Venezuelan Russian Adv

1ac Russia Advantage

Russia is using economic contacts in Latin America to establish geopolitical dominance and challenge U.S. hegemonyBlank, 10 --- Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (4/13/2010, Stephen J., “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf, JMP)

However, none of the expanding economic ties should disguise Moscow’s fundamentally geostrategic orientation. Medvedev wants the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) to bring about a genuine multipolarity and weaken U.S. hegemony in international

financial institutions and the global economic order .54 He and Argentina’s President Cristina Kirchner advocated reforming international financial institutions, a major thrust of recent Russian foreign policy, and Medvedev urged Argentina to recognize Russia as a market economy.55 Medvedev and subordinate officials have also urged Brazil to coordinate foreign policy with Russia to foster the multipolar world.56 Indeed, in 2006, then-Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov openly admitted that successful business contacts are crucial to Russia’s geopolitical cooperation with other governments when he said, “I would not set higher targets for geopolitical relations without making a success in the economy first.”57 Similarly, Medvedev conceded that his own trip to Latin America was prompted by serious geopolitical reasons.58 Venezuela and Cuba The dominance of geopolitics emerges quite strongly in Russian foreign policy towards its main partners in Latin America, Venezuela and Cuba. Russia’s interests are fundamentally geostrategic , not economic, and no Latin economy save perhaps Brazil can offer Russia much tangible benefit. Therefore, geopolitical and strategic aims outweigh economic interaction with these states. For example, the BBC reported that Patrushev told Ecuador’s government that Russia wanted to collaborate with its intelligence agency, “to expand Moscow’s influence in Latin America.” 59 Moscow also signed an agreement to sell Ecuador weapons.60 Most probably Russia wants to link Ecuador and Venezuela with Russian weapons and intelligence support against Colombia. Since they are both antagonistic to Colombia, they can then support the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), threaten a U.S. ally and seek to pin Washington down in another dirty war.61 Chávez’s open support of the FARC with Russian weapons strongly suggests that Moscow knows all about his efforts and approves of them. The case of Viktor Bout, the notorious arms dealer who enjoys protection from Russia’s government, reinforces this analysis. In 2008 Bout was arrested in Thailand for offering to deliver weapons to the FARC as part of a sting organized by the United States. It may not be coincidental that Bout’s offers coincide with Russian support for Chávez’s

latest clash with Colombia.62 Once Bout was arrested and obliged to undergo an extradition hearing, Moscow brought immense pressure to bear upon Bangkok so that he would not be extradited to the United States and forced to name names, dates, places and people.63 Undoubtedly, Moscow also fully recognizes Chávez’s conversion of Venezuela into a critical transshipment center for narcotics from both Latin America and West Africa, his support for insurgencies and terrorists throughout Latin America and his expansionist and revolutionary dreams about Colombia, and seeks to exploit those factors for its own anti-American purposes.64 Therefore one must treat reports of actual or forthcoming Russian agreements with Nicaragua and Venezuela on counter-drug cooperation with great wariness, as they could be smokescreens for Moscow’s conscious support for drug running into America, Europe and Latin America.65 Indeed, reports from 2003 point to Russian criminal penetration of Mexico’s narcotics gangs.66 More recently, in early 2009, a Russian and a Cuban citizen were both arrested for drug smuggling in Yucatán.67 Simultaneously, Russia openly wants to increase cooperation among the BRIC members’ intelligence services and Latin America in general. Clearly Moscow wants to establish permanent roots in Latin America and use those contacts as bases for political influence to support those states and potential insurgent movements against the United States. 68 These are only some of the reasons why Moscow’s arms sales to Venezuela, and projected sales to Cuba, are perhaps the only truly dangerous aspects of its policies in Latin America. These sales aim to give Chávez much of what he needs to foment his Bolivarian Revolution throughout Latin America, since Chávez is running or selling weapons to insurgents and left-wing regimes all over the region, and second, because these weapons make no sense unless he is planning an arms race in Latin America. Chilean, Colombian and especially Brazilian reports all raise the alarm about the $5.4 billion in Russian arms sales to Venezuela. These reports raise the specter of Venezuela “detonating” a continental arms race, acquiring the largest Latin American fleet due to its purchase of submarines, the comprehensive arming of Venezuela’s army, fleet and air forces with huge arms purchases, and the acquisition of hundreds of thousands of Kalashnikovs, and an ammunition factory. These reports also point out that since 2003, if not earlier, these automatic rifles and ammunition have migrated from Venezuela to the FARC. This causes great fear that Russian arms will underwrite armed insurgencies and drug running (submarines being excellently equipped for that purpose, as well as to defend Venezuela’s coastline from nonexistent threats).69 The sheer scale of ongoing Russian arms sales to Venezuela since 2004 justifies these alarms, as they make no strategic sense given the absence of any U.S. or other military threat. Even Chávez knows this, for he claims that the air defense missiles he ordered are meant to protect oil derricks!70 Therefore there are purposes beyond the legitimate defense of Venezuela for these weapons. Moscow has sold Venezuela $5.4 billion in weapons since 2004. Those systems include 24 Su-30 fighters, 100,000 Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles, Ak-103 assault rifles, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles. Venezuela also bought 53 Mi-17V-s and Mi-35M helicopters. In addition, Russia has helped develop factories in Venezuela that can make parts for the

rifles, their ammunition and the fighters, with an announced goal of producing 50,000 rifles a year. Venezuela plans to buy 12 Il-76 and Il-78 tankers and cargo aircraft, or possibly 96-300 military transport planes, Tor-M1 anti-air missiles, a fifth generation anti-air system equally effective against planes, helicopters, UAVs, cruise missiles and high precision missiles, and Igla-S portable SAM systems. In September 2009, Moscow advanced Caracas a $2 billion credit to buy more arms: 92 T-72 main battle tanks, Smerch rocket artillery systems, and the Antey 2500 anti-ballistic missile system.71 Other Russian defense sources said that the tank deal could be expanded to include three diesel-powered submarines “Kilo” class, combat helicopters Mi-28 and armored infantry vehicles BMP-3.72 Venezuela also seeks Mi-28n Hunter high-attack helicopters and is discussing the possible purchase of submarines.73 There were also earlier discussions about selling project 636 submarines (among the quietest subs in the world) to Venezuela during 2011-13, along with torpedo and missile ordnance for Venzuela’s navy. The $2.2 billion loan in 2009 will go for 92 T-70 and T-72 tanks, BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Smerch anti-tank missiles, multiple rocket launchers, S-300, Buk M-2 and Pechora anti-aircraft missiles, all systems usable against Colombia. In return, Russia got access to join Venezuela’s national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), in exploring oil fields in the Orinoco River basin.74 The signed agreements make it clear that each of the three Russian companies has staked its own bloc in the Orinoco oil belt. Thus, LUKOIL has received permission to explore the Junin-3 block. In effect, it has extended its three-year-long contract with PDSVA on the block's evaluation and certification. The new two-year agreement provides for the bloc's joint exploration and development. Once accomplished, the two companies plan to establish a joint venture to develop the deposit. This will require billions of dollars in investment. The oil from this project could then be sent to an oil refinery in Italy. LUKOIL has just bought 49.9% of its shares. TNK-BP and PDSVA signed an agreement on the joint study of the Ayacucho-2 block in the wake of a framework memo signed last October. As with the LUKOIL agreement, it provides for a second phase - the sale of the produced oil abroad.75 Venezuela’s arms purchases make no sense unless they are intended for purposes of helping the FARC and other similar groups, fighting Colombia, projecting power throughout Latin America, drug running with subs that are protected against air attacks, or providing a temporary base for Russian naval and air forces where they can be sheltered from attacks but threaten North or South America.76 Since Putin has said that permanent bases in Cuba and Venzuela are unnecessary, this leaves the door open to temporary bases, including submarine bases as needed.77 Recently Bolivia, too, has offered its territory as a base in return for arms sales and economic help on energy and other projects.78 Much of what Russia sells to Venezuela is compatible with that idea, as is Putin’s call for restoring Russia’s position in Cuba and ongoing talks between Russian and Cuban military officials (e.g., Sechin’s trips in 2008).79 The following facts are also particularly noteworthy. Chávez is not only arming the FARC; he is also training other Latin American states’ military forces (e.g., Bolivian forces). 80 Venezuela aided Iranian missile sales to Syria, Chávez told

Iranian leaders about his desire to introduce “nuclear elements into Venezuela,” (i.e., nuclear weapons) and Russia supports the allegedly peaceful Venezuelan development of nuclear energy and explorations for finding uranium and an alternative nuclear fuel, thorium.81 Iran is now actively helping Venezuela explore for uranium.82 These developments suggest the possiblity of Venezuela functioning as a kind of swing man or pivot for a Russo-Venezuelan-Iranian alliance against the U nited S tates. Certainly elements in the Iranian press and government believe that Tehran should further intensify its already extensive efforts here to create the possibility of a “second front” in political or even in military terms against the U nited S tates. Hizbollah already raises money and runs drugs in Latin America and many have noted the growing network of ties between Iran and Latin American insurgents and terrorists facilitated by Chávez.83

In particular, Russia uses oil investments to secure military ties to contain the U.S.Farah, 13 --- veteran newsman and founder of WorldNetDaily.com (3/3/2013, Joseph, “Russia-China standoff in Venezuela; Both eye oil reserves as they compete for influence,” www.wnd.com/2013/03/russia-china-standoff-in-venezuela/)

WASHINGTON – As Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez remains gravely ill and may die soon, Russia and China are weighing their future in the country where they have billions of dollars in oil investments, according to report from Joseph Farah’s G2 Bulletin. In an effort to secure a position for the future, Russian President Vladimir Putin sent close former KGB associate Igor Sechin to Venezuela to discuss with Venezuelan Vice President Nicolas Maduro future bilateral relations. Sechin has been handling Latin American issues for years. He also happens to be the executive chairman of the Russian oil conglomerate Rosneft. Sechin and Maduro finalized a number of agreements that help assure Russia’s future position in Venezuela and keeps pace with China, which has loaned billions of dollars to the Chavez government to help ensure security of its own oil investments in the country. Both countries are in the process of helping develop Venezuela’s oil reserves, said to be the largest in the world at an estimated 296 billion barrels. Regional sources say that Sechin negotiated almost $47 billion in investments in the Venezuelan oil sector, including agreements to set up a joint Russia-Venezuela drilling and manufacturing company and to permit increased Russian access to offshore oil reserves. However, both countries also have an ulterior strategic reason for maintaining their position in Venezuela, and that is having a base from which to watch and undertake a containment approach toward the U nited S tates Russia

is using its investments as a way to obtain more bases for its navy . In

2008, Russia sent in long-range bombers and a naval squadron to

Venezuela . While it hasn’t done a repeat of these deployments,

Russia wants permanent basing rights in Venezuela . Russia also has expanded its arms sales to Venezuela, including more than 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, Mi-35 helicopters, Su-30 jet fighters, air defense systems, tanks and armored vehicles. If Chavez dies, there is a question as to what extent a new leader will be as friendly to both Russia and China. Any new leadership probably will continue working with them but could be friendlier to the U nited S tates, unlike the Chavez regime, according to informed sources. In turn, this could create a climate for further American investment which the Russians would then find

competitive with their own interests .

Venezuela is key --- Russian control there will be a springboard to dominating the rest of the regionRaikhel, 12 (Yurii, “Russia’s oil companies tapping into Venezuela’s oilfields”, 10-9-12, The Day, http://www.day.kiev.ua/en/article/day-after-day/russias-oil-companies-tapping-venezuelas-oilfields)//KG

On September 26, Russia’s biggest state-controlled Rosneft oil company and a subsidiary of Venezuela’s PDVSA, La Corporacion Venezolana del Petroleo (CVP), signed trade agreements worth about 20 billion dollars, including a pact that allows Rosneft to tap into new Venezuelan oilfields in a region known as the Orinoco Oil Belt. Rosneft will invest 16 billion dollars in the Carabobo 2 oil project. Last week oil started coming from Venezuela’s Junin-6 deposit. Among the documents signed in the presence of President Hugo Chavez were a memorandum of understanding and an agreement whereby Rosneft would pay a bonus worth 1.1 million dollars, and another one whereby CVP would receive a five-year loan worth 1.5 billion dollars. The documents were signed by Rosneft President Igor Sechin and his PDVSA counterpart Rafael Ramirez. Another agreement and memorandum concerned joint oil development and production ventures, including the construction, by Inter RAO, of a 300 MW power plant running on petroleum coke. President Putin made his Venezuelan counterpart happy with a personal present, a 3-month-old Russian Black Terrier, delivered by Sechin. Chavez said his name would be El Russo – Russian. Putin’s present carried a message, considering that the Russian Black Terrier was first bred in Russia, in the second half of the 20th century, when the crossing of Giant Schnauzers, Airedales, Rottweilers and Newfoundlands resulted in this new sturdy black-coated breed, with big teeth and long strong and frost-resistant paws. The puppy will quickly grow strong enough to accompany and protect Chavez on his trips to Guiana Plateau and the spurs of the Cordillera on the Colombian border, the only places where you can find snow in a 9.3928° N, 66.3562° W country – except that Chavez isn’t likely to venture such trips, considering his current physical condition; also considering that the Russian Black Terrier needs a frisky handler; that this big doggie must have a hair cut every three months

– otherwise it will turn into a shaggy, shapeless bear. Most likely, this gift symbolizes Russia’s penetration of this Latin American country. Russia’s expansionist moods in regard to this remote continent could be regarded from three aspects: political, military-technological, and economic one; also considering that all these aspects are intertwined . What are Putin&Co. after in Venezuela? Politically speaking, in terms of Cheka/KGB, any enemy of Washington is Russia’s friend. Hugo Chavez is this kind of friend. Putin will make every effort to win him over to his side and the process appears to be reciprocal. The president of Venezuela needs foreign support, considering the domestic situation, with Russia being among the options on his agenda, including China. All this makes Putin hurry up. Russia’s interest in Venezuela has to do with an attempt to turn this country into a bridgehead to penetrate

neighboring countries with similar leftist regimes, including the multiethnic State of Bolivia and the Republic of Ecuador, also eventually Colombia, if all goes well, as schemed by the Kremlin. If this scheme works, Moscow will succeed in seriously limiting Washington’s

influence behind the rear lines. Then will come the turn of Central America, with fantastic prospects. This was the Soviet political leadership’s cherished dream. To help it come true, the Soviet Communist Party’s Politburo spared no funds supporting Fidel Castro’s regime and Nicaragua’s Sandinista movement. The whole project went down the drain. Daniel Ortega’s return to power in Nicaragua failed to provide for rapprochement with Moscow. Havana started drifting, slowly but surely, toward Beijing. President Rafael Correa of Ecuador and his Bolivian counterpart Evo Morales took a cautious stand from the very start, yet both have to do nationalizing, particularly in the energy sector, using anti-US rhetoric. Another aspect is Russia’s military ambitions; its generals and admirals are daydreaming about a naval base in Venezuela, after losing the spy one in Lourdes, in Cuba, with Vietnam refusing to discuss the possibility of using its Cam Ranh Bay. Events in Syria may well end up in evacuation from Tartus. What are the options left for Russia’s Navy? Hugo Chavez is going through the motions of keeping their naval bases, with the stability of his regime being anyone’s guess, considering that the results of the October 7 election are still to be determined. In other words, there are options. There are options relating to military and technological cooperation. Venezuela has been a major buyer of Russia’s weapons systems, registering between six and seven billion dollars worth of such purchases by the end of 2011, including 24 Su-30MKAV war aircraft, Tor-M1 and Pechora-2M air defense systems, 35 helicopters, 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles (AK-103), 9K38 Igla Soviet-developed man-portable infrared homing surface-to-air missiles, 92 T-72 tanks (talks are underway concerning the delivery of another 100 armored vehicles’ shipment). AK-103, ammunition production, and helicopter repair facilities are under construction. Venezuela’s populist policy of sharing leftovers from lavishly laid tables with the impoverished strata, government control over retail prices call for bigger food imports to keep these prices low. Its oil and gas industry remain the main source of the central

budget’s revenues, yet this source is affected by an increase in emergency situations, with breakdowns and explosions caused by mismanagement. Recently an explosion tore through Venezuela’s biggest Amuray oil refinery, in Punto Fijo in the Peninsula of Paraguana, killing at least 39 people, wounding dozens and halting operations at this world’s second oil-producing facility, considering that such accidents have become common practice there. Russia showed its understanding by giving a loan, one of many totaling several billion dollars. Moscow is still prepared to splurge, otherwise Beijing will step in. Also, there is the aspect of the oil and gas extraction costs in Russia being on an upward curve, considering that new deposits can be developed only in the north, something easier said than done. The prospects of gas supplies to Europe remain ambiguous. Their rate is not increasing and is likely to decrease, considering the availability of liquefied and shale gas. Apparently, the only option is exporting capital to the most attractive countries. Putin wants to remain in office, but he knows he can’t stay there forever, so oil-and-gas revenues will come in handy, anyway. Add here the demonstrative support of Hugo Chavez during the presidential campaign. One hears about the gap narrowing between him and the sole opposition candidate, Henrique Capriles, with the current margin being some five percent. The competition is severe, so much so two opposition leaders were shot dead in the western state of Barinas. Four persons were injured during a shootout when rehearsing the casting of ballots in early September. The Opposition is determined to remove Chavez from office and the man is sure to face a number of problems. The United States is once again being regarded by Russia as an enemy, in terms of foreign and domestic policy. Not so long ago, Russia banned USAID activities on its territory, a very unfriendly act reminding one of the cold war. In this sense, Vladimir Putin’s gift of a puppy and the agreements made with Venezuela fit perfectly into the pattern. What is happening is just the beginning.

The plan crowds out Russia’s critical energy cooperation with Venezuela which it is using to undermine U.S. influenceRinna, 13 (3/9/2013, Anthony, “Russia’s Uncertain Position in post-Chávez Venezuela,” http://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2013/03/russias-uncertain-position-in-post.html, JMP)

The domestic and regional implications of the death of Hugo Chávez are numerous and wide-ranging, but unique to Venezuela is the reverberations the death of its leader will have in faraway Russia and Eastern Europe. With the passing of “El Comandante," it’s possible that Russia’s geopolitical influence in Latin America may weaken and that it’s arms exports will decline, directly affecting Russia’s economic growth. Much of this depends on who succeeds Chávez and what sort of relationship his successor pursues with Russia. In the 21st century, Russia has had a tendency in its foreign policy to pursue relations with smaller, less powerful, but in many cases very central, states in regions

around the world (i.e. Serbia in the Balkans, Syria in the Middle East, etc.) in an effort to increase its own role in the so-called “multi-polar” world. While Russia’s major ally in Latin America is actually Brazil, Russia has found Venezuela to be a willing partner in supporting Russia’s own foreign policy, with Venezuela even going so far as to (hypocritically) recognize South Ossetia’s declaration of independence from Georgia while opposing Kosovo’s independence from Serbia because of the “bad precedent” it would set. Venezuelan vice president Nicolás Maduro said that "the unipolar world is collapsing and finishing in all aspects, and the alliance with Russia is part of that effort to build a multipolar world." Russia’s ties with Venezuela as its Latin American partner was a perfect match- Chávez was an outspoken critic of the U nited

S tates and his country controlled vast reserves of energy, which gave

Russia an excellent opportunity to exert its influence in the country

and counter American power in the region , namely, by combining mutual feelings on U.S. influence abroad with the capacity to develop Venezuela’s energy industry. Venezuela was billed as a regional leader for Latin America. For while Chávez’s leftist administration was one of several that proliferated throughout the region, his had been by far the most vocal (it is not uncommon, in fact, for Latin American governments to be relatively aligned on the right-left spectrum, with rightist governments predominating in the 1970’s and 80’s). Chávez carefully developed relations with Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador and the two most recent Argentine administrations, that of the late Nestor Kirchner and his wife Crisitina Fernández (who succeeded her late husband in 2007). His flamboyant anti-American rhetoric was occasionally balanced out by Brazil’s center-left president Inácio Lula da Silva and Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff. Nevertheless, Venezuela provided a beacon through which Russia was able to exert geopolitical influence in a region far beyond its periphery. One of the biggest areas of cooperation between Russia and

Venezuela is the energy sector , a fact recently underscored by Vladimir Putin’s decision to send Igor Sechin, CEO of Russia’s state owned oil company Rosneft, as a special presidential envoy to Hugo Chávez’s funeral. Venezuela has the largest proven reserves of crude oil in the world, but the oil is in need of a more intense refinement process than most other crude supplies around the world. Russia has the technological capabilities Venezuela needs to refine its heavy crude, and Russian energy companies are active in several aspects of the Venezuelan energy industry. Russian companies plan to invest $17.6 billion in Venezuela by 2019 and multiply energy output fourfold in an attempt to expand cooperation to offshore areas and oil services, according to Reuters. Sechin has said Rosneft will finance production with loans from Russian banks and credit lines from international banks. Because the Venezuelan economy is currently in shambles, it is highly likely that the Russian-Venezuelan energy cooperation will continue, with the possibility that if a government friendlier to the U nited S tates should take power, existing contracts with Russian companies would continue, but that

American companies would be invited to participate in new ventures . The situation in Venezuela may actually effect Russia’s energy relations with one of its Eastern European neighbors- Belarus. Belarus has had a rather unique relationship with Russia, and is part of a “union state” with Russia. Yet since 2007, the one thorn in the side of Belarus-Russia relations has been energy, mainly because of a dispute which emerged when Russia accused Belarus of siphoning Russian gas transported through Belarus and selling it at world market prices (Belarus had enjoyed Russian gas at a discounted price). When Russia refused to meet Belarusian quotas for energy imports, Belarus turned to Venezuela for energy imports starting in 2010, with energy shipped via tankers from Venezuela to the Ukrainian port of Odessa, then up to Belarus through a pipeline. Belarus has sought 23 million tons of oil from Russia for 2013, but Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has stated that if Russia will only sell Belarus up to 18 million tons (as it has stated) and it will import energy from Venezuela and Azerbaijan. Yet if Venezuela for any reason suspends its sales of energy to Belarus, this may give Russia more leverage over Belarus as it (Belarus) will have lost a valuable supplier of alternative energy. This situation seems unlikely since Venezuela can only benefit from the influx of cash, but is still an example of how far reaching the implications of the upcoming transfer of power in Venezuela really are. After energy, Russia’s most valuable export is armaments and military hardware. Chávez constantly feared a U.S. invasion of Venezuela, and had been engaged in a long-standing dispute with neighboring Colombia over the presence of U.S. troops in Colombia (these U.S. troops including most notably the U.S.’s élite Special Forces, whose purpose is to assist with counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency). This, in principle, was the basis for his decision to enter into contractual agreements with Russia regarding arms sales. Venezuela is the second-largest customer for Russian military hardware (after India), and as Russia’s economy is famously lacking in diversity of exports outside of energy, a willing market for arms is greatly welcomed (a situation only enhanced by the instability in another major importer of Russian arms- Syria). In 2009, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned of a possible arms race between Colombia and Venezuela. Since 2006, the gross income for Russian military sales abroad has doubled, and Russian arms sales are now almost exclusively handled through state-owned company Rosoboronexport. Chávez’s death, however, could reduce Russia’s client relationship with Venezuela in the arms industry, depending on how the succession plays out. It would be easy to assume that Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s vice president, would succeed the late Chávez, yet Venezuela’s opposition is relatively strong. The Venezuelan economy, despite the strength of the country’s crude reserves, is not entirely healthy, and if the Venezuelan opposition ends up in power they may decide that it is not economically viable to have such contracts arms with Russia. Viachelav Nikonov, deputy chair of the Russian Parliament’s committee on foreign affairs, has stated that he does not believe a new Venezuelan administration would be able to opt out of currently existing contracts, but future contracts may not be pursued. Given the fragile state of Venezuela’s economy, Russia will most likely remain a major player in Venezuela’s foreign relations, because even if the opposition were somehow to come to power, Russian participation in the country’s energy sector is still largely

necessary for it to be able to produce energy in adequate amounts and at sufficient levels of refinement. Yet Russia may lose a large part of its customer base in the armaments industry, and if a right-wing administration comes to power, or at least a Chávez lieutenant who seeks to improve relations with the U nited S tates, Russia may also

find itself with less of a partner in the geopolitical arena of

countering U.S. influence in Latin America .

