Vaccine matching of FMD in the region

• O SEA topotype (Mya-98): O Manisa, O Ind R2/75 and O Taw 98(some isolates from Hong Kong (2011) : not matching O Manisa, O Taw 98)

• ME-SA topotype (PanAsia-2) (2009-2010) : O Manisa, O IND R2/75, O TAW 98 and O BFS.

• FMDV A from Iran (2009-2010) : A TUR 06.

• FMDV A from Afghanistan (2010-2011): A IRAN 05, A TUR 06.

• A from the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea: Mya-97.

• Asia 1 from Bahrain, Pakistan and Iran (2010-2011):

not matching with Asia 1 IND 8/79, Asia 1 Shamir, Asia 1 WBN

17

Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus

7 immunologically distinct serotypes

Capsid Non-structural proteins

AAAAAAAAAn

L P1 P2 P35’ UTR 3’ UTRVPg

VP4 VP2 VP3 VP12A 2B 2C 3A 3B 3C 3DPoly C

~8.2 kb

IRES

O, A, C, Asia 1, SAT 1, SAT 2, SAT 3

FMD Differentiation of Infection and Vaccination

FMD VaccineInactivated Vaccine (concentrated purified)Potency：Normal ３ＰＤ５０

For emergency ６～１２ＰＤ５０

Differentiated Infected VaccinatedAnimal

１）LPB ELISA ○ ○

２）NSP ELISA ○ ×

The conditions for FMD vaccine

•The FMD vaccine must be an inactivated vaccine.

•The vaccine selected should be a good antigenic match for field isolates. It is very important to send samples to FMD Reference Laboratories for virus isolation and sequencing.

•Whenever FMD vaccine is used, in an emergency to control FMD outbreaks or routinely, it is essential to be able to determine whether FMDV antibodies are the result of infection or vaccination.

•The vaccine should be produced in accordance with the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals.

•Cooperation and research collaboration on FMD diagnosis and vaccine production are important between Member Countries to control FMD in the region.

•In order to be able to differentiate between antibodies by infection and by vaccination, there is an urgent need to continue striving to produce pure vaccines to limit the effect of NSP’s when evaluating surveillance results.

Empty Capsid

Intact FMDV

Empty Capsid of FMDV as vaccine antigen

Virus Genome

One Copy of 3D Protein

No Genome

No NS proteins

Only Outer Shell

Genetic engineering technique

A new generation FMD vaccine

1. Sharing Disease Information in Pool 1 - 3(South East and East, Central and Middle-East Asia)

2. Early notification of the FMD to Members in the region and OIE

3. Strengthen the border control to prevent FMD virus entry 4. Scientific research collaborations of the FMD laboratories

to control the disease among the member countries in the region.

5. Technical supports to the developing countries in the region for diagnosis of FMD

6. Financial and economic supports to provide good matching FMD vaccines to FMD epidemic countries

To reduce FMD outbreaks in the regionProposals

The epidemiological roles of susceptible animals in FMD

Cattle：The most susceptible livestock to FMDV.

（Detector）

Pigs：Pigs excrete very large quantities of the virus (100- to 2000-fold more than cattle and sheep).

（Amplifier）

Sheep：Mild or un-apparent clinical signs, making early detection of FMDV infection difficult.

（Transporter ?）

An example of Detector

• Japan in 2000: PanAsia of O ME-SA topotype• FMD in only cattle

• Miyazaki, Hokkaido killed 7４０ cattle• Only Japanese black cattle created atypical

clinical signs. No vesicles in mouth or nasal cavity

• Pigs form typical symptom of vesicle in foot by animal experiments

• The source of the virus was considered to be imported hay or straw from the Asia region.

Excretion of virus

Minimal effectiveinfecting dose 101.0 ID50 102.6 ID50

105 ID50 108 ID50

Detector Amplifier

Epidemiology of FMD

Epidemiological role

Examples of Amplifier

• Taiwan 1997, UK 2001, South Korea 2002

• Recently Japan 2010, South Korea 2010-2011

• O type Cathay, ME-SA and SEA topotypes

• Accumulation of FMDV in the environments makes new outbreaks.

• FMD outbreaks in pigs are often on a very large scale.

• The FMD can cause serious economic damage.

Economic Impact in Recent FMD Outbreaks

Year Country No. of Animal Destroy Economic Damage

1997 Taipei China Swine 4 million 3.6 Billion US$ in first year

2000 Japan Bovine 740 72.7 Million US$

2000 S. Korea Bovine 2200 273 Million US$(FMD Vaccine to 850,000 Bovine)

2002 S. Korea Swine 160,000 225 Million US$

2001 UK Susceptible Animals 14.4 Billion US$6 million

2010 Japan Swine & Bovine 290,000 3 Billion US$ for complete recovery

2010- S. Korea Swine & Bovine 3.5 Million 3 Billion US$

Samples of Transporter

• UK in 2001, Cyprus in 2007

• The clinical signs are sometimes mild or unapparent.

• It makes early detection of FMDV infection difficult.

• Possibility of huge FMD outbreaks

• Serological tests are important for the diagnosis of FMD in sheep.

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発生農場数

英国の口蹄疫発生(MAFF UK, 2001～2002)

累積発生数

１日の発生数Numbers of slaughtered animals

2002. 1.14

Cases：2026

slaughtered 4.05 Million

species cattle 0.6 M

sheep 3.3 M

pig 0.14 M

goat 2 Thousand

others 2 T

由来農場Freshwater / Isle of Wight

発見されたと畜場（27頭）Brentwood / Essex

2001.2.21.

由来農場Great Horwood / Buckinghamshire

由来農場Freshwater / Isle of Wight

発生と畜場･農場（４件）Essex州

UK FMD outbreaks in 2001

2001.2.25

e

発生農場（３件）Devon州

発生農場（３件）Northumberland州

移動制限地域Berwick-on-Tweed / Northumberland州

移動制限地域Fyvie / Abardeen州

移動制限地域Woodchester 及びKington

/ Gloucestershire州

発生農場（１件）Hereford州

Epidemiological findings of 2001 UK FMD outbreaks

19 heads of sheep

Livestock markets

Distance between A B 400km

C happened before A and B

A Initial outbreak （Tyne and Wear state）

Pig Farm

Origin of the FMDV

Unknown（Airborn infection）

C Cumbria stateDevon state

Expansion of Nationwide infection

B First find Essex state Slaughter house

（Airborn infection）

Cattle near by the slaughter house

（Epiological Investigation）

To prevent pandemic outbreaks and to inhibit huge economic catastrophes in the region

1. Early Detection

2. Early Extinguishment

3. Early notification

4. Good matching Vaccine

However….

Infected pigs excrete FMD viruses within 2 - 4 days after FMD infection

And it takes about 7 days before the animals can induce protective antibodies by vaccination.

Prompt effective tools are strongly desired