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Using innovation Using innovation survey data to survey data to evaluate R&D policy in evaluate R&D policy in Flanders Flanders Additionality research Additionality research Kris Aerts Dirk Kris Aerts Dirk Czarnitzki Czarnitzki K.U.Leuven K.U.Leuven Steunpunt O&O Statistieken Steunpunt O&O Statistieken Belgium Belgium

Using innovation survey data to evaluate R&D policy in Flanders Additionality research Kris Aerts Dirk Czarnitzki K.U.Leuven K.U.Leuven Steunpunt O&O Statistieken

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Using innovation Using innovation survey data to survey data to

evaluate R&D policy in evaluate R&D policy in FlandersFlanders

Additionality researchAdditionality research

Kris Aerts Dirk CzarnitzkiKris Aerts Dirk Czarnitzki

K.U.Leuven K.U.Leuven Steunpunt O&O StatistiekenSteunpunt O&O Statistieken

BelgiumBelgium

2

ContentsContents

1.1. IntroductionIntroduction

2.2. Literature reviewLiterature review

3.3. Evaluation of the Flemish R&D policyEvaluation of the Flemish R&D policy

4.4. ConclusionConclusion

1. Introduction1. Introduction

4

R&D in EuropeR&D in Europe

Barcelona target:Barcelona target:2010: 3% of GDP2010: 3% of GDPEUEU R&D R&D

1/3 public 2/3 private funding1/3 public 2/3 private funding

But:But:private R&D private R&D ~ public good ~ public good

positive externalities!positive externalities!

subsidies!subsidies!

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Subsidies: economic dilemmaSubsidies: economic dilemma

Crowding out effect?Crowding out effect?public grants - private investmentpublic grants - private investment

Empirical analysis Empirical analysis relationship between R&D subsidies and R&D

activities

treatment effects analysistreatment effects analysis

FlandersFlanders

2. Literature 2. Literature reviewreview

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Literature reviewLiterature review

► Blank & Stigler (1957)Blank & Stigler (1957)► David et al. (2000)David et al. (2000)► Klette et al. (2000)Klette et al. (2000)

InconclusiveInconclusive

BUT:BUT:Selection biasSelection bias “picking the winner” “picking the winner”

strategystrategy

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Selection biasSelection bias

REAL QUESTION:REAL QUESTION:““How much would the recipients have invested if How much would the recipients have invested if

they had not participated in a public policy they had not participated in a public policy scheme?” scheme?”

Matching estimatorMatching estimator1.1. Probit model on participation dummyProbit model on participation dummy

2.2. Regression of R&D activity Regression of R&D activity (including selection correction: accounting for different (including selection correction: accounting for different propensities of firms to be publicly funded)propensities of firms to be publicly funded)

Selection modelSelection model

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Recent researchRecent research

► Wallsten (2000) – US► Lach (2002) – Israel► Czarnitzki et al. (2001, 2002, 2003) & Hussinger (2003) –

Germany► Duguet (2004) – France► González et al. (2004) – Spain

Majority of recent studies: complimentary effects but no complete rejection of crowding out effects

► Holemans & Sleuwaegen (1988), Meeusen & Janssens (2001) & Suetens (2002) – R&D-performing firms in Belgium (not controlling for selection bias)

3. Evaluation of the 3. Evaluation of the Flemish R&D policyFlemish R&D policy

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Tackle problem of selection biasTackle problem of selection bias

Matching estimatorMatching estimator Selection modelSelection model

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Matching estimatorMatching estimator

“What would a treated firm with given characteristics

have done if it had not been treated?” (treatment = receipt of a subsidy for R&D)

Variation on Heckman’s selection model Variation on Heckman’s selection model well suited for cross-sectional datawell suited for cross-sectional data

no assumption on functional form or distribution no assumption on functional form or distribution

only controlling for only controlling for observedobserved heterogeneity heterogeneity among among treated and non treated firmstreated and non treated firms

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Matching estimator Matching estimator (2)(2)

Average treatment effect on treated Average treatment effect on treated firms:firms:

| 1 | 1T CTTE E Y S E Y S

Outcome variable:

R&D spending

Status:S=1 treated

S=0 not treated

Potential outcome if

treated group would not have been treated

Directly observable

?

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Matching estimator Matching estimator (3)(3)

Problem: E(YProblem: E(YCC|S=1) = ?|S=1) = ?