Increased Russian influence risks extinction--regional proliferation, establishment of Russian military strongholds and growing antagonism make conflict inevitable in the status quo Nyquist 01, Independent journalist and policy analyst. Jeffrey Nyquist is a writer for Financial Sense and an expert in Chinese and Russian military and foreign policy strategies. He was formerly a Contractor for the Defense Intelligence Agency(Jeffrey, "Russia Builds Anti-American Alliance," 05/24/01, WND, http://www.wnd.com/2001/05/9366/)//AD

Last week Russia got together with Venezuela, one of America’s largest oil suppliers, to announce a “strategic partnership.” Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has admitted that this partnernship

is aimed at defeating “unipolarity” — a euphemism for America’s

status as the world’s dominant military and economic power. In joining with Russia, Venezuela has signed on with a growing anti-American coalition which includes countries like China, India and Iran. It should be noted that Moscow is the hub of this coalition. Offering its new client a wide range of strategic options (including military-technical support), Moscow wants to work with Venezuela on “fixing” oil prices. This is a high priority for Russia, which seeks to hurt the oil-dependent West and gain greater oil revenues for itself. There is also a more threatening aspect to the Russia-Venezuela partnership. Last week Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov signed a military cooperation agreement with his Venezuelan counterpart, Jose Vicente Rangel. From now on we can expect to see Russian military advisers joining Chinese military advisers in South America. We can also expect the deployment of new weapons systems, including aircraft

and air-defense missiles. Moves of this kind have serious national-security implications for the United States. Americans should therefore ask what has motivated Venezuela’s new relationship with Russia? President Hugo Chavez, a former paratrooper, is the self-proclaimed champion of the poor and oppressed in his country. Chavez’s policy has been to gradually disenfranchise the rich. At the same time he has publicly embraced Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. Chavez has also transformed the Venezuelan constitution, eliminating effective checks to presidential power. Chavez has denied being a communist. It is constantly asserted that Chavez’s admiration for Castro, his close military ties to China and his new “partnership” with

Russia have nothing to do with secret Marxist proclivities. On reviewing Chavez’s record, one might ask how a Marxist dictator would differ from Chavez? Of course, denying communist proclivities is pro forma among communists. The entire Russian state has adopted this pose for nearly a decade, receiving many advantages in the process. Why shouldn’t this be the case in Venezuela? After all, communism is supposedly dead. If the corpse twitches from time to time, say something clever about the electrical physiology of decaying political bodies. There is no need to give the game away. This will be vigorously denied by many wishful thinkers, but the worldwide communist movement is not dead. Throughout history the communists have gone underground time and time again. The phony death and burial of communism is just another way of going underground. Long before the Soviet Union announced its own demise, communists in the Western Hemisphere were encouraged to describe themselves as “progressives.” President Chavez could not be ignorant of this tradition, which has been described for us by David Horowitz in “Radical Son,” an autobiographical account. Horowitz’s parents were card-carrying communists who made “it a rule never to discuss their real politics, to identify their associates, or to reveal their Party activities to any outsider.” President Hugo Chavez acts like a communist. He is even suspected of supporting communist insurgents in neighboring Colombia. Last year he invited Colombian communists to visit his country, to speak before his legislature. He was the first head of state since the Gulf War to visit Iraq and shake Saddam Hussein’s hand. Last year he hosted a visit from Fidel Castro. His education program is currently modeled after Cuba’s. And now he openly aligns himself with Moscow and Beijing. If that is not enough, Venezuelan Defense Minister Jose Vicente Rangel is anxious to acquire Russian fighter aircraft, air-defense systems and more. Cuba is no longer alone in Latin America. Now the communist rebels in Colombia have an ally on the border. They have a chance to win. Imagine how Venezuela, soon to be hosting Russian military advisers, will be able to help the Colombian rebels. For those who don’t know, the communist movement in Colombia is fueled by cocaine. As it happens, Russia is a major clandestine player in the drug offensive against America, as documented by Joseph D. Douglass Jr. in a book entitled “Red Cocaine.” Earlier this month the U.S. Coast Guard found half a billion dollars worth of cocaine on a fishing boat. The vessel was manned by Russian and Ukranian gangsters who had reportedly allied with Colombian cocaine traffickers. This is but one data point among many. Can you connect the dots? The ongoing hostility of Russia can be traced in its new Latin American policy. It is no accident that the communist rebels in Colombia receive most of their heavy weapons from Eastern Europe. It is also no accident that Russian gangsters have allied with a communist insurgency that fuels itself with cocaine. Furthermore, we have to wake up to the fact that the supposedly nonexistent communist bloc not only has a newfound ally in Venezuela, but has its Chinese front companies positioned on both sides of the Panama Canal. In the 1950s we would have taken strong measures to counter such moves. Today we do nothing. We no longer think of Russia as an enemy. And yet, Russia and China have formed a strategic coalition against us. More than that, they are slowly and quietly

building a network of anti-American countries. In recent days Russia announced a strengthening of military ties with Libya, over a month ago a pact was signed with Iran. Meanwhile, China has moved to patch things up with communist Vietnam and has established closer relations with South Africa. The strategic objectives here should be obvious. The stage is being set for a renewed conflict between Russia and America. In this renewed conflict Russia will have broken from its Cold War containment. It will have powerful outposts in our own hemisphere. It will have the support of China and it will have a diplomatic influence over critical oil producing states. Those who thought we were in trouble in 1980, when Ronald Reagan was elected president, should look more carefully at the situation today. America has reduced its military power across the board. NATO is in a state of confusion and weakness. It is time to wake up

Uniqueness / Internal Links / Solvency

2ac Russia Expanding Now

Russia is boosting oil ties with VenezuelaHiscock 13, Geoff Hiscock is a business journalist and author based in Sydney, Australia. He has been writing on Asian business for more than 30 years and is the author of four books, including Asia's Wealth Club (1997), which documented Asia’s richest tycoons; its follow-up, Asia’s New Wealth Club (2000); a global profile of Indian business leaders in India's Global Wealth Club (2007); and India's Store Wars (2008), which looks at the growth of the modern retail scene. He served as Sydney bureau chief and Asia Business Editor for CNN.com International from 2001-2006, and as International Business Editor of The Australian daily newspaper from 1995-2000(Geoff, "Russia deepens Venezuela oil ties" 2/14/13, The Australian, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/russia-deepens-venezuela-oil-ties/story-e6frg9df-1226577701328)//AD

WHILE the United States forges ahead with its shale-led energy revolution, Russia is steadily building up its stake in the oil industry of

Venezuela , where anti-American rhetoric has been the hallmark of now-ailing leader Hugo Chavezs 14-year rule. Igor Sechin, president of Russia’s state-owned oil giant Rosneft, declared last month the oil-rich South American country would be the main focus of Rosneft’s overseas investments. Under a series of accords signed during Sechin’s visit to Venezuela on January 29-30, Russia will commit to invest up to $US40 billion in jointly exploiting the Orinoco extra-heavy oil belt -- regarded as one of the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves -- with Venezuela’s state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA). The US Geological Survey estimated in 2010 that the Orinoco belt, a 600-km strip straddling the Orinoco River in the central-eastern part of Venezuela, held 513 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil. According to OPEC statistics, Venezuela’s proven reserves stand at 296 billion barrels, the largest in the world. It also has 5.5 trillion cubic metres of gas reserves, ranking it No. 8 in gas behind Russia, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, UAE and the US. Venezuela relies heavily on its oil exports, which supply 95 per cent of its foreign earnings. Output, which was above 3 million barrels a day in the 1990s and early 2000s, has since fallen below that figure, although Venezuela’s stated goal is to reach 5 million barrels a day by 2015 and 6.5 million by 2020, through development of the Orinoco belt. Venezuela’s heavy sour crude remains in demand with some refiners because it is cheaper than light sweet crude. Last week’s hefty devaluation of the bolivar currency by the government of Chavez – who has been in hospital in Havana, Cuba since surgery in December – will ease the country's budget shortfall, but will also likely spur inflation and further weaken the economy. Vice President Nicolas Maduro is running the country in the absence of Chavez. In the late 1990s, Venezuela was supplying almost 2 million barrels a day of crude oil to the United States. But that figure has shrunk in recent years to just over a million barrels a day, on the back of increased US shale oil and gas production, and

increased imports from friendlier US neighbour Canada. Even so, Venezuela ranks as a top-four supplier, behind Canada and Saudi Arabia, and about level with Mexico. That makes the United States Venezuela’s most important trading partner, despite Chavez constantly railing at US “imperialism”. The big change for Venezuela is the increased interest being shown

in the Orinoco belt by Russia , China and India. European and Asian oil companies such as Eni of Italy, Repsol of Spain, Petronas of Malaysia and Petrovietnam are active there, as is the US major Chevron, in partnership with Japanese companies. PDVSA has a majority 60 per cent stake in all the various Orinoco blocks that have been licensed since 2009. Rosneft, for example, has committed to spend $US10 billion on its Venezuela projects over the next few years, including the highly prospective Junin-6 and Carabobo-2 blocks in the Orinoco belt. Rosneft heads a Russian consortium with 40 per cent of Junin-6, where the technically recoverable reserves of oil are close to 11 billion barrels. Late last month Rosneft said it would buy out one of its Russian partners, Surgutneftegas. It had earlier announced that it would acquire another partner, TNK-BP, from current owners BP and the Russian AAR group in 2013, leaving Gazprom Neft and LUKoil as the remaining Junin-6 investors. Junin-6 is expected to produce 450,000 barrels a day at peak output. During his visit to Caracas, Sechin met Oil and Mineral Resources Minister Rafael Ramírez, with the two sides agreeing to strengthen cooperation and investment in Venezuela’s oil industry. They also said they would set up a joint drill-manufacturing operation. Like Russia, China also has been a heavy investor in Venezuela, with the China Development Bank committing to lend more than $40 billion since 2008 against crude oil sales. China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) is a 40-60 partner with PDVSA in the Junin-4 block, where projected production is 400,000 barrels a day. Alongside PDVSA’s 60 per cent stake, US oil major Chevron has 34 per cent of the Carabobo-3 block – also a 400,000 barrel a day project -- with Japanese partners holding 5 per cent and Suelopetrol (an independent Venezuelan oil producer) 1 per cent. PDVSA’s 40-60 partner in Junin-5, a 240,000 barrel a day project, is Italy’s Eni, while in the 400,000-bpd Carabobo-1 block the foreign partners with PDVA are Petronas (11 per cent), Repsol-YPF (11 per cent) and an Indian consortium led by ONGC Videsh with 18 per cent. ONGC Videsh, the overseas arm of state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of India, also has a stake in another Orinoco belt project, the San Cristobal oil field at Junin. Indian private sector giant Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL), led by India’s richest man Mukesh Ambani, is another investor in Venezuelan oil and gas projects, and is considered likely to commit a further $2 billion this year to more exploration and development of Orinoco oil belt prospects. Last October Reliance signed a 15-year heavy crude oil supply contract and a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with PDVSA to further develop Venezuela’s heavy oil fields. Under the contract, PDVSA will supply between 300,000 and 400,000 barrels a day of Venezuelan heavy crude to Reliance’s two refineries at Jamnagar in Gujarat state. Reliance said at the time the 15-year contract and MOU marked a “further strengthening of the long-standing relationship between Reliance and PDVSA”. But the failing health

of Chavez has left some investors wary of over-committing until the dynamics of any transition to a new Venezuelan leader are clear. Geoff Hiscock writes on international business and is the author of “Earth Wars: The Battle for Global Resources,” published by John Wiley & Sons.

Russia is using oil ties with Venezuela to leverage its influence and create a strategic alliance in the regionMarquez, 13 - a journalist for more than 25 years, specialising in international news and worked for 15 years with Agence France-Presse, 10 as assignment editor in Caracas (Humberto, “Russia to Get Venezuelan Oil for a Few Cents a Barrel”, Inter Press Service, 3-18-13, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/russia-to-get-venezuelan-oil-for-a-few-cents-a-barrel/)//KG

CARACAS, Mar 18 2013 (IPS) - Russian state oil firm Rosneft and Venezuela’s PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.) have agreed to form a partnership to exploit an oilfield with estimated reserves of 40 billion barrels, strengthening the alliance between the two countries. For 1.5 billion dollars, the Russian company will take over 40 percent of a project at a Venezuelan deposit expected to produce 400,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude in five years’ time, executives from the two companies said. “It is an attractive deal for Rosneft to buy, or gain access to, reserves at a very low price. That 40 percent interest ‘buys’ 16 billion barrels at a cost of 10 cents of a dollar per barrel,” Víctor Poleo, a professor of graduate studies in oil economics at the Central University of Venezuela, told IPS. The cost of a barrel of oil on the international market is between 90 and 110 dollars. The crude in question is in the Orinoco oil belt, an area of 55,000 square kilometres in the southeast of Venezuela which is estimated to contain reserves of 1.2 trillion barrels, of which 240 billion barrels are technically recoverable, according to the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining. The government of Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), who died Mar. 5, named the oil blocks in the Orinoco belt after battles in the 1810-1824 war of independence and parcelled them out as concessions to mixed companies with PDVSA holding a minimum stake of 60 percent. The Hydrocarbons Law of 2006 replaced the service contracts that were formerly extended to foreign operators, which were now invited to become partners. Legally the oil reserves belong to the nation. Rosneft will pay PDVSA a bonus of 1.1 billion dollars for the rights to the new partnership in the Carabobo block, which has already been endorsed by the Venezuelan parliament. In April, the two companies will fine-tune the details of the formation of the new mixed company, named PetroVictoria. The Russian firm also took over 40 percent of the mixed company that is operating the nearby Junín block, when it bought the Russian-British consortium TNK-BP in October. The Junín reserves are estimated at 53 billion barrels, and Rosneft’s 40 percent share is greater than the 18 billion barrels it owns in Russia. With the addition of the Carabobo operation, “the book value of (Rosneft’s) shares is revalued at very low cost,” said Poleo, a critic of mixed companies because he considers they “relinquish our rights over the reserves. “At the end of the day, it means that for every 100 barrels produced from the Junín

or Carabobo blocks, 40 will belong to Rosneft, which will also get 40 percent of the oil revenue,” said Poleo, who was vice minister for energy in the first three years of the Chávez administration. José Suárez Núñez, of the specialist publication Petrofinanzas, highlighted Russia’s inroads in the Orinoco belt, although he said “volumes for now are minuscule, and the crude is extra heavy and very costly to refine.” This contrasts “with deposits of lighter oil and (Russia’s) lead in production volumes, at 10 million bpd,” he told IPS. Most of the crude in the Orinoco oil belt is extra heavy, less than 10 degrees API (American Petroleum Institute classification), compared to over 30 degrees API in oil from the Middle East, Russia or the North Sea. Before distillation, this extra heavy oil must be improved in a process equivalent to partial refining. “Rosneft’s agreements with PDVSA are part of Russia’s projection towards Latin America, a region that has traditionally been in the sphere of influence of the United States,” said Kenneth Ramírez, an expert on oil geopolitics and president of the private Venezuelan Council of International Relations. This projection is part of “ Russia’s grand

strategy to re-emerge as a global power and replicate the advance of Washington over what was once its zone of influence, in central and southern Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Black Sea,” he told IPS. “Among its strategies is strengthening its ties with Brazil, the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and making advances to ALBA (the eight-member Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America) which is led by Venezuela,” Ramírez said. Russian President Vladimir Putin sent the head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, as his special representative to the state funeral for Chávez on Mar. 8. Sechin met with Nicolás Maduro, the acting president of Venezuela and the candidate expected to win the Apr. 14 elections, to smooth over obstacles in the bilateral oil relationship. Local media indicate PDVSA is having difficulties meeting its financial commitments, pointing to delays in its obligations to Brazilian state oil company Petrobras for the construction of the Abreu e Lima refinery. But oil minister Rafael Ramírez, who is also head of PDVSA, confirmed “the commitment to continue the energy policy begun in 1999″ by the late president Chávez. “The strategic relationship with China and Russia will be deepened, in concordance with the multipolar scheme that has been the basis of the foreign policy of the revolution,” said the minister. As the projects are developed, the Russian-Venezuelan alliance will invest 46 billion dollars in the Orinoco belt, of which Moscow will contribute 17 billion dollars, he said. Kenneth Ramírez highlighted that Rosneft is also working in mature fields (those in which production has passed its peak) in areas other than the Orinoco belt, and has signed agreements to participate in future gas production and to supply drills for crude extraction. “Moscow isn’t seeking supplies of oil, since it has reserves of 88 billion barrels, but it’s looking for deals to leverage a strategic alliance ,” he said. In Poleo’s view, “it is good business for the new Venezuelan nomenklatura (people in key administrative positions) to build alliances with Putin and his ‘siloviki,’ high level members of the KGB (the former Soviet Union’s intelligence and security agency) who took over the management of large companies after the fall of the old regime.” Venezuela’s military purchases from Russia appear to fit in the context of this alliance.

Since 2006, Caracas has bought at least nine billion dollars’ worth of aircraft, helicopters, rocket launchers, tanks, armoured vehicles and assault rifles from Moscow, according to Control Ciudadano para la Seguridad, la Defensa y la Fuerza Armada Nacional (Citizen Control of Security, Defence and the Armed Forces), a local NGO.

Cooperation between Russia and Venezuela increasing in military and energy sectorsRIA Novosti, 13 - Russia's leading news agency (“Chavez Exit No Major Threat to Russia’s Lucrative Deals – Experts”, 1-9-13, http://en.rian.ru/business/20130109/178668233.html)//KG

MOSCOW, January 9 (RIA Novosti) – Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez’s failing health and possible departure from power are unlikely to pose an immediate threat to Russia’s multi-billion-dollar arms and energy contracts with his country, despite his direct personal support for the deals, Russian analysts told RIA Novosti on Wednesday. Chavez, who is continuing his fight against cancer and hasn’t appeared in public in about a month, asked parliament yesterday to postpone his January 10 inauguration, citing doctors’ recommendations. Russia has intensified cooperation with Venezuela since Chavez came to power in 1999, signing multi-billion-dollar contracts with the Latin American country in the arms, oil and gas spheres. The military-technology contracts, often short on publicly available details, have been piling up in recent years . Between 2005 and 2007, Caracas signed $4 billion worth of deals with Russia to buy Sukhoi fighter jets, combat helicopters and small arms. Chavez’s government also secured a $2.2-billion loan in 2010 to purchase Russian T-72 tanks and S-300 air defense systems. Energy deals have also enhanced bilateral ties. Major joint ventures involve development of the Junin 6 and Junin 3 oilfields on the Orinoco River. Junin 6 is being developed by Russia's National Oil Consortium, which includes GazpromNeft, Lukoil, Rosneft, Surgutneftegaz and TNK-BP, together with Venezuela's state oil and gas company, PDVSA. Junin 3 is being developed by Lukoil. Prior to his illness, Chavez personally endorsed the deals. But even for places as dependent on personalities as these two countries, his departure would not automatically mean the emergence of problems for Russian companies operating in Venezuela, said Igor Yushkov, a senior analyst for the National Energy Security Fund, a commercial research organization. “Chavez is a charismatic leader who plays a big role in the development of modern Venezuela and many things may be centered around him,” but whoever his successor will be, the deals currently in place with Russia are likely to be respected since Chavez’s allies will stick to his policies, while his opponents will want to burnish their liberal, rule-of-law credentials. If “Chavez’s supporters […] unite around a single leader and do not engage in rivalry among themselves, if they emerge as a single front and nominate a single successor candidate, then they have all the chances to retain power,” Yushkov said. It is possible, however, that Chavez’s opponents could come to power. After the postponed inauguration, they

accused the government of violating the Constitution, which stipulates that new presidential elections must be held within 30 days if Chavez is not fit enough to be sworn in on the scheduled date. But even if the opposition were to take over government, Yushkov argues, it is unlikely they will renege on legally binding agreements. “This is because they position themselves as liberal forces, as a counterbalance to ‘Dictator Chavez,’” he added. Dmitry Abzalov, a leading analyst at the Center for Current Politics, also a private research firm, agreed, saying that although Russia’s contracts with Venezuela were largely centered on Chavez, it is highly probable they would be fulfilled. According to Abzalov, Rosneft head Igor Sechin, who was deputy prime minister in Vladimir Putin’s cabinet (before Putin’s return to the Kremlin as president in 2012), visited Chavez shortly before his surgery, and “managed to reach an agreement” with the Venezuelan leadership about major energy deals. Sechin also had positive meetings with military top brass aligned with Chavez and his heir-apparent, Vice President Nicolas Maduro. “That is why, it is highly probable that the accords signed between Russia and Venezuela will be honored,” Abzalov said. The only question that remains open is the two countries’ long-term cooperation, Abzalov said. “Apart from the existing contracts, there were also discussions on the prospects of delivering armaments for the Venezuelan Air Force and Navy,” he said. “This cooperation will largely depend on who Chavez’s successor is.” “But in the medium term, the contracts will be executed in full. This refers both to military-technical deals and also to energy cooperation – first and foremost, the development of the Orinoco oil belt,” he said.

Venezuela and Russia are forming a strategic alliance now --- energy cooperation is a central featureAgencia EFE, 13 – (“Maduro reaffirms Venezuela's alliance with Russia”, Global Post, 7-2-13, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/agencia-efe/130702/maduro-reaffirms-venezuelas-alliance-russia)//KG

Moscow, Jul 2 (EFE).- Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro showed here Tuesday that he plans to pick up where late predecessor Hugo Chavez left off in relations with Russia. "Hugo Chavez generated a great respect and love for Russia. We have inherited that love," Maduro said during a meeting at the Kremlin with Russian President Vladimir Putin. "We have come to confirm our desire to reinforce and expand the strategic alliance with Russia ," the Venezuelan leader said. "During the last decade we have forged a map of cooperation in various areas. We move forward on the energy front, that is, oil and gas, and in provision of equipment for the petroleum sector," Maduro said. The new president's first visit to Moscow included the signing of an accord between Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA and Russian counterpart Rosneft to carry out joint projects in the Andean nation. Russian utility Inter RAO EES also reached an accord with PDVSA to build a power plant in Venezuela. Putin said he and Maduro reaffirmed their "common

position to pursue the course of strategic cooperation in all ambits." The Russian also praised Maduro for "firmly taking the baton" from Chavez, who died in March after a long battle with cancer, and praised the late Venezuelan head of state as "a great and sincere friend of Russia, a strong and valiant man." Maduro took time during his visit to attend a ceremony in northwest Moscow to mark the re-naming of a street in Chavez's honor. Chavez, who traveled to Russia on nine occasions, sought to institutionalize bilateral economic cooperation and bought billions of dollars worth of arms and military equipment from Moscow. Venezuela turned to Russia after the United States cut off sales of military materiel to Caracas, including spare parts for the F-16s combat planes Washington sold the Andean nation in the 1980s.

--- AT: Maduro Different

Maduro will expand strategic alliances with RussiaEFE 13, Agencia EFE, S.A is a Spanish international news organizaton; the fourth largest wire service globally(Agencia EFE, S.A, "Maduro reaffirms Venezuela's alliance with Russia" 7/2/13, Fox News Latino, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/07/02/maduro-reaffirms-venezuela-alliance-with-russia/)//AD

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro showed here Tuesday that he plans to pick up where late predecessor Hugo Chavez left off in relations with Russia. "Hugo Chavez generated a great respect and love for Russia. We have inherited that love," Maduro said during a meeting at the Kremlin with Russian President Vladimir Putin. "We have come to confirm our desire to reinforce and expand the strategic alliance with Russia," the Venezuelan leader said. "During the last decade we have forged a map of cooperation in various areas. We move forward on the energy front, that is, oil and gas, and in provision of

equipment for the petroleum sector ," Maduro said. The new president's first visit to Moscow included the signing of an accord between Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA and Russian counterpart Rosneft to carry out joint projects in the Andean nation. Russian utility Inter RAO EES also reached an accord with PDVSA to build a power plant in Venezuela. Putin said he and Maduro reaffirmed their "common position to pursue the course of strategic cooperation in all ambits." The Russian also praised Maduro for "firmly taking the baton" from Chavez, who died in March after a long battle with cancer, and praised the late Venezuelan head of state as "a great and sincere friend of Russia, a strong and valiant man." Maduro took time during his visit to attend a ceremony in northwest Moscow to mark the re-naming of a street in Chavez's honor. Chavez, who traveled to Russia on nine occasions, sought to institutionalize bilateral economic cooperation and bought billions of dollars worth of arms and military equipment from Moscow. Venezuela turned to Russia after the United States cut off sales of military materiel to Caracas, including spare parts for the F-16s combat planes Washington sold the Andean nation in the 1980s. EFE

2ac U.S.-Russia Zero Sum / Engagement Solves

U.S. engagement will draw Venezuela away from Russia and ChinaLeMaster 09, Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army(Dennis, "US POLICY OPTIONS MITIGATING VENEZUELAN SPONSORED SECURITY CHALLENGES" 3/12/09, US Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA497699)//AD

Increased engagement is the second policy option. An engagement policy seeks a cooperative relationship with Venezuela that achieve interests vital to both nations. Its hallmark would be communication. The central themes would be to reassureVenezuela that the US is not contemplating the assassination of Chavez. This assurance encourages the respect to the Venezuelan people because it affirms US approval of their democratic process, to include their choice of President. Ideally, this message would soften the perception of Venezuelans that the US is a bullying nation whose dominant behavior on the international arena is unilateral. Finally, engagement would include reestablishment of economic programs and military relationships. The recent change in US administrations makes engagement highly feasible. A new administration provides a logical juncture to usher in a new era of cooperation. President Obama has stated that the US will operate from a multilateral platform in the international system. This sends a clear message to hemispheric countries that the US will abandon from unilateral methods. This validates visions and values

that promote security, economic growth, and democratic processes . Implementation will require increased resources and commitments across the spectrum of national power because there will be heightened activity between the US and Venezuela, as well as other Latin American nations. The confidence levels of both nations would be high as engagement builds on rekindled relationships established long ago. Acceptability and suitability are as alluring as feasibility. Healthy relations with Venezuela are desirable for US businesses, particularly energy companies with their large investments in Venezuela. Economic growth would benefit the entire hemisphere. Engagement supports our interests as the prevailing nation in the

Western Hemisphere. It is doubtful that an engaged Chavez

Administration will as aggressively court our competitors such as

China, Russia, and Iran . He also will probably abandon foreign policies designed to block or diminish US influence in the region. Finally, the suitability of engagement improves our counter-terrorism and illegal drug programs. Engagement is a low-risk policy option. Reaching out and entering into dialogue with the Chavez administration may alter the perception of a future US-led regime

change. Much of Chavez’s posturing seeks to increase his power and to generate solidarity among South American states to resist US influence. As these efforts subside, there is a substantial reduction in risk for conflict and an increase in the possibility for economic growth. Engagement promotes

regional harmony and guarantees US influence.

U.S. involvement will crowd out Russian oil investment --- peaceful coexistence is not likelyRT, 13 (3/6/2013, “Chavez’s death opens oil industry questions for Venezuela,” http://rt.com/business/chavez-venezuelan-death-oil-887/, JMP)

Venezuela a 'priority' for Russian oil investmentSimilar to the US, Russia has also had a large presence in the Venezuelan energy sector. For almost a decade, Russia’s largest privately owned oil company Lukoil has been developing the Venezuelan Orinoco Oil Belt with the country’s state-oil firm Petroleum of Venezuela, the world’s third largest.Another Russian energy major, Gazprom has been developing gas deposits in the Gulf of Venezuela since 2008.Last month Russia's leader in petroleum industry, Rosneft announced Venezuela will be a ‘priority’ for the company in foreign energy projects. The oil giant agreed to develop several fields in the crude-rich southeast region, and has committed $40 billion in investment. However, Petroleum of Venezuela will control the majority of the project’s stake, at 60%.Russia hopes all the agreements reached with Venezuela under the Hugo Chavez presidency will remain in place and the two countries will retain the same level of cooperation, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich said on Wednesday.“We hope that all the agreements that were reached will be implemented. We also intend to fulfill our commitments and hope that the policy of Venezuela will stay the same,” Mr Dvorkovich said.Oil gamesIf the opposition comes to power in Venezuela, the rules of the oil game can change and not necessarily to the benefit of Russian companies, Konstantin Simonov, head of the National Energy Security Fund told RT Business.“The opposition in Venezuela is quite strong. We remember elections in 2012 when the gap between Chavez and his closest rival was just a small percent. It means Mr Maduro can lose the election and this scenario will be extremely dangerous for the Russian companies. I’m pretty sure in that case we will see American companies returning to Venezuela,” Mr Simonov said. Russian companies will be forced out of major projects they managed to nail, once American players enter the game, as they will try to eliminate unwanted rivals and become sole shareholders of the projects. Peaceful co-existence is unlikely to happen there , says Konstatin Simonov, as the costly production of the cites will leave not enough profit to be shared among all sides engaged.

A new leader can also take advantage of the competition among the companies for the rights to get their hands on Venezuela’s oil reserves, Mr Simonov goes on, and simply sell the projects Russia has only agreed to develop but has yet to finialize. “If we are speaking about the Junin-6 project, Rosneft and its Russian partners paid Chavez an “entrance ticket” of $1 billion. It wasn’t an investment, just a payment. So instead of asking for $1 bln, how about half a billion, to take these assets from Russian companies and sell them to Americans. This is very simple logic with such political regimes – if we see a new leader come to power, they'll try to abolish all the old contracts and sell the same assets to the new parties because you can sell the same assets twice. This tactic clearly makes for very good business.”But experts say that it is likely that the country’s policies will not change much, as Nicholas Maduro, endorsed by Chavez, is favored by political pundits to take over as president. The election will be held in 30 days.“My expectation is that we will see the status quo, with a transition to a similar style of government from Chavez’s successor,” said Katherine Spector, head of commodity strategy at CIBC World Markets in New York.

