IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

JASON KOKINDA, • CIVIL ACTION •

Petitioner, • •

v. • Case No. 15-3282 •

ROBERT GILMORE, ET AL, • •

Respondents, • District Case No • 13-2202 •

ORDER

AND NOW, this day of -----------, 2015, upon

consideration of prose petitioner's, Jason Kokinda, "Petition for

Release on Recognizance or Surety Pending Disposition of 28 u.s.c.

§ 2254 Petition,'' it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED that the ''Peti-

tion for Release on Recognizance or Surety Bending Disposition of

28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition" is GRANTED. THUS SHALL SCI-Greene super-

intendent, Robert Gilmore, immediately release Jason Kokinda on

his own recognizance to ensure that his meritorious claims in the

state court do not become moot by completion of sentence.

BY THE COURT:

Per Curiam

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

JASON KOKINDA, • CIVIL ACTION •

Petitioner, • •

V. • Case No. 15-3282 •

ROBERT GILMORE, ET AL, • •

Respondents, • District Case No. 13-2202 •

PETITION FOR RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE OR SURETY

PENDING DISPOSITION OF 28 U.S.C. § 2254 PETITION

Petitioner, Jason Kokinda, prose, hereby moves for habeas

bail pending disposition of his 28 u.s.c. § 2254 habeas petition,

and represents:

1. On July 17, 2015, Kokinda filed a petition for release on

bail pending disposition of his habeas corpus petition in the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

(a). He subsequently filed a "Petition to Correct/Supplement

Pending Bail Motion,"on or about September 22, 2015 (pursuant to

date of mailing and Prisoner's Mailbox Rule).

(b). On August 4, 2015, the respondents filed an answer to

the habeas bail motion.

(c). On or about October 11, 2015, Kokinda filed a traverse

(pursuant to date of mailing and Prisoner's Mailbox Rule).

2. On August 21, 2015, District Puppet-Judge Jan E. DuBois

denied Kokinda habeas bail relief, by simply rubber-stamping the

boilerplate answer provided by respondents; adopting the assertions

in Answer (absent any independent consideration) as authoritative.

(a). Answer dogmatically dictated that Kokinda's claims fell

under AEDPA ''unreasonable determination'' deference standards, and

that he thus failed to plead and prove strong likelihood of success

1

on the merits; and that Kokinda had an indeterminate sentence of

three(3) to seven(7) years, which made his case distingishable from

extraordinary circumstances prong of habeas bail test where the

prior cases in other states involved short flat sentences.

3. In adopting the boilerplate reasoning of the respondents,

DuBois also adopted their ignorant recital of procedural history,

by asserting: (a) that no Response was filed by the state; and

(b) that Kokinda had five habeas claims pending.

4. Kokinda timely filed his ''Motion for Clarification and

Reconsideration of 8/21/15 Order," on or about September 2, 2015,

(pursuant to date of mailing and Prisoner's Mailbox Rule).

(a). Therein, he cited the lack of authentic consideration by

the district court, evinced by its/their wholesale adoption of the

respondents' Answer.

(b). He furthermore proved that he had a right to pre-AEDPA

de novo review to all of his claims, immediately, with exception to

all four habeas preclusion doctrines (including exhaustion require­

ment).

5. On or about September 12, 2015, petitioner filed a pre­

mature ''Notice of Appeal'' to ensure timely appellate review, the

moment that DuBois predictably denied habeas bail relief in the

clarification/reconsideration motion.

6. On or about September 22, 2015, Clerk Marcia M. Waldron,

mailed Kokinda notice that the court required this bail motion, and

memorandum in support thereof, within five days, with a certificate

of service showing that documents were served on respondents.

(a). Petitioner did not however receive this letter until the

twelfth of October, 2015, because of transfer (See Exhibit-A).

2

( 1). Because the ''Notice of Appeal'' was filed prematurely,

however, the appellate court did not yet have jurisdiciton, because

the motion for clarification/reconsideration was still pending.

See Sacks v. Rothberg, (1988, App. DC) 269 US App DC 353, 845 F. 2d 1 098, 11 FR serv 3d. ( ''Premature notice of appeal becomes ef­fective to vest appellate court with jurisdiction once District Court disposes, finally, of all matters pending before it.")

