Democracy Promotion/Soft Power—Negative

General Defense

US Isn’t ModeledThe US isn’t modeled and domestic surveillance isn’t keyNaughton 15 - John Naughton is professor of the public understanding of technology at the Open University. (“Surveillance laws are being rewritten post-Snowden, but what will really change?; The ripples from the revelations of NSA surveillance can be felt around the world - but intelligence and law-enforcement agencies will carry on regardless,” Lexis Nexis, 6/17/2015) STRYKERAt one level it's a significant moment: one in which - as a Guardian leader writer put it - "an outlaw

rewrites the law". And in a few other countries, notably Germany, Snowden's revelations do seem to be having a demonstrable impact - as witnessed, for example, by

the Bundestag's inquiry into NSA surveillance within the Federal Republic. These are non-trivial outcomes, but we shouldn't get carried away . The revelations have had close to zero effect on the way the British security agencies - and their political

masters - go about things. And now that the Tories are liberated from the tiresome obsession of the Lib Dems with privacy and human rights, who knows what Theresa May and the spooks are cooking up? (The relevant passage in the Queen's speech merely says that "new legislation will modernise the law on communications data".) On the other side of the Atlantic, although the USA Freedom Act does introduce a number of reforms, the surveillance landscape remains largely unchanged . Americans' phone records will still be hoovered up - but now by the telephone companies, not the NSA - and access to them will require a warranting process. And elements of transparency around government surveillance and the operations of the secret Fisa court will be introduced. So while there is some good news for American citizens in the new legislation, the position for the rest of the world is that nothing changes . The US retains the right to snoop on us in any way it pleases - and of course to spy on any US citizen who has the misfortune to exchange a phone call or an email message with us. Edward Snowden's revelations have thus brought about some amelioration in the domestic surveillance regime within the US, but so far they have done little to protect those who live outside that benighted realm and quaintly regard privacy as a basic human right.

Surveillance Not BadSurveillance doesn’t hurt the US imagePew 14 - The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan American think tank based in Washington, D.C., that provides information on social issues, public opinion, and demographic trends shaping the United States and the world. (“Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image,” http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/ 7/14/2014) STRYKERRevelations about the scope of American electronic surveillance efforts have generated headlines around the world over the past year. And a new Pew Research Center survey finds widespread global opposition to U.S. eavesdropping and a decline in the view that the U.S. respects the personal freedoms of its people. But in most countries there is little evidence this opposition has severely harmed America’s overall image . In nearly all countries polled, majorities oppose monitoring by the U.S. government of emails and phone calls of foreign leaders or their citizens. In contrast, Americans tilt toward the view that eavesdropping on foreign leaders is an acceptable practice, and they are divided over using this technique on average people in other countries. However, the majority of Americans and others around the world agree that it is acceptable to spy on suspected terrorists, and that it is unacceptable to spy on American citizens.

Germany proves that even international spying doesn’t hurt relations or US imageBrinkbäumer, 5/14, (Klaus, German political reporter, “Betrayal and Betrayers: Merkel's Risky Silence in the NSA Scandal,” Spiegel International, May 14, 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gabriel-speaking-out-on-bnd-scandal-shows-merkel-in-bad-light-a-1033369.html)//ergThe world of politics abounds with tales of secrets and betrayals, of collective silence and the indiscretion of individuals. Tales of trust and mistrust. The shadowy world of espionage is no different -- its secrets and betrayals legendary. But Sigmar Gabriel's treachery stands out nonetheless. The German vice chancellor recently announced that Angela Merkel had twice assured him that the NSA and Germany's foreign intelligence agency, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), had never spied on German companies. In fact, in 2008 the Americans began reneging on agreements and going too far -- much too far. They spied on aviation giant Airbus, among others. In August 2013, Angela Merkel had her then Chief of Staff Ronald Pofalla announce that the NSA was doing "nothing that damaged German interests." In fact, the Chancellery knew better. But Merkel refrained from taking action, opting instead to navigate her way through the situation by saying nothing. Nearly two years ago, after the information leaked by Edward Snowden first surfaced, she said she didn't really know what it was all about. The message she's been conveying ever since is that it's all terribly technical and not all that important, really. Leading by Stealth The chancellor's strategy had the desired effect. The public saw her as a victim. The general election in 2013 should have been dominated by the NSA spying scandal, but Merkel emerged unscathed, triumphant. Newspapers like the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung naively wrote that secret services just happen to spy -- and, after all, we need intelligence, so what is one to do?

Outrage over surveillance has boiled overFrancis, ’14, (David, reported from Berlin as the Richard Holbrooke journalist-in-residence at the European Council on Foreign Relations, “Germany’s Hypocrisy on NSA Surveillance,” Slate, FEB. 25 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/02/angela_merk

el_surveillance_proposal_germany_is_hypocritical_about_the_nsa.single.html)//ergMany American allies are still seething over the steady stream of revelations about the depth and breadth of the National Security Agency’s surveillance network. None is more upset than Germany. German outrage was simmering even before reports in late October that the NSA had targeted German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cellphone. After, it boiled over . Merkel called President Obama to confront him over the spying. American officials were summoned to the Bundestag (the German parliament), and German intelligence came to the White House to complain. Wells of trust built up since the end of the Cold War quickly ran dry. And according to reports in a German newspaper this week, the spying continues: An anonymous NSA employee told the German publication Bild am Sonntag that the United States is now monitoring Merkel’s advisers. Obama, who in 2008 was greeted as a hero by hundreds of thousands of people during his first European speech in Berlin, is now considered by many to be a villain. On the other hand, a survey conducted by public broadcaster ARD and Die Welt newspaper shows that six out of 10 Germans consider Edward Snowden, the man responsible for opening the rift between their country and the United States, a hero. Only 14 percent believe Snowden is a criminal. He’s met with Green politician Hans-Christian Ströbele, who passed a letter from Snowden to Merkel. Snowden has also offered to testify in front of German parliament on NSA security practices, an offer the Bundestag is still mulling over. In the four months since the Merkel-cellphone dustup, Germany has taken a number of steps to better secure its data from the prying eyes of the NSA. Last week Merkel announced that she is backing proposals from German companies like Deutsche Telekom, which have offered to create data networks meant to keep Europe’s data in Europe. Right now the majority of European data travels through American servers, making it susceptible to NSA surveillance. She also revealed plans to launch a broad counterespionage offensive against the United States and the United Kingdom. “We will, above all, discuss which European providers we have who offer security for our citizens,” Merkel said on her weekly podcast recently. “So that you don’t have to go across the Atlantic with emails and other things, but can build up communications networks also within Europe.”

Germany and other countries spy on their citizens and work with US intelligence agencies—no impact to the affFrancis, ’14, (David, reported from Berlin as the Richard Holbrooke journalist-in-residence at the European Council on Foreign Relations, “Germany’s Hypocrisy on NSA Surveillance,” Slate, FEB. 25 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/02/angela_merkel_surveillance_proposal_germany_is_hypocritical_about_the_nsa.single.html)//ergGermany would like the world to believe in a simple narrative regarding privacy and surveillance: Unlike the NSA, Germany does not spy on its citizens, and it respects privacy rights. But, like most things in Germany, it’s more complicated than that. Germany does monitor citizens and foreign nationals living within its borders—it just does so quietly. German intelligence officials meet regularly with American counterparts and share information on domestic and international threats. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), and its foreign intelligence agency, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service), then use this information to police extremist activities within their borders. German security services keep their work quiet in large part because of German history. In the last century, Germans were subject to surveillance from two of the most ruthless groups in modern history: the Nazis and then the Stasi, the Soviet secret police in East Germany. One of the reasons Merkel was so incensed by being targeted by NSA surveillance is that she grew up under the Stasi’s watch in East Germany. The fact that her American and British allies were doing the same thing made it all the more insulting—to her and to her compatriots. Everyone is doing it. The NSA is just better at it than anyone else. Germans also have a conflicted relationship with war and threats to their homeland. When it comes to both, Germany is a nation with its collective blinders on. Germany is constitutionally prohibited from fighting an offensive war, yet its troops have been fighting and dying in Afghanistan for more than a decade. And despite the fact that polls show more than 50 percent of Germans view Islam as a threat to the German way of life, few approve of the surveillance methods used to stop extremism. The most glaring fact that Germans ignore is

how much their government works with the NSA. Reports last summer in Der Spiegel—ironically, the same magazine that published some of the first NSA-Snowden accusations—indicated that Germany and the NSA work closely, and that German intelligence services were eager and willing to work with the Americans. (You can read the details of the extent of cooperation here.) Jens Stomber is the NSA issues coordinator for the German Pirate Party, a group that’s the equivalent of the American far left and has been gaining popularity across Europe. He thinks Merkel’s heralded German data network plan is redundant. “The NSA has a cooperation with the German secret service, so they would get that data anyway by doing this cooperation. I don’t think that they really care about what kind of network it is. So, they will simply collect and back data in the German network,” Stomber told Russian radio after Merkel made her new proposal. Merkel has denied any knowledge of cooperation with the NSA, and the German public lost interest in it. But this partnership is an open secret among German politicians and the European hacking community. Last fall I met with Linus Neumann, Karsten Nohl, and Ben Schlabs, three white-hat hackers who work at Security Research Labs in Berlin. They said that German cooperation likely goes far beyond what’s already been revealed. “The German services are cooperating with NSA big-time,” Neumann said. “I mean, they have weekly meetings a couple of miles from here. … They do all kinds of surveillance on users as part of their daily work. So we basically have the same issues here.” Neumann, who is German, said that he believes that his government also oversteps its authority. “Of course Germany’s also doing some kind of surveillance, and this surveillance is probably very intrusive and not constitutional,” he said. (The German government did not respond to a request for comment.) Neumann’s claims are supported by revelations about U.S.-German intelligence collaboration. According to Der Spiegel, German intelligence agencies have been using a program called XKeyScore to collect metadata within Germany . Last April a high-ranking delegation of German intelligence officials met with officials from the NSA to discuss cooperation. The Washington Post reported that in 2008, German intelligence accidentally sent American intelligence 300 phone numbers of American citizens, raising suspicions that the numbers were being tapped. This, combined with Neumann’s accusation, lends credence to the sentiment expressed by National Intelligence Director James Clapper when the Merkel-cellphone scandal broke: Everyone is doing it. The NSA is just better at it than anyone else. Now, the German intelligence services could use the same justification for this surveillance as the NSA does: It stops terror attacks. And you can’t argue with Germany’s success on this front. Unlike the United Kingdom and Spain—victims of large-scale post-9/11 terrorist plots in which dozens died—Germany has not been attacked. In fact, its security services have been quite effective at stopping attacks before they start. They’ve done it while grappling with an increasingly marginalized and growing Turkish immigrant population, a ripe breeding ground for extremism. (And remember: Some of the 9/11 hijackers plotted from the Al-Quds mosque in Hamburg before coming to the United States.) For instance, in 2007, German authorities, with assistance from the CIA, were able to stop a series of coordinated bombings by a homegrown extremist cell with ties to al-Qaida across Germany after the NSA intercepted emails from Pakistan to Germany. German police arrested 28-year-old Fritz Gelowicz and 22-year-old known only as Daniel S. Both were German nationals who had recently converted to Islam. Two other suspects were later arrested. In 2011 German authorities arrested three people they claimed were connected to al-Qaida. Then-interior minister Hans-Peter Friedrich called these individuals a “concrete and imminent danger,” adding, “this proves that Germany continues to be in the cross hairs of international terrorists, and we need to remain vigilant.” A second group connected to al-Qaida was arrested later that same year. After the first of Snowden’s revelations, Friedrich even credited NSA information with stopping five terror attacks within Germany . (He later backed off that claim, refusing to give a specific number to a parliamentary inquiry.)

CircumventionEither US will spy independent of the plan or will push countries to move to local surveillance controlShah, ’13, (Anup, “Surveillance State: NSA Spying and more,” Global Issues, Surveillance State: NSA Spying and More, October 07, 2013, http://www.globalissues.org/article/802/surveillance-state)//ergIt is interesting to note that a few months earlier the US was resisting what seemed like international efforts to put the stewardship of the Internet in the hands of the United Nations rather than being a decentralized system (though with the US having final say over the changes to certain aspects of the core, or root, Internet servers). At the time, much of the technology community and others argued that the US is a good defender of the Internet (and helped create it in the first place), and that putting it into the hands of the UN was really the agenda of nations like Russia, China and others with questionable records on human rights. Examples such as surveillance and censorship were given as reasons to not trust other governments. And forums and blogs were filled with the usual over-simplistic UN-bashing that the US is often known for. The US, by comparison, (probably rightly) argued that the current decentralized system works well. Internet giants such as Google also weighed in along similar lines, as did various Internet freedom activist organizations and individuals. Unfortunately, even with the current system, governments unfortunately can sensor large portions of the Internet if they want to. But as the recent spying episode has revealed as well, this is perhaps another reason for the US not wanting to relinquish control of such a globally valuable resource. Being able to tap into some of the core Internet servers, many of which are based in the US or US-friendly nations, gives it an advantage of other countries and entities. In other words, if even within the current system countries like China and Russia can censor and monitor the Internet why do they care about wanting more control? Larry Geller gives an example: No doubt wrongdoers completely understand that they mustn’t plot their activities using Gmail. They know that if their cell phones are powered on, someone in the US knows where they are. So they avoid using the systems that the NSA is tracking. Those whose data does get recorded and analyzed are overwhelmingly ordinary citizens—of this and other countries. The NSA computers are filled with ordinary people’s data, including details of their love-lives, their financial transactions, and which movies they’ve ordered tickets to see. The recent leaks by Edward Snowden may revive pressure to move to more local control of data flows to prevent US spying. Do other countries care whether we record their citizen’s private data? Perhaps not so much. But Putin may care that his own phone calls are on file someplace in Utah.

Alt Causes

Alt Cause—International SurveillanceUS global image is strong OR international surveillance is an alt causePew 14 - The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan American think tank based in Washington, D.C., that provides information on social issues, public opinion, and demographic trends shaping the United States and the world. (“Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image,” http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/ 7/14/2014) STRYKER

Moreover, President Obama is still largely popular internationally – across 44 nations, a median of 56% say they have confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs . And, while Obama no longer has the same high levels of popularity that he

enjoyed immediately after his election in 2008, there has been very little change in his appeal over the past year. The biggest declines in his ratings since last year are found in two nations where the U.S. has listened to the private phone conversations of national leaders: Germany (from 88% confident in 2013 to 71% confident now) and Brazil (69% in 2013, 52% now) . Obama’s favorability is also down considerably in Russia, reflecting recent tensions over the crisis in Ukraine. Only 15% of Russians currently express confidence in the American president, down from an already low 29% in 2013. U.S. favorability has also declined dramatically – just 23% of Russians say they have a favorable opinion of the U.S., less than

half of the 51% registered in last year’s survey. In spite of the unpopularity of U.S. spying and its use of drones, America also remains more popular globally than China , its principal rival in world affairs. A median of 49% of the publics surveyed hold a positive view of China. And the U.S. is still considered the world’s top economic power, although this is less true today than it was before the Great Recession. However, looking to the future, a median of 50% of those surveyed in both 2013 and 2014, up from 41% last year, see China eventually supplanting America as the dominant world superpower.