Russia competes with the US for influence in Latin America Blank 11 – Professor of Strategic Studies at United States Army War College (August 18, 2011, “Russia’s Second Wind in Latin America” https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdf)

<While China’s huge entry into Latin America deservedly receives more attention, clearly Russia intends to compete with the United States throughout Latin America. Moreover, one consequence of Russia’s deals may be to corrupt Latin American officials and governments while buying influence. Even if Russia’s influence here is arguably minimal, some analysts argue that Washington should engage in dialogue with Moscow about its activities in the region to make clear the importance of issues such as Hugo Chávez’s subversive activities, and to gain a platform from which to counter Moscow in a dialogue about the former Soviet space.27 Be that as it may, both Moscow and Beijing are seriously challenging our policies in Latin America. While we should not panic about Russia’s presence in the region, it is necessary that we maintain a vigorous U.S.security policy towards Latin America.>

--- XT: Engagement Solves

US indifference in Latin America is fueling Russian expansionism Walle, 12 - writes for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (Walter, “Russia's Intrusion into the Americas is a Wake-Up call for the United States”, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 5-9-12, http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=73388pageid=13pagename=Analysis)//KG

Russian – Latin American relations are relatively warm these days, especially when it comes to a number of seemingly left-leaning countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Nonetheless, Washington’s indifference to these countries may have pushed these governments further into Moscow’s diplomatic embrace. The United States appears to have calculatedly severed any sort of close relations with these left-leaning nations, and has been prone to criticize them with the same degree of careless indifference as it has of Russia itself. In addition, these resident dynamics have provided the region with a growing autonomy; as Argentinean president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner aptly stated, “the world has changed, Latin America is nobody’s backyard.” This represents a full shift from Cold War politics, when the U.S. supported authoritarian regimes throughout the region in order to act as a firewall to contain Soviet influence within the hemisphere. In fact, much of the ever-growing presence of Russia in Latin America is due to Moscow’s aspirations to return to global preeminence, coinciding with Washington’s increasingly unsympathetic view toward a number of these left-leaning Latin American countries. Notably, Russia has been able to exert its influence on an expanding agenda of mostly military and energy issues through a series of existing ties, as well as through allying itself with Central American nations to fight ever-changing drug trafficking trends. As the U.S. has curtailed military and economic assistance to some emerging countries in Latin America, Russia emerged as a pivotal ally for some and a preferred alternative for others. Colombia and Venezuela, A Proxy Conflict? With Russia’s new relationships with leftist Latin American governments and the U.S.’ increasingly aimless presence in the region, one can discern a growing interaction among regional actors. In fact, this new direction seems to be reminiscent of a slow return to a Cold War modus operandi. As Carácas modernizes its army with Russian technology, Bogota is likewise being buttressed by the U.S., with its “Plan Colombia” (an international initiative to fight drug trafficking), and other countries like Israel and Spain.

US support and economic engagement of Venezuela key to crowd out Russia – neglect leads to successful Russian expansionism Blank, 9 - Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (Stephen, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US’s Neighborhood”, Ifri, April 2009, www.ifri.org/downloads/ifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09.pdf)//KG

In analyzing the nature of Russia’s relations with Latin America, a few conclusions can be drawn. First, Moscow's main motives in Latin America are clearly geopolitical and tied to its self-presentation as a global superpower and rival of the US. Second, its capabilities for achieving decisive strategic influence are limited to a few struggling, leftist Latin American states. Third, the current economic crisis has constricted those capabilities still further. Fourth, most Latin American states will not follow Russian policies against their own interests simply to improve trade or let Russia hijack them for its purposes- unless the

Obama Administration utterly neglects or disregards them , which is unlikely. Even Russian commentators and some military officers recognize and publicly admit that the posturing seen in exercises in Venezuela and the Caribbean is just that, a display with little or no strategic benefit." � The only way in which Russian policy truly threatens the US and Latin America is its military and intelligence support for Chavez and similar leaders. This support is passed on to insurgents and narco-trafficantes in order to destabilize pro-American regimes while strengthening Chavez and his allies. Adequate responses to such threats are inherently economic and political, and only military as a last resort. Washington can do much to facilitate security in Latin America : regenerating its own economy; simultaneously opening up trade markets and eliminating barriers to Latin American exports; enhancing multilateralism and interoperability among defense forces as requested by Latin American militaries; and beginning the normalization of Cuba. Havana is no longer the threat it was, Venezuela has claimed that dubious honor. Rehabilitating Cuba, given that Castro's days are clearly numbered, would take the air out of Chavez's balloon; it is quite clear that Havana would probably welcome a path towards better relations with the US, especially the economic benefits they would inevitably bring. A policy with a more symbolically important impact upon Latin America is currently difficult to imagine. Nonetheless, there should be no illusion that the security problems that plague this region are easily overcome, quite the opposite. But that is all the more reason why the US cannot ignore the area and let it drift to Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing for want of a better alternative. That outcome would only confirm once again that in world politics, there is no such thing as benign neglect. Instead neglect is malign and engenders negative results for the negligent state along with those neglected. The policies of the Bush administration allowed Russia to gain a foothold in Latin American politics, a result of Washington's negligence; under

President Obama, the US should reverse those outcomes and demonstrate what liberal democracy in action can truly accomplish.

Only direct US engagement can reverse the tide of anti-Americanism-- helps form sustainable partnerships Noriega and Cardenas 12, Roger F. Noriega is a former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs (Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean) and a former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States. He coordinates AEI's program on Latin America and writes for the Institute's Latin American Outlook series. José R. Cárdenas is a contributor to AEI’s Venezuela-Iran Project and an associate with Vision Americas (Roger/Jose, "The Mounting Hezbollah Threat in Latin America – by Roger Noriega & José R. Cárdenas" 12/05/12, America Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/outlook /foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/an-action-plan-for-us-policy-in-the-americas/)//AD

As US policymakers struggle to overcome sluggish economic growth while confronting abiding security threats, there is a stronger argument than ever for fortifying US partnerships with countries in

the Americas whose economies and security are intertwined with America’s own economy and security. While the United States has been preoccupied with other regions, most Latin American nations have continued to modernize their market economies; two nations in particular—Brazil and Mexico—are emerging as global players. Therefore, the time is right to restore a strong bipartisan consensus in the United States that promotes a constructive, free-market growth agenda in the Americas. Practical initiatives—not rhetoric—will encourage America and its neighbors to find common ground for their collective benefit. Key points in this Outlook: •America’s economic crisis and threats to US security have undermined its traditional global-leadership role and weakened its connections to Latin American nations that continue to modernize their economies. •The United States must recover its regional credibility by taking bold initiatives to restore its fiscal solvency, while aggressively promoting trade, energy interdependence, technology transfer , and economic growth. •The United States must then retool its strategy for its partners in the Americas by working with them to combat threats such as cross-border criminality and radical populism, encouraging dialogue with regional leaders, and ensuring law enforcement cooperation to develop a mutually beneficial relationship. A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success and security. The region is

home to three of the top four foreign sources of energy to the United

States, as well as the fastest-growing destinations for US exports

and investment. Clearly, geography and shared values predetermine a united destiny for the United States and its neighbors in the Americas. How positive and fruitful that destiny will be depends on whether US

policymakers, private businesses, and civil society move with a greater sense of purpose toward seizing promising opportunities and meeting critical challenges. Times have changed. The US fiscal crisis and preoccupation with two distant wars have distracted policymakers in Washington and undermined US leadership in the Americas. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits are highly valued by most countries in the Western Hemisphere, today, the United States is no longer the only major partner to choose from. Asia (principally China) and Europe are making important inroads. So, as US policymakers retool their strategy for the Americas, they must shelve the paternalism of the past and be much more energetic in forming meaningful partnerships with willing neighbors. Of course, the United States must recover its credibility by making bold decisions to restore its own fiscal solvency, while aggressively promoting trade, energy interdependence, technology transfer, and economic growth. Then, Washington will be better positioned to cultivate greater economic and political cooperation among its neighbors, beginning with an open and candid dialogue with the region’s leaders about their vision, their challenges, and their priorities. Partnerships can thus be built on common ground. "Today, 95 percent of the world’s consumers live outside the United States, and the International Monetary Fund predicts that, through 2015, some 80 percent of economic growth will take place beyond US shores." The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by petrodollars and allied with dangerous extraregional forces pose daunting challenges. Although it is wise to prioritize a positive socioeconomic and political agenda, assessing and addressing threats is an indispensable prerequisite to achieving US security and regional leadership. To make the most of their united destiny, the United States and its partners in the Americas should: •Promote and defend democracy, the rule of law, and human rights and private property as the building blocks of just societies, accountable governments, and prosperous economies; •Advocate and support the empowerment of individuals through the development of strong free-market economies, healthy private sectors, and free trade among nations; •Assist neighbors in addressing their essential security needs so they can grow in peace and be more effective allies to prevent or confront common threats; •Incentivize capital markets and encourage new and innovative technology cooperation to develop a regional community that is interdependent in the production and distribution of a range of products and services—particularly energy; •Confront international organized crime in Mexico and Central America by supporting effective law-enforcement institutions and competent judicial systems; •Work with willing allies to restore the Organization of American States to its essential mission of promoting and defending common values and meeting common threats; •Address the role of China and Russia in the Americas by encouraging open and transparent regional investment and trade and rejecting exploitive policies that undermine local societies, regional security, and economic growth; •Combat threats posed by authoritarian regimes and their ties with Iran, Hezbollah, and transnational criminal organizations;

•Assist the Cuban people in transitioning to a post–Castro Cuba by helping to jump-start their private sector, rehabilitate their economy, and restore their political freedoms when the dictatorship collapses. Maximizing Mutual Global Competitiveness Expanding regional economic cooperation is crucial to US economic growth. An aggressive trade promotion and investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive, globalized economy is not a policy option; it is an imperative . Clearly, prosperity at home depends on success abroad. The economic opportunities in the Western Hemisphere are enormous, and US policy-makers and the private sector must recognize them as critical to US economic growth. In 2011, US exports reached a record $2.1 trillion in total value, despite the fact that only 1 percent of US businesses export their products to foreign markets. The United States must expand on these opportunities. Exports benefit the US economy by offering companies opportunities to tap new markets, expand their production, and earn more consumer dollars. Today, 95 percent of the world’s consumers live outside the United States, and the International Monetary Fund predicts that, through 2015, some 80 percent of economic growth will take place beyond US shores. It is indisputable that an aggressive US trade policy—meaning selling US goods and services in as many markets as possible—is essential for the US economy to hone its competitive edge in the 21st century. In this sense, America’s future is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbors in its own hemisphere. A prosperous hemisphere means a more prosperous United States. "Since 2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty. Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American income increased by more than 30 percent." The Western Hemisphere’s Moment. The United States is strategically well-placed to begin a new chapter in trade relations with Latin America. The countries within the Americas are bound by close historical, cultural, familial, and geographic ties, linked by common values and mutual interests. What also facilitates expanded economic engagement is the regional trade partners’ proximity to US shores, and the significant number of Hispanics living in the United States—some 50 million—that provide an exceptional strategic advantage in doing business with their countries of origin. Equally important are the advances that many countries within the region have made in establishing economic stability and growth in recent years as the roots of democracy and the rule of law continue to take hold. Countries such as Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia have been at the forefront in modernizing their economies and opening them to investment, liberalizing trade, and becoming more competitive overall. The numbers tell the story. Since 2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty. Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American income increased by more than 30 percent, meaning that currently, nearly a third of the region’s some 570 million people are considered middle class. And in just the next five years, regional economies are projected to expand by one-third. That macroeconomic stability generates even greater opportunities for US business. The Western Hemisphere already supplies a quarter of the world’s crude oil, a third of the world’s natural gas, nearly a fourth of its coal, and more than a third of global electricity, while offering tremendous potential for the

development of renewable energy technologies. Certainly, many in the US private sector have already discovered the benefits of intrahemispheric economic relationships. In fact, Latin America has played a key role in expanding US exports in recent years. The Congressional Research Service reports that from 1998 to 2009, US trade with Latin America increased an average of 82 percent, more than 72 percent with Asia, 52 percent with the European Union, and 64 percent with the rest of the world. In 2011 alone, trade with Latin America grew 20 percent. The economic growth in 2011 elevated trade between the United States and the region to a historic high of $772 million. Exports to the region grew 22 percent to $350 million, while imports increased by 20 percent to a total of $420 million. According to the US Department of Commerce, American companies now export more to the Western Hemisphere—some 42 percent of total US exports—than to any other part of the world, including China. Last year, US merchandise exports to Latin America totaled $367 billion, and the US private sector accounts for one-third of all foreign direct investment in the region. The United States now has trade agreements with 11 countries in the Western Hemisphere, which the Department of Commerce reports help to support nearly four million US jobs. Clearly, however, there is much more that can be done to fulfill the potential of intrahemispheric economic relations in the hyper-competitive global economy. High-level official US engagement is imperative to revitalizing existing alliances and developing new partnerships to boost mutual competitiveness. A reinvigorated US trade policy must transcend past approaches that have been too identified with solely US interests and too focused on bilateral relationships. A 21st-century approach necessitates more multilateral engagement and cooperation, mutually beneficial information-sharing and support, and an inclusive vision. A complementary strategy to increase demand for US goods and services requires mobilizing private capital, encouraging technology transfer, and leveraging existing US programs to strengthen the private sector throughout the Americas. Traditionally, private-sector growth has been held back by lack of investment and access to credit. In a true win-win strategy, the United States can boost exports and investment while strengthening regional producers and consumers. In summary, increased US government initiatives to expand economic partnerships with the country’s Western Hemisphere neighbors are crucial to America’s economic recovery and competitiveness. A prosperous hemisphere is also beneficial to US security concerns. The Americas is home to some of the most dynamic markets in the world. The US administration must recognize this reality and take full advantage of the opportunities. "According to the US Department of Commerce, American companies now export more to the Western Hemisphere—some 42 percent of total US exports—than to any other part of the world, including China." Boosting Two-Way Trade. US prosperity depends on greater global economic interaction, with the Western Hemisphere providing unique opportunities. Three recommendations for boosting two-way trade: •Promote the US government’s Pathways to Prosperity initiative as the primary US vehicle—including presidential- and cabinet-level participation—through which to facilitate greater hemispheric trade integration;[1] •Expand Latin American participation in the Trans-

Pacific Partnership—an initiative to promote stronger economic ties between the Western Hemisphere and the Asia-Pacific region—beyond Peru, Chile, and Mexico; •Through the Inter-American Development Bank, increase material and technical support to trade- and business-advocacy groups throughout the region to promote “best practices” among companies, cooperatives, or individuals seeking to export their goods or services. Americas Economic Freedom Initiative. To accelerate the growth of the regional middle class—and thereby spur demand for US goods and services—a presidential-level initiative should be implemented to help boost a robust private sector throughout the region. Some recommendations for accomplishing this: •Marshal US and regional expertise to develop regional capital markets that will increase the availability of private financing for business expansion, budding entrepreneurs, and innovators. First, this would entail convening a regional capital-markets summit—with the participation of the US Department of the Treasury and regional counterparts—to launch a public-private task force to develop a capital formation work plan identifying the prerequisites and targeting obstacles to the development of robust capital markets in Latin America and the Caribbean. The team would consist of government financial-sector experts, Inter-American Development Bank specialists, and business and investment professionals. Second, it would require joining other nations in developing and funding a regional private-enterprise investment fund through the Inter-American Development Bank to provide equity and debt capital directly to private entrepreneurs quickly and on commercial terms (especially in locations traditionally neglected by private capital because of high risk). This fund should be governed by a private board and managed independently by investment professionals subject to public oversight; •Charge multilateral development banks to technically and financially support the creation of national or subregional enterprise funds to bolster local private-sector development at the grassroots level, which will provide seed capital and technical support to small and medium enterprises. These funds would be capitalized with public and private funds and managed by investment professionals; • Ensure that adequate protections exist in regional capital markets to prevent international terrorist financing and illicit-narcotics money laundering; •Convene a summit of deans of business schools to expand exchange programs between the 20 most prominent business schools in the Americas. This program should bolster expertise in trade, business management, and capital management, among other fields, to strengthen the professional capacity in national economies; •Expand exchanges among scientists and engineers with innovator-entrepreneurs and those engaged in private research and development to cross-fertilize and identify commercially viable technology and innovation; •Revise US Millennium Challenge Corporation guidelines to prioritize programs in subregions (for example, in Southern Mexico and Northeast Brazil) and to emphasize cooperative funding arrangements, including private-sector contributions. Attaining Western Hemisphere Energy Security. We must also maximize mutual global competitiveness in the energy realm. The United States can accomplish this by immediately approving extension of the Keystone XL Pipeline that connects Canada oil deposits with US refineries in the Midwest. We should

also strive to create a “Big 4” regional energy consultative group between the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil—including representatives of the private sector—to promote cooperation and share best practices on energy production and distribution. We should likewise host a Camp David summit with leaders of these four nations. Democracy Promotion Agenda The rise to power of Hugo Chávez and his fellow authoritarian populists has exposed the fragility of Latin America’s democratic institutions. Their modus operandi has been to use those institutions to gain power and then proceed to systematically hollow them out, concentrating power in the executive, marginalizing the opposition, and undermining rule of law. A US strategy to reengage with the Americas must include a vibrant democracy promotion component to assist US partners in helping to strengthen and consolidate their democratic institutions against the predations of would-be authoritarians. To be sure, the primary democracy-building responsi-bility rests with the leaders and citizens of each country. It is for each nation to make the difficult decisions to reduce the power of the state, protect individual freedoms, and promote accountability and integrity in government. The United States is not a disinterested bystander, however. It is best served by working to advance the cause of democracy around the world, for the very real benefits of America’s long-term security and prosperity. This is not only an issue of US self-interest. Democracy also confers significant benefits on its citizens wherever it has succeeded in taking root, resulting in more effective government, more security, and better prospects for economic development. The United States can support this process by backing reformers who are working in their countries to consolidate stable, honest, and rules-based institutions and creating incentives for increased accountability in government through US assistance. Also critical is the need to increase support for the bedrock of representative government: civil society nongovernmental organizations. These include, but are not limited to, busi¬ness associations, media organizations, government, labor unions, consumer and environmental groups, and women’s and human rights watchdog groups. In Cuba, citizens must rise to this challenge by overcoming their fears and claiming their future. Before they can build that future, they must dismantle the vestiges of the police state and command economy. The responsibility is theirs, but their friends can help with a series of bold and constructive measures. Although it is more important than ever to preserve the economic sanctions and use them as leverage to bring about broad, deep, and irreversible reforms, the United States should use the promise of aid, trade, and normal political relations as an incentive to leverage change. The United States must be conscientious and bold in its support for democrats in the Americas. It must not allow the hostility of antidemocratic regimes to deter it from helping struggling democrats in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. If those democrats are willing to take the necessary risks to advocate for different futures for their countries, the United States must demonstrate its solidarity and support for them. Again, there is no silver bullet in the policy toolkit for developing democratic institutions, building transparent and apolitical judicial systems, eliminating corruption, and promoting competitive elections. It is a difficult process that is never quite complete, as US history shows. But only by resolutely supporting

democracies and democratizing countries can we achieve and sustain a stable, secure, and prosperous hemisphere. Some recommendations for promoting democracy: •The Organization of American States: the Obama administration should instruct the US permanent representative to work with willing states to promote core values and interests, invigorate the application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and restore the independence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. •Latin America needs to be reprioritized as a recipient of the funding allocated to the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and related organizations. While democracy has taken firm root, its institutions need strengthening, or else the hard-fought-for gains of recent decades will be jeopardized. Democracy promoters should prioritize support for political parties, independent journalists, and others that are indispensable and constructive protagonists in the political process. •In Cuba, the United States should restore purposeful and focused prodemocracy programs aimed at bringing genuine change to the island. •The US president should reactivate the US Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to update transition plans and formulate a specific pledge of robust US aid to a genuine transition. •The United States should create a private-enterprise fund and a US-Cuba business council to empower entrepreneurs on the island once a transition is under way to promote the development of a healthy and independent private sector, respect for private property, and the rule of law. A Security and Stability Agenda Shared land and maritime borders make security in Western Hemisphere countries a permanent priority for the US government. The security challenges confronting Mexico, Central America, and Venezuela are more dramatic today than in recent memory. In the final year of the George W. Bush administration, Mexico and the United States agreed on a $1 billion counter-narcotics assistance package. Yet, despite the enormous opportunity this presented to bring Mexico and the United States into a closer and mutually beneficial security cooperation, the aid was so slowly delivered that Mexicans have been left to wonder if their raging drug war is a priority for the United States. Conservative lawmakers who were the driving force behind Plan Colombia a decade ago have been less active on Mexico, focusing instead on border security as a means to fight illegal immigration and leaving Mexicans to square off with bloodthirsty cartels on their own. It is time for the United States to more fully recognize that “Mexico’s drug war” is more accurately “America’s drug war” that Mexico is fighting. The US Department of Justice says that Mexico’s drug-trafficking organizations are the greatest organized crime threat in the United States. The US must suppress demand for illicit drugs through education, treatment, and law enforcement, but helping Mexico sustain this fight is an indispensable responsibility as well. "Even as the international community implements new financial sanctions to deny Teheran the means to sustain a uranium enrichment program, the regime has established dozens of shadowy commercial enterprises and banks in Venezuela to launder as much as $30 billion through its petro-economy." Moreover, increased US bipartisan political support may encourage the Mexican people and their new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, to sustain their antidrug efforts to advance the two countries’ common security, stability, and prosperity. The

United States should also provide robust and innovative material support for these efforts and institutionalize law-enforcement cooperation and information sharing that are essential to the common fight against transnational criminal groups. In Central America, the institutions of government and the rule of law have been overwhelmed by the onslaught of criminal gangs that have been displaced by Mexico’s stepped-up law enforcement. Guatemala’s state apparatus has been underfunded for decades, and the institutions of Honduras have been weakened by a succession of populist caudillo presidents, systematic corruption, and the expanding presence of organized crime. El Salvador confronts the unique challenge of hardened gang members deported from the United States maintaining their ties to criminal networks in US urban centers. A public-security crisis in these countries has undermined popular confidence in elected officials and overwhelmed poorly trained and equipped security forces. Unless the United States and neighboring countries organize an international response, several of these countries may soon become ungovernable territories, producing economic failure, civil strife, and refugee crises. This challenge requires a regional rescue plan (led by the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Europe, and the multilateral development banks). The United States should encourage interested nations to organize a summit of governments and institutions to develop such a plan and agree on how it should be implemented and funded. But by far the greatest threat to security and stability in the Americas is the narco-state that has taken root in Venezuela under the unaccountable regime of Hugo Chávez. This hostile regime is managed by Cuba’s security apparatus, funded by China, armed by Russia, and partnered with Iran, Hezbollah, and Colombian and Mexican narco-traffickers. US law enforcement and federal prosecutors have gathered fresh, compelling evidence implicating senior Venezuelan officials and Chávez himself in narcotics trafficking in collusion with Colombian terrorist groups. Chávez has also forged an important strategic alliance with Iran to allow it to evade international sanctions and carry its asymmetrical threat against the United States to the country’s doorstep. Even as the international community implements new financial sanctions to deny Teheran the means to sustain a uranium enrichment program, the regime has established dozens of shadowy commercial enterprises and banks in Venezuela to launder as much as $30 billion through its petro-economy. Certainly the drug kingpins managing Venezuela today have everything to lose when Chávez succumbs to cancer. Several ruthless, anti-United States governments have a stake in trying to engineer a chavista succession, even as the government struggles with an unsustainable fiscal situation, a collapsing economy, social polarization, and a public-security crisis. In short, within the next several years, Venezuela will become a manmade disaster that will impact regional security and energy supply. America’s current policy of evading responsibility for the implosion in Venezuela is untenable and dangerous. Every serious government in the Americas has a stake in addressing these issues before they become unmanageable. The crises in Central America and Venezuela will require US leadership, intelligent diplomacy, and resources to organize an effective multilateral response. The following are recommendations for addressing these issues, listed by country or region. The Americas: •Renew emphasis on intelligence

capabilities and mission to confront extraregional threats and cross-border criminality; •Increase dialogue with regional and European military, intelligence, and security agencies on common threats; •Direct US Northern and Southern Commands, the US Coast Guard, and the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to provide “surge” engagement plans for additional funding and other support; •Ensure better cooperation from the US State Department with law enforcement and intelligence efforts. Mexico: •Develop strong bipartisan support in the US Congress for Mexican counternarcotics efforts and for treating Mexico as not just an “enforcer” but an ally against drug trafficking cartels, and emphasize common “North American” strategies; •Set up an interagency US-Mexico financial crimes unit based at the US Treasury to improve targeting of organized-crime money-laundering operations to cripple the financial solvency of the cartels. Central America: •Build an international coalition to support Central American antidrug and anticrime security efforts— which would include Mexico, Colombia, and the European Union—then direct confiscated assets to foreign antidrug programs; •Develop an integral strategy to strengthen regional governments and their institutional processes with the objective of marginalizing organized crime groups through increased security, legal prosecution, and anticrime operations. Venezuela: •Form an interagency task force under US National Security Council leadership to assess and respond to the threats posed by the Chávez government and its alliance with Iran, its role in narco-trafficking, and implications of Russian arms purchases; •Enhance the use of law-enforcement actions by the DEA and the US Treasury to unmask Venezuelan officials and companies that are involved with narco-trafficking, international terrorism, or sanctioned Iranian entities; •Direct US embassies abroad to assist Venezuelan opposition groups in building an international democratic solidarity network to maintain scrutiny of the Chávez regime’s gross abuses of democratic processes and to defend the basic rights of the democratic Venezuelan opposition; •Deliver appropriate diplomatic messages to China, Cuba, Russia, and Iran not to interfere in a post–Chávez democratic transition in Venezuela; •Prepare a post–Chávez action plan to assist in removing criminal elements from the current Venezuelan government, helping Venezuelan people recover stolen assets through wanton corruption practices, and assist in rehabilitating the oil sector and national infrastructure through private-sector engagement and multilateral development banks. US-Brazilian Relations A reinvigorated US policy in the Western Hemisphere cannot proceed without a fundamental reevaluation of bilateral relations with Brazil. With a population of some 200 million, a $2.5 trillion economy (the world’s sixth largest), and a recent history of steady political and economic management, Brazil is beginning to realize its enormous potential. Much as China used the 2008 Beijing Olympics to unveil its economic progress and modernity, Brazil will be the focus of global attention in 2014 and 2016 as it hosts the World Cup and Olympics, respectively. Strengthening and expanding US relations with Brazil should be a US presidential priority. Specifically, it is in both countries’ interests to deepen the developing partnership, namely in the areas of trade, security, and energy. Yet, though there are opportunities in a more modern US-Brazil relationship, there are also challenges. It will be a

test of US diplomacy to convince some sectors in Brazil that relations with the United States are not a zero-sum game, and that significant benefits can accrue for both populations as a result of deeper cooperation. Some recommendations for US-Brazil cooperation: •Invigorate presidential-level engagement; •Establish a jointly funded US-Brazil foundation (modeled on the German Marshall Fund) to institutionalize broad cooperation; focusing on information and communications technology (the so-called “e-economy”); student, political, cultural, and other grassroots exchanges; and language training; •Charge an interagency team with developing strategies to overcome the zero-sum approach in bilateral relations adhered to by some in the Brazilian foreign policy establishment; •Institutionalize a bilateral defense ministerial on global security challenges, defense cooperation, military modernization, and regional security challenges; •Incentivize US ventures with Brazil’s aviation and aerospace industries and overcome technology-transfer issues to create opportunities for US manufacturers; •Offer working-level cooperation with World Cup and Olympics planning teams. Conclusion The potential opportunities and mutual benefits have never been greater for intrahemispheric cooperation. But US policymakers must aggressively seize initiative in turning that potential into reality. Certainly there are challenges and obstacles ahead, but increased economic relationships will take on a dynamic and momentum of their own, and once and for all render obsolete some of the retrograde populist agendas in the Americas. Geographic proximity, cultural and family ties, shared values, and growing prosperity are powerful incentives to drive a fundamental reassessment of US relations in the Western Hemisphere. It is essential that US policymakers demonstrate the political will to take advantage of this unprecedented opportunity.

