G.R. No. 152809 August 3, 2006MORALIDAD,Petitioner,vs.SPS. DIOSDADO PERNES and ARLENE PERNES,Respondents.Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61610, to wit:1. Decision dated September 27, 2001,1affirming an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City which reversed that of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, Branch 1, in an action for unlawful detainer thereat commenced by the petitioner against the herein respondents; and2. Resolution dated February 28, 2002,2denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land located in Davao City and registered in the name of petitioner Mercedes Moralidad under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-123125 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City.In her younger days, petitioner taught in Davao City, Quezon City and Manila. While teaching in Manila, she had the good fortune of furthering her studies at the University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. While schooling, she was offered to teach at the Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese, which she did for seven (7) years. Thereafter, she worked at the Mental Health Department of said University for the next seventeen (17) years.During those years, she would come home to the Philippines to spend her two-month summer vacation in her hometown in Davao City. Being single, she would usually stay in Mandug, Davao City, in the house of her niece, respondent Arlene Pernes, a daughter of her younger sister, Rosario.Back in the U.S.A. sometime in 1986, she received news from Arlene that Mandug at the outskirts of Davao City was infested by NPA rebels and many women and children were victims of crossfire between government troops and the insurgents. Shocked and saddened about this development, she immediately sent money to Araceli, Arlenes older sister, with instructions to look for a lot in Davao City where Arlene and her family could transfer and settle down. This was why she bought the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-123125.Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene move from Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the property to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner made known this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986.3The document reads:I, MERCEDES VIA MORALIDAD, of legal age, single, having been born on the 29th day of January, 1923, now actually residing at 8021 Lindbergh Boulevard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., wishes to convey my honest intention regarding my properties situated at Palm Village Subdivision, Bajada, Davao City, 9501, and hereby declare:1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein and stay as long as they like;2. That anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned real property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another;3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof;4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own;5. That any proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties shall be allotted to my nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of in standing.xxx xxx xxxFollowing her retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with the respondents on the house they build on the subject property. In the course of time, their relations turned sour because members of the Pernes family were impervious to her suggestions and attempts to change certain practices concerning matters of health and sanitation within their compound. For instance, Arlenes eldest son, Myco Pernes, then a fourth year veterinary medicine student, would answer petitioner back with clenched fist and at one time hurled profanities when she corrected him. Later, Arlene herself followed suit. Petitioner brought the matter to the local barangay lupon where she lodged a complaint for slander, harassment, threat and defamation against the Pernes Family. Deciding for petitioner, the lupon apparently ordered the Pernes family to vacate petitioners property but not after they are reimbursed for the value of the house they built thereon. Unfortunately, the parties could not agree on the amount, thus prolonging the impasse between them.Other ugly incidents interspersed with violent confrontations meanwhile transpired, with the petitioner narrating that, at one occasion in July 1998, she sustained cuts and wounds when Arlene pulled her hair, hit her on the face, neck and back, while her husband Diosdado held her, twisting her arms in the process.Relations having deteriorated from worse to worst, petitioner, on July 29, 1998, lodged a formal complaint before the Regional Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, charging the respondent spouses, who were both government employees, with conduct unbecoming of public servants. This administrative case, however, did not prosper.Then, on August 3, 1998, petitioner filed with the MTCC of Davao City an unlawful detainer suit against the respondent spouses. Petitioner alleged that she is the registered owner of the land on which the respondents built their house; that through her counsel, she sent the respondent spouses a letter demanding them to vacate the premises and to pay rentals therefor, which the respondents refused to heed.In their defense, the respondents alleged having entered the property in question, building their house thereon and maintaining the same as their residence with petitioners full knowledge and express consent. To prove their point, they invited attention to her written declaration of July 21, 1986, supra, wherein she expressly signified her desire for the spouses to build their house on her property and stay thereat for as long as they like.The MTCC, resolving the ejectment suit in petitioners favor, declared that the respondent spouses, although builders in good faith vis--vis the house they built on her property, cannot invoke their bona fides as a valid excuse for not complying with the demand to vacate. To the MTCC, respondents continued possession of the premises turned unlawful upon their receipt of the demand to vacate, such possession being merely at petitioners tolerance, and sans any rental. Accordingly, in its decision dated November 17, 1999,4the MTCC rendered judgment for the petitioner, as plaintiff therein, to wit:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of herein plaintiff and against the defendants, as follows:a) Directing the defendants, their agents and other persons acting on their behalf to vacate the premises and to yield peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff;b) Ordering defendants to payP2,000.00 a month from the filing of this complaint until they vacate premises;c) Sentencing defendants to pay the sum ofP120,000.005as attorneys fees and to pay the cost of suit.Defendants counterclaim are hereby dismissed except with respect to the claim for reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses which should be litigated in an ordinary civil actions. (sic)Dissatisfied, the respondent spouses appealed to the RTC of Davao City.In the meantime, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. The motion was initially granted by the RTC in its Order of February 29, 2000, but the Order was later withdrawn and vacated by its subsequent Order dated May 9, 20006on the ground that immediate execution of the appealed decision was not the prudent course of action to take, considering that the house the respondents constructed on the subject property might even be more valuable than the land site.Eventually, in a decision7dated September 30, 2000, the RTC reversed that of the MTCC, holding that respondents possession of the property in question was not, as ruled by the latter court, by mere tolerance of the petitioner but rather by her express consent. It further ruled that Article 1678 of the Civil Code on reimbursement of improvements introduced is inapplicable since said provision contemplates of a lessor-lessee arrangement, which was not the factual milieu obtaining in the case. Instead, the RTC ruled that what governed the parties relationship are Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, explaining thus:Since the defendants-appellees [respondents] are admittedly possessors of the property by permission from plaintiff [petitioner], and builders in good faith, they have the right to retain possession of the property subject of this case until they have been reimbursed the cost of the improvements they have introduced on the property.Indeed, this is a substantive right given to the defendants by law, and this right is superior to the procedural right to [sic] plaintiff to immediately ask for their removal by a writ of execution by virtue of a decision which as we have shown is erroneous, and therefore invalid. (Words in brackets supplied),and accordingly dismissed petitioners appeal, as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and declared invalid. Consequently, the motion for execution pending appeal is likewise denied.Counter-claims of moral and exemplary damages claimed by defendants are likewise dismissed. However, attorneys fees in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos is hereby awarded in favor of defendants-appellants, and against plaintiffs.SO ORDERED.8Therefrom, petitioner went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 61610.On September 27, 2001, the CA, while conceding the applicability of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code to the case, ruled that it is still premature to apply the same considering that the issue of whether respondents right to possess a portion of petitioners land had already expired or was already terminated was not yet resolved. To the CA, the unlawful detainer suit presupposes the cessation of respondents right to possess. The CA further ruled that what governs the rights of the parties is the law on usufruct but petitioner failed to establish that respondents right to possess had already ceased. On this premise, the CA concluded that the ejectment suit instituted by the petitioner was premature. The appellate court thus affirmed the appealed RTC decision, disposing:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is hereby denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, the petitioners complaint for Unlawful Detainer is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.With the CAs denial of her motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of February 28, 2002, petitioner is now before this Court raising the following issues:I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FOR BEING PREMATURE WHICH DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 448 AND 546 AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CODE ON USUFRUCT INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 1678 OF THE CIVIL CODE.The Court rules for the petitioner.The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that what was constituted between the parties herein is one of usufruct over a piece of land, with the petitioner being the owner of the property upon whom the naked title thereto remained and the respondents being two (2) among other unnamed usufructuaries who were simply referred to as petitioners kin. The Court, however, cannot go along with the CAs holding that the action for unlawful detainer must be dismissed on ground of prematurity.Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following wise:ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy anothers property.9It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi,10with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same.11It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986, supra, made known her intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of her property. There can also be no quibbling about the respondents being given the right "to build their own house" on the property and to stay thereat "as long as they like." Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks "proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties" for the petitioners "nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of (sic) in standing." The established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the property but also granted them, among the petitioners other kins, the right to enjoy the fruits thereof. We have no quarrel, therefore, with the CAs ruling that usufruct was constituted between petitioner and respondents. It is thus pointless to discuss why there was no lease contract between the parties.However, determinative of the outcome of the ejectment case is the resolution of the next issue, i.e., whether the existing usufruct may be deemed to have been extinguished or terminated. If the question is resolved in the affirmative, then the respondents right to possession, proceeding as it did from their right of usufruct, likewise ceased. In that case, petitioners action for ejectment in the unlawful detainer case could proceed and should prosper.The CA disposed of this issue in this wise:xxx Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides xxxxxx xxx xxxFrom the foregoing provision, it becomes apparent that for an action for unlawful detainer to prosper, the plaintiff [petitioner] needs to prove that defendants [respondents] right to possess already expired and terminated. Now, has respondents right to possess the subject portion of petitioners property expired or terminated? Let us therefore examine respondents basis for occupying the same.It is undisputed that petitioner expressly authorized respondents o occupy portion of her property on which their house may be built. Thus "it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein and stayas long as they like." From this statement, it seems that petitioner had given the respondents the usufructuary rights over the portion that may be occupied by the house that the latter would build, the duration of which being dependent on how long respondents would like to occupy the property. While petitioner had already demanded from the respondents the surrender of the premises, this Court is of the opinion that the usufructuary rights of respondents had not been terminated by the said demand considering the clear statement of petitioner that she is allowing respondents to occupy portion of her land as long as the latter want to. Considering that respondents still want to occupy the premises, petitioner clearly cannot eject respondents.12We disagree with the CAs conclusion of law on the matter. The term or period of the usufruct originally specified provides only one of the bases for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession of the thing given in usufruct. There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the Civil Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof" (Emphasis supplied). What may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear "that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another." That the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own." In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there were indeed facts and circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished by the occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct, namely, the document adverted to which the petitioner executed on July 21, 1986.As aptly pointed out by the petitioner in her Memorandum, respondents own evidence before the MTCC indicated that the relations between the parties "have deteriorated to almost an irretrievable level."13There is no doubt then that what impelled petitioner to file complaints before the local barangay lupon, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, and this instant complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is that she could not live peacefully and harmoniously with the Pernes family and vice versa.Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been terminated.To reiterate, the relationship between the petitioner and respondents respecting the property in question is one of owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents claim for reimbursement of the improvements they introduced on the property during the effectivity of the usufruct should be governed by applicable statutory provisions and principles on usufruct. In this regard, we cite with approval what Justice Edgardo Paras wrote on the matter:If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and 580. In case like this, the terms of the contract and the pertinent provisions of law should govern (3 Manresa 215-216; se also Montinola vs. Bantug, 71 Phil. 449).14(Emphasis ours.)By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on the property. We quote Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil Code:Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property. (Emphasis supplied.)Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property against any damage to the same.Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be ordered to vacate the premises without any right of reimbursement. If the rule on reimbursement or indemnity were otherwise, then the usufructuary might, as an author pointed out, improve the owner out of his property.15The respondents may, however, remove or destroy the improvements they may have introduced thereon without damaging the petitioners property.Out of the generosity of her heart, the petitioner has allowed the respondent spouses to use and enjoy the fruits of her property for quite a long period of time. They opted, however, to repay a noble gesture with unkindness. At the end of the day, therefore, they really cannot begrudge their aunt for putting an end to their right of usufruct. The disposition herein arrived is not only legal and called for by the law and facts of the case. It is also right.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the decision of the MTCC is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that all of respondents counterclaims are dismissed, including their claims for reimbursement of useful and necessary expenses.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 3314 January 3, 1907ANSELMO CHINGEN,Plaintiff-Appellant, vs.TOMAS ARGUELLES AND WIFE, ET AL.,Defendant-Appellees.On the 25th of October, 1905, the plaintiff, Anselmo Chingen, by his attorney, Claro Reyes, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, praying for judgment against the four defendants herein for one-half of the jewels therein mentioned and the rent of the property referred to therein, to wit, 4,170 pesos, or a half of 8,340 pesos received by the defendants since the date they took possession of the legacies left by the deceased Raymunda Reyes in her will - that is to say, since the 29th of May 1900 - which said legacies consisted of a house numbered 8, 10, 12, and 14 Calle Claviera, district of Binondo, two combs set with diamonds, and pearls, respectively a gold ring with three diamonds each, and a gold ring with one large and several diamonds, the defendants having refused to pay half of the earnings derived from the property left by the testatrix and the legacies referred to belonging to him as the surviving husband of the deceased, who died without legitimate heirs, ascendants or descendants all efforts to collect the sum thus claimed having failed., The plaintiff further prayed that the defendants be required to pay the costs, and for such other and further relief as the court might deem just and equitable. The defendant, by their attorney, Teodoro Gonzalez, after the demurrer of the complain had been overruled, filed an answer wherein they prayed that the action be dismissed with the costs against the plaintiff, admitting all the allegations of the complaint except such as were expressly or tacitly denied in their special answer, wherein they alleged that the legacies referred to in this complaint were unconditional legacies, specific and definite of property belonging to the testatrix, the value of which legacies did not exceed one half of the estate of which she could freely dispose, and therefore were not subject to the right of usufruct which ordinarily would belong to the plaintiff; that the testatrix made a partition of her property which became irrevocable, it not having been contested within the time prescribed by law by the widower plaintiff, the only one who could have maintained an action for the rescission of such partition, the said plaintiff having alienated a considerable part of the personal property assigned to him; and that the property bequeathed in these legacies was delivered t the defendant legatees by the plaintiff, who was the executor of the will. law libraryThe plaintiff filed a reply to the said answer, admitting all the facts alleged therein in paragraphs A, B, and C, thereof, except in so far as it was asserted that the right of usufruct did not extend to the property embraced in the legacies; that the value of the such property had not been included in the property of the estate and for his reason it was impossible to determine with certainty the value of one half of the entire estate; and that if the value of the said legacies was not included in the estate the right of usufruct which the surviving husband and upon one half of the property left by the testatrix would be jeopardized; and denying the consequences of paragraph C and the allegations contained in paragraphs D and E. law libraryAfter hearing the evidence introduced by both parties, the court entered judgment on the 6th of March, last, in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, dismissing the said complaint with the costs to the defendant, from which judgment the plaintiff excepted, and after his motion for a new trial was overruled excepted thereto. Article 837 of the Civil Code provides:If the testator should have neither legitimate ascendants or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one half of the estate also in usufruct.The object of the action brought by the plaintiff was to recover one half of the jewels mentioned in his complaint and one half of the rent accruing from a certain property, which said property, as well as the jewels in question, were delivered as part of their legacies to the legatees, Carmen Reyes, Jose Reyes, and Pedro Reyes, under the will of the deceased Raymunda Reyes.The plaintiff in his brief presented on appeal in this case seems to insists upon his original petition, for he claims this object is to recover the remainder of the property which belonged to him in usufruct under the law as the surviving spouse of the testatrix, citing to this end article 815 of the Civil Code. The main reliance of the plaintiff is that his deceased wife, the testatrix, did not assign to him in her will the entire portion which belonged to him; that is to say, one half of the estate in usufruct.In addition to this, the plaintiff should also have stated that he was one of the executors of the will in question, the first among those designate in clause 17 of the will; and that he, the plaintiff, and the minor Lamberto Reyna are the only heirs under the said will. This will account for the testatrix silence as to the usufructory portion pertaining to the husband. The testatrix left no legitimate descendants or ascendants. Her surviving husband was therefore entitled to the usufruct of one half of the estate. Where the surviving husband is also an heir under the will, as happens in the present case, the undivided portion assigned to him as such their in accordance with the terms of the will shall be considered as an integral part of the one half of the estate subject to the right of usufruct of such husband for the reason that the latter's right, even though he may be also an heir under the will, is not superior, and he is not object of the law is to equalize the condition of the heirs and of the surviving spouse who received nothing in addition to a share of the estate property, not as surviving spouse, but as an heir, which share he has already received and accepted.It is not just that the plaintiff, Anselmo Chingen, after receiving the property to which he was entitled be also testamentary heir of his deceased wife, should be also entitled to the usufruct so received by him was not included.The property of the estate of his deceased wife having been divided in two equal parts, the property to which the plaintiff was entitled as an heir under the will should have been taken out of the one half, subject to the usufruct of the surviving spouse. This done, the usufruct, of course, is extinguishedipso factoby the merger of such right of usufruct and ownership in the same person, as provided in paragraph 3 of article 513 of the Civil Code.It is absurd and contrary to all justices that the plaintiff should received his share as an heir under the will from one half of the estate and be further entitled to the usufrucrt of the other half to the prejudice of his coheir and the various legatees under the will. There is no law or article of the code which authorizes such an iniquitos privilegeIn any event the portion of the estate subject to the usufruct must be claimed from the heir or heirs in due time, and in the manner and form prescribed by law. law libraryIt appears from the record that the property of the estate was liquidated, distributed, and apportioned among the heirs and legatees under the will, the plaintiff, as the executor and heir of his deceased wife, and attorney Nazario Constantino, guardianad litemof the minor heir, Lamberto Reyna, being the only ones who took part in the proceedings were duly approved by the court. (Original bill of exceptions, pp. 15-23.) It appears from the proceedings in question that there were assigned to the plaintiff, Anselmo Chingen, the surviving husband of the deceased, as his share of the community property and his usufruct, property to the value of 9,740.12 pesos and 13,000 pesos as testamentary heir. virtual law libraryAccording to the will, a copy of which appears on pages 7 to 13 of the record, there were twelve legatees and some substitutes who were entitled to various classes of property described in detail in the said will, and, if it is true as contended by the executor, now the plaintiff in the will of the testatrix by delivering to the various legatees the property bequeathed to them by his deceased wife, it may be said that the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the rest of the estate having been made between the only two heirs, the plaintiff one of them, the estate is finally and definitely settled, for the partition of an estate puts an end to the undivided condition of the same, and confers upon each of the heirs the exclusive ownership of the property assigned to him. (Article 1068 of the Civil Code. ) The plaintiff, as has been said before, claims half of the jewels bequeathed to the legatees, and one half of the rents accruing from a certain house also bequeathed to the defendants, as his, the plaintiffs, usufructory portion. He has failed, however, to state the total value of the estate and the value of the one half of the property to which he claims to be entitled in usufruct. He has said absolutely nothing as to the nature and value of the property assigned to him in the partition of the estate, either as an heir or as a surviving spouse of the deceased. law libraryThe plaintiff does not seek to have the aforesaid partition set aside, nor can he ask such a thing, for the partition of the estate was made exclusively by him and the guardianad litemof this coheir. However, the property of the estate having been disturbed, and the plaintiff having disposed of some of the most valuable property awarded to him in said partition, as he himself admits (p. 14), and the properties having been actually delivered to the respective legatees, a new liquidation or settlement of the estate can not be had, and the partition made under the exclusive direction of the plaintiff as executor of the will of the deceased can not be set aside, since the same is expressly prohibited by the provisions of article 1078 of the Civil Code. Moreover, it has not been shown that the property bequeathed to the defendant legatees was included in the one half of the husband. The mere fact that the plaintiff delivered the said property to the legatees absolutely and unconditionally shows conclusively that his right of usufruct is intact and has not been injured in any way. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the legacy to which this action relates consists of a house and certain jewels and is according to the will, an unconditional legacy without any fixed period, and that the property thus bequeathed is specified in the said will and described as being of the exclusive ownership of the testatrix, so that the legatees were entitled to the property thus bequeathed to them from the death of the testatrix, and as owners of such property were also entitled to the fruits and earnings and any increase thereof, as well as liable for any los or impairment thereof. (Arts. 881, 882, Civil Code.) For the reasons hereinbefore set out and those contained in the judgment appealed from in so far as they conform with this decision, we are of the opinion that judgment should be affirmed, and the defendants are hereby absolved of the complaint of the plaintiff, Anselmo Chingen, with the costs against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter the case be remanded to the Court of First Instance of execution. So ordered.c[G.R. No. L-9023.November 13, 1956.]BISLIG BAY LUMBER COMPANY. INC.,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SURIGAO,Defendant-Appellant.

Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. is a timber concessionaire of a portion of public forest located in the provinces of Agusan and Surigao. With a view to developing and exploiting its concession, the company constructed at its expense a road from the barrio Mangagoy into the area of the concession in Surigao, with a length of approximately 5.3 kilometers, a portion of which, or about 580 linear meters, is on a private property of the company. The expenses incurred by the company in the construction of said road amounted to P113,370, upon which the provincial assessor of Surigao assessed a tax in the amount of P669.33.Of this amount, the sum of P595.92 corresponds to the road constructed within the area of the concession. This was paid under protest. Later, the company filed an action for its refund in the Court of First Instance of Manila alleging that the road is not subject to tax.Defendantfiled a motion to dismiss on two grounds (1) that the venue is improperly laid, and (2) that the complaint states no cause of action; this motion was denied. Thereafter,Defendantfiled its answer invoking the same defenses it set up in its motions to dismiss. In the meantime, Congress approved Republic Act No. 1125 creating the Court of Tax Appeals, whereuponPlaintiffmoved that the case be forwarded to the latter court as required by said Act. This motion however, was denied and, after due trial, the court rendered decision orderingDefendantto refund toPlaintiffthe amount claimed in the complaint. This is an appeal from said decision.The first error assigned refers to the jurisdiction of the lower court. It is contended that since the present case involves an assessment of land tax the determination of which comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals under Republic Act No. 1125, the lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case.It is true that under section 22 of said Act the only cases that are required to be certified and remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals which upon its approval are pending determination before a court of first instance are apparently confined to those involving disputed assessment of internal revenue taxes or custom duties, and the present case admittedly refers to an assessment of land tax, but it does not mean that because of that apparent omission or oversight the instant case should not be remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals, for in interpreting the context of the section above adverted to we should not ignore section 7 of the same act which defines the extent and scope of the jurisdiction of said court. As we have held in a recent case, section 22 of Republic Act No. 1125 should be interpreted in such a manner as to make it harmonize with section 7 of the same Act and that the primordial purpose behind the approval of said Act by Congress is to give to the Court of Tax Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all tax, customs, and real estate assessment cases through out the Philippines and to hear and decide them as soon as possible (Ollada vs. The Court of Tax Appeals, 99 Phil., 604). Considering this interpretation of the law, it logically follows that the lower court did not act properly in denying the motion to remand the instant case to the Court of Tax Appeals.Considering, however, that it would be more expeditious to decide this case now than to remand it to the Court of Tax Appeals because, even if this course is taken, it may ultimately be appealed to this court, we will now proceed to discuss the case on the merits.The Tax in question has been assessed under section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 470 which provides: SEC. 2.Incidence of real property tax. Except in chartered cities, there shall be levied, assessed, and collected, an annual ad- valorem tax on real property, including land, buildings, machinery, and other improvements not hereinafter specifically exempted.Note that said section authorizes the levy of real tax not only on lands, buildings, or machinery that may be erected thereon, but also on any other improvements, and considering the road constructed byAppelleeon the timber concession granted to it as an improvement,Appellantassessed the tax now in dispute upon the authority of the above provision of the law.It is the theory ofAppellantthat, inasmuch as the road was constructed byAppelleefor its own use and benefit it is subject to real tax even if it was constructed on a public land. On the other hand, it is the theory ofAppelleethat said road is exempt from real tax because (1) the road belongs to the national government by right of accession, (2) the road cannot be removed or separated from the land on which it is constructed and so it is part and parcel of the public land, and (3), according to the evidence, the road was built not only for the use and benefit ofAppelleebut also of the public in general.We are inclined to uphold the theory ofAppellee. In the first place, it cannot be disputed that the ownership of the road that was constructed byAppelleebelongs to the government by right accession not only because it is inherently incorporated or attached to the timber land leased toAppelleebut also because upon the expiration of the concession, said road would ultimately pass to the national government (Articles 440 and 445, new Civil Code;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryTabotabo vs. Molero, 22 Phil., 418). In the second place, while the road was constructed byAppelleeprimarily for its use and benefit, the privilege is not exclusive, for, under the lease contract entered into by theAppelleeand the government and by public in by the general. Thus, under said lease contract,Appelleecannot prevent the use of portions, of the concession for homesteading purposes (clause 12). It is also in duty bound to allow the free use of forest products within the concession for the personal use of individuals residing in or within the vicinity of the land (clause 13). The government has reserved the right to set aside communal forest for the use of the inhabitants of the region, and to set forest reserves for public uses (clause 14). It can also grant licenses covering any portion of the territory for the cutting and extraction of timber to be used in public works, for mining purposes, or for the construction of railway lines (clause 15). And, if it so desires, it can provide for logging railroad, cable ways timber chute os slide, telephone lines, pumping stations log landings, and other rights of way for the use of forest licensees, concessionaires, permittees, or other lessees (clause 26). In other words, the government has practically reserved the rights to use the road to promote its varied activities. Since, as above shown, the road in question cannot be considered as an improvement which belongs toAppellee, although in part is for its benefit, it is clear that the same cannot be the subject of assessment within the meaning of section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 470.We are not oblivious of the fact that the present assessment was made byAppellanton the strength of an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice, but we find that the same is predicated on authorities which are not in point, for they refer to improvements that belong to the lessee although constructed on lands belonging to the government. It is well settled that a real tax, being a burden upon the capital, should be paid by the owner of the land and not by a usufructuary (Mercado vs. Rizal, 67 Phil., 608; yArticle 597, new Civil Code).Appelleeis but a partial usufructuary of the road in question.Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.G.R. No. L-3691 November 21, 1951JACINTO DEL SAZ OROZCO y MORTERA and MARIA PAZ ALCANTARA,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.SALVADOR ARANETA, FRANCISCO DEL SAZ OROZCO Y LOPEZ, DOLORES DEL SAZ OROZCO Y LOPEZ, and the minors FELISA, EUGENIO, ANTONIO, JOSE, MARIA Y CARLOS, all surnamed DEL SAZ OROZCO Y LOPEZ whose natural guardian is DOA CONCEPCION LOPEZ VDA. DE DEL SAZ OROZCO,defendants-appellees.Eugenio del Saz Orozco died on February 7, 1922, leaving a will which he had executed on March 5, 1921, and was afterwards duly admitted to probate. The pertinent clause of that will provided that certain properties should be given in life usufruct to his son Jacinto del Saz Orozco y Mortera, with the obligation on his part to preserve said properties in favor of the other heirs who were declared the naked owners thereof. Among these properties were 5,714 shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, according to the project of partition executed pursuant to said will and duly approved by the court.On September 11, 1934, the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company declared and distributed stock dividends out of its surplus profits, the plaintiff receiving his proportionate portion of 11,428 shares. On November 17, 1939, said Mining Company again declared stock dividends out of its surplus profits, of which the plaintiff received 17,142 shares, making a total of 28,570 shares.The question at this issue is whether the stock dividend is part of the capital which should be preserved in favor of the owners or an income of fruits of the capital which should be given to and enjoyed by the life usufructuary, the plaintiff herein, as his own exclusive property.The same question was raised in the Matter of the Testate Estate of Emil Maurice Bachrach,*G.R. No. L-2659 the decision of which was promulgated on October 12, 1950. In that case, the question raised was stated as follows:Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to the usufructuary, or is it capital or part of the corpus of the estate, which pertains to the remainderman. That is the question raised in this appeal.In said case, Emil Maurice Bachrach was the owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. He received 54,000 shares, representing 50 per cent stock dividend on said original shares. On June 10, 1948, Mary MacDonald Bachrach as life tenant or usufructuary of the estate filed a motion asking the Court of First Instance to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of Emil Maurice Bachrach, to transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificates of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, was fruit or income and, therefore, belonged to her as usufructuary. The other heirs of Bachrach opposed the motion on the ground that the stock dividend was part of the capital or corpus of the estate and belonged to the remainderman. The court granted the motion and the other heirs appealed.Justice Ozaeta, with the unanimous concurrence of the other members of this Court, ruled that a dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and, consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can be declared only out of profits of the corporation, for it were declared out of the capital it would be a serious violation of the law.For the reason sustaining the doctrine, we refer to that recent decision.The appellees attempt to differentiate the present case from that case, contending that, while the doctrine in that case effected a just and equitable distribution, the application of it in the present case would cause an injustice, for, quoting Justice Holmes, "abstract propositions do not decide concrete cases." We have examined the two cases carefully and we have not perceived any difference which would justify a reversal or modification of the doctrine in the Bachrach case.One of the differences pointed out is that by the declaration of stock dividends the voting power of the original shares of stock is considerably diminished, and, if the stock dividends are not given to the remaindermen, the voting power of the latter would be greatly impaired. Bearing in mind that the number of shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining company is so large, the diminution of the voting power of the original shares of stock in this case cannot possibly affect or influence the control of the policies of the corporation which is vested in the owners of the great block of shares. This would not be a sufficient reason for modifying the doctrine of the Bachrach case. These remarks are made in answer to the argument of the appellees in this particular case, but they do not imply that if the diminution of the voting power were considerable the doctrine should be modified.With regard to the sum of P3,428.40 which is alleged to have been received by the plaintiff from the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, as a result of the reduction of its capital in January, 1926, it appears that it has not been proven that the plaintiff has received said sum; on the contrary, it was denied by him as soon as he arrived in the Philippines from Spain. There is no ground, therefore, for ordering the plaintiff to deliver such sum to the defendants.In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is declared that the stock dividends amounting to 28,570 shares, above mentioned, belongs to the plaintiff-appellant Jacinto del Saz Orozco y Mortera exclusively and in absolute ownership. Without costs. It is so ordered.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. L-51333 May 18, 1989RAMONA R. LOCSIN, accompanied by her husband RENATO L. LOCSIN; TERESITA R. GUANZON, accompanied by her husband ROMEO G. GUANZON; CELINA R. SIBUG; accompanied by her husband CARLOS V. SIBUG; MA. LUISA R. PEREZ, accompanied by her husband JOSE V. PEREZ; EDITHA R. YLANAN, accompanied by her husband CARLOS W. YLANAN; and ANA MARIE R. BENEDICTO, accompanied by her husband JOSE LUIS U. BENEDICTO,petitioners,vs.HONORABLE JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch III and SPOUSES JOSEPH SCHON, and HELEN BENNETT SCHON,respondents.G.R. No. 52289 May 19, 1989RAMONA R. LOCSIN, accompanied by her husband RENATO L. LOCSIN; TERESITA R. GUANZON, accompanied by her husband ROMEO G. GUANZON; CELINA R. SIBUG; accompanied by her husband CARLOS V. SIBUG; MA. LUISA R. PEREZ, accompanied by her husband JOSE V. PEREZ; EDITHA R. YLANAN, accompanied by her husband CARLOS W. YLANAN; and ANA MARIE R. BENEDICTO, accompanied by her husband JOSE LUIS U. BENEDICTO,petitioners,vs.CARLOS PANALIGAN, AMADO MARQUEZ, HERBERT PEDROS, ANTONIO FELICIANO, JR., HUGO AGUILOS, ALBERTO GUBATON, JULIA VDA. DE ESQUELITO, SERAFIN JANDOQUELE, SEFERIAS ESQUESIDA, CARLOS DELA CRUZ, ELISEO GELONGOS, ESPINDION JOCSON, SALVADOR MUNUN, ULFIANO ALEGRIA, and IRENEO BALERA, and Spouses JOSEPH SCHON, and HELEN BENNETTE SCHON,respondents.G.R. No. L-51333 May 18, 1989RAMONA R. LOCSIN, accompanied by her husband RENATO L. LOCSIN; TERESITA R. GUANZON, accompanied by her husband ROMEO G. GUANZON; CELINA R. SIBUG; accompanied by her husband CARLOS V. SIBUG; MA. LUISA R. PEREZ, accompanied by her husband JOSE V. PEREZ; EDITHA R. YLANAN, accompanied by her husband CARLOS W. YLANAN; and ANA MARIE R. BENEDICTO, accompanied by her husband JOSE LUIS U. BENEDICTO,petitioners,vs.HONORABLE JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch III and SPOUSES JOSEPH SCHON, and HELEN BENNETT SCHON,respondents.There are before us for review the following: (1) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch 3, in Civil Case No. 13823; and (2) the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, 11th Judicial District, in CAR Case No. 76. Both of these decisions dismissed the petitioners' complaints for lack of jurisdiction.Petitioners Ramona R. Locsin, Teresita R. Guanzon, Celina R. Sibug, Ma. Lusia R. Perez, Editha R. Ylanan and Ana Marie R. Benedicto were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land known as "Hacienda Villa Regalado" located in Barrio Panubigan, Canlaon City, Negros Occidental. The tract of land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-494 and there more particularly described in the following terms:TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLENO. T-4941. Carlos Panaligan2.00 Ha.