Other countries only care about us spying on THEM—the aff doesn’t change foreign surveillanceShah, ’13, (Anup, “Surveillance State: NSA Spying and more,” Global Issues, Surveillance State: NSA Spying and More, October 07, 2013, http://www.globalissues.org/article/802/surveillance-state)//ergBreaking UN protocol at a General Assembly meeting of all members states Brazil strongly criticized the US for illegally infiltrating its communications network, intercepting phone calls, and breaking into the Brazilian Mission to the United Nations. President Dilma Rousseff dismissed the US argument that such activities were to counter terrorism. Instead, she argued, “corporate information — often of high economic and even strategic value — was at the center of espionage activities.” Reports also surfaced of the US spying on the United Nations and various European countries, including the office of the European Union at the UN. The US had managed to crack the UN’s internal video teleconferencing system, as part of its surveillance of the world body. Leading technology web site, Ars Technica, also adds that the NSA also runs a bugging program in more than 80 embassies and consulates around the world, under a program called the “Special Collection Service”, an “intensive” program that has “little or nothing to do with warding off terrorists,” according to Der Spiegel.

Aff doesn’t solve—Surveillance is a GLOBAL problem that can’t be solved with a DOMESTIC solutionSt. Vincent and Hall, ‘14, (Sarah, CDT’s Human Rights and Surveillance Fellow and Joseph Lorenzo, Chief Technologist at the Center for Democracy & Technology, “Five US Surveillance Programs Undermining Global Human Rights,” Center for Democracy and Technology, September 18, 2014, https://cdt.org/blog/five-us-surveillance-programs-undermining-global-human-rights/)//ergThose of us in the United States often like to think—rightly or wrongly—that our overall human-rights record is in pretty good order. However, even those who view the US as a global human-rights leader have had to take a deep breath when considering the past year of Big Brother-like surveillance revelations. A major UN body highlighted these revelations—along with a decidedly sobering array of other US human-rights issues—in a set of recommendations back in April. In order to keep drawing attention to these surveillance-related problems, CDT and the ACLU submitted comments this past Monday to the United Nations describing five particularly egregious surveillance programs that have had a grievous impact on human rights around the world. Every four years, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) evaluates all of a country’s human-rights commitments during a process called the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). During the UPR, the UN HRC examines the promises a country has made—i.e., in human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—and evaluates to what extent that country is living up to its obligations. We make it crystal clear that on a daily basis, US authorities are intercepting the private communications and other personal electronic data of hundreds of millions of people across the globe, the vast majority of whom are not suspected of any wrongdoing. In anticipation of next year’s UPR of the United States, CDT and the ACLU sought to do something unique: after wading into the sea of NSA-related surveillance revelations that have emerged during this past year, we highlighted (and used our technical expertise to explain) five specific surveillance programs that have a particularly outrageous and broad impact on the human rights—including privacy, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly—of people around the world. We aimed to provide an accessible technical description of the five programs and explain the impact these programs have on millions of people throughout the world, regardless of any suspicion of wrongdoing and without any judicial oversight. The five programs we analyzed include: DISHFIRE, an initiative through which the US collects hundreds of millions of private text messages worldwide every day; CO-TRAVELER, through which the US captures billions of location updates daily from mobile phones around the world; MUSCULAR, which entails the US’ interception of all data transmitted between certain data centers operated by Yahoo! and Google outside of US territory; MYSTIC, a US program that collects all telephone call details in five sovereign countries other than the US, as well as the full content of all phone calls in two of those countries; and QUANTUM, a US program that listens in real-time to traffic on the Internet’s most fundamental infrastructure and can respond based on certain triggering information with active attacks, including the delivery of malicious software to the end-user’s device. In our submission we make it crystal clear that on a daily basis, US authorities are intercepting the private communications and other personal electronic data of hundreds of millions of people across the globe, the vast majority of whom are not suspected of any wrongdoing. The intercepted data includes information about where those hundreds of millions of people are, with whom they correspond, and what they say in their correspondence. At the end of our submission, we make a number of recommendations to the US about how it can improve its respect for human rights in this context. The recommendations focus on halting the US’ indiscriminate interception of individuals’ private communications data, getting greater (or, to be more accurate, any) Congressional and judicial oversight for these programs, stopping the attacks under QUANTUM, and ensuring that the relevant orders and regulations are brought into line with human-rights law.

The five eyes are a bad model of democracy—aff can’t account for international surveillance norms amongst democraciesNyst and Crowe, ’14, (Carly and Anna, Reporters for Privacy International, “Unmasking the Five Eyes’ global surveillance practices,” GIS Watch, Communications surveillance in the digital age, 2014, http://www.giswatch.org/en/communications-surveillance/unmasking-five-eyes-global-surveillance-practices)//ergThe revelations of the last year – made possible by NSA-whistleblower Edward Snowden – on the reach and scope of global surveillance practices have prompted a fundamental re-examination of the role of intelligence services in conducting coordinated cross-border surveillance. The Five Eyes alliance – comprised of the United States National Security Agency (NSA), the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Canada’s Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), and New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) – is the continuation of an intelligence partnership formed in the aftermath of the Second World War. The patchwork of secret spying programmes and intelligence-sharing agreements implemented by parties to the Five Eyes arrangement constitutes an integrated global surveillance arrangement that now covers the majority of the world’s communications. Operating in the shadows and misleading the public, the Five Eyes agencies boast in secret how they “have adapted in innovative and creative ways that have led some to describe the current day as ‘the golden age of SIGINT [signals intelligence]’.”2 This report summarises the state of understanding about the Five Eyes global domination of communications networks, and explains the most concerning surveillance capabilities developed by the intelligence agencies. It also explores the implications of expanded surveillance powers for the rights to privacy and free expression, and the free flow of information and ideas throughout global communications networks. Finally, it canvasses some of the ways that Privacy International is seeking to unpick the Five Eyes alliance and argues for the restoration of privacy and security in digital communications. The Five Eyes Beginning in 1946, an alliance of five countries (the US, the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) developed a series of bilateral agreements over more than a decade that became known as the UKUSA (pronounced yew-kew-zah) agreement. This established the “Five Eyes” alliance for the purpose of sharing intelligence, but primarily signals intelligence (hereafter “SIGINT”). The close relationship between the five states is evidenced by documents recently released by Snowden. Almost all of the documents include the classification “TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL” or “TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY”. These classification markings indicate the material is top-secret communications intelligence (aka SIGINT) material that can be released to the US, Australia, Canada, UK and New Zealand. Notably while other alliances and coalitions exist, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, none of the documents that have thus far been made public refer to any of these arrangements, suggesting the Five Eyes alliance is the preeminent SIGINT collection alliance. The Five Eyes agencies are playing a dirty game. They have found ways to infiltrate all aspects of modern communications networks: forcing companies to hand over their customers’ data under secret orders, and secretly tapping fibre optic cables between the same companies’ data centres anyway; accessing sensitive financial data through SWIFT, the world’s financial messaging system; spending years negotiating an international agreement to regulate access to the data through a democratic and accountable process, and then hacking the networks to get direct access; threatening politicians with trumped-up threats of impending cyber war while conducting intrusion operations that weaken the security of networks globally; and sabotaging encryption standards and standards bodies, thereby undermining the ability of internet users to secure information. The Five Eyes is a close-knit group. The level of cooperation under the UKUSA agreement is so complete that "the national product is often indistinguishable."3 This has resulted in former intelligence officials explaining that the close-knit cooperation that exists under the UKUSA agreement means “that SIGINT customers in both capitals seldom know which country generated either the access or the product itself.”4 In addition to fluidly sharing collected SIGINT, it is understood that many intelligence facilities run by the respective Five Eyes countries are jointly operated, even jointly staffed, by members of the intelligence agencies of Five Eyes countries. Each facility collects SIGINT, which can then be shared with the other Five Eyes states. Code-named programmes that have been revealed to the public over the last decade go some way to illustrating how the Five Eyes alliance collaborates on specific programmes of activity and how information is shared. One important example is the TEMPORA programme, revealed by Snowden. By placing taps at key undersea fibre-optic cable landing stations, the programme is able to intercept a significant portion of the communications that traverse the UK. The Guardian has reported that 300

analysts from GCHQ and 250 from the NSA were directly assigned to examine material collected.5 TEMPORA stores content for three days and metadata for 30 days. Once content and data are collected, they can be filtered. The precise nature of GCHQ’s filters remains secret. Filters could be applied based on type of traffic (e.g. Skype, Facebook, email), origin/destination of traffic, or to conduct basic keyword searches, among many other purposes. Reportedly, approximately 40,000 search terms have been chosen and applied by GCHQ, and another 31,000 by the NSA to information collected via TEMPORA. GCHQ have had staff examining collected material since the project’s inception in 2008, with NSA analysts brought to trial runs of the technology in summer 2011. Full access was provided to NSA by autumn 2011. An additional 850,000 NSA employees and US private contractors with top-secret clearance reportedly also have access to GCHQ databases. GCHQ received £100 million (USD 160 million) in secret NSA funding over the last three years to assist in the running of this project.6 A core programme that provides filtering capability is known as XKEYSCORE. It has been described by internal NSA presentations as an “analytic framework” which enables a single search to query a “3-day rolling buffer” of “all unfiltered data” stored at 150 global sites on 700 database servers.7 The NSA XKEYSCORE system has sites that appear in Five Eyes countries.8 The system indexes email addresses, file names, IP addresses and port numbers, cookies, webmail and chat usernames and buddylists, phone numbers, and metadata from web browsing sessions including searches queried, among many other types of data that flow through their collection points. While UKUSA is often reported as having created a “no spy pact” between Five Eyes states, there is little in the original declassified documents from the 1940s and 1950s to support such a notion. Crucially, first and foremost, no clause exists that attempts in any form to create such an obligation. As best as can be ascertained, it seems there is no prohibition on intelligence gathering by Five Eyes states with respect to the citizens or residents of other Five Eyes states. There is instead, it seems, a general understanding that citizens will not be directly targeted, and where communications are incidentally intercepted, there will be an effort to minimise the use and analysis thereof by the intercepting state. Outside the Five Eyes, everyone else is fair game, even if they have a separate intelligence-sharing agreement with one or several Five Eyes members.9

Foreign and domestic surveillance affect soft power Champion 14 (Marc, writes editorials on international affairs, “U.S. soft power takes a hit in wake of report,” The Japan Times, 12/16/14, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/12/16/commentary/world-commentary/u-s-soft-power-takes-a-hit-in-wake-of-report/#.VYhSy9NVjZF)//kjzA second area where the U.S. is suffering severe damage to its image is from the National Security Agency’s claim to have the collection of Internet metadata from citizens anywhere and everywhere. As with the U.S. renditions policy, America’s closest allies collude in this collection effort and have suffered a public backlash as a result. Again, the publics of these countries aren’t wholly naive: They know that governments spy on other governments, as well as on criminals and terrorists. Indeed, they mostly support spying on terrorists. But the NSA revelations were disruptive, because they created the perception that the U.S. was using its dominance of the Internet to collect data on ordinary citizens across the globe. Again, according to the Pew global survey, majorities disapprove of the U.S. monitoring foreign citizens in all except five countries (one of which was the U.S.). Americans should hardly be surprised: More than 60 percent of them find it unacceptable for the U.S. to spy on its own citizens — so why would Germans or Italians feel otherwise?

Alt Cause—Middle EastMiddle East is an alt cause—China’s more popular therePew 14 - The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan American think tank based in Washington, D.C., that provides information on social issues, public opinion, and demographic trends shaping the United States and the world. (“Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image,” http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/ 7/14/2014) STRYKER

The Middle East is the clear exception . China’s favorability in the region is not especially high, but is higher than that for the U.S . Anti-Americanism has been common in many Middle Eastern nations throughout the Obama presidency, as was the case during the George W. Bush era. And again this year some of the lowest ratings for the U.S . are found in the region . Only 19% of Turks and 12% of Jordanians offer a favorable opinion of the U.S., and at 10% Egypt gives the U.S. its lowest rating in the survey.

Alt Cause—DronesDrones alternative causePew 14 - The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan American think tank based in Washington, D.C., that provides information on social issues, public opinion, and demographic trends shaping the United States and the world. (“Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image,” http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/ 7/14/2014) STRYKERU.S. Drone Strikes Increasingly Opposed Since beginning its war on terrorism more than a decade

ago, the U.S. government has launched several hundred missile strikes from pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia and elsewhere.

The vast majority of these drone strikes have been carried out by the Obama

administration. Such attacks are extremely unpopular . In 37 of the 44 countries surveyed in 2014 by the Pew Research Center, half or more of the public disapproves of American drone strikes. This includes 26 where strong majorities of seven-in-ten or more are critical of this signature U.S. military action. Israel (65%), Kenya (53%) and the U.S. (52%) are the only countries where at least half back the use of drones against suspected terrorists. Among those opposed are the publics of major NATO allies such as Spain (86%), Turkey (83%), France (72%), Germany (67%) and the United Kingdom (59%), all of which have experienced terrorist attacks on their own soil. Fully 82% in Japan, America’s principal Asian ally, are against the use of drones, as are 75% in South Korea, another major Washington regional security partner. The use of pilotless aircraft against suspected terrorists is widely criticized throughout much of the Middle East. More than seven-in-ten in all six Muslim majority nations surveyed in the region disapprove of the policy. That includes 90% of Jordanians, 87% of Egyptians and 84% of Palestinians. Two-thirds of Pakistanis are also against the use of drones, hardly surprising given that the preponderance of U.S. drone strikes have been aimed at targets in Pakistan. The opposition is relatively low, however, compared with that in other nations, possibly because 30% of Pakistanis declined to answer the question. In many countries where publics are already strongly opposed to drone use, there has been no significant change in attitudes since 2012 when the Pew Research first asked about this U.S. policy. But there have been some noteworthy increases in public disapproval since 2013 . Perhaps most important, Americans’ own disapproval of such missile strikes has grown 11 percentage points in the past year. Over that same period opposition has gone up by more than 15 points in Senegal, Uganda, France, and Germany.

