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U.S./NATO-RussianStrategicRelationshipandMissileDefense
TyttiErasto,PhD,RogerR.HaleFellowPloughsharesFund
FASWorkshop,WashingtonD.C.17May2017
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IBACKGROUNDASSUMPTIONS
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1.BACKGROUNDASSUMPTIONS
A) MissiledefensewillplayakeyroleinfutureU.S./NATO-Russianstrategicrelationship.
B) RussianconcernsaboutEuropeanPhasedAdaptiveApproach(EPAA)areexaggeratedbutnotbaseless.
A) IftheUnitedStateswantsnucleararmscontrol,itmustaddressRussianconcernsaboutmissiledefense.
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2.BACKGROUNDASSUMPTIONS
D) EPAAiscurrentlynotdrivenbystatedsecurityconsiderations:anuclear/intermediate-rangemissilethreattoEuropefromtheMiddleEast(rationaleforPhaseIIIinPoland)doesnotexist.
D) SuspendingEPAAPhaseIIIwouldbetheeasieststeptowardsaddressingRussianconcernsaboutmissiledefense.
D) AsfarasRussianmotivationsfordevelopingtheprohibitedGround-LaunchedCruiseMissile(GLCM)aredominatedbyconcernsovermissiledefense,restraintonEPAAmightalsohelptotacklethecrisisovertheIntermediateNuclearForces(INF)Treaty.
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IICASEAGAINSTEPAAPHASEIII
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3.EUROPEANPHASEDADAPTIVEAPPROACH,EPAA
• EPAAannouncedbyPresidentObamainSeptember2009,• scalingdowntheBushadministration’splansfor3rdGround-Based
Interceptorsite(GBI)inEurope• adaptabilitytoIran’sactual,ratherthanhypothetical,capabilities
ü “ifthethreatfromIran’snuclearandballisticmissileprogramiseliminated,thedrivingforceformissiledefenseinEuropewillbeeliminated.”BarackObama7July2009
• EPAAadoptedbyNATOattheLisbonSummit,November2010
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4.EPAAPHASES• PhaseI(Complete)
• X-bandradarplacedinKurecik,Turkey;• Aegis-equippedshipwithSM-3BlockIAinterceptorsdeployedinthe
MediterraneanSeain2011;• fourU.S.Aegisshipshome-portedinRota,Spain,in2014-2015
• PhaseII(Complete)• AegisAshoresite,withBlockIBinterceptorsandradar,builtinDeveselu,Romania
in2013-2016;• upgradedinterceptorsalsodeployedonships
• PhaseIII(Underway)• AegisAshoresitetobebuiltinRedzikowo,Poland,withBlockIIAinterceptors
(upgradedcapacityagainstinter-mediaterangemissiles)in2016-2018;• newinterceptorsalsodeployedonshipsandinRomania
• PhaseIV(Cancelled)• WouldhavedeployedBlockIIBinterceptors(againstICBMs)inPolandby2020
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5.RANGEOFIRAN’SMISSILESIran’slongest-rangemissilesaremedium-range;theycannotreachPoland• Sajjil-2:2000km(indevelopment)• Ghadr:1600km(operational)
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6.NOIRANIANIRBMTHREATINNEARFUTURE,EITHER
A) Developinglonger-rangemissilestakestimeandwillnotgounnoticed.• “Theneedtoflighttestmissilesbeforetheyaremadeoperationalprovides
advancedwarningofnewcapabilities.Flighttrialsinvolveadozenormoretestlaunches,andhistoricallyrequirethreetofiveyearstocomplete,sometimesmore.”
• manyexamplesofcountriesusinglong-rangeballisticmissileprogramsasabasisfordevelopingsatellitelaunchers,butnocountryhaseverdonethereverse
B)Iran’sapparentlackofinterestinIRBMs/ICBMs• forthepastdecade“Iranhasfocusedonimprovingtheaccuracyandreliability
ofitsmissiles,withlittleattentiontoincreasingrange.”
• “noevidencetosuggestthatIranisactivelydevelopinganintermediate- orintercontinental-rangeballisticmissile”
SOURCE:MichaelElleman 2016
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7.NOIRANIANIRBMTHREATINNEARFUTURE,EITHER
C)JointComprehensivePlanofAction(JCPOA)2015• underJCPOA,Irancannotdevelopnuclearweapons;inforceatleastuntil2025• “breakout”timeofoneyear(toproducematerialfor1nuclearbomb)
• notincludingtimeforbuildingnuclearwarheadweighingnomorethan750kg
D)AndwhywouldIranwouldattackanuclear-armedAlliance?• leadershipinTehranisnotsuicidal;neverthreatenedEuropeorUnitedStates• Iranian-Europeanrelationsnotdefinedbyenmity,butratherbymutualinterest
intrade
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8.AMPLEWINDOWTORESUMEPHASEIIILATERIFNEEDED
NoreasontoassumethatIranwoulddevelopIRBMs/attackEuropebut…
q IfIranwouldbegindevelopingIRBM, 3-5yearwindowtorespond
q IfIranembarksoncrashnuclearweaponsprogram,buildingonenuclearbombandmatingitintoamissilelikelytotakemuchlongerthanoneyear
PhaseIIIoriginallyscheduledtotake2yearsand8months• only1yearand8monthsleftforcompletionnow(May2017)
àNoneedtobuildtheAegisAshoresiteinPolandinadvance;plentyoftimetorespondtoIranianIRBMthreatlaterifneeded—evenifconstructionwouldbeginfromzero
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9.COUNTRIESWITHBALLISTICMISSILES
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10.EUROPEANMISSILEDEFENSEMOTIVATIONS
ü “theNATO[ballisticmissiledefense]commitmentisasmuchaboutpolitics,alliancecohesionandultimatelyRussia,thanitisaboutIran.”
