USS Tecumseh Wreck Management Plan

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Department of Defense

Legacy Resource Management Program

PROJECT NUMBER (94-1704)

USS TecumsehShipwreck:Management Plan

W. Wilson West, Jr.

1996


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USSTECUMSEHSHIPWRECKMANAGEMENTPLAN

BY

W. WILSONWEST, JR.


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Cover: Rare painting of Tecumseh at sea en route to Mobile Bay, accompanied by USS Augusta (right) and USS

Eutaw. Oil on canvas (1912) by Xanthus Smith, Captain's Clerk aboard USS Augusta. (Dr. Charles V. Peery)


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PRODUCEDANDFUNDEDTHROUGH

A COOPERATIVEPARTNERSHIP

BETWEEN

DEPARTMENTOFDEFENSELEGACYRESOURCEMANAGMENTPROGRAM

NAVALHISTORICALCENTER

NATIONALMARITIMEINITIATIVE, NATIONALPARKSERVICE

NATIONALCONFERENCEOFSTATEHISTORICPRESERVATIONOFFICERS

1996


BY

W. WILSONWEST, JR.


5/160 iTABLEOFCONTENTS

TABLEOFCONTENTS i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii

LISTOFFIGURES v

EXECUTIVESUMMARY& INTRODUCTION 1

SITELOCATIONANDENVIRONMENTALSETTING 3

PHYSIOGRAPHY 3

THEWATERCOLUMN 4

BATHYMETRY& SEDIMENTATION 4

VESSELSIGNIFICANCE 7

SIGNIFICANCEOFUSS TECUMSEH 7

WARGRAVESTATUS 8

HISTORICALBACKGROUND 9

CONSTRUCTIONANDOPERATIONALHISTORY 9

OPERATIONSONTHEJAMESRIVER 17

MOBILEBAY 20

SITEHISTORY 27

THESMITHSONIANPROJECT 29

THEWHEELERTECUMSEHMEMORIALCORPORATION 38

SITEINVESTIGATIONSSINCE1977 41

PREVIOUSSHIPRECOVERYPROJECTS 44

SITEMANAGEMENT 49

MANAGEMENTAUTHORITY 49

MANAGEMENTOPTIONS 50

USS MONITOR 50

USS ARIZONA 51

OPTION1: PRESERVATION-IN-PLACE 52

SITEPROTECTION 53

PUBLICEDUCATION 56



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SITEMONITORING 57

OPTION2: LIMITEDEXCAVATIONANDRECOVERY 58

CONSERVATION 58

COST 59

OPTION3: EXCAVATION, RECOVERY, & CONSERVATION 59

CONSERVATION 61

COST 62

EDUCATION 63

MANAGEMENTRECOMMENDATIONS 63

ENDNOTES 67

BIBLIOGRAPHY 79

PRIMARYSOURCES 79

MANUSCRIPTS 79

PRINTEDGOVERNMENTDOCUMENTS 80

CONTEMPORARYBOOKS 80

PERIODICALLITERATURE 80

NEWPAPERS 81

SECONDARYSOURCES 81

BOOKS& MONOGRAPHS 81

PRINTEDGOVERNMENTDOCUMENTS 83

ARTICLES 84

NEWSPAPERS 84

UNPUBLISHEDMANUSCRIPTS 85

APPENDIX1: USS TECUMSEHARTIFACTS 2

APPENDIX2: SMITHSONIANPROJECTTASKMILESTONES- 1968

PERSONALCOMMUNICATIONS 85


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was made possible through a cooperative partnership between the National ParkServices National Maritime Initiative and the Naval Historical Center of the U.S. Navy, with funding

from the Department of Defense Legacy Program. Kevin Foster of the National Maritime Initiative

and Dr. William Dudley, Dr. Robert Neyland and Barbara Voulgaris of the Naval Historical Center

provided guidance concerning the style and content, and offered invaluable advice necessary for

dealing with controversial material and sensitive issues.

The history of USS Tecumseh now extends over132 years. The research materials and data

related to her construction, operational history, and past site investigations, are spread across the

country among federal and state archives, local historical repositories, and private collections and

personal papers. The collection and compilation of this information was made possible by the

generous assistance offered by many individuals whom I would like to recognize.

A large amount of the documentation related to the history of Tecumseh is housed in the

Military History Collection of the National Museum of American History at the Smithsonian Institu-

tion. Dr. Harold Langely, Curator of the naval collection, provided access to the vast amount of

material associated with the Smithsonian's recovery project (1967-1974).

Several members of the original Smithsonian Tecumseh Project team including Project

Manager Colonel Robert M. Calland, USMC, Ret., Project Historian James Stokesberry, Navy Supervi-

sor of Salvage Captain Willard F. Searle, Jr. USN, Ret., diver Earl Lawrence, and Smithsonian museum

specialist Jim Hutchins, provided first hand accounts of the work at the site and were able to fill in

many of the puzzling gaps in the historical record.

Libby Glenn of the Smithsonian Institution's Archives , Pat Gang and Ron Altemus of the

National Geographic Society's Film Library, Mark Werthheimer and Alexandra Elliott of the Curator

Branch at the Naval Historical Center, Rebecca Poulliot and Joe Judge of the Hampton Roads NavalMuseum, and Robert N. Bolster at the Chemistry Lab and Dr. David K. van Keuren at the History

Office of the Naval Research Laboratory were some of the many individuals who provided easy

access to the Tecumseh material in their collections.

A great deal of information and willing assistance was found in Alabama through Lawerence

Oaks, Executive Director, and Jim Parker and Greg Rhinehart at the Alabama Historical Commission.

This also includes the staff at Fort Morgan State Historic Site, particularly Blanton Blakenship and

Mike Bailey. William Garner of the Alabama Marine Police, Captain Sidney Dorgan of the Mobile

Bar Pilots Association, and David Carey, Harbormaster of the Alabama State Docks, Commander Eric

Fagerholm of the Coast Guard Aviation Training Center Mobile, and Lieutenant Commmander

Richard Wells of the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Mobile, all provided insight into understand-

ing the steps necessary to provide increased protection for the Tecumseh site. Thanks to Mr. Jack

Friend of Mobile who always met the challenge when discussions concerning the size of peepholesin the turret reached the esoteric bottom.

Many thanks to Leslie Bright of the North Carolina Underwater Archaeology Unit, Betty

Seifert of the Maryland Archaeological Conservation Program, Herbert Bump, Kurt Knoerl, and

Gordon P. Watts, Jr. who contributed their time and expertise to the theoretical exercise of recovery,

conservation, and preservation of Tecumseh.

At NOAA's Marine Sanctuary and Reserves Division, John Broadwater, Dina Hill, and Bruce


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Terrell gave me a deeper appreciation of the intricacies of the establishment and management of marine

sanctuaries and the difficult times ahead for USS Monitor. John also provided valuable material on the

construction and installation of the Yorktown Shipwreck Project cofferdam.

Frank Cantelas of the Department of History at East Carolina University,Lynn Harris of the South

Carolina Institute of Archaeology & Anthropology, Elizabeth H. Joyner of the Vicksburg National Military

Park, and Campbell McMurray of the Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth, UK., assisted me with back-ground on shipwrecks and historic ship preservation in their locales.

Thanks to Dr. Charles V. Peery for the rare images of Tecumsehand Captain Craven.

All of the research and writing for this plan would have gone into a document of a lesser quality

if not for the professionalism and expertise of two individuals. Eternal thanks to Hallie Brooker of the

National Maritime Initiative for her design and production work on the plan; and to Nell Dieterle of the

Cultural Resources Geographic Information Services (NPS) for her cartographic expertise which produced

the maps and digital elevation models of Mobile Bay. Thanks to Candace Clifford and George Mendez

for their technical assistance and support, and to Bill Long for the use of a secluded garrett during days of

torturous rewrites.

At the beginning of this project, I was confident and sustained high hopes of learning a great dealmore about the construction and internal workings of John Ericsson's monitors. I gained the interest and

the ear of Captain Ernest W. Peterkin, USNR, considered the final authority on the design and construc-

tion of the monitor-type ironclad. Sadly, we lost Pete early this year. However, because of her generosity

and desire to have Pete's years of hard work reach as many people as possible, his widow, Betty Peterkin,

provided me with complete access to his papers and plans relating to Monitor and Tecumseh. This

material is now on loan to the Mariner's Museum, and I am grateful to be able to include Pete's original

drawings in the USS Tecumseh Management Plan. This report is dedicated to his memory.

W. Wilson West, Jr.


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LISTOFFIGURES

SITELOCATION& ENVIRONMENT

Figure 1 Site Location Map

Figure 2 Mobile Bay Drainage Basin

Figure 3 Contour Elevation Map of Lower Mobile Bay

Figure 4 Digital Elevation Model of Lower Mobile BayFigure 5 1849 Bathymetric Map of Study Area

HISTORICALBACKGROUND

Figure 6 Profile and Cross Section of USSMonitor

Figure 7 CSS Virginia (ex-Merrimack) in Drydock at Gosport, Virginia

Figure 8 The Battle of Hampton Roads. Monitorand Virginiaat Close RangeFigure 9 Inboard Profile of USSMontauk After Postwar Refit

Figure 10 USSPassaicat Sea

Figure 11 Reconstruction of General Arrangements of Tecumseh Prepared for the National Armed

Forces Museum Advisory Board, June 1969, by Captain Ernest W. Peterkin, USNR

(courtesy of Mariners Museum)

Figure 12 Lines Drawing of Tecumseh Prepared for the National Armed Forces Museum AdvisoryBoard, June 1969, by Captain Ernest W. Peterkin, USNR (courtesy of Mariners Museum)

Figure 13 Isometric Drawing Projection of Hold Subdivision of Tecumseh Prepared for theNational Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, June 1969, by Captain Ernest W.