Alt Cause—GITMO/WOTAlt causes to the US democratic model—GITMO and WOTFukuyama and McFaul 7 - Francis Fukuyama is a professor of international political economy and director of the International Development Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. Michael McFaul is a Hoover Senior Fellow, a professor of political science, and director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford University. He is also a nonresident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a member of TWQ's editorial board. (“Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v031/31.1fukuyama.html 2007) STRYKERTo argue that the United States has strategic and moral interests in the spread of democracy does not mean that the United States is capable of spreading democracy. Domestic factors , not external forces, have driven the process of democratization in most countries. Consequently, especially in light of the tragedy

in Iraq, some have argued that Americans can best promote democracy abroad by simply watching it develop naturally .18 Although the United States' ability to promote democracy abroad has limits, which have become more severe in the past few years, U.S. policies can be very important in helping nurture democratic development. The war in Iraq has fostered the false impression that military force is the only instrument of regime change in the U.S. arsenal, when in fact it is the rarest used and least effective way to promote democratic change abroad. A wiser, more effective, and more sustainable strategy must emphasize nonmilitary tools aimed at changing the balance of power between democratic forces and autocratic rulers and, only after progress toward democracy has been made, building liberal institutions. Restoring the U.S. Example Inspiration for democrats struggling against autocracy and a model for leaders in new democracies are two U.S. exports now in short supply. Since the beginning of the republic, the U.S. experiment with democracy has provided hope, ideas, and technologies for others working to build democratic institutions. Foreign visitors to the United States have been impressed by what they have seen, and U.S. diplomats, religious missionaries, and businesspeople traveling abroad have inspired others by telling the story of U.S. democracy. In the second half of the twentieth century, during which the United States developed more intentional means for promoting democracy abroad, the preservation and advertisement of the U.S. democratic model remained a core instrument. Today, this instrument needs repair. The U.S. model has been severely undermined by the methods that the administration has used to fight the global [End Page 34] war on terrorism . Irrespective of the legal particulars that may or may not justify the indefinite detention of combatants/terrorists at the Guantanamo Bay detainment camp in Cuba, opinion polls demonstrate overwhelmingly that most of the world views U.S. detention policies as illegitimate and undemocratic. Thankfully, senior U.S. officials did not try to defend the inhumane treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in 2004.

Gitmo hurts US standing and prevents effort to stop terrorismThe Atlantic 07 (a magazine that covers news and analysis on politics, business, culture, technology, national, international and life, “Guantanamo's Shadow: The Atlantic recently asked a group of foreign policy authorities about the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,” The Atlantic, October 2007, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/10/guantanamos-shadow/306212/)//kjz“Nothing has hurt America’s image and standing in the world—and nothing has undermined the global effort to combat nihilistic terrorism—than the brutal torture and dehumanizing actions of Americans in Abu Ghraib and in other prisons (secret or otherwise). America can win the fight against terrorism only if it acts in ways consistent with the values for which it stands; if its behavior descends to the level employed by the terrorists, then we have all become them instead of us.” “Gitmo has hurt the US in two different ways. At the strategic level, it has undercut the U.S. case around the world that we represent a world view and a set of values that all can admire,

even those who do not wish to replicate our system and society in their own countries. Gitmo has become a symbol for cruelty and inhumanity that is repugnant to a wide sector of the world community and a powerful tool that al Qaeda can use to damage US interest and recruit others to its cause. At the tactical level, Gitmo deludes many in the US, an never more than the senior leaders of the Bush Administration, into believing that harsh interrogation techniques can produce good intelligence and is a necessary tool in fighting terrorist. This 'truth' spread from Gitmo to Iraq and we have paid a horrible price for it.” “It has hurt America disastrously. The so-called global war on terrorism depends fundamentally on America's moral authority, so that other nations will want to cooperate with us. Guantanamo has become a vibrant symbol of American exceptionalism, but this exceptionalism is unwanted around the world.”

Alt Cause—National DebtMore alt causes—national debtArey 10 - Howard E. Arey is a Lieutenant Colonel for the United States Army. (“ECONOMIC RENEWAL: A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES,” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a523905.pdf 3/24/2010) STRYKERThe national debt of the United States, increasing with anticipated budget deficits for the next

decade, is the single greatest threat to the country’s security and its role as a democratic model for the world . At worst, the debt will sow the seeds for global economic turmoil as the world community recognizes that its only superpower and holder of the “global currency” may eventually be unable to repay its debt obligations. The more likely case is that the eroding strength of U.S. economic power will lead to its decline in the global order and a lesser desire by other nations to “be like America .” This foretells a possible weakening of

support for free market capitalism that in the longer term can remove a necessary foundation for the emergence and growth of democratic institutions. This may ultimately be the most perilous danger, as the decline in advocacy for free market and democratic principles may lead to a new world order where centralized authoritarian governments like China shine brighter for the world’s developing nations. There is a narrow window for the United States to address this threat, for “once economic rot sets in, it is historically very difficult to reverse .”2 Although some economists downplay the debt problem, recent world events such as the credit rating downgrades for Greece and Mexico, and the Dubai request for debt restructuring, have shown that “inevitable surprises” emerge quickly. This decade is critically important for the country because as debt service consumes a growing percentage of U.S. discretionary spending, the rise of China on the world stage presents an alternative to the American model . 3 The U.S. must act now to adopt a grand strategy of “economic renewal” that not only sustains the economic superiority of the U.S. but maintains this nation as the clearest exemplar of free market ideas and democratic principles. President Obama’s speech at West Point highlighted the importance of this economic foundation: “In the end, our security and leadership does [sic] not come solely from the strength of our arms."4 To sustain this strength, the country must act to reduce its debt and restructure the role of the U.S. dollar in the international monetary system to set conditions for the nation’s economy to thrive.

Alt Cause—Private SurveillanceThe aff just propels the privatization of surveillanceShah, ’13, (Anup, “Surveillance State: NSA Spying and more,” Global Issues, Surveillance State: NSA Spying and More, October 07, 2013, http://www.globalissues.org/article/802/surveillance-state)//ergChris Pyle, a former military instructor exposed the CIA and Army’s monitoring of millions of Americans engaged in lawful political activity in the 1970s. His revelations ultimately leading to a series of laws aimed at curbing government abuses. He was recently interviewed by the excellent Democracy Now! about the recent NSA revelations and echoed concerns raised by others; about lack of knowledge and oversight by Congress and that the secrecy is out of control. But he also adds that privatization of surveillance (70% percent of the intelligence budget of the United States today goes to private contractors, Democracy Now! notes) is resulting in a lack of accountability and importantly a way for governments to shirk their legal responsibilities; “the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, which protects us from unreasonable searches and seizures, only binds the government, doesn’t bind corporations. That’s a serious problem,” he notes.

The aff can’t combat the private information selling marketsMead, ’13, (Derek, Editor in Chief, “Mass Surveillance Is Big Business: Corporations Are as Good at Spying as Governments,” Motherboard, November 18, 2013, http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments)//erg

Data is the currency of surveillance, and it's not just the NSA and GCHQ looking to cash in. As a newly released cache of documents and presentation materials highlights, the private surveillance industry is booming. More shocking is that many firms claim in their own corporate PowerPoints that they've got capabilities that rival that of the government giants. The document trove, called the Surveillance Industry Index (SII) and released by Privacy International, and contains 1,203 documents from 338 companies in 36 countries, all of which detail surveillance technologies. Some advertised capabilities are astounding: A firm named Glimmerglass, which produces monitoring and repair equipment for undersea cables, touts in a brochure that its equipment enables "dynamic selection and distribution of signals for analysis and storage." Another firm, Elaman, advertises its line of FinFisher IT intrusion products in another brochure. It reads like any other brochure for tech products, with Elaman stating that the "FinFisher product suite [aids] government agencies in collecting critical IT information from target computers." The system is designed for anyone to use, the company says; all users have to do is insert a USB dongle into a target computer and, after a "short period of time," it will "extract information like usernames and passwords, e-mails, files, and other critical system and network information from Windows systems." That private companies are developing advanced data-gathering and monitoring technology should come as no surprise, especially when the NSA's reliance on private contractors in the development of its own surveillance tech is well documented. The surveillance industry, like many other sectors of the massive private industry that supports law enforcement and governments worldwide, is driving the state of the art forward. But what is surprising is how open the industry actually is. As Privacy International notes in its announcement of the SII, much of its documents are from its "collection of materials and brochures at surveillance trade shows around the world," as well as information from Wikileaks and Omega Research Foundation. Surveillance companies are businesses, too, and like weapons manufacturers who try to drum up business at major weapons expos like Sofex, the surveillance industry has its fair share of trade shows and glossy, superlative-laden promo materials. A screenshot from one linked document Of course, that world isn't open to average consumers, which is why SII—and previously, Wikileaks' Spy Files, among others—is eye-opening. What's even more concerning than systems that guarantee "complete data

inflow from all networks" is who's buying it. And while all the brochures I've read so far are careful to specify that surveillance tech is only for legal data collection, "legal" is a very fluid term worldwide. Governments have increasingly relied on data collection to hold onto power, and as our own Meghan Neal detailed a few months ago, the surveillance needs of dictators continue to be served by American companies despite embargoes. During the Arab Spring, surveillance and internet control were major tools used by governments to try to control dissent; most recently, Sudan hit the internet kill switch in order to limit the spread of anti-government info online.

Private information is sold on markets—circumvention and changing laws make it impossible to combat itMead, ’13, (Derek, Editor in Chief, “Mass Surveillance Is Big Business: Corporations Are as Good at Spying as Governments,” Motherboard, November 18, 2013, http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments)//ergThe flip side of that control is preemptive surveillance and data collection. And while data-driven law enforcement is currently in vogue in the West—a privacy battle all its own—the capabilities available on the thriving private surveillance market are also available for regimes worldwide to crush encroachment in their power. There's a very good reason that the UN High Commissioner called privacy a human right earlier this year: The vast tools available to people with enough money and network access are more capable of accessing private information than ever before. And unless local laws say otherwise—what laws that haven't been circumvented or changed, that is—there's no oversight of what someone might monitor. "There is a culture of impunity permeating across the private surveillance market, given that there are no strict export controls on the sale of this technology, as there on the sale of conventional weapons," Matthew Rice, a research consultant with Privacy International, told The Guardian. "This market profits off the suffering of people around the world, yet it lacks any sort of effective oversight or accountability. So when a company advertises that its technology can rip phone call content straight off a cell network, it's doing so with a sense of agnosticism. A firm might not sell tech to some guy off the street, but when a guy like Moammar Gadhafi wants to pick up a bunch of surveillance tech, foreign markets say yes. Again, aside from economic embargoes and the like, the use of such technology is regulated by local laws, and spying on political rivals or everyday folks may be legal, depending on where it's used. It's a nice sentiment for firms looking to profit off of surveillance. But for private citizens worldwide, and especially those living under the most oppressive governments, the elimination of privacy is surely a dangerous trend.

Alt Cause—Brownback AmendmentAlt causes to democracy promotion—Omission of the Brownback Amendment makes commitments uselessDettmer, ’14, (Jamie, journalist and broadcaster, “Obama’s Budget Fails Democracy Promotion Abroad,” The Daily Beast, 06.12.14, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/12/obama-s-budget-fails-democracy-promotion-abroad.html)//ergBut American democracy campaigners say the United States has national interest stakes too in combating autocrats and that the White House is not getting the balance right between realpolitik and democracy and human-rights promotion. Overseas there has been criticism, too. At a state banquet in Warsaw to celebrate the 25th anniversary of Poland’s first partially free elections, Lech Walesa, whose Solidarity labor movement helped bring down the Iron Curtain, urged Obama to be more forward-leaning. “I said that I wished the United States would lead,” Walesa told Polish television. Obama aides and State Department officials dismiss the criticism—they also bristle at claims that the administration has been decreasing funding for democracy and governance promotion and support. Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser, claims democracy transitions in Indonesia and Tunisia as Obama successes. “We’ve made a democracy a central part of our approach in every region that we operate,” he told The Washington Post. The dropping of the legislative provision instructing the Secretary of State not to seek prior host government approval when funding civil society groups in their countries isn’t helping the administration make its case that democracy is a fundamental aim of Obama foreign policy. The provision the administration is proposing to remove from the foreign appropriations bill is called the “Brownback Amendment.” Named after GOP Senator Sam Brownback, now the governor of Kansas, the amendment was first passed in 2005 and was attached initially to funding for democracy and governance activities in Egypt, allowing the Bush administration to provide aid directly to civil society organizations regardless of whether the Egyptian government approved or whether the organizations were registered as NGOs. Every year since 2009, Brownback language has been included in FY budget and appropriation requests with the provision stating that when providing “assistance for democracy, human rights, and governance activities, the organizations implementing such assistance and the specific nature of that assistance shall not be subject to the prior approval of the government of any foreign country.” Asked why the Brownback Amendment was being omitted from the foreign appropriations request for the first time since 2009, a State Department spokesperson said: “The administration’s requests frequently recommend that Congress remove restrictions and requirements that constrain flexibility to manage foreign policy, are overly burdensome, and/or are unnecessary due to policy or procedures already in place.” The proposed omission coincides with an increasing tendency of the State Department and USAID in their calls for aid proposals from civil society groups for applications to come only from registered U.S. or foreign nonprofit organizations. “This may not be breaking the Brownback Amendment, but it goes against its spirit,” complains Bockenfeld. Foreign governments insist often that local recipients of U.S. aid must be legally registered but they control the registration process and frequently block from registration civil society organizations or activist groups they disapprove of. By restricting aid to only registered groups, the State Department is colluding with repressive regimes, fear democracy advocates.

Alt Cause—Exchange ProgramsExchange programs are key to successful promotion of democratic ideals—empirics Atkinson 10 (Carol, Vanderbilt University, Department of Political Science, Assistant Professor, “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs from 1980–2006,” Foreign Policy Analysis, 2010, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22948/Atkinson_Does_Soft_Power_Matter.pdf)//kjzAccording to Joseph Nye (2004:5) soft power is the ability to obtain one’s own goals because others admire your ideas and want to emulate your example: ‘‘In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles relations with others’’ (Nye 2004:8). To enhance one’s soft power it is necessary to share experiences with those whom you wish to co-opt to your way of doing things. Nye argues that hosting educational exchanges is one way of socializing others to your own norms, ideas, and procedures; and in the process build soft power. Historically, statesmen have advocated educational exchange programs as a way to gain influence and shape international political behavior. For example, both of the protagonists in the Cold War pursued political influence through student exchange programs. On the Soviet side, students who studied at the International Lenin School in Moscow were more likely to achieve prominent positions within the communist party in Great Britain during the 1920s through 2 Does Soft Power Matter? 1940s (Cohen 2005:229–230). On the US side, US-hosted exchanges exposed future political leaders within the Soviet Union to the freedoms and prosperity found under a democratic government and free-market system. Scholarly exchanges increased Western influence particularly within the Russian intelligentsia whose interactions in Western political, scientific, and academic circles helped foster gradual liberalization in the Soviet Union that contributed to the eventual collapse of the Soviet system (Richmond 2003; Nye 2004). Former KGB1 General Oleg Kalugin, who spent a year as an exchange student at Columbia University in 1958–1959, noted the importance of such programs in undermining the ideational basis of the Soviet communist system: ‘‘Exchanges were a Trojan Horse in the Soviet Union. They played a tremendous role in the erosion of the Soviet system. They opened up a closed society. They greatly influenced younger people who saw the world with more open eyes, and they kept infecting more and more people over the years’’ (Oleg Kalugin as quoted in Richmond 2003:32). Research has consistently shown that exchange students return home with a more positive view of the country in which they studied and the people with whom they interacted.