(2). Kokinda did not receive October 6, 2015, Order disposing

of motion for clarification/reconsideration, until October 19, 2015,

due to the temporary transfer to SCI-Graterford (September 10, 2015

to October 1 , 201 5) • ( See Exhibi t-B) •

(i). Therefore, pursuant to Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule

9.1, Kokinda has complied with appellate procedures, by filing the

required bail motion and memorandum, as promptly as possible after

the filing of his premature notice of appeal; and is thus entitled

to merit review and relief, or nunc pro tune filing in any regard.

7. In the October 6, 2015, Order, DuBois shows an outrageous

lack of comprehension for the issues presented by Kokinda, before

the Court, seeking disposition of bail issues pursuant to law.

(a). DuBois attempts to paint the wholesale adoption of the

respondents' Answer, as~ mere clerical error, with no prejudice

to Kokinda, because the Response was actually considered, and a

t~ue adjudication with comprehensive review took place regarding

all of his habeas filings of: petition, memorandum, traverse, and

response, etc.

(b). This type of ''trust us'' minimalization rings very hollow,

when you consider that none of the court orders in the postconvic-

tion show any comprehension for claims actually asserted; and the

epic record of judicial traps, and arcane legal facades, prove a

3

fixed agenda to railroad Kokinda through ex parte proceedings to

cover up another profound political scandal.

8. In the October 6, 2015, Order, DuBois further shows proof

of fixed agenda, by fragmenting ''exemption of exhaustion'' legal

standard; allowing the reader to draw the conclusion from his

arcane legal facade, that Kokinda didn't meet standard.

9. Further proof of a fixed agenda, where the opinions are

fabricated to achieve a predetermined result, is the specious

arguments DuBois attempts to apply in rebuttal to AEDPA issues.

(a). Rather than showing comprehension for how ''full and

fair" is used in the Hertz & Liebman habeas treatise that Kokinda

cited as support for his textbook right to de novo review, DuBois

first presumes that there was an 'adjudication on the merits' for

the habeas Court to defer its rulings to, and then addresses the

lack of ''full and fair'' hearings in that context.

(1). Kokinda had argued that the PCRA Court had fabricated

bogus waivers; and/or intentionally misunderstood the nature of

all claims to make its own claims up out of thin air, as if they

were argued by Kokinda.

(2). Kokinda also argued that the presumption that the PCRA

Court had adjudicated his profound age-play based claims on the

merits, was incomprehensible on its face considering that it

would be a dogmatic dictation of per se unrebuttable guilt devoid

of the applicable legal theories and comprehension thereof.

(i). Furthermore, it is clear in opinion what claims Steinberg

believed were meritless (that he did not have to discuss); and what

little he did discuss, is entirely separate from claims presented.

4

(b). It is of critical importance that a habeas corpus court

take care to determine if any actual 'adjudication on the merits'

took place in state postconviction proceedings; considering that

AEDPA standards dramatically foreclose possible relief or hearings.

10. The reasoning employed by DuBois was therefore backwards,

in that he stated failure to plead AEDPA ''unreasonable'' standards

was fatal to habeas bail motion. In truth, if one is pleading the

AEDPA 2254(d) (1) and (2) deference standards, it is highly unlikely

that he will succeed at all.

11. DuBois is attempting to construct a trap, that the AEDPA

standands always apply, to limit the scope of review to a certain

victory for respondents. He tries to mislead the reader, by making

it seem like this is some novel Third Circuit standard, that the

Hertz & Liebman treatise did not consider in excerpt provided.

12. Kokinda has the strongest case possible for immediate

habeas corpus relief:

(a). His case is a simple hollywood delusion. The actors be­

hind his official oppression, simply misrepresented figurative age

as a literal fact, to frame Kokinda within a ''To Catch A Predator''

hollywood sting stereotype.

(1). Building myths from that inculpatory lens of 'literal age'

to sell an illogical drama; that Kokinda was severely mentally ill,

andimagined the published ages in chats were figurative rather than

factual; with the help of trial counsel arguing such as a sabotuer.

(b). The criminal officials furthered the oppression by simply

destroying/suppressing evidence which supported truthful innocence,

and using inadmissible hearsay to fill in huge holes they created.