Peterkin, USNR (courtesy of Mariners Museum)

Figure 14 Isometric Drawing Projection of First Platform Subdivision of TecumsehPrepared for the

National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board, June 1969, by Captain Ernest W.Peterkin, USNR (courtesy of Mariners Museum)

Figure 15 Commander T.A.M. Craven. "Carte de Visite" Taken While Commanding USS TuscaroraFigure 16 Only Known Photograph of Tecumseh(left) and Sister Ship USS ManhattanUnder Con-

struction at Jersey City, New Jersey

Figure 17 Contemporary Map of the Upper James River, Virginia

Figure 18 USS Commodore JonesDestroyed Off Jones Point in the Upper James RiverFigure 19 Contemporary Map of Trent's Reach in the Upper James River

Figure 20 Detail of Union Obstructions at Trent's ReachFigure 21 Rare Painting of Tecumseh En Route to Mobile Bay

Figure 22 CSS Tennessee

Figure 23 Contemporary Map of the Confederate Defenses of Lower Mobile Bay

Figure 24 The Raines Keg TorpedoFigure 25 Mine Sweeping Operations at the Entrance to Mobile Bay

Figure 26 Contemporary Map of the Battle of Mobile Bay

Figure 27 Loss of USS TecumsehFigure 28 Boat from USSMetacometRescuing Survivors

Figure 29 "After you, sir"

SITEHISTORY

Figure 30 Contemporary Map Showing Position of Tecumseh (28) After the Battle

FIgure 31 Conceptual Drawing of Tecumseh Display at National Armed Forces Museum Park

Figure 32 Aerial View of TecumsehSite During the Smithsonian Project

Figure 33 Colonel Robert Calland and Dredge Engineer

LISTOFFIGURES


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Figure 34 Preparations for Dredging

Figure 35 Dredge Booster #3

Figure 36 Suctionhead with Water JetsFigure 37 Calland and Diver Earl Lawrence Discussing Excavation

Figure 38 Conceptual Model of Tecumseh's Position on the Bottom

Figure 39 Lawrence with ProbeFigure 40 Tecumseh Project Press Conference at Smithsonian Institution

Figure 41 Section of Blower Housing Removed for Analysis

Figure 42 Section of Frame and Deck Plating Removed For AnalysisFigure 43 Analysis of Cross Section of Deck Plate

Figure 44 Cross Section of Deck Plate Removed For Analysis

Figure 45 Sample of Scale Removed from Plating

Figure 46 Cross Section of Frame and Hull Plating Removed for Analysis

Figure 47 Rivet Head through Angle, Spacer, and Hull Plating (Sandblasted)

Figure 48 Peened Head of Rivet in Figure 47 (Sandblasted)Figure 49 Conceptual Drawing of Cellular-Wall Cofferdam for Tecumseh Project

Figure 50 Gulf Coast Archaeological Society Survey - 1977

Figure 51 Sonogram Signature of Exposed Area of TecumsehFigure 52 Plan of Exposed Area of Tecumseh's Hull

Figure 53 Photograph of Torch-Cut Hole

Figure 54 Conceptual Drawing of Present Condition and Position of TecumsehBased on Site DataCollected through October 1993 (Martin Peebles)

PREVIOUSSHIPRECOVERYPROJECTS

Figure 55 Figureheads from 17th-century Swedish Warship Kronan

Figure 56 Excavation of Steamboat Bertrand

Figure 57 Recovery of 17th-century Swedish Flagship Vasa

Figure 58 Mary RoseUndergoing ConservationFigure 59 Stern of USS Cairo- 1965

Figure 60 CSS Neuseon DisplayFigure 61 Stern of CSSJackson

Figure 62 Machinery and Hull Remains of CSS Chattahoochee

Figure 63 Alvin Clark - 1979Figure 64 Alvin Clark - 1994

MANAGEMENTOPTIONS

Figure 65 Overhead Schematic of the Wreck of USSMonitor

Figure 66 USS Arizonafrom Bow Looking Aft - December, 1941

Figure 67 Perspective View of USS Arizonafrom BowFigure 68 Perspective View of USSArizonafrom Stern

SITEPROTECTION

Figure 69 Tecumseh Buoy

Figure 70 Marine Traffic Near Tecumseh Buoy

Figure 71 Location of Regulated Navigation Area (RNA) Around TecumsehBuoy

Figure 72 Warning Sign for Regulated Navigation Area (RNA)

Figure 73 Anchorage For Explosives (AFE) Area

Figure 74 U-1105BuoyFigure 75 Brochure for U-1105 Site

Figure 76 Brochures for CSSFloridaand USSCumberlandSites


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OPTION3

Figure 77 Aerial View of Yorktown Shipwreck Project Cofferdam

Figure 78 Artist Conception of Yorktown Shipwreck Project CofferdamFigure 79 Raising Mary Rose

LISTOFFIGURES


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13/160EXECUTIVESUMMARY& INTRODUCTION 1

EXECUTIVESUMMARY& INTRODUCTION

Early on the morning of August 5, 1864,

fourteen-wooden steam warships, lashed in pairs,followed four turreted ironclads toward the entranceto Mobile Bay, Alabama. As the lead ship USS

Tecumsehapproached the buoy marking the edge of

the Confederate minefield, her captain, T. Augustus

Macdonough Craven, ordered the helm to port.

Tecumsehs bow slowly answered the helm as she

passed the buoy on the starboard side. Seconds latera violent underwater explosion rocked the ironclad

throwing her over on the port beam ends. Tecumsehbegan to settle quickly and, rolling over to port, sank

in less than two minutes. Despite the rapid plunge,

twenty-one of the 114 crewmen survived. CaptainCraven, however, was not among them.

On February 16, 1967, the Smithsonian

Institution announced it had located Tecumseh off

Ft. Morgan in thirty feet of water. She was found

buried in the muddy bottom, intact and in aremarkable state of preservation. Smithsonian

officials were aware of Tecumsehs historical

significance and her potential for display. At this

time the museum revealed plans to make the

ironclad the centerpiece of a new outdoor museumpark near Washington, D.C.. However, afterconducting a two-year survey of the wreck, they

abandoned the project in 1974. In 1975, to provide

increased protection for the wreck, Tecumseh was

added as a discontiguous property of the Fort

Morgan National Historic Landmark site. Since

1975, despite several cursory examinations, therehas been no organized effort to scientifically study or

recover the ironclad.

In September of 1993, the USS Tecumseh

Conference convened aboard the battleship USS

Alabama inMobile. The conference was sponsoredby the National Park Services American Battlefield

Protection Program, working with the National

Maritime Initiative, and organized by the Naval

Historical Center (NHC), Washington, D.C..

Hosted by the USS Alabama Battleship Commission

aboard Alabama, attendees included representa-tives of the U.S. Navy, State of Alabama, NationalPark Service, the Smithsonian Institution, National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers Mobile District, Fort

Morgan State Historic Site, City of Mobile, Mobile

Maritime Museum, Baldwin County Archaeological

Committee, University of Alabama, East CarolinaUniversity Program in Maritime History and

Nautical Archeology, local historians, divers, andother experts on Civil War naval history.

The conference was held to discuss the futuremanagement and protection of Tecumseh. Becauseof her location in the shallow littoral of lower Mobile

Bay, the site is threatened by both human and

natural forces, including vandalism, looting,

commercial vessel anchoring, erosion, and corro-

sion. The Tecumseh conference recognized anurgent need to coordinate the efforts of government

and the private sector in the interests of preserving

and managing this important historic site, and to

consider options by which the site can be better

protected and further studied. As a tomb for 93sailors, and containing important artifacts, supplies,and equipment, Tecumseh is both a war grave and

an important source of data on the Union navy and

life at sea in the nineteenth century.

Representatives agreed that a management

plan detailing all of the conference's issues andoptions was necessary. Acting on behalf of the U.S.

Navy, which has custody of the wreck, the Naval

Historical Center, assisted by the National Maritime

Initiative, has developed this draft plan, which was

produced in cooperation with other federal

agencies, state and local governments, and privategroups and individuals. It addresses the ship not as

an isolated site, but within her historical,

geographical, and technological context, and

outlines options and recommendations for protec-

tion and preservation.


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15/160SITELOCATION& ENVIRONMENTALSETTING 3

SITELOCATIONANDENVIRONMENTAL

SETTING

The Tecumseh site is 300 yards northwest of

Fort Morgan, off the western end of MorganPeninsula. Bathymetric data indicates that she lieson a south to north orientation between the 25- and

30-foot bottom contours. Tecumsehcapsized as she

sank and, because of the short distance to the

bottom, the turret did not fall away from the deck.

She came to rest on the starboard rail, supported by

the turret and pilothouse at an angle ofapproximately 20 to 250 off the bottom. Previous

investigations of the site indicate that the vessel restson a hard, coarse-grain sand bottom and is covered

with alternating layers of sand and silt. The distance

from the starboard turn of the bilge, the highest partof the wreck, to this hard bottom, is approximatelythirty feet.