Frequently after returning home, they try to use the knowledge gained during their time abroad to improve the situation in their home country (Wilson and Bonilla 1955; Watson and Lippitt 1958; Selltiz, Christ, Havel, and Cook 1963; Wang 1991; Richmond 2003; Miller 2006). Exchange students often describe their own impressions of how their experience abroad changed their personal views. One such student is Qian Ning, the son of former Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen, who studied at the University of Michigan. In an interview for Newsweek he noted that for Chinese students: ‘‘our experiences made us see that there are alternative ways for China to develop and for us to lead our personal lives. Being in the United States made us realize that things in China can be different’’ (Qian 1997:38). In addition to university exchanges, research on US government-funded programs has found evidence that selected US training programs2 aimed at mid-career professionals promote a more positive attitude toward the United States as well as enhancing ‘‘international communication which may indirectly reinforce the democratic values and orientations of program participants’’ (Miller 2006:26). Educators have echoed social scientists

arguing, ‘‘education, while inseparable from context, is fundamental to the support and growth of democracy. One of the most effective mechanisms for the dissemination of democratic ideals is international educational exchange’’ (Williams 2004:36). US policy makers have promoted educational exchanges as one way that US soft power (and

security) might be enhanced through the democratic socialization of potential ruling elites of nonliberal states. Former Secretary of State Rice pointed specifically to this goal: ‘‘every foreign student attending one of our universities represents an opportunity to enhance democracy in America and to strengthen the cause of freedom abroad’’ (Rice 2006). Notably, the National Security Strategy of the United States recommends educational exchange programs as one strategy whereby the United States might promote democracy and effectively engage in the so-called ‘‘battle of ideas’’ with nonliberal forces. Military as well as civilian programs are believed to contribute to this long-term goal. The strategy calls for ‘‘tailoring assistance and training of military forces to support civilian control of the military and military respect for human rights in a democratic society’’ (US White House 2006:6). More generally, it recommends ‘‘expanding 1 KGB is the transliteration of the acronym for the Soviet Union’s secret police that was tasked with maintaining internal security and enforcing loyalty to the Communist Party. 2 International Military Education and Training, Community Connections Program, Community Partnership Program, and Global Training for Development; see Miller (2006) for details. Carol Atkinson 3 educational opportunities for Americans to learn about foreign languages and cultures and for foreign students and scholars to study in the United States’’ (US White House 2006:45). Scholars at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, see exchanges as a way to liberalize Iran: ‘‘Educational exchanges with Western students would help to bolster and open up communications with Iran’s restive students, who historically have played a leading role in their country’s reform movements’’ (Phillips and Brooks 2008).

Alt Cause—TortureAlt cause—torture program already damaged soft power Lord 14 (Kristin, President and CEO of IREX, a global education and development NGO, “Soft Power Outage: The revelations about the United States' brutal torture program have damaged the country's best asset abroad.,” Foreign Policy, 12/23/14, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/23/soft-power-outage/)//kjzThe release of a long-awaited report by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the CIA’s secret detention and interrogation program dealt yet another blow to the United States’ moral authority and its credibility as a defender of human rights around the globe. It also begs the question: How much damage must the United States suffer before it learns to take soft power more seriously and, finally, learn to use it more proactively? To understand the immediate damage done to U.S. influence,

look no further than the commentary surrounding the report’s release. According to the Washington Post, the state-run Chinese news service Xinhua editorialized that “America is neither a suitable role model nor a qualified judge on human rights issues in other countries,” while a pro-government television commentator in Egypt observed, “The United States cannot demand human rights reports from other countries since this [document] proves they know nothing about human rights.” The Islamic State and other extremists joined the propaganda gold rush. One tweet, quoted in a report from the SITE Intelligence Group, pointed to the audacity of the United States lecturing Muslims about brutality, adding, “Getting beheaded is 100 times

more humane, more dignified than what these filthy scumbags do to Muslims.” Such reactions are galling and they

do real harm to U.S. credibility. But the fault lies not with those who released the report, as some critics argue, but with those who permitted and perpetrated acts of torture, those who lied about it to America’s elected representatives, and those who

willfully kept the president and senior members of the Bush administration in the dark. Their actions undermined not only American values, but also American influence and national security interests. In the words of a former prisoner of war, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), the actions laid out in the Senate report “stained our national honor” and “did much harm and little practical good.”

Internet Freedom

Internet Not K2 DemocracyInternet freedom doesn’t promote democracyMartin 11 - Joseph Martin is a Policy Fellow at the Syrian Emergency Task Force, an organization focused on building a free and democratic Syria. (“Does Internet Freedom Lead to Democracy?” http://mic.com/articles/524/does-internet-freedom-lead-to-democracy 1/26/2011) STRYKERInternet usage in the Middle East has increased 1,825% since 2000, compared to

432% across the rest of the world. Many have argued the proliferation of the Internet would usher in a new era of free speech and democratization across the region; however, this has not been the case . On the contrary, Saudi Arabia and numerous Gulf States have designed an Internet infrastructure capable of filtering out nearly 100% of censored content. This is truly an astonishing feat given the sheer volume of “unauthorized” content available online. In a recent speech, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recognized, according to Human Rights Watch's account, “that an open internet is not just a matter of human rights, but integral to economic development and political stability”. Intuitively, I agree. When governments heavily regulate Internet content, they dampen ingenuity, cultural richness, and entrepreneurialism. Arab nations are in need of innovative minds. Water shortages, dwindling oil reserves,

over-population, and international business competition are among the pressing issues facing the region today. Who isn’t curious how technology policy in the Middle East will adapt to a population hungry for the Internet? If the region opens the doors of free communication, a new era of innovation, collaboration, and economic prosperity could emerge. We could all witness Arab collaboration bring to pass innovative enterprises the

likes of Twitter, Skype, Facebook, or Groupon. However, history has shown that a shift towards the proliferation of communication tools does not necessarily promote democratization . As far back as 1940 it was commonly speculated that the innovation of long-distance calling would usher in an era of equality, peace, and democracy. However, WWII, the Korean War, Vietnam, and the

Cold War shortly followed. The flaw in this theory is that all types of groups and institutions can benefit from the Internet , not just democratic ones . Is democracy the natural evolution of Internet freedom? No. Societies have different needs

and priorities. Some face high rates of violence and corruption, thereby valuing security over freedom of speech. Others may look upon the excesses of capitalism with disgust. While others may simply be appeased – or even prefer – command-capitalism, socialism, or another hybrid political or

economic system. In the end, I argue that democracy is not the natural evolutionary end-result when societies procure the benefits of Internet freedom .

Democracy Promotion

Surveillance Not BadSurveillance doesn’t hurt US democracy reputationPew 14 - The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan American think tank based in Washington, D.C., that provides information on social issues, public opinion, and demographic trends shaping the United States and the world. (“Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image,” http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/ 7/14/2014) STRYKER

Still, the U.S. has a relatively strong reputation for respecting personal freedoms compared with the other major nations tested on the survey . A median of 58% believe the American government respects individual liberties, while 56% say this about France, 36% about China, and only 28% say it about the Russian government.1 And while the Snowden revelations have harmed aspects of America’s image, overall ratings for the U.S. remain mostly positive . Globally, the U.S. has a higher favorability rating than China. This is especially true in Europe – across the seven European Union nations surveyed, a median of 66% express a favorable opinion of the U.S., while just 39% feel this way about China. The U.S. is also considerably more popular in Latin America, while both countries receive mostly high marks in Asia and Africa.

Surveillance doesn’t undermine democracy promotionPew 14 - The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan American think tank based in Washington, D.C., that provides information on social issues, public opinion, and demographic trends shaping the United States and the world. (“Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image,” http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/ 7/14/2014) STRYKER

Nevertheless, half or more of the public in 33 of 44 nations surveyed still think that Washington safeguards Americans’ freedoms . The U.S. image as a protector of personal liberties remains quite strong in a number of Asian nations: South Korea (91%), Philippines (87%), Japan (84%) and Vietnam (75%); and also in the Middle East: Lebanon (84%) and Israel (75%). And in many societies, the younger generation is much more likely than their elders to see the U.S. as a defender of domestic liberties. This is particularly true in Uganda, where there is a 20-point generation gap on this measure, and Russia with a 19-point difference.

Democracy Promotion FailsSpread of western democracy causes more problems than it solvesGreen, ’14, (Andrew, former Ambassador to Syria and to Saudi Arabia, “Why Western democracy can never work in the Middle East,” The Telegraph, 16 Aug 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/11037173/Why-Western-democracy-can-never-work-in-the-Middle-East.html)//ergThe West’s abject failure to understand the inner workings of these countries has had some disastrous effects. Iraq is the classic case. I was opposed to the invasion of that country, not because I had any love for Saddam but because I believed that the alternative would be worse. I was concerned that our invasion would destroy the stability of the Gulf which had, since the fall of the Shah in 1979, depended on a tripod comprising Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (the latter supported by the West). That is exactly what happened and we now find that the Iranians are in a position to dominate the Gulf region. Internally, the outcome was even worse. The army was disbanded (although some would say it disbanded itself). The Americans then closed down the Ba’ath party, the only political organisation in the country. Certainly, it had been an instrument of Saddam’s rule but it was not all bad. Just as anybody in a position of responsibility in the Soviet Union was obliged to be a member of the Communist party so were senior Iraqis obliged to be members of the Ba’ath party. The result was to atomise the social and political structure of the entire country. Favour for favour ground to a halt and so did the country’s governance. A while later, elections were held to loud applause from Washington. There was a huge turnout by the majority Shia’ who must have been amazed at the naivety of their occupiers. As it turned out, Nouri Malaki, the Iraqi prime minister who was finally forced to step down this week, proved to be a Shia’ version of Saddam – at least as the minority Sunnis perceived him. Indeed, it was the severe disaffection of the Sunni tribes in the North of Iraq that permitted IS to make the rapid territorial gains that have stunned both the West and the governments of the region. We in the West have little conception of the mutual hatred and contempt between these two Islamic sects . Think of the Protestant and Catholic hatreds, thankfully of the past, and multiply them up. Then add in a regional struggle for power. We now have the leading Sunni power, Saudi Arabia, feeling threatened by the growing power of the Shia’ standard bearer in Iran as their influence spreads in Syria and Lebanon – a Shi’ite arc which the Saudis are determined to oppose. Where do our interests now lie? We have a humanitarian interest in getting effective aid to the hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the blood curdling violence of the Islamic fighters. Protecting them requires that the front line of Kurdish controlled Iraq be stabilised. Only the Kurds can do that and, as the US and most of Europe - EU foreign ministers met in emergency session in Brussels yesterday to discuss the issue - HAVE now recognised, they must be provided with the ammunition, equipment and intelligence that they need. It is very likely that close air support will also be necessary, at least for some months but any involvement of ground troops would be a very serious mistake. While it may be necessary to have a very small number of special forces in a position to direct air strikes, we cannot allow “mission creep” to take over. Before long the very presence of Western forces generates resentment and hostility . Once the immediate crisis has been addressed, we must prevent the development of the Islamic state. That will require an effective government in Baghdad who must take steps to win back the acquiescence, if not the loyalty, of the Northern tribes who, of course, are Sunni and who could take on the Islamic extremists if they chose to. Beyond that we need to review our attitude to the present regimes in Tehran and in Damascus – yes, Damascus. We cannot afford to do less. An “Islamic state” poses a major threat to the stability of the whole Middle East. Furthermore, it establishes an area under the control of Islamic extremists which poses a threat to Britain itself. The Security Service have been unambiguous in pointing to the risk of “blow-back” – that is young men from Britain going out to fight and coming back fired up with hostile intent. This risk will be exacerbated by any success that IS may continue to have as it will certainly be seen by its adherents as a sign of God’s favour to their cause. To be effective in the region and to ensure our own security, we must, for once, learn from the past and ensure that our policies

take account of the internal dynamics of the countries of the region. We cannot afford any more mistakes. The growing chaos in the Middle East poses a real and present danger both to our economy and the peace of our society and indeed to that of the wider world.

Democracy promotion fails and risks confrontationTaliaferro 7 - Jeffrey W. Taliaferro is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. (“Hegemonic Delusions: Power, Liberal Imperialism, and the Bush Doctrine,” Lexis Nexis, 2007) STRYKERFinally, Layne contends that his extraregional hegemony theory explains certain continuities in grand strategy during and after the Cold War. Maintaining U.S. preponderance and preventing the emergence of multipolarity in Eurasia figures prominently in the National Security Strategy reports released by the George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations. Despite rhetorical and tactical differences with its predecessor, the current administration's grand strategy is

hegemonic in scope, shaped by Open Door ideology, and largely blind to the longterm consequences of its actions and the legitimate concerns of other states. Regardless of whether Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,

former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the others in the administration actually believe their rhetoric about democracy promotion and the benign motives for U.S. policy, the fact is [*179] that hardly anyone else believes them . Layne notes, "Wilsonian liberalism self-consciously rests on the conviction that the United States is a model for the world and that its values and institutions are superior to everybody else's. . . .The inclination to universalize liberal democracy puts the United States on a collision course with others whose ideologies, institutions, and values differ from America's. . . ."

Unrestricted faith in global democracy is disastrousTaliaferro 7 - Jeffrey W. Taliaferro is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. (“Hegemonic Delusions: Power, Liberal Imperialism, and the Bush Doctrine,” Lexis Nexis, 2007) STRYKERDespite their differences, Layne's The Peace of Illusions and Smith's A Pact with the Devil highlight the interplay of systemic constraints and liberal ideology in shaping the types of policies the United States pursues abroad. Both books offer a sobering warning for the future of U.S. grand strategy regardless of whether the Democrats or the Republicans win the 2008 election: overwhelming preponderance, arrogance, and blind faith in the ability of liberal democracy and free markets to alleviate international threats can have disastrous consequences for the United States and for the rest of the world . Unfortunately, the chances that any of the presidential candidates will heed that warning are low.