2. Amado Marquez1.50 Ha.

3. Herbert Pedros1.50 Ha.

4. Antonio Feliciano, Jr.2.00 Ha.

5. Hugo Aguilos3.50 Ha.

6. Alberto Gubaton8.90 Ha.

7. Hulo Aguilos1.32 Ha.

8. Julia Vda. de Esquelito2.25 Ha.

9. Carlos Panaligan1.25 Ha.

10. Serafin Jandoquele5.35 Ha.

11. Seferias Esquesida2.00 Ha.

12. Carlos de la Cruz4.70 Ha.

13 Eliseo Gelongos3.00 Ha.

14. Espindion Jocson5.55 Ha.

15. Salvador Munon1.5884 Ha.

16. Ulfiano Alegria1.85 Ha.

17. Ireneo Balera8.30 Ha.

TOTAL56.555Ha.2

A parcel of land (Lot 2-G) of the subdivision plan Psd-28446, Sheet 2, being a portion of Lot 2 (remaining portion) described in plan II-6992, G.L.R.O. Record No. 133), situated in the Barrio of Panubigan, Municipality of Canlaon Province of Negros Occidental, Bounded on the N., by Lot 2-A of the subdivision plan; on the E., and S., by Binalbagan River; on the W., by Lot 2-E of the subdivision plan; on the NW., by Lots 2-F and 2-A of the subdivision plan. ...containing an area of THREE MILLION THIRTY-THREE THOUSAND AND FORTY EIGHT (3,033,048) square meters, more or less.1

