V. Administrative Adjudication

8/13/2019 V. Administrative Adjudication

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V. Administrative Adjudication

G.R. No. L-15138 July 31, 1961

BILL MILLER, petitioner-appellee,vs.ATANACIO A. MARDO, and MANUEL GONZALES, respondents-appellants.

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G.R. No. L-15377 July 31, 1961

NUMERIANA RAGANAS, plaintiff-appellant,vs.SEN BEE TRADING COMPANY, MACARIO TAN, and SERGIO TAN, defendants-appellees.

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G.R. No. L-16660 July 31, 1961

VICENTE ROMERO, petitioner-appellee,vs.ANGEL HERNANDO ETC., and SIA SENG, respondents-appellants.

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G.R. No. L-16781 July 31, 1961

CHIN HUA TRADING COMPANY, and LAO KANG SUY, petitioners-appellees,vs.ATANACIO A. MARDO, JORGE BENEDICTO, and CRESENCIO ESTAO, respondents-appellants.

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G.R. No. L-17056 July 31, 1961

FRED WILSON & CO., INC., petitioner-appellant,vs.MELITON C. PARDUCHO, ETC., and MARIANO PABILIARE, respondents-appellees.

R. L. Resurreccion for petitioner-appellee.Paciano C. C. Villavieja for respondents-appellants.

BARRERA,J .:

These appeals, although originating from different Courts of First Instance, are here treatedtogether in this single decision because they present but one identical question of law, namely,the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government


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Survey and Reorganization Commission under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, asamended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices ofthe Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtimeand separation pay, etc.

In G.R. No. L-15138 , Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department ofLabor, in Manila, a complaint (IS-1148) against Bill Miller (owner and manager of Miller Motors)claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957, on which latterdate he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being paid separation pay. He prayed for

judgement for the amount due him as separation pay plus damages. Upon receipt of saidcomplaint, Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department ofLabor required Miller to file an answer. Whereupon, Miller filed with the Court of First Instance ofBaguio a petition (Civil Case No. 759) praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer fromproceeding with the case, for the reason that said Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear anddecide the subject matter of the complaint. The court then required the Hearing Officer andGonzales to answer and, as prayed for, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The latter filetheir separate motions to dismiss the petition, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, impropervenue, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it being argued that pursuant toRepublic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as implemented by Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, regional offices of the Department of labor have exclusiveand original jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of laborstandards or working conditions. Said motions to dismiss were denied by the court. Answerswere then filed and the case was heard. Thereafter, the court rendered a decision holding thatRepublic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as well as Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 andReorganization Plan No. 20-A issued pursuant thereto, did not repeal the provision of theJudiciary Act conferring on courts of first instance original jurisdiction to take cognizance ofmoney claims arising from violations of labor standards. The question of venue was alsodismissed for being moot, the same having been already raised and decided in a petitionfor certiorari and prohibition previously filed with this Court in G.R. No. L-14007 (Mardo, etc. v.De Veyra, etc.) which was dismissed for lack of merit in our resolution of July 7, 1958. From thedecision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, respondents Hearing Officer and Gonzalesinterposed the present appeal now before us.

In G.R. No. L-16781 , Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department ofLabor, a complaint (RO 3 Ls. Case No. 874) against Chin Hua Trading Co. and/or Lao KangSuy and Ke Bon Chiong, as Manager and Assistant Manager thereof, respectively, claiming tohave been their driver from June 17, 1947 to June 4, 1955, for which service he was not paidovertime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours and for Sundays and legal holidays) and vacationleave pay. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him, plus attorney's fees. Chin HuaTrading, et al., filed their answer and, issues having been joined, hearing thereof was startedbefore Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo and Hearing Officer Jorge Benedicto. Before trialof the case could be terminated, however, Chin Hua Trading, et al., filed with the Court of FirstInstance of Manila a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 26826)),to restrain the hearing officers from proceeding with the disposition of the case, on the groundthat they have no jurisdiction to entertain the same, as Reorganization Plan No. 20-A andExecutive Order No. 218, series of 1956, in relation to Republic Act No. 997, as amended byRepublic Act No. 1241, empowering them to adjudicate the complaint, is invalid orunconstitutional. As prayed for, a preliminary injunction was issued by the court. After duehearing the court rendered a decision holding that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is null and voidand therefore, granted the writ of prohibition making permanent the preliminary injunction


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previously issued. From this decision, the claimant and the hearing officers appealed to theCourt of Appeals, which certified the case to us, as it involves only questions of law.

In G.R. No. L-15377 , appellant Numeriana Raganas filed with the Court of First Instance ofCebu a complaint (Civil Case No. R-5535) against appellees Sen Bee Trading Company,Macario Tan and Sergio Tan, claiming that she was employed by appellees as a seamstressfrom June 5, 1952 to January 11, 1958, for which service she was underpaid and was not givenovertime, as well as vacation and sick leave pay. She prayed for judgment on the amount dueher for the same plus damages. To said complaint, appellees filed a motion to dismiss, on theground that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear the case as it involves a money claim andshould, under Reorganization Plan No. 20-A be filed with the Regional Office of the Departmentof Labor; and there is pending before the regional office of the Department of Labor, a claim forseparation vacation, sick and maternity leave pay filed by the same plaintiff (appellant) againstthe same defendants-appellees). Acting on said motion, the court dismissed the case, relying onthe provision of Section 25, Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A and on our resolution inthe case of NASSCO v. Arca, et al . (G.R. No. L-12249, May 6, 1957). From this order, appellantRaganas appealed to the Court of Appeals, but said court certified the case to us.

