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8/9/2019 Valuing, Desiring and Noramtive Priority BRADY
1/13
Scots Philosophical Association
University of St Andrews
Valuing, Desiring and Normative PriorityAuthor(s): Michael S. Brady
Source:The Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 53, No. 211 (Apr., 2003), pp. 231-242Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the Scots Philosophical Associationand theUniversity of St. AndrewsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542866.
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2/13
The
hilosophicaluarterly,
ol.
53,
No.
21I
ISSN
oo3i-8o94
April
o03
VALUING,
DESIRING AND
NORMATIVE
PRIORITY
BY
MICHAEL.
BRADY
Judgement
nternalism
laimshat ur valuative
udgements
illmotivate
s
to ct
ppropriately,
t
leastn o
ar
s we re ational.examineow his
laim houlde
understood,
ith
articular
focus
n
whether
aluingnjoys
kind
f
normative
riority'
ver
esiring.
considernd
reJect
views
ccording
owhich
aluingomethingrovides
ne
with reasonobe
moved;
his laim
f
normative
priority
nd he
eadings
f
nternalism
t
uggests
re oo
trong.
also
reject
n nter-
pretation
hichschewslaims
f
normative
riority,
hilst
aintaining
hat
aluing
evertheless
rationally
ommits
r
equires
ne o e
motivated;
his
ejection
f
ormative
riority
nd he
eading
of
nternalismt
upports
re ooweak.n
the
inal
ectionssketchhe
nderstanding
fjudgement
internalism
favour,
nd
efendt gainstbjections.
Judgement
nternalismlaims
hat here s a
conceptual
onnection etween
judging
hat
omething
s
valuable nd
being
motivated o attain
hat
hing.'
The
precise
nature f this
onnection
s, however,
ifficulto
pin
down. One
problem
s
that here re
(or
can
be)
occasionswhenwe lack
any
motivation
to
act
in
accordancewith ur
evaluative
udgements;
n
the
ight
f
this,
ny
conceptual
onnection
must e a
defeasible
ne. Another s
that failure o be
moved
by
one's values is a
failure, omehow,
f
rationality;
n
the
ight
f
this,wemustunderstand hedefeasible onnections implyinghatfavour-
able
evaluations f
x will
motivate s to
act in so
far
as we are
rational.2
his
paper
examines how
udgement
nternalismhould
be understood
n
the
light
fthese
onstraints.
n
?1
reject eadings
which
laim that
valuations
enjoy
a
particular
ind of
normative
riority'
ver
motivations
uch that
valuing
omething
rovides
ne with
reasono be
moved
appropriately.
n
?II
I
reject
an
interpretation
hich eschews
claims of
normative
riority,
and
maintains hat
valuing
nevertheless
ationally
ommitsr
requires
ne to
I For detailsof this and other kinds of internalism,ee D. Brink,Moral Realismnd the
Foundations
f
Ethics
Cambridge
UP,
1989),
PP.
37-43;
S.
Darwall,
Reasons, Motives,
nd the
Demands of
Morality:
n
Introduction',
n
S. Darwall et
al.
(eds),
Moral
Discourse
nd
Practice
(Oxford
UP,
1997),
P- 305-12;
and
M.
Smith,
TheMoral
Problem
Oxford
UP,
1994), p. 60-3-
2
Smith,
p.
133-7.
See also C.
Korsgaard,
Skepticism
bout Practical
Reason',
Journal
f
Philosophy,
3 (1986),
pp.
5-25-
?
The
Editors f The
hilosophical
uarterly,003.
Published
y
Blackwell
ublishing,
6o00
arsington
oad,
Oxford
x4
2DQ,
UK,
and
350
Main
Street, Malden,
MA
2148,
USA.
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3/13
232
MICHAEL
S.
BRADY
be motivated.
n
the
final
ections
sketch nd
defend he
understanding
f
internalism hich
favour.
I
If
we make
the
plausible
ssumption
hatmotivation
equires
he
presence
of
desire,
we can
understand
udgement
nternalisms
claiming concep-
tual connection etween
aluing
nd
desiring.
n
particular,
e
can
under-
stand
t as
claiming
hat
gents
will
desire
n
accordance
with heir
aluing,
at
least
in
so
far as
they
are rational. But what
is the nature of
this
connection?n this ection shallconsider,nd ultimatelyeject, viewof
internalism
ccording
o
which here s
something
ormatively
pecial
bout
valuing,
r more
correctly,
view as to the
way
n
which
valuing
ounts s
special.