PHYSIOGRAPHY

Coastal Alabama is located in the northeastern

part of the Gulf of Mexico extending from Perdido

Pass, in the southeast corner of the state, westward

for fifty-six miles to the Mississippi state border.Alabama has forty-six miles of shoreline along theGulf. This area lies within the Southern Pine Hills

and the Coastal Lowlands, subdivisions of the East

Gulf Coastal Plain. The Southern Pine Hills are amoderately sloping plain ranging in elevation from

about 100 feet near the coast, to 300 feet in northern

Baldwin and Mobile counties. The CoastalLowlands is a flat to gently undulating plain

extending along the coast adjacent to Mobile Bay

and lies behind the coastal beaches in southern

Baldwin County.1 (Figure 1)

The Mobile Bay estuarine system is separatedfrom the Gulf by Morgan Peninsula and Dauphin

and Petit Bois islands. Its main components are

Mississippi Sound, Mobile Bay, Mobile Delta, LittleLagoon, and Bon Secour Bay. These estuaries have

a total surface area of 397,353 acres of open water,

a volume of 3,833,489 acre-feet mean high water(MHW), and an average depth of 9.74 feet. The

formation of this valley dates to the middle to late

Pleistocene Period. Present-day Mississippi and

Alabama barrier islands are thought to be Holocene

in age, dating from 3,000 to 6,000 years old.2

(Figure 2)

The source of this large, dynamic estuary lies

forty miles north of Mobile Point in the Mobile

Delta. The confluence of six rivers combine as the

Mobile-Tensaw river valley which forms the Mobile

Delta. These rivers drain an area that extendsnorthward into the Piedmont sections of Mississippi,

Alabama, and Georgia, forming a watershed area ofnearly 43,200 square miles. With an average

discharge of 61,945 cubic feet per second, this

volume carries approximately 4.7 million tons ofsuspended material, mainly of sand, clay, gravel,and heavy minerals into Mobile Bay each year. This

is the fourth largest river system in the United States

in terms of discharge.3 (Figure 3)

Fort Morgan sits on the western end of MorganPeninsula at the entrance to Mobile Bay. Morgan

Peninsula is a large bay-mouth bar or spit that

has formed westward from the eastern shore of the

bay, extending eighteen miles to Mobile Point.

From Mobile Point, the main pass of the bay extendsthree miles to the eastern end of Dauphin Island.Main Pass is a natural inlet maintained by tidal

currents and is classified as tide-dominated because

of its well-developed ebb-tidal delta system, which

acts as a transition zone between the main estuary

and the Gulf of Mexico. A submerged tidal delta has

formed on both the seaward and landward sides ofthe inlet. This ebb-tidal delta forms a fan-shaped

apron extending six miles into the Gulf of Mexico.

Depths average ten feet along the delta outside the

channel, however, high sediment deposition rates

have created emergent channel margin bars.

Pelican Island, Sand Island, and other intermittentbars combine to form Pelican Bay, immediately

south of Dauphin Island. To the northwest of

Dauphin Island is the bays auxiliary outlet through

Pass aux Herons. About 28% of the bay water flows

through this pass and into Mississippi Sound.4

The average annual bay water temperature is

fairly constant, with bottom water usually slightly

cooler than water at the surface. The Main Pass area



is warmer in the winter and cooler in the summer

than the upper bay. The average yearly water

temperature at the entrance to the bay is 74oF at thesurface, and 73.5oF on the bottom. The averageannual temperature for Fort Morgan is 68.9oF. The

annual amount of precipitation is high in the bay

area, with an average of sixty-four inches, and tendsto be highest during July and lowest in October and

November. The average monthly relative humidityfor Mobile is 73%.5

The direction and velocity of the prevailing

winds in coastal Alabama varies with the seasons.

The average annual wind velocity is 8.3 miles per

hour. Winds are predominately from the northerlydirections during the fall and winter months, andsoutherly during the spring and summer. The

strongest winds (25+ miles per hour ), other than

tropical cyclones or hurricanes, occur less than five

days during the year and originate from the

northwest and southeast.6

THEWATERCOLUMN

The astronomical tide along coastal Alabama

varies from 1 to 1.6 feet being lowest in the tidal

streams at the north end of the bay. The mean tidalrange at Mobile Point is 1.2 feet, which is classified

as microtidal. Main Pass is the primary avenuethrough which Gulf of Mexico waters meet

freshwater from the Mobile-Tensaw River system.Tidal movement and freshwater discharge are the

two most important factors that affect currents in

Mobile Bay. The ebb- and flood-tides flow through

Main Pass every six hours and the change from floodto ebb to flood produces short periods of zero

current velocity. The current at Morgan Point can

reach four knots at peak flood and ebb tide.7

At early flood tide Gulf water enters Mobile Bay

through Main Pass and is deflected toward thenortheast. During ebb tide there is a fairly uniform

movement of water to the south. Freshwater

discharge and wind have an affect on tidal range bypiling up water in the northern part of the bay during

high freshwater discharge or strong southerly winds,

and removing bay water during low freshwaterdischarges or strong northerly winds.8

Salinity distribution in Mobile Bay is a result of

the interaction of freshwater discharge, currents,evaporation, tides, winds, and bathymetry. Salinity

levels can range from 0 to 36 parts per thousand (ppt)

in the lower bay. The lowest salinities are present

during high river discharge and flooding between

January and May and average 15 ppt in lowerMobile Bay. Conversely, the highest salinities occurduring low river discharges between June and

November, and average 30 ppt in the lower bay.

During periods of very low rainfall, salt water tendsto dominate the surface in the lower part of the bay

and Main Pass, and can be found as far as twenty-one miles up the Mobile-Tensaw River.9

In general, average annual bottom salinities are

higher than those at the surface. The best evidence

of this is the Mobile Ship Channel. The channel is

flanked by an almost unbroken line of dredge spoilmaterial on both sides for its entire length. This

barrier, between the deep channel and shallow bay,

produces a salt water wedge from Main Pass to the

Mobile-Tensaw River for most of the year. Other

effects of the Mobile Ship Channel are segmentation

of the bay, shoaling, alteration of water exchange,increased turbidity, and changes in sedimentation.10

BATHYMETRY& SEDIMENTATION

The 1849 bathymetric data for Mobile Bay

shows the natural configuration of the ebb-tidal

delta before the first dredging and spoil operations.At that time, the floor of the bay was relatively flat

with a depth of ten to fourteen feet with a gentleslope toward its center and southward to the Gulf.

At the bay's mouth, the eastern side of the tidal inletbetween Dauphin Island and Mobile Point was

scoured to a depth of fifty-four to fifty-eight feet.

North and south of the delta the depths decrease

rapidly, shallowing to less than eighteen feet inPelican Bay.11(Figure 5)

Figure 5. 1849 Bathymetric map of lower Mobile Bay.(Geologic Survey of Alabama)


17/160SITELOCATION& ENVIRONMENTALSETTING 5

Significant changes have occurred in the

bathymetry of Mobile Bay since 1849. General

shoaling of the broad flat bay bottom decreased thedepth of most areas from one to three feet. The

bathymetry was greatly modified by the dredging of

the ship channel and disposal of dredge material.

The main ship channel from Mobile to the mouth ofthe bay is presently 400 feet wide with a depth of

thirty-seven feet. Spoil banks, with a relief of six feetor more, extend along both sides of the channel

south to Great Point Clear. South of there, the spoil

material is on the west side of the channel with a

relief of two to three feet. Over the last 130 years,

the silting up of Pelican Bay and southern Mobile

Bay seems to have been a gradual and continuousprocess. The most likely causes are freshwaterdischarge, sedimentation rate, wave energy, relative

sea level change, and the history of deforestation

and dredging.12

The suspended sediment load of the Mobile-Tensaw River system reaching Mobile Bay is

estimated as averaging 4.7 million tons per year. Of

this amount, 30% (1.4 million tons) of the total load

passes through the estuarine system into the gulf

each year. Long term sediment accumulation for thebay had been estimated at 1.7 feet per century.Present rates are considerably higher than in the past

and are probably still accelerating. This

accumulation, due in part to the growth of the delta

toward the mouth of the bay, has shifted deposition

down-bay and increased sedimentation rates inthat area.13

An east-west belt of sand encompasses

Dauphin and Little Dauphin islands, Main Pass, and

Morgan Peninsula between the bay-bottom clays

and silts, and the ebb-tidal delta clays and silts. Inthe southern periphery of the bay, sediments areestuarine silts and clays with mixed clay-silt-sand

and sand. A curving ribbon of sand follows the tidal

and main ship channels from Mobile Point to the

southern end of the ebb-tidal delta. This belt of sand

widens considerably in Pelican Bay, and this areaand the ebb-tidal delta are slowly aggrading; the

ebb-tidal delta sedimentation rate has been

calculated at 2.5 feet per century.14

Stratigraphic cross-sections have been made

based on borings taken by the Exxon Company insupport of a pipeline route survey. The cross-sectionthrough the ebb-tidal delta consists of a lenticular

body of quartz sand measuring up to thirty feet thick,

along the east-west axis of Dauphin Island and

Morgan Peninsula. Toward shore, it is less shelly

and grades to silty sand with numerous clay lenses.15

(Figure 4)


19/160VESSELSIGNIFICANCE 7

SIGNIFICANCEOFUSS TECUMSEH

Today, USS Tecumsehs significance can be

judged on several levels. One places her in the Cult

of theMonitor: The success of the ship that saved

the Union at the Battle of Hampton Roads, and the

monitor mania that ensued, provided the catalyst forthe technological changes which would transform

the worlds navies. Although historians continue to

debate the contributions of Monitor to thedevelopment of the ocean-going capital warship,

one salient feature remains today: the revolving gunturret. Early monitors exhibited poor sea-keepingqualities which consigned their class to coastal

operations. After the war, however, they continued

in this service as training and coastal defense

platforms until the first decade of the twentieth

century. Of the fifty-one monitors laid down duringthe war, the nineteen ships of the Passaic andCanonicus-classes embody the features of mature

monitor design as developed by Navy engineers.