5

13. To undermine Kokinda's incontrovertible proofs of innocence

and right to unprecedented habeas relief, DuBois is attempting to

subvert his claims using guile. Showing an outrageous lack of corn-

prehension for claims actually presented, to fabricate the appear-

ance of proceedings that are actually held ex parte.

(a). This is accomplished by fabricating Kokinda's claims to

the point they become ridiculous or incomprehensible, ignoring his

claims altogether and making up claims for him, and using false or

fragmented standards of tangential reasoning in fact or law to

fabricate false narratives which appear to be legal decisions (be-

cause they superficially resemble the issues presented, or mere .

fragments of the issues expounded).

14. DuBois then attempts to justify the lack of extraordinary

circumstances required for the grant of bail, by making the length

of sentence (rather than concerns of comity) the gravamen of why

Kokinda failed to meet standard. Thus creating an impossible bar

to habeas bail relief, since Pennsylvania does not give out flat

sentences or typically short sentences like cases in other states.

The need for habeas bail due to severe rapidly progressing illness

requiring release to a hospital, would also be obviated by the fact

such claims are more appropriate under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, • since

they would deal with Eighth Amendment inadequate prison medical care

or conditions. Making the examples of extraordinary circumstances

articulated in Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3d Cir.

1992), into nothing more than intangible myths.

(a). The sole reason why Pennsylvania Courts create such hard-

line standards, is for urban renewal effect of Federally subsidized

state prisons (replacing need to help economically disadvantaged).

6

15. The asserted need for bail demonstrating 'extraordinary

circumstances' is in part due to the fact PCRA petition will be­

come moot in state court without grant of bail. And, petitioner

has a petition filed in Pennsylvania Supreme Court seeking to re­

solve the judicial corruption surrounding backdated/fabricated

Superior Court judgment order; that will have limited jurisdiction

to grant relief, if bail is denied, or less established procedures,

that make grant of relief more difficult.

15. Petitioner is not able to serve a copy of this bail motion,

exhibits, and memorandum in support of bail motion, on the respondents

due to their extortions on and off the record. See final arguments in

their answer to habeas bail motion, where they attempt to criminalize

loose, figurative, rhetorical hyperbole, by fragmenting provocative

metaphors from the record, and painting them in a false narrative to

mean whatever they want. Which was accompanied by other threats to

bribe judges and simply commit petitioner in ex parte proceedings to

cover up theft of his case-file, off the record.

(a). These circumstances are far more extraordinary than those

mentioned in Landano supra; to release petitioner from dangerous op­

pression and threats of extortion, as his whole case has been.

THUS, for each of the foregoing reasons of the dialectic, and

the memorandum and exhibits in support of these pleadings, petitioner

requests that the Court grant release on recognizance or bail pending

the adjudication of 28 u.s.c. § 2254 petition; and that it does so

forthwith, before bail petition becomes moot on November 1st, 2015.

Prisoner for Jesus Christ,

7

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Case No. 15-3282

District Case No. 13-CV-2202

JASON KOKINDA,

Appellant,

-VERSUS-

ROBERT GILMORE, KATHLEEN KANE, JAMES B. MARTIN,

Appellees,

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF BAIL MOTION FOR APPELLANT

Collateral order appeal of the August 21, 2015

and October 6, 2015 orders denying habeas

bail, entered by Jan E. DuBois in the

U.S. District Ct. for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania

at Case No. 13-CV-2202.

Prisoner for Jesus Christ,

Jason Kokinda #JP8929

SCI-Greene 175 Progress Dr. Waynesburg, PA 15370

III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

A. Petitioner has jurisdiction in U.S. District Ct. below:

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), A federal court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for habeas relief ''only on the ground-.. that _ [ a petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. As petitioner has pled in his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, filed timely within year, in court below.

B. The U.S. Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this case:

Armstrong v. Grondolsky, 290 Fed. Appx. 451 (3d Cir. 2008) ( ''We have jurisdiction under the collateral order doc­trine to review an order denying a motion for release on bail <290 Fed. Appx. 453> pending the resolution of a habeas petition. United States v . Smith, 835 F.2d 1048 (3d Cir. 1987)'') Petitioner is appealing denial of such a bail motion herein.