AT: Can’t Solve --- Russia Wants to Inevitably Counter the U.S.

Business deals facilitate Russian expansionism – only increased U.S. engagement can crowd out Russia Wall Street Journal, 10 (“Russia, Venezuela Strengthen Ties”, Dow Jones & Company Inc, 4-3-10, Proquest, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/abicomplete/docview/237987651/13F777572582BD7D55F/24?accountid=14667)//KG

CARACAS, Venezuela--Russia offered to help Venezuela set up its own space industry, including a satellite launch site, as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin made his first visit to the South American country on Friday. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez announced the offer by Russia hours before Mr. Putin arrived, saying officials would discuss the possibility of setting up a "satellite launcher and a factory.'' He didn't give details or say how much that might cost. Russian and Venezuelan officials said they planned to sign new agreements for energy projects in Venezuela, as well as industrial, commercial and agriculture projects. On Friday, a senior Russian oil executive said Russian companies and Venezuela will invest between $60 million and $80 million this year in Venezuela's vast Orinoco heavy-crude belt. Petroleos de Venezuela SA, Venezuela's state oil monopoly, and a Russian consortium, which includes state giant Rosneft OAO and private major Lukoil OAO, agreed in February to set up the project in the belt's Junin 6 field. The deal is part of a massive plan to develop the Orinoco oil belt--considered one of the largest in the world--that is slated to add 2.1 million barrels per day of new production. The two countries are also discussing new weapons deals, Mr. Chávez said in televised remarks, without giving details. Mr. Chávez's government has already bought more than $4 billion in Russian weapons since 2005, including helicopters, fighter jets and 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles. Mr. Chávez said last year that Russia agreed to loan Venezuela up to $2.2 billion for additional arms deals. Mr. Chávez also reiterated that Russia will help Venezuela develop nuclear energy--a plan he has mentioned previously that has yet to take shape. "We aren't going to make an atomic bomb, but we are going to develop atomic energy with peaceful aims,'' he said. Mr. Chávez, whose country is a major oil exporter and member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, said, "We have to prepare ourselves for the post-oil era.'' The Venezuelan leader has grown increasingly close to Russia, Iran and China while criticizing U.S. policies, and his calls for countering U.S. influence to create a

"multipolar world'' have found resonance in Moscow . The U.S. State Department poked fun at Mr. Chávez's suggestion that Venezuela may set up a space industry with Russian help. "We would note that the government of Venezuela was largely closed this week due to energy shortages,'' State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley told reporters. "To the extent that

Venezuela is going to expend resources on behalf of its people, perhaps the focus should be more terrestrial than extraterrestrial.'' Worsening electricity shortages prompted Mr. Chávez's government to decree public holidays throughout this week to save energy. A severe drought has pushed water levels to precarious lows in the dam that supplies most of Venezuela's electricity. Some political analysts in Moscow say Russia is drawn to Venezuela because of the its anti-U.S. rhetoric, though business deals have helped cement the growing relationship between the two countries. ``The only thing that really unites Russia and Venezuela is that they don't want to see a unipolar world,'' dominated by the U.S., said Sergei Mikheyev, an analyst at the Center for Political Technologies, adding that President Barack Obama's administration hasn't done enough to lure Moscow away from Caracas. Obama says he is committed to a ``reset'' of the U.S. relationship with Russia, but Mikheyev said ``the Americans haven't compromised with Russia on any significant issue ... so it makes no sense for them (the Russians) to change priorities.'' Mikheyev noted that the United States has so far failed to react to Russia's plea to cut drug traffic from Afghanistan to Russia's Central Asian borders. Russia has also spent years trying to convince the U.S. to scrap Cold War measures that have restricted U.S.-Russia trade. Venezuela is also a very lucrative arms and technology market, and Mikheyev said `` without the business

involved , the anti-American rhetoric wouldn't be enough to unite

Russia and Venezuela'' .

2ac Economic Ties Key

Challenging Russia on the economic front is critical --- it uses commercial ties and energy deals to secure its political interestsBlank, 10 --- Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (4/13/2010, Stephen J., “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf, JMP)

Tactics and Instruments of Russian Foreign Policy This does not mean that Russia has no intrinsic interests in Latin America. Those interests are commercial and political, with the former being a means to secure first commercial and then political interests (e.g., using Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua) to counter U.S. influence in Latin America. In support of those interests, Russian presidential and ministerial statements concerning their and Latin American visits display a remarkable similarity. The discussion always revolves around trade, mainly in commodities but also, if possible, in high-tech and industrial products; energy deals whereby Russia either invests in the other state’s energy firms or explores for energy there; attempts to gain leverage for each side’s investment in the other’s country; Russian offers of arms sales and space-launch services (particularly to Brazil and Venezuela); arms sales (particularly to Venezuela and like-minded states like Bolivia); and Russian leaders’ habitual rhetorical invocation of a congruence or identity of interests with their interlocutors on current issues in world politics, especially construction of a multipolar world order.42 The turn to leftism in several Latin American states since 2006, combined with growing awareness of both China’s penetration of the region and Latin American economic opportunities, generated Russia’s efforts to make its anti-American campaign appear to conform with Latin American interests.43 Likewise, comments highlighting an identity of views on key elements of this vaunted multipolarity routinely appear in joint communiques of foreign ministers and presidents.44 Latin American economic integration through MERCOSUR allegedly appeals to Russia, but mainly because it supposedly points to support for a multipolar world.45 This dichotomy between a professed economic agenda and serious efforts to make deals with Latin American states, and Moscow’s increasingly transparent strategic objectives, appeared during Medvedev’s 2008 trip. His private talks seemingly emphasized trade opportunities, but his public rhetoric strongly stressed hopes for Latin American support for a multipolar world.46 Russian-Venezuelan cooperation allows Russia to undercut U.S. influence CBS News, 12 (“Russian Warships Cruise Into Venezuela”, 3-14-09, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-4632489.html)//KG Russian warships sailed into a Venezuelan port Tuesday, greeted by a 21-gun salute and an eager welcome from President Hugo Chavez as Moscow

seeks to expand its influence in Latin America. Russians sailors dressed in black-and-white uniforms lined up along the bow of the destroyer Admiral Chabanenko as it docked in La Guaira, near Caracas. The deployment is the first of its kind in the Caribbean since the Cold War and was timed to coincide with President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Caracas - the first ever by a Russian president. For the past six months, it seems that Medvedev has been working hard to dismantle his liberal image and revive memories of the Cold War, reports CBS News' Alexsei Kuznetsov. Chavez, basking in the support of a powerful ally and traditional U.S. rival, wants Russian help to build a nuclear reactor, invest in oil and natural gas projects and bolster his leftist opposition to U.S.

influence in Latin America . Chavez also wants weapons - he has bought more than $4 billion in Russian arms, including Sukhoi fighter jets, helicopters and 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, and more deals for Russian tanks or other weaponry may be discussed after Medvedev arrives Wednesday. Russia's deployment of the naval squadron - the behemoth flagship Peter the Great, the missile destroyer and two support vessels - is widely seen as a demonstration of Kremlin anger over the U.S. decision to send warships to deliver aid to Georgia after its battles with Russia, and U.S. plans for a European missile-defense system. But Bush administration officials mocked the show of force. "Are they accompanied by tugboats this time?" U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack joked to reporters in Washington. He noted that Russia's navy is but a shadow of its Soviet-era fleet, and reasserted U.S. dominance in Latin America. "I don't think there's any question about ... who the region looks to in terms of political, economic, diplomatic and as well as military power," McCormack said. "If the Venezuelans and the Russians want to have, you know, a military exercise, that's fine. But we'll obviously be watching it very closely." Venezuelan sailors stood at attention along the pier where the destroyer docked, while two support ships also pulled into port. The Peter the Great, the largest ship in the Russian fleet, anchored offshore in the distance due to its size. When Russia sent two strategic bombers to Venezuela in September, some drew comparisons to the

Soviet Union's deployments to Cuba during the Cold War . But both countries have also shown signs of trying to engage President-elect Barack Obama. And Chavez told reporters that it's ludicrous to invoke the Cold War to describe the naval exercises beginning Dec. 1. "It's not a provocation. It's an exchange between two free countries," Chavez said. Russia's ambitions to make inroads in Latin America may be checked by global events. Both Venezuela and Russia are feeling the pinch of slumping oil prices, and their ability to be major benefactors for like-minded leaders is in doubt given the pressures of the world's financial crisis. The maneuvers starting Dec. 1 "should be viewed largely as a propaganda exercise," said Anna Gilmour, an analyst at Jane's Intelligence Review. "Pragmatic Russian policy suggests that it will content itself with a brief high-profile visit, rather than a longer-term deployment that could cause severe tensions with the U.S., at a time when Russia may be looking to re-engage with the new administration," she said. Next week, the warships will participate in exercises enabling

sailors to practice reconnaissance, anti-drug patrols, anti-terrorism and search and rescue operations. There will also be anti-aircraft exercises involving Venezuela's newly bought Sukhoi fighter jets, though no live ammunition will be used, Rear Adm. Luis Morales Marquez said. He said two of the Sukhois welcomed the ships with a flyover early Tuesday as they neared the coast. Medvedev's tour this week to Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba was planned before the financial crisis, and Russia must now downsize its ambitions in Latin America because its pockets are no longer so deep, said Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor of Russia in Global Affairs Magazine. "Russia will have to put off big projects like the construction of a gas pipeline across South America," Lukyanov said. The proposed natural gas pipeline is Chavez's brainchild, a controversial and ambitious plan for which he has explored Russian investment. But Russia still has an economic interest in selling more weapons and boosting business in Latin America, and Venezuela can help "open the doors, " noted Venezuelan political scientist Ricardo Sucre Heredia. "It's a win-win relationship for the two countries," Sucre said. "Russia gains in terms of its international power and its presence, and Venezuela gains in terms of having an ally."

Economic ties allows for Russian expansionismBlank, 9 - Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (Stephen, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US’s Neighborhood”, Ifri, April 2009, www.ifri.org/downloads/ifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09.pdf)//KG

Nevertheless, Russia's activities in the region cannot be ignored. Prime Minister Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov have said that "Latin

America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the multipolar

world that is forming. "" And while neither Russia nor Venezuela will challenge the US militarily, e.g. with Russian bases in Cuba, their individual and collective goals entail the substantial worsening of East-West relations and of the acute instabilities already existing on the continent. Moscow's purposes in engaging Latin America economically and diplomatically have developed from the concept formulated by Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in 1997 when he visited Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica. At that time, Primakov stated that as a great power Russia should naturally have ties with all continents and all regions in the world. Continuing this policy, then President Putin wrote in a 2001 telegram to participants in a conference on Latin America that political dialogue and economic links with the region were important and would be mutually beneficial. He cited the establishment of links in science, education, and culture as particular areas of focus." Finally in 2006 Lavrov wrote that: "In recent years the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin (LACB) occupy an increasingly noticeable place in the system of contemporary international relations. Our contacts with them […] are an important component of the international efforts of Russia in tackling the problems

common to the entire world community. Thus the quest for great power status vis-a-vis Washington and for a multipolar world that constrains American ability to upset Moscow's concept of global and regional strategic stability drives Russian policy. To those ends Russia uses areas of comparative economic advantage (energy, arms sales, space launches, sales of nuclear reactors) to leverage political support for Russian positions against American interests. Russian interest in recovering or gaining positions in Latin America preceded the more recent notion that it will show the US that if it intervenes in the CIS Moscow can reciprocate in Latin America. That idea has only become possible by virtue of Russia's recovery in 2000-08 and the corresponding and coinciding decline of US power and prestige due to the Bush Administration's disastrous policies. The current economic crisis plus new policies from the Obama Administration should lead to less public emphasis on that particular rationale for Russian policy in Latin America. Instead Moscow may attempt to identify its foreign policy with the clear preference of Latin American security elites for the following principles: -Latin America should be impervious to challenges to security outside the region and should respect the principles of international law as established in the charters of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN). -Any initiative for the employment of joint forces (with the US or other states) must comply with decisions of the UN. Integration initiatives must similarly be based on shared multilateral objectives, e.g. opposition to unilateral operations involving the use of force." While these points accord with Russian rhetoric, Latin American elites overwhelmingly prefer cooperation with the US based on its acceptance of their needs and interests, as well as genuine appreciation of their views. They do not want to be pawns in a new version of the cold war." � Indeed, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva recently expressed his hope that President Obama will implement a "preferential" � relationship with Latin America.

2ac Venezuela Key

Venezuela critical to Russian expansion in Latin America Gee, 8 - San Francisco-based journalist and has written for the Economist, the New York Times, and the Lancet (Alastair, “How Russia Is Trying to Regain Influence in Latin America”, US News, 10-14-08, http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/10/14/how-russia-is-trying-to-regain-influence-in-latin-america)//KG

MOSCOW—Somewhere in the North Atlantic, a squadron of Russian warships is steering toward the Caribbean. Led by the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, the ships are on their way to joint naval exercises with Venezuela. U.S. officials say they'll be watching when the vessels finally arrive in a few weeks. Russia has beefed up its presence in Latin America in recent months, inking military and business deals amid a drive to reassert its status as a major world

power . "Russia is adopting the course that any superpower should have," says Boris Martynov, deputy director of Moscow's Institute of Latin America. Latin America seems an obvious partner. Russia's relations with the West are strained following the Georgia conflict, while some left-leaning governments in the region, such as Venezuela and Bolivia, are looking for allies after clashing with the United States. But it's up for debate what Russia truly wants in the region and whether it has the capacity to become a major player there. This is not the first time Russians have sought close links with Latin America. In 1962, the stationing of Soviet missiles in Cuba nearly precipitated nuclear war with the United States. The Soviets also funded regional communist parties and invited students from the region to study in Soviet universities. But after the 1991 Soviet collapse, Russia broke off most of its ties. The recent developments are one more sign of its oil-fueled resurgence, which has only recently been slowed by the global credit crunch. The upcoming naval exercises will be the first time since the end of the Cold War that Russia has had a major military presence in the Caribbean. They follow a training visit to Venezuela by two Russian bombers in September. Russia will also provide Venezuela with a $1 billion military loan, and President Hugo Chá vez, who has visited Russia twice since June, has said Russian and Venezuelan oil and gas producers will form a global energy "colossus." Meanwhile, a top Russian minister close to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Igor Sechin, traveled to Latin America to bolster links with Cuba, where Russia has said it will build a space center, and Nicaragua. Nicaragua is the only country apart from Russia to have recognized the independence from Georgia of the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the energy sphere, state-owned gas firm Gazprom announced in September that it plans to invest $4.5 billion in a Bolivian natural gas project along with French firm Total. It also intends to participate in the Venezuelan and Brazilian sections of a pipeline that will cross the South American continent. Still, it's not yet clear whether Russia's involvement in Latin America is more about furthering its

own global ambitions or about sending a message to the United States, which Russia considers to have interfered in its sphere of interest during the August conflict with Georgia. Russia is partly motivated by a desire to regain the global influence it lost after the Soviet collapse . In this vein, it has also been fostering ties with Iran, resumed the long-range air patrols over the Pacific and Atlantic oceans that ended with the Soviet Union, and even dispatched a warship to Somalia after a Ukrainian boat carrying 33 tanks was seized by pirates there in September. Links with Latin America may also help further Russia's aim of becoming a

counterweight to the United States on the international stage . Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin have criticized the United States for causing the financial crisis and fostering global instability, particularly as a result of the Iraq war. Additional sore points are U.S. involvement in the Georgia conflict and the missile defense system it plans for eastern Europe. And, like the United States and China, Russia hopes to benefit from Latin America's raw materials and energy deposits. All of this plays into the hands of the left-leaning Latin American nations that are looking to pull out of the United States' orbit. U.S.-Venezuelan tensions have ratcheted up since Chávez came to power, and in September, Bolivia expelled the U.S. ambassador after accusing the United States of fomenting unrest in the country.

2ac Latin America Key

Latin America is keyBlank, 10 --- Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (4/13/2010, Stephen J., “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf, JMP)

Russia’s Policies and Objectives in Latin AmericaFor these reasons, we cannot ignore Russia’s activities in Latin America. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that Latin America and Russia are natural partners, not because of Latin America’s economic growth but because of the congruence between Latin governments’ foreign policies and Russia’s attempt to bring them into its concept of a multipolar world.

15 Similarly Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has also said that “ Latin

America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the multipolar

world that is forming — we will pay more and more attention to this vector of our economic and foreign policy.”16 So while neither Russia nor Venezuela will challenge the U.S. militarily, (e.g., by Russian bases in Cuba), their individual and collective goals entail the deliberate and substantial worsening of East-West relations and of Latin America’s pre-existing acute problems.17

Latin America provides a critical role in Russia’s quest for a multipolar world Blank 11 – Professor of Strategic Studies at United States Army War College (August 18, 2011, “Russia’s Second Wind in Latin America” https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdf)

<Similarly Putin also stated that “Latin America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the multipolar world that is forming – we will pay more and more attention to this vector of our economic and foreign policy.”9As before, energy and arms sales are the main instruments of this foreign policy. The biggest recent deal concerns Brazil, not surprisingly, in view of the aforementioned “strategic partnership.” In July, the Russian oil company TNK-BP bought 45% of the Petra Energia project in the Amazonian micro-region of Alto-Solimões for about $1 billion. This project comprises 21 exploration blocks over an area of about 48,000 square kilometers in the Solimões river basin in the upper reaches of the Amazon, 11 of which are already being exploited.10 Paraguay, the least-explored Latin American country for hydrocarbons, just sent a delegation to the Russian company Gazprom 3which is interested in forming a joint venture with the Paraguayan state-run company Petropar, should it find reserves. Money is

allegedly no object and Gazprom is ready to conduct all phases of the operation: exploration, exploitation, transport and commercialization. Gazprom has already established joint ventures (JVs) with Bolivia and Venezuela, and its Bolivian deal could possibly give it entrée into Brazil’s electricity market.11 Beyond existing deals, Gazprom is also eyeing a 20% stake in Bolivia’s ACERO project and mulling “joint energy projects” with Peru.12 More broadly in the Russia’s relation plans with Latin America economic sphere, Russia is one of the states with which Ecuador is currently negotiating for loans.>

Impacts

U.S. Influence / Hegemony

Ties with Venezuela allow Russia to counter US influence in Latin AmericaBlank, 9 - Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (Stephen, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical Games in the US’s Neighborhood”, Ifri, April 2009, www.ifri.org/downloads/ifriblankrussiaandlatinamericaengapril09.pdf)//KG

Nonetheless, Russia does have genuine interests in Latin America. Those interests are commercial and political: the former being a means to secure the latter. In regard to Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua those interests are more strategic and overtly aimed at

countering US influence in Latin America . Whether visiting the region or hosting Latin American officials in Moscow, Russian officials take every opportunity to make rhetorical declarations on a congruence or identity of interests with their interlocutors on current issues in world politics, including construction of a multipolar world order . " In all cases discussion revolves around the following issues: trade, mainly in commodities but in high-tech and industrial products where possible; energy, whereby Russia either invests in the other state's energy firms or explores for resources there; attempts to gain leverage for each sides' investment in the other's country; Russian offers of arms sales and space launch services (particularly to Brazil and Venezuela). Russia’s anti-American campaign appeared to conform with Latin American interests, as a result of the turn to leftism in several Latin American states beginning around 2006, combined with growing awareness of China’s penetration of the region and Latin American economic opportunities. Latin American economic integration through MERCOSUR allegedly appeals to Russia, but mainly because it implies support for a multipolar world." This dichotomy between a professed economic agenda with serious efforts to sign deals with Latin American states and the increasingly transparent strategic objectives was equally visible during Medvedev's 2008 trip. Medvedev's private talks appear to have emphasized trade opportunities, but his public rhetoric expressed hopes for Latin American support for a multipolar world." � To support this economic and strategic agenda Moscow has made extensive economic overtures to Latin American governments. Russia has offered them all deals with respect to oil, gas, nuclear energy, uranium mining, electricity generation, weapons sales, high-tech defense technology, agriculture and cooperation with regard to space. The geographical scope of these offers covers the whole Latin American world from Mexico, Cuba, and Trinidad in the Caribbean to Argentina and Chile in the South although the mixture of goods and services under consideration naturally varies from state to state.

Russian expansionism with Venezuela show attempts to counter US influence in Latin AmericaAssociated Press, 08 (“Chavez: Latin America Needs Russia to Reduce U.S. Influence, Keep Peace”, Fox News, 9-21-08, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/09/21/chavez-latin-america-needs-russia-to-reduce-us-influence-keep-peace/)//KG

MOSCOW – Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez said in an interview broadcast Sunday that Latin America needs strong friendship with Russia to help reduce U.S. influence and keep peace in the region . The interview aired as a Russian Navy squadron prepared to sail to Venezuela. Venezuela recently hosted a pair of Russian strategic bombers and is preparing to conduct a joint naval exercise with Russia. Russian media say Chavez plans to visit Moscow Friday, his second trip in just over two months. "Not only Venezuela, but Latin America as a whole, needs friends like Russia now as we are shedding this (U.S.) domination," Chavez told Russia's Vesti 24 television. "We need Russia for economic and social development, for all-around support, for the life of the peoples of our continent, for peace." During the Cold War, Latin America became an ideological battleground between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Kremlin has moved to intensify contacts with Venezuela, Cuba and other Latin American nations amid increasingly strained relations with Washington after last month's war between Russia and Georgia. The weeklong deployment of a pair of Tu-160 strategic bombers to Venezuela — and the plan to send a navy squadron there — mark a projection of Russian military power to the Western Hemisphere unprecedented since the Cold War . The nuclear-powered Peter the Great missile cruiser, accompanied by three other ships of Russia's Northern Fleet, was preparing to sail from its base on a cruise that will include a joint exercise with the Venezuelan Navy, Navy spokesman Igor Dygalo said on Vesti 24 television. The RIA Novosti news agency quoted the Northern Fleet command as saying the ships will likely leave early Monday. Russian officials had said earlier that the squadron was to head to Venezuela in November. They would not explain the change. Russia's intensifying military contact with Venezuela appears to be a response to the U.S. dispatch to Georgia of warships carrying aid after its war with Russia. Russian officials harshly criticized the U.S. deployment to Georgia's Black Sea coast. President Dmitry Medvedev warned this month that Russia could follow its dispatch of bombers to Venezuela by deploying forces to other friendly nations. Under Chavez, Venezuela has cultivated close ties with Moscow and placed big orders for Russian jets, helicopters and other weapons. Chavez has repeatedly warned that the U.S. poses a threat to Venezuela. Russia has signed weapons contracts worth more than US$4 billion with Venezuela since 2005 to supply Sukhoi fighter jets, Mi-17 helicopters, and 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles. Chavez's government is in talks to buy Russian submarines, air defense systems and armored vehicles and more Sukhoi jets. Russian and Venezuelan leaders have also talked about boosting cooperation in the energy sphere to

create what Chavez has called "a new strategic energy alliance." Russian companies Gazprom and Lukoil have signed agreements with Venezuelan state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA to jointly explore several Orinoco fields. Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who visited Venezuela last week, announced that five of Russia's biggest oil companies are looking to form a consortium to increase Latin American operations. State-controlled Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegaz and TNK-BP hope to build a US$6.5 billion refinery to process Venezuela's tar-like heavy crude. Such an investment could help Venezuela, the world's ninth-biggest oil producer, wean itself from the U.S. refineries on which it depends to process much of its crude. Already, Chavez has moved to reduce the involvement of private companies, including Exxon Mobil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips, while striking new oil development agreements with state companies from Iran and China. "The level of our development allows us to conduct strategic projects in Latin America," Sechin said in remarks broadcast Sunday on Vesti 24 television. And he warned the United States that it should not view the region as its own backyard: "It would be wrong to talk about one nation having exclusive rights to this zone.”

Increased Russian ties attempt to counterbalance US hegemony in the regionBBC Worldwide Limited, 08 - the commercial arm of the BBC for media and entertainment (“Latin America no longer just part of US-Russia game – website”, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 12-4-08, Proquest, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/abicomplete/docview/460459398/13F72D736344C819FE5/1?accountid=14667)//KG

President Dmitriy Medvedev made a tour 22-27 November of countries of Latin America. Having taken part in the APEC summit in Peru, he visited Brazil, Venezuela, and Cuba. The tour was of very different levels: the Russian leader endeavoured within it to contribute to the unification of efforts in the fight against the world financial crisis and the expansion of energy cooperation and also to interaction in the military and military-technical spheres. Among the countries that Medvedev visited there are both those that are radically anti-American (Venezuela and Cuba) and those controlled by centre-left governments that distance themselves from the United States, but have no intention of marring relations with the Americans - Peru and Brazil. The tour was seen by observers as Russia's return to Latin America, which harmonizes perfectly with Russia's overall foreign-policy concept: furtherance of the formation of a multipolar world, countermeasures to "US

hegemony ," Russia's consolidation on premier world markets, and the expansion of export possibilities. The "return" to Latin America is infused with both geopolitical (Russia's arrival in a region that is particularly "sensitive" for the United States as an "symmetrical response" to the United States for the presence on the post-Soviet territory), and important economic, meaning. This was initiated under Putin, when he, as president, also made a tour of Latin American countries. Now the Russian

regime is attempting to develop this vector at a new level. Several areas of Russia's cooperation with Latin American countries simultaneously have been actively developed against this background. Primarily power industry. The governmental steward of the Latin American direction is now Deputy Premier Igor Sechin, which has to do primarily with Russia's aspiration to become established in the region economically (chiefly via the fuel and energy complex). Responsible in the cabinet for the real sector (aside from the military-industrial complex), Sechin has taken up in the earnest the promotion of the energy and other projects of the biggest Russian producers. Brazil is of interest from the perspective of the as yet unexplored oil reserves on Brazil's marine shelf. But energy relations are being developed more actively for the time being with Venezuela - the biggest oil producer. The central topic of energy cooperation was the plan for the formation of an energy consortium promoted by Igor Sechin. The consortium is being formed by Russian oil companies, primarily for operations in Venezuela (exploration for and recovery of energy resources). The head of the RF Ministry of Energy said earlier that the Venezuelan PDVSA national company would have the controlling interest in the consortium, Russia would be represented by the Big Five energy companies: Gazprom, Rosneft, LUKOIL, TNK-BP, and Surgutneftegaz. Igor Sechin subsequently specified that "this consortium could tackle projects in third countries also, the companies are considering the possibility of cooperation with Cuba as well, and this is a pretty darn good structure, in my opinion."