Tecumseh is also significant for her role inAdmiral David Farraguts attack on Mobile Bay inAugust of 1864, one of the largest naval battles of the

Civil War. That role represents a single moment

defined by a dramatic sinking at the outset of an

hours-long battle. Her loss set into motion a series of

events, resulting in one of the most recognized naval

slogans ever uttered; Damn the Torpedoes, FullSpeed Ahead! Ironically, Tecumsehs sinking is the

primary reason why she survives today, and her

paramount significance derives mainly from the

remarkable state of her preservation. She may be the

most important and valuable Civil War relic in theUnited States.

Including Tecumseh, there are only four known

surviving examples of the Ericsson U.S. Navy

ironclad in the world. The original, USSMonitor, is

in 235 feet of water off Cape Hatteras, North

Carolina. She lies capsized and exposed on thebottom. Although the ironclad and its contents have

remained intact, she is in a severely deteriorated

condition. USS Weehawken, of the Passaicclass, is

just offshore of Morris Island, South Carolina, at the

entrance to Charleston Harbor. Weehawken waslost in a freak accident in December 1863. In 1871,

after extensive channel clearance demolition, the

Corps of Engineers reported that the pilothouse,

turret and deck were blasted to a depth of eleven and

a half feet. Pieces of these structures were left in the

hold with the boilers and her engines were removed.Today, the remains of Weehawkens hull lies under

eight to ten feet of sand. USSPatapsco, also of thePassaicclass, struck a torpedo (underwater mine) inthe shallow waters of Charleston Harbor, off Ft.

Sumter, in January 1865 with the loss of sixty-four

officers and men. Efforts to clearPatapscofrom thechannel were also made in 1871. The pilothouse

was removed and her turret was reported as inclined

at an angle of 35o. The decks were blown off over

the engine room but the engines were not removed.

At the time there was five and one half feet of water

over the upper edge of the turret and fifteen feet overbalance of the wreck. Today the wreck is in much

the same condition, with a large amount of structural

remains exposed on the bottom.16

Of these four monitors Tecumseh is, without

question, the best preserved. Suspended insediment, the vessel is a time capsule containing

pristine examples of mid-nineteenth century

technological and cultural material. Some scholars

will argue that these types of examples abound

today and that little additional knowledge can be

gained from the study of a site for which there isalready a body of documentary material. The

monitors, however, are an anomaly in thedevelopment of warship design and contain

numerous mechanical and architectural features

which, due to the exigencies of wartimeconstruction, were not thoroughly documented.These innovations presented new and unique living

and working conditions unknown to crews prior to

the war. The preservation and study of this material

provides us with a tool for understanding these

changes and their effect on the way we conducted

our wars.

VESSELSIGNIFICANCE



WARGRAVESTATUS

Technonolgy is giving us the opportunity to

locate and explore previously inaccessible U.S.

Navy wrecks throughout the world. Many of these

vessels contain the remains of crew who perishedduring the loss. At the time of this writing, the Navyhas no formal policy concerning the protection of

the remains of servicemen lost at sea. In the past, the

treatment of ships as watery graves has been taken

on a case-by- case basis. Of the numerous U.S.

losses in the Pacific during World War II, Arizona

stands out as one of the most dramatic and costly interms of lives lost. It is, perhaps, our most visibleexample of a naval war grave and memorial.

Tecumseh shares this distiction with Arizona

by the instananeous loss of more than 80% of the

crew. Consequently, consideration must be given tothe men still entombed aboard her. Concern over

the disposition of the remains was expressed by the

families of the crew only three months after the

sinking. Tecumsehs status as a war grave was

confirmed with the passage of the joint resolution ofAugust 1876 revoking James Slaughters salvagerights. However, this law did not prohibit the

recovery of Tecumseh; anyone attempting to salvage

the vessel would have to include a detailed plan for

the removal and reburial of the crew. Although the

Smithsonian planned for the recovery and reburialof the remains, bones were removed from the wreck

in a piecemeal fashion during the course of their

project. Today, the Naval Historical Centerconsiders Tecumseha war grave site and as such she

cannot be disturbed without the permission of the

Secretary of the Navy.17


21/160HISTORICALBACKGROUND 9

HISTORICALBACKGROUND

CONSTRUCTIONANDOPERATIONALHISTORY

For more than 300 years, from the introductionof artillery on warships through the War of 1812,engagements at sea were fought in familiar line-of-battle formations by heavily constructed woodenships carrying large batteries of smoothbore guns. Inthe half century before the American Civil War,however, rapid advances in ship design, propulsion,

and ordnance accelerated by the IndustrialRevolution, brought radical changes to navalarchitecture and war at sea. The introduction ofsteam-driven paddlewheels and screw propellers fornaval purposes forever altered the course of strategyand tactics. It was the shellgun, however,successfully tested during the Crimean War, whichdoomed the largest wooden warships, steam or sail,to extinction. Naturally, naval shipwrights took thenext logical step and the only defense againstexploding shells: armor plating.

Proposals and plans for armoring ships andfloating batteries appeared in the United States fromthe time of the War of 1812, increasing with eachdevelopment in ordnance. Despite this, Congressappropriated funds for only one armored vesselbefore the Civil War. In 1842, Robert L. Stevens ofHoboken, New Jersey, submitted a plan for a largeiron steamer to be protected by plates of four-and-one-half-inch iron armor plate. Unfortunately,work on the Stevens Battery suffered manysetbacks and the vessel remained unfinished at theoutbreak of the war. By 1846, Congressionalattention had focused on the war in Mexico. Thesuccess of steam warships along the Mexican coastled to postwar appropriations for wooden steam

frigates and sloops. After initiating construction onthe first armored, seagoing warship, the UnitedStates fell steadily behind the European powers,particularly France and Great Britain.18

The introduction of the shellgun in 1824 and itsuse by a Russian fleet to destroy a Turkish fleet atSinope during the Crimean War, had convinced theFrench to adopt armor plating. The successfuldemonstration of the offensive and defensive

capabilities of armored floating batteries atKinburun in 1855 ended wooden warshipconstruction in France. Not to be replaced as self-appointed master of the seas, Great Britainimmediately initiated its own ironclad constructionprogram. Large steam frigates, plated with armor butretaining the full-rigged ship design of the period,characterized construction in both countries. TheFrench were producing the La Gloire class, three-masted steam frigates plated with four and one-half

inches of iron from stem to stern. The Britishcountered with Warrior, a large iron-hulled steamerarmored only amidships for protection of thegundeck and engineering spaces. By 1861, thirty-seven armored warships were in various stages ofconstruction in Europe.19

Before 1860, the United States had adoptedevery major innovation in warship design andconstruction except armor plating. To an apatheticCongress, the growing European ironclad fleetsappeared formidable but untested. In any case, civilwar had brought an immediate need forconventional warships to enforce a newly imposedblockade of the southern United States.

At the time of the Confederate attack on FortSumter, April 12, 1861, Union Secretary of theNavy, Gideon Welles, counted forty-two vessels onactive duty. Of this number, only twelve wereimmediately available for service along the southerncoast. Fortunately for Welles, nineteen first-classsteam warships had been built just prior to the war.In early 1861, Congress authorized construction ofseven screw sloops-of-war to which Welles addedone more. Without awaiting Congressionalapproval, he contracted for twenty-three light-draft

screw gunboats to be rapidly constructed to meet theNavys immediate needs in shallow southern coastalwaters.

At the special session of Congress called byPresident Lincoln on July 4, Welles reported on thecondition of the Navy and his recent action toimprove the service. Sanctioning his earlyconstruction contracts, Congress appropriated fundsfor twelve additional light-draft paddlewheel


22/16010 USS TECUMSEHSHIPWRECKMANAGEMENTPLAN

steamers. Having secured the initial appropriationsnecessary for implementing the blockade, Wellesfocused attention on the construction of armoredwarships. He emphasized recent improvements inthe French and British navies, and the ingenuity andinventive facilities of our own countrymen.