C. The Final Order der1ying Relief in Reconsideration Motion:

The final order denying Relief in Rule 60 and 59 Motion for Reconsideration, was entered on the docket on the 6th day of October , 2015, making the notice of appeal timely even though it was filed in advance of final order.

Premature notice of appeal becomes effective to vest appellate court with jurisdiction once District Court disposes, finally, of all matters pending before it. Sacks v. Rothberg, (1988, App DC) 269 US App DC 353, 845 F.2d 1098, 11 FR Serv 3d 233.

D. The Appeal is from a Final/Collateral Order:

Decision which has not terminated proceedings in Dis­trict Court is immediately appealable under ''collateral order'' doctrine, under which order is deemed final and appealable for purposes of 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291, if it conclusively determines disputed question, resolves important issue completely separate from merits of action, and is effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard (1988) 486 US 517, 100 L Ed 2d 517, 108 S. Ct. 1945.

1

IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

A. Did the District Court apply the wrong standard and scope

of review to deny Kokinda's requested habeas bail, by: (1) not

actually considering filings (as evinced by outrageous lack of

comprehension of claims presented); and (2) presuming that either

all of Kokinda's habeas claims were adjudicated on the merits in

state courts, or that AEDPA 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d) (1) and (2) ap­

plies regardless; and (3) making sentence imposed a gravamen in

discussion of 'extraordinary circumstances' prong; rather than

comity interests, duration of sentence remaining, and other extra­

ordinary factors comprehensive to injustice of conviction as whole?

2

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Procedural History

1 . On November 1 2, 2009, petitioner entered a plea of ''guilty

but mentally ill" in the Lehigh Co. Court of Common Pleas, for four

counts of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318, and Unlawful Use of a Communication

Facility. He was sentenced to a term of thirty-six to eighty-four

months of incarceration on February 17, 2010.

2. On April 23, 2013, petitioner filed a prose Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. On May 30, 2014, Magistrate Judge Lynne A. Sitarski issued

a Report and Recommendation, recommending that proceedings be held

in stay and abeyance pending resolution of Post-Conviction Relief

Act petition in state courts. On June 18, 2014, the District Court

approved, and adopted Magistrate Judge Lynne A. Sitarski's May 30,

2014 Report and Recommendation; staying all further proceedings,

pending the exhaustion of state remedies, refusing to consider any

exemptions to ''exhaustion rule'' asserted.

3. On August 21, 2015, the District Court denied petitioner's

petition for release on recognizance or surety, pending adjudication

and disposition of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.

4. Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Clarification and

Reconsideration, received by the Court on or about September 8th,

2015.

5. On September 12th, 2015, petitioner filed in Notice of

Appeal on August 21, 2015, Order, in light of fact that he was on

Writ, and would not receive the Reconsideration disposition order

in time to prepare ''Notice of Appeal'' later; without risk of appeal

becoming moot. 3

B. Relevant Facts

1. Kokinda has proven his ''actual innocence'' and that the

case presented against him, is in reality nonexistent. The Common­

wealth has never contested the actual merits of his claims, and

neither has any state or federal judge. 1

2. The questions presented in this case are purely questions

of law, of whether DuBois unlawfully truncated the standard and

scope of review, to deny an otherwise incontrovertible right to

relief under examples of stare decisis.

C. Rulings Presented for Review

1. The August 21, 2015 order by Jan E. DuBois denying bail

relief is simply boilerplate presumptions that adopt the answer

filed by respondents wholesale, truncating the scope and standard

of review to fabricate a special impossible bar for Kokinda.

2. The October 6, 2015 order by Jan E. DuBois denying to

make clarification, and denying reconsideration, is a more subtile

means of achieving the same result; that covers up obvious lack of

comprehension of habeas issues, as if mere clerical error; suggest-

ing that AEDPA deference and exhaustion apply to Kokinda, through

false legal standards that are comprehensively not applicable upon

closer examination. An order full of dogmatic dictations and pre­

sumptions in place of proofs, demonstrating an outrageous lack of

comprehension for the habeas claims actually presented.

VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. Kokinda has shown a strong likelihood of success on the

merits, and entitlement to de novo review on all claims presented;

1: See record generally, especially recent habeas bail filings.