Arms Race

Weapons from Russia lead to arms race escalation in Latin AmericaSuchlicki, 12 - director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami (Jaime, “Iran’s influence in Venezuela: Washington should worry”, InterAmerican Security Watch, 8-6-12, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/irans-influence-in-venezuela-washington-should-worry/)//KG

Emboldened by Venezuela’s vast oil resources and his close relationship with Iran and Russia, Chávez has laid claim to the leadership of the anti-American movement in the region. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro’s illness and Cuba’s weak economy thrusted the leadership of Latin America’s left onto Chávez. If Fidel was the godfather of revolutionary/terrorist/anti-American groups, Chávez is the trusted “capo.” The Venezuelan leader has manipulated past elections, and will manipulate future ones. He is increasingly deepening his Bolivarian revolution by weakening and subverting Venezuela’s democratic institutions. At best, Venezuela’s

weapons purchases from Russia are leading to a major arms race in

the region , with Colombia acquiring U.S. weapons and Brazil turning to France. Other countries, such as Ecuador and Peru, are also spending their much-needed resources in the acquisition of weapons. A coalition of Venezuela and its allies, Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua, may develop into a club of well-armed, anti-American regimes exercising influence in the region by intimidating its neighbors. Over the years, U.S. policy has either ignored or mildly chastised Chávez for his extremism. That policy is no longer viable or prudent. The United States needs to develop policies that undermine the Chávez regime, organize the opposition and accelerate the end of his rule. Covert operations to strengthen opposition groups and civil society need to be implemented. Vigilance and denunciation of Venezuelan-Iranian activities and Chávez’s meddling in Colombia and elsewhere are critical to gain international support for U.S. policies.

Latin American arms races escalate to warMolero, 9 – Ball State University (Luis Nava, “Factors Affecting Increasing Military Expenditures in Latin America, 1996-2006”, Indiana Journal of Political Science, Winter 2008/2009, http://www.indianapsa.org/2008/article6.pdf)//KG

Table 1 shows the military expenditures of each Latin American state, in millions of U.S. dollars. As can be observed, the highest proportion of the military expenditures within Latin America for the period of 1996 through 2006, is concentrated within the following nation-states:

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. This could lead some scholars to think that there is not a general arms race underway in this region. However, the fact that the military expenditures are concentrated within just a few countries is not a reason to ignore these increases. Some nation-states, such as Chile, have increased military spending in constant dollars during this time period by 114.5 percent. Venezuela increased its spending by 76 percent followed by Columbia with 64.7 percent. Even a mini-arms race

may exacerbate tensions between Latin American nations, making it

easier for minor disputes to escalate to war . On other hand, if increasing military expenses never result in war, this expense constitutes a waste of resources that these nation-states could redirect to problems such as poverty and starvation. There are differing opinions about whether or not the percentage of GDP within Latin American states wasted on weapons is meaningful. Some researchers tend to belittle the importance of military expenditures within this region. Obviously, it is relatively small in comparison to the world’s spending for military purposes. Table 2 illustrates the economic effort spent for building military capacity. This indicator is better than the first because it measures the nation’s economic effort in military expenditures as a proportion of its total economic capability. Nonetheless, we must keep in mind that differences exist between the development levels within the Latin American nation-states. By focusing on the group of nation-states in Table 1 that have the biggest military expenditures, note that the Venezuelan military expenditures, as a percentage of its GDP, has increased 80 percent while this indicator remains almost constant by the other countries. The third indicator, shown in Table 3, measures the military expenditures related to these Latin American countries based on population size. Some nation-states have decreased their ratio during this time period: Argentina, 73 percent, Paraguay, 50 percent; and Uruguay, 30 percent. Other nation-states, however, have increased their spending per capita during the same time period: Chile, 111 percent; Colombia, 47.7 percent; Ecuador, 85 percent; and Venezuela, 79 percent.

Russian expansionism escalates to an arms race and war – reset of relations failsCohen, 12 - professor emeritus at New York University and Princteon University (Stephen, “Is the US Returning to the Cold War With Russia?”, The Nation, 6-18-12, http://www.thenation.com/article/168460/us-returning-cold-war-russia#)//KG

For the American political and media establishment, US-Russian relations always begin yesterday—without the pre-history of the relationship and thus without its essential political context. Of this we now have a new and increasingly dangerous example. As Washington and Moscow sink deeper into another familiar cold war–like conflict, this time over Syria, American policy-makers and commentators, Democrats and Republicans alike, declare that President Obama’s “reset” of relations with

Moscow has failed . With equal unanimity, they blame only Moscow, in particular President Vladimir Putin, while entirely deleting Washington’s longstanding role in the deteriorating relationship, as they have done for more than a decade. But as I pointed out in this Nation article a year ago, Obama’s reset was all but doomed from inception because it was based on the same bipartisan, winner-take-all triumphalism that had guided US policy toward post-Soviet Russia since the 1990s. As before, Obama’s “new” policy meant “selective cooperation”—that is, concessions from Moscow without US reciprocity. Until the US-Russian conflict over Syria erupted this year, the Obama White House wanted three major concessions from the Kremlin as part of the reset: support in the US confrontation with Iran (new negotiations are under way in Moscow this week); assistance in supplying NATO forces in Afghanistan; and then withholding Russia’s veto of a UN Security Council resolution for a “no-fly zone” over Libya. The Obama administration got all three concessions. In return, Moscow wanted a compromise on the administration’s plan to place missile defense installations near Russia’s borders; an end to NATO expansion in the direction of Ukraine and Georgia; and a curtailment of US interference, known as “democracy promotion,” in Russia’s internal politics. The Kremlin got none of these. In short, another chance for expansive cooperation in US-Russian relations, even the partnership possible after the Soviet Union ended in 1991, has again been squandered in Washington, not in Moscow. That the historical and political analyses set out in my 2011 article, as well as the concerns expressed there, have been amply justified by events gives me no satisfaction. Nor to add that a year later, things have only gotten worse. The three US policies to which Moscow reasonably objected before the reset have become more aggressive, and indeed, in the Kremlin’s view, have been supplemented by Washington’s policy of selective military “regime change” in the Middle East. In response, as I also warned, anti-American forces in Russian politics have continued to grow, along with the possibility of “another escalation of the arms race,” about which both Putin and former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, on whom Obama unwisely based the reset, warned. Meanwhile, Obama’s challenger for the presidency, Mitt Romney, has declared that Russia is again America’s “number-one geopolitical foe,” thereby confirming my worst concern—that we are on the verge of, or already in, a new cold war.

Venezuelan militarization fueled by Russia escalates to arms race Labott, 9 – CNN Foreign Affairs Reporter (Elise, “U.S. fears Venezuela could trigger regional arms race”, CNN, 9-16-09, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/09/16/us.venezuela.arms/)//KG

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The United States fears recent weapons purchases by Venezuela could fuel an arms race in South America, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Tuesday. "They outpace all other countries in South America and certainly raise the question as to whether there is going to be an arms race in the region," Clinton said

about Venezuela's arms deals, after a meeting with Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez. The Russian government Monday extended $2.2 billion in credit to Venezuela to finance arms purchases, including 92 Soviet-era T-72 tanks and short-range missiles with a reach of 55 miles (90 kilometers). Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez also said his nation will purchase an anti-aircraft weapons system with a range of 185 miles (300 kilometers). The planned arms purchases come at a time when Venezuela is at odds with neighboring Colombia over negotiations that would give U.S. troops access to Colombian military bases. Chavez has said his military buildup is in response to the growing U.S. presence in the region, which he calls threatening and dangerous to Latin America. The United States is also concerned about deepening ties between Venezuela and Iran. In addition to ongoing military cooperation, Chavez said in Tehran last week that the Iranian government would help Venezuela develop nuclear technology. In exchange, Venezuela has offered to export gasoline to Iran, which would give Tehran an out if Western nations impose petroleum sanctions over Iran's nuclear program. Senior administration officials say Venezuela's attempt at "sanctions busting" is alarming. Clinton urged Venezuela to be transparent about its weapons purchases. Venezuela, she said, "should be putting in place in procedures and practices to ensure that the weapons they buy are not diverted to insurgent groups or illegal organizations like drug trafficking gangs and other criminal cartels." Vazquez voiced concern that an arms race in South America would divert funds from badly needed development in poor countries. "We should devote our energies and resources to fight against the real scourges of our societies ... such as drug trafficking and terrorism," he said. "Instead of spending it in weapons, spending it in housing, good housing for our people, and to further deepen investment, especially in the field of education."

Conflict/Instability

Russian-Venezuelan ties signal Russian expansionism – increasing tensions lead to Cold War IIAris, 13 - journalist who has lived in and reported on Russia and the former Soviet Union countries since 1993, currently reporting on the development of business, economics and finance in Russia (Ben, “Rekindling the Cold War as Russia rearms”, US-Russia.org, 3-14-13, http://us-russia.org/1085-rekindling-the-cold-war-as-russia-rearms.html)//KG

"With the full support of a feckless policy elite and an uncritical media establishment, Washington is slipping, if not plunging, into a new Cold War with Moscow." Strong words from Professor Stephen Cohen in a January article published in The Nation, who is a lonely voice in the US academic establishment with an unpopular point of view. He has been warning for several years now that rapidly deteriorating relations between the US and Russia will lead to a new period of sustained political and military tension between the two powers. And with Russia now ratcheting up spending on re-equipping its military to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars, plus the noticeably chillier tone in the security rhetoric in the last months, it could well be that historians will one day point to the current period as the start of Cold War II – though the proxy wars that characterised the first one are not much in evidence yet. President Vladimir Putin was at a military plane factory in Novosibirsk on March 6, where he said that Russia has a "historic chance" to rearm and he intends to seize it. "We will have no other historic chance to solve these ambitious tasks the country is now facing to ensure its defence capability in due time and with due quality when [the required] funds are available, thank God," Putin said. "Tomorrow we will have none of these funds, and time will be lost." Putin has clearly made a decision to try to return Russia to its Soviet-era military strength. Increasingly, it also appears that Russia has given up any hope of becoming a cooperative partner with the West. Last year, Putin said that military spending will increase by $770bn between 2014 and 2020 – more than the country intends to spend on modernising its power sector. The sum is so big that the then-finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, who was noted for his fiscal prudence, protested so loudly he ended up losing his job. To put this sum into context: the Russian military budget already doubled between 2006 and 2009 from $25bn to $50bn, but under the new plan it will rise further to $128bn a year on average for the next six years, or about 3.2-3.7% of GDP. Although this still lags the US' annual defence budget of $600bn, more than all its Nato allies combined, in absolute terms it will bring Russian spending up to par with the US as a share of GDP – and at a time when some Nato members are slashing their own defence spending to as low as 1% of GDP. Nuclear Spending has already been pouring into Russia's nuclear arsenal. US President Barack Obama signed a strategic arms reduction deal with his counterpart Dmitry Medvedev in 2010, but as Medvedev's star waned so did the good relations: Cohen argues

in his book, "Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War", that Obama invested too much into Medvedev who was only a stand-in, and not enough into Putin to make the so-called "reset" in Russo-US relations stick. Now relations are decaying rapidly. According to Putin's chief of staff and close confidante Sergei Ivanov, the Kremlin is "no longer interested in reducing its stockpiles" of missiles. "The upgrade of our strategic nuclear forces has already finished in all key areas – from the point of view of development, trials and transfer to the Armed Forces. All modern new-generation nuclear forces have effectively been developed and tested in our country," Ivanov, a former Russian defence minister, said in an interview with the daily Komsomolskaya Pravda. "When I hear our American partners say: 'Let's reduce something else,' I would like to say to them: 'Excuse me, but what we have is relatively new'." If Ivanov's comments didn't make the Kremlin's new policy clear to Washington, then a massive Russian military exercise in February – the biggest since the fall of the Soviet Union – that included moving tactical nuclear missiles around for the first time, should have. Russia's supposed to inform Nato of its exercises but apparently this one caught the alliance by surprise. The exercises followed a recent surge in Russian strategic bomber flights that included a recent circling of the US Pacific island of Guam by two Tu-95 Bear bombers and simulated bombing runs by Tu-95s against Alaska and California in June and July. According to US reports, the Pentagon was alarmed at both the scale of the exercises and the types of weapons being deployed.

This Cold War escalates to a regional war Orozco and Llana, 8 - freelance journalist based in Caracas AND European Bureau Chief based in Paris for the Christian Science Monitor (Jose and Sara Miller, “Cold war echo: Russian military maneuvers with Venezuela”, The Christian Science Monitor, 9-12-08, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/0912/p01s05-woam.html)//KG

The last time a Russian Navy ship plied the azure waters of the Caribbean for major joint maneuvers with an anti-US country was during the cold war. But in a move out of Cuban leader Fidel Castro's historical playbook, Venezuela's Hugo Chávez announced this week that his nation will host four Russian warships and 1,000 troops in November for joint military exercises. That was followed Wednesday by the arrival in Venezuela of two Russian long-range bombers. Although Latin American leaders so far have shrugged off the moves as another act of bravado in Mr. Chávez's push against what he calls "Yankee hegemony," some diplomats and US officials see the potential for real trouble . The US typically ignores the leftist leader's angry tirades, and is playing down the news. Still, an extensive military relationship between Venezuela and Russia could heighten tensions and signal the start of a new

regional cold war . "This is a risky step that could provoke the US ,"

says retired Navy Vice Admiral and former Vice Minister of Defense Rafael Huizi Clavier. "Any incident, any error, could bring problems." This week, Russia announced that it will send a naval squadron, including the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, as well as long-range patrol planes for the upcoming joint exercises with Venezuela. On Wednesday, two Russian strategic bombers landed in Venezuela for training. Russian officials say they will leave in four days. Commenting on the deployment, Mr. Chávez dismissed comparisons to the cold war, but said he had hopes of flying one of the Russian planes. Addressing Mr. Castro, the Cuban leader is a close friend and mentor, Chávez said: "I'm going to fly a Tu-160. Fidel, I'm going to fly low past you there." The announcements, and the arrival of Russian bombers, come as Venezuela has stepped up military purchases from Russia, including fighter jets, helicopters, and Kalashnikov rifles. And it's not just Russia that Venezuela has become close to. Venezuela has developed political and commercial alliances with China, Cuba, and Iran, three key US competitor. China is helping Chávez put a communications satellite in orbit this year. "The objective is clear: to tell the world 'we are sovereign,' " says Hector Herrera, a retired lieutenant colonel of the National Guard and founder of the Bolivarian Civic Military Front, a pro-Chávez organization that works on security and defense issues. "Venezuela is a free and sovereign nation and can have friends and enemies." US-Russian ties grow tense The joint military exercises come at a time of tension between the US and Moscow, after the two went head-to-head over the brief war between Georgia – an ex-Soviet republic – and Russia last month. The US has pushed for Georgia to enter NATO, and US plans for a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe are seen as a threat by Russia. Russia has denied the latest moves with Venezuela are a tit-for-tat response to the recent deployment of US warships to the Black Sea. Mervin Rodriguez, head of the International Studies department at the Central University of Venezuela in Caracas, says that the move to align so explicitly with Russia at this time could be perceived as "taking sides." Historically, he says, Venezuela has taken on a pacifist and neutral position in world affairs, maintaining official neutrality for most of World War II. Politically, the announcement pays off for both Russia and Venezuela. "This is probably a mutual thing," says Robert Work, the vice president for strategic studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. "Russia was upset that US and NATO were moving into what they consider their near abroad [with Georgia]. And anything Chávez can do to vex the Americans is a good thing from his perspective." Chávez also sends a message to the US that he has outside support if the US attempts an invasion, a notion the socialist leader has claimed since the US tacitly supported a 2002 coup that briefly ousted him from power. Claims of US intimidation in the region grew recently with the US Navy reactivation of its Fourth Fleet, more than 50 years after it was disbanded, to conduct missions in the Caribbean. Pushing for a multi-polar world The Russian Navy visit likely is meant as a response to the US reactivating the Navy fleet, says Steve Ellner, the Venezuela-based author of "Rethinking Venezuelan Politics." "Chávez has, from the beginning, very clearly pushed this idea of a multipolar world in response to US domination," says Mr. Ellner. "So this move is not

inconsistent and not surprising." But taking Russia's side doesn't necessarily serve Venezuela's interests, some analysts say. It runs contrary to the South American country's past neutrality. "That language of multipolarity contradicts our foreign policy," says Mr. Rodriguez. "It's a fallacy. Now we are simply becoming followers of one side. Just as we criticize the Fourth Fleet." On his weekly Sunday TV show, Chávez attempted to play down the geopolitical angle, focusing on supporting the work of a "strategic ally." That position was reiterated by his administration. "The objective is to unify the ties of friendship and cooperation between both navies," said Salbatore Cammarata Bastidas, the head of naval intelligence for Venezuela, according to a statement on the Information Ministry website. But the geopolitical message is clear, says Larry Birns, the director of the left-leaning Council on Hemispheric Affairs in Washington. "The new patterns of military relationships [in Latin America] are a function of the drift away of Latin America from the US," says Mr. Birns. That no one seemed riled in the region is even more proof, says Mr. Birns. "After all these years," he says, "it is not pariah nations that have become isolated; it's Washington."

Expanding relations with Venezuela signals Russian expansionism – causes regional instability Coats, 8 - B.A. in Journalism and Latin American Studies from the University of Texas (Christopher, “A rms, Oil and a Global Alliance Drive Chavez’s Visit to Russia”, Finding Dulcinea, 6-24-08, http://www.findingdulcinea.com/news/international/July-08/Arms--Oil-and-a-Global-Alliance-Drive-Chavez-s-Visit-to-Russia.html)//KG

A recent visit to Russia by Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez sparked worried speculation about a closer, more strategic relationship between the two countries. 30-Second Summary Hoping to create a closer diplomatic and economic collaboration between himself and newly inaugurated president Dmitry Medvedev, Chavez traveled to Moscow to discuss an increased Russian oil presence in Venezuela and to seal a €1.25 billion arms deal for his country. Moreover, Chavez took the opportunity to promote a more cohesive force against what he sees as an economic and possibly military threat from the United States. “Russia and Venezuela must become strategic allies in the oil sphere and in military-technical cooperation,” Chavez announced. “This will guarantee the sovereignty of Venezuela because we are now threatened by the United States.” Chavez followed up that as a part of the oil agreement, Russian armed forces would be welcomed and supported in Venezuela. While both presidents took pains to note that their visit was strictly a business affair, some observers have become suspicious of what a Russia-Venezuela alliance could mean for the United States. A U.S. State Department spokesman remarked that developing ties between the two nations had possible implications for “ regional

stability ” in South America . However, one regional expert remarked that given the U.S. presence in a number of former-Soviet republics,

including Georgia, it was hardly surprising for Russia to try to make in-roads in South America.

Russia's expansion into Venezuela is setting the state for a second Cold War--tensions are escalatingAbelgas 08, Writer for Ang Peryodiko, a newspaper based in Canada(Valeria, "The Second Cold War" 10/2/08, Ang Peryodiko, Original Site (link not working): http://www.angperyodiko.ca/opinion_columns/val_abelgas/abelgas_ vol6no19.html Article was found at: http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=32652464)//AD

The dispatch by Moscow of the nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great and three other ships to Venezuela on Monday has made the resurgence of the Cold War between the United States and Russia imminent, if it has not actually began. As in the original Cold War, which began with the fall and split of Germany in World War II in 1945 and ended with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany in 1990, Latin America is turning out to be an important battleground

for the two superpowers. Russia has recently intensified its

contacts with Venezuela -- an oil-rich nation that has been a pain in the neck for the US -- Cuba and other South American nations following the heightening of tensions between the two superpowers in the dispute over Georgia. The incident brings to mind the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 when the world came closest to a nuclear war, and which ended when American President John F. Kennedy and United Nations Secretary General U Thant reached an agreement with Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev to dismantle Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for a no-invasion agreement and the removal of US missiles in Turkey. The emerging new Cold War is starting in almost the same manner as the old one. In 1945, shortly after Germany surrendered to the Allies and was split into West and East Germany, Russia, fearing another invasion from Western Europe after Germany had tried to invade it three times in the last 150 years, formed a buffer zone from Western Europe by exerting its might over what later became known as the Iron Curtain – Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. These countries, along with the Soviet Union, formed the Warsaw Pact, the formation of which was in response to the formation of the United States-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With the Soviets ready to extend its sphere of influence to Greece and Turkey in 1947 – with the Greeks in the midst of a civil war and the Turks needing help to modernize its society -- then US Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson called on Congress to come to the assistance of the two countries, arguing that if these countries fall into the hands of the communists, the neighboring nations would also subsequently fall. This later became known as the Domino Theory. Thus, the Cold War intensified as the two major victors of the Second World War raced to claim

the spoils of war. The Cold War was characterized by satellite wars, foremost of which were the Korean War and the Vietnam War. The score was tied in the Korean War, with Korea being divided into North and South Korea, but the communists prevailed in the Vietnam War, with Hanoi overpowering Saigon after the US abandoned its ally. The Cold War also saw the emergence of the Nuclear Arms Race, with both the Soviets and the Americans battling to have more and superior nuclear bombs; the Space Race, which was dominated by the Soviets early on until the Americans beat them to the moon; the close calls to disaster during the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis; and the calming policy that came to be known as détente. The Cold War put the world constantly on the edge of fear and devastation for 45 years while the two superpowers expanded their spheres of influence to wide parts of the globe and threatened to annihilate each other. With the emergence of a rationale leader in the Soviet Union in the 1980s in the person of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Cold War began to thaw. Gorbachev declared, upon assuming the position of general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that beyond a certain point, which, according to him, had been reached and passed at that time, increases in military power were useless. Gorbachev launched his glasnost (openness) and perestroika (economic restructuring) policies that triggered the end of the Cold War, and eventually of the once powerful Soviet Union. I was lucky to witness the Soviet Union’s transformation at that time when the Novosti Press Agency invited fellow journalist Maritess Vitug and I in August of 1988 to visit the cities of Moscow and Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in Russia, Tbilisi in the Georgian Republic, and Baku in the Azerbaijan Republic. A couple of years later, the arms race came to an end and Gorbachev abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine, which declared that no satellite country in Eastern Europe would be allowed to defect. Within months, democratic movements emerged in these Iron Curtain countries and their authoritarian governments fell one by one, ironically like dominoes. The Cold War ended where it started, with the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the reunification of the two Germanys. With Russia now trying to create another buffer zone around its southern borders, and the United States racing to exert influence over these former Soviet republics around the Caspian Sea, which incidentally hold a huge reserve of oil and natural gas and host major oil pipelines to the East and to Central Asia, it was inevitable that history would repeat itself. For years after the break-up of the once powerful Soviet Union, Russia was pictured by the West as a defeated country. Crippled by the sudden turn of events, the Russians were faced with domestic problems – rising crime rates, government corruption, separatism, economic depression, rising poverty and social discontent. But since the financial collapse of 1998, Russia’s economy has taken a major rebound, powered by its huge oil and gas reserves. It is the world’s eighth largest oil producer, the world’s top natural gas producer, has the world’s fifth largest foreign reserves at $600 million, and has the world’s fifth largest gold reserves. It supplies 30% of Europe’s oil needs and 40% of its gas. Its economy grows by an average of 6 to 7 percent annually since 1999, and its stock market index increased by 83 percent last year. In contrast, the US economy is experiencing the biggest

turmoil since the Great Depression with its financial institutions in serious jeopardy, its stock market in chaos, its economy teetering on the precipice of a deep recession or worse, another depression, its body politic currently immersed in extremely divisive political campaign, and more importantly, its credibility and influence among the world’s nations in serious doubt. Unlike the first Cold War, the Second Cold War is not a race for political influence but is a battle for the world’s dwindling oil and gas reserves. It is not coincidental that it started in an area where vast oil and gas reserves sit – the Caspian Sea region. And it’s not merely symbolic that Russia has decided to intensify it by sending a part of its naval fleet to oil-rich Venezuela. The Second Cold War’s satellite wars will not be fought in Korea or Vietnam, but is now being fought in Iraq and soon in Iran, both oil-producing countries. Don’t expect insurrections and skirmishes in Cuba. They will occur in oil-producing countries, such as Venezuela, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and possibly the oil-rich region of Brunei, Indonesia, the Spratlys in the China Sea, and Mindanao. While the economy and the Iraq problem are the central issues in the US presidential campaign, there is a need to recognize that the Second Cold War has begun and should, therefore, be an important parameter in the choice of this great nation’s next leader. Should we elect a leader who will be firm and strong, but who will gently and calmly steer us through the troubled waters of the Second Cold War, or should we choose one who has for years ruled out conciliation with Russia, wanted Russia out of the stabilizing economic group G-8, and who has been itching for a direct confrontation with the long-time Cold War rival? Should it be Barack Obama or John McCain? The debates on this important foreign policy matter have not begun. But the Second Cold War is well way off the starting gate.