Despite his belief that this was not the best time forheavy expenditures on experimental vessels, Wellesdid not hesitate to call for ironclad construction.20

Congress responded quickly to Wellessrequest. Two weeks after the special session, a billwas introduced in the Senate directing the Secretaryto appoint a board to investigate ironcladconstruction. The measure, enacted August 3,called on the board to investigate the plans andspecifications that may be submitted for theconstruction or completing of iron or steel-cladsteamships or steam batteries. The sum of$1,500,000 was appropriated for the construction.The three designs approved for construction by theboard became the ironclads USS New Ironsides,USS Galena, and USSMonitor.21

The synthesis of the technological and scientificadvances during this period is nowhere betterillustrated than in the construction of USS Monitor.Designed and built by the Swedish engineer andinventor John Ericsson, the Monitor-type becamethe ironclad of choice of the United States Navyduring the Civil War, giving its name as the genericterm for all low-freeboard turreted vessels. Ericssoncame to the United States in 1839 to build the highly

successful USS Princeton for Captain Robert F.Stockton. The first screw steam warship,Princeton,incorporated a number of recent developments innaval technology, many of which were Ericssonsown inventions. In addition to his patented six-

blade propeller, Ericsson introduced a direct-actingmarine engine which connected directly to thescrew shaft. The combination of these featuresenabled the builder to place all of the vessels motivemachinery below the water line. Eliminating thepaddle wheels greatly reduced the risk of disabling

gunfire and allowed room for additional broadsidearmament. Princetons boilers burned smokelessanthracite coal and were force-fed by fan blowers.22

Ericsson successfully combined these techno-logical innovations in the creation of his steam-powered armored gun battery. Monitor was 172feet long, 41 feet in beam, and had a 10-foot 4-inchdepth of hold for a total displacement of 1,255 tons.All of the engineering and berthing spaces werelocated in the hull, which was protected by a 6-inch-thick armor belt that encircled the vessel at thewaterline. The flat deck was featureless except forthe pilothouse at the bow, the smokestacks, and

Monitors most unique and controversial feature,the revolving turret. The idea of mounting guns in arevolving platform dates back to the introduction ofartillery. Although an ancient concept, the turretwas never widely accepted for land defense and notfor naval purposes until the Civil War. Ericssonsturret was twenty feet in diameter and nine feet talland carried two XI-inch Dahlgren smoothborecannon. The structure was made of nine layers ofone-inch-thick iron plate bolted through, androtated by auxiliary steam power.23 (Figure 6)

The contract forMonitorwas signed on October

4, 1861 with Ericssons guarantee that the vesselwould be completed and ready for sea in onehundred days. This time stipulation was particularlyimportant to the government in light of the eventstaking place in Norfolk, Virginia. After their captureof the Gosport Navy Yard, the Confederates beganconstruction of a casemated ironclad ram. CSSVirginia was built on the salvaged remains of thesteam frigate USS Merrimack, which had beenburned and scuttled during the Union withdrawal.Federal officials feared that Virginia could destroythe fleet in Hampton Roads, thus breaking theblockade and potentially threatening the Union

capital.24

(Figure 7)

Monitor was commissioned February 25, 1862,and received her crew of fifty-seven men, allvolunteers. Lieutenant John L. Worden was her firstcommanding officer. Worden was ordered to takethe ironclad to Hampton Roads as soon as possibleand wait for CSSVirginia. Repairs and bad weatherdelayed his departure until March 6. At the lastminute the Navy Department, bowing to politicalFigure 6. Outboard profile and cross-section of USS Monitor



pressure, sent orders for Worden to steam directly toWashington, D.C., rather than join the fleet atHampton Roads. Monitor, however, was well out tosea before the new orders arrived.25

Sailing under tow for Virginia, Monitor ran intotrouble. Caught in a gale off New Jersey, sheimmediately demonstrated her poor sea-keepingqualities as there appeared to be a leak in everyseam. As the engine room filled with water, theblower fans were disabled thus cutting off draft forthe furnaces and ventilation. Suffocating smoke andfumes filled the engine room and prostrating thecrew. Fortunately, the storm abated, enabling the

crew to lower the water level and restart theblowers. Spared by the elements, Monitor limpedinto Hampton Roads on the night of March 8 to be

greeted by the explosion of USS Congress. On herfirst day, Virginia, under the command of FlagOfficer Franklin Buchanan, had rammed and sunkUSS Cumberland and driven Congress ashore inflames, before withdrawing at dusk. The steamfrigate USS Minnesota was hard aground with hercrew anticipating Virginias return the followingmorning.26

The Monitor-Virginia fight that followed onMarch 9 was tactically a draw, with both sidesclaiming victory. The Federals could claim a victoryin strategic terms because they remained in controlof the blockade of Hampton Roads. However,

although the two ironclads never fought each otheragain, the mere presence of Virginiakept the Unionfleet in check until the Confederate evacuation of

Figure 8. Battle of Hampton Roads. Monitorand Virginia at close range.

Figure 7. Outboard profile of CSS Virginia.



Norfolk two months later. (Figure 8)

Secretary Welles had decided before the battleat Hampton Roads that the monitor-type ironcladoffered the only rapid and effective counter to theConfederate ironclad construction program. In his

annual report to Congress on December 2, 1861, theSecretary recommended the construction of twentyarmored vessels. After a month and a half delay, theSenate passed the Act of February 13, 1862,appropriating $10,000,000 for the construction oftwenty ironclads. The Navy Department advertisedthe following week for the construction of threetypes of armored vessels: one for western rivers, onefor harbor defense, and one for coastal defense. Ofthe two latter classes, it was required that the gunscould train to all points of the compass withoutchange in the vessels position. Despite the meritsof the monitor system, and to avoid anyembarrassing failures, they stated that no contractsfor armored warships would be awarded until

Monitor was thoroughly tested.27

Confident that his vessel would perform aspromised, John Ericsson submitted a proposal toWelles in late 1861 for the construction of sixironclads of an improvedMonitor-type. Shortly afterthe Monitor-Virginia engagement, Ericsson and hispartners were awarded contracts for the six vessels.Four additional contracts for ironclads of the samedesign were awarded to builders in Boston and NewYork. Generally known as the Passaic class, thesevessels were larger versions of the original Monitor,

incorporating several improvements.28

Monitor had been plagued with defects caused

by compromises in design necessitated by her rapidconstruction. Ericsson himself admitted that manyof the improvements in the Passaicclass had beencarefully considered during Monitors construction.The Unions immediate needs, however, hadrequired simple, rapid construction. The Passaics

measured 200 feet in length overall with an extremebeam of forty-six feet. While maintaining the samedraft asMonitor, the depth of hold was increased byone foot to eleven feet four inches and theirdisplacement was doubled. The most significantimprovements in this class were the relocation of thepilothouse to the top of the turret and a moreconventional hull design. The pilothouse became acylindrical structure secured atop the turrets centralsupport shaft. Six feet in diameter, it was built ofeight layers of one-inch iron plate and pierced withviewing slits. 29

The Passaic-class turret's inside diameter wasenlarged to twenty-one feet to mount two XV-inchDahlgren smoothbore cannon. However, ordnancemanufacturers were only able to supply half thelarge guns by the commissioning dates. Conse-quently, one XI-inch cannon was substituted in eachturret. After installation of the XV-inch guns, it wasdiscovered that they would not project through thegunport. To enable the operation of the gun,Ericsson designed an iron smokebox over the insideof the port to direct the smoke and muzzle blast outof the turret. In addition, Monitors cumbersomependulum port stoppers were replaced with crank-shaped stoppers, allowing the simultaneous firing of

both guns. A permanent smokestack was installedwith eight inches of armor on six of its eighteen feet.Permanent standing ventilators and additional

Figure 9. Inboard profile of USS Montauk (Passaic-class). (Canney, The Old Steam Navy)



blowers were added to increase ventilation below.(Figure 9) To improve their sea-going capabilities,Ericsson gave the Passaics more ship-like lines,substantially reducing the overhang of the armorbelt at the bow and stern. This single design changewas a major factor in the survivability of thesevessels. During the war, no monitors, with theexception of the original, were lost at sea due tostructural failure or weakness.30 (Figure 10)

The majority of the Passaic vessels were beingbuilt in east coast shipyards. To facilitatecommunication between the Department and thecontractors, Welles appointed Rear Admiral Francis

H. Gregory as Superintendent of Ironclads andinstructed him to open an additional office in NewYork City. Chief Engineer Alban C. Stimers wasappointed Chief Inspector of Ironclads withoversight over all the vessels under construction.

While the Passaics were under construction,the Navy Department solicited bids for theconstruction of the third generation of turretedironclads based on Ericssons original design. Thesewould be the largest and most advanced single turretmonitors to see combat during the war. Ninecontracts for the Canonicus-class monitors were

awarded in September of 1862.31

The shipbuilding firm of Charles Secor & Co. ofNew York City received the contract to buildTecumseh, as well as USS Manhattan and USS

Mahopac in six months, for the sum of $460,000each. Additionally, the Department would pay abonus of $500 per day if the vessels were completedahead of schedule; however, the same amountwould be applied as a penalty for every day the

vessels were delivered beyond the due date. Secor& Co. was formed in 1847 by Frances Secor and hissons, Charles, Zeno, and James, and since that timethey had completed numerous civilian andgovernment contracts including the fitting outsteamers for the Army and the Navy at the outbreakof the war. The Secors were currently completingUSS Weehawken, and as the Canonicus-class wassimply an enlarged version of the Passaics, they feltthey would have no difficulty in rapidly completingone or more of the new vessels.32

The specifications and list of modifications forthe proposed monitors outlined only minor changes

to the overall length of the vessels and the size oftheir power plants. The length on deck wasincreased from 200 feet to 235 feet. However, thebeam, depth of hold, and dimensions of the lowerhull remained the same. The two Ericsson vibratinglever engines were enlarged, the number of boilerswas increased from 2 to 4 and the propeller wasenlarged to 14 feet in diameter.33 (Figures 11-14)

With the prospect of substantial profits for earlycompletion, the Secors began work on the ironcladsimmediately. The Department informed them thatthe plans and specifications were being prepared by

Chief Engineer Stimers and would be forwarded ascompleted. In the interim, the builders shouldconsult John Ericsson concerning any constructionquestions; however, when approached by thecontractors for assistance, Ericsson declined to helpbecause of his involvement with the construction ofthe Passaic class. Rather than delay the start ofconstruction, the Secors relied on their Weehawkenplans and the list of modifications originallyprovided.