The idea that
valuing enjoys
a
privileged
tatus
when
compared
with
desiring,
hat
t
has a measure f whatwe
might
all
normative
riority,
tems
from ur conviction hatrational
gents
eem to tailor heir esires o their
values,
but not viceversa. his
suggests
hat when
valuing
and
desiring
diverge,
he
rrationality
eems o attach o
agents'desiring
ather
han
their
valuing
cf.
mith,
p.
142-7,
177-8o,
n the
spirit'
f
nternalism).
fwe are
sympathetic
o the
dea
of
normative
riority,
e need
to
give
an
accountof
what t
consists
n.
The
strongest
osition
here
will
hold that
valuing
ome-
thing
n
and of itself
rounds
rational
bligation
o desirethat
thing:
n
this
iew,
f
n
agent
valuesx then
rationally
ught
o
desire
.
The
notion
rationally
ught'
s meant to
capture
what
the balance of
considerations
avours,
nd
hence what
it
is
all-things-considered
ational
for n
agent
to
do.3
A
slightly
eaker
reading
f the claim
that
valuing
has
normativeriorityverdesiring oldsthat aluing omethingnand of tself
grounds
n
objective
easono desirethat
hing.
A
reason s here
viewedas a
consideration
which
favours
ome course of
action,
but
which can
in
principle
e
outweighed y
other
onsiderations. n this
view,then,
f
an
agent
values
x
then has an
objective
eason
o desire .
I think
we have
good
reason o
reject
hese
ways
of
understanding
orma-
tive
priority,
nd
hence
good
reasonto
reject
hese
ways
of
nterpreting
he
claims that
udgement
nternalism
akes.
For
suppose
that S's
values are
themselveso highlyrrationalrunjustifiedhat oughtnottovaluex; it s
highly
ounter-intuitive
n
this
ase to
maintain hat
nevertheless
aluing
x
grounds
rational
obligation,
r
provides
S with an
objective
reason,
to
3
ee
J.
Broome,
'Normative
Requirements',
n
J.
Dancy
(ed.),
Normativioy
Oxford:
Blackwell,
000),
pp.
78-99,
at
p.
79.
?
The Editors
f
The
hilosophicaluarterly,003
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4/13
VALUE,
DESIRING AND NORMATIVE
PRIORITY
233
desirex. What S
ought
o do
in
this
ase is
surely
o
get
rid
of the
positive
evaluation f
x,
rather handesire
n
accordancewith
t.4
We do not
have
to
relyonly
on
what seems
plausible,
however.For we have
reason to
reject
equally strong
eadings
fother rational
requirements,
n which case the
conclusion an be
supported y
analogy
with
hese.
The
epistemic equirement
o
believe
n
accordance
with modus
onens
provides
n
illustration.
strong
way
of
understanding
his s
as the claim
that fS
believes
hat and also
that
supports
,
S
has
a
rational
bligation
to
believe
q.
However,
s
John
Broome
has
argued,
his
eading
s
mistaken,
and not
ust
because S's
belief
n
the
former
ropositionsmay
be
epistem-
ically
uspect.5
or
suppose
thatthe
strong
eading
were
true.
f
we
grant
that believes hetautologyfpthen, theprinciple mplies hat fS believes
p,
thenS
rationally
ught
o believe
-
which s
obviously
alse.As a
result,
we should
reject
he
trongway
of
understanding
his
pistemic
rinciple.
The same
form f
argument
ells
quallyagainst
strong
eading
f the
principle
of
instrumental r
means-end
rationality.6
t is
traditional o
understand his
s the claim
that
f
an
agent
S intends
o
4
and
Iing
s a
necessary
means to
4ing,
then S
rationally
ught
to
W.
This
reading
too
should
be
rejected,
nd
not
simply
because
agents'
intentions,
ike
their
evaluations,an be irrational.n addition,fS is to fulfilhe ntention o
4
then
t s
necessary
or
to
4.
If
the
trong
eading
were
true,
t
wouldfollow
thatS
therefore
ationally
ught
o
4,
n
which ase
the truth f
the
strong
reading
entails hat
merely
ntending
o do
something rounds
rational
obligation
o do that
thing.
ince this
s
false,
we
should
reject
he
strong
reading.
It is
tempting,
n
the
light
f
this,
o
reject
trong eadings
f the
claim
that
valuing
has
normative
riority
ver
desiring.
his
does
not,
however,
forceus
to
abandon the
dea that
valuing njoys weakerkindofpriority,
which
we
might
apture
n
terms
f ts
provision
f a
different
weaker)
ort
of
normative
eason.
ndeed,
rejecting
he dea
that
valuing rovides
s with
obligations
r
reasons
of an
objective
ort
uggests
he
obvious
replacement
candidate,
namely, ubjective
bligations
r
reasons.