American global dominance is over—heuristics like democracy promotion failDrezner 9 - Daniel W. Drezner is Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. (“The Challenging Future of Strategic Planning,” Lexis Nexis, Winter/Spring, 2009) STRYKERWith the conclusion of the George W. Bush presidency, there is a demand for new concepts and plans to organize American foreign policy. Containment is dead and gone. The Bush Doctrine was unpopular at home and abroad. n14 Isolationism is simply not a viable option. Both policymakers and scholars need a better grasp of how to craft viable, long-term strategies for the international environment of the twenty-first century. To describe the current international environment as complex would be an understatement. To appreciate the depth of these external challenges, consider the Princeton Project on National Security. This was a multi-year, multi-pronged effort to develop a twenty-first-century doctrine that could achieve what containment accomplished during the Cold War. The effort to create a "Kennan by committee" involved hundreds of foreign policy analysts. After dozens of meetings, however, the final report concluded, "it became clear that such an organizing principle--such as containment, enlargement, balancing or democracy

promotion--would not be forthcoming . Indeed, no overarching concept fit because no one danger facing the United States is the overarching threat ." n15 If today's leading foreign policy analysts cannot agree on a single heuristic to anchor U.S. foreign policy, policy planning becomes that much more difficult . n16 It is easy to list the external challenges facing the United States. From a conventional, state-centric perspective, the greatest conundrum is coping with the rise of developing country great powers. Two years ago the National Journal ran a cover story resuscitating Paul Kennedy's thesis of America's "imperial overstretch," articulated most prominently in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Kennedy's assessment of the current situation was stark: "There are now more players on the globe who can screw us rather more effectively than we can screw them." n17 Two years later, the trend lines only reinforce that assessment, even among America's allies. Last year, the French foreign minister declared

that "the magic is over" for America's image , and the German finance minister declared

that the United States would soon lose its status as a financial superpower. n18

Promoting global democracy is impossibleAmerican Interest, ’14, (“Is Democracy Promotion a Failed Policy?” The American Interest, May 03, 2014, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/05/03/is-democracy-promotion-a-failed-policy/)//ergTarek Masoud was once an enthusiastic believer in America’s effort to promote democracy abroad. The Harvard political scientist and many of his colleagues thought the U.S. could sow Western ideals of democracy, freedom, and prosperity by funding political parties and encouraging the growth of democratic institutions in developing nations. Masoud now thinks their reasoning was flawed, and that the mission itself is perhaps impossible. “We should be much more humble about what the best possible outcomes are,” he told the Boston Globe. The the Arab Spring uprisings that gave way to civil war in Syria and ongoing chaos in Libya have been a reality check, says Masoud: “Maybe in a place like Syria or Libya the best possible outcome is one in which the old regime is at the table.” As the Globe‘s writer, Thanassis Cambanis, puts it, “our desire to see freedom spread has been clouding our judgment about what actually allows it to take root.” Those who favored promoting democrocy abroad believed that “individual actions can change the course of nations, and that democracy can be nurtured by giving the right skills to promising leaders and activists,” says Cambanis, but that viewpoint is falling into disfavor. Even if such efforts don’t lead directly to democratic reform, their supporters often argue that they are still “good for society” and will occasionally “yield a great leap forward in freedom.” According to Masoud and his colleagues: [T]he biggest determinant of whether authoritarian regimes survived had nothing to do with civil society, individual protest leaders, or even the workings of the political system. […] It may be […] that international democracy training programs amount to well-intentioned but ineffectual junkets.

Democracy InevitableSuccessful democracy promotion is inevitable—accepted norm and other countriesMcFaul 4 - Michael McFaul is a Hoover Senior Fellow, a professor of political science, and director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford University. He is also a nonresident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a member of TWQ's editorial board. (“Democracy Promotion as a World Value,” http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v028/28.1mcfaul.html 2004) STRYKERYet, this interpretation of the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and American popularity on the one hand and the status of democratic values in the international community on the other is misleading. First, democracy as an international norm is stronger today than ever , and democracy itself is widely regarded as an ideal system of government . Democracy also has near-universal appeal among people of every ethnic group, every religion, and every region of the world. Second, democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal has become increasingly acceptable throughout most of the international community. Norms protecting the

sovereignty of states still trump norms protecting the rights of individuals, but the balance is shifting. The United States, especially in the last century, has played a pivotal role in making the advancement of democratic values a legitimate foreign policy objective. Today, however, the United States no longer holds a monopoly on

the business of democracy promotion. That development is a sign that such policy is not just a U.S. national interest (or camouflage for other U.S. national interests), but an international norm embraced by other states , transnational organizations, and international networks. The existence of norms does not mean that they are always followed. Nonetheless, the violation of norms does not prove that normative frameworks have no meaning or influence. Furthermore, although many around the world loathe U.S. power

and preaching, the norm of democracy has achieved striking universality in the current international system. The promotion of democracy, even when embraced and, according to many, tainted by the most powerful country in the international system, has also become an international norm.

AT//AfricaNo Africa war or they can’t solve Straus 12—professor of politics at the University of Wisconsin (Scott, WARS DO END! CHANGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/03/01/afraf.ads015.full)The principal finding is that in the twenty-first century both the volume and the character of civil wars have changed in significant ways.5

Civil wars are and have been the dominant form of warfare in Africa, but they have declined steeply in recent years, so that today there are half as many as in the 1990s. This change tracks global patterns of decline in warfare.6 While some students of African armed conflicts, such as

Paul Williams, note the recent trend,7 it is fair to say that the change in the prevalence of civil wars is not recognized by most Africanists and generalists. Equally important but even less noted is that the

character of warfare in Africa has changed. Today's wars are typically fought on the peripheries of states, and insurgents tend to be militarily weak and factionalized . The

large wars that pitted major fighting forces against each other, in which insurgents threatened to capture a capital or to have enough power to secede, and in which insurgents held significant territory – from the Biafra secessionists in Nigeria, to UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique, the TPLF in Ethiopia, the EPLF in Eritrea, the SPLM in

Sudan, the NRM in Uganda and the RPF in Rwanda – are few and far between in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia's Al-Shabab holds territory and represents a significant threat to the Somali federal transitional government, but given the 20-year void at the centre of Somalia the case is not representative. In April 2011, rebel forces in Côte d'Ivoire captured Abidjan, but they did so with external help and after incumbent Laurent Gbagbo, facing a phalanx of domestic, regional, and international opposition, tried to steal an

election.8 More characteristic of the late 2000s and the early 2010s are the low-level insurgencies in

Casamance (Senegal), the Ogaden (Ethiopia), the Caprivi strip (Namibia), northern Uganda (the Lord's Resistance Army), Cabinda (Angola), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Chad and the Central African Republic (various armed groups in the east), Sudan (Darfur), and South Sudan, as well as the insurgent-bandits in eastern Congo (a variety of armed actors, including Rwandan insurgents) and northern Mali

(al-Qaeda in the Maghreb). Although these armed groups are in some cases capable of sowing terror and disruption, they

tend to be small in size, internally divided, poorly structured and trained, and without access to heavy weapons .9 Several of today's rebel groups have strong

transnational characteristics, that is, insurgents move fluidly between states. Few are at present a significant military threat to the governments they face or in a position to seize and hold large swaths of territory.

Democracy is bad in the context of African stabilityHenderson 9 - Errol Henderson conducts research on international relations theory, analysis of war and peace, culture and world politics, African politics as well as African-American political ideology. His work has been published in various journals such as British Journal of Political Science, International Interactions, International Politics, and Journal of Conflict Resolution. (“Disturbing the Peace: African Warfare, Political Inversion and the Universality of the Democratic Peace Thesis,” British Journal of Political Science, 39.1, p. 25-58, January, 2009) STRYKERIn conclusion, it is clear that although the empirical evidence in support of the contention that democracies rarely if ever fight each other is voluminous, the democratic peace thesis has not been systematically applied to the individual regions that comprise the global system . Further, as with much recent work

in world politics, the applicability of this research to Africa is not clear because IR scholars rarely test their theoretical models specifically on African states.

Therefore, in this article I tested the universality of the democratic peace thesis by applying it to sub-Saharan African states. The findings support the political inversion thesis , which argues that the greater domestic legitimacy of democratic states in Africa increases their willingness to deploy troops abroad as compared to autocratic states whose greater illegitimacy compels them to keep their troops close to home in order to check potential insurgency; therefore, politically open African states should

be more likely to fight each other . The findings with respect to Africa do not refute the democratic peace thesis, as such, since the disputants consisted largely of democratic-anocratic pairs and not two fully fledged democracies. More challenging to the universalist viewpoint is our finding that the democratic peace does not hold in any region outside the West;

therefore, Africa is hardly the 'anomaly' that it first appears, but its conflict processes seem to approximate the modal form for most of the world's regions with respect to the democratic peace phenomenon.

Moreover, the results indicate that the democratic peace is reversed in Latin America and Asia ; and, unlike in the case of Africa, the disputatious democracies in these regions have often been coherent democracies involved in violent conflicts. These findings provide an unequivocal response to the universalist claims of democratic peace advocates - and on their own terms. For example, in their critique of Cohen's work, Russett and Ray provided a clear criterion for establishing the accuracy of democratic peace claims: they stated that in statistical models that test the democratic peace thesis 'if other variables prove significant but democracy does not, then the democratic peace hypothesis is "refuted" (or at least not supported).'138 They added that 'despite efforts of exactly this nature by several researchers using different measures and statistical techniques, the significance of democracy has so far proved robust'.139 Using this clear standard we found no support for the claim that the democratic peace is a universal phenomenon.140 The results reinforce Beck et al.'s admonition that 'theories of international conflict that have a one-size-fits-all approach to regions and time periods should be replaced with theories that reflect the highly contingent and context-dependent nature of the phenomenon.'141

AT//TerrorismDemocracy doesn’t play a role in combatting terrorismKaron, ’01, (Tony, Senior Editor, “Can Democracy Be a Weapon Against Terrorism?” Time, Sept. 28, 2001, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,176249,00.html)//ergWhat the terrorists hate about America, President Bush told Congress last week, is "what we see right here in this chamber, a democratically elected government." He proceeded to elaborate: "Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms, our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan." [an error occurred while processing this directive] Bold words. But casting the war on terrorism as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism is a little misleading — even dangerous . The anti-terror effort is an effort to rally humanity against cruelty, civilization against barbarism, extremism against moderation. But democracy doesn't quite make it into the binary oppositions involved in this fight. For one thing, none of the three "existing" governments the President cited are democracies — Jordan and Saudi Arabia are monarchies, whose leaders are chosen by heredity rather than by an electorate, while Egypt holds tightly-controlled elections from which the most popular opposition party is banned. And Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf, another key player in the anti-terrorism coalition, is nothing if not a self-appointed leader (he took power in a coup). Also, many of the freedoms cited by President Bush are severely curtailed in all four. Of course, holier-than-thou political correctness may be an intolerable luxury right now . War is a messy business, in which you work with whomever shares your immediate objectives, no matter how odious their domestic policies. Remember that without Stalin in the Western camp, Hitler could conceivably have won World War II. But in the long term, eliminating the root causes of terror will involve, if not complete democracy, at least allowing citizens of Middle Eastern countries some voice their governance.

Democracy cannot confront terrorist threatsKaron, ’01, (Tony, Senior Editor, “Can Democracy Be a Weapon Against Terrorism?” Time, Sept. 28, 2001, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,176249,00.html)//ergA new type of terrorist threat The Western priority, right now, is clearly to muster all hands on deck for the fight against Bin Laden and his cohorts, no matter how dirty some of those hands may be. And some short-term political prices will have to be paid. Musharraf, for example, will considerably strengthen his grip on power in Pakistan by helping the U.S. — if he can survive the domestic backlash. U.S. sanctions against his government have been lifted, and he can expect billions of dollars of aid and credit as well as plenty of diplomatic favors. All for helping take down a Taliban regime Pakistan all but created. Still, for exactly that reason, Pakistan's intelligence services remain the West's best hope of actually finding Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan. Strengthening the hand of undemocratic regimes may be unavoidable in the short term. But in the long run, if the world is to be freed of the scourge of Islamist terrorism, that solution may not suffice — because unlike the state-sponsored terrorism of the 1970s and '80s, which came out of rogue nations like Libya and Syria, many of the terrorist groups Bin Laden has brought together first emerged under authoritarian regimes backed by the West. Contemporary political Islam first exploded onto the world stage in 1979 with the Iranian revolution, which destabilized the politics of the Islamic world for almost two decades. That outcome was caused, in part, by the fact that the authoritarianism of Iran's pro-Western monarch, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, tolerated no democratic challenge to his regime. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Algeria's Armed Islamic Group, which appear to have provided a number of key operatives for Bin Laden's networks, both emerged in situations where democratic channels were closed to Islamists and other opposition groups. In the case of Pakistan, the authoritarian regime of the late General Zia ul-Haq actually encouraged the emergence of Islamist groups as a bulwark against domestic leftists and a vanguard to fight the Soviets in neighboring Afghanistan. Now, some of those same Islamists may be coming back to haunt the current military government. Can democracy work in the Middle East? There's no easy answer here, because democracy isn't always the

harbinger of freedom. The German elections of the early 1930s showed that something as mundane as a split between rival political parties whose combined share of the vote dwarfed that of the Nazis allowed democracy to enable totalitarianism. And many analysts suspect that truly democratic elections in countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan might, indeed, produce Islamist governments hostile to the West. At the same time, the temptation to suggest Islam and democracy don't easily mix should be avoided. Indeed, even Iran's limited forms of democracy has provided a platform for its people to vote for reformist President Mohammed Khatami to express their desire for a society based on laws and for coexistence with the West. Hard-liners may cling to power despite their repudiation by the electorate, but the voters' impact is undeniable — Iran may have been a state sponsor of terrorism in the past, but it is currently weighing joining the anti-terrorism coalition. Arab authoritarianism has produced reliable allies for the West, but it has also created an environment conducive to the growth of Islamic terrorism. Stopping Bin Laden and his ilk requires an immediate consensus among widely different regimes on the need to stamp out the scourge of terrorism. But a long-term solution to the problem of terrorism emanating from the Middle East may require a profound shift in that region's politics.

Turn—Democracy is the perfect condition for terrorism to bloomChenoweth, ’06, (Erica, American political scientist as well as a faculty member and Ph.D. program co-director at the University of Denver's Josef Korbel School of International Studies, “The Inadvertent Effects of Democracy on Terrorist Group Emergence,” Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 2006, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/chenoweth_2006_06.pdf)//ergThis project contributes to this debate by exploring the causal processes linking democracies to terrorist group activity. I argue that terrorist activities proliferate in democratic countries for two related reasons. First, democracies provide the permissive environment, or opportunity structure, wherein terrorist groups flourish. Second, the motivation for terrorist groups to escalate in democracies can be explained by intergroup dynamics, with terrorist groups of various ideologies competing with one another for limited agenda space. To test my hypotheses, I conduct a cross-national, longitudinal analysis of 119 countries for the period 2 1975n97, using agenda competition as the key independent variable and the number of new terrorist groups as the dependent variable. This research is significant for several reasons. First, it contributes to the debate concerning the relationship between democracies and terrorism. Few studies have investigated the dynamics existing between terrorist groups or the significance of such dynamics in explaining this relationship. Therefore, this research is critical in both developing testable hypotheses regarding terrorism and creating recommendations for potential policy responses. A further goal is to contribute to the growing policy literature endorsing democracy as a way to eradicate terrorism. This project is a critique of the latter perspective, offering some considerations for scholars and policymakers who advocate democratization without taking into account all of its potential ramifications. Improved knowledge about the origins and development of terrorist groupsoand the conditions that enhance themois necessary in order for policymakers to make informed choices in foreign policy, especially in light of the current emphasis on terrorism and its potential impacts on U.S. security.