Figure 10. USSPassaic at sea. (Naval Historical Center)



The contractors had no choice but to make thebest of a bad situation by completing the alterationsas quickly as possible. Unfortunately, the Navy wasagain long on promises and short on results. Thenew plans and specifications were slow in coming,

appearing sporadically throughout the first quarterof 1863. Substantial alterations on the monitorswere not begun until the beginning of February.37

The original contract due date passed with thevessels no nearer completion than they were in mid-December. The Secors were understandably upsetby the Navys mismanagement of the project. Theysuggested to Welles that the government wasentirely to blame for the delays which had placedtheir firm in financial difficulty. Since the alterationshad drastically changed the contracted design, theyfelt the contracts were void and should be cancelled.Rather than defend the Navys obvious blunders, theSecretary reminded the contractors of their patrioticduty and the Unions desperate need for thewarships and encouraged them to press forcompletion. Unfortunately, this was just thebeginning of a long list of delays and setbacks for thecontractors which would postpone the completionof the ironclads for another year.38

The last set of modifications for the vessels cameafter the aborted Union ironclad attack onCharleston, South Carolina, in April of 1863. OnApril 7, Rear Admiral Francis DuPont attacked theConfederate defenses of Charleston with a fleet of

nine ironclads, including seven Passaic-classmonitors. After the attack, Stimers and Ericssonreviewed the reports and assessed the damage to theindividual monitors. Although none of the monitorswere critically damaged during the attack, severalreceived injuries that partially or completelydisabled their offensive capacity. The concentratedConfederate fire had pounded turrets andpilothouses, jamming port stoppers and disablingguns. Shots striking at or near the bases jammedthree turrets and severely retarded the movement ofseveral others. The most critical defect wasdiscovered in the towers construction. When a shot

hit the structures, broken nuts and bolts wouldricochet across the interior wounding andsometimes killing the crewmen. USSNahants pilotwas killed in this manner and so many bolts werelost in her pilothouse that it nearly collapsed. 39

On June 18, Stimers sent a list of alterations tothe contractors designed to correct these weakness.To alleviate the problem of broken bolts and nuts,rivets would be used for securing the plates of the

As with all previous monitor construction, themajority of the work was subcontracted. The hull,turret, pilothouse, and deck armor were fabricated atthe shipyard of Joseph Colwell in Jersey City, NewJersey. The main and auxiliary boilers were built by

John Dolan & Co. and the Atlantic Steam Engine Co.,both of New York City. Turret engines and gearingwere provided by Clute Brothers of Schenectady,New York. The joinery work was subcontracted tothe firm of Hawthorn and Friend. Forging for themain engines were provided by Lazell Perkins Co. ofBridgewater, Connecticut. Numerous smallcontracts were let for nuts, bolts, gaskets, hoses,belts, and other miscellaneous materials.34

By October, the ironclads were well underway.The keel, garboard strake, and stem and sternpostwere nearly completed on Tecumseh and a numberof frames, beams, and plates had been fabricated.Because of their extensive shipbuilding facilities andconvenient location near the Ironclad Office, theSecors moved well ahead of the other contractors.

The specifications for the ironclads were finallysent to the contractors on October 9, 1862, andplans would continue to arrive in a sporadic andhaphazard manner. Upon examination of thespecifications, the Secors discovered severalinstances where they differed materially from theoriginal plans and specifications used as the basis fortheir bids. Not only would the changes substantiallyalter the work already completed, there was concern

that the vessels would not float when launched.Because construction was advancing so rapidly, theDepartment had no choice but to temporarily stopthe work on all the Canonicus-class monitors untilthe type and extent of the changes required could bedetermined.35

Work languished on the ironclads for more thana month. Finally the list of alterations were sent onDecember 22. Basically, the vessels were deepenedby eighteen inches, thus lengthening the stem andstern posts and the vertical shaft under the turret.This increased the length to beam ratio to 5:1, thus

moving the turret twenty feet forward on the deck.The tops of the boiler shells were raised, and thedome over the propeller well was eliminated. Thesealterations ended all possibility of finishing thevessels before March 15, thus eliminating premiumsfor early completion. The size and form of theironclads were materially changed rendering muchof the materials on hand useless. By the middle ofDecember, Tecumseh was almost completely inframe and the changes would require a large amountof the completed work to be torn out and replaced.36



turret, pilothouse, and smokestack. They would beput through from the inside and riveted smooth onthe outside. In an effort to prevent turret jamming, aband of wrought iron five inches thick and fifteeninches wide would be attached around the base ofthe turret. As an additional anti-jamming measure,

the gutter in which the turret rested was widenedand filled with hemp gaskets. The gun carriageslides were also shortened to give a one-inchclearance between their ends and the wall of theturret.40

The damage to Nahants pilothouse promptedseveral important changes. The armor wasincreased to ten inches and the viewing slits wereenlarged. To compensate for structural weakness,two additional iron bands were applied around theinside top. The cover was increased in thickness,recessed into the top, and riveted into place. Thebase of the pilothouse was to have an iron band orglacis similar to that of the turrets to protect thecomposition ring on which it rested. Thesmokestack armor was increased to eight inches andan iron grate was placed inside the stack below thedeck line to keep debris from entering theengineering spaces. To improve the habitability ofthe vessels, and particularly the ventilation whensecured at battle stations, Stimers installed apermanent ventilator stack twenty-five feet tall,tapering from twenty-four to eighteen inches indiameter. This ventilator entered at the berthdeckwith connecting pipes to ventilate the galley andwater closets. All of these changes were ordered for

the vessels under construction and as a retrofit on thePassaics.41

On June 22, Commander Tunis AugustusMacdonough Craven was appointed commander ofTecumseh. Craven was an energetic veteran navalofficer who had received his commission as a passedmidshipman in 1835. At the time the contracts forthe Harbor and River monitors were let, Craven wasin command of the steam sloop-of-war USSTuscarora searching for Confederate commerceraiders in European waters. On June 9, 1863,Welles ordered him to command Passaic; however,

two weeks later he was given command ofTecumseh with orders to push her constructionforward as rapidly as possible. Craven reported forduty at the Secors yard in early July. In his firstreport to the Department he stated that the work wasprogressing well and he expected the ironcladslaunch in four weeks. The changes ordered on June18 had ended any hope of completing the ironcladsby the fall of 1863, and delays in receiving herboilers postponed Tecumsehs launch until Septem-

ber 12. Moored to the wharf, the workrecommenced immediately to complete the vesselsturret and pilothouse and install her motivemachinery. Craven optimistically estimated thatTecumsehwould be ready for service in six weeks. 42

(Figure 15)

However, minor problems and alterationscontinued to delay the completion into 1864. Animportant feature in the design of Monitor and the

Passaic class was the ability to operate the shipsanchor under fire without endangering the crew.The four-fluked Ericsson anchor designed for these

vessels was secured in a circular anchor well underthe overhang of the bow. It could be deployed andretrieved in battle or at sea without going on deck.The redesigned hull of the Canonicus-classprecluded the use of this system. Their fine lines andreduced bow overhang left no room for an anchorwell. The plans which the contractors bid on, didnot show the anchor well nor did they indicate howthe anchors would be serviced. After weeks ofdeliberation it was decided that the most efficient

Figure 15. Commander T.A.M. Craven. Taken while command-ing USS Tuscarora, 1862. "Carte de Visite" courtesy ofDr. Charles V. Peery.



Figure 16. Rare Brady photograph of USS Tecumseh(left) and USS Manhattanunder construction at Jersey City, New Jersey. Notethe fine ship-like bow of Tecumseh which necessitated the redesign of the anchor and hoisting mechanism. (City Museums ofMobile)

deflect fragments projected toward the inside of thestructure. This design was approved and adapted toall the Canonicus-class vessels.

In late January Craven suggested that a shield ofboiler iron be placed around the upper edge of theturret for keeping out spray and to serve also as aguard, behind which to use musketry or handgrenades, in case the enemy gets in possession of thedecks. Because of a monitors low freeboard theturret roof was the only open deck space for the crewwhen operating at sea. Experience aboard the

Passaics had also exposed the crews vulnerability tosnipers when operating on inland waters.Approving Cravens plan, Stimers directed theSecors to construct a rifle screen three feet high ofone-half-inch plate on Tecumsehs turret. Aroundthe screen twelve inches from the upper edge,twelve loop holes were cut for muskets. Riflescreens were ordered for all the Canonicus-class andeventually added to the Passaics.45

Tecumsehs machinery was successfully testedon January 28, 1864, and on March 29, Cravenreported to Welles that Tecumseh had finallycompleted all of her trials and had been delivered to

the navy yard in New York. At the navy yard she wasgiven priority to receive all available crewmen,equipment, and stores. Tecumseh was commis-sioned as an ironclad steamer, third rate on April 19.On the evening of April 26, Craven left Sandy Hookwith orders to join Acting Rear Admiral Samuel P.Lees squadron at Hampton Roads. Tecumseharrived on April 28, after an uneventful maidenvoyage, and joined the squadron at anchor offNewport News.46

method would be to lead the chain over the bowthrough iron chocks, across the deck in a coveredchainway, and into the chain locker. A collapsiblederrick would be provided for catting and fishingthe anchors.43 (Figure 16)

Tecumsehs battery of two XV-inch Dahlgrensmoothbores cannon was delivered the first ofNovember but because of a machinists strike in NewYork City it was not mounted until January 6, 1864.To alleviate the problems encountered with the

Passaics gunports, the muzzles of the XV-inch guns

were lengthened sixteen inches to allow them toproject out of the turret. After installation of theguns, Craven reported that the port stoppers did notsufficiently close the ports, leaving an opening ofnine inches at the top and seven inches at thebottom. He considered this unsatisfactory,explaining that an 8 shot can easily enter the port;if at the top, it will glance upwards through thepilothouse; if below, it will glance downward andthrough the bottom of the ship. Cravenrecommended that new port stoppers be madeimmediately. Responding to the report, Stimersexplained that the stoppers had been moved back

two inches from the ports to prevent jammingsimilar to that in the Passaic turrets and that onlysmall fragments could enter.44

The Department referred the problem toEricsson who, after reviewing the reports, agreedwith Stimers that the only danger was from flyingfragments of shots striking the stoppers. Heproposed that the contractors install small stopblocks of wrought iron above and below the port to



Figures 17. Map of the upper James River.