Democracy

Increased Russian influence kills democracy – props up authoritarian statesTolstrup, 9 - Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark (Jakob, “Studying a negative external actor: Russia’s management of stability and instability in the ‘Near Abroad’”, Routledge, 10-2-09, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5806/Tolstrup_-_Studying_a_Negative_External_Actor.pdf)//KG

So much for the direct effects. As Table 3 indicates, the policy of managed stability also has indirect negative effects. The effects are indirect because they do not bear directly on the liberal performance of the targeted republics, but instead strengthen what Levitsky and Way call their coercive state capacity. 38Coercive state capacity is paramount for autocratic resilience; only by holding the capacity to quell opposition and reinforce elite cohesion can a regime withstand the external and internal pressures for change, and only this way can authoritarianism be consolidated Thus, Russia’s policy of managed stability strengthens the incumbents’ coercive state capacity by helping them sustain stability, order, and control. The help is, primarily, channelled through economic levers such as favourable subsidies, credits, and lower energy prices. A well-known example is the arbitrary differences in Russian gas prices – differences that in 2008 ranged from US$280/mcm (the Baltic republics), over US$230 (Georgia), US$191 (Moldova), and US$179 (Ukraine), to US$119 (Belarus) and US$110 (Armenia).39 This vital economic support to authoritarian regimes makes it easier for incumbents to keep the economy running, finance the necessary welfare goods, pay salaries to the coercive state apparatus, and to distribute rents to the ruling elite to secure support. While the former two guarantee a minimum of stability, the latter two ensure that order and control are upheld. Even though economic levers are the most important tools for the policy’s indirect negative effect, military and political levers serve the purpose as well, although only as a supplement. By supporting and cooperating with the incumbent regime on both bilateral and multilateral terms, Russia minimizes the costs of possible Western isolation. Thus, by cooperating with the regime, Russia adds legitimacy to it and offers an alternative to Western integration – an integration that would, ceteris paribus, be conditioned on democratic improvements .40 All in all, Russian support on the military, political, and economic levels can be said to minimize the costs of being authoritarian. Without Russia’s protection, many of the authoritarian regimes in the ‘Near Abroad’ would be much worse off due to bad performance on all three levels of security, legitimacy, and welfare. And this would, ceteris paribus, make it more difficult for the incumbents to uphold a strong coercive state apparatus that can rig elections to ensure legitimacy, curtail political and civil rights to quell the opposition, and help concentrate power in the executive to consolidate authoritarianism.

In brief, Russia’s policy of managed stability makes it easier to be authoritarian – in the words of Ambrosio, Russia bolsters the authoritarian regimes.41 Now let me turn to the policy of managed instability.

Russia kills democracy – destabilizes democratic regimesTolstrup, 9 - Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark (Jakob, “Studying a negative external actor: Russia’s management of stability and instability in the ‘Near Abroad’”, Routledge, 10-2-09, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5806/Tolstrup_-_Studying_a_Negative_External_Actor.pdf)//KG

Turning to the indirect effects of the policy of managed instability, the stability dimension once again shows its importance. While Russia is trying to stabilize the targeted republics under the policy of managed stability, the opposite is the case with the policy of managed instability. This instability has two consequences for the republics’ liberal performance. First, military, political, and economic sanctions raise the costs of continuing reforms or choosing them in the first place. This is because reform-minded elites will have a harder time convincing the electorate of the rightness of pursuing democratic ideals when they cannot secure order and prosperity. Second, Russian sanctions and their effects make the democratizing states look unstable and unfit for integration in the eyes of the West. This not only prolongs the integration process but potentially also weakens the support and enthusiasm of the West and thereby the Western push for further reforms. Let me explain how this is done. Militarily, Russia is destabilizing the Western-oriented republics in several ways. Apart from the already mentioned support to secessionist regions, relevant levers are military threats, interventions, and strategic use of military bases within the countries.48 While it is evident how military invasions, like the one against Georgia in August 2008, are devastating for a country’s political and economic stability, it is less clear how exactly Russian military bases affect the stability dimension. One example is the Russian naval base in Sevastopol in Crimea, Ukraine. Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ownership of the naval base (and of Crimea) has remained a disputed issue that Russia again and again has used to question Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity.49 By repeatedly questioning Ukraine’s sovereignty, Russia acts as a constant nuisance factor for regime consolidation, and, furthermore, makes the country look less attractive as a partner in the eyes of the West (which is sceptical about importing territorial conflicts). Politically, Russia is working fiercely to delegitimize the Western-oriented governments, while at the same time supporting more Russia-oriented elites in the opposition or in secessionist parts of the country. When Russia weakens the incumbent and strengthens the opposition, the political situation in the country is destabilized and maybe even deadlocked, as is the case in Ukraine. This pattern of support and sanctions very much follows the already mentioned procedure that is used during elections with interference on the diplomatic, the financial, and the media level. Therefore, it will not be discussed further here. Financially, Russia is destabilizing the republics

in the ‘Near Abroad’, first and foremost through its aggressive energy policy – a policy that consists of supply cut-offs, non-transparent models of price increases, and attempts to take control of strategic pipeline routes, infrastructure and energy-producing and distributing companies. Tellingly, from 1991 to 2006, 55 incidents of supply interruptions occurred in the post-Soviet region that were purely motivated by political or economic reasons.

Environment

Russian oil development leads to spills that devastate the environmentArnold, 7 - freelance journalist based in Baku, Azerbaijan (Chloe, “Russia: Oil Spill Highlights Tragic Environmental Legacy”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 5-26-13, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079207.html)//KG

Waves approaching 6 meters high pounded ships plying the Kerch Straight connecting the Black and Azov seas on November 11. The "Volganeft-139," carrying about 4,000 tons of oil, split in two in the course of the storm, causing it to spill about half of its contents into the narrow straight. Four ships sank to the bottom, including two vessels carrying a combined 7,000 metric tons of sulfur. The devastation left in the wake of the storm was staggering. At least five seamen were lost on the day and tens were missing. Endangered species such as the Dalmatian pelican and the great black-headed gull were seen coated in oil, as the region awaits the arrival of thousands of migratory birds that nest along the waterways during winter. Fish caught in Kerch Straight have been deemed unsafe to eat, threatening the livelihoods of locals. And dolphins swimming the waters are threatened by waters registering oil pollution 30 times higher than normal. Soiled Image Russian state television broadcast images of officials from the Emergency Situations Ministry rushing to the scene to mount a rescue effort and massive clean-up operation. Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov flew to the scene the day after the disaster to survey the damage. A presidential decree was issued calling for all means to be used to protect the local fauna. The Russian government has applauded the swift response to the country's worst-ever oil spill, but environmentalists are citing the disaster as the latest example of an inherited legacy of ecological ineptitude . The "Volganeft-139," for example, was a 1970's designed single-hulled tanker that was licensed only for river transport. It was not intended for use on the open sea. Igor Chestin, director of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in Russia, says one of the ill-fated vessels carrying sulfur has a similar history. "The other vessel, 'Volganeft-123' -- according to the register it didn't exist actually, so that ship was already outdated and had been taken off all the lists," Chestin says. "That vessel simply shouldn't have been in that area." Most distressing to many environmentalists, is that such oversight is a result of a system that has long polluted Russia's collective mindset when it comes to the environment. The waters of the region -- the Black and Azov seas and the Kerch Straight -- were by no means pristine before what is now being called Russia's worst oil spill. A report by the United Nations Environment Program outlines threats to the Black Sea from chronic overfishing, high levels of pollution, large discharges of raw sewage, damaging levels of coastal erosion, and the suffocating impact of sludge and mud dredged from nearby ports. For Sergei Tsyplyonkov, the executive director of Greenpeace Russia, there is a simple explanation. "In my opinion, the situation that surrounds this catastrophe illustrates the

general attitude of the Russian government to questions of ecology," Tsyplyonkov says. "Beginning at the end of the 1990s and the start of 2000, the Russian leadership has clearly demonstrated the direction it intends to follow. And it is this: that the Russian government is prepared to pay the ecological price for economic development." The Soviet era, he adds, was catastrophic for the environment. High world oil prices in the 1970s and 1980s meant the Soviet leadership had at its disposal vast sums of money, which it spent on nuclear reactors and diverting rivers to increase irrigation. Legend has it that one Soviet official, when questioned about the construction of a giant and potentially lethal paper mill on the shores of the world's largest freshwater lake, said that "even Lake Baikal must work for the advancement of the Soviet regime."

Russian development leads to massive oil spills – outdated techDawid, 11 - Sierra Club activist, having worked in transportation, land use, and now air quality (Irvin, “Environmental Devastation From Russia's Oil Drilling Considered Routine”, Planetizen, 12-20-11, http://www.planetizen.com/node/53204)//KG

It's on the scale of a Deepwater Horizon spill every 2 months - except that it's considered the cost of doing business. Aging pipes, lax oversight and inclement weather all combine to make an estimated 5 million tons of annual spillage. While the weather is harsh, AP also looks at drilling in Canada and Norway and even Nigeria, where spills result in part from rebel attacks, but none are on the scale of the world's largest oil producer. While aging pipelines are a major cause, outdated technology is also a great contributor - even new pipelines begin leaking shortly after operation. Total spillage is estimated at 1% of annual production. "It is happening everywhere," Ivan Blokov, campaign director at Greenpeace Russia, said. "It's typical of any oil field in Russia. The system is old and it is not being replaced in time by any oil company in the country." That observation was corroborate by Russian researchers. "Oil and oil products get spilled literally every day," said Dr. Grigory Barenboim, senior researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Water Problems. The results are vast dead stretches of forest, tundra, rivers, and lakes. The Russians estimate that 10-15% of the leakage runs into rivers that empty into the Arctic Ocean. Russia is already making plans to drill in the Arctic though its clear that their technology is not prepared for it. "Over the past years, environmental risks have increased more sharply compared to how far our technologies, funds, equipment and skills to deal with them have advanced," Barenboim said.

Human Rights

Increased relations lead to crime and human rights violations Amsterdam, 9 - International Lawyer on emerging markets, politics of business, and rule of law (Robert, “Are Russia's Arms Deals to Venezuela Destablizing Central America?”, Huffington Post, 7-28-09, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-amsterdam/are-russias-arms-deals-to_b_245993.html)//KG

Yesterday afternoon, Russia's RIA Novosti Spanish wire service reported on the arrival of the Deputy Prime Minister and Rosneft Chairman Igor Sechin to Caracas, Venezuela. The reason for the trip of Russia's energy czar (and leader of the "siloviki" network of former KGB officers), according to the Kremlin news outlet, was to prepare for Hugo Chávez's upcoming visit to Moscow and a high-level inter-governmental commission to be held in St. Petersburg. By the end of the day, Sechin had already inked many deals, conveniently for himself and for Russia, with the Venezuelan government -- Bloomberg reports that Russia and Venezuela signed wide-ranging cooperation accords on energy, military, and agricultural cooperation, including the formation of a joint venture between PDVSA-Services and Gazprom's Latin America division. What does Sechin personally get out of the trip? He took a trip with his PDVSA counterpart Rafael Ramirez out to the Orinoco Belt to see an oil field which was once owned by U.S. firm ConocoPhillips before expropriation, announcing plans to unveil another joint venture to develop it with with Rosneft in September. Joint ventures and big-sounding cooperation agreements are a familiar sight to observers of Russia-Venezuela relations, and the two countries have even formed a $4 billion development bank. But other than arms purchases, the trade volume hasn't yet caught up. Venezuela still exports some 60% of its oil to the United States, comprising 11% of U.S. supply. The U.S. is by far their largest trade partner, and Russia's volumes don't even yet compete with China's business with Venezuela. The reason for all this fuss, of course, is that the relationship is highly political . For the Russians, there is a clear desire to poke Washington in the eye after Vice President Joseph Biden's visit to the Ukraine and Georgia -- Sechin seems dead-set on proving Hillary Clinton right that no spheres of influence exist. More than just the immense enjoyment that Chávez must feel in passing an oil field taken directly from an American company into the hands of a Russian company, there is also a strong and growing military dimension to the relationship to the tune of $4.4 billion. A Swedish think tank estimates a 900% growth in arms purchases in the last five-year period, making Venezuela the #1 buyer of Russian arms in the world. Hugo Chávez should be honored to have such a high ranking official from the Kremlin to help him "prepare" for his next visit to Moscow -- Sechin is estimated by many Kremlinologists to have much more clout, and many more billions, than President Dmitry Medvedev himself. Sechin is the main figure running Russia's Latin America policy, as he is rumored to be

fluent in both Spanish and Portuguese from his KGB days in Africa. Controversy seems to follow the man wherever he goes. Many point to him as being the main conspirator and beneficiary behind the Kremlin's takeover of the Yukos oil company - a multi-billion dollar daylight robbery. The Rosneft chairman has also come under fire for what many believe to be a non-sensical deal with the Chinese, passing them control of the future of Russian oil. The economist Konstantin Sonin has written that "Sechin's contract with China might go down in history like the notorious privatization auctions of the early 1990s." The timing of his visit -- along with the high tensions over Honduras following the coup -- raises some concerns over the uptick in military hardware transfers between Moscow and Caracas. The Venezuelan President recently made several comments about doubling his orders of T-90 battle tanks from Russia. The Kremlin recently sent the battleship Peter the Great to carry out war games with Venezuela in the Caribbean. Venezuela is the only country in Latin America with a license to manufacture their own Kalashnikovs, a fact which is very worrying to the Colombian government when so many of these small arms seem to go missing. A Colombian newspaper also ran a report this month about a Venezuelan contact attempting to sell 20 Russian-made surface-to-air missiles on the black market. What the United States may be worried about with this visit is Russia's potential acquiescence to Chávez's apparent plan to disrupt the attempts to broker a deal on behalf of former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. Under instructions from Chávez, Zelaya has ignored all advice from Arias, and made many high risk stunts, including crossing over the border for a few minutes amid teeming crowds this past weekend (Christopher Sabatini from the Council of the Americas describes Zelaya's actions as "tragic silliness"). Many observers believe that Chávez and Zelaya "need more dead Hondurans" to produce the outcome they are looking for. There can be no doubt of two facts: this level of arms purchases by Chávez defeats the narrative that he is about protecting the interests of the poor and underprivileged of Venezuela, and secondly, there are individuals seeking improper personal enrichment through their powers of office. The grotesque level of corruption in both Russia and Venezuela should stimulate the discussion as to whether the predatory nature of both states constitutes not only an international crime, but as well a breach of fundamental human rights for which there may indeed be remedies under international law.

Laundry List

Increased Russian influence in Venezuela crowds out the US and promotes crime, corruption, and terrorCohen and Walser, 8 - Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security AND Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies (Ariel and Ray, “The Russia-Venezuela Axis: Using Energy for Geopolitical Advantage”, The Heritage Foundation, 7-21-08, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/07/the-russia-venezuela-axis-using-energy-for-geopolitical-advantage)//KG

When Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez touches down in Moscow on July 22 to meet with the duumvirate of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev, he will be ready for more than the usual diplomatic photo-op. This odd trio will be well-positioned to plan substantial international mischief. A Russian-Venezuelan axis is a 21st-century throwback to the Cold War Soviet-Cuban alliance. Such a partnership bodes ill for energy security, for freedom in both nations, and for the Western Hemisphere. Despite differences in culture, language, and geography, the rulers of Russia and Venezuela are increasingly rejecting civil society and narrowing political space in their respective countries. They drive out foreign investors and erode market mechanisms. Both governments have mounted sustained attacks on the rule of law in an effort to exert control over energy resources, excessively strengthen the state, and expand geopolitical clout. Putin and Chávez are promoting an alternative vision to that of the U.S. and the West and are comfortable with the progress they are making toward this end. Redistribution of Global Power The Russia-Venezuela condominium is emblematic of geopolitical forces rising to challenge U.S. leadership

and influence . Chávez and the Russian duo want to redistribute global power as expediently as possible. In pursuit of this "world without the West," the two governments are dumping the dollar in favor of the Euro during energy transactions, using energy as a geopolitical weapon , and calling for the creation of "new economic and financial institutions" to supplant the post-Bretton Woods order. They also are cooperating in launching a natural gas OPEC-style cartel, led by Russia. For Russia, this new relationship is part of a larger effort to recover its great

power status lost as the result of the Soviet Union's precipitous collapse. Chávez, on the other hand, seeks to realize Simón Bolivar's dream of a united Latin America capable of challenging the "Colossus to the North." Such geopolitical ambitions reflect the buoyancy found in oil- and gas-rich nations riding the crest of $135 per barrel oil. Russia and Venezuela, together with Iran, are among the trend-setters in the democracy roll-back taking place since the late 1990s, especially in petro-states. The rise of oil prices has accelerated this process and helped precipitate the rise of statism and the decline in democratic

governance, while energy revenues provide the means to buy off political opponents and the media, build up internal security forces, and insulate regimes from any domestic and international criticism. While Russia is supporting Iran-both diplomatically and militarily-and buying European politicians with Gazprom jobs, Chávez is working to undermine stability in the Western Hemisphere. For instance, Chávez provides covert support for the narco-terrorism of the FARC, suitcases of clandestine cash for political candidates, friendship with Hezbollah, and a permissiveness or inattention that has allowed Venezuela to become a major transit point for cocaine. Sprawling and Increasingly Statist Economies Chávez and the Putin-Medvedev duumvirate both preside over sprawling and increasingly statist economies, gorged upon freshly nationalized industries and deeply dependent on resource nationalism. Russia has forced Western energy companies out of massive development projects in Siberia and the Far East, pressured British Petroleum to sell a major stake in a large Siberian gas field to Gazprom, and squeezed Royal Dutch Shell in the giant Sakhalin Island project. The current dispute between BP and Russian TNK-the only remaining major oil venture in Russia with 50 percent foreign ownership-is also consistent with Russia's continuing commitment to de-privatization. Yet Russian state control is not limited to natural resources. State control has also been mounting over metals, the arms sector, and the automotive industry. Moreover, despite resistance within the Kremlin, President Medvedev has just approved the transfer of the state's assets in 426 companies to a single "national champion"-state-owned Rostekhnologii or Russian Technologies. As it so happens, Rostekhnologii is run by Sergey Chemezov, Putin's intelligence community comrade. This transfer of assets and the ongoing dispute between British Petroleum and Russian TNK directly contradict Medvedev's rhetoric of liberal economics and legal reform. In the last 18 months, Chávez has also increased the tempo of nationalizations with several "my way or the highway" deals. By allowing for increased importation, skyrocketing oil prices mask-temporarily-economic mismanagement and the deeper shortcomings of anti-market economic policies. In modern-day Venezuela, crime, corruption, and inflation rise and while the quality of life of the average citizen declines or stagnates. Crony capitalism, coupled with lack of transparency and accountability, makes life difficult for the ordinary Russian or Venezuelan. Scarce wonder that, according to The Heritage Foundation's 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, Russia stands 134th out of 157 ranked nations, while Venezuela has descended to the bottom 10 at 148th out of 157. Energy as a Geopolitical Weapon The Kremlin is skilled at using energy as a foreign policy tool. It has cut off supplies to six countries over the last seven years and uses energy dependence as leverage to divide Europe on key issues. Most recently, after the signing of an agreement between Prague and Washington for an anti-missile defense radar station, a Russian company sharply reduced the flow of oil to the Czech Republic. Mimicking the Russians, Caracas relishes using oil for geopolitical leverage and influence. In recent months, Chávez has bolstered oil subsidies and a financing facility known as Petrocaribe. Using the oil bonanza, Chávez has pledged assistance that eclipses U.S. aid in the Western Hemisphere. Even democratic Costa Rica cannot resist the

seduction of relief at the pump. At the working level, Russia's energy giant Gazprom and Venezuela' national petroleum company, PDVSA, are cementing an energy partnership in South America. As the chief of PDVSA recently reported, "We want to make [PDVSA] like Gazprom, but with a social role." Chávez seeks to deepen cooperation with the Kremlin and its state-run enterprises. He has invited Russian firms to exploit the Orinoco River basin-potentially the world's largest oil deposit, holding 1.2 trillion barrels of extra-heavy crude. Gazprom is also involved in a proposed Venezuelan initiative to construct an 8,000-kilometer trans-South American gas pipeline that will link Venezuela's oil and gas fields to Argentina via Brazil, with potential spurs going to Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina. According to Chávez, these Russian state-run firms are part of the vanguard of the Bolivarian revolution. Arms sales-which Russia uses to gain friends and influence governments-are key components of the Kremlin's relationship with Venezuela. Flush with cash, Chávez is buying as much military hardware as possible. For instance, in 2006, Chávez sealed a $3 billion arms package with Russian state-owned arms trader Rosoboronexport that included 100,000 Kalashnikov AK-103 series automatic rifles, 24 advanced Sukhoi (SU-30) fighter jets, and 53 military helicopters. A Russian Kalashnikov rifle plant and munitions factory should be operational in Venezuela by 2010. Caracas is also interested in Russian air defense systems and diesel submarines. Chávez increasingly relies on Russia to provide the weaponry he insists is needed to defend Venezuela against the bogey of a U.S. invasion. The July 22 visit will yield more arms, including a possible submarine deal. While Washington tends to focus on Chavez's ties to the FARC or Iran and Hezbollah, Venezuela's rapidly solidifying relationship with Russia opens up previously unexplored avenues for diplomatic, military, and perhaps nuclear cooperation between the two. Whether in Eurasia or the Western Hemisphere, these actors are playing a broad geopolitical game into which they hope to lure China, India, Brazil, and other rising powers. A Multi-Pronged Strategy The next administration will have to devote more attention to the Western Hemisphere, as well as to the increasing threat of resource nationalism from Russia, Venezuela, Iran, and other energy-rich countries. Specifically, the next administration must develop a multi-pronged strategy committed to: Promoting market access and the rule of law among energy producers; Promoting greater cooperation between energy consumers; and Developing alternative sources of energy consumers want. These are trying days for the globe's democracies, yet greater threats were defeated in the past.

Prolif

Increased Russian ties with Venezuela attempt to counter US influence and lead to nuclear proliferationDiehl, 09 - Research Associate, Monterey Institute of International Studies (Sarah, “Venezuela's Search for Nuclear Power - or Nuclear Prestige”, NTI, 5-7-09, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/venezuelas-search-nuclear-power/)//KG

Russia-Venezuela Nuclear Deal, November 2008In November 2008, Director of Rosatom Sergei Kiriyenko noted that his company had been in talks about nuclear cooperation with Venezuela since 2005.[62] While few public sources mention the progress of these talks, Venezuela has been increasing its arms purchases from Russia since 2005, and the two countries did sign a nuclear cooperation agreement in November 2008. As one Russian analyst has pointed out, Chávez's interest in arms deals with Russia quickened after the aborted coup in 2002, and intensified in late 2004, "when on the one hand his relations with the domestic opposition deteriorated and, on the other, when a new spiral of confrontation began with the United States."[63] Since 2005, Venezuela has spent $3-$4 billion on Russian arms, including 100,000 Kalashnikov AK-103 assault rifles (and a factory to build more in Venezuela), 24 Sukhoi fighter jets, and 53 combat helicopters.[64] Questions about Venezuela's ability to pay for the arms purchases,[65] and 2006 U.S. sanctions on Russian companies Sukhoi and Rosoboroneksport for transferring weapons to Venezuela and Iran seemed to only make the countries more defiant about their arms trade.[66] In September 2008, along with announcing an oil and gas consortium and a nuclear cooperation deal, Russia promised to loan Venezuela $1 billion to buy additional Russian military technology, possibly including TOR-M1 air defense systems, Igla-S portable SAM systems, Il-78 aerial tankers, and Il-76 military cargo aircraft.[67] Along with an increase in arms and energy deals, joint military exercises, and anti-U.S. rhetoric, Russian and Venezuelan officials proposed a nuclear cooperation deal.[68] In September 2008, Chávez made his seventh visit to Moscow in as many years and received Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's pledge that Russia would sign a nuclear cooperation accord with Venezuela.[69] The Russian press reported that the country's leading nuclear facilities contractor, Atomstroyeksport, had a general agreement on nuclear cooperation with Venezuela that was part of a larger Russian-Venezuelan plan to develop oil and gas deposits in Venezuela and Latin America.[70] But the importance of the agreements may be

more political than economic . Russia ratcheted up its alliances with Venezuela at a time when the United States criticized Russia for its invasion of Georgia, sought to place missile defense installations in the Czech Republic and Poland, and worked to add former Eastern Bloc countries to NATO. For his part, Chávez used the impending nuclear deal to build

domestic support during elections and counterbalance U.S.

influence in Latin America .[71] One reporter assessing the dynamics of the announced nuclear deal wrote: Moscow is engaged in a spat with Washington over the conflict in Georgia, plans for a U.S. missile shield in Russia's backyard and U.S. naval operations in the Black Sea. Suggesting it may transfer nuclear technology to one of the United States' main foes in the Western Hemisphere is another jab. It is welcomed by Chávez, who uses hostile relations with Washington to fire up supporters, some of whom are frustrated with high crime and soaring food prices.[72] In November 2008, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov said the view that Russia's rapprochement with Venezuela and other Latin American states was primarily about diplomatic sparring with the United States was "absolutely wrong." But at the same time, he noted that the Latin American countries had condemned U.S. policies toward the conflict in Georgia and supported Russian efforts to "force Tbilisi to peace."[73] Lavrov also emphasized that Russia and the Latin American countries are allies seeking a "new, safer and fairer world order," and rejecting attempts to impose unilateral solutions and to interfere in a state's internal affairs. He said that Russia intended to increase its high technology exports, including nuclear energy items, to strengthen its collaborations in Latin America.[74] In the run-up to the signing of the nuclear cooperation agreement, the two parties were mindful that it would be an irritant to the United States and would raise the question of nuclear proliferation, particularly given Russia's assistance to Iran's nuclear program and Venezuela's close ties with Iran.[75] In November 2008, at the closing of the Fifth Meeting of the Russia-Venezuela High Level Intergovernmental Commission, Chávez remarked that Venezuela will always be accused of trying to build a nuclear bomb even though it only seeks to generate nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.[76]

AT: Russian Military Weak

Russian military capabilities increasing Yevseyev, 13 - research fellow with the International Security Center at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Vladimir, “Don’t write off the Russian Navy”, Russia Direct, 6-18-13, http://russia-direct.org/content/don%E2%80%99t-write-russian-navy)//KG

Despite it’s revived naval ambitions, Russia’s present opportunities in this area are limited. In the meantime, the country will content itself with cooperating with NATO in the Mediterranean Sea. As a superpower, the Soviet Union maintained a permanent Mediterranean squadron, consisting of up to 50 surface warships and other vessels servicing the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets. The squadron had no fixed base, but instead used a number of logistic points, one of which was located at Tartus in Syria. During the Cold War, the United States had its 6th Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean, which rivaled the military potential of the Soviet force. The U.S. Navy retains that capacity to this day. As such, during the Iraq invasion of 2003, it could call upon more than 40 surface ships, including two aircraft carriers, two to four nuclear submarines, 175 aircraft and 21,000 service personnel. The collapse of the Soviet Union forced its successor, Russia, to drastically reduce its naval presence. As a result, only the Northern Fleet was preserved, while all the others essentially being reduced to little more than flotillas hardly capable of securing a naval presence away from Russian shores. Of course, some small groupings of warships, mainly from the Northern Fleet, did keep the flag flying, during naval exercises off the coast of Venezuela, for instance. But military operations in remote waters were all but out of the question due to the small number of surface ships and submarines. Recently, this situation has begun to change. In 2013, for example, the Russian Navy is due to receive not only the Borei-class (Project 955) Alexandr Nevsky and Yasen-class (Project 885) Severodvinsk nuclear-powered submarines (NPS), but also four surface ships: the Stereguschy-class (Project 20380) Boiky and Stoiky guided-missile corvettes, the far-zone guided-missile head frigate Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov under Project 22350, and the large landing ship Ivan Gren under Project 11711. The military capability of the fleet has also increased. In particular, the multi-purpose NPS Severodvinsk features a Kalibr missile system – able to strike ground targets with cruise missiles at a distance of 1,400 kilometers (870 miles) from an underwater position (the previous maximum range did not exceed 300 kilometers (186 miles)). The driving force behind the need to accrue naval military power was not Russia's increased economic capability, but the country's need to position itself as a leading state that is able to implement an independent foreign policy. This course was formulated in its final version after Vladimir Putin's presidential inauguration in May of 2012. Anatoly Serdyukov, then-defense minister of the country, was unable to develop the military sphere in this direction, which was one for the reasons for his

replacement with Sergey Shoigu. Given the deepening Syrian crisis and the very real interference of NATO in that country's internal affairs, the Kremlin decided to establish a permanent naval formation in the region. The first announcement to that effect was made by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu at a meeting of senior officers of the Armed Forces in the first half of March 2013. It was initially planned that the task force would consist of up to ten warships and support vessels under the command of the Black Sea Fleet.