This
view
might
be
supported
s
follows:
o value x
is to
think
hat
x
is
good,
and to think
hat
x
is
good
is
to think
hat
one
has an
objective
ustificatory
eason to
obtain
it. But
subjective
easons
ust
are
considerations
ne
takes to
be
objective
See G. Sayre-McCord,The Metaethical roblem', thics,1081997), P- 55-83,atp. 64,
fn.
5.
5
See
J.
Broome,
Reasons and
Motivation',
roceedingsf
he
ristotelian
ociety,
upp.
Vol.
71
(1997),
.
126.
See also
his
Normative
Requirements',
.
85.
6
The
following
rgument
s
due to
Alan
Millar.
See his
'Normative
Reasons
and
Instrumental
ationality',
nJ.L.
Bermldez
and
A. Millar
eds),
Reasons
nd
Nature:
ssays
n the
Theory
fRationalityOxford
UP,
2002).
?
The
Editors
f
The
hilosophicaluarterly,003
This content downloaded from 84.89.129.46 on Mon, 2 Feb 2015 11:18:01 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
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5/13
234
MICHAEL S.
BRADY
justificatory
easons,
n
whichcase
one's
valuing
x
necessarily
rovides
ne
with
subjectiveustificatory
eason
to obtainx.
Since,
n standard ases
at
least,
reason o do
something
s also reason
o desire o do
it,
we can
derive
the claim thatvaluing
Oing
providesone with a subjective ustificatory
reason
to
desire o
4.
Moreover,
incethe
fact hat ne desires
omething
n
itself
rovides
neither
bjective
nor
subjective
easons,
hese laims eem
to
warrant heviewthat
aluing
has
normative
riority
ver
desiring.7
We
should
reject
this weaker
reading.
The
first
hing
o note is that
weaker
readings
f
our otherrational
principles
r
requirements
eem no
more
plausible
hantheir
tronger
ousins.
f,
for
nstance,
t s
claimedthat
S's
believing
hat
p
and that
f
p
then
grounds
subjective
eason
for
to
believeq, or entails hatS subjectivelyughtto believeq, we can simply
repeat
the
previous
form f
argument:
ince
S
believes
the
tautology
f
p
then
,
the
weakened
principle mplies
hat
believing
grounds subjective
reason
or
obligation
or
to
believe
p;
and
this
gain
seems
false.
Believing
that
,
in
and
of
tself,
ails
o
provide
ny
kind
of
self-justification.
imilar
remarks
pply
o
ntending
nd,
by
analogy,
o
valuing.
A
second
argument gainst
the
weaker
nterpretation
s
perhaps
more
straightforward:
t
is
not clear thatthe
concept
of a
subjective
eason s a
conceptof a genuinereasonat all, inwhichcase a reading f internalism
which nvokes his
oncept
will not be a
reading
which
ndicates
genuine
relation f normative
riority.
easons,
by
definition,
ecommend r favour
that for
which
they
are reasons.
Subjective
reasons,
by
definition,
re
considerationshat
n
agent
hinksavour r
recommend
hatfor
which
hey
are reasons.But this s not a
weakerkindof
favouring
r
recommending;
t
is
no kind
of
favouring
r
recommending
t all.
Whenever think have a
reason,
t
is
always
the
case that
regard
ome
considerations
favouring
acting
r
believing,
nd
never he case that
regard
he
act
hat thinkome
consideration
avours
ctions
in
and
of tself
avouring
ction.
ndeed,
would
be inclined o
deny
this,
without measureof
confidence hat
am
a
good
judge
of
these
things,
nd
hence that the considerations a
reason. As a
result,
he
concept
of a
subjective
eason
s
the
concept
of
something
hich
rational
eople
would not
recognize
r
taketo be a
reason
which
uggests
it
represents
o kind
of reason at all.
So
even f
t s claimed
that
valuing
x
provides subjective
eason
to desire
x,
we can
deny
that
this ntails hat
there s
any
kind
f
genuinely
ormative elation f
priority
etween
aluing
anddesiring. he weaker eading urns uttobe false.
Given
this,
we
might
oubtthat here
s
any
genuinely
ormative elation
of
priority
etween
aluing
nd
desiring.
his does
not,
however,
orce
s
to
7
See
W.
Quinn,
Putting
Rationality
n
its
Place',
in R.
Frey
nd
C. Morris
eds),
Value,
Welfare,
nd
Morality
Cambridge
UP,
1993), p. 26-50.
C The
Editors
f
The
hilosophicaluarterly,003
This content downloaded from 84.89.129.46 on Mon, 2 Feb 2015 11:18:01 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
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6/13
VALUE,
DESIRING AND
NORMATIVE
PRIORITY
235
reject
hetruth
f nternalism.or
there re other
normative elations hich
eschew
the
dea of such
priority,
nd
yet
re no less
genuine.