Autocracies are better at stopping the spread of terrorismChenoweth, ’06, (Erica, American political scientist as well as a faculty member and Ph.D. program co-director at the University of Denver's Josef Korbel School of International Studies, “The Inadvertent Effects of Democracy on Terrorist Group Emergence,” Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 2006, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/chenoweth_2006_06.pdf)//erg

Moreover, the specific civil liberty of press freedom may also increase terrorism through two distinct processes. First, and most bothersome to researchers, is the problem of reporting bias across different regime types. Autocracies have less incentive to report the existence of oppositional groups or oppositional violence, and therefore restrict the material printed by their media. In a democracy, however, the media has an incentive to report not only transparently, but 12 also sensationally 13 Quan Li suggests, however, that the positive effect of civil liberties may be epiphenomenal of a crucial aspect of democratic governance: the degree of institutional constraints on the decisionmaking power of the government. Whereas freedom of action in a nondemocracy is contingent upon support from the elite, the democratic government is held accountable by other branches of government as well as by the domestic electorate. As Li argues, 12. Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002). 13. Li, iDoes Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?i 14. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in R.W. Apple Jr., iMeese Suggests Press Code on Terrorism,i New York Times, July 18, 1985. Furthermore, the democratic government places fewer restrictions on media content. Therefore, terrorist incidents are less likely to be reported in autocratic countries than in democracies. Reporting bias, then, may lead researchers to the erroneous conclusion that civil liberties actually contribute to terrorist violence in the long run. Press freedom may have an additional positive causal effect on terrorism. Without media coverage, terrorist groups are essentially obsolete. Widespread fear and panic are fundamental elements of terrorist strategy. In fact, Margaret Thatcher called the press the ioxygeni for 14 terrorists. Because free press exists in most democracies, terrorists have increased incentives to grow in, move to, and conduct their violence within such countries. Sensational media coverage also serves the terrorists in their recruiting, teaching, and training techniques. The press, therefore, is inadvertently complicit in fulfilling terroristsi objectives.

Democratic institutional constraints make fighting terrorism impossibleChenoweth, ’06, (Erica, American political scientist as well as a faculty member and Ph.D. program co-director at the University of Denver's Josef Korbel School of International Studies, “The Inadvertent Effects of Democracy on Terrorist Group Emergence,” Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 2006, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/chenoweth_2006_06.pdf)//ergEven more important, however, is that institutional constraints weaken the governmentis ability to fight terrorism. Checks and balances force the democratic government to be more accountable to a broader range of domestic interests. The democratic government is unlikely to engage in counterterrorist activities that could be perceived as undermining core democratic values, due to electoral incentives as well as norms of fair play. Authoritarian regimes, on the 17 other hand, are less constrained and more able to find and crush terrorist organizations. Democratic countries, therefore, are less likely to adopt counterterrorist strategies that are as 18 strict as those enacted by nondemocratic regimes. Some scholars have also noted a relationship between the form of democracy and terrorism. John Huber and G. Bingham Powell found differing effects of majoritarian and proportional representation on the congruence between citizen preferences and public policies. On the whole, the proportional representation system generates closer alignment of citizen self- 19 placement and the estimated positions of governments on either majoritarian or mixed systems. Unsurprisingly, then, Marta Reynal-Querol has found that proportional representation also reduces the probability that groups will rebel within a state, because the opportunity costs of engaging in conflict are higher in this type of system than any other. discovered a negative correlation between proportional representation and terrorist incidents, following Reynal-Querolis findings.21

AT//Middle EastNo escalationChristopher J. Fettweis 7 Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department at the US Naval War College, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, 49(4), p. 83-98Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni–Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intraMuslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct

conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once

again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely . Wider war No matter

what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem

counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region’s autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam’s rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon

and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than

regional conflagration. Iraq’s neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of

their coreligionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor – the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world – to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to

address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare .

Democracy promotion especially fails in the context of the Middle East—it just produces more violenceHarsanyi, ’15, (David, Senior Editor, “Obama Is Wrong. Democracy Is The Last Thing The Middle East Needs Right Now,” The Federalist, FEBRUARY 19, 2015, http://thefederalist.com/2015/02/19/obama-is-wrong-democracy-is-the-last-thing-the-middle-east-needs-right-now/)//ergPresident Barack Obama gave a speech at White House’s “Countering Violent Extremism” summit yesterday crammed with predictable feel-good ideas for combating the imaginary root causes of Islamic extremism. And in the midst of arguing that radicalism was principally driven by anger over colonialism, illiteracy, and unemployment, Obama proposed an idea that we should have been abandoned trillions of dollars and many years ago: more democracy. Here’s how the president laid it out in the Los Angeles

Times: Efforts to counter violent extremism will only succeed if citizens can address legitimate grievances through the democratic process and express themselves through strong civil societies. First of all, does Obama really believe that extremists have “legitimate grievances?” Are the disaffected youth recruited from the slums of Paris (but, curiously, not from the slums of Rio or Beijing) concerned that France doesn’t offer a strong enough civil society? Are the radicals beheading Christians in North Africa ticked off over a lack of women’s rights in Yemen? Are extremists who target Jews and free-speech enthusiasts in Copenhagen worried about the health of democratic institutions in Europe? No, it’s the grievances themselves that are the root of the problem. In most Arab countries, the authoritarian leadership is in some ways more liberal than the majority of the citizenry. As bad as these regimes are – and we coddle and enable many of them – almost every time the democratic process has been tried in the Islamic world, it’s produced more extremism and factional violence . So which nation does the president propose would benefit most from more democracy? Pakistan? Iraq? Saudi Arabia? Jordan? How would Christians and Alawites fare in a democratic Syria, do you think? Perhaps as well as minorities do in a democratic Libya, a place Obama argued Americans had to intervene militarily or the “democratic impulses that are dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship.” Turns out that democratic impulses can also lead to darkness. There is no Gadhafi regime, but there is anarchy, a fertile recruiting ground for terrorists and a country where Copts can be executed without too many hassles and American consulates can be sacked without any repercussion. All of it enabled, in part, by the president’s unauthorized war (and Congress’ implicit approval of that war) that was meant to help facilitate democracy. At the same time, the administration punishes the Egyptian government for putting an end to the extremism empowered by democratic impulses. It is Egypt’s al-Sisi – no great friend of liberty, granted – who’s spoken out most forcefully about the future of Islam. Yet the administration has withheld aid from that government until it can “certify that Egypt is taking steps toward democracy.” As if insuring a larger role for the Muslim Brotherhood was in the U.S.’s – or the world’s – best interests.

Democracy can’t work in the Middle East—especially because of current instabilityHarsanyi, ’15, (David, Senior Editor, “Obama Is Wrong. Democracy Is The Last Thing The Middle East Needs Right Now,” The Federalist, FEBRUARY 19, 2015, http://thefederalist.com/2015/02/19/obama-is-wrong-democracy-is-the-last-thing-the-middle-east-needs-right-now/)//ergTo put our confused priorities in perspective, the United States condemned the Egyptians for bombing ISIS targets in Libya over the summer, complaining that “outside interference in Libya exacerbates current divisions and undermines Libya’s democratic transition.” (Incredulous italics mine) Egypt is not only dealing with ISIS in democratic Libya, it is dealing with terrorism originating from democratic Gaza, where Palestinians were offered autonomy and a chance to build a strong civil society, but put Hamas in charge instead. In the West Bank, where the moderates of the PLO run the show, Mahmoud Abbas can’t even hold elections because the will of the people is too extreme for Fatah. In Turkey and in Pakistan, the military is counterbalance to the democratic impulses that would allow theocrats to become members of NATO or nuclear powers. Democracy can’t work now. Three reasons why: 1. In a open political environment, extremists will always be willing to resort to violence to grab power. 2. Institutions tasked with protecting society from that extremism will no longer be “democratic” once they react. 3. The populace doesn’t have any real desire for a secular democracy, anyway. According to Pew Research Center polling, given a choice between a leader with a strong hand or a democratic system of government, most Muslims choose democracy. For us, democracy is shorthand for all the things we like about liberalism, but overwhelming percentages of Muslims believe that Islamic law should be the

official law of their own nations, which, as we’ve seen, does not “coexist” with our notions of self-determination. With apologies to the president, this knotty situation does not exist because Americans aren’t sensitive enough. But I’m sympathetic to Michael Gerson’s contention that presidents don’t have the freedom to be honest, constrained by sensitivities and realities of the world. He writes: Most of those urging Obama to assert that Islam is somehow especially flawed among the great faiths have never been closer to power than a fuse box. There is no possible circumstance in which a president could say such a thing. It would cause a global firestorm, immediately alienating Muslim allies and proxies whom we depend on to help fight the Islamic State and other enemies. The problem is that the president goes far beyond niceties. For starters, I’m not sure anyone has ever implored him to say Islam is inherently flawed or doomed. But shouldn’t we non-politicians be more sympathetic to M.G. Oprea’s argument that, among other things, referring to Islamist terrorists merely as “violent extremists” constitutes a dangerous attempt to hide from reality? The administration claims it doesn’t want to confer ISIS –a group that Graeme Wood says derives its philosophy “from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam” – the credibility of being called “Islamic.” This fantasy forces the administration to concoct offensive rationalizations and preposterous moral equivalencies that drives disjointed, ineffective policies. Much like our Middle East “democracy” fantasy ends up bolstering the power and reach of the very same extremists we claim to want to stop.

Democracy can’t account for the complexities of Middle East governments—it only produces more chaosGreen, ’14, (Andrew, former Ambassador to Syria and to Saudi Arabia, “Why Western democracy can never work in the Middle East,” The Telegraph, 16 Aug 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/11037173/Why-Western-democracy-can-never-work-in-the-Middle-East.html)//ergAs I write, the immediate crisis on Mount Sinjar appears to have been resolved but the appalling scenes which have dominated our television screens in recent weeks and the graphic reports in newspapers have galvanised public opionion. People demand that we do all in our power to help the Christians and the Yasidis who are being so viciously persecuted. And they are right to do so. This is a problem that will not go away. One million people have been displaced since Islamic State militants took over swathes of Northern Iraq. Yesterday, the governor of Dohuk province warned of a “genocide”, as hundreds of thousands sought refuge there. So what exactly is in our power? This requires a realistic appraisal of the situation on the ground and of our capacity to change it. Certainly, the situation across the Middle East is now more chaotic and dangerous than it has been for half a century. The enthusiasm of yester-year for the “Arab Spring” has proved entirely misguided. It has led to chaos in Egypt and anarchy in Libya. Those determined to be “on the right side of history” now find themselves on the wrong side of the argument. Democracy is empathically not the solution for extremely complex societies and Western meddling only makes matters immeasurably worse. The fundamental reason for our failure is that democracy, as we understand it, simply doesn’t work in Middle Eastern countries where family, tribe, sect and personal friendships trump the apparatus of the state. These are certainly not societies governed by the rule of law. On the contrary, they are better described as “favour for favour” societies. When you have a problem of any kind, you look for someone related to you by family, tribe or region to help you out and requests are most unlikely to be refused since these ties are especially powerful. In countries where there is no effective social security, your future security lies only in the often extensive family. Behind what we might perceive as this somewhat chaotic structure lie the secret police and the armed forces. They hold the state together under the aegis of the president, king, or whoever rules the roost. That leader keeps the different elements of society in play with concessions to each group but he has an iron fist to be used when necessary, as the public well understand. Examples can readily be found in Presidents Mubarak in Egypt, Asad in Syria and Saddam in Iraq. Nor are the kings of Jordan, Bahrain or, indeed, Saudi Arabia altogether different. There is much less cruelty in the latter countries but the iron fist is there when needed. Yet who in those countries today could survey the Middle East and believe that a republic would be a better option.

Democratization might not work in the Middle East—too many variablesO'Connell 12 - Jamie O'Connell is a Senior Fellow of the Honorable G. William and Ariadna Miller Institute for Global Challenges and the Law at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, as well as a Lecturer in Residence. He teaches and writes on political and legal development, and has particular expertise in law and development, transitional justice, democratization, post-conflict reconstruction, and business and human rights. (“Common Interests, Closer Allies: How Democracy in Arab States Can Benefit the West,” Stanford Journal of International Law, Lexis Nexis, Summer, 2012) STRYKER

The lack of consensus among scholars about the causal mechanism of the democratic peace makes it harder to predict whether democratization in Arab countries would reduce conflict . If one or more of the theories is correct, then we could expect newly democratic Arab states that acquired all of the qualities of democracy implied by these theories to resolve disputes with other democracies more peacefully than they had before. Without knowing what about democracy makes a state more peaceable, we do not know which political changes in particular Arab countries are likely to reduce the chances of conflict involving them. However, even before political scientists resolve this question, Western policymakers tracking political change in Arab countries can pay particular attention to the aspects of democracy that scholars have identified as possible contributors to international peace. n148

Soft Power

Soft Power HighUS image doing wellPew 14 - The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan American think tank based in Washington, D.C., that provides information on social issues, public opinion, and demographic trends shaping the United States and the world. (“Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image,” http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/ 7/14/2014) STRYKERA country’s brand is a valued commodity, especially when that nation is the world’s largest economic and strategic

power. And, in 2014, America’s image remains strong in much of the world. Despite anger with Washington over U.S. spying on both foreign leaders and foreign nationals, widespread opposition to U.S. drone strikes , disagreements about what to do in the Middle East and other recurring tensions , most surveyed publics around the world still hold a favorable view of the United States . Young people, in particular, in many nations have an especially positive opinion of America. Overall, attitudes toward the U.S. are largely unchanged from 2013. A global median of 65% voice an affirmative opinion about America. This includes a median of

74% in Africa, 66% in Western Europe, 66% in Asia, 65% in Latin America, but just 30% in the Middle East. For nearly a decade and a half the U.S. global image has been on a roller coaster ride. At the beginning of the century America was seen favorably by majorities in most of the countries where comparable public opinion data are available. Over the next few years the bottom fell out of U.S. approval numbers, amid widespread opposition to the war in Iraq and other aspects of U.S. foreign policy. America’s image began to rally in some nations and to soar by the end of the decade following the election of Barack Obama, at least in Europe and

parts of Asia and Latin America. After slipping a bit again in the first years of this decade, brand U.S. has stabilized and even recovered in a few nations in 2014. Currently, majorities in 30 of 43 nations express a favorable opinion of the United States. This includes majorities in five of seven European nations, where 78% of Italians, 75% of

the French and 73% of Poles voice positive views of Uncle Sam. There is no evidence of a rise of anti-Americanism in most of Western Europe, home to great animosity toward Washington in the

middle of the last decade. Only in Germany, where U.S. favorability is down 13 points since 2009, has the positive image of the United States slipped significantly.