AndrewFutter 2015
ü while“someNATOstatesseethepurposeoftheprojectprimarilyinprotectionagainstthreatsfromthesouth,”othersviewitas“avisibleexpressionofAmerica’ssecurityguaranteesforEurope– bywhichthey
meanaboveallprotectionagainstRussia.”Dickow &al2016
ü “NATO’sinsistenceonpushingaheadwithamissiledefence systemdoesnotnecessarilyimplyagreementoveritspurposeandgoal.ThelackofadebatecanbeexplainedbyWashington’ssustainedwillingnesstofundtheprogramme almostentirelyitself.Formany,thepoliticalcostsofchangingcoursealsoappearshigherthanthoseofcontinuingthe
programme.”Dickow &al2016
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IIILINKBETWEENMISSILEDEFENSEAND
NUCLEARARMSCONTROL
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9.RUSSIANCONCERNSABOUTEPAA
RussianconcernsaboutEPAAareexaggerated
• SM-3sinPolandcannotreachRussianICBMsheadingtotheUnitedStates
• RussianmissilesoutnumbertheplannedamountofinterceptorsinEurope
• SM-3unlikelytoworkreliablyinreal-lifecircumstances(Postol &Lewis2010)
Buttheyarenotbaseless
• uncertaintyaboutthefuturedevelopmentU.S.ABMtechnologyandpolicy• increaseinthenumber/ capabilityofinterceptorsthatfitVLSlaunchtubes?
• Aegisshipsaremovableü When“launching[SM-3BlockIIA]fromtheBalticSeanearStockholm[…]More
trajectoriesheadingtowardtheUSeastcoastcannowbepotentiallyintercepted”(Wilkening2012)
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10.SM-3BLOCKIIADEPLOYMENTSWORLDWIDE
• BlockIIAdeploymentstobeginin2018
• IflocatedatseanearUScoasts,BlockIIAinterceptors couldprovidethebasisforcontinentalmissiledefense(iftheycouldinterceptincomingmissilessuccessfully).
• Thecurrentnumber(35)ofBMD-capableshipscouldincreaseto80-100bylate2030s—eachwithabilitytocarry90-122BlockIIAinterceptors.
ü “Bythemid- tolate-2030s[…]thenumberofUSstrategic-capableinterceptors,includingground-basedsystems,couldberoughlycomparabletothenumberofsurvivableRussianICBM/SLBMwarheads...iftheroleswerereversed,thiswouldbeanabsolutelyunacceptablesituationtotheUnitedStates”
SOURCE:GeorgeN.Lewis2016&2017
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IVMISSILEDEFENSEDISPUTEANDINFCRISIS
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11.ALLEGATIONSOFINTERMEDIATENUCLEARFORCES(INF)TREATYVIOLATIONS
Inthe1987INFTreaty,theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionagreedtoeliminateall“shorter”- and“intermediate”-range[500-5500km]land-basedmissilesandlaunchersofsuchmissiles.
U.S.concerns• Russiandevelopment(since2008)&deployment(sinceDec2016)ofprohibited
Ground-LaunchedCruiseMissile(GLCM)• SSC-8– ground-basedversionofKalibr Sea-LaunchedCruiseMissile?
Russianconcerns• multi-purposeMK-41VerticalLaunchingSystem(VLS)atAegisAshoresitesin
RomaniaandPolandcouldbeusedtolaunchprohibitedTomahawkGLCM,alongsideSM-3interceptors
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12.BACKGROUNDASSUMPTIONSREGARDINGINFCRISIS
A) Ifunresolved,theINFcrisiswillpreventfurtherprogressinarmscontrolandmightleadtodangerousescalationinEurope.
A) AsfarasRussianmotivationsfordevelopingprohibitedGLCMaredominatedbyconcernsovermissiledefense(bothinthesenseof“missile-defense-counter-force”capabilityandbargainingtool),thereisroomfordiplomacywhennegotiationinvolvesEPAA.