The
following
section onsiders
whether he relation etween
valuing
nd
desiring
an
be
understoodlongsimilarines.
II
In
the
previous
ection
argued
that
valuing
x does not
ground
reason of
either n
objective
r a
subjective
ind,
et alone
a
rational
bligation,
o
desire
x.
Nevertheless
e
might
till
hink
at
east
f
we are inclined owards
judgementnternalism)hat here s something rong, rom henormative
standpoint,
n
someone who values
x
but lacks
any
desireforx. What
this
might
e
emerges
rom
omething
imilar
hat an be
said
once
again
about
our other elations.
ven ifwe
doubt
hat
believing
hat
and
that
fp
then
grounds
reasonfor
subject
o believe hat
q,
we
might
evertheless
hink
there
s
something rong
with
subject
who does
not,
from he
standpoint
of
rationality;
nd even
if
we doubt that
ntending
o
do
something ives
agents
reason
o
take he
necessary
teps
o fulfilhat
ntention,
e shallbe
inclined o think hatthere s somethingmiss ftheydo not.How might
our views bout
these ther elations
e
captured?
The
solution
s
to
deny
thatthere s
anything
ormativelypecial
about
the
elements
n the
left-hand ide
of
these relations
deny,
that
s,
that
these lements
round
easons o believe
or
ntend
what s
on the
right-hand
side;
and to
maintain nsteadthat there
s
something ormatively
pecial
about each relation
onsidered s
a
whole
this
s
the
ine
taken
by
Broome
and
Millar).
To
illustrate,
e should
reject
the view that
if
S
believes that
p
and
believesthat
fp
then
,
then
S
has
a
reason
to believe that
q;
we
should
maintain
nstead hat has
a
reason o
believe ,
f
S
believes hat
and
that
Ifp
then
).
Similarly,
e
should
reject
heviewthat
fS
intends
o
0
then his
gives
S a
reasonto takethe
necessary
means
to
#ing,
nd
should
ccept
that
S
has
a
reason to
(take
the
necessary
means
to
oing,
f S
intends
o
0).8
In
each
instance,
what S
has
a
reason to do is to avoid ts
being
he ase hat he
left-hand
ide
of
the relation
ccurswithout he
right-hand
ide:
n
the
epi-
stemic
ase,
thismeans S
has a reason
to avoid
believing
hat
p
and that
If
p
then without lso
believing
hat
q;
in the
practical,
has a reason
to avoid
intending
o
4
without lso
doing
what
s
necessary
or
Oing.
But
thereare two
ways
in
which
these
requirements
r
commitmentsan
be
8
Broome talks f
requirements',
nd Millar of
normative
ommitments',
ather
han of
'reasons'.
C The
Editors
f
The
hilosophical
uarterly,
003
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7/13
236
MICHAEL
.
BRADY
discharged:
n
the former nstance can either
elieve
that
q
when S
has
theseother
beliefs,
r
get
id
f
hesether
eliefs;
n
the
atter,
can either
o
what s
necessary
o
fulfil
he
ntention,
r
get
id
f
he
ntention.
What
does
not
follow s that,givenS's beliefthatp and that f
p
then , S eitherhas a
justificatory
eason
to
believe
hat
q
or
a
justificatory
eason
to
get
rid
of
the
beliefs hat
and that
p
entails
,
and a
similar
oint
pplies
to
intending:
f.
Millar.)
We
might,
n
the
ight
f
this,
nderstand he
normative elation
etween
valuing
nd
desiring
n similarines.That
is,
on
the
assumption
hat here
s
something rong
with
valuing
x and
yet
failing
o desire
x,
we
might
ash
this s
the claim
that
valuing
x
commits
ne
to
desiring
,
or
requires
hat
onemustdesirex,where his nturns understood s theclaimthat ne has
a
reason to
(desire
x,
if
one values
x).
As
with
the
other
relations,
we
can
suppose
that he
commitment
ncurred
y
one's
valuing
can
be
discharged
in
one of two
ways: by
acquiring
he
desireof
x,
or
by
getting
id of one's
positive
valuation f x.
As a
result,
we can
deny
that
valuingenjoys
ny
normative
riority
ver
desiring.
or as far
s the
above
principle
oes,
we
have no
more
eason to
discharge
ur
obligation y
acquiring
he
relevant
desire
han
by
relinquishing
ur evaluation.
One obviousreasonagainstunderstandingnternalismnthisway s that
this s
hardly
ow
things
trike
s
from
ur
perspective
s
valuers.When
we
value
something,
t does
not
appear
to
us thatwe
have no
more reason
to
acquire
the
desire hanto
giveup
our
evaluation.