And, despite this slippage, roughly half of Germans (51%) still see America in a positive light. The biggest decline in ratings for the U.S. is in Russia, where 71% now hold an unfavorable opinion. About half (51%) the Russian public expressed a positive opinion of Uncle Sam in 2013. In 2014, only 23% hold that view, a drop of 28 percentage points. Russians’ sentiments have been up and down in the last few years (57% positive as recently as 2010). The recent souring of the Russian mood about the United States has come at a time of growing Moscow-Washington tension over Crimea, Ukraine and U.S. economic sanctions against some Russians. A significant number of Greeks also harbor anti-American sentiment. More than six-in-ten Greeks express a negative view (63%, vs. 34% favorable).

Greeks have been quite negative the past three years at a time of growing Greek frustration over their economic situation. In Asia, majorities in eight of 11 nations express a positive opinion of the United States. This includes 92% of Filipinos, 82% of South Koreans and 76% of Bangladeshis and Vietnamese. Even half the Chinese give Uncle Sam a thumbs up. Only Pakistanis are strongly anti-American, with just 14% expressing a favorable assessment of the U.S., while 59% are unfavorable. The median positive approval of the United States in Pakistan in 13 surveys since 2002 has been a mere 15%. In eight of nine Latin American countries, majorities see the U.S. in a favorable light. Salvadorans (80%) are particularly positive in their

assessment, as are Chileans (72%) and Nicaraguans (71%). Notably, despite all the tensions between Washington and Caracas, 62% of Venezuelans have a favorable opinion of the U.S. But less than four-in-ten Argentines (36%) are positively disposed

toward Washington. In the seven surveys the Pew Research Center has conducted in Argentina since 2002, never more than about four-in-ten Argentines have expressed favorable sentiment toward their big neighbor to the north. Africans express particularly positive views about America. Strong majorities in all seven nations surveyed back the United States, including roughly

three-quarters or more of Kenyans (80%), Ghanaians (77%), Tanzanians (75%) and Senegalese (74%). The Middle East is the sole region where anti-Americanism is both deep and widespread. Eighty-five percent of Egyptians and Jordanians and 73% of Turks voice a negative opinion of the United States. Only 10% of Egyptians, 12% of Jordanians and 19% of Turks have a favorable view. The Egyptian rating is the lowest among the 43 nations in the study. The Tunisians are divided: 42% positive, 47% negative.

Israelis are the only public in the region where a majority (84%) holds a favorable opinion of America. And they are the second biggest U.S. fans among the nations surveyed,

trailing only the Filipinos. While hardly embracing America, Palestinians’ views of the United States improved by 14 percentage points, from 16% favorable in 2013 to 30% positive in 2014, possibly the consequence of Washington’s efforts to restart the Middle East peace process, even though the

attempt ultimately failed. The global public’s view of the United States is largely unchanged from 2013. Among the thirty-five countries surveyed in both 2013 and 2014, the median favorable assessment in 2014 is 62%, unchanged from 2013. Young See U.S. Positively Young people are more likely than their elders to have a favorable view of the United States in many parts of the world. In 24 of 43 nations, there is a generation gap in sentiment toward America with those ages 18 to 29 far more supportive of Uncle Sam than people 50 years of age and older. This age disparity is particularly evident in parts of Asia, where young Vietnamese (89%) look more favorably on the U.S. than do older Vietnamese (64%), a 25 percentage point difference that is possibly a legacy of the Vietnam War, which the older generation would have experienced personally. There is a similar generation gap about the United States in Thailand (+22 points) and China (+21 points). Ethnic and Religious Divides about the United States In a number of nations where the population is divided among major ethnic and religious groups, views of the United States can divide along those fault lines. In Israel, 91% of Jews have a favorable opinion of America. Just 46% of Israeli Arabs voice a positive view. In Lebanon, Israel’s neighbor to the north, more than half of Sunni Muslims (55%) and Christians (53%) say they are positively disposed toward the United States. But only 10% of Shia Muslims agree. Meanwhile in Malaysia, Buddhists (74%) are more supportive of the U.S. than are Muslims (40%). And in Nigeria, 80% of Christians express a favorable opinion of America, compared with 59% of

Muslims. Obama Still Popular The election of Barack Obama as the 44th U.S. president in 2008 was widely approved around the world , leading to high expectations for the new American leader. His election also coincided with a dramatic jump in favorability of the United States, promising an end to the anti-Americanism that had plagued much of Washington’s relations with the rest of the world for several years. Today, Obama remains largely popular in much of the world , except the Middle East . Half or more of the public in 28 of 44 countries surveyed has

confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs. And his median positive rating is 56%. In most

nations the public’s assessment of Obama’s performance is largely unchanged since 2013. His image has dropped by double-digits in five nations – Brazil, Germany, Argentina, Russia and Japan.

But it has risen appreciably in Israel and China. Western Europeans’ views of Obama remain

fairly positive. More than eight-in-ten French (83%) and seven-in-ten Italians (75%), British (74%) and Germans

(71%) have confidence in the U.S. president doing the right thing. Revelations that Washington systematically reads both Americans’ and some foreigners’ emails and listens in on their telephone conversations appears to have significantly damaged Obama’s approval in only one European Union (EU) country: Germany. Germans’ views of Obama fell 17 percentage points since last year. Nonetheless, German confidence in

the U.S. president remains relatively high. Russian (15%) faith in Obama, already quite low in 2013, is down 14 points, a likely casualty of the Ukraine confrontation. And Obama’s handling of that

crisis has not won the U.S. president much support in Ukraine, where only 44% give him a positive grade. Half or more of the publics in nine of 11 Asian nations surveyed have confidence in Obama to do the right thing in world affairs. Such pro-Obama sentiment is particularly strong in the Philippines (89%) and South Korea (84%). About half the Chinese (51%) now approve of his conduct internationally, up 20 points in the past year. Just 7% of Pakistanis think highly of Obama, making them his most severe critic. Notably, confidence in Obama’s leadership, while still high in Japan (60%), is down 10 points since 2013. In Africa, half or more of the public in all seven nations surveyed give Obama a positive rating. He is

particularly appreciated in Kenya (78%) and Tanzania (74%). Latin Americans take a more jaundiced view of the U.S. president. In just four of the nine countries in the survey do half or more approve of his conduct of foreign affairs. And his highest rating is a relatively modest 58% in El Salvador. Meanwhile, roughly a third rate Obama highly in Venezuela (33%) and Argentina (31%). Moreover, appreciation for the U.S. president’s international stewardship is down 17 points in Brazil and 13 points in Argentina in just the past year. Obama’s lowest regional approval is in the Middle East. Only 13% of Palestinians, 17% of Jordanians and 19% of Egyptians have confidence in his leadership. At the same time, 71% of Israelis give Obama a thumbs up. And that approval has risen 10 points since 2013, possibly thanks to the Obama administration’s renewed efforts to find some settlement for the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Whatever global publics think of the American president in 2014, there is widespread disappointment in his leadership in world affairs compared with views in 2009, his first year in office. Since 2009 Obama’s ratings have declined in 19 of 21 countries for which comparable data exist. It is up significantly in only one. And the median assessment of his global stewardship is down from 62% in 2009 to 55% in 2014. This includes a drop of 30 percentage points in Argentina, a 25-point falloff in Japan, a 23-point decline in Egypt and 22-point slides in Germany and Russia. Only in Israel has the public’s view of Obama improved significantly. Israeli confidence in him is up 15 points, from 56% to 71%, since he became president.

Soft power high now because of FIFA scandal action Shearer 5/30 (Derek, Stuart Chevalier Professor, Diplomacy and World Affairs at Occidental College, “US soft power triumphs in probe of Sepp Blatter’s corrupt casino,” The Conversation, 5/30/15, https://theconversation.com/us-soft-power-triumphs-in-probe-of-sepp-blatters-corrupt-casino-42538)//kjzThe selection by FIFA of Putin’s Russia to host the 2018 World Cup and of tiny Qatar to host in 2022 was highly suspect. Suspicions of money changing hands and undue influence on the FIFA executive committee were widespread, and led to cynicism about FIFA as an international sporting organization. Blatter, who was re-elected for his fifth term as head of the organization, has continually shrugged off concerns about his leadership. He has worked at FIFA for 40 years, the past 17 as president. Although FIFA is mocked by TV comedians like John Oliver and criticized by citizen groups demanding great transparency, reform of the organization has seemed unlikely. Blatter maintained tight control of the organization. FIFA’s insider-controlled governance structure seemed impenetrable, until the US took legal action. John Oliver riffs on FIFA. “Today, soccer wins, transparency wins. Enough of dirty deals, enough of lies,” former Argentine soccer star Diego Maradona told the media after the indictment. Romário de Souza Faria, a Brazilian soccer star turned politician, praised the FBI on the floor of the Brazilian Senate. Popular British soccer blogger Roger Bennett told CBS Morning News that the US deserved the thanks of the world for moving against FIFA officials. The immediate impact of the Department of Justice action is a plus for American soft power. Although the US is late to the soccer world – baseball, football and basketball have always had more appeal – the game has greatly expanded from AYSO youth leagues to top collegiate teams to a professional soccer league. Begun in 1993, Major League Soccer (MLS) has expanded to 20 cities in the US and Canada and is now moving toward profitability. Average attendance at matches exceeds that of the NBA and the NHL.

US soft power still high despite Chinese gainsShah 14 (Ritula, a journalist and news presenter on BBC Radio, “Is US monopoly on the use of soft power at an end?,” BBC World Tonight, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-29536648)//kjzChinese strategy There is another complicating factor, the US may still be the only superpower but there are now new, competing visions of what the world should look like. null China's Confucius Institutes have proved controversial The success of China's economy provokes both fear and admiration though China would like more of the latter. The 2008 Beijing Olympics probably marked the beginning of the Chinese government's efforts to nurture a soft power message. Since then, things have stepped up. There has been an expansion of Chinese Central Television, with the broadcaster producing English language programming from Washington and Nairobi. The Education Ministry is funding more than 450 Confucius Institutes which aim to spread Chinese language and culture. Their locations include some 90 universities in North America. But this attempt at building soft power has gone awry. Earlier this year,

the American Association of University Professors wrote a report criticising the presence of Confucius Institutes on US campuses. The academics argued the Institutes were an arm of the Chinese state, which worked to "advance a state agenda in the recruitment and control of academic staff, in the choice of curriculum, and in the restriction of debate". Tibet, Taiwan, and Tiananmen are said to be among the subjects that aren't open for discussion in the Institutes. And in recent weeks, two prominent US universities have suspended their affiliated Confucius Institutes, as concerns about them grow. So for now, China's state funded soft power message, is treated with some suspicion and has nothing like the impact of the more grassroots US version. China is still feared rather than admired by most of its Asian neighbours (not least because of its military or hard power capacity) but over time, who is to say that Beijing's economic success, regardless of its political system, won't win over global admirers? So does soft power really matter? Governments seem to value it even though soft power alone won't prevent wars or silence your critics - although it may help to win support for your point of view. For now, US soft power, remains pre-eminent, America continues to succeed in selling us its culture, its ability to innovate and its way of life. But there are competing economic powers and competing ideologies, all demanding to be heard, all wanting to persuade you to see it their way. Wielding soft power effectively is set to get more complicated.

AT//Nye (Uniqueness)There is no risk of soft power decline OR tons of alternative causesNye 15 - Joseph Nye is university distinguished service professor and former dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He has served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, chair of the National Intelligence Council, and deputy under secretary of state for security assistance, science, and technology. (Is the American Century Over? pp. 137-138 e-book, 2015) STRYKERAs we saw earlier, ancient Rome had an economy without productivity, a society riven by internecine warfare, and rampant corruption and decay in political institutions that made Rome incapable of defending itself. The facts above make it hard to draw a sustainable analogy between the United States and Rome. American culture has cleavages, but they remain manageable and less dangerous than at times in the past. Social problems abound, with some getting worse and some better . The society remains open to the outside world and better able than most to renew itself by immigration.

The American economy is growing more slowly than in the past, but it remains innovative at using and commercializing technologies because of its entrepreneurial culture, the most mature venture capital industry, and a tradition of close relations between industry and the world’s top ranking

universities. It leads the world in research and development , and is at the forefront of new cyber, nano, bio, and energy technologies. Real problems exist in terms of inequality and educating the workforce of the future. The largest questions are about political institutions. Political gridlock was incorporated into the American system from the start , but it has been increasing in Washington in recent years . Even if they are not worse than in the

past, the important question is whether the institutions will be able to cope with the problems of the future. At the same time, the federal system also ensures diversity and the

potential for innovation in states and cities. And the lesser role of government means that much of the innovation in America occurs outside government and outside Washington. Moreover, despite the increased partisan bickering, several serious problems , ranging from deficits to energy to health care costs, have improved rather than deteriorated in recent years. America has many problems and they raise many questions, but they are not creating an absolute decline that gives us a clear answer about when the American century will end .

Soft Power DoomedSoft power loss inevitable—leads to failure to lead global orderMetla 6/10 (Valeriya, holds two Bachelor Degrees in regional studies and international criminal justice, “Is the United States a Superpower in Decline?,” Law Street, 6/10/15, http://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/world/united-states-superpower-decline/)//kjzIt’s commonly believed that the United States is experiencing the decline of its global power. Christopher Layne, Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, argues that global power is shifting from West to East, leading to an American decline in influence and loss of global dominance. Those who support the notion that America’s superpower status is fading often argue the following: Due to its policies in the Middle East and Latin America, America lost its soft power influence over other countries. The war in Iraq is widely considered a failure that exhausted the U.S. military and broke the bank, increasing the country’s debt and leading to even greater proliferation of terrorism in the Middle East. Starting from the period of decolonization, America portrayed itself as a protector of human rights and democratic values. Nevertheless, after 9/11, the United States widely used torture against suspected terrorists, who were confined in Guantanamo Bay and other “black sites.” Basically, the United States condemns other countries for violating human rights but abuses those principles itself. America didn’t sign various important international treaties. For example, while the majority of countries can be prosecuted in the International Criminal Court (ICC) if their leaders commit certain international crimes, the United States cannot, suggesting double standards and tendency toward unilateral decision-making. At home, the state of permanent impasse in Congress is making it extremely difficult to make any progress in making decisions or reforming outdated and often counterproductive laws. In addition, racial inequality and poverty are on the rise, and infrastructure is deteriorating without proper investments. The U.S. economy still hasn’t fully recovered from the 2008 financial collapse, while other countries such as China, India, Brazil, and Turkey are becoming stronger in terms of their economies and militaries. Some even compare the United States with the British Empire, referring to its collapse a century ago. But, at the very least, this viewpoint suggests that America has lost the favor of many countries. Meanwhile, China has reached the status of a great power, and globalization has become omnipresent. Stephen Walt, Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, argues that “the real issue is whether developments at home and overseas are making it harder for the United States to exercise the kind of dominant influence that it did for much of the latter half of the 20th century.” According to this view, the United States is not declining and is still one of the most powerful countries in the world, but its capacity to lead global order has been diminished due to the array of domestic and foreign policy failures. As the Cold War ended, international relations also changed, making it more difficult for the United States to exercise its influence in the world. Further, Ian Bremmer, President of the Eurasia Group, argues in his book “Superpower: Three choices for America’s Role in the World” that the United States is still a global superpower. Watch the video below with Ian Bremmer to learn more about possible scenarios.