Rubin (1977): conditional independence assumption

Participation and potential outcome are independent for individuals with the same

set of exogenous characteristics X

THUS: THUS:

| 1, | 0,C CE Y S X E Y S X

| 1, | 0,T CTTE E Y S X x E Y S X x

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Matching estimator Matching estimator (4)(4)

Best matching: more than one matching Best matching: more than one matching argumentargument

BUT:BUT:Curse of dimensionalityCurse of dimensionality

Solution:Solution:

Propensity scorePropensity scoreRosenbaum/Rubin (1983): probit model on receipt of

subsidiesLechner (1998): hybrid matching include additional

variables

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Matching protocolMatching protocol

1. Specify and estimate probit model to obtain propensity scores2. Restrict sample to common support (remove outliers)3. Choose one observation from sub sample of treated firms and delete it

from that pool4. Calculate Mahalanobis distance between this firm and all non-subsidized

firms in order to find most similar control observation5. Select observation with minimum distance from remaining sample

(selected controls are not deleted from the control group) 6. Repeat steps 3 to 5 for all observations on subsidized firms7. The average effect on the treated = mean difference of matched

samples:

8. Sampling with replacement ordinary t-statistic on mean differences is biased (neglects appearance of repeated observations) correct standard errors: Lechner (2001) estimator for an asymptotic approximation of the standard errors

1ˆ T C

TT i iTi i

Y Yn

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Selection modelSelection model

)z'(

)z'(Sx)SY(E

i

ii

'i

111

)z'(

)z'(x)SY(E

i

ii

'i

10 00

)z'(

)z'()()(xTTE

i

i'i

0101

Effect of the treatment on the treated firms:

BUT we need an instrumental variable!!!effect on probability to receive funding but no effect on R&D and innovative activity

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DatasetDataset

► Flemish companiesFlemish companies► Sources: Sources:

Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS III)Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS III)1998-2000

774 observations – 179 subsidy recipients

ICAROS database IWT ICAROS database IWT IWT= main company funding institution in

Flanders

Patent data from European Patent Office (EPO)Patent data from European Patent Office (EPO)data on all patent applications since 1978

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VariablesVariables

► Receipt of subsides:Receipt of subsides: dummy variable(local government, national government and EU)

► Outcome variables:Outcome variables: R&D:R&D: R&D expenditure at firm level in 2000 R&Dint:R&Dint: R&D expenditure / turnover *100(very skewed distribution also logarithmic transformation

scales)

Patent/EMP: Patent/EMP: patent applications in 2000 per employee

D(Patent>0): D(Patent>0): dummy variable for patenting firms

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VariablesVariables

► Control variables (1):Control variables (1): nprj:nprj: number of projects applied for in the

pastControl for previous funding history

lnEmp:lnEmp: number of employees in 1998 ln smoothens variable

exportexport:: exports/turnover Degree of international competition

group:group: part of group foreign:foreign: owned by foreign parent

company

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VariablesVariables

► Control variables (2):Control variables (2): PStock/Emp:PStock/Emp: firm’s patent stock per employee

control for previous (successful) R&D activities per employee: avoid multicollinearity with firm size 1979 to 1997: past innovation activities

, 11it i t itPS PS PA

Depreciation rate of

knowledge: 0,15

e.g. Hall (1990)

Patent Stock of firm i in period t

Patent applications filed at EPO of firm i in

period t

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Descriptive statisticsDescriptive statistics

subsidized firmspotential control

groupp-value of

two-sided t-test on mean

equality

N1 = 179 N0 = 596

Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.

NPRJ 0.453 1.981 0.076 0.384 p = 0.0122lnEMP 4.399 1.427 3.779 1.239 p < 0.0000GROUP 0.682 0.467 0.539 0.499 p = 0.0005FOREIGN 0.296 0.458 0.255 0.436 p = 0.2936EXPORT 0.533 0.331 0.353 0.340 p < 0.0000PSTOCK/EMP 0.720 2.412 0.126 0.936 p = 0.0015R&D 1.623 4.602 0.299 1.2113 p = 0.0002R&DINT 4.613 8.421 1.719 5.116 p < 0.0000lnR&D -2.033 3.107 -5.826 3.947 p < 0.0000lnR&DINT -0.092 2.437 -2.747 3.071 p < 0.0000D(PATENT>0) 0.072 0.260 0.017 0.129 p = 0.0062PATENT/EMP 0.092 0.506 0.015 0.139 p = 0.0455

Differences: treatment or other characteristics?

Matching technique

Observations without common support are dropped => 174 firms

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Matching procedureMatching procedure

Probit estimation on the receipt of subsidiesProbit estimation on the receipt of subsidiesCoefficient Std. err.