Rather
t
seems
to us
that
we
have
good
reason to
acquire
the
desire,
ince
we have
good
reason
to
attain
what
we value.
This
much
followsfrom
the nature
of
valuing.
Furthermore,
elinquishing
ur
evaluative
ommitmentn
the
ground
hat
we
lack the
relevant
esire eems he
height
f
rrationality,
ince
failure
o
have
therelevant
esire
does not
seem
any
reason t all
to
change
he
evalu-
ation.Here we return o the idea that
valuingenjoys
normative
riority:
rational
gents
ct
in
the
ight
f their
alues,
nd
are
inclined o tailor heir
desires o their
alues,
but not vice
ersa;
nd when
their
alues and
desires
diverge,
ational
agents
think
hat
the
irrationality
ttaches
to the
latter
rather
han
the former.
oes
not
this
therefore
uggest
hat
valuing
does
indeed have
priority
ver
desiring,
nd to
this
extent
grounds
stronger
normative
ommitments
han
hose
provided
y
ntending
nd
believing?
While think
hat
here s
something
ormatively
pecial
about
valuing,
and I argueas much nthefollowingection, heaboveresponse trikesme
as
inadequate,
or
wo
reasons.
The firsts
something
have
already
hown:
the fact
hat
must,
ua
valuer,
egard
myself
s
having
reasonto
act
(and
desire)
does
not entail
that
have
reason;
and the
fact
hat,
ua
valuer,
regard
valuing
s
normatively
pecial
does
not
entail
that t is.
The claim
?
The
Editors of
The
Philosophical
O0arterly,
003
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VALUE,
DESIRING AND NORMATIVE
PRIORITY
237
that
valuing
has
normative
riority
ver
desiring
s not the claim
that
we
think
hat t
does;
it is the claim thatwe are
right
o think
his,
nd
nothing
about the
phenomenology
f
valuing
eems
o
guarantee
hatwe are
right.
The second reason s that theputative isanalogy etweenvaluing nd
intending
reaks
down,
incefrom ur
perspective
ur ntentionslso
enjoy
a measureof
priority.
hat
is,
we
are
disposed
to tailorour desires
o
our
intentions,
ather han vice
ersa;
nd
our
ntentionsresist econsideration'n
a
way
our desiresdo not.9
Nevertheless,
f
the above
argument
s
cogent,
then this factwill be insufficiento show
that
ntending
o
0
really
does
provide
us with reasonfor
doing
what
s
necessary
o
bring
t about. As
a
result,
n
analogouspoint
bout
valuing
houldnot
be
thought
o showthat
there s a genuine elation fpriorityetween aluing nddesiring.
I
doubt, herefore,
hat laims
of
normative
riority
an be
grounded y
appeal
to how
things
trike
s
as valuers.Nevertheless think hat here s a
sense
n
which
valuing
has normative nd not
merely sychological riority
over
desiring,
nd
in
the
following
ection
explain
nd defend his iew.
III
My
claim s that
valuingprovides
neither
bjective
nor
subjectiveustifica-
tory
easons o have an
appropriate
esire,
ut
despite
his
njoys
measure
of
normative
riority
ver
desiring.
s
a
result,
deny
hatwe
shouldunder-
stand
nternalism
n
a
way
whichmakes t
analogous
o the nstrumental
nd
epistemic
rinciples
iscussed
n
the
previous
ections.
n
order
to
explain
how
this can be
so,
I
need to consider he relation
between
valuing
and
desiring,
ot
n
isolation,
ut
n
the
ight
f other
spects
f our
psychology.
On
my picture,
he claim that
valuing
has normative
riority
s not
equi-
valent othe claim thatvaluing s somehow pecial,orprovides reasonof
some kind
to desireor
get
x.
What it comes
down to is the claim that an
agent's
bringing
bout one kind of
coherent
elationship
etween
valuing
and
desiring,
y
desiring
n
accordance
with the
valuing,
offers better
solutiono a
normative
roblem
han
bringing
bout a
different
ut
qually
coherentelation
by
relinquishing
he
valuing
n
the
light
of the lack of an
appropriate
esire.
This,
admit,
ounds little
aradoxical:
f
he relations
are
equally
coherent,
o
they
not count
as
equally
good
solutions
o
a
normative roblem, speciallyas I shall how)given hat heproblems one
of
incoherence?think
ot,
since
the former
elation ontributeso a
further
kind of
coherence nd
consistency
n
the
agent's
psychological
et,
and
to
this xtent
ounts s
rationally
referable.
9
See M.
Bratman, ntention,lans,
nd
Practical
eason
Harvard
UP,
1987),
p.
io8-9.
?