4

considering that the "loose, figurative, non-literal, rhetorical

language" the Commonwealth bases its prosecution upon, is not it-

self criminal evidence without serious independent evidence to

prove otherwise. Also considering that the state proceedings were

subverted at every level with judicial traps, bogus waivers, and

denials of every fundamental material needed to obtain an 'adjudi-

cation on the merits' of any claim. The analysis of DuBois omits

this, and presumes AEDPA deference, and how lack of ''full and fair''

state proceedings is considered, when the state did 'adjudicate

the merits' of habeas claims presented.

(a). Kokinda has also demonstrated that he did meet the habeas

exemptions to exhaustion; and that DuBois merely failed to define

the cited standard of • review, which makes this incontrovertible.

(b). The lack of true consideration by DuBois, evinced in

part by what he calls clerical errors, is apparent on the face

of every order he drafts; considering that each shows an out-

rageous lack of comprehension for the issues presented.

2. The length of sentence imposed has never been announced as

a gravamen for consideration in habeas bail standards, not even as

a factor. The new scheme being announced by DuBois makes habeas

bail a myth in Pennsylvania, because the standards are fundamentally

impossible. Urban renewal and the need to deal with the poor effected

by the brown properties, is driving force in civil rights erosion.

VII. ARGUMENT

A. KOKINDA HAS DEMONSTRATED 'THE STRONG LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS

ON THE MERITS' AND 'EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES' REQUIRED FOR HABEAS

BAIL, WHEN CONSIDERED UNDER PROPER SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW.

5

Scope and Standard of Review

Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[B]ail pending disposition of habeas corpus review is available 'only when the petitioner has raised substantial claims upon which he has a high probability of success or exception circumstances exist which make a grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective.''' Pellullo v. United States, 487 F.Appx. 1, 3 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Landano, 970 F.2d at 1239)).

1. It is textbook Black Letter Law that Kokinda is exempt

from all preclusion doctrines that typically truncate the scope,

and drastically limit the availability of habeas relief. Because

the state did not 'adjudicate the merits' of his claims, and only

focused on Mistake of Age defense in vacuum of false evidence

that trial counsel was willing to discuss at hearing. 2

(a). The waivers that the state used to evade addressing the

merits of unrebuttable proofs of actual and legal innocence, were

all patently bogus on their face. 3

(b). Thus, there was nothing for the habeas court to logically

defer its decisions to, and no reason to truncate or limit the

scope of review or availability of hearings/relief. The state

court opinions are merely a restatement of the Commonwealth's

bogus ''To Catch A Predator'' delusion held within a vacuum, ab-

sent any application of the legal theories actually argued.

(1). The opinions do not meet state opinion writing stan-

dards, which would preclude extension of the Richter presumption

(to presume an adjudication on the merits), even if any part of

the opinion were hypothetically ambiguous. 4

2: See "Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration of 8/21/15 Order,'' pgs. 4-10, .13,· 19-23 3: Pg.4, 1_9-23 of said n.2 motion 4: ''Petition to Immediately Adjudicate Pending Bail Motion,'' pgs. 2-3, discussing Commonwealth v. Montalvo, and Johnson v. Williams, U.S. , 133 s. Ct. 1088, 185 L.Ed.2d 105, 2013, extending Richter presumption of 'adjudication on the merits' to ambiguous opinions. 6

2. Pgs. 3 at ~4. through pg. 5 at ~6. of the ''Petition to

Immediately Adjudicate Pending Bail Motion," when supplemented to

habeas corpus memorandum, prove incontrovertibly that Kokinda is

entitled to immediate release with a bar to reprosecution; with

great simplicity, for which no subjectivity exists to even debate.

3. Because Kokinda's claims are unrebuttable, DuBois is thus

attempting to argue AEDPA deference in a vacuum, on the presumption

that Kokinda's claims were presumably or actually adjudicated on

the merits. See Pg. 7 of his October 6, 2015 opinion; where he

cites to Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 237 (3d Cir. 2004),

while failing to discuss§ at 238, where it states:

''The current statute simply states that federal courts must defer to legal and factual det rminations "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the me its in State court proceedings." 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d). ''We have int rpreted § 2254(d)'s 'adjudication on the merits' language to meant at 'when, although properly preserved by the defendant, the state co rt has not reached the merits of a claim thereafter presented to federal habeas court, the deferential standards rovided b AEDPA ••• do not a 1 . '' Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 718 (3d Cir. 2004) ( uoting Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001)).''(emphasis added).