A portion of this land, known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 and consisting of an area of 60.07464 hectares, was subject to the lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon:. The bulk of this lot was cultivated by the following lessees-tenants who customarily delivered the rental to Helen Schon:TENANTSOn 22 October 1972, after the onset of the martial law administration of former President Marcos, Presidential Decree No. 27 was promulgated, decreeing the "Emancipation of Tenants." The tract of land owned in common by the petitioners, including the portion thereof subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights, fell within the scope of "Operation Land Transfer." In consequence, staff members of the Department of Agrarian Relations Identified the tenant-tillers of said land, and the necessary parcellary map sketch was made and submitted to the Bureau of Lands Office in Dumaguete City.3Petitioners through counsel sought the opinion of the DAR as to who (petitioners or respondent Helen Schon) should be entitled to receive the rental payments which continued to be made by the respondent tenants to Helen Schon. The DAR District Officer rendered an opinion on 30 May 1977 that the rental payments as of 22 October 1972 were properly considered as amortization payments for the land and as such should pertain to the land- owners and not to the usufructuary.41. Civil Case No. 13828, Court of First Instance of Negros OccidentalOn 22 May 1978, petitioners filed against the spouses Joseph and Helen Schon Civil Case No. 13828 in the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for collection of rentals plus damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. There petitioners claimed that since the land subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights was among the parcels of land which colectively had been declared by the DAR as a land reform area pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, the rental payments which the respondent spouses had been colecting from the tenants really pertained and should be delivered to petitioners, beginning from 21 October 1972, as constituting or forming part of the amortization payments for the land to be made by the tenants. Petitioners sought in that case to recover from the Schons all such previous rentals or the money value thereof, and prayed for injunction to prevent the respondents from collecting any further rental payments from the tenants of the land involved.Upon the other hand, in their Answer filed on 12 July 1978, the respondents Schon contended that under the provisions of Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946 dated 17 June 1976, and given the facts involved in Civil Case No. 13823, the Court of First Instance was bereft of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. That jurisdiction, the Schon spouses urged, was vested in the CAR instead. Respondents further argued that, upon the assumption arguendo that the Court of First Instance did have jurisdiction, Article 609 of the Civil Code must in any case be applied by that court in resolving the case .52. CAR Case No. 76, Court of Agrarian RelationsApproximately five (5) months after filing their complaint before the Negros Occidental Court of First Instance, petitioners filed a second complaint on 13 October 1978, this time with the Court of Agrarian Relations, 11th Judicial District, San Carlos City. In this complaint before the Agrarian Court, petitioners impleaded as co-respondents of the spouses Schon the tenants who were cultivating the land burdened with the usufruct of Helen Schon. Petitioners prayed that the respondent tenants be required to pay to petitioners (rather than to the spouses Schon) all future rentals beginning with the crop year of 1978 and every year thereafter, until full payment of the amortization payments computed by the DAR. In their Answer, the respondents Schon once again asserted lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, this time on the part of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Respondents contended that the dispute between petitioners and respondents Schon related to the continued existence or termination of the usufructuary rights of Helen Schon, which issue did not constitute an agrarian dispute and therefore had to be litigated elsewhere, i.e., before the regular courts of first instance.The respondent tenants, for their part, agreed with the Schons that there was no tenancy relationship existing in respect of the land cultivated by them, since such land had already been brought within the ambit of "Operation Land Transfer", and prayed that the petitioners and the usufructuary be required to litigate among themselves their respective rights before the proper court.3. Dismissal of Civil Case No. 13823 and CAR Case No. 76On 15 February 1979, the Agrarian Court rendered a decision dismissing petitioners' complaint in CAR Case No. 76. The Court of Agrarian Relations held that it had no jurisdiction to decide the case:... it is crystal clear that the contending parties are actually Ramona R. Locsin, et al., and the naked owners of 101 hectares of subject agricultural land, on one hand, and Helen Bennett-Schon, who is the usufructuary of the same land, on the other.For all legal intents and purposes, Helen Bennett-Schon belongs to the category of a landowner, since she is the recipient of any and all fruit derived from the land of which the plaintiffs are the naked owners. The usufruct lasts for as long as Helen Bennett-Schon lives. Therefore,this case actually is a dispute between two landowners one, the naked owners, the other, the beneficial owner hose controversy revolves on who of them should receive the rentals being paid by the tenants or lessees on the land in question. Consequently, there is as between the two contending parties, no agrarian dispute which this Court may take cognizance of.Under the circumstances, it is the considered stand of this Court that it is not the proper forum both with respect to the second amended complaint and with respect to the petition for appointment of a receiver.WHEREFORE, RESOLVING BOTH THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND THE PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER, THE LATTER BEING ONLY A REPLAY OF THE FORMER, BOTH ARE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION (pp. 7-8 Decision)6Petitioners appealed the decision of the Agrarian Court to the Court of Appeals, the appeal being there docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 09-440. In a Decision dated 27 November 1979, however, the Court of Appeals ruled that since the only issue presented in the appeal was whether or not the Court of Agrarian Relations had jurisdiction to try and decide CAR Case No. 76, the appeal raised "a pure question of law" and certified the case to the Supreme Court for the latter's disposition.We turn to Civil Case No. 13823. On 16 March 1979, the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental issued an order also dismissing the complaint of petitioners on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide that case. The Court of First Instance held that it was the Court of Agrarian Relations that had jurisdiction over the case, and rationalized this position in the following manner:In determining whether this Court has jurisdiction, necessarily,a determination should first be made as to the nature of the lease rentals that were being paid to the defendants by the tenants-lessees. There is no question that on May 30, 1977, the Provincial Chairman of Operation Land Transfer rendered an opinion that the rentals as of October 21, 1972 was to be considered as amortization payment to the land and as such should pertain to the land owners and not to the usufructuary, the defendants herein (Annex 'B' of the Complaint). Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946 enumerates the case that falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, as follows:(a) Cases involving the rights and obligation of persons in cultivation and use of agricultural land ...;(b) Questions involving rights granted and obligations im posed by law, presidential decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations issued and promulgations in relation to the agrarian reform program ...;(c) Cases involving the collection of amortization on payment for lands acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27 as amended ...Itcould be seen from the above that the jurisdiction given to the Court of Agrarian Relations is so broad and sweeping as to cover the issue involved in the present case.... the agricultural leasehold relation is not limited to that of a purely landlord and tenant relationship.The agricultural leasehold relationship is established also with respect to the person who furnished the landholding either as owner, civil lessee,usufructuaryor legal possessorand the person who cultivates the same. It might as well be asked whether the opinion of the Provincial Chairman of Operation Land Transfer previously adverted to and which is now one of the issues in this incident would involve the determination of the rights granted and obligations imposed in relation to the agrarian reform program. The search for an answer need not be deferred as reference to Par. (b) of Presidential Decree No. 49 provides such answer-x x x x x x x x xQuestions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by the law, presidential decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations issued and promulgations in relation to the agrarian reform program.Clearly,the determination of the nature of the payment made by the tenants to the defendants herein is a question which involved the right of the tenants in relation to the land reform program of the government.7The above order of the Negros Occidental Court of First Instance was brought directly to us by petitioners on a Petition for Review in G.R. No. 51333.G.R. No. 51333 and G.R. No. 52289 were consolidated by a Resolution of this Court dated 16 June 1982.The consolidated cases present the question of which court had jurisdiction to decide one and the other case. Both the Court of First Instance and the agrarian Court were persuaded by the adroit and disingenuous pleading of respondent Schon's counsel. Beyond the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter, is, of course, the substantive question of twhether the peitioner as naked owners of the land subjected to the beneficial owner's right of Helen Schon, became entitled to the payment's made by the tenants or lessees of such land from and after the property was declared part of a land reform area.The issue of which court is vested with jurisdiction over Civil Case no. 13823 and CAR Case No. 76 is, happily, no longer a live one. Jurisdiction overboth casesis clearly vested in the appropiateRegional Trial Courtin view of the provisions of Section 19(7) ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 129 which was enacted by theBatasang Pambansaon 10 August 1981 and fully implemented on 14 February 1983.8Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:xxx xxx xxx(7) In all civil actions and special proceedingsfalling within the exclusive origin al jurisdictionof juvenile and domestic relations courts andof the courts of agrarian relations as now provided by law;xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)The Regional Trial Courts have full authority and jurisdiction to interpret and apply both the mass of statutes and rules and regulations relating to land reform and the general civil law, including the law on usufruct. Unlike a regional trial court sitting as a probate court, a region al trial court seized of an agrarian dispute and interpreting and applying statutes and administrative rules and regulations concerning land reform and the sliminations of agricultural tenancy relationships, continues to act as a court of general and plenary jurisdiction. Section 44 of b.P. Blg. 129 abolished the Courts of Agrarian Relations and did not re-create them.We note that resolution of the underlying substantive issues here raised requires examination of both land reform statutes and related rules and regulations (and as well the practice of the relevant administrative agency or executive department) and the Civil Code provisions on usufruct.Mindful of the length of timewhich has gone by since the first of the consolidated cases reched this Court, and in the effort to render expeditious justice, we have considered whether we should now confront and resolve the issue relating to the legal character of the payments made by the respondents tenants-lessees since 21 October 1972 to respondent Helen Schon, as well as the issue relating to the possible application of Article 609 of the Civil Code. Because, however, of the nature and importance of the first issue, and considering that the pleadings and the records of theses two (2) cases are bare of any substantial discussion by the parties on both issues, the Court feels it would not be prudent to resolve those issues without further proceedings. We are convinced, however, that those issues are primarily, if not wholly, issues of law rather than of fact and that hence there appears no need to remand these cases to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings there. Instead, we shall require the parties to file memoranda on the issues above indicated, and the direct the Solicitor General to intervene in these cases and to file a memorandum addressing the same issues.ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to: (1) REQUIRE the petition and private respondents in G.R. Nos. 51333 and 52289 to file simultaneous memoranda addressing the substantive issues identified above, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, and to FURNISH the Solicitor General a copy of their respective memoranda; and (2) to DIRECT the Solicitor General to file a motion for intervention on behalf of the government and a memorandum on the same substantive questions within thirty (30) days from receipt of petitioners' and private respondents' memoranda.SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 107132.October 8, 1999]MAXIMA HEMEDES,petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINIUM REALTY AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, ENRIQUE D. HEMEDES, and R & B INSURANCE CORPORATION,respondents.[G.R. No. 108472.October 8, 1999]R & B INSURANCE CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DOMINIUM REALTY AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, ENRIQUE D. HEMEDES and MAXIMA HEMEDES,respondents.D E C I S I O NGONZAGA_REYES,J.:Assailed in these petitions for review oncertiorariis the decision[1]of the eleventh division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22010 promulgated on September 11, 1992 affirmingin totothe decision of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Laguna in Civil Case No. B-1766 dated February 22, 1989,[2]and the resolution dated December 29, 1992 denying petitioner R & B Insurance Corporations (R & B Insurance) motion for reconsideration.As the factual antecedents and issues are the same, we shall decide the petitions jointly.The instant controversy involves a question of ownership over an unregistered parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6, plan Psu-111331, with an area of 21,773 square meters, situated in Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.It was originally owned by the late Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes.On March 22, 1947 Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory Conditions[3]whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the following resolutory conditions:(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the children, or their heirs, of the DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE in a public document conveying the property to the latter; or(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE before her death or remarriage contained in a public instrument as above provided, the title to the property shall automatically revert to the legal heirs of the DONOR in common.Pursuant to the first condition abovementioned, Justa Kausapin executed on September 27, 1960 a Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion[4]conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property under the following terms -That the said parcel of land was donated unto me by the said Jose Hemedes, my deceased husband, in a deed of DONATION INTER VIVOS WITH RESOLUTORY CONDITIONS executed by the donor in my favor, and duly accepted by me on March 22, 1947, before Notary Public Luis Bella in Cabuyao, Laguna;That the donation is subject to the resolutory conditions appearing in the said deed of DONATION INTER VIVOS WITH RESOLUTORY CONDITIONS, as follows:(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the children, or their heirs, of the DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE in a public document conveying the property to the latter; or(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE before her death or remarriage contained in a public instrument as above provided, the title to the property shall automatically revert to the legal heirs of the DONOR in common.That, wherefore, in virtue of the deed of donation above mentioned and in the exercise of my right and privilege under the terms of the first resolutory condition therein contained and hereinabove reproduced, and for and in consideration of my love and affection, I do hereby by these presents convey, transfer, and deed unto my designee, MAXIMA HEMEDES, of legal age, married to RAUL RODRIGUEZ, Filipino and resident of No. 15 Acacia Road, Quezon City, who is one of the children and heirs of my donor, JOSE HEMEDES, the ownership of, and title to the property hereinabove described, and all rights and interests therein by reversion under the first resolutory condition in the above deed of donation; Except the possession and enjoyment of the said property which shall remain vested in me during my lifetime, or widowhood and which upon my death or remarriage shall also automatically revert to, and be transferred to my designee, Maxima Hemedes.Maxima Hemedes, through her counsel, filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over the subject unregistered land.Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (0-941) 0-198[5]was issued in the name of Maxima Hemedes married to Raul Rodriguez by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna on June 8, 1962, with the annotation that Justa Kausapin shall have the usufructuary rights over the parcel of land herein described during her lifetime or widowhood.It is claimed by R & B Insurance that on June 2, 1964, Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the subject property in its favor to serve as security for a loan which they obtained in the amount of P6,000.00.On February 22, 1968, R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the loan even after it became due on August 2, 1964.The land was sold at a public auction on May 3, 1968 with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder and a certificate of sale was issued by the sheriff in its favor.Since Maxima Hemedes failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, R & B Insurance executed an Affidavit of Consolidation dated March 29, 1974 and on May 21, 1975 the Register of Deeds of Laguna cancelled OCT No. (0-941) 0-198 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 41985 in the name of R & B Insurance.The annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was maintained in the new title.[6]Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin executed a Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes, pursuant to the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her late husband Jose Hemedes.Enrique D. Hemedes obtained two declarations of real property - in 1972, and again, in 1974, when the assessed value of the property was raised.Also, he has been paying the realty taxes on the property from the time Justa Kausapin conveyed the property to him in 1971 until 1979.In the cadastral survey of Cabuyao, Laguna conducted from September 8, 1974 to October 10, 1974, the property was assigned Cadastral No. 2990, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, in the name of Enrique Hemedes.Enrique Hemedes is also the named owner of the property in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office at Calamba, Laguna.On February 28, 1979, Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation (Dominium).On April 10, 1981, Justa Kausapin executed an affidavit affirming the conveyance of the subject property in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes as embodied in the Kasunduan dated May 27, 1971, and at the same time denying the conveyance made to Maxima Hemedes.On May 14, 1981, Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia Brewery) who, even before the signing of the contract of lease, constructed two warehouses made of steel and asbestos costing about P10,000,000.00 each.Upon learning of Asia Brewerys constructions upon the subject property, R & B Insurance sent it a letter on March 16, 1981 informing the former of its ownership of the property as evidenced by TCT No. 41985 issued in its favor and of its right to appropriate the constructions since Asia Brewery is a builder in bad faith.On March 27, 1981, a conference was held between R & B Insurance and Asia Brewery but they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.On May 8, 1981, Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery wherein she asserted that she is the rightful owner of the subject property by virtue of OCT No. (0-941) 0-198 and that, as such, she has the right to appropriate Asia Brewerys constructions, to demand its demolition, or to compel Asia Brewery to purchase the land.In another letter of the same date addressed to R & B Insurance, Maxima Hemedes denied the execution of any real estate mortgage in favor of the latter.On August 27, 1981, Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint[7]with the Court of First Instance of Binan, Laguna for the annulment of TCT No. 41985 issued in favor of R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property.Specifically, the complaint alleged that Dominium was the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the February 28, 1979 deed of sale executed by Enrique D. Hemedes, who in turn obtained ownership of the land from Justa Kausapin, as evidenced by the Kasunduan dated May 27, 1971.The plaintiffs asserted that Justa Kausapin never transferred the land to Maxima Hemedes and that Enrique D. Hemedes had no knowledge of the registration proceedings initiated by Maxima Hemedes.After considering the merits of the case, the trial court rendered judgment on February 22, 1989 in favor of plaintiffs Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes, the dispositive portion of which statesWHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:(a) Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41985 of the Register of Deeds of Laguna null and void and ineffective;(b) Declaring Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation the absolute owner and possessor of the parcel of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;(c) Ordering the defendants and all persons acting for and/or under them to respect such ownership and possession of Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation and to forever desist from asserting adverse claims thereon nor disturbing such ownership and possession; and(d) Directing the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41985 in the name of R & B Insurance Corporation, and in lieu thereof, issue a new transfer certificate of title in the name of Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation.No pronouncement as to costs and attorneys fees.[8]Both R & B Insurance and Maxima Hemedes appealed from the trial courts decision.On September 11, 1992 the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decisionin totoand on December 29, 1992, it denied R & B Insurances motion for reconsideration.Thus, Maxima Hemedes and R & B Insurance filed their respective petitions for review with this Court on November 3, 1992 and February 22, 1993, respectively.In G.R. No. 107132[9],petitioner Maxima Hemedes makes the following assignment of errors as regards public respondents rulingIRESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 1332 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IN DECLARING AS SPURIOUS THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF UNREGISTERED REAL PROPERTY BY REVERSION EXECUTED BY JUSTA KAUSAPIN IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER MAXIMA HEMEDES.IIRESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS VOID AND OF NO LEGAL EFFECT THE KASUNDUAN DATED 27 MAY 1971 EXECUTED BY JUSTA KAUSAPIN IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT ENRIQUE HEMEDES AND THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY RESPONDENT ENRIQUE HEMEDES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT DOMINIUM REALTY AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION.IIIRESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENTS ENRIQUE AND DOMINIUM IN BAD FAITH.IVRESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. (0-941) 0-198 ISSUED IN THE NAME OF PETITIONER MAXIMA HEMEDES NULL AND VOID.VRESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT NO LOAN WAS OBTAINED BY PETITIONER MAXIMA HEMEDES FROM RESPONDENT R & B INSURANCE CORPORATION.VIRESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT NO REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS EXECUTED BY PETITIONER MAXIMA HEMEDES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT R & B INSURANCE CORPORATION.VIIRESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE VALID TITLE COVERING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. (0-941) 0-198 IN THE NAME OF PETITIONER MAXIMA HEMEDES AND NOT THE TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (TCT) NO. 41985 IN THE NAME OF R & B INSURANCE CORPORATION.