In G.R. No. L-16660 , Vicente B. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. 2 of the Department ofLabor a complaint (Wage Case No. 196-W) against Sia Seng, for recovery of alleged unpaidwages, overtime and separation pay. Sia Seng, filed an answer. At the date set for hearing thelatter did not appear despite due notice to him and counsel. Upon his petition, Romero wasallowed to present his evidence. Thereafter, a decision was rendered by the Hearing Officer infavor of Romero. Upon the latter's motion for execution, the records of the case were referred toRegional Labor Administrator Angel Hernando for issuance of said writ of execution, being theofficer charged with the duty of issuing the same. Hernando, believing that Sia Seng should begiven a chance to present his evidence, refused to issue the writ of execution and ordered a re-hearing. As a consequence, Romero filed with the Court of First Instance of Isabela a petitionfor mandamus (Case No. Br. II-35) praying that an order be issued commanding respondentRegional Labor Administrator to immediately issue a writ of execution of the decision in WageCase No. 196-W. To this petition, respondent Regional Labor Administrator filed a motion todismiss, on the ground that it states no cause of action, but action thereon was deferred until thecase is decided on the merits. Sia Seng filed his answer questioning the validity of the rules andregulations issued under the authority of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A. After hearing, the courtrendered a decision ordering, inter alia, respondent Regional Labor Administrator to forthwithissue the corresponding writ of execution, as enjoined by Section 48, of the Rules andRegulations No. 1 of the Labor Standards Commission. From this decision of the Court of FirstInstance, Sia Seng and Regional Labor Administrator Hernando appealed to us. Appellant SiaSeng urges in his appeal that the trial court erred in not dismissing the petition, in spite of thefact that the decision sought to be enforced by appellee Romero was rendered by a hearingofficer who had no authority to render the same, and in failing to hold that Reorganization PlanNo. 20-A was not validly passed as a statute and is unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. L-17056 , Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 3 of the Department ofLabor a complaint (IS-2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc., alleging that petitionerengaged his services as Chief Mechanic, Air conditioning Department, from October 1947 toFebruary 19, 1959, when he was summarily dismissed without cause and without sufficientnotice and separation pay. He also claimed that during his employment he was not paid forovertime rendered by him. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him for such overtimeand separation pay. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that said regional


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office "being purely an administrative body, has no power, authority, nor jurisdiction toadjudicate the claim sought to be recovered in the action." Said motion to dismiss having beendenied by respondent Hearing Officer Meliton Parducho, petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. filedwith the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminaryinjunction (Civil Case No. 41954) to restrain respondent hearing officer from proceeding with thecase, and praying, among others, that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it vests originaland exclusive jurisdiction over money claims (to the exclusion of regular courts of justice) on theLabor Standards Commission or the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, be declarednull and void and unconstitutional. As prayed for, the court granted a writ of preliminaryinjunction. Respondents Hearing Officer and Pabillare filed answer and the case was heard.

After hearing, the court rendered a decision declaring that "by the force of Section 6 of R.A. No.997, as amended by R.A. 1241, Plan No. 20-A was deemed approved by Congress when itadjourned its session in 1956' (Res. of May 6, 1957 in National Shipyards Steel Corporation v.Vicente Area, G.R. No. L-12249). It follows that the questioned reorganization Plan No. 20-A isvalid.".

Petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. appealed directly to us from this decision.

The specific legal provision invoked for the authority of the regional offices to take cognizance ofthe subject matter involved in these cases is paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization PlanNo. 20-A, which is hereunder quoted:

25 Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases fallingunder the Workmen's Compensation law, and cases affecting all money claims arising fromviolations of labor standards on working conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaidwages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees andlaborers; and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment formedical services of domestic help.

Under this provision, the regional offices have been given original and exclusive jurisdictionover :

(a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law;

(b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards on workingconditions, unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave ofemployees and laborers; and .

(c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment formedical services of domestic help.

Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, however, the Department of Labor,except the Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for compensationunder the Workmen's Compensation law, had no compulsory power to settle cases under (b)and (c) above, the only authority it had being to mediate merely or arbitrate when the parties soagree in writing, In case of refusal by a party to submit to such settlement, the remedy is to file acomplaint in the proper court. 1

It is evident, therefore, that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting money claimssuch as those sought to be enforced in these proceedings, is a new conferment of power to the


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Department of Labor not theretofore exercised by it. The question thus presented by thesecases is whether this is valid under our Constitution and applicable statutes.

It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which createdthe Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, the latter was empowered

(2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary,or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service,activities, and functions . (Emphasis supplied.)

But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to administrative, not judicial functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created tocarry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government (See Section 3of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. No. 1241), which plainly did not include the creation ofcourts. And the Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in oneSupreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of theConstitution). Thus, judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be conceded that thelegislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving theexercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrativefunctions. 2 But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that wouldleave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid,only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matterexclusively vested in the courts. 3

If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothingadministrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such conferment can not beimplied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the Government Survey andReorganization Commission to create "functions" in connection with the reorganization of theExecutive Branch of the Government.

And so we held in Corominas et al. v. Labor Standards Commission, et al . (G.R. No. L-14837and companion cases, June 30, 1961);

. . . it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 997, to authorize thetransfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice, from these to the officialsto be appointed or offices to be created by the Reorganization Plan. Congress is well awareof the provisions of the Constitution that judicial powers are vested 'only in the SupremeCourt and in such courts as the law may establish'. The Commission was not authorized tocreate courts of justice, or to take away from these their jurisdiction and transfer said

jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices created under the Reorganization Plan. TheLegislature could not have intended to grant such powers to the ReorganizationCommission, an executive body, as the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to

legislate or create courts of justice any other agency of the Government . (Chinese FlourImporters Assoc. vs. Price Stabilization Board, G.R. No. L-4465, July 12, 1951; SurigaoConsolidated vs. Collector of Internal Revenue G.R. No. L-5692, March 5, 1954; U.S. vs.Shreveport, 287 U.S. 77, 77 L. ed 175, and Johnson vs. San Diego, 42 P. 249, cited in 11

Am. Jur 921-922.) (Emphasis supplied.)

But it is urged, in one of the cases, that the defect in the conferment of judicial or quasi-judicialfunctions to the Regional offices, emanating from the lack of authority of the ReorganizationCommission has been cured by the non-disapproval of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A by


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Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 997, as amended. It is, ineffect, argued that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is not merely the creation of theReorganization Commission, exercising its delegated powers, but is in fact an act of Congressitself, a regular statute directly and duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislativepowers in the mode provided in the enabling act.

The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 997, as amended, invoked in favor of this argumentreads as follows:

SEC. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans submitted by the Presidentduring the Second Session of the Third Congress shall be deemed approved after theadjournment of the said session, and those of the plan or plans or modifications of any planor plans to be submitted after the adjournment of the Second Session, shall be deemedapproved after the expiration of the seventy session days of the Congress following the dateon which the plan is transmitted to it, unless between the date of transmittal and theexpiration of such period, either House by simple resolution disapproves the reorganizationplan or any, modification thereof. The said plan of reorganization or any modification thereofmay, likewise, be approved by Congress in a concurrent Resolution within such period.

It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted Reorganization Plan No.20-A to the President who, in turn, transmitted the same to Congress on February 14, 1956.Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting the saidreorganization plan. It is now contended that, independent of the matter of delegation oflegislative authority (discussed earlier in this opinion), said plan, nevertheless became a law bynon-action on the part of Congress, pursuant to the above-quoted provision.

Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. By specific provision of the Constitution

No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof

in its final form furnished the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its passage bythe National Assembly (Congress), except when the President shall have certified to thenecessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereofshall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall be taken immediatelythereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. (Sec. 21-[a], Art. VI).

Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to thePresident. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with hisobjections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large on itsJournal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all theMembers of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with theobjections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by

two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be entered on its journal. If any billshall not be returned by the President as herein provided within twenty days (Sundaysexcepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall become a law in likemanner as if he has signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its return, inwhich case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days afteradjournment. (Sec. 20[1]. Art. VI of the Constitution).

A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of theReorganization Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is in distinct


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(d) In case G.R. No. L-16660, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, directing theRegional Labor Administrator to issue a writ of execution of the order of the Regional Office No.2, is hereby reversed, without costs; and .

(e) In case G.R. No. L-17056, the decision rendered after hearing by the Court of First Instanceof Manila, dismissing the complaint for annulment of the proceedings before the Regional officeNo. 3, is hereby reversed and the preliminary injunction at first issued by the trial court is revivedand made permanents without costs. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4634 September 24, 1997

JESUS CABARRUS, JR., complainant,vs.JOSE ANTONIO S. BERNAS, respondent.

TORRES, JR., J .:

On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed an administrative complaint for disbarmentagainst Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised PenalCode and Code of Professional Responsibility. In his complaint-affidavit 1 dated August 12,1996, complainant alleged as follows:

A. That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., subscribed under oathbefore Marie Lourdes T. Sia Bernas, a notary public in Makati City, wife of lawyerJose Antonio Bernas, a verification and certification of non-forum shopping whichwas appended to a complaint for reconveyance of property and damages,denominated as Civil Case No. 65646, filed before the Regional Trial Court inNational Capital Region, RTC, which case was raffled to RTC Branch 159 in PasigCity. A photocopy of said complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annexex ( sic )

A, A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;

B. That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of public document, I amhereto quoting verbatim, the test ( sic ) of Annex A-6, the verification and certificationof non-forum shopping which states:

Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states:

He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he cause the preparation of theforegoing pleading, the content of which are true to his personal knowledge and thathe has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in

any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal oragency . If he should learn that a similar action of ( sic ) proceeding has been filed or ispending before the Supreme Court or any other Tribunal agency, he undertake toreport to ( sic ) that fact within Five (5) days from notice to this notice ( sic ) to thisHonorable Court. Emphasis supplied.

C. That the cause of action relied upon by the respondent in Civil Case No. 65646 isfraud, facilitated by forgery as gleaned from paragraphs 15, 16, and 22;


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D. That contrary to the tenor, import and meanoing ( sic ) of the allegation under 1-Bof the instant complaint, respondent and his counsel Jose Antonio Bernas causedthe preparation and filing of a criminal complaint for falsification of a public documenton April 11, 1996, (three days before the filing of the aforecited Civil Case) at the

AOED of the National Bureau of Investigation if ( sic ) Taff ( sic ) Ave., a xerox copy ofsaid complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annex "B".

D-1. That as stated in Annex "B", the gravaman of the affidavit complaint of therespondent is forgery, the same legal issue in Civil Case No. 65646;

D-2. That as early as August 14, 1995, respondent counsel, Jose Antonio Bernasfiled a written complaint at the NBI for the same cause of action which was reiteratedin another letter submitting to the NBI standard specimen signatures dated October1995, copies of said letter complaint are hereto attached and marked as Annexes(sic ) "C".

E. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., on the basis of Annexes A, B, C, D,inclusive of submarkings knowingly subverted and perverted the truth when he falsify

certified ( sic ) and verified under oath in the verification and certification of non-forumshopping, that:

He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving thesame issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of

Appeals, or any other Tribunal or agency." Where verification-certification was placed under oath and was conveniently notarizedby the wife of the counsel of respondent in both cases at Branch 159of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI, an agency within the ambis ( sic )and purview of the circulus ( sic ) of the Supreme Court prohibitingforum shopping.

F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the counsel on record of the respondents in Civil CaseNo. 65646 is the same lawyer who instigated a criminal complaint at the NBI forforgery and respondents themselves conspired and confabulated with each other infacilitating and insuring the open, blatant and deliberate violation of Art. 172 of theRevised Penal Code which states:

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsifieddocuments. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium andmaximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall beimposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsificationsenumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official

document or letter of exchanged ( sic ) or any other kind of commercialdocument; and

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intentto cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any ofthe acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicialproceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to


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cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embracedin the next preceding article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions ofthis article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.

G. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated, abettedand facilitated the perversion and subversion of truth in the said verification and

certification of non-forum shopping. Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3,3.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, the pertinentprovisions of which are herein below quoted and a copy of said code is heretoattached and marked as Annex "E";

CANON 1. A. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW

AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest, immoral or decietful ( sic ) conduct.

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abetactivities simed ( sic ) at defiance of the law or atlessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 3. A. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICESSHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED ANDOBJECTIVE INFORMATION OF ( sic ) STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Rule 3.01 A lawyer shall not use or permit the useof any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claimregarding his qualified ( sic ) or legal services.

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOODFAITH TO THE COURT.

In his Comment, 2 respondent Jose Antonio Bernas avers that he has not committed forumshopping because the criminal action is not an action that involves the same issue as those in acivil action and both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so long as the civilaspect has not been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping onlyexists when identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiple fora.

In his Supplemental Comment, 3 respondent further contends that neither he or his clientPascual has commenced any criminal action. Pascual merely requested the NBI to assist in the

investigation or prosecution, and left it to the NBI to determine whether the filing of anendorsement to the prosecutor, who would determine probable cause, would be appropriate. Itwas only upon request of the NBI that he assisted Ramon Pascual in drafting an affidavit-complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant. Likewise, respondent bycounsel reiterates that the letter transmitted to the NBI cannot constitute an action or proceedingbecause the NBI's functions are merely investigatory and informational in nature. NBI has noprosecutorial functions or quasi-judical powers and is incapable of granting relief or remedy. TheNBI cannot be an agency contemplated by the circular.


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(g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific crime laboratory and to conductresearches in furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal investigation;

(h) To perform such other related functions as the Secretary of Justice may assignfrom time to time.

Explicitly, the functions of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory andinformational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting anyrelief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whosefindings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative andas public welfare may require. It renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detectionof crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those persons responsiblefor defrauding his client.

The courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powersand those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, but to makebinding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or

quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums contemplated by theCircular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

B. Jurisdiction

G.R. No. L-24281 May 16, 1967

ROSITA C. TALEON and MIGUEL SOLIS, petitioners appellants,vs.THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE DISTRICT ENGINEER,Province of Davao,and LUCIA O . TOLENTINO, respondents-appellees.

Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners-appellants.Tolentino, Amoguis and Madrazo for respondent-appellee L. O. Tolentino.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico de Castro andSolicitor C. S. Gaddi for respondent-appellee Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

BENGZON, J.P., J .: Petitioner-appellant Rosita Taleon is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Lupon, Davao, whichshe acquired from her co-petitioner-appellant Miguel Solis who had constructed therein man-madecanals and fishpond dikes.

On April 17, 1961, respondent-appellee Lucia Tolentino wrote a letter-complaint to the Secretary ofPublic Works stating that several fishpond operators and/or owners in Lupon, Davao have built damsacross and closed the Cabatan River, a public navigable stream, thereby depriving her and the


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residents therein of passageway, fishing ground and water supply. This letter-complaint was formallyamended on June 9, 1961, wherein Tolentino specified appellants Taleon and Solis, and anotherneighbor, one Humberto de los Santos, as those responsible for the closing of the alleged CabatanRiver, on the banks of which their lands abutted. On June 13, 1961, Taleon filed her answer denyingthe existence of the alleged river and claiming that the dams were constructed inside her registeredproperty and that her water source was a man-made canal connected to the sea.

An administrative hearing was thereafter held. On July 11, 1961, the Secretary of Public Works,through the department undersecretary, rendered a decision finding that appellants were indeedobstructing the Cabatan River, a Public navigable stream which used to pass inside their lands, withthe dams they constructed thereon, and ordering their demolition. Appellants filed a motion toreconsider claiming that the ruling was contrary to the facts established and that the Secretary hadno jurisdiction over the Case. This was denied.

Appellants elevated the case to the Office of the President on October 11, 1961. After reviewing therecords, said office affirmed on November 10, 1961 the decision of July 11, 1961. Appellants filed amotion to reconsider based on an alleged decision of Public Works Secretary Moreno rendered onNovember 24, 1961, reversing the former ruling of July 11, 1961. On January 10, 1962, the Office ofthe President denied the motion, on two grounds: (1) An official examination of the records of thecase showed that said decision of Secretary Moreno did not form part thereof, and (2) even if it weregenuine, it had no legal effect since the Secretary had already lost jurisdiction when appellants filedtheir appeal to the President.

On February 9, 1962, Taleon was informed by the District Engineer of Davao that her dams wouldbe demolished on February 16, 1962, upon orders of the Executive Secretary, the administrativedecision having become final and executory. To stop the threatened demolition, appellants filed suitin the Court of First Instance of Davao against the Public Works Secretary and the Engineer ofDavao. They were able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction on February 15, 1962.

On September 1, 1962, appellants filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminaryinjunction against the herein respondents-appellees in the Court of First Instance of Manila. After thelatters' respective answers were filed and the case in Davao was dismissed, upon appellants'motion, said Manila court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, altho in form atemporary restraining order with bond.

The issues having been joined, a pre-trial conference was held and the Court of First Instance ofManila allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss the petition. Upon orders of said court, theadministrative records were sent up. On January 11, 1965, acting on the respective memorandasubmitted by the parties in support of and in opposition to the pending motion to dismiss, the court aquo ruled that appellants were given a fair hearing in the administrative case and that the decisiontherein was supported by the evidence adduced and dismissed the petition stating:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the respondents' Motion to Dismiss, GRANTED. Let

this petition be, as it hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioners.

The temporary restraining order issued on 17 December 1962 is hereby dissolvedand the bond filed by petitioners, cancelled.

Taking issue with this ruling, the petitioners instituted the present appeal, raising questions purely oflaw. They submit that the court a quo erred in dismissing the case without giving them a full trial,thereby depriving them of the opportunity to prove that the alleged extension of the Cabatan Riverpassing across their property is but a depression and that the decision rendered by Secretary


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Moreno on November 24, 1961, is genuine. Appellants also reiterate that the Secretary of PublicWorks has no jurisdiction over the case, since the dams and the body of water in question werelocated inside registered private property.

Appellants' contentions are without merit. First of all, full trial was not needed. The issues raisedbefore the court a quo were all purely legal and thus could be resolved on the basis of the pleadings

and memoranda filed and the administrative records sent up to it. No necessity was there for furtherreception of evidence.

Anent the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works, this point has been squarely covered inLovina v. Moreno , L-17821, November 29, 1963. 1 There We upheld the power of the Public WorksSecretary under Republic Act 2056 to declare as a public navigable stream any alleged depressionor bodies of water even inside titled properties. That case involved a creek, located inside a titledland, which was alleged to be privately owned. The Public Works Secretary declared it as part of apublic stream which plaintiffs therein had blocked with their dams. In sustaining the Secretary, Wethere ruled that such fact-finding power on his part was merely incidental to his duly to clear allnavigable streams of unauthorized obstructions and, hence, its grant did not constitute an unlawfuldelegation of judicial power. And we remarked there that although the title was silent as to theexistence of any stream inside the property, that did not confer a right to the stream, it being of apublic nature and not subject to private appropriation, even by prescription.

Appellants would offer affidavits which are hearsay 2 and testimonies aliunde to show that thealleged Cabatan River inside their property is really a mere depression. As also enunciated in Lovinav. Moreno , supra , however, there cannot be a trial de novo in cases of this nature, since a review ofan administrative finding is limited to the evidence already presented before the administrative body. 3 This rule bars presentation of evidence aliunde and limits the trial court's functions to determiningwhether there is evidence in the administrative records substantial enough to support the findingstherein. Here, the records of the administrative case were actually brought up and submitted to thecourt a quo and it held that the administrative finding that the alleged depression was really a part ofthe navigable Cabatan River was supported by substantial evidence. Said court fully did its duty, tohave gone further would have been exceeding its power.

Regarding the alleged second decision of the Secretary, its non-existence has been officiallycertified by the Chief of the Records Division of the Department of Public Works, the officialcustodian. 4 This alone is proof enough that there is no such decision. 5 But even granting that there isreally such a decision , it would not help appellants' cause any. Said decision would still be wanting oflegal force and effect since Secretary Moreno had already lost jurisdiction to revoke the former rulingbecause of the appeal then already taken by appellants themselves to the Office of the President,which affirmed the former ruling. And even conceding jurisdiction, the second decision could stillaffect nothing since it was actually revoked and reversed by the ruling of the Office of the President,dated January 10, 1962, which denied the motion to reconsider filed by appellants wherein theyinvoked said new decision. So, a full trial to prove the authenticity of the Moreno decision would be apointless waste of the court a quo's time.