Russian navy encroaching on US influence in Latin America – training exercises with VenezuelaGertz, 12 - senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times (Bill, Silent Running: Russian attack submarine sailed in Gulf of Mexico undetected for weeks, U.S. officials say”, The Washington Free Beacon, 8-14-12, http://freebeacon.com/silent-running/)//KG

A Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine armed with long-range cruise missiles operated undetected in the Gulf of Mexico for several weeks and its travel in strategic U.S. waters was only confirmed after it left the region, the Washington Free Beacon has learned. It is only the second time since 2009 that a Russian attack submarine has patrolled so close to U.S. shores. The stealth underwater incursion in the Gulf took place at the same time Russian strategic bombers made incursions into restricted U.S. airspace near Alaska and California in June and July, and highlights a growing military assertiveness by Moscow. The submarine patrol also exposed what U.S. officials said were deficiencies in U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities—forces that are facing cuts under the Obama administration’s plan to reduce defense spending by $487 billion over the next 10 years. The Navy is in charge of detecting submarines, especially those that sail near U.S. nuclear missile submarines, and uses undersea sensors and satellites to locate and track them. The fact that the Akula was not detected in the Gulf is cause for concern, U.S. officials said. The officials who are familiar with reports of the submarine patrol in the Gulf of Mexico said the vessel was a nuclear-powered Akula-class attack submarine, one of Russia’s quietest submarines. A Navy spokeswoman declined to comment. One official said the Akula operated without being detected for a month. “The Akula was built for one reason and one reason only: To kill U.S. Navy ballistic missile submarines and their crews,” said a second U.S. official. “It’s a very stealthy boat so it can sneak around and avoid detection and hope to get past any protective screen a boomer might have in place,” the official said, referring to the Navy nickname for strategic missile submarines. The U.S. Navy operates a strategic nuclear submarine base at Kings Bay, Georgia. The base is homeport to eight missile-firing submarines, six of them equipped with nuclear-tipped missiles, and two armed with conventional warhead missiles. “Sending a nuclear-propelled submarine into the Gulf of Mexico-Caribbean region is another manifestation of President

Putin demonstrating that Russia is still a player on the world’s political-military stage,” said naval analyst and submarine warfare specialist Norman Polmar. “Like the recent deployment of a task force led by a nuclear cruiser into the Caribbean, the Russian Navy provides him with a means of ‘showing the flag’ that is not possible with Russian air and ground forces,” Polmar said in an email. The last time an Akula submarine was known to be close to U.S. shores was 2009, when two Akulas were spotted patrolling off the east coast of the United States. Those submarine patrols raised concerns at the time about a new Russian military assertiveness toward the United States, according to the New York Times, which first reported the 2009 Akula submarine activity. The latest submarine incursion in the Gulf further highlights the failure of the Obama administration’s “reset” policy of conciliatory actions designed to develop closer ties with Moscow. Instead of closer ties, Russia under President Vladimir Putin, an ex-KGB intelligence officer who has said he wants to restore elements of Russia’s Soviet communist past, has adopted growing hardline policies against the United States. Of the submarine activity, Sen. John Cornyn (R., Texas), member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said, “It’s a confounding situation arising from a lack of leadership in our dealings with Moscow. While the president is touting our supposed ‘reset’ in relations with Russia, Vladimir Putin is actively working against American interests, whether it’s in Syria or here in our own backyard.” The Navy is facing sharp cuts in forces needed to detect and counter such submarine activity. The Obama administration’s defense budget proposal in February cut $1.3 billion from Navy shipbuilding projects, which will result in scrapping plans to build 16 new warships through 2017. The budget also called for cutting plans to buy 10 advanced P-8 anti-submarine warfare jets needed for submarine detection. In June, Russian strategic nuclear bombers and support aircraft conducted a large-scale nuclear bomber exercise in the arctic. The exercise included simulated strikes on “enemy” strategic sites that defense officials say likely included notional attacks on U.S. missile defenses in Alaska. Under the terms of the 2010 New START arms accord, such exercises require 14-day advanced notice of strategic bomber drills, and notification after the drills end. No such notification was given. A second, alarming air incursion took place July 4 on the West Coast when a Bear H strategic bomber flew into U.S. airspace near California and was met by U.S. interceptor jets. That incursion was said to have been a bomber incursion that has not been seen since before the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. It could not be learned whether the submarine in the Gulf of Mexico was an Akula 1 type submarine or a more advanced Akula 2. It is also not known why the submarine conducted the operation. Theories among U.S. analysts include the notion that submarine incursion was designed to further signal Russian displeasure at U.S. and NATO plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe. Russia’s chief of the general staff, Gen. Nikolai Makarov, said in May that Russian forces would consider preemptive attacks on U.S. and allied missile defenses in Europe, and claimed the

defenses are destabilizing in a crisis . Makarov met with Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July. Dempsey

questioned him about the Russian strategic bomber flights near U.S. territory. The voyage of the submarine also could be part of Russian efforts to export the Akula. Russia delivered one of its Akula-2 submarines to India in 2009. The submarine is distinctive for its large tail fin. Brazil’s O Estado de Sao Paoli reported Aug. 2 that Russia plans to sell Venezuela up to 11 new submarines, including one Akula. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Moscow’s military is working to set up naval replenishment facilities in Vietnam and Cuba, but denied there were plans to base naval forces in those states. Asked if Russia planned a naval base in Cuba, Lavrov said July 28: “We are not speaking of any bases. The Russian navy ships serve exercise cruises and training in the same regions. To harbor, resupply, and enable the crew to rest are absolutely natural needs. We have spoken of such opportunities with our Cuban friends.” The comment was posted in the Russian Foreign Ministry website. Russian warships and support vessels were sent to Venezuela in 2008 to take part in naval exercises in a show of Russian support for the leftist regime of Hugo Chavez. The ships also stopped in Cuba. Russian Deputy Premier Dmitri Rogozin announced in February that Russia was working on a plan to build 10 new attack submarines and 10 new missile submarines through 2030, along with new aircraft carriers. Submarine warfare specialists say the Akula remains the core of the Russian attack submarine force. The submarines can fire both cruise missiles and torpedoes, and are equipped with the SSN-21 and SSN-27 submarine-launched cruise missiles, as well as SSN-15 anti-submarine-warfare missiles. The submarines also can lay mines. The SSN-21 has a range of up to 1,860 miles.

Nyquist/Red Spread Prodict

Their authors are wrong – we are rightChristopher Ruddy, Media Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, “Russia and China Prepare for War -- Part 8: Why are Most Americans Oblivious to These Terrifying Facts?,” NEWSMAX, March 17, 1999, http://archive.newsmax.com/articles/?a=1999/3/17/151001.

Why Are Most Americans Oblivious to These Terrifying Facts? There are many reasons: 1. In today's society, where hundreds of stories compete for attention, a story must be reported over and over again, and repeated by several different types of media (such as TV and newspapers and news magazines) before it penetrates the public consciousness. 2. The establishment press has not regularly reported on military developments in Russia . Most media have unthinkingly swallowed the Clinton line that "Russia and China are our friends" hook, line and sinker 3. Media omissions and distortions, coupled with Clinton administration propaganda about "our friend Russia" and "our friend, China," has left the overwhelming majority of those in Congress and the military totally ignorant of the new military threat posed by the Russians and Chinese. 4. US military leaders who are aware Russian rearmament and US disarmament in their particular area of expertise (for instance strategic bombers), may be unaware of the big picture , i.e., how extensive those trends are . Further, military officials may want to speak out, may fear being fired or blacklisted from employment bv defense contractors after they leave the military. Many probably also buy the official line that "the Cold War is over" so there's no reason to be concerned about Russian military exercises or overflights of the US or the closure of US military bases. Others may believe, with some justification, there is no one in the mainstream they can turn to who will honestly report Russian rearmament and US disarmament. 5. Russia appears to be making most of its preparations in the open , so as not to arouse suspicion, lulling US observers into a false sense of security. After all, if the Russians are conducting military exercises out in the open and announcing redeployment of missiles to the seas, there can't be anything sinister about it, can there? 6. The idea of a REAL nuclear war that would destroy America is so alien to most Americans, that most can't even imagine it much less try to stop it. Unfortunately this is not the case in Russia which discussed and threatened nuclear war against the United States for 50 years. Russian strategic military planning has been based on a nuclear war with the US for decades. Unlike Americans who believe that "there are no winners in nuclear war," Russia's leaders believe they can win a nuclear confrontation. Having lived through repeated invasions bv foreign enemies, such as the Nazi destruction of Stalingrad, the Russian people know from first-hand experience thev and their nation can survive and recover from enormous military devastation. 7. America's Intelligence Agencies can not be totally relied upon. Clinton has drastically reduced the number of CIA personnel in covert operations - the cloak-and-dagger spies necessary for getting first hand information. The United States has unquestioned technical spying ability. However, there are limits to what we can discern about Russian intentions and plans from spy

satellites. That's when it counts to have a man in the Kremlin. However, the US has never had a top-level spy in Russia's intelligence services above the rank of colonel. No senior members of the Politburo or any members of the Russian general staff have ever defected to the West. Even in Fast Germany and Cuba, all our "top" spies have all turned out to be double agents for the communists.

The only sources that aren’t tainted by the KGB are those that have no connection with Russian military intelligence, professorships or large book dealsNyquist ‘9 [J.R, renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, “Never Ask the Wolves to Help You Against the Dogs,” 8-21, http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/analysis.html //GBS-JV]

But the reader must stop and set all this aside. In Russia all facts are attended by a bodyguard of fiction. Wild opinions bearing the character of insanity, mixed with conspiracy theory, mixed with rumor, mixed with fantastic speculations and a dash of truth -- leaves everyone hypnotized by an illusory parade of vivid images. In Filin's account of the Arctic Sea, everything is probable except for the concluding details; and nothing is independently verified. The story is about a superpower struggle involving the Middle East, but ends up centering on the conflict between Moscow and Kiev. The president of Ukraine, who was poisoned by the KGB five years ago, is fighting against pro-Russian forces in the Ukrainian government. He struggles against pro-Russian voices in the Ukrainian media. He struggles against a parliament dominated by Russian agents. Is it not outrageous that American special forces siezed the Arctic Sea? Is it not outrageous that Ukraine's president should take the side of the United States? One may assume there were negotiations between Moscow and Washington, and a resolution of the matter. (Perhaps the missiles would have to return to Russia.) But the truth of the matter? If you want to find the truth about Russia, if you want to penetrate the reality of Russia's KGB regime, then you should not seek the truth among the paid minions and military hangers-on of the Soviet past. The truth, in our time, is more likely to come from people who have no ties to Russian military intelligence, no professorships, no large book deals, and no part in Moscow's ongoing disinformation campaign. On the American side, the situation is no different. The deepest truths do not appear in the major media, at the offices of the CIA or NSA, or within Congress, or the State Department.

Nyquist is right about RussiaRuddy ’99 [Chris. Hoover Institution Fellow of War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford. “Russia May Launch a Surprise Attack Against the US” www.newsmax.com, 12 March 99]

In early 1998, Nyquist predicted that authorities in Russia would deliberately implode their own economy to advance their political and military agendas. There were several reasons. First, that would divert

attention from the theft of billions of dollars by government officials from "privatized" companies, and provide a convenient explanation why none of them were making any money. Second, by engendering Russia's economic collapse and blaming the West, the necessary psychological atmosphere for war against the US would be created. Another outcome of Russia's economic collapse, Nyquist said, would be the emergence of a series of progressively stronger and more militarist Russian leaders. Primakov -- Yeltsin's Prime Minister -- perfectly fits Nyquist's prediction. He's a former hard-line, anti-American KGB general. Nyquist also predicted that Russia would ally with China. That, too, has now taken place, as you'll see below. Finally, Nyquist predicted that Russia would stockpile huge quantities of food and other supplies for war, and begin moving their nuclear weapons on to their naval ships where they are much more difficult to monitor and deter. All of this has occurred.

Venezuela Aff ***Don’t Read With Russia Adv

AT: Russia CP

Doesn’t solve the case --- Russia will not be able to successfully expand energy coop with Venezuela Blank 10 – Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S Army War College (April 13, 2010, “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf)

<Still, while Russia will continue expanding its ties to Latin America, Russia’s capacities for deep involvement are less than it wants, as is Latin American states’ ability to support Russian goals. This is especially true for countries like Venezuela that depend on energy or commodities revenues, as their capabilities have also declined due to the global economic crisis. Thus Russia will only partially, if at all, meet Latin American expectations for support, even in stricken economies like Cuba. Likewise, Russian companies charged with developing relations with Latin America recently acknowledged that little or no economic expansion will occur anytime soon. For example, even though Russia and Venezuela ostentatiously agreed to create oil and gas companies, Russian companies have few liquid assets for investing in Latin America. Indeed, Russia habitually makes grandiose claims and then fails to implement them, as we can see in Moscow’s energy programs in Siberia, the Far East and Central Asia. Not surprisingly, even

Venezuela displays skepticism about Russia’s ability to transform its ties to Venezuela, which are mainly in arms sales, into a relationship based on large-scale investment and diplomatic coordination.>

Latin America prefers cooperation with the US instead of Russia Blank 10 – Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S Army War College (April 13, 2010, “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf)

<While these points accord with Russian rhetoric, Latin American elites overwhelmingly prefer cooperation with the United States based on its acceptance and appreciation of their needs interests and views. They refuse to be pawns once again in a new version of the Cold War. Indeed, Brazilian President Inacio “Lula” da Silva openly expressed his hope that President Obama implements a ‘preferential’ relationship with Latin America. Unfortunately, Russian and Venezuelan foreign policies, albeit for different reasons, aim to embroil the continent in a contest with the United States. Russia still covets a global, or even superpower, status equal to that of the United States and therefore wants to join every international club that exists, whether or not it has any real interests in the area.23 Thus Russia

expressed to Argentina its interest in becoming an observer at the South American Defense Council that is part of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Russia also wants to participate as an observer in the Latin American Association of Training Centers for Peace Operations (Alcopaz).This craving for status lies at the heart of Russian foreign policy. Consequently Russian policy in Latin America is ultimately an American policy. It aims to instrumentalize Latin America as a series of countries or even a weak, but still discernible,political bloc to support Russian positions against U.S. policy and dominance in world affairs. Therefore Russia argues that Latin American states that wish to challenge America need to rely on Moscow. Thus President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua pledged to Russia Nicaragua’s opposition to a “unipolar” world and welcomed Russian presence in Latin America as a sign of opposition to that unipolarity by saying “extreme conditions are being created in Latin America and all the governments are welcoming Russia’s presence.” Chávez’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had similar objectives in mind.>

AT: Russia SOI DA

Venezuela Relations with Russia are gone with Chavez Tarasenko and Safronov 13 (March 11, 2013, “Will Russia’s Cozy Relationship with Venezuela Die with Chavez” http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/will-russia-039-s-cozy-relationship-with-venezuela-die-with-chavez-/venezuela-chavez-russia-oil-military-trade-weapons/c1s11149/)

<Nicolas Maduro said that America’s military attaché, David Delmonaco, would be removed because he was destabilizing the country. A couple of hours later, the vice-president was on the TV again. “Commandante Hugo Chavez died at 4:25 p.m. local time,” he announced with a shaky voice, and called on Venezuelans to come together and wipe away their tears. “Viva Hugo Chavez,” he said, raising his fist in a symbol of victory.Thousands of people filled the streets in Caracas, and Venezuela entered a weeklong national mourning. Chavez was buried on Friday, and Russia sent the head of Rosneft energy giant Igor Sechin, Minister of Industry Denis Manturov and the general director of Rostechnology.Now Venezuela is preparing to elect a new president. No matter who wins, whether it is Chavez’s designated successor or the opposition candidate, experts say that there will likely be serious changes.“No new government is going to continue the sharp anti-Americanism that Chavez governed with," explained Fedor Lukyanov, a representative of the Russian Council on Foreign Relations. "If Maduro wins, the relationship between Caracas and Washington will improve. If the opposition wins, then the country will totally reorient itself towards the United States.”  The Kremlin has expressed hope that “the positive and constructive Russian-Venezuelan relations will remain unchanged.” But Lukyanov is convinced to the contrary: “The 2000s were an anomaly, when Venezuela became one of Russia’s most important world trade partners, and that anomaly is unlikely to survive Chavez’s death, because it was connected to Chavez personally, to his personal political views and ambitions.”Another experts says: “many of the agreements between Caracas and Moscow will remain, at least on paper, but others will likely be revisited.” <Vladimir Semago, the vice-head of the Russian-Venezuelan Commerce Council is even more emphatic. “Now that Hugo Chavez is gone, all of this pretense of friendship with Venezuela will go, too,” he told Kommersant. “There was never any real partnership between our countries, there were only attempts to convince Russians that Moscow was colonizing Latin America, like it did in Africa during Soviet times.”According to Semago, one of the most ambitious projects – the creation of an oil consortium that is a partnership between the Russian national companies and the Venezuelan oil company – is a “total myth.”“The consortium was never allowed to do anything and never accomplished anything. There were only ever two Russian companies that were interested, anyway,” Semago explained. 

There are even more questions about the future of Russian-Venezuelan military partnerships, because those deals were always intimately connected to Chavez himself. When Chavez visited Moscow in 2004, he signed the first two major military contracts, for over $550 million worth of military equipment. “The work was hard, but as soon as Chavez got involved, it was like there was suddenly understanding on both sides,” said a source familiar with the negotiations. “And in all of the subsequent weapons negotiations he took a very direct role.” In 2011, Chavez was able to get an agreement for Russia to extend a $4 billion dollar credit to Venezuela for weapons purchases. “Even though extending this credit was basically suicide, we still did it, because it was important for us to maintain a good relationship with Caracas,” explained a source in the Federal service for military partnerships. “But when it became clear that you couldn’t have a dialogue with anyone but Chavez himself, the other members of the Venezuelan delegation stopped making an effort to work with us.” >

Venezuela Neg

Russian Expansion Answers

Fails

Russian expansionism fails – costs, expertise, and lack of real influence Romero, 10 - Brazil bureau chief for The New York Times and covers Brazil and several other countries in South America (Simon, “Putin Visits Venezuela to Discuss Oil and Arms”, The New York Times, 4-2-10, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/world/americas/03venez.html?_r=0)//KG

CARACAS, Venezuela — Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin of Russia visited Venezuela on Friday to sign a series of military and oil agreements with President Hugo Chávez, who is seeking to expand ties with Russia as a way of countering the influence of the United States in Latin America. Mr. Putin’s one-day visit built on a relationship rooted in billions of dollars of Russian arms sales to Venezuela over the past decade. Venezuela has also emerged as one of Russia’s most vocal supporters, recognizing two Russian-backed separatist enclaves of Georgia in 2009 and applauding Russian efforts to advance the ambitions of an embryonic group of gas-rich nations. Russia’s warm ties with Venezuela are also opening the way for it to improve relations with a handful of other countries in Latin America, notably Bolivia. President Evo Morales of Bolivia, a staunch critic of the Obama administration and a major recipient of Venezuelan aid, was also expected to discuss cooperation agreements with Mr. Putin here on Friday night. Still, obstacles persist

to a more assertive Russian expansion in Venezuela beyond the sphere of weapons sales and political engagement with Mr. Chávez’s allies. As if to illustrate these challenges, the highlights of Mr. Putin’s visit included the sale of 2,250 Russian-built Lada vehicles to Venezuela’s government, and the delivery of four MI-17 helicopters to Mr. Chávez’s military, even though Mr. Chávez had suggested before Mr. Putin’s arrival that the countries could cooperate ambitiously on nuclear energy and a satellite-launching base in Venezuela. Relatively low oil revenues in

both Russia and Venezuela may also hamper their plans to build

complex and expensive oil projects in southern Venezuela. One oil

venture discussed by senior Venezuelan and Russian officials here this

week would require at least $18 billion in investments . Still, Mr. Putin signaled seriousness over Russia’s oil ambitions here by agreeing to pay $600 million in signing fees. Skepticism also lingers over Russia’s capacity to expand its influence in the hemisphere after the Soviet Union, with more resources, achieved few tangible results in Central and South America during the cold war. “Russia, whatever its leaders’ ambitions, mostly lacks the wherewithal to mount an enduring diplomatic and economic offensive in Latin America,” said Stephen Kotkin, a Russia specialist at Princeton University. Disarray in Venezuela’s oil industry has contributed to intensifying electricity blackouts, not to

mention undermining its ability to play a more influential role in the gas-exporters group that Russia is supporting. Venezuela still needs to import natural gas from neighboring Colombia and has been unable to increase its own natural gas output to fuel power plants around the country. Mr. Chávez insisted in a news conference on Friday that Venezuela and Russia were prepared to work together to build nuclear energy projects here to alleviate the electricity shortages (officials here have also referred to nuclear cooperation with Iran). But the timing of such projects remains vague, and the cost and scientific expertise needed to carry out such plans remain outside of Venezuela’s reach, according to studies by independent nuclear specialists.

No Expansion

Russian-Venezuelan cooperation will be limited --- won’t create more international influenceChristou 13 – London School of Economics and Political Science with an MSC in International Relations.  (April 21, 2013, “Russia and Venezuela after Chavez” http://blog.futureforeignpolicy.com/2013/04/21/russia-and-venezuela-after-chavez/)

<So the future of Russo-Venezuelan relationship depends on two things. One is how Nicolas Maduro chooses to pursue his foreign policy should he win the upcoming election, which looks ever more likely. The other, and more important factor, is the international events which occur in the near and further future.  The unfolding North Korean crisis suggests that   Russia may co-operate   with the US to achieve de-escalation , continuing its quest for greater involvement in the Korean Peninsula which will also allow it to influence events and be seen as a mediator. Obviously Venezuela holds less clout internationally, but in the case of a Maduro victory it seems likely that anti-US rhetoric will continue. As such, all indications point to continued Russo-Venezuelan co-operation, in the spheres of trade and energy, however that the relationship will evolve to one with greater international influence seems unlikely. Instead, it suits both parties to focus on their co-operation at the micro-level . This allows Russia influence in South America, a trade market and access to Venezuela’s highly sought after energy supplies. For Venezuela it means the access to arms, but more importantly the claim to a major international ally. In all it is a relationship of convenience for both and one which looks set to continue.>

Venezuela Relations with Russia are gone with Chavez Tarasenko and Safronov 13 (March 11, 2013, “Will Russia’s Cozy Relationship with Venezuela Die with Chavez” http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/will-russia-039-s-cozy-relationship-with-venezuela-die-with-chavez-/venezuela-chavez-russia-oil-military-trade-weapons/c1s11149/)

<Nicolas Maduro said that America’s military attaché, David Delmonaco, would be removed because he was destabilizing the country. A couple of hours later, the vice-president was on the TV again. “Commandante Hugo Chavez died at 4:25 p.m. local time,” he announced with a shaky voice, and called on Venezuelans to come together and wipe away their tears. “Viva Hugo Chavez,” he said, raising his fist in a symbol of victory.Thousands of people filled the streets in Caracas, and Venezuela entered a weeklong national mourning. Chavez was buried on Friday, and Russia sent the head of Rosneft energy giant Igor Sechin, Minister of Industry Denis Manturov and the general director of Rostechnology.

Now Venezuela is preparing to elect a new president. No matter who wins, whether it is Chavez’s designated successor or the opposition candidate, experts say that there will likely be serious changes.“No new government is going to continue the sharp anti-Americanism that Chavez governed with," explained Fedor Lukyanov, a representative of the Russian Council on Foreign Relations. "If Maduro wins, the relationship between Caracas and Washington will improve. If the opposition wins, then the country will totally reorient itself towards the United States.”  The Kremlin has expressed hope that “the positive and constructive Russian-Venezuelan relations will remain unchanged.” But Lukyanov is convinced to the contrary: “The 2000s were an anomaly, when Venezuela became one of Russia’s most important world trade partners, and that anomaly is unlikely to survive Chavez’s death, because it was connected to Chavez personally, to his personal political views and ambitions.”Another experts says: “many of the agreements between Caracas and Moscow will remain, at least on paper, but others will likely be revisited.” <Vladimir Semago, the vice-head of the Russian-Venezuelan Commerce Council is even more emphatic. “Now that Hugo Chavez is gone, all of this pretense of friendship with Venezuela will go, too,” he told Kommersant. “There was never any real partnership between our countries, there were only attempts to convince Russians that Moscow was colonizing Latin America, like it did in Africa during Soviet times.”According to Semago, one of the most ambitious projects – the creation of an oil consortium that is a partnership between the Russian national companies and the Venezuelan oil company – is a “total myth.”“The consortium was never allowed to do anything and never accomplished anything. There were only ever two Russian companies that were interested, anyway,” Semago explained. There are even more questions about the future of Russian-Venezuelan military partnerships, because those deals were always intimately connected to Chavez himself. When Chavez visited Moscow in 2004, he signed the first two major military contracts, for over $550 million worth of military equipment. “The work was hard, but as soon as Chavez got involved, it was like there was suddenly understanding on both sides,” said a source familiar with the negotiations. “And in all of the subsequent weapons negotiations he took a very direct role.” In 2011, Chavez was able to get an agreement for Russia to extend a $4 billion dollar credit to Venezuela for weapons purchases. “Even though extending this credit was basically suicide, we still did it, because it was important for us to maintain a good relationship with Caracas,” explained a source in the Federal service for military partnerships. “But when it became clear that you couldn’t have a dialogue with anyone but Chavez himself, the other members of the Venezuelan delegation stopped making an effort to work with us.” >

Russia’s involvement superficialBlank, 10 --- Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (4/13/2010, Stephen J., “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf, JMP)

Still, while Russia will continue expanding its ties to Latin America, Russia’s capacities for deep involvement are less than it wants, as is Latin American states’ ability to support Russian goals. This is especially true for countries like Venezuela that depend on energy or commodities revenues, as their capabilities have also declined due to the global economic crisis. Thus Russia will only partially, if at all, meet Latin American expectations for support, even in stricken economies like Cuba.5 Likewise, Russian companies charged with developing relations with Latin America recently acknowledged that little or no economic expansion will occur anytime soon. For example, even though Russia and Venezuela ostentatiously agreed to create oil and gas companies, Russian companies have few liquid assets for investing in Latin America.6 Indeed, Russia habitually makes grandiose claims and then fails to implement them, as we can see in Moscow’s energy programs in Siberia, the Far East and Central Asia.7 Not surprisingly, even Venezuela displays skepticism about Russia’s ability to transform its ties to Venezuela, which are mainly in arms sales, into a relationship based on large-scale investment and diplomatic coordination.8

Russia is not making real inroads into Latin AmericaBlank, 10 --- Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (4/13/2010, Stephen J., “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf, JMP)

Despite’s Russia’s efforts to make economic inroads in South America, and especially Venezuela, in fact its actual achievements

are modest , especially in view of the current global economic crisis whose repercussions are felt everywhere. Cuba may want restoration of former economic cooperation with Russia, but Russia cannot afford such cooperation beyond a few economic sectors like energy or arms sales. The Russo-Cuban relationship’s economic dimension is quite limited compared to what it was a generation ago.88 Neither is truly large-scale Russian investment in Venezuela possible. Accordingly, projects like the plan to carry gas from Venezuela to Argentina across the Amazon basin, which was under-financed to begin with and economically senseless as well, will probably not go anywhere.89 Moreover, in fact few projects have actually been signed or carried out, or will be. Additionally, there are serious problems (as is frequently the case) with the quality of Russian weapons and Venezuelan maintenance of them.90 Medvedev

sidestepped Chávez’s call for a real alliance and no major agrements were signed during his trip.91Indeed, Cuba may be turning back to Moscow because it cannot depend any longer on Venezuela’s energy supplies, due to the crisis.92 Similarly, although Nicaragua seeks larger trade links with Russia, China and Latin American members of ALBA, the difficulties are immense. While Ortega acknowledges the presence of a crisis, it is unlikely that Moscow and Beijing will create an ALBA monetary zone based on a regional currency, as he wishes to do.93 For the same reason, the agreement between Moscow and Caracas to trade in their national currencies may not go far.94

No Threat to U.S.