4. On pg. 8 of his Octobe~ 6, 2015 opinion, DuBois tries to

pull a fast one again, by acknp wledging that there are exceptions

to exhaustion; and not contesting that state proceedings were not

'' full and fair'' See pg. 7 foot~ote 5; while failing to acknowledge

that the lack of ''full and faiir'' proceedings is defined as excep-

tional circumstances that overcome exhaustion requirement.

See Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 516 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Acknowledging the Supreme Cort's strong presumption in favor of exhaustion, we also recognized that '' in rare cases ~ exceptional circumstances of peculiar urge cy may exist which permit a federal court to entertain an unexhausted claim." Id. at 206-07 (same case § of Christy v. Horn that DuBois cites). We explained that such circumstances exist where "state remedies are inadequate or fail to afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised, or where exhaustion in state court would be 'futile.''')

7

(a). Kokinda had argued over and over again, that habeas

proceedings should be exempt from exhaustion on this very law

that he had highlighted, from citing it before. But, DuBois did

not even recognize the controlling standard at that time; as a

means to prejudice Kokinda more blatantly to hopefully have

him become hopeless in light of the judicial corruption. But

Kokinda can care less what any judges dictate, because his power

is through the public and a persuasive record (worth much more

than the worthless fiat awarded in lawsuits).

Extraordinary Circumstances

5. DuBois has added new gravamen considerations to Landano

supra bail standard, which make the grant of bail pending dis-

position of§ 2254 petitions fundamentally impossible.

(a). He attempts to make 'length of sentence imposed' a

gravamen, because the cases of precedent were all out state,

states where short flat sentences are given out. Which would thus

foreclose such relief in Pennsylvania, where long indeterminate

sentences are handed out. He does not even attempt to address the

arguments made on pgs. 14-15, that ''comity is the chief gravamen''

in such cases, and that 'length of sentence remaining' is only

gravamen considered by U.S. Supreme Court, that 'the less time that

remains on a prisoner's sentence, the stronger his interest in re-

lease.' He merely exploits the reliance of other states on the

Federal Model Penal Code; and Pennsylvania's misuse of prisons in

dealing with economically disadvantaged people and places, by pro-

fiting of the federally subsidized bonds w/punishments instead of

helping them solve demons in their lives.

8

(b). Then, after unlawfully truncating the scope and standard

of review applicable to make a preliminary determination for the

''strong likelihood of success on the merits'' element of bail claim;

DuBois attempts to justify incarceration on basis of charges, by

showing an outrageous .lack of comprehension for how malicious and

baseless the nonexistent criminal case against Kokinda is.

(1). It is a hypothetical age-based social engineering com­

mercial infraction, wholly devoid of any evidence to present a

prima facie case. But, DuBois characterizes it as a serious crime

that Kokinda was convicted of, because 'ignorance is bliss.'

(2). The dinstinctive difference between Kokinda's pled and

proven claims, and the cursory opinions of DuBois, are that Kokinda

is able to plead and prove his claims; the respondents are unable

to rebut claims, and DuBois is trying to fabricate any excuse in

the book to ignore or limit them within the vacuum created by the

state and upheld through absence of any corrective process (that

would allow for adversarial testing of state's dicta theory).

6. Cases like Landano supra and Lucas v. Hadden, 790 F.2d

365 (3d Cir. 1986), are cases where habeas bail was originally

granted and reversed for lack of 'extraordinary circumstances.'

(a). In none of the case-law, much less the most precedential

cases, has 'length of sentence imposed' or 'supposed seriousness

of charges' been considered as a gravamen or factor.

(1 ). Lucas involved ten year indefinite sentence, and Landano

a life sentence. Surely if 'length of sentence imposed' were a

gravamen factor or even substantial factor to consider, it would

be discussed specifically in at least one habeas bail case.

9

(i). 'Length of possible sentence' and 'seriousness of prima

facie case' may be factors for considering how much bail to require,

but should not be a threshold gravamen to consider a much different

element of whether exceptional circumstances are met by need to

effectuate writ comity interests, or unusual dire health problems.