It is recognized that the trial court may dismiss a petition for certiorari even after an answer is filedupon a motion to dismiss, where said petition is found to be patently without merit. 6 But the court aquo did not summarily dismiss the petition. It conducted a pre-trial conference and even ordered therecords in the administrative case to be elevated to it. Now the Rules of Court 7 authorizes the trialcourt to render judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment, as justice may require, if at thepre-trial it finds that facts exist which would warrant such judgment. All the necessary facts beingalready before the court a quo , no further trial was required. Its decision rendered at that stage wastherefore sanctioned by the Rules.


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Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners-appellants.So ordered.

G.R. No. L-43653 November 29, 1977

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),petitioner,vs.BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and DIEGO MORALES, respondents.

G.R. No. L-45378 November 29, 1977

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES. INC. (RCPI),petitioner,

vs.

BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and PACIFICO INNOCENCIO,respondents.

Treas & Aligaen for petitioner.

R. Mag. Bernardo for respondent Morales.

Silvestre T. de la Cruz for respondent Innocencio.

Primitivo C. Santos for respondent Board.

MARTIN,J .,

These two petitions (G.R. No. L-43653 and G.R. No. L-45378) for review by certiorari of thedecisions of the Board of Communications in BC Case No. 75-01-OC, entitled " Diego T Morales vs.Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)" and BC Case No. 75-08-OC,entitled "Pacifica Innocencio vs. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)," have beenConsolidated as per resolution of this Court dated March 21, 1977, as they involve the same issueas to whether the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for damages allegedlysuffered by private respondents for failure to receive telegrams sent thru the petitioner RadioCommunications of the Philippines, Inc., RCPI for short.

In BC Case No. 75-01-OC (G.R. No. L-43653) complainant respondent Diego Morales claims thatwhile he was in Manila his daughter sent him a telegram on October 15, 1974 from Santiago,Isabela, informing him of the death of his wife, Mrs. Diego T. Morales. The telegram sent thru thepetitioner RCPI however never reached him. He had to be informed personally about the death ofhis wife and so to catch up with the burial of his wife, he had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela. Inits answer petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted fromSantiago, lsabela to its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City but when it was relayed fromCubao, the radio signal became intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manilaunreadable and unintelligible. Because of the failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him,respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages.

In BC Case No. 75-08-OC (G.R. No. L-45378) complainant respondent Pacifico Innocencio claimthat on July 13, 1975 Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of


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the petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna for the Purpose of informing him aboutthe death of their father. The telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the non-receipt and/or non-delivery of the message sent to said address, the sender (Lourdes Innocenciohas not been notified about its non-delivery, As a consequence Pacifica Innocencio was not able toattend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver tohim said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the death of their father when

he visited his hometown Moncada Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguishand personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages.

After hearing. the respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner wasinadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine ofP200 pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. Iand Letter of Implementation No. 1.

The main thrust of the argument of petitioner is that respondent Board has no jurisdiction toentertain and take cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of contractualobligation arising from negligence covered by Article 1170 of the Civil Code 1 and injury causedby quasi delict or tort liability under Article 2176 of the Civil Code 2 which according to it should

be ventilated in the proper courts of justice and not in the Board of Communications.

We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service Commissionand its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislatureand not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or bynecessary implication,. conferred upon it by statute". 3 The functions of the Public ServiceCommission are limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power asare expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. 4 As successor in interestof the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers

jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public ServiceCommission. One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Actgoverning the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue certificate of public

convenience. But this power to issue certificate of public convenience does not carry with it thepower of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of certificate of publicconvenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest.But even assuming that the respondent Board of Communications has the power or jurisdictionover petitioner in the exercise of its supervision to insure adequate public service, petitionercannot be subjected to payment of fine under Section 21 of the Public Service Act, because thisprovision of the law subjects to a fine every public service that violates or falls to comply with theterms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of theCommission. In the two cases before us petitioner is not being charged nor investigated forviolation of the terms and conditions of its certificate of public convenience or of any order,decision or regulations of the respondent Board of Communications. The complaint ofrespondents in the two case was that they were allegedly inconvenienced or injured by the

failure of the petitioner to transmit to them telegrams informing them of the deaths of closerelatives which according to them constitute breach of contractual obligation through negligenceunder the Civil Code. The charges however, do not necessarily involve petitioners failure tocomply with its certificate of public convenience or any order, decision or regulation ofrespondent Board of Communication. It is clear from the record that petitioner has not beencharge of any violation or failure to comply with the terms and condition of its certificates ofpublic convenience or of any order, decision or regulation of the respondent Board. The chargedoes not relate to the management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages bypetitioner in accordance with its certificate of public convenience. If in the two cases before Us


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complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Innocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner'sbreach of contractual obligation arising from negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilatetheir grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts andnot in the respondent Board of Communications. Much less can it impose the disciplinary fine ofP200 upon the petitioner. In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29236) and ConstancioLangan vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29247), this Court speaking thru Justice Enrique Fernando, ruled:

There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Boardof Communications as successor in interest) imposing the fines in these twopetitions. The law cannot be any clearer . The only power it possessed over radiocompanies as noted was to fix rates It could not take to task a radio company for annegligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. That it did then inthese two petitions lacked the impress of validity.

In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public ServiceCommission lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner. There isnothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to impose a fine that calls for adifferent conclusion.

WHEREFORE. both decisions of respondent Board of Communications in BC Case No. 75-01 OCand BC Case No. 75- 08-0C are hereby reversed, set aside, declared null and void for lack of

jurisdiction to take cognizance of both cases. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142601 October 23, 2006

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE

DEL MONTE, BULACAN, SPS. ANGEL and ROSARIO CRUZ, RUFINO LAAN, RUFINO LAANSANTOS, ANDRES NEPOMUCENO, SPS. ALBERTO and HERMINIA HAGOS, LEONGUILALAS, SPS. OSCAR and HAYDEE BADILLO,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J .:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorar i1

assailing the Decisio n2

of the Court of Appeals datedNovember 16, 1999 and Resolution dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54495, entitled"NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, versus, The Hon. Rufino V. Mijares, in his capacityas Commissioner, Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), Municipality of SanJose Del Monte, Bulacan, represented by Hon. Eduardo V. Roquero, in his capacity as MunicipalMayor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, JOSEPH ELMER S. GUEVARRA, Sheriff IV of the Ex-Officio Sheriff, Malolos, Bulacan, SPS. ANGEL A. CRUZ and ROSARIO C. CRUZ, RUFINO LAAN,RUFINA LAAN SANTOS, ANDRES NEPOMUCENO, SPS. ALBERTO HAGOS and HERMINIA
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b) The lot lines of Tala Estate traverses thru Marilao River.

c) The northern portion of the lot lines of Parcels 1, 2 and 3 SWO-41615 TalaEstate indicated that it traverses thru Marilao River.