The Editors
f
The
hilosophical
Quarterly,
003
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9/13
238
MICHAEL .
BRADY
To
begin
with,
uppose
hat n
agent
S
is
in
the
following osition,
which
I
shall call
(A):
S
values
x,
but does
not desirex. Let us assume
that
this
psychological rofile
s
somehow
ncoherent r
inconsistent,
nd thus
one
thatS hasreasonnot to be in.Let us also assumethat hefollowing sycho-
logical profiles
re coherent r consistent:
i)
S
values x and
desires
;
(ii)
S
does not value x
and
does not desire
x.
Now
(i),
in and of
itself,
s
not
rationally
referable
o
(ii);
nor is
it,
in
and
of
itself,
ny
more
coherent.
Whetherwe should
rationally
refer
's
being
n
state
i)
to S's
being
n
state
(ii)
depends,
urely, pon
whether is indeedvaluable. But
given
hatS
has
the
inconsistent
rofile
A),
is
there sense
in
which S's situation s
better
resolved,
rom he
rational
tandpoint,
y
S's
coming
o be in
(i)
rather
han
(ii)? Is (i) rationally referable o (ii) as a solutiono the inconsistencyr
incoherence
n
A),
at leastwhen ll
other
hings
re
equal?
The
analogy
with
requirements
urrounding elieving
nd
intending
suggests
hat he
answer s 'No'. On this
view,
when we find
urselves
n
a
situation imilar
o
(A),
we are
ust
psychologicallyisposed
o
adopt profile
(i)
rather han
profile
ii),
since we are
disposed
to resist
econsidering
ur
values and
instead esire
n
accordancewith
hem.
But this
isposition
s
not
itself
ationally
arranted. here s
nothing ationally
ntoward
bout
people
who, in situationA), are disposedto get rid of theirvalues and achieve
coherence
n
that
way.
I
think
hatwe
should nswer Yes' to
the
question
bove,
for he follow-
ing
reason. We have
agreed
that
A)
is
incoherent r
inconsistent;
et
us
make the
further
lausible
ssumption
hat here s
something
fvalue about
coherence
nd
consistency.
iven
this,
we
might xplain
S's
moving
rom
A)
to
i)
or
(ii)
not
merely
n
terms f S's
beingdisposed
owards
oherence
nd
consistency,
ut
in
terms f S's
valuing
hesefeatures.
We
cannot,
however,
simply
nvoke 's
valuing oherence,
ince thiswould not
explainwhy
S
is
moved to
adopt profile
i)
rather han
ii),
or vice ersa. ecause of
this,
ur
explanation
f the case
whereS is
motivated o
adopt
profile
i)
will
nvoke
something
ike
S's
valuing
coherence
of
this
ort,
oherence achieved
by
changing
esires
o
that
hey
match
values.
n
other
words,
he
explanatory
or
motivational
tory
we
tell in
this nstancewill
invoke
S's
valuing
the
priority
f
valuing
ver
desiring.
ur
explanation
f the
case
where
S
ends
up
in
(ii)
will
also
invoke 's
valuing
oherence,
ut n
this nstance
what
s
valued is
coherence
ttained
y
changing
alues so as
to match
desires. n
otherwords, heexplanatory torywe tellhere will nvokeS's valuing he
priority
f
desiring
ver
valuing.
What
this
uggests
s
that here s
indeed
something ationally referable
about S's
acquiring
he
desire
f
x,
nstead f
relinquishing
he
evaluation,
s
a
solution
o
being
n
situation
A).
I
need
to
explore
he
explanations
f
the
?
The
Editors f The
hilosophical
uarterly,
003
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VALUE,
DESIRING
AND NORMATIVE PRIORITY
239
previousparagraph
n more
detail. When
S is moved to
adopt
profile i)
because values
the
priority
f
valuing
over
desiring,
he motivational
tory
we tell
will
nvolve wo nstances f
S's
desires
ollowing
's values: S's
desir-
ingxfollows rom 's valuingx as a result fS's desiringhat heevaluation
should remain steadfast
nd
the
desires hould
change,
where this
desire
itself esults rom
aluing
hiskindofcoherence.As
a
result,
e can
say
that
the motivational
xplanation
f S's
achieving
oherence
y
coming
o
be
in
state
i)
rather
han
tate
ii)
s
one
that
would
endorse,
ince
t
s
consistent
with
hinking
hat
valuing
has
priority
ver
desiring.
o
this
xtent
is,
we
might ay,
as S
values
being;
S's motivationsxhibit r
express
's
prefer-
ences
about
S's
motivations.
Supposeinstead hatS ismovedtobe inprofileii)becauseS values the
kind
of
coherence
gained
by
changing
's values so as to match
S's
desires.