OPERATIONSONTHEJAMESRIVER

On March 9, 1864,President Lincoln appointedUlysses S. Grant as general-in-chief of all Unionarmies at the newly revived rank of lieutenant

general. Prior to this time, and throughout the war,the various Union armies in the east and west hadacted independently of each other with mixedresults. To remedy this situation Grant selected anoverall commander for each of the principal armiesin the eastern and western theaters. His plan was tomove all the Federal armies in concert using theirsuperior numbers and resources to apply simulta-neous pressure against the remaining Confederateforces.47

In the west, Major General William TecumsehSherman was selected to command the combinedarmies of the Cumberland, Ohio, and Tennessee.His objective was the army of General Joseph E.Johnston near Atlanta, Georgia. In the east, MajorGeneral George G. Meade remained in command ofthe Army of the Potomac; however, Grantestablished his headquarters with Meades army inthe field. This army faced one of the two majorConfederate armies under General Robert E. Leelying south of the Rapidan River and just west ofFredericksburg, Virginia.48

In addition to the movements of the mainarmies, Grant ordered Major General Franz Sigel toadvance in force up the Shenandoah Valley thus

threatening the Confederacys breadbasket. Insoutheastern Virginia, Major General Benjamin F.Butler would ascend the James River, with theobjective of severing the Richmond-Petersburgrailroad, and if possible, capture Petersburg orRichmond. The desired effect was to cause Lee tospread his badly outnumbered forces to protect allthe threatened areas.49

Grant set his armies in motion in early May.Meade crossed the Rapidan River on May 4, andButler was to start that night and advance as far upthe James as possible by daylight on the 5th. Butler

embarked his 40,000 troops on vessels of AdmiralLees North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, whichwould support the armys right flank on the Jamesduring the advance. An odd assortment of 200transport and support vessels would be escorted upriver by five ironclads and seven gunboats. Thesevessels included the monitors USS Tecumseh,Canonicus, Saugus and Onondaga, and thecaptured Confederate ram Atlanta. The shallow-draft gunboats USS Osceola, Commodore Morris,

Shokokon, Stepping Stones, Delaware, GeneralPutnam, and Shawsheen would be employed in theupper James to provide support for the ironclads andmaintain communications with Hampton Roads.50

On the night of May 4, Butler began his advancewith Lees gunboats searching for torpedoes andobstructions. Following the gunboats were thetransports carrying troops and supplies. Craven, assenior ironclad captain, led the monitor column,which was bringing up the rear, under tow. The fleetreached City Point at the confluence of the Jamesand Appomattox rivers by sunrise on the 5 th,encountering little or no resistance along the way.After securing City Point, the bulk of Butlers armywas landed at Bermuda Hundred, a neck of landlying between the James and Appomattox rivers. Bymidmorning on the 6th, the Army of the James wasentrenched along a line from Port WalthallsLanding on the Appomattox, to Trents Reach on the

James, about fifteen miles below Richmond.51

(Figure 17)

After landing the army, Lee ordered thegunboats to begin searching the meandering rivernorth of Bermuda Hundred for torpedoes and otherobstructions. Although the task was painstakinglyslow, the squadron steadily advanced until theafternoon of May 6 when USS Commodore Jones(Figure 18) was destroyed by an electricallydetonated torpedo in an area known as Deep



Figures 18. USS Commodore Jones was destroyed by a 2000 lb. electrically-detonated torpedo opposite Jones Point on theupper James River. (Naval Historical Center)

Bottom.

Fearing the loss of a monitor, the admiralrecalled his squadron and ordered the torpedoclearance operations to recommence at a slower,more vigilant pace, no matter what the delays. Theironclads finally reached their assigned station atTrents Reach, opposite Butlers right flank, at theend of May.52

Throughout the first half of May, Butlers armymade several half-hearted attempts to advance onRichmond and Petersburg. However, by May 17,Butler was back at his original entrenchment line atBermuda Hundred, effectively bottled up by thearmy of Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard.Although Beauregard would never be able to take

this strongly defended position, Butlers forces wereneutralized and unable to cooperate with Grantsoperation north of the river.53

The Overland Campaign ended at Cold Harboron June 3. Throughout five weeks of fighting Granthad been unable to defeat General Lee north of theJames River. Therefore he decided to secretly movehis entire army south of the James and operateagainst Petersburg. Successfully completing thismaneuver by June 14, Grant crossed the river belowCity Point and began the assault on Petersburg thefollowing day.

In response to reports that the Confederateironclad squadron was below the obstructions atDrewrys Bluff six miles south of Richmond, Grant

Figure 19. Map of Trent's Reach. The position below the ob-structions (lower center) was the anchor for the right flank ofGeneral Bulter's army.

Figure 20. Detail of Union Obstructions at Trent's Reach.



On June 20, the monotony of blockade duty wasinterrupted by the approach of the ConfederateJames River Squadron. The squadron, composed ofthe ironclads CSS Virginia II, Fredericksburg, and

Richmond, and five gunboats, moved down fromDrewrys Bluff to cooperate with Battery Dantzler in

an attack on the Union ironclads.

At noon on the 21st, Battery Dantzler beganfiring on Tecumseh, Saugus, Canonicus, andOnondaga in Trents Reach. Craven immediatelyordered all ships to return fire. Shortly after thebattery opened fire, the Confederate fleet joined infrom their position near Dutch Gap in an attempt tocatch the monitors in a crossfire. Unfortunately bothVirginia II and Richmond broke down during theengagement and were forced to retire. Due to theextreme range and the Confederate fleets inabilityto see the monitors, their action was of littleconsequence, with most of the fire being exchangedby the monitors and Battery Dantzler. Theengagement was little more than an exercise for thegun crews. Craven reported that the engagementlasted about four hours and Tecumseh destroyedone gun emplacement. Canonicus and Saugusreceived minor hits. Ultimately the guns atHowletts remained and the Confederate fleetretired upstream.56

Two days after the attack, Tecumsehleft TrentsReach for Norfolk. Craven had received orders toproceed to Pensacola, Florida, where he was toreport to Rear Admiral David G. Farragut,

commanding the West Gulf Blockading Squadron.En route to Norfolk, Tecumsehs wheel ropes partedcausing the ironclad to run hard aground where she

Figure 21. Rare painiting of Tecumseh at sea en route to Mobile Bay, accompanied by USS Augusta(right) and USS Eutaw. Oil oncanvas (1912) by Xanthus Smith, Captain's Clerk aboard USSAugusta. (Dr. Charles V. Peery)

ordered the river obstructed at Trents Reach inpreparation for his crossing. Lee and his officersstrongly protested this move because it would forcehis squadron to lie in a defensive position belowthese obstructions. Grant remained firm in hisrequest, to which Welles acquiesced and the

obstructions were begun. On June 15, Craven, assenior officer present, was put in charge of theproject.54

The area known as Trents Reach was thesouthern arm of a long meandering bend in theupper James River. The right flank of Butlers armywas anchored on the south bank of this bend. Theriver was unusually wide at this point and had twonavigable channels. The main channel ran along thesouth bank and a smaller channel ran close to thenorth shore. Craven and the engineers sank fourwooden hulks and extended a heavy boom acrossthe main channel. Another boom was extended

across the rivers shallow center and secured withanchors. A schooner was sunk in the northernchannel with a boom extending to the river bank.Craven was later advised to sink two more hulks inthis channel. A secure line of obstructions wasfinally completed on June 18, four days after Granthad begun crossing the river. Admiral Lee stationedhis monitors in a position below this line to guardagainst its removal, or any advance by theConfederate squadron. Above these obstructionsthe Confederates had begun construction on abattery of heavy guns on Beauregards left flank atHowletts farm. Situated on a high bluff, Battery

Dantzler had a commanding view downriver of theUnion ironclads in Trents Reach.55

(Figures 19 & 20)



mounting about twenty-seven guns and garrisonedby 400 officers and men. To the northwest of

remained for four hours. Upon investigation, it wasdiscovered that the wire tiller ropes had beenburned in half by the heat of the boilers. Cravenspent a week repairing and supplying his vesselwhile waiting for a tow from USSAugustaorEutaw.All three vessels were ready for sea and sailed forPensacola on July 5.57 (Figure 21)

MOBILEBAY

In January 1864, Admiral David G. Farragutreturned to his headquarters at Pensacola, Florida,after a five-month leave to find his West GulfBlockading Squadron infected with Ram Fever.Rumors were running along the Gulf that hiscounterpart, Admiral Franklin Buchanan, of CSSVirginiafame, was going to bring his squadron out ofMobile Bay and break the blockade. Farragut was

hoping to conduct a joint operation with the army toclose the bay to Confederate commerce beforeBuchanans fleet appeared in the lower bay.58

Farragut and his staff believed that when theConfederate squadron appeared it would beformidable. According to deserters and contrabands,the vessels completed or under construction atMobile were the lightly-armored, wooden gunboatsCSS Morgan, Gaines, and Selma; the ironclads CSSTennessee, Tuscaloosa, Huntsville, and Nashville;and the CSS Baltic, a converted towboat whose hullwas so rotten she was eventually laid up as

unseaworthy.

