract; external validity
Vignette study
Less abstract than lab experiments; control over variables
Hypothetical interactions; lack of “incentive compatibility”
22
Evidence on effects ofdyadic embeddedness:
A survey on IT-transactions
More information:• Batenburg, Raub & Snijders (2003) Contacts
and Contracts: Dyadic Embeddedness and the Contractual Behavior of Firms, Research in the Sociology of Organizations 20: 135-188
23
A survey on IT-transactions
Data on the purchase of hard- and software, standard and complex products
• ca 1000 transactions (“Trust Games”)
• ca 800 buyers (trustors): Dutch SMEs
• 600+ suppliers (trustees)
• various replications and extensions of the study in the Netherlands and Germany
24
• Trust of buyer: “Lack of trust” measured by buyer’s costly INVESTMENTS IN CONTRACTING with supplier (person-days and departments involved, financial and legal clauses and technical specifications included in contract)
• Dyadic learning: (positive) experiences of buyer from previous transactions with supplier – PAST
• Dyadic control: expectations of buyer on future transactions with supplier – FUTURE
Survey: variables and measurements I
25
• Control variables: • Transaction characteristics (e.g., specific
investments, uncertainty, volume)
• Marginal costs of contracting
• Characteristics of buyer and supplier, including respondent characteristics
Survey: variables and measurements II
26
• IT transactions are associated with risks
• Focus on risks of the buyer (such as delayed delivery, inferior quality etc.) due to:
• opportunistic behavior of supplier• incompetence of supplier• external contingencies
• Contracting as a device to mitigate risks:• reduction of incentives for opportunistic
behavior of supplier• compensation for buyer if risks
“materialize”
Investments in contracting: assumptions I
27
Investments in contracting:assumptions II
Core assumptions for deriving hypotheses:• Investments in contracting are costly and
actors will economize on these costs• Investments in contracting will increase in
risks
28
Hypotheses on effects of dyadic embeddedness I
Effects of a positive past relationship:• Dyadic learning: reduced probability of
supplier incompetence• Also: mutual relationship specific
investments• Availability of costless safeguards from
prior transactions (e.g., reuse of contract for a prior transaction)
• Good working relations between employees of the two firms
Decreasing investments in contracting
29
Two effects of expected future transactions:
• Reciprocity effect: conditional cooperation becomes an alternative for costly investments in contracting Decreasing investments in contracting
• Reusability effect: investments in contracting can be (partly) reused for future transactions (e.g., reuse of adapted version of the contract)Increasing investments in contracting
Note: reusability effect larger when contractual safeguards are not yet available, i.e., larger for transactions without prior business between buyer and supplier
Hypotheses on effects of dyadic embeddedness II
30
Without additional assumptions on strength of reciprocity effect and reusability effect: no hypothesis on main effect of FUTURE on INVESTMENTS IN CONTRACTING
Due to larger reusability effect for transactions without prior business between buyer and supplier: negative interaction effect PAST x FUTURE on INVESTMENTS IN CONTRACTING (dyadic control)
Hypotheses on effects of dyadic embeddedness III
31
Survey: empirical evidence on effects of dyadic embeddedness
• Robust result for various statistical models, for alternative operationalizations of variables, and controlling for transaction characteristics, marginal costs of contracting, and characteristics of buyer and supplier:INVESTMENTS IN CONTRACTING decrease with:
• PAST: positive past experiences of buyer• PAST x FUTURE: expected future
transactions if positive past experiences exist
Support for hypotheses on dyadic learning and control effects
32
Evidence on effects ofdyadic embeddedness:
A vignette study onbuyer-supplier relations
More information:• Buskens & Raub (2002) Embedded Trust,
Advances in Group Processes 19: 167-202
33
Data: a vignette study on buyer- supplier relations
• Respondents: 40 purchase managers of Dutch medium-sized and large companies
• Judgments on 348 virtual transactions (= vignettes; 8-10 vignettes per respondent)
• Data on • transaction management• transaction characteristics• dyadic embeddedness• network embeddedness• characteristics of purchase managers
34
vignette number: xxx
The transaction concerns
a product: - about which your firm has only very limited expertise.