[10]Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 108472[11],petitioner R & B Insurance assigns almost the same errors, except with regards to the real estate mortgage allegedly executed by Maxima Hemedes in its favor.Specifically, R & B Insurance alleges that:IRESPONDENT COURT ERRONEOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 1332 OF THE CIVIL CODE.IIRESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE ON (sic) THE KASUNDUAN BY AND BETWEEN JUSTA KAUSAPIN AND ENRIQUE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT JUSTA KAUSAPIN BY WAY OF A DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF UNREGISTERED REAL PROPERTY BY REVERSION CEDED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO MAXIMA SOME ELEVEN (11) YEARS EARLIER.IIIRESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE ON (sic) THE AFFIDAVIT OF REPUDIATION OF JUSTA KAUSAPIN NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SHE IS A BIAS (sic) WITNESS AND EXECUTED THE SAME SOME TWENTY-ONE (21) YEARS AFTER THE EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE IN FAVOR OF MAXIMA.IVRESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINT OF ENRIQUE AND DOMINIUM HAS PRESCRIBED AND/OR THAT ENRIQUE AND DOMINIUM WERE GUILTY OF LACHES.VRESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING R & B AS A MORTGAGEE NOT IN GOOD FAITH.VIRESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE DAMAGES PRAYED FOR BY R & B IN ITS COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSSCLAIM.[12]The primary issue to be resolved in these consolidated petitions is which of the two conveyances by Justa Kausapin, the first in favor of Maxima Hemedes and the second in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes, effectively transferred ownership over the subject land.The Register of Deeds of Laguna issued OCT No. (0-941) 0-198 in favor of Maxima Hemedes on the strength of the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion executed by Justa Kausapin.Public respondent upheld the trial courts finding that such deed is sham and spurious and has no evidentiary value under the law upon which claimant Maxima Hemedes may anchor a valid claim of ownership over the property. In ruling thus, it gave credence to the April 10, 1981 affidavit executed by Justa Kausapin repudiating such deed of conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes and affirming the authenticity of the Kasunduan in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes.Also, it considered as pivotal the fact that the deed of conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes was in English and that it was not explained to Justa Kausapin, although she could not read nor understand English; thus, Maxima Hemedes failed to discharge her burden, pursuant to Article 1332 of the Civil Code, to show that the terms thereof were fully explained to Justa Kausapin.Public respondent concluded by holding that the registration of the property on the strength of the spurious deed of conveyance is null and void and does not confer any right of ownership upon Maxima Hemedes.[13]Maxima Hemedes argues that Justa Kausapins affidavit should not be given any credence since she is obviously a biased witness as it has been shown that she is dependent upon Enrique D. Hemedes for her daily subsistence, and she was most probably influenced by Enrique D. Hemedes to execute the Kasunduan in his favor.She also refutes the applicability of article 1332.It is her contention that for such a provision to be applicable, there must be a party seeking to enforce a contract; however, she is not enforcing the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion as her basis in claiming ownership, but rather her claim is anchored upon OCT No. (0-941) 0-198 issued in her name, which document can stand independently from the deed of conveyance.Also, there exist various circumstances which show that Justa Kausapin did in fact execute and understand the deed of conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes.First, the Donation Intervivos With Resolutory Conditions executed by Jose Hemedes in favor of Justa Kausapin was also in English, but she never alleged that she did not understand such document.Secondly, Justa Kausapin failed to prove that it was not her thumbmark on the deed of conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes and in fact, both Enrique D. Hemedes and Dominium objected to the request of Maxima Hemedes counsel to obtain a specimen thumbmark of Justa Kausapin.[14]Public respondents finding that the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property By Reversion executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Maxima Hemedes is spurious is not supported by the factual findings in this case..It is grounded upon the mere denial of the same by Justa Kausapin.A party to a contract cannot just evade compliance with his contractual obligations by the simple expedient of denying the execution of such contract.If, after a perfect and binding contract has been executed between the parties, it occurs to one of them to allege some defect therein as a reason for annulling it, the alleged defect must be conclusively proven, since the validity and fulfillment of contracts cannot be left to the will of one of the contracting parties.[15]Although a comparison of Justa Kausapins thumbmark with the thumbmark affixed upon the deed of conveyance would have easily cleared any doubts as to whether or not the deed was forged, the records do not show that such evidence was introduced by private respondents and the lower court decisions do not make mention of any comparison having been made.[16]It is a legal presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.[17]The failure of private respondents to refute the due execution of the deed of conveyance by making a comparison with Justa Kausapins thumbmark necessarily leads one to conclude that she did in fact affix her thumbmark upon the deed of donation in favor of her stepdaughter.Moreover, public respondents reliance upon Justa Kausapins repudiation of the deed of conveyance is misplaced for there are strong indications that she is a biased witness.The trial court found that Justa Kausapin was dependent upon Enrique D. Hemedes for financial assistance.[18]Justa Kausapins own testimony attests to this fact -Atty. Conchu:Q:Aling Justa, can you tell the Honorable Court why you donated this particular property to Enrique Hemedes?A:Because I was in serious condition and he was the one supporting me financially.Q:As of today, Aling Justa are you continuing to receive any assistance from Enrique Hemedes?A:Yes Sir.(TSN pp. 19 and 23, November 17, 1981)[19]Even Enrique Hemedes admitted that Justa Kausapin was dependent upon him for financial support.The transcripts state as follows:Atty. Mora:Now you said that Justa Kausapin has been receiving from you advances for food, medicine & other personal or family needs?E. Hemedes:A:Yes.Q:Was this already the practice at the time this Kasunduan was executed?A:No that was increased, no, no, after this document.xxxxxxxxQ:And because of these accommodations that you have given to Justa Kausapin; Justa Kausapin has in turn treated you very well because shes very grateful for that, is it not?A:I think thats human nature.Q:Answer me categorically, Mr. Hemedes shes very grateful?A:Yes she might be grateful but not very grateful.(TSN, p. 34, June 15, 1984)[20]A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false.[21]At the time the present case was filed in the trial court in 1981, Justa Kausapin was already 80 years old, suffering from worsening physical infirmities and completely dependent upon her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes for support.It is apparent that Enrique D. Hemedes could easily have influenced his aging stepmother to donate the subject property to him.Public respondent should not have given credence to a witness that was obviously biased and partial to the cause of private respondents.Although it is a well-established rule that the matter of credibility lies within the province of the trial court, such rule does not apply when the witness credibility has been put in serious doubt, such as when there appears on the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.[22]Finally, public respondent was in error when it sustained the trial courts decision to nullify the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion for failure of Maxima Hemedes to comply with article 1332 of the Civil Code, which states:When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.Article 1332 was intended for the protection of a party to a contract who is at a disadvantage due to his illiteracy, ignorance, mental weakness or other handicap.[23]This article contemplates a situation wherein a contract has been entered into, but the consent of one of the parties is vitiated by mistake or fraud committed by the other contracting party.[24]This is apparent from the ordering of the provisions under Book IV, Title II, Chapter 2, section 1 of the Civil Code, from which article 1332 is taken.Article 1330 states that -A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.This is immediately followed by provisions explaining what constitutes mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud sufficient to vitiate consent.[25]In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract.[26]Fraud, on the other hand, is present when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to.[27]Clearly, article 1332 assumes that the consent of the contracting party imputing the mistake or fraud was given, although vitiated, and does not cover a situation where there is a complete absence of consent.In this case, Justa Kausapin disclaims any knowledge of the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion in favor of Maxima Hemedes.In fact, she asserts that it was only during the hearing conducted on December 7, 1981 before the trial court that she first caught a glimpse of the deed of conveyance and thus, she could not have possibly affixed her thumbmark thereto.[28]It is private respondents own allegations which render article 1332 inapplicable for it is useless to determine whether or not Justa Kausapin was induced to execute said deed of conveyance by means of fraud employed by Maxima Hemedes, who allegedly took advantage of the fact that the former could not understand English, when Justa Kausapin denies even having seen the document before the present case was initiated in 1981.It has been held by this Court that mere preponderance of evidence is not sufficient to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the effect that the grantor executed a certain document and acknowledged the fact of its execution before him.To accomplish this result, the evidence must be so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the certificate, and when the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld.[29]In the present case, we hold that private respondents have failed to produce clear, strong, and convincing evidence to overcome the positive value of the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion a notarized document.The mere denial of its execution by the donor will not suffice for the purpose.In upholding the deed of conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes, we must concomitantly rule that Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights over the subject property.Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had earlier transferred to Maxima Hemedes the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the first condition stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband.Thus, the donation in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not exist at the time of the transfer, having already been transferred to his sister.[30]Similarly, the sale of the subject property by Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more rights than its predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an innocent purchaser for value since Enrique D. Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon which it relied.The declarations of real property by Enrique D. Hemedes, his payment of realty taxes, and his being designated as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey of Cabuyao, Laguna and in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office in Calamba, Laguna cannot defeat a certificate of title, which is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.[31]Particularly, with regard to tax declarations and tax receipts, this Court has held on several occasions that the same do not by themselves conclusively prove title to land.[32]We come now to the question of whether or not R & B Insurance should be considered an innocent purchaser of the land in question.At the outset, we note that both the trial court and appellate court found that Maxim