(2). Landano seems to have eroded the rights of litigants to

obtain habeas bail pending adjudication, by suddenly requiring

that both 'exceptional circumstances' and 'high probability of

success on the merits' are required; when the stated standard

uses the operative word OR to denote that either is sufficient.

7. Kokinda has an ''Application for Exercise of King's Bench

Powers or Extraordinary Jurisdiction" pending in the Penn. Supreme

Court at Case No. 140 MM 2015. Which he filed to resolve the judi­

cial misconducts/crimes surrounding what was clearly a bogus back­

dated/fabricated judgment order; involving all sorts of corruption,

including tip off by FBI, and undercover correctional officer, all

attempting to harm Kokinda unlawfully and grievously.

(a). This application will become ineffective in producing any

significant effect on curing defects in PCRA proceedings, pursuant

to the fact that PCRA relief becomes moot when Kokinda maxes out

his sentence on November 1st, 2015. See ''Petition to Expand Record''

Exhibit-E, Pennsylvania Supreme Court filings in this matter.

(b). The issues present significant t extraordinary -circumstances'

which require bail to allow state to effectively address major de­

fects in state proceedings and scandalous corruption/crimes by o f ­

ficials. Kokinda is also entitled to bail for all of the reasons

cited in pending 140 MM 2015 case, including how the respondents

10

are extorting him both on and off the record.

(c). The American Injustice system, and all others around the

world, are merely the manifestion of the superrich mafias using law

to oppress the economically disadvantaged, as a scapegoat, to say

here they are the bad guys. So, that they continue to hold all

of their fraudulent power, by bathing all of their malificient works

in false light. Pennsylvania, in particular, uses the law to dispose

of the mentally ill and economically disadvantaged persons they ne­

glect to help before a crime is committed. This is done to generate

economic interest off the abundance of brown property and wastelands

left over from industrial corps. They generate money off the feder­

ally subsidized bonds; by redistributing wealth back into brown pro­

perty they obtain under eminent domain. They embezzle kickbacks off

of contracts, and funding that is supposedly going to prisons; and

force prisoners to buy from mafia controlled monopolies. They poison

the prisoners with chemicals like salt peter and androgens in the

food, which leads to chronic health problems. And then they pretend

to treat them to cover up ''deliberate indifference,'' by painting it

as professional negligence. Which under standards produced by this

court, in conspiracy with prison officials, requires a 'certificate

of merit' and BAR attorney to litigate. A BAR attorney whose license

is controlled by the state, who will not fairly litigate claims, if

at all. The civil rights and burden of proof are gone, and it is now

lawyers simply bullying clients into adhesion contracts of guilt,

which waive all constitutional rights. In conclusion, making the

prisons to be nothing more than holocaust camps for a utopian slave

society; as the Jews were such .a perfect scapegoat in Nazi Germany.

1 1

VIII. CONCLUSION

The habeas filings in their entirety, both plead and prove

that Kokinda is the victim of official oppression; a scapegoat

used to produce political demagogue propaganda for the puppet

Torn Corbett to pass $24 billion tax-break for mafia controlled

fracking industry. Anyone who doubts the plausibility of this

lacks erudition over the subject matter. Kokinda is not able to

fully prove it, because the FBI is full of mafia bribes and

extortions; and no one is able to investigate it at this time.

The respondents have openly stated that they want to frame

Kokinda again, using the same exact principle used in the instant

case of taking fragments of figurative language that is at

best provocative, and framing it within a false narrative to mean

whatever they want. All of the proceedings in courts have been held

ex parte, where Kokinda has no real standing to debate bogus case.

The respondents have stated that their case is not even legiti­

mate, off-the-record, and that they are just going to bribe more

judgs to commit Kokinda like a Jew to a holocaust camp; with a

complete absence of due process and civil rights. This court has

helped the respondents commit grave crimes against Kokinda, and

done everything opposite of what their jobs required. There is no

end to its abuses of power! The courts are obviously delusional,5

with the belief that there is no right or wrong; and that they can

get away with these immoral acts without divine retribution. Habeas

bail must be granted immediately to ensure justice and right be done.

12Pr1soner for Jesus Christ 5: II Thessalonians 2:10-12