- for which there are no alternative suppliers on the market.
a transaction: - with a small volume, namely, less than US$ 5.000,= on a yearly basis.
- where extra investments by your firm are not necessary.
a supplier: - from the Netherlands.- from whom your firm knows some business
partners, but your firm does not do business with them.
- with whom your firm has had a relationship in which minor problems sometimes occurred.
- with whom your firm expects to do business for a long period.
Example of a vignette
35
Buyer-supplier vignettes: variablesVariable Value Text
Volume 0 1 2
A transaction with a small volume, namely less than US$ 5.000 on a yearly basis. A transaction with a considerable volume, namely, about 5% of the total purchase volume of your firm. A transaction with a very large volume, namely, 18% of the total purchase volume of your firm.
SpecificInvestments
01
2
A transaction for which extra investments by your firm are not necessary.A transaction for which your firm has to make small investments, such as investments in specific machines and equipment. A transaction for which your firm has to make considerable in-vestments, such as investments in specific machines and equipment.
Uncertainty 012
A known product about which your firm has the required expertise.A known product but one about which your firm has only limited expertise.A brand new product about which your firm has only very limited expertise.
Past 012
A supplier with whom your firm has never done business before.A supplier with whom your firm has a relationship in which minor problems occurred.A supplier with whom your firm has a long and successful relationship.
Future 01
It is uncertain how long your firm will continue with the supplier.Your firm expects to do business for a long period with the supplier.
Degree 01
2
You do not know any business partners of the supplier.You know some business partners of your supplier, but your firm does not do business with them.You do business with other business partners of the supplier.
Exit opportunities
012
A product for which there are no alternative suppliers on the market.A product for which there are some alternative suppliers on the market.A product for which there are many alternative suppliers on the market.
Country 01234
A supplier from Eastern Europe.A supplier from Japan.A supplier from the United States.A supplier from Germany.A supplier from the Netherlands.
36
• Trust of buyer: “Lack of trust” measured for each vignette by buyer’s costly INVESTMENTS IN CONTRACTING with supplier (duration of negotiation with supplier and departments of buyer involved in negotiations)
• Dyadic learning: (positive) experiences of buyer from previous transactions with supplier – PAST
• Dyadic control: expectations of buyer on future transactions with supplier – FUTURE
Buyer-supplier vignettes: variables and measurements I
37
• Control variables: • Transaction characteristics (e.g., specific
investments, uncertainty, volume)
• Characteristics of buyer and supplier, including respondent characteristics (e.g., experience with transactions like described on vignettes)
Buyer-supplier vignettes: variables and measurements II
38
• Note: Vignette study on buyer-supplier relations and survey on IT-transaction allow to test same hypotheses on effects of dyadic embeddedness with two different but complementary data sets based on different designs
Buyer-supplier vignettes and survey on IT-transactions
39
Buyer-supplier vignettes: empirical evidence on effects of dyadic embeddedness• Robust result for various statistical models
and controlling for transaction characteristics as well as respondent characteristics:INVESTMENTS IN CONTRACTING decrease with:
• PAST: positive past experiences of buyer• PAST x FUTURE: expected future
transactions if positive past experiences exist
Renewed support for hypotheses on dyadic learning and control effects with data based on different research design
40
Evidence on effects ofnetwork embeddedness:survey on IT-transactions
More information:• Rooks, Raub & Tazelaar (2006) Ex Post
Problems in Buyer-Supplier Transactions, Journal of Management and Governance 10: 239-276
41
• Network embeddedness:• DEGREE: ties of buyer with other buyers of
supplier• SECTOR DENSITY: contacts among firms in
business sector of buyer• VISIBILITY of supplier in the market (as