Unlike Venezuela, Russian foreign policy interests largely intersect with those of the U.S.Christou 13 – London School of Economics and Political Science with an MSC in International Relations.  (April 21, 2013, “Russia and Venezuela after Chavez” http://blog.futureforeignpolicy.com/2013/04/21/russia-and-venezuela-after-chavez/)<But despite this continuation in rhetoric and action, the international context may or may not affect how the relationship continues.   Some claim , Maduro is even more anti-American than his predecessor and arguably Russia and Putin have hardened their stance towards the United States in recent years as the “reset’ in their relationship failed to take off. However, a notable difference arises when one considers the actions of both states towards the US. Russia, despite its quest for great power status has in many cases fallen in line with American foreign policy goals. North Korea is a good example. While Russia has never issued rhetoric as strong as that of the United States, Russian politicians have always stressed Russian desire to mediate in the ongoing disputes arising from North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapon capability. In fact, in the current impasse which is arising following continued North Korean provocations Russia’s Foreign Ministry essentially fell in line with the US view: “For Russia – which is a member of United Nation’s Security Council – this is completely unacceptable”. Another example where Russia has essentially fallen in line was 9/11, when Vladimir Putin pledged co-operation with the US to defeat terrorism – the link here was obviously Russian desire to justify its own actions against what is saw as domestic terrorism in Chechnya. Obviously, disagreements still exists, and serious ones at that. Syria is a major case in point, with Russia having blocked three Security Council resolutions to date. None-the-less the Russian side has called for alleviation of the crisis, and in broader terms that even the Americans would be reluctant to intervene in the conflict. But the point is that Russian foreign policy can in many cases correspond with that of the US. Russia won’t always agree with the US but its actions in the foreign policy arena suggest a mindset where domestic considerations will prevail, and even if these don’t correspond with American desires rhetoric will be strong but overly scornful . >

No Crowd Out

Aff can’t solve – both sides are too motivated to cooperate and counter US influence AP, 10 - Associated Press (“Chavez: Russia Offers Venezuela Nuclear Help”, Fox News, 4-3-10, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/04/03/chavez-russia-offers-venezuela-nuclear-help/)//KG

CARACAS, Venezuela – Russia has agreed to help Venezuela draw up plans for a nuclear power plant, President Hugo Chavez said Friday. Atomic energy was one of many areas of cooperation discussed as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin made his first visit to the South American country. "We're ready to start drawing up the first plan of a nuclear power plant, obviously with peaceful aims," Chavez said. Chavez had announced plans to turn to Russia for nuclear help in the past. He did not give details on how much Venezuela is prepared to invest, or how long it might take. Russia and Venezuela also launched a joint business to tap vast oil deposits in eastern Venezuela, and Chavez said Moscow has offered to help Venezuela set up its own space industry including a satellite launch site. Putin also pledged to keep selling arms to Venezuela. Chavez's government has already bought more than $4 billion in Russian weapons since 2005, including helicopters, fighter jets and 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles. "We will continue supporting and developing Venezuela's defense capabilities," said Putin, who headed back to Moscow after the one-day visit. He noted Russia has agreed to lend Venezuela up to $2.2 billion for additional arms deals and said Venezuela has yet to use any of those funds. Chavez said the two governments were discussing new arms deals but did not give details. Officials signed 31 agreements during Putin's visit to deepen cooperation in areas from air transport to agriculture. Russia is sending more than 2,000 Lada cars to Venezuela, Chavez said. Putin said there are plans to eventually assemble the cars in Venezuela. Chavez has grown increasingly close to Russia, Iran and China while fiercely criticizing U.S. policies, and his calls for countering U.S. influence to create a "multi-polar world" have found resonance in Moscow. "Our objective is to make the world more democratic, make it balanced and multi-polar," Putin said. "The cooperation between Russia and Venezuela in this context has special importance." When asked by a reporter how the U.S. might view Venezuela's growing defense spending, Chavez noted Washington has barred arms sales to his government. "The Yankee empire doesn't want us to have one single little plane," he said, adding: "We don't really care what Washington thinks. We aren't making alliances here against Washington." Putin said if the United States doesn't want to sell arms to Venezuela, "well, for us that's good." Chavez said Thursday that Russia has offered to help Venezuela set up a "satellite launcher and a factory" to help Venezuela establish its own space industry. He didn't give details or say how much that might cost. Venezuela launched its first communications

satellite from China in 2008. The U.S. State Department poked fun at Chavez's suggestion that Venezuela may set up a space industry with Russian help. "We would note that the government of Venezuela was largely closed this week due to energy shortages," spokesman P.J. Crowley told reporters. "To the extent that Venezuela is going to expend resources on behalf of its people, perhaps the focus should be more terrestrial than extraterrestrial." Worsening electricity shortages prompted Chavez's government to decree public holidays throughout this week to save energy. A severe drought has pushed water levels to precarious lows at the dam that supplies most of Venezuela's electricity. Putin said Russia's government sees Venezuela as something of a bridge for deepening ties with Latin America, and noted that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev plans to visit Brazil soon. Bolivian President Evo Morales met in private with Putin at Chavez's presidential palace Friday night. Bolivia is requesting a loan from Russia to buy helicopters to help combat drug trafficking, Morales said. Venezuela's state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA has formed a joint venture with a consortium of five Russian oil companies to drill for and process heavy crude in the Orinoco River basin in eastern Venezuela. The five companies — Rosneft, Lukoil, TNK-BP, Gazprom and Surgutneftegas — have agreed to pay the Venezuelan government $1 billion for the right to help develop an area known as Junin 6, and Putin handed Chavez a folder containing what he said was a $600 million down payment. Venezuela also agreed to allow the companies to be involved in three other areas in the crude-rich Orinoco region. Political analysts in Moscow say Russia is drawn to Venezuela because of the its anti-U.S. rhetoric, though business deals have helped cement the growing relationship. "The only thing that really unites Russia and Venezuela is that they don't want to see a unipolar world," dominated by the U.S., said Sergei Mikheyev, an analyst at the Center for Political Technologies, adding that President Barack Obama's administration hasn't done enough to lure Moscow away from Caracas. But, he said, "Without the business involved, the anti-American rhetoric wouldn't be enough to unite Russia and Venezuela." Chavez presented Putin with the Order of the Liberator — Venezuela's highest honor — and gave him a replica of a sword used by South American independence hero Simon Bolivar — the namesake of Chavez's socialist-inspired "Bolivarian Revolution." Putin kissed the replica sword and said: "Russia from the start has supported Latin America's struggle for independence."

Aff can’t solve – Russia and Venezuelan cooperation is multifaceted and both are determined to challenge the USKroth, 12 - Pravda journalist (Olivia, “Venezuela’s partnership with Russia : An emblematic step”, Voltairenet, 7-16-12, http://www.voltairenet.org/article174988.html)//KG

Under President Chávez, Venezuela is enjoying good relations with Russia as one of its most important trade and military partners in Latin America. By strengthening the Venezuelan-Russian ties, Hugo Chávez wants to help creating a multi-polar world, “a world that permits the rights of peoples to liberty, self-determination and

sovereignty”. Over the past years, while the Russian Federation has been led by Vladimir Putin either as Prime Minister or as President, the ties between Chávez and Putin have become stronger. Both leaders are ardent patriots, proud to serve their respective countries which they love with great intensity. Both men share similar views on many topics, for example the role of the USA in global economics. Hugo Chávez agreed with Vladimir Putin’s opinion that the USA is an “economic parasite” because of its “constant instability and high debts, living far beyond its means and transferring the burden of its problems to the entire world economy.” On Venezuelan television (VTV) President Chávez repeated Vladimir Putin’s words, demanding Venezuela to “ free itself

from the parasite ” . Venezuela has the largest oil reserves and is the fifth biggest oil exporter world-wide. In the twelve years of Hugo Chávez’ government, Venezuela transferred its international funds from US banks to other banks in different parts of the world. Furthermore Venezuela paid back all of its debts to US banks and ended its dependence on the IMF. Venezuela is a strategic business partner for Russia in the exploitation of gas and crude oil. Since 2005, Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA and the Russian oil company Lukoil have been drilling oil in the Venezuelan Orinoco Oil Belt together. Another joint venture contract was signed in 2011 between Russia’s Rosneft and PDVSA to exploit the oil reserves of the blocs Carabobo-2 North and East. Rosneft holds 40 percent, PDVSA owns the majority of 60 percent. Since 2008, PDVSA has furthermore been drilling gas jointly with Russia’s Gazprom in the Gulf of Venezuela. The Caribbean Gas Belt, which stretches along the coast of Venezuela, contains 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. President Chávez wants his country to produce its own gas with Russian help, thanks to the transfer of Russian technology and training. “It is a great advantage for Venezuela to count on Russia’s presence and Gazprom in the Gulf”, Hugo Chávez pointed out. Another shared Venezuelan-Russian enterprise is the mining of gold in Venezuela’s gold mines, Las Cristinas and Las Brisas. Both gold deposits were nationalized under the Chávez Government. The Russian firm Rusoro was granted partnership with Venezuelan state mining companies. To finance these projects, a bi-national bank was created in 2009. Russia’s Gazprombank and VTB control 51 percent, Venezuela’s PDVSA and the National Treasury own 49 percent. The bi-national bank’s headquarters are located in Moscow, with offices established in Caracas and Beijing. The bi-national bank aims to boost financial cooperation between Venezuela and Russia. According to President Chávez, this bank is a step on the way “to transform the financial architecture of the 21st century”. As Russia’s President Vladimir Putin remarked, the commercial exchange between Russia and Venezuela saw “a tenfold increase in 2011”. Russia exports busses to Venezuela, while the Russian car company Lada is looking to open up factories in Venezuela. The Latin American partner sends agricultural products to Russia: cacao, flowers and plantains (bananas). Ruso-Venezolana Orquídea S.A., a mixed Russian-Venezuelan enterprise for the export/import of Venezuelan orchids to Russia, is building a special cargo terminal in the airport of Caracas-Maiquetía (IAIM), in the state of

Vargas. Ricardo Javier Sánchez, director of the enterprise, recently presented the construction project with special installations to keep the orchids beautiful and fresh while being packed and transported all the way to Russia, their final destination. In addition, Venezuela’s socialist agricultural Mission, Gran Misión AgroVenezuela, wants to export more homegrown tropical fruits to Russia: mangos, melons, pineapples. Coffee export shall also be boosted in the coming years. At the beginning of June this year, a Russian delegation, presided by Denis Manturov, Russia’s Minister of Industry and Commerce, visited Venezuela and inspected the site of Fuerte Tiuna in Caracas, where sixteen new apartment buildings were erected with Russian assistance. Each apartment measures between 60 and 70 square meters, comprising two or three rooms, bathroom and kitchen. Venezuela built 10.000 new homes with Russian materials and technology, 6.000 in Fuerte Tiuna, a barrio of the capital city, another 4.000 in Turmerito, a quarter of Turmero, in the state of Aragua. Of course, Russian-Venezuelan arms deals are the main theme of western mainstream press reports, but in reality they are only one of many areas of cooperation. “We want peace”, Hugo Chávez assures, “but in order to preserve the security and tranquility of our nation it is necessary to strengthen our defense”. In view of the alleged ending for the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the endangered socialist Syrian Arab Republic, his words acquire a special meaning. They might sound exaggerated in NATO ears but are well understood in non-aligned countries. Professor Franz J. T. Lee, who teaches political science at the University of the Andes in Mérida/Venezuela, wrote in his essay The Gaddafi paradigm and our dim chance of surviving against global fascism: “Among the grievous errors of the government of Libya are the following: if you are swimming in an ocean of oil and fresh water, you must know that no matter how you try to escape, in the end the Orwellian bloody NATO army boots will come for you. Hence prepare yourself for the coming struggle.” [1] President Hugo Chávez heard the message and is preparing himself for the coming struggle by stepping up the military training and equipment of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, mainly with Russian armament imports. In another article Franz J. T. Lee asked, “Could Venezuela see her future in the oily crystal ball in Libya?” “Nothing more than the fact of possessing the largest oil reserves of the earth, as is the case in Venezuela, can lead to belligerent invasions. Therefore, watch out, Venezuela!” [2] President Chávez seems to foresee danger for himself in the oily crystal ball in Libya. He repeatedly expressed his fears of meeting the same fate as the Jamahiriya’s Great Brother Leader Muammar Gaddafi. “We see that imperialism has dropped its mask, has put aside morals and found a pretext to bomb Libyan towns, killing Libyan civilians”, Hugo Chávez stated in an interview, adding that the imperialists placed him in the same category as Gaddafi, depicting him as a “cruel dictator”. One of Venezuela’s leading intellectuals, Luis Britto García, the author of more than 70 books, explained the situation of the Jamahiriya in a poetic way, interpreting Libyan proverbs in his essay When you see Libya burning (Cuando veas arder Libia): “A Libyan proverb says, ‘Watch out for the malignance of the one to whom you give favors’. The first condition a country has to fulfill in order to be invaded is to possess crude oil and gas reserves. – ‘When cattle dies, the knives are

taken out’, admonishes another Libyan proverb. The second condition for a country to be invaded is to exercise sovereignty over its natural resources.” [3] Indeed, the parallels to Venezuela are striking, only a blind person would be unable to see them. President Chávez certainly does not suffer from blindness and is taking precautions. As early as September 2008, Russia sent Tupolev TU-160 bombers for training flights to Venezuela. In November 2008, both countries held joint naval exercises in the Caribbean Sea. The Russian flotilla, including the nuclear-powered warship “Peter the Great”, was dispatched from Russia’s arctic base in Severomorsk. The Russian Federation sells various kinds of weapons and military equipment to Venezuela, including shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, attack helicopters, combat aircraft, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled howitzers, self-propelled mortars, assault rifles, sniper rifles, ammunition. According to The Voice of Russia, the latest Russian armament shipment reached Puerto Cabello, Venezuela’s overseas port, in May this year, carrying tanks of the types BTR-80A and BMP-3M, multiple rocket launchers “Smerch” and anti-aircraft missiles S-300V. The Venezuelan Government also received various kinds of ammunition and training simulators. A Russian state official, Sergei Goreslavski, confirmed that the Russian Federation is constructing a maintenance center for military equipment in Venezuela, specialized on repairing helicopters of the types Mi-17B5, Mi-26T2 and Mi-35M2. Meanwhile, Venezuela is not merely an importer any more, but has started producing its own armament and military equipment with Russian

help . The country produces two types of “Catatumbo” rifles with Russian design. The first type is modeled after the famous Russian assault rifle Kalashnikov AK-103, designed by Mikhail Kalashnikov in 1994 and manufactured by Izmash in Russia. The Venezuelan Army uses the standard issue of this weapon which is now manufactured in the state of Maracuy. The aim is to produce 50.000 units per year. The Venezuelan assault rifle has a caliber of 7.62x39 mm, the same as AK-103. It has a range of 400 meters and can be used with or without telescope, General Morales of the Venezuelan Armed Forces informed. The second type is modeled after the Russian Dragunov rifle, designed by Yevgeny Dragunov between 1958 and 1963, manufactured by Izmash in Russia as well. The “Snayperskaya Vintovka Dragunova” (SVD) is a semi-automatic sniper rifle, designed as a squad support weapon. The Venezuelan equivalent has a caliber of 7.62x51 mm, an effective range of 800 meters and a maximum range of 1300 meters with telescope. The series of rifles, made in Venezuela, is named “Catatumbo”, after a river that flows into Lake Maracaibo in the state of Zulia. “Catatumbo” lightning occurs over the marshlands at the Maracaibo mouth of the Catatumbo river during storms at night. The very strong light can be seen up to 400 kilometers away and has been used for ship navigation. It was therefore also called the “Maracaibo Beacon”. The beacon of the Venezuelan Armed Forces is its series of “Catatumbo” rifles. The newest feat which President Chávez proudly presented a few days ago is Venezuela’s fist unarmed drone, built with joint Russian – Iranian – Chinese technology and assistance. “It is one of three aircraft that we

have made, and we will continue to manufacture them”, he announced. The drone has a range of 100 kilometers, can reach an altitude of 3000 meters and stay aloft for up to 90 minutes. It transmits real-time video and images. The 3x4 meter drone is part of Venezuela’s defense system, aimed at the monitoring of dams, pipelines and other infrastructure. Venezuela has begun to sell weapons and military vehicles to other Latin American

countries within the alliances of ALBA and UNASUR . Julio Morales Prieto, director of Cavim (Companía Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares), where the Venezuelan drone is built, says that other Latin American states want to buy the drone. During a meeting on the 9th of June, when the Russian delegation visited the Miraflores Palace in Caracas, President Chávez said that “Venezuela has the right to defend itself. We have the constitutional obligation to keep our Armed Forces well equipped, well trained and in high spirits morally for national defense.” On Venezuelan TV the President remarked that the Venezuelan-Russian meeting was a “signal of both governments’ political will to continue strengthening bilateral relations and with these to contribute to a balanced world”. In the cultural area, Russian-Venezuelan cooperation has been intensified as well. The Russian language is taught in national education centers of Venezuela, supervised by the Agency of Cooperation with Russia. These centers organize activities to introduce Russian culture and history in Venezuela, for example with exhibitions, seminars and workshops. Thus, on the 15th of April 2012, a Russian Music Festival was inaugurated in the Art Center Daniel Suárez of Caracas. Tatiana Rusakova, a Russian specialist in Venezuela, pointed out that interest in the Russian culture is growing. “This is due to the fact that Russian-Venezuelan ties have been intensified during the last ten years. In 2011, a group of Venezuelan students visited a number of Russian cities with the program Simón Bolívar 2007-2013.” Tatiana Rusakova also emphasized that more and more Venezuelans are enrolling in Russian language courses. The Central University of Venezuela in Caracas trains future teachers of the Russian language. The Government of the Russian Federation offers scholarships to Venezuelan students who are interested in studying at Russian universities. Last but not least, Venezuela is promoting tourism in Russia. In March 2012, the Bolivarian Government participated in Moscow’s International Tourism Fair (MITT). A group of the Venezuelan Ministry of Tourism (Mintur) presented touristic points of interest in Venezuela to Russian travel agencies. The ten people of the delegation attended more than 190 meetings with international travel agents from Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia, handing out brochures and promotional videos of Venezuela. They also met with officials of tourist magazines: TTG, Voyage, Travel Magazine, News Outdoor, and the internet portal travel.rian.ru. President Chávez promotes cooperation with Russia in other Latin American countries, just like the Russian Federation greeted the recent founding of CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), launched in Caracas, in December 2011. A spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry lauded “this emblematic step that our Latin American partners have made”. Russia supports the desire of Latin American

countries for unity and the consolidation of their identity, of which Hugo Chávez is the first and foremost representative.

Plan doesn’t solve --- Russia is trying to secure deals with lots of Latin American countriesBlank, 10 --- Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (4/13/2010, Stephen J., “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf, JMP)

To support this economic and strategic agenda, Moscow has made extensive economic overtures to Latin American governments from Mexico to Argentina and Chile. Russia has offered them all deals with respect to oil, gas, nuclear energy, uranium, electricity, weapons sales, high-tech defense technology, agriculture and space launches. Indeed, Medvedev’s trip and talks with local leaders appear to have focused principally on economic issues. 47 Nonetheless, certain patterns are clear. For example, Russia fully understands Brazil’s importance as South America’s largest economy and power and seeks much closer economic ties with it. Since at least 2006, Moscow has been pursuing what it calls a “technological alliance” with Brazil, allegedly because together they can initiate world-class technological projects.48 Russia also wants to take part in a projected gas pipeline from Argentina to Bolivia, as well as other key energy projects with Venezuela and other states.49 One important reason why Moscow included countries like Brazil and Peru is to expand its “commercial beachhead” in South America beyond traditionally anti-American governments and compete more vigorously with the United States, both commercially and politically.50

Can’t solve --- Russian military coop with CubaBlank, 10 --- Research Professor of National Security Affairs Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (4/13/2010, Stephen J., “Russia and Latin America: Motives and Consequences,” https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Blank_miamirussia_04-13-10.pdf, JMP)

Furthermore, Chávez has sought to engage Moscow not just in a formal alliance, which it has so far resisted, but also in participation in the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribean (ALBA). Medvedev has indicated Russia’s willingness to discuss participation in this organization, since it accords with Russia’s ideas about a multipolar world and international division of labor. 84 Neither has Moscow forgotten about its military partnership with Cuba. Russia has pledged to continue military-technological cooperation (arms sales) with Cuba.85 Russian officials continue to say Cuba holds a key role in

Russian foreign policy and that Russia considers it a permanent partner in Latin America.86

Alt Cause

Alt cause – US missile defense, NATO expansion, Georgian warMcIntyre and Ure, 8 - former Senior Pentagon correspondent for CNN AND CNN Congressional Producer in the Pentagon (Jamie and Laurie, “Expert: Russia-Venezuela military exercises reaction to U.S. moves”, CNN World, 9-25-08, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/25/russia.venezuela/)//KG

Russia is displaying its military power in America's back yard, sending a convoy of warships to Venezuela for joint naval exercises, the first such deployment since the Cold War. The Kremlin is becoming increasingly cozy with Venezuela, Cuba and other Latin American countries unhappy with the United States, in apparent response to thorny issues such as U.S. missile defense plans in Eastern Europe, NATO's eastern expansion, and U.S. warships dispatched to Georgia. "Some of this is the Russians wanting to get even. They see American warships close to their shore; they're going to put Russian warships close to us," said Russian military expert John Pike of globalsecurity.org. The fleet of ships headed toward the Caribbean includes some of Russia's finest, like the nuclear-powered Peter the Great cruiser and the anti-submarine warship Admiral Chebanenko. Pike said that while these vessels are impressive, they are no match for the American Navy and pose little threat to the United States. "They have obsolete technology. They would simply be no match for American warships in a one-to-one combat," he said. Nonetheless, this deployment adds to the tension created earlier this month when two Russian Tu-160 nuclear long-range bombers arrived in Venezuela, also for military exercises. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a vocal critic of the United States, greeted the Russian pilots with a blunt message for Washington. "Venezuela is not alone! Russia is with us," he said. "They are our strategic partners. The Russian Tu-160 bombers on our land are a warning to the empire of the U.S.A.!" Chavez is increasing Venezuela's ties with Russia. He arrived in Moscow on Thursday for his second trip there in the past two months. Russia, meanwhile, has sold Venezuela more than $4 billion in arms. U.S. Defense Department spokesman Geoff Morrell says the Pentagon is not fazed. "Russia is certainly within its rights to conduct exercises with its allies. What's the old saying? You're sort of known by the company you keep. If they wish to hang out with the Venezuelan navy, that's their business," he said. But Russia knows the United States is watching, and that seems to be the idea, Pike said. "The Russians, sort of from here on out, every couple months are going to come up with some sort of new event, some sort of new exercise, some sort of new provocation to keep us focused on them," he said

Arms Turn

Venezuela uses its oil revenues from the US to purchase Russian armsSuchlicki 12 – Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami (August 5, 2012, “Venezuela- Iran- Iran’s influence in Venezuela: Washington should worry” http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/05/2930050/irans-influence-in-venezuela-washington.html)

<Chávez is also using Venezuela’s oil wealth for other purposes. Chávez’ support for Cuba exceeds $7 billion per year in subsidized petroleum shipments and investments in Cuba’s oil infrastructure. The Venezuelan regime supports a variety of leftist, anti-American regimes in Latin America including Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador. And Chávez has spent more than $6 billion in purchasing Russian weapons, creating a long term Venezuelan dependency on the Russian military. Venezuela remains an open back door for Cuba’s acquisition of sophisticated Russian weapons.Emboldened by Venezuela’s vast oil resources and his close relationship with Iran and Russia, Chávez has laid claim to the leadership of the anti-American movement in the region. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro’s illness and Cuba’s weak economy thrusted the leadership of Latin America’s left onto Chávez. If Fidel was the godfather of revolutionary/terrorist/anti-American groups, Chávez is the trusted “capo.”The Venezuelan leader has manipulated past elections, and will manipulate future ones. He is increasingly deepening his Bolivarian revolution by weakening and subverting Venezuela’s democratic institutions. At best, Venezuela’s weapons purchases from Russia are leading to a major arms race in the region, with Colombia acquiring U.S. weapons and Brazil turning to France. Other countries, such as Ecuador and Peru, are also spending their much-needed resources in the acquisition of weapons. A coalition of Venezuela and its allies, Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua, may develop into a club of well-armed, anti-American regimes exercising influence in the region by intimidating its neighbors.>