NPRJ

lnEMP 0.184 *** 0.047

PSTOCK/EMP 0.106 *** 0.038

GROUP 0.181 0.133

FOREIGN -0.337 ** 0.142

EXPORT 0.725 *** 0.171

Constant term -1.926 *** 0.319

Test on joint significance on industry dummies

2(11) = 16.49

Log-Likelihood -378.1717

Pseudo R-squared 0.1002

Number of obs. 774

*** (**, *) significance level of 1% (5, 10%)The regression includes 11 industry dummies

Coefficient Std. err.0.292 *** 0.103

0.173 * 0.058

0.097 * 0.038

0.180 0.136

-0.266 0.198

0.693 *** 0.175

-1.926 *** 0.437

2(11) = 14.10

-370.4076

0.1151

774

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Matching procedureMatching procedure

Propensity score (+ size) Propensity score (+ size) select nearest select nearest neighbourneighbour

Kernel density estimatesKernel density estimates

01

23

40 .2 .4 .6 .8 1

Estimated Propensity Score

Treatment GroupPotential Control Group

0.1

.2.3

.4

2 4 6 8ln(EMP)

Treatment GroupPotential Control Group

01

23

0 .2 .4 .6 .8Estimated Propensity Score

Treatment GroupSelected control group

0.1

.2.3

2 4 6 8ln(EMP)

Treatment GroupSelected control group

BEFORE matching

AFTER matching

propensity scorepropensity score sizesize

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Matching resultsMatching results

subsidized firms potential control group

p-value of two-sided t-

test on mean

equalityN1 = 174 N0 = 174

Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.

NPRJ 0.276 0.621 0.241 0.729 p = 0.635

lnEMP 4.379 1.408 4.369 1.302 p = 0.943

PSTOCK/EMP 0.462 1.319 0.477 1.722 p = 0.927

GROUP 0.684 0.466 0.678 0.469 p = 0.909

FOREIGN 0.293 0.456 0.224 0.418 p = 0.143

EXPORT 0.525 0.330 0.499 0.330 p = 0.466

Propensity score 0.304 0.148 0.299 0.138 p = 0.763

R&D 1.292 3.563 0.518 1.213 p = 0.007

lnR&D -2.142 3.073 -3.996 3.988 p = 0.000

R&DINT 4.370 8.202 2.208 4.653 p = 0.003

lnR&DINT -0.155 2.436 -1.624 2.962 p = 0.000

D(PATENT>0) 0.109 0.312 0.091 0.289 p = 0.639

PATENT/EMP 0.224 0.942 0.179 0.712 p = 0.647

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Selection modelSelection model

N(obs) Mean difference

Std. Dev.

R&D 179 1.758 *** 1.909

R&DInt 179 2.129 *** 1.971

lnR&D 179 2.424 *** 0.638

lnR&DInt 179 1.978 *** 0.258*** (**, *) significance level of 1% (5, 10%)

Instrumental variable NPRJ valid?

4. Conclusion4. Conclusion

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ConclusionConclusion

► Matching estimatorMatching estimator► Selection modelSelection model

No full crowding outNo full crowding out

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Future researchFuture research

► Time series analysis: Time series analysis: robustness of analysis + lag variables robustness of analysis + lag variables

► Amount of subsidiesAmount of subsidies► Relationship with output variables Relationship with output variables

productivity / performanceproductivity / performance

► Including dataset on all subsidies Including dataset on all subsidies applied for at IWT (Flemish applied for at IWT (Flemish government)government)

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Evaluation of the usefulness Evaluation of the usefulness of the CIS in this domainof the CIS in this domain

rich dataset, especially when combined rich dataset, especially when combined with other data sources with other data sources

no amounts of funding; only dummyno amounts of funding; only dummy

firmfirm-level data versus -level data versus projectproject-level data-level data link with output?link with output? link with other variables?link with other variables?

(behavioral additionality)(behavioral additionality)

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Evolution of CIS question Evolution of CIS question in this domain: in this domain: CIS III

Did your company receive financial government support for innovative activities between 1998 and 2000?

Belgian governments: O YES: Which institution(s)?........

O NO

The European Union: O YES:

FP4 or FP5? O YES O NO

O NO

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Evolution of CIS question Evolution of CIS question in this domain: in this domain: CIS IV

Did your company receive any government support for innovative activities between 2002 and 2004?

Local or regional governments O YES O NO Federal government O YES O NO The EU O YES: O NO

FP5 or FP6? O YES O NO3xNO:

GO to next question

Was (part of) this government support granted for activities in which your company was involved in a collaboration agreement?

O YES O NO:

GO to next question

Was a university or public research institution involved in (one of) these collaboration agreement(s)?

O YES O NO

??? ????

??

? ? ?? ?

??

?? ?? ? ?? ? ?

QUESTIONS?QUESTIONS?