assessed by buyer)
• Note: these are indicators for network learning as well as network control opportunities (“voice opportunities”) of buyer
Survey: variables and measurements III
42
• Trustworthiness of supplier:• PERFORMANCE of supplier, e.g., delivery in
due time, quality of product, quality of after-sales service (Rooks et al. (2006): EX POST PROBLEMS instead of PERFORMANCE)
Survey: variables and measurements IV
43
Survey: empirical evidence on effects of network embeddedness on trustworthiness of supplier
• Robust result for various statistical models and controlling for transaction characteristics, buyer’s INVESTMENTS IN CONTRACTING, and characteristics of buyer and supplier:PERFORMANCE of supplier increases (i.e., EX POST PROBLEMS decrease) with network embeddedness (DEGREE, SECTOR DENSITY, VISIBILITY)
Support for hypotheses on network control effects on supplier (trustee) behavior
44
Survey: empirical evidence on effects of network embeddedness on trust of buyer
• Robust result for various statistical models, for alternative operationalizations of variables, and controlling for transaction characteristics, marginal costs of contracting, and characteristics of buyer and supplier:network embeddedness (DEGREE, SECTOR DENSITY, VISIBILITY) has no effect on buyer’s INVESTMENTS IN CONTRACTING
No support for hypotheses on network learning or control effects on buyer (trustor) behavior
45
Puzzle
• Suppliers seemingly react to incentives from network embeddedness (suppliers seemingly take reputation effects of their performance into account).
• How to explain that buyers seemingly do not anticipate on this feature?
• Data and/or measurement problems (including sample selectivity and endogeneity of network embeddedness)?
• Lack of “strategic rationality”?
46
Another summary of the puzzle• Trustee reacts to trustor’s opportunities for
• dyadic control and• network control
• Focal trustor reacts to her own opportunities for dyadic control: she seemingly anticipates that trustee anticipates on effects of his present behavior on future behavior of focal trustor
• Focal trustor does not react to her own opportunities for network control: she seemingly does not anticipate that trustee also anticipates on effects of his present behavior on future behavior of other trustors
47
Another vignette experiment:buying a used car
More information:• Buskens, V. & J. Weesie (2000) An
Experiment on the Effects of Embeddedness in Trust Situations: Buying a Used Car, Rationality and Society 12: 227-253
48
Buying a used car
• Buyer chooses between trust or no trust (buy or not buy).
• Trust gives the dealer the opportunity to honor or abuse trust (sell a decent or inferior car). In both situations he is better off than when trust would not be placed
• Buyer gains from honored trust, but regrets trust if trust is abused.
• Dealer earns an extra profit from abusing trust (too much money for a bad car).
49
Variables to be manipulated and related hypotheses
Sanction opportunities w.r.t. third parties
Buyer’s sanction opportunities
Control
Prior third-party experiences
Prior buyer’s experiences
Learning
Network EmbeddednessDyadic Embeddedness
• Trust increases with• positive own experiences (dyad)
• expected future transactions (dyad)
• positive information from third parties (network)
• sanction opportunities w.r.t. third parties (network)
50
The set-up of the vignettes
• Pairs of vignettes including six variables.• Price• Past (own experience)• Future (own expected future interactions)• Density (general reputation)• Indegree (friends experiences)• Outdegree (own third-party sanction
opportunities)
• Subjects compare pairs of situations to buy a used car.
• Some additional questions.
51
A pair of vignettes• You can buy a car for $4000.
• You never bought a car from The Autoshop before.
• You will move to the other side of the country in a few weeks.
• The Autoshop is an unknown garage in your neighborhood.
• As far as you know, none of your friends have bought a car from The Autoshop before.
• You do not have a close social link with the owner of The Autoshop.
• You can buy a car for $4000.
• You bought a car from The Autoshop before and you were satisfied.
• You do not expect to move out of town soon.
• The Autoshop is a well-known garage and has many customers in your neighborhood.