3. In Municipal Resolution No. 06-08-95 dated August 8, 1995, it is requested thatthe geographic positions of BM Nos. 11 to 24, Tala Estate shall be recognized as theofficial lots lines which delineates the boundaries of San Jose del Monte, Bulacanand Caloocan City. Moreover, the resolution is opposed to the delineation of MarilaoRiver as the boundary of two localities, as embodied in SWO-41615.

4. If the lot lines of Parcels 1, 2 and 3, SWO-41615 will be the basis for theboundaries of the two LGUs, Marilao River will be the natural boundary between thetwo LGUs; if BM 11 to 24, Tala Estate shall be the basis for the boundaries, somenorthern portions of Parcels 1, 2 and 3, SWO-41615, portions of Bankers Village andPangarap Village belongs to the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan."

The Comprehensive Report states that the San Jose del Monte Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions

contradict the delineation embodied in SWO-41615 of the Tala Estate, a 598-hectare propertyallotted by the government mainly for housing and resettlement site under the administration of theNational Housing Authority (NHA), pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 843 issued by thenPresident Ferdinand E. Marcos on April 26, 1971.

Unsatisfied with the report of the DENR, respondent municipality filed a complaint with theCommission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) ,6 against petitioner NHA. Several residentsof San Jose del Monte, namely: spouses Angel and Rosario Cruz, Rufino Laan, Rufina Laan Santos,

Andres Nepomuceno, spouses Alberto and Herminia Hagos, Leon Guilalas, spouses Oscar andHaydee Badillo, and Leoncio Laan (herein private respondents) joined the municipality ascomplainants in the said case. They alleged that their properties are within the Municipality of SanJose del Monte; that Presidential Proclamation No. 843 does not cover their properties; and that theNHAs Bagong Silang Resettlement Project encroaches on their landholdings. They prayed that theNHA be ordered to award them damages. Incidentally, the City of Caloocan was not impleaded as aparty in their complaint.

On June 22, 1998, the COSLAP rendered its Resolution ruling that the correct boundary betweenrespondents San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City is that specified in the twin Resolutions of theSangguniang Bayan of said respondents. The COSLAP likewise held that all other issues, such asthose raised by respondents, are mere incidents of such ruling. In effect, the COSLAP ruled that theland covered by the NHA project, being within the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, encroachesupon respondents properties.

On January 14, 1999, petitioner NHA, upon invitation of the Bureau of Local GovernmentSupervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (Bureau), attended a meeting held

on January 26, 1999 between the local officials of respondent municipality and Caloocan City. Thepurpose of the meeting was to provide an avenue for the discussion of the territorial boundarybetween the two local government units. During the meeting, petitioner NHA posed strong oppositionto the COSLAP Resolution, contending that the latter has no jurisdiction over the boundary dispute.Subsequently, the Bureau directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 30days.
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Instead of submitting a position paper, respondent municipality filed with the COSLAP a motion forexecution of its Resolution dated June 22, 1998. On May 17, 1999, the COSLAP granted the motionand issued a writ of execution.

Petitioner NHA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging that in issuing theJune 22, 1998 Resolution and the writ of execution, COSLAP acted without jurisdiction.

On November 16, 1999, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for having been filed out of timeand for petitioners failure to avail of the remedy of appeal.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

At the threshold, let it be stated that a judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction isvoid. It can never become final and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the question .7

The main issue for our resolution is whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the boundary disputebetween respondent municipality and Caloocan City.

COSLAP was created by Executive Order No. 561 issued on September 21, 1979 by then PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos. The Commission is an administrative body established as a means ofproviding a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems to avoid social unrest. Itsobjective is to settle land conflicts among small settlers, landowners and members of culturalminorities.

The powers and functions of the COSLAP are laid down in Section 3 of Executive Order No. 561,thus:

Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers

and functions:

x x x

2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, Thatthe Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve landproblems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, forinstance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of socialtension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or

timber concessionaires;

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivisions of lands of thepublic domain; and


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(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

x x x

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such couldwield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes .8 In acting on a landdispute, the COSLAP may either assume jurisdiction if the matter falls under paragraph 2(a) to (e) orrefer the matter to an agency having appropriate jurisdiction.

There is no provision in Executive Order No. 561 that COSLAP has jurisdiction over boundarydispute between two local government units. Under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local GovernmentCode, the respective legislative councils of the contending local government units have jurisdictionover their boundary disputes. Sections 118 and 119 provide:

Section 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute.

x x x

(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on theone hand and a highly urbanized city on the other , or two (2) or morehighly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to therespective sanggunians of the parties.

(e) In the event the Sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement withinsixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue acertification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by theSanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) daysfrom the date of the certification referred to above.

Section 119. Appeal. Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court,

any party may elevate the decision of the Sanggunian concerned to the properRegional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional TrialCourt shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending finalresolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continuedfor all legal purposes.

Rule III implementing the above provisions states:

Rule III

SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES

Art. 15. Definition and Policy. There is boundary dispute when a portion or thewhole of the territorial area of an LGU is claimed by two or more LGUs. Boundarydisputes between or among LGUs shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably.

Art. 16. Jurisdictional Responsibility. Boundary disputes shall be referred forsettlement to the following:


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(a) Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan for disputes involvingtwo (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality, as the case maybe;

(b) Sangguniang panlalawigan for those involving two (2) or moremunicipalities within the same province;

(c) Jointly, to the sanggunians of provinces concerned, for those involvingcomponent cities or municipalities of different provinces; or

(d) Jointly, to the respective sanggunians, for those involving acomponent city or municipality and a highly urbanized city or two (2) ormore highly-urbanized cities. x x x

Thus, instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case, the COSLAP should have referredrespondents complaint to the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Caloocan City and the SangguniangBayan of San Jose del Monte. Their decision may be appealed to the proper Regional Trial Court.