Once
more the
explanation
f
S's
being
moved
to
adopt
some coherent
profile
will
nvolve 's desires
ollowing
's values: S is moved to
adopt pro-
file
ii)
because
S
valuesthis
kind
f
coherence,
nd as a result
esires hat
's
values are
changed
o as to
be
in line
with
S's
desires.
But
this s
a
motiva-
tional
explanation
hat
S
would ot
ndorse,
n the
ground
hat t is
incon-
sistentwith
thinking
hat
desiring
as
priority
ver
valuing.
That
is,
S is
movedto be in (ii),rather han i),because valuesachieving oherenceby
keeping
's desires he same
and
changing
's
values;
but
S's
being
moved
to
be
in
ii),
rather han
i),
displays
he
opposite
elation,
ince t
s
an instance
of S's
valuing
emaining
teadfastnd S's desires
ollowing
uit.
n this
ase,
S is not
s
S values
being,
t
leastto this
xtent;
's
motivations
ail o
exhibit
or
express
's
preferences
bout
S's
motivations.
My point
s
this:
ust
as
there s
something
nconsistent
r
incoherent
n
valuing
x and
failing
o desire
x,
so too is there
omething
nconsistentr
incoherent
n
being
moved to
remedy
his
ncoherence
n
a
way
which
exemplifies
relation etween
aluing
nd
desiring
hich
you
do not
value.
This is indeed he
case
when
S is moved
to
adopt profile
ii)
because
S
values
this
kind
of
coherence.As
a
result,
eing
moved
to
adopt profile
ii)
is not
really palatable
olution
o
the ncoherence r
inconsistency
n
(A),
since t
appears
to substitute
ne kind of
inconsistency
etween
values
and
desires
for
another.
The
same
cannot be said about
S's
being
moved to
adopt
profile
i),
however,
ince
here S's motivation
xemplifies
he
very
relation
between
valuing
nd
desiring
which
S
values
-
in
which
case
we
have an
explanation fwhy i) srationally referableo (ii)as a solution o S's being
in
state
(A).
Rational
agents
will
indeed
avoid
the
inconsistency
r in-
coherence
nvolved n
valuing
x
but
failing
o
desire
x;
but
rational
gents
will
achievecoherence nd
consistencyy
desiring
,
rather
han
by
getting
ridof
their
valuative
udgements.
?
The Editors
f The
hilosophical
uarterly,
00oo3
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11/13
240
MICHAEL
S.
BRADY
In
the
following
ection shall consider number
of
objections
o
this
explanation
f
normative
riority,
nd
give
ome brief
esponses.
IV
Objection
a):
the above account
begs
the
question,
ince
it
assumes
that
rational motivation nvolves
valuing
the kind of coherence attained
by
changing
ne's desires o
that
they
match one's
values,
and
being
moved
because of this.But
if
you
assume that thisrelation s indeed
valuable,
of
course
you
will
have
an answer
as to
why
the relation
s
normative
..
because
you
have
ust
assumed t
This
objection
misrepresents
he
account. What is assumed is that
coherence
r
consistency
s
valuable,
and thatrational
motivationnvolves
valuing
coherence
of
somekind.
What
is not
ssumed
-
indeed,
what is
explicitly
enied
-
is that
profile
i)
is
any
more
valuable,
n
and of
itself,
than
profile
ii).
So whilstwhat s
assumed ntails
hat
profile
i)
is
valuable,
as it
s a
coherent
r
consistent
rofile,
t
does
not entail
hat
ailoring
ne's
desires o
one's values s a better
olution
han
changing
ne's values
so that
they
matchone's desires.That
conclusion ollows rom
he
argument,
ather
thanthe ssumption.
Objection (b):
the
account still
begs
the
question,
ince it
assumes that
rational
motivation nvolves
valuing
coherence
of
either
ype)
nd
being
moved because
of this.But
why
assume this?We
can,
after
ll,
grant
he
plausible
ssumption
hat oherence s
valuable,
whilst
enying
hat
ational
agents
mustvalue
coherence.We
might
hink
nstead
that motivation
n-
volves
purely
sychological isposition
o desire
x
whenone
values
x,
but s
no
less rational
or hat.'0
f
so,
the
account
mustbe understood s
claimingthat
valuing
has a measureof
priority
ver
desiring nly
forthose
agents
who value
coherence nd are
thereby
moved,
but otherwise
oes not.
This
objection
lso fails. he
assumption
hat
oherence
nd
consistency
are
valuable s
indeed
warranted,
ince
otherwise
t s
difficulto
ground
he
claim
that
here re
genuine
equirements
urroundingaluing
nd
desiring
in the
first
lace."