• You have friends who bought a car from The Autoshop before and they were satisfied.
• The owner of the garage and you are members of the same football team.
52
Experimental design• Choices of pairs
• Price is constant within a pair (only for interactions)
• No “ordered” pairs (not too easy)
• Between 2 and 4 variables that differ (not too
complex)
• Ten pairs per subject
• Considerable variation in comparisons within
subjects
• Ultimately 125 students rating 1249 vignettes
53
Statistical model• Random utility model.
• Probit model on choices for vignettes.
• Independent variables are the differences between the values at the vignettes (0: type of embeddedness to same on two vignettes, 1 or -1: type of embeddedness present on one vignette but not on the other)
• Coefficients are interpretable as indicators for the increase in utility assigned to a vignette related to the given type of embeddedness
• Standard errors modified for clustering (alternatively multilevel analysis could have been done)
54
Results: main effects
All Chicago Utrecht TilburgPastFutureDensityIndegreeOutdegree
1.09**0.57**0.71**0.83**0.26**
0.99** 0.61** 0.67** 0.77** 0.18
1.11** 0.61** 0.73** 0.89** 0.28*
1.39** 0.30 0.73** 0.86** 0.51*
N 1249 400 720 129
** and * represent two-sided significance at p < 0.01 and p < 0.05 respectively.
55
Results: interaction effectsAll Chicago Utrecht Tilburg
PastFutureDensityIndegreeOutdegreePast x futureFuture x outdegreeFuture x densityOutdegree x densityOutdegree x price
1.05**0.45**0.74**0.83**0.46**0.11
-0.040.19
-0.21-0.13
0.92** 0.44 0.73** 0.76** 0.34 0.19 0.07 0.09-0.18-0.19
1.12** 0.52** 0.73** 0.89** 0.40**-0.00-0.06 0.24-0.22 0.03
1.39** 0.30 0.73** 0.86** 0.51* 0.53-0.15 0.16 0.38 0.75*
N 1249 400 720 129
56
Additional analyses
• No differences between sessions
• No differences related to timing of a pair of vignettes or time spent on a decision
• No effects of age, gender, field of study
• Outdegree has larger effect for subjects who are more concerned about “reputation” issues
• Subjects with knowledge of game theory tend to value control variables higher
57
Conclusion
• Support for main effects of embeddedness
• control and learning
• dyadic and in networks
• No support for interaction effects
58
Discussion
• Motivation of behavior (no direct incentives and students might not be experts)
• Interpretation of variables• Future: moving has more side-effects than
loss of sanction possibilities alone
• Possible extension
• Similar experiment with experts
• Moving to an abstract laboratory
experiment
59
Overview of Results
Not tested+Incentives
++Dyadic control
+Network control
+learning and control hard to disentangle
Network learning
++Dyadic learning
Used-car vignettes
Buyer-supplier vignettes
60
Summary of empirical evidence
SurveyVignette
studyLab
experiment
Dyadiclearning • Consistent support for dyadic learning
and control effects on trust of trustorDyadiccontrol
Network learning
• Quite some support for network learning effects on trust of trustor
• Hardly support for network control effects on trust of trustor
• Consistent support for network control effects on trustworthiness of trustee
Networkcontrol
61
Additional slides
62
Additional slides onsurvey on IT-transactions
63
• Nationally representative survey on the purchase of IT-products (hard- and software) by Dutch SMEs
• Data collection via buyers• CATI-interview (selection of transaction)• Structured questionnaire, usually
administered via site visit• Additional archival information, sometimes
including a rough content analysis of contracts
• Data quality• total response rate: 58%• non-response not selective• low partial non-response
Survey on IT-transactions: data collection I
64
• ‘Average transaction’:• a product worth 50,000 US-$• purchased by a firm with ca 80 employees• negotiating and contracting required ca 5