Consequently, we rule that the COSLAP does not have jurisdiction over the boundary disputebetween San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City. We have consistently ruled that a judgment forwant of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of anyobligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void .9 Such nullity iscorrectable only by certiorari .10 And certiorari cannot be dismissed for timeliness inasmuch as a void

judgment never acquires finality and any action to declare its nullity does not prescribe .11 Having nolegal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves theparties in the position they were in before the trial .12

Clearly, the Court of Appeals erred in disposing NHAs petition for certiorari. It should havedismissed the petition, not on the grounds that it was filed late and that certiorari is not a substitutefor a lost appeal, but solely on the ground that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subjectboundary dispute.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54495 are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

C. Rules of Procedure

G.R. No. 147525 February 26, 2007

BONIFACIO ESPINOZA,Petitioner,vs.PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATIONOFFICE OF PAMPANGA andMARIA QUIBULOY,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA,J .:
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Under review are the January 14, 1994 decision 1 and June 01, 2000 resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 502 UDK. The CA dismissed petitioner Boni facio Espinozaspetition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the provincial adjudicatorof the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Office (PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga indeciding DARAB Case No. 203-P-90.

The events leading to this petition for review on certiorari stemmed from an agrarian disputebefore the PARAD, San Fernando, Pampanga. A complain t3 for ejectment was filed againstpetitioner by private respondent Maria V. Quibuloy, as co-owner and administratrix of threeparcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3676. She alleged that petitioner hadreneged on his obligations as tenant to pay the rent and till the subject landholding.

Instead of answering the complaint, petitioner moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.He cited Section 1, Rule III of the 1989 Rules of Procedure of the Department of AgrarianReform Adjudication Board (1989 DARAB Rules), providing for conciliation proceedings beforethe Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) prior to initiating the case. He contended thatpresentation of a certification from the BARC, attesting that the dispute had been submitted to itfor mediation or conciliation without any success of settlement, was a jurisdictional requirement.On that note, he concluded that the provincial adjudicator could not take cognizance of theagrarian dispute due to Quibuloys failure to present the required certifica te.

The hearing on the motion to dismiss was set on November 7, 1990 .4 On the said date,petitioner or his counsel failed to appear, hence the motion was submitted for resolution .5

Without issuing a ruling on petitioners motion, the provincial adjudicator set the case for hearingon May 22, 1991. Again, neither petitioner nor his counsel attended the hearing. Thus, Quibuloywas allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the dispute was ordered submittedfor decision .6

Just before the decision was rendered, petitioner filed his answer assailing Quibuloyspersonality to bring suit. Petitioner also offered unsubstantiated denials of Quibuloys charges.

As his defense, he denied allegations of non-payment of rents and non-tillage of the land forlack of knowledge and information to form a belief as to the veracity thereof.

The provincial adjudicator was sufficiently convinced that Quibuloys allegations were true andcorrect. Accordingly, he decided the case against petitioner .7

Instead of immediately appealing from the adjudicators decision, petitioner allowed thereglementary period to lapse. Thereafter, he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

The appellate court dismissed the petition as "unavailing and vacuous. "8 It reiterated the well-

settled rule that certiorari lies only in cases of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Itstressed that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.

Now, petitioner comes to us with practically a rehash of the issues already raised in the CA, towit:

I.
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WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE [PARAD] OFPAMPANGA IS CORRECT IN PROCEEDING WITH DARAB CASE NO. 203-P-90 WITHOUT FIRSTCOMPLYING WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN SECTION 1, RULEIII OF THE [1989] DARAB REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE [PARAD] OFPAMPANGA IS CORRECT IN DECIDING DARAB CASE NO. 203-P-90 WITHOUT FIRSTRESOLVING PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT PE TITIONERS ANSWERTO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT IN DARAB CASE NO. 203 -P-90 WAS FILED OUT OFTIME AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE SAME.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS CORRECT IN DECIDING DARAB CASE NO. 203-P-90 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON THE BASIS OF THE SELF-SERVING

AFFIDAVIT OF THE LATTER AND HER LONE WITNESS CONSIDERING HER FAILURE TOPRESENT THE TITLE OF THE LAND IN QUESTION (TCT NO. 3676) OR ANY DOCUMENT TOSHOW HER AUTHORITY TO ACT AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE SAME.

V.

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA s] DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND DENIALOF [PETITIONERS] MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS PROPER .9

We deny the petition.

A special civil action of certiorari is an independent action, raising the question of jurisdictionwhere the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has actedwithout or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction .10 The ultimate purpose of such action is to keep an inferior tribunal within thebounds of its jurisdiction or relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts .11 1awphi1.net

A petition for certiorari was never meant as a mode of reviewing errors of judgment committedby an inferior tribunal. Thus, it has been settled that the remedy of certiorari is not a substitutefor an appeal lost by the party entitled thereto especially if the right of appeal was lost throughnegligence .12 When the remedy of appeal is available but is lost due to petitioners ownnegligence or error in the choice of remedies, resort to certiorari is precluded.

Under the 1989 DARAB Rules ,13 an aggrieved party may appeal the decision of a provincialadjudicator to the Adjudication Board within 15 days from receipt. In this case, petitioner allowedthe appeal period to lapse and instead filed a petition for certiorari in the CA roughly threemonths after the assailed decision was rendered.

It is evident that the CA acted on the petition properly.
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Even if, in the greater interest of substantial justice, certiorari may be availed of, it must beshown that the adjudicator acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, that is, that the adjudicator exercised his powers in an arbitrary or despotic mannerby reason of passion or personal hostilities, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion orvirtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law .14

As correctly found by the appellate court, there is no showing that errors of jurisdiction or graveabuse of discretion were committed by public respondent.

On the first assigned error, the 1989 DARAB Rules exempted parties residing in non-adjoiningbarangays from presenting the BARC certification .15 Since it is undisputed that Quibuloy residedin San Nicolas 1ST, Lubao, Pampanga while petitioner stayed in San Agustin, Lubao,Pampanga, the former was not required to present the BARC certification before the adjudicatortaking cognizance of the agrarian dispute. Needless to say, the provincial adjudicator did not errin entertaining the dispute notwithstanding the absence of the BARC certification.