CSS Tennessee, however, was considered themost powerful ram in the Confederate navy in 1864.She measured 209 feet long and forty-eight feet inbeam. The casemate was seventy-eight feet, eight

inches long and armored with five inches of ironplate. An extra inch of plate was added to theforward of the pilothouse. Tennessee was armedwith four 6.4-inch Brooke rifles in broadside and 7-inch Brooke rifles fore and aft. The ironcladsmachinery proved to be one of her mainweaknesses. The engines were not designed and

built for the vessel, but were taken from a strandedriverboat. They were inadequate for the vessels use,developing only six nautical miles an hour.Tuscaloosaand Huntsvillewere similar in design toTennessee but smaller. CSS Nashville was a largeside-wheel ironclad. Because of the slowproduction of iron plate, these three vessels were notcompleted before the Union attack. The gunboats

Morgan, Gaines, and Selmacarried a total of sixteenguns and were armored only with light platingaround their boilers.59 (Figure 22)

In late January, Farragut made a reconnaissance

of the fortifications at the entrance to Mobile Bay.The principal entrance into the bay wasapproximately three miles wide running betweenMobile Point on the east and Dauphin Island on thewest, Fort Morgan on the western end of MobilePoint, and Fort Gaines on the eastern end ofDauphin Island guarded the channel. (Figure 23)

Fort Morgan was a bastioned work of brick andearth with exterior water batteries on the beachfacing the channel. It mounted forty-five gunsranging in size from 10-inch Columbiads to 24-pounders, the majority being of the smaller caliber.

The fort was garrisoned by 640 officers and menunder the command of Brigadier-General Richard L.Page.

Fort Gaines was a smaller brick and earthwork

Figure 22. CSS Tennessee. (Naval Historical Center)



Figure 23. Map of the Confederate Defenses of lower Mobile Bay drawn by Captain Jules V. Gallimard, Engineer, C.S.A. (NationalArchives)

Figure 24. The Raines Keg Torpedo.

Dauphin Island was Grants Pass, a smaller,shallower channel used only by light-draft vessels. Itwas guarded by a small earthwork fortificationknown as Fort Powell. Fort Powell mounted only sixguns and was garrisoned by two companies ofinfantry.

In addition to these fortifications, the Confeder-ates had driven wooden piles into the shoal waters at

Grants Pass and east of Fort Gaines. As Farragutnoted the presence of these piles, he was aware thatmines, known as torpedoes, had been laid in themain channel to further constrict its size. Thetorpedoes extended approximately 400 yards intothe channel from the end of the piles, their eastern-most end being marked by a red buoy. It wasgenerally believed that there were anywhere from100 to 200 torpedoes planted in three staggeredrows. The majority of these devices were the cone-shaped, Fretwell-singer type fired by a direct contactcap and trigger device. Additional torpedoes placedshortly before the battle were the Raines keg-typewith ultra-sensitive primers. This type was usually

anchored to the bottom with a section of railroadiron. Approximately 300 yards of the main channeldirectly under the guns of Fort Morgan were leftopen for blockade runners.60 (Figure 24)

Farraguts plans for an early attack on the baywere postponed again in April as a result of MajorGeneral Nathaniel P. Bankss ill-fated Red Rivercampaign in Louisiana. Banks's move onShreveport was supported by Rear Admiral David

Porters river gunboats. In mid-April Bankss armysuffered defeat, forcing him to retreat leavingPorters fleet trapped above the falls on the Red Riveruntil May 13. Farragut wrote to Welles commentingon Bankss disaster and the excitement it createdalong the gulf. He feared that the Confederatevictory in the west would move Buchanan intoaction.

On the night of May 17, Buchanan broughtTennessee into the bay. Buchanan knew his onlyhope for success was a surprise attack on the Unionblockaders, and he planned this attack for that night.Unfortunately, it was midnight by the time coal andammunition were loaded and when the anchor washauled up, they discovered that the ironclad wasaground by the outgoing tide. With sunrise the nextmorning, the vessels position was revealed just as



the incoming tide refloated her. After this,Buchanan assumed a defensive attitude and beganpreparing his squadron for the Union attack.61

CSS Tennessee was a constant worry toFarragut. He told his commanders in New Orleans

and Pensacola to prepare themselves for an attackwhich might come at anytime. Meanwhile, hebombarded the Navy Department with requests formonitors. The presence of Tennessee in the lowerbay seemed to bring the Navy Department to life.On June 7, Welles ordered the newly commissioned

Manhattan to proceed to Pensacola and report toFarragut. He also wrote to Admiral Porter at MoundCity, Illinois, asking, and then ordering him to sendsome of the new Mississippi River ironclads toFarragut. Welles notified Farragut on June 25 that

Manhattan was en route from New York, the twin-turreted river ironclads USS Winnebago andChickasaw were headed for New Orleans, andTecumseh was at Norfolk and would be sent in aweek to ten days. It appeared the admiral wouldfinally be able to makehis move. Manhattanarrivedat Pensacola on July 8.62

Assured that the monitors were on their way,Farragut issued his orders for the assault. Theybegan, Strip your vessels and prepare for conflict.Send down all your superfluous spars and rigging.The line of attack was to be the same as at New

Orleans and Port Hudson. The ships would passFort Morgan in pairs lashed side by side. Theflagship would lead, running northeast until abreastof the fort, then north by west. He went on to statethat If one or more of the vessels be disabled, theirpartner must carry them through.63

By the time Manhattan joined the fleet offMobile, Farragut decided he would use fourteen ofhis largest wooden steamers and the four ironclads.The wooden vessels would be paired as follows:USS Hartford and Metacomet; USS Brooklyn andOctorara; USS Richmond and Port Royal; USS

Lackawana and Seminole; USS Monongahela andKennebec; USS Ossipee and Itasca; and USSOneida and Galena. The fleet would run in on themorning flood tide at low steam, preferably with alight southwest wind, which would blow the smoke

Figure 25. Mine sweeping operations at the entrance to Mobile Bay. Admiral Farragut ordered the recovery and examination ofmany of the torpedoes planted by the Confederates in the Main Pass channel.



from the battle into the faces of the fort's gunners. 64

Tecumseh finally arrived off Pensacola on July28. The following day, Farragut issued additionalorders to clear up any questions his commandersmight have. They read, in part, Should any vesselbe disabled to such a degree that her consort isunable to keep her station, she will drop out of lineto westward and not embarrass the vessels nextastern by attempting to regain her stations. As totorpedoes he stated:

There are certain black buoys placed by theenemy from the piles on the west side of thechannel across it towards Fort Morgan. Itbeing understood that there are torpedoesand other obstructions between the buoys,the vessels will take care to pass to theeastward of the easternmost buoy, which isclear of all obstructions.65

He also suggested that propellers be stopped toallow the ships to drift over drag lines laid by theenemy. As it turned out, these ropes and manytorpedoes had been carried off by storms and swiftcurrents. (Figure 25)

Winnebago arrived from New Orleans onAugust 1, and Chickasaw a day later. The weatherhad been extremely rough, causing delays in gettingthe monitors to Mobile. Farragut was anxious tostart and grew impatient when Tecumseh wasdelayed at Pensacola. He knew from the Mobile

papers that the Confederates were making lastminute preparations for his attack. He wrote toCaptain Thorton Jenkins commanding USS Rich-mond at Pensacola informing him of the arrival ofthe river monitors and advising him to leave withTecumseh as soon as she was ready.66

By the end of July the necessary troops wereavailable for an assault on Forts Morgan and Gainesin connection with Farraguts attack. Major GeneralGordon Granger was chosen to lead the first assaultagainst Fort Gaines. Granger visited Farragut offMobile on August 1 and informed him that he

planned to land his troops on Dauphin Island on the3rd and attack the fort on the 4th. Farragut toldGranger that the Confederates were concentratingon the defense of Fort Morgan and were unpreparedfor him at Fort Gaines. Grangers force was made upof 1,500 infantry, two light and two heavy batteries,and a battalion of engineer troops - in all 2,400men.67

Farragut tentatively agreed to run his fleet in at

the same time the army attacked the fort; however,Tecumseh was two days behind schedule becauseof repairs and the admiral feared that he would bedelayed. Both Farragut and Captain PercivalDrayton sent urgent letters to Jenkins telling him tohurry Tecumsehalong. On the 4th, Grangers troopsengaged Fort Gaines as Farragut waited forTecumseh. Now he sent out last minute instructionsconcerning the use of the ironclads. Because themonitors were slower than the wooden vessels theywould get underway first. This allowed them tocover the fleet when the rebel ships attacked.Farragut stated:

The service I expect from the ironclads is,first, to neutralize a much as possible thefire of the guns which rake our approach;next to look out for the [enemy] ironcladswhen we are abreast of the fort, and, lastly,to occupy the attention of those batteries

which would rake us while running up thebay.68

He planned for Chickasaw and Winnebago to holda position off the fort and follow after the woodenships had passed. TecumsehandManhattanwere toconcentrate on Tennessee. Tecumseh, in tow ofUSS Bienville, finally arrived with Richmond and

Port Royal on the evening of the 4th. After thesevessels were safe at anchor, Farragut made hisdecision to go in the next morning.

At 3:00 a.m. on the 5 th, the admiral rose and

found the wind light from the southwest and theflood tide running. All hands were called and by 5:30 a.m. the fleet stood ready to get underway.Farragut had been persuaded after much debate toallow Brooklyn, under Captain James Alden, to leadthe wooden column.

As senior monitor captain, Craven was a

Documents

USS Tecumseh Wreck Management Plan