mendays of buyer’s employees…• and involved ca 2 divisions of buyer’s firm• for about two thirds of buyers, transaction
is of ‘great’ or ‘very great’ importance for their IT-situation
Survey on IT-transactions: descriptives
65
Future
Survey on IT-transactions: descriptives
66
• Transaction characteristics (indicators for trust problems, opportunism problems, and other risks associated with the transaction), e.g., monitoring problems, switching costs, importance of durability of product, importance of product for profitability buyer, volume of transaction
• Costs of contractingE.g., in-house legal expertise
• Dyadic embeddedness• Prior transactions with the supplier
(duration, frequency, volume, satisfaction)• Expected future business (frequency,
volume)
Survey on IT-transactions: variables I
67
• Network embeddedness• Indicators for density of buyer’s network of
business contacts• Relations of buyer with other clients of
supplier• Availability of and relations of buyer with
other suppliers
• Various control variablesE.g., ‘demography’ of buyer and supplier, other suppliers involved in transaction…
Survey on IT-transactions: variables II
68
• Ex ante management: search and selection• Investments in search
E.g., mendays, departments involved• Extensive and intensive search
E.g., number and specificity of offers, number and kind of information channels
used• Ex ante management: contractual planning
• Investments in negotiating and contractingE.g., mendays, departments involved
• Legal, financial, and technical issues addressed during negotiations and in the contract
Survey on IT-transactions: variables III
69
• Ex post management – contract execution• Supplier performance, ex post problems
(type and seriousness)• conflict resolution (type and seriousness of
sanctions, ‘legal’ vs. ‘extra-legal’)
• New business between buyer and supplier after focal transaction
Survey on IT-transactions: variables IV
70
Independent Variables Hypothesis Coefficient |t-value|
71
3.33–0.12**–Past × Future
1.28 0.05?Future
3.12–0.09**–Past (1 = yes)
Dyadic Embeddedness
|t-value|CoefficientHypothesisIndependent Variables
Standardized Coefficients from the Ordinary Least Squares Regression on management
73
TABLE 2Three-Stage Least Squares Regression Analysis of EX POST
PROBLEMS(1205 transactions of 775 buyers)
-0.085** (0.034)
-0.088** (0.034)
–EXIT NETWORK
-0.054* (0.028)
-0.052* (0.028)
–VISIBILITY
-0.055* (0.029)
-0.068** (0.029)
–SECTOR DENSITY
-0.059* (0.035)
-0.063* (0.035)
–DEGREE
0.066* (0.032)
0.054~ (0.031)
–EXPECTED FUTURE
-0.206*** (0.038)
–SATISFACTION*
-0.045~ (0.033)
-0.042 (0.033)
?PAST
Embeddedness characteristics
Model 2Model 1HypothesisVariable
74
Survey on IT-transactions: why no effects of network embeddedness on buyer behavior?
• Endogeneity of network embeddedness: before buying, buyers search for information on product and supplier, with network embeddedness changing as a by-product of search
• Unmeasured variance in the trust problem: network embeddedness seemingly measures a part of the trust problem
• Sample selectivity: buyers avoid transactions with “large” trust problems when network embeddedness is low
• Supplier effects on investments in contracting: suppliers may contract more “carefully” with well-embedded buyers
75
Additional slides onvignette study on
buyer-supplier relations
76
Buyer-supplier vignettes: regression analysis of INVESTMENTS IN CONTRACTING
Independent variable Hypothesis Model 1 Model 2
VolumeSpecific investmentsUncertaintyPastFutureDegreeExit opportunitiesInstitutional embeddednessPast x FutureConstant
+++?
0.63**0.16**0.16*
-0.14*-0.02-0.08~-0.04-0.10**
-1.27
0.64**0.14*0.17**
-0.13*-0.02-0.09*-0.04-0.10**-0.32**-1.26
Explained varianceNumber of subjectsNumber of observations
0.4940
348
0.5140
348
**,*, and ~ represent two-sided significance at respectively p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10 based on Huber standard errors modified for clustering.