Once
this s
admitted,
t
supports
heview
that
genuinely
rational
motivation
equires
ecognition
f this
alue. For we
might
uppose
that here
s
something
ncoherent
r
inconsistent
n
being
disposed
owards
(and hence desiring)what is genuinely aluable,without egardingt as
valuable.
Since what is
desired n
this
case is
genuinely
aluable,
rational
agents
will
resolve
this
incoherence
by
coming
to
value
coherence
and
10
See
Broome,
Reasons
and
Motivation',
p.
141-2.
I
I
Cf.
p.
x of
Dancy's
introduction
n
his
Nonnativity.
O
The Editors
f
The
Philosophical
uarterly,
003
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VALUE,
DESIRING AND NORMATIVE
PRIORITY
241
consistency.
enuinely
ationalmotivation hus
proceeds
from
ecognition
of
the value of coherence nd
consistency,
nd not
merely
rom
disposi-
tion owards uch
things.
It might e thought hatthis eaves unanswered heoriginal bjection,
and that
have
only
offered
n
explanation
f the
priority
f
valuing
ver
desiring
n those
gents
who
happen
to value coherence. or
givenmy rgu-
ment,
hosewho do not value coherence nd
consistency
ack the attitudes
which
make it
true
hat S
ought
to
restore oherence nd
consistency y
acquiring
he desire o
0;
we are thus
unable
to
say
of
them
hat
hey
o the
wrong
hing
f
hey
esolve he
nconsistencyy
getting
id
of
their valuative
beliefs.12
Givenmyprevious omments, owever,we can doubt that nyfurther
explanation
s
required.
My
aim has
been to
explain
he
dea
that
gents
will
desire
n
accordancewith
heir alues n so
ar
as
they
re
rational;
nd
I
have
claimed that
gents
willvalue coherence nd
consistency
n
so
ar
as
they
re
rational.he demand
that must
n
addition
xplain
the
priority
f
valuing
over
desiring
n
thosewho lack he
relevant
ttitudes
hereforetrikesme as
illegitimate,
or
cannot
explain
how thosewho are
incapable
of
rational
motivation an be
rationally
moved to
acquire
the desireforx when
they
valuex. So it s true hat, ivenmy rgument, e cannot ayof suchpeople
that
hey
ught
o
restore oherence nd
consistencyy
acquiring
hedesire
for
when
they
alue
x;
but that s
because
they
ack the
attitudes
hich
re
needed
to
make
ny
such
ought'
laim
appropriate.
Objection
c):
there re
(obviously)
ases where he
right
r
rational
hing
o
do would be
to
get
rid of our
values,
rather handesire
n
accordancewith
them.
ndeed,
mentioned uch
cases
above,
where
n
agent's
values
might
themselves e
highly
rrational.
However,
the
account of the
previous
section uggestshatwhen ourvalues and desires onflict,eason s on the
side of
our
values,
n
which
ase the
account
truggles
o accommodate
uch
(obvious)
ases.
This
response
lso fails.The
account of
normative
riority
have
given
focuses
n
the relation
etween
valuing
nd
desiring
s
such,
regardless
f
additionalor
independent
easons
agents might
have for
changing
heir
values or
desires
or both).
Because of
this,
nothing
n
my
accountrules ut
taking
uch
reasons
ntoconsideration hen
we
attempt
o determine hat
it is all-things-consideredight r rationalfor gentsto do. It is therefore
difficulto see how
the account
struggles
o
accommodate
the fact that
agents
might
have
reason to
get
rid
of
their
alues rather han
acquire
the
relevant
esires.
12
This
point
was
raised
by
an
anonymous
eferee.
?
The
Editors
of
The
hilosophicaluarterly,
003
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13/13
242
MICHAEL
.
BRADY
I
do notdoubt
hat
here
re
other
bjections
hat
might
e raised
gainst
this
way
of
understanding
ormative
riority
nd
(hence)
udgement
internalism.
or do
I
doubt
hat he
dequacy
f
this ccount
epends,
t
least npart, ponhow twould ffectthermeta-ethicalssues. efend-
ing
the
reading
gainst
urther
bjections,
nd
cashing
ts
meta-ethical
implications,
re,however,
asks or notherime.13
University
f tirling
13
A
version f
this
paper
was
presented
o the
Philosophy
epartment
t the
University
f
Aberdeen n
May
2ooi.
I
am
grateful
o
the
participants
or
heir iscussion.
would
also like
to
thank
AntonyDuff,
Fiona
Macpherson,
an
anonymous
referee
or
this
ournal,
and in
particular
lan
Millar,
for
heir
elpful
omments.
?
The
Editors
fThe
hilosophical
uarterly,003