A) AsfarasRussianmotivationsaredominatedbyUS/NATOadvancedconventionalweapons,thereisroomfordiplomacywhennegotiationinvolvessuchweapons.
A) AsfarasRussianmotivationsaredominatedbyChinese,Indian,PakistaniandIranianINF,thereisroomfornegotiationwhenthatnegotiationinvolvessuchcountries.
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VTHREESCENARIOS
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13.SCENARIOI:DOWNWARDSPIRALq EPAAPhaseIIIcompletedasplanned,byendof2018
à Russianresponse• Iskanders willstayinKaliningradindefinitely• threatsagainstPolandanotherEuropeanABMsystemhostswillincrease• INF-rangeGLCMscontinuetobedeployed• Iskanders toCrimea?RussianwithdrawalfromNewSTART?
à US/NATOresponse• additionalmeasurestoprotectRedzikowo site(morePAC-3s)?• increasingcallsfordirectingmissiledefensesagainstRussia,as
wellastheintegrationofair,ballistic&cruisemissiledefense?• deploymentofUSINFinEurope?
à Russianresponse• missiledefensethreatseenasincreasinglyimminent• maximizingabilitytopenetrate/outnumberU.S.
interceptorsandpreventcounter-forcestrike• increasingthenumberofINF-rangeGLCMs?
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14.MEDVEDEV’SNOVEMBER2011“ULTIMATUM”• Russiatotakesteps1-4immediately• Ifmissiledefensedisputeremainedunresolved,alsostep5and,potentially,6-7
1.EarlywarningradarstationinKaliningradoncombatalertþ
2.Addedprotectionforstrategicnuclearweaponsthoughair& spacedefenseþ
3.Developadvancedpenetrationsystems&warheadsforstrategicnukesþ
4.Plansfordisablingmissiledefensesystemdata&guidancesystemsþ
5.DeploymodernoffensiveweaponssystemstoensureabilitytotakeoutanypartoftheUSmissiledefence systeminEuropeþ
• OnlyIskanders mentionedbyMedvedev,butINF-rangeGLCMscouldservethispurposeaswell.
6.Othermeasuresdeemednecessary☐ ?
7.WithdrawalfromtheNewSTART☐ ?
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15.TALKABOUTREPURPOSINGEPAA• InternalNATOdebateonthisissueapparentlyongoingtosomeextent—thusfarthose(EastEuropeans)callingforEPAAtobedirectedagainstRussiaconstituteaminority
• Someanalystsalsopromotethisview:
ü AdditionalstepsareneededtoupdateandexpandEuropeanairdefensesintoanIntegratedAirandMissileDefense(IAMD)networktailoredtodeteranddefeatlow-tierRussianthreatswhileenhancingstrategicstability.[…Missiledefense]architecturetailoredtoIran[…]doesnotdeterRussia.Boththesouthernandtheeasternproblemsrequirerespective,albeitrelated,solutions.The[Warsaw]summitaffirmedthatNATOwillhave“thefullrangeofcapabilitiesnecessarytodeteranddefendagainstpotentialadversariesandthefullspectrumofthreats[…].ApplyingthistoairandmissiledefensewillmeangoingbeyondcurrentEuropeanPhasedAdaptiveApproach(EPAA)plans,whileremainingconsistentwiththeEPAA’sguidingprincipleofadaptability.(Karako 2016)
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16.SCENARIOII:“UPWARD”SPIRALq EPAAPhaseIIIishaltedbyendof2018.
à Russianresponse• threatsagainstPolandandothersdecrease• Iskanders withdrawnfromKaliningrad?• perceivedneedforINF-rangeGLCMsdecreases?
à US/NATOresponse• limitednatureofEPAAreflectedbothinrhetoric& actions• opennesstotransparencymeasuresinRomanianAegisAshoresite?
à Russianresponse• perceivedthreatfrommissiledefenselessimminent• opennesstonucleararmscontrol• opennesstoINFtransparency/verificationmeasures
à USresponse• opennesstocomprehensivestrategicarmscontrol
talks,includingglobalmissiledefense
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17.SCENARIOIII:MIXEDDEVELOPMENTS
a) DespitecompletionoftheRedzikowo site,EPAA’slimitednatureissignaledbyothermeans(e.g.adecisionnottodeployBlockIIAinterceptorsinEurope),pavingthewayforcomprehensivearmscontrol.
a) DespitesuspendingPhaseIII,RussiafocusesontheabsenceoflegallimitstoEPAA,andcontinuesprohibitedINFdeployments.TheUS/NATOrespondinkind,consideringanyfurtherrestraintregardingmissiledefenseasappeasement.
a) Despiteinitialpositivesteps,noprogressisultimatelymadetowardsarmscontroldueto…
A) USrefusaltoshowrestraintregardingitsbroadermissiledefensepolicy;B) Russianrefusaltoreducenuclearweapons,despiteUSrestraintonmissile
defense;C) lackofinterestinnucleararmscontrolineither/boththeUSandRussia