On the second issue, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are not boundby technical rules followed in courts of law. The adjudicator is given enough latitude, subject tothe essential requirements of administrative due process, to be able to expeditiously ascertainthe facts of the agrarian dispute .16

While there may have been a technical lapse on the part of the adjudicator in disposing of themotion to dismiss, the assailed acts of the adjudicator did not amount to a grave abuse ofdiscretion justifying a writ of certiorari. Considering the technical flexibility afforded to agrarianadjudicators, the order may easily be construed as a denial of the motion to dismiss. Whatwould have been the prudent recourse under the rules was to submit an answer immediately,participate in the hearing and appeal an adverse decision. Sadly, petitioner failed to do any ofthese. It is now too late for him to di spute the adjudicators decision.

Moving on to the third assignment of error, we hold that petitioners answer was indeed filed outof time. While the 1989 DARAB Rules provides that the non-answering respondent (petitioner)may be allowed to belatedly file his answer, it also provides that the answer should be filedbefore the matter is submitted for decision. Here, petitioner submitted his answer after the casewas submitted for decision.

Lastly, on the fourth assignment of error, it cannot be overemphasized that only errors of jurisdiction may be reviewed by the CA in a petition for certiorari. "Where the issue or questioninvolved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the courtto render said decision the same is beyond the province of a special civil action forcertiorari. "17

In sum, the petition failed to prove that the CA committed any reversible error in denyingpe titioners petition for certiorari as well as his motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. L-856 April 18, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.

Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant. Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.

TUASON,J . :

Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of thePeople's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by electrocution.

Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1,2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court, were substantiated. In a unanimous decision, thetrial court found as follows:

"As regards count No. 1

Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited,apprehended and commandeered numerous girls and women against their will forthe purpose of using them, as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral purposeand sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among such unfortunate victims, were FelinaLaput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay,Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos.

It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of theaccused; it sufficient to reproduce here succinctly the testimony of Eriberta Ramo.She testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused came to her house to get her and

told her that she was wanted in the house of her aunt, but instead, she was broughtto the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that she escaped andreturned to Baclayon her hometown; that the accused came again and told her thatColonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did not accept the job;that a week later the accused came to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in takingsome other girls Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor Hontanosastold her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife; that when she was brought toColonel Mini the latter had nothing on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel Minithreatened her with a sword tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in havingcarnal knowledge with her; that on the following night, again she was brought toColonel Mini and again she was raped; that finally she was able to escape andstayed in hiding for three weeks and only came out from the hiding when ColonelMini left Tagbilaran.


Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in company withsome Japanese and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramofrom their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor ofColonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, Agapito Hontanosas in order that saidJapanese Colonel might select those first who would later be taken to satisfy hiscarnal appetite and that by means of threat, force and intimidation, the above


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mentioned two sister were brought to the headquarters of the Japanese Commanderat the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a lifeof shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said witnessesEriberta Ramo her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not necessary here to reciteonce more their testimony in support of the allegations in court No. 2; this Court isfully convinced that the allegation in said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by the

evidence adduced.


Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls named EduardoS. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol, bythe accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to theJapanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, theaccused Susano Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer, before delivering themto said Japanese Officer, satisfied first their lust; the accused Susano Perez rapingEduarda S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente Bullecer, the other girl EutiquiaLamay. Eduarda S. Daohog, testifying, said: that while on the way to Tagbilaran, theaccused though force and intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that sheresisted with all her force against the desire of the accused, but of no avail; that uponarriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer named Takibayaswho also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused andhis companion, Bullecer, went to her house to take her and her sister; that her sisterwas then out of the house; that the accused threatened her with a revolved if sherefuses to go; that she was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that whilethey were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the car, and theircompanion Bullecer took the other witness (Eutiquia Lamay); that when the accusedand Eduarda returned to the car, the latter; Eduarda, covered her face, crying; thatlater, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that on arriving and inthe presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the Governor exclaimed: "I did notcall for these girls": but the accused replied saying: "These girls talked bad against

the Japanese , and that is why we arrested them"; that the said GovernorHontaosas then, said: "Take them to the Japanese "; that the accused and Bullecerbrought the two girls to the Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to oneroom by the Japanese Captain called Dr. Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) wastaken to another room by another Japanese living in that house; that she was rapedby that Jap while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.

In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog andEutiquia Lamay, all the allegations in Court No. 4 were fully proven beyondreasonable doubt.


Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accusedcommandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana Bonalos on the pretextthat they were to bee taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in theinvestigation of a case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and uponarriving atTagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the aforesaid two girls to the residence ofColonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed Forces in Bohol and by means ofviolence threat and intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had sexualintercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused subsequently of Colonel Mini


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and through violence, threat and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledgewith her against her will; that two days, later, upon the pretext of conducting theunfortunate girls to their home, said accused brought the other girls FelicianaBonalos to a secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean ofthreat and violence had carnal knowledge with her against her will.

Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused came to get heron the pretext that she was to be used as witness in a case affecting certainChinaman before Colonel Mini; that she and her younger sister Flaviana werebrought in a car driven by the accused; they were brought to the house of ColonelMini; that sister Flaviana was conducted into a room and after remaining in the samefor about an hour, she came out with her hair and her dress in disorder; that Flavianatold her immediately that she was raped against her will by Colonel Mini; that she(Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said Jap officer, was taken by Perez to anuninhabited house and there by threat and intimidation, the accused succeeded inraping her; that when she returned to her (the witness), Flaviana was crying; that thefollowing day while conducting the two girls back to their hometown, she (Feliciana)was also raped by the accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.

Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as following:That on June 15, 1942, the accused came and told her that the Japanese neededher daughters to be witnesses; that accordingly, he daughters, under thatunderstanding, started for Tagbilaran; that later, she went to Tagbilaran to look forher daughters and she found them in the office of the Puppet Governor; that onseeing her, both daughters wept and told her that they were turned over to theJapanese and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her (the witness) that afterthe Japanese had raped her the accused also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabitedhouse; that the accused did not permit her two daughter to return home on thepretext that the Puppet Governor was then absent and in the meanwhile they stayedin the house of the accused Perez; that when her daughter returned to her houseultimately, they related to her (mother) what happened; that both daughters told her

they would have preferred death rather than to have gone to Tagbilaran; thatFeliciana told her (the mother) that the accused had raped her.

The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as a part ofthe res gestae regardless of the time that had elapsed between the occurrence andthe time of the information. In the manner these two witnesses testified in court, therecould be no doubt that they were telling the absolute truth. It is hard to conceived thatthese girls would assume and admit the ignominy they have gone through if theywere not true. The Court is fully convinced that all the allegations contained in CourtNo. 5 have been proven by the testimonies of these two witnesses beyondreasonable doubt.


Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companionapprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nic

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V. Administrative Adjudication