Soft Power IneffectiveUS soft power fosters resentment Gardels 05 (Nathan, editor of New Perspectives Quarterly since it began publishing in 1985. Since January 2014 he has been editor-in-chief of THEWORLDPOST, “The Rise and Fall of America’s Soft Power,” New Perspectives Quarterly, winter 2005, https://onlinelibrarystatic.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2005.00718.x/asset/j.1540-5842.2005.00718.x.pdf?v=1&t=ib9nb68d&s=a861662ec00cfe0815f1f12ce5848ee8cb9ca038)//kjzDOUBLE MESSAGE | America’s soft power thus carries a double message. It is a beacon of hope for the huddled masses who risk their lives to get here across the scorching desert from Mexico, on rickety rafts from Haiti or in the holds of rusty cargo ships from China; but it is also a satellite signal that inflames the pious and mobilizes the militant. Those who want what America has but can’t get it are stuck in their hopeless lives under corrupt and repressive regimes. On the other hand, those who don’t want it can’t escape its ubiquitous presence. Either way there is combustible resentment and anger across the Muslim world that, as V. S. Naipaul sees it, “their misfortune is due to the success of another civilization

AT//TerrorismSoft power fails at combatting terrorism—empirics Kroenig, McAdam, and Weber 10 (Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council; Melissa, Visiting Scholar at George Washington University’s Elliott School, in the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies; Steven, Professor at the Information School , University of California, Berkeley, “Taking Soft Power Seriously,” Comparative Strategy, 12/13/10, http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucst20)//kjzThe United States has also sought to apply soft power to counter ideological support for terrorism. Again, despite a concerted effort by the United States, global support for terrorist ideology shows no sign of abating and, according to some measures, may be increasing. The inability of the United States to counter ideological support for terrorism can be attributed to an environment hostile to the application of soft power. The societies and groups to which the United States has targeted its message largely lack functioning marketplaces of ideas and the U.S. message is not credible to the target audience. For these reasons, the application of soft power has been an ineffective tool for countering ideological support for terrorism, despite the importance of individual attitudes as a driver of terrorist behavior. In the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the United States presented a three-pronged strategy for winning the war on terror.48 The first two elements of the strategy, attacking terrorist networks and defending the homeland, were definitively in the realm of hard power. The third and, according to many Pentagon officials, the most important element of the strategy was “countering ideological support for terrorism.”49 As part of this soft power strategy, the United States declared its intent to “Support models of moderation in the Muslim world by helping change Muslim misperceptions of the United States and the West.”50 According to the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, “winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas.”51 A special task force on “strategic communications” was set up at the Defense Science Board that argued, “the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas.”52 Under the leadership of Karen Hughes as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the State Department established regional media hubs offering U.S. spokespeople with foreign language skills to speak on America’ behalf in media outlets throughout the Middle East.53 The United States government also increased the budget for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. agency responsible for dispensing foreign aid, by 60 percent, from 5 billion in 1998 to 8 billion in 2003.54 The United States funded a variety of pro-American media in the Muslim world, including H1 magazine, Radio Sawa, and the Al Hurra television station.55 Furthermore, the United States established reeducation facilities, such as the “House of Wisdom” in Iraq, to teach moderate Muslim theology to detainees captured in the war on terror.56 Despite this widespread effort to communicate throughout the Muslim world, the United States largely failed in its effort to apply soft power to its advantage in the war on terror by the end of the Bush administration. The war on terror will probably be a “generational struggle,” but it is nevertheless troubling that after a sustained multiyear Downloaded by [Georgetown University] at 11:08 23 June 2015 Taking Soft Power Seriously 421 effort to counter ideological support for terrorism, the United States made real progress on very few of its stated objectives. The United States, since 9/11, avoided a major terrorist attack, and while the causes of this can be debated, it is not likely the result of a waning of terrorist ideology globally, as is evidenced by the string of attacks in other parts of the world.57 Terrorist ideology continued to flourish globally with the help of the internet.58 The low public opinion of the United States in the Muslim world, often thought to be one of the factors contributing to terrorism against the United States and its allies, did not improve by the end of the Bush administration. In fact, a 2006 study found that people’s “attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy actually worsened slightly since they started listening to Radio Sawa and Al Hurra.”59 The U.S. failure to use soft power effectively in the war on terror was severely pronounced in some of the most important countries. In Egypt and Pakistan, for example, 60 percent and 41 percent of

their respective publics possessed either positive or mixed views of al Qaeda in 2006.60 According to Doug Miller, chairman of the international polling firm Globescan, “The fact that so many people in Egypt and Pakistan have mixed or even positive views of al Qaeda is yet another indicator that the US war on terror is not winning hearts and minds.”61 Why did the United States fail in its effort to use soft power to counter ideological support for terrorism? Part of the reason was that the United States was not able to compete in a functioning marketplace of ideas in most of the societies where a threat of jihadi terrorism exists. In the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the United States acknowledges that “terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and self-serving propaganda.”62 In other words, many countries of the Middle East and the broader Muslim world lack a functioning marketplace of ideas. They are disproportionately authoritarian.63 These governments often take measures, generally for the purposes of domestic stability, that have the effect of preventing meaningful competition in their domestic marketplaces of ideas. Foreign media content containing ideas about democracy and freedom is filtered.64 Radical religious groups, extremist parties, and fundamentalist madrassas are supported to shore up the legitimacy of secular regimes.65 Domestic problems are externalized and blamed on an “imperial” United States.66 The lack of a functioning marketplace of ideas in this region contributes to the pervasiveness of conspiracy theories.67 Due in part to these phenomena, public opinion of U.S. foreign policy in 2005 was lower in the Middle East than in any other world region.68 The inability of the United States to communicate in this region is aptly described by Norman Patizz, an American media entrepreneur, who notes that “there is a media war going on [in the Muslim world] with incitement, hate broadcasting, disinformation, government censorship, self-censorship, and America is not in the race.”69

AT//ProliferationNo prolif impactColin H. Kahl 13, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Melissa G. Dalton, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Matthew Irvine, Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, February, “If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf*cites Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR***I I I . LESSONS FROM HISTOR Y Concerns over “regional proliferation chains,” “falling nuclear dominos” and “nuclear tipping points” are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.14 Warnings of an inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of “rogue states” in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.15 In 2004, for example, Mitchell Reiss warned that “in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear ‘tipping point,’ where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic.” Given the presumed fragility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, “a single new entrant into the nuclear club could catalyze similar responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the

most likely candidates.”16 Nevertheless, predictions of inevitable proliferation cascades have historically proven false (see The Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven

far more common than nuclear proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly rare. Moreover, most countries that have

started down the nuclear path have found the road more difficult than imagined ,

both technologically and bureaucratically, leading the majority of nuclear-weapons aspirants to reverse course. Thus, despite frequent warnings of an unstoppable “nuclear express,”17 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the “train to date has been slow to pick up steam, has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected.”18 None of this means that additional proliferation in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable. Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian nuclearization requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic constraints and the available strategic alternatives. Incentives and Disincentives to Proliferate Security considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and

disincentives for states to pursue nuclear weapons. Analysts predicting proliferation cascades tend to emphasize the incentives for reactive proliferation while ignoring or downplaying the disincentives . Yet, as it

turns out, instances of nuclear proliferation (including reactive proliferation) have been so rare because going down

this road often risks insecurity, reputational damage and economic costs that outweigh

the potential benefits.19 Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving state decisions to proliferate. All else being equal, if a state’s leadership believes that a nuclear deterrent is required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.20 Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an “enduring rival”– especially countries with inferior conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis their opponents or those that face an adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons – may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.21 A recent quantitative study by Philipp Bleek, for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear weapons programs and eventually acquire the bomb.22 The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded. Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception – and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time. In the first two decades of the nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in 1967), India (“peaceful” nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).23 This significant slowdown in the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states with the technical and industrial capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly increased over time.24 Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South Africa and the Soviet successor states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).25 Indeed, by one estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weaponsrelated dimensions since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to abandon these activities before

they produced a bomb. Over time, the number of nuclear reversals has grown while the number of states initiating programs with possible military dimensions has markedly

declined . 26 Furthermore – especially since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970 – reactive proliferation has been exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership among the community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and suspected acquisition of nuclear weapons by these outliers has not triggered widespread reactive proliferation in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have engaged in a vigorous arms race, but Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states to follow suit.27 In the Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons. Egypt took initial steps toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to Israel’s presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in 1981 and abandoned its program.28 Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only Iran’s program persists and none of these states initiated their efforts primarily as a defensive response to Israel’s presumed arsenal.29 Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, including construction of a covert nuclear reactor near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.30 (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.31) The motivations for Syria’s activities remain murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israel’s alleged development of the bomb and Syria’s actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched nuclear weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in progress, and the rest failed or were reversed.32 The successful projects have also generally needed much more time than

expected to finish. According to Jacques Hymans, the average time required to complete a nuclear weapons program has increased from seven years prior to 1970 to about 17 years after 1970, even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial base required for proliferation has expanded to more and more countries.33 Yet throughout the nuclear age, many states with potential security incentives to develop nuclear weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.34 Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent statistical research shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to acquiring the bomb, although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.35 This suggests that a rival’s acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive proliferation decisions. One reason that reactive proliferation is not an automatic response to a rival’s acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both directions. Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but

leaders have to weigh these potential gains against the possibility that seeking nuclear weapons would make the country or regime less secure by triggering a regional arms race or a preventive attack by outside powers. Countries also have to consider the possibility that pursuing nuclear weapons will produce

strains in strategic relationships with key allies and security patrons. If a state’s leaders conclude that their overall security would decrease by building a bomb, they are not likely to do so.36 Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted the importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a country’s relative status and influence.37 Empirically, the most highly motivated states seem to be those with leaders that simultaneously believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or enhancing their international status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at odds with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.38 Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often “combine to produce a very strong tendency to reach for the bomb.”39 Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational costs associated with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country’s leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive diplomatic relations with Western countries and see membership in the “community of nations” as central to their national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus they will be less likely to go for the bomb.40 In contrast, countries with regimes or ruling coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and autonomy from outside interference seem more inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are signatories to the NPT.41 Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of “rogue” states fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military applications did so, and very few renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have started such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in such activities gave them up.42 The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although sanctions alone proved insufficient to dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferator’s vulnerability to sanctions must be considered. All else being equal, the more vulnerable a state’s economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that have pursued nuclear weapons with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system – especially those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration – have historically been less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling coalitions.43 A state’s vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leadership’s assessment regarding the probability that outside powers would actually be willing to impose sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for sanctioning states. In other instances, however, a state may be so vital to outside powers – economically or geopolitically – that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic Constraints In addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-strapped states can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous sacrifices.44 A country’s technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear program also help determine the ease and speed with which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and related mining activity, civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some “latent” capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle – the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium – is particularly important because this is the essential pathway whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.45 States must also possess the bureaucratic capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear weapons program. Hymans convincingly argues that many recent

would-be proliferators have weak state institutions that permit, or even encourage, rulers to take a coercive, authoritarian

management approach to their nuclear programs. This approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately

undermines nuclear projects by gutting the autonomy and professionalism of the very

scientists, experts and organizations needed to successfully build the bomb.46 Alternative Sources of Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside nuclear powers has provided a potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that developed nuclear weapons since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpower’s protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and North Korea). Many other countries known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) or thought they were unreliable at the time they embarked on

their programs (e.g., Taiwan). In contrast, several potential proliferation candidates appear to have abstained from developing the bomb at least partly because of formal or informal extended deterrence guarantees from the U nited S tates (e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Sweden).47 All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds

that security assurances have empirically significantly reduced prolif eration proclivity among recipient countries.48 Therefore, if a country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction to a rival developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily motivated to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors (as opposed to status-related motivations) but are wary of the negative consequences of proliferation.

Autocratic Peace

Democracy BadDemocracies have more inequalities and military expansionismAnwar, ’13, (Fahad, “Why democracy is wrong,” Pakistan Observer, Vol. XXIV No. 192, May 13, 2013, http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T22213316219&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T22213316223&cisb=22_T22213316222&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=384243&docNo=5)//ergDemocracy does not deserve the semi-sacred status accorded to it. In Europe, democratically elected politicians such as Jörg Haider, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Silvio Berlusconi, Umberto Bossi, Gianfranco Fini and Pim Fortuyn are a reminder of democracy's defects: an anti-racist dictatorship is preferable to a racist democracy. Democracy is expanding globally, but not because of its moral superiority. Military intervention is now the standard origin of democratic political systems. Any universal ideology will tend to crusades and messianic conquest, and democracies feel entitled to 'bring freedom' to other countries. The best-known classic hypothesis about democracies is the so-called democratic peace theory. It is promoted by pro-democratic campaigners and by politicians, as 'scientific evidence' of the need for democracy. The claim is that 'democracies do not go to war with each other'. The research typically compares dyads - pairs of countries/states. A statistical measure (frequency of war) is possible for different categories - democracy against democracy; democracy against non-democracy; and non-democracy against non-democracy. It is one of the few classic 'testable hypotheses' in international relations theory. Unfortunately for the democracy lobby, research failed to demonstrate conclusively that democracies are more peaceful among themselves. Nevertheless, it suggests other testable propositions about democracy. Several of the criticisms of democracy presented here, can be stated as sociological or political-science hypotheses, indicating possible research projects: they are given in separate boxes such as this one. Several testable propositions are available for the hypothesis of structural reinforcement of inequality in democracies:in all democratic states there is inequality of wealth and income,inequality of wealth and income has not declined permanently in any democratic state,in democracies stable over more than one generation, inequality of wealth increases,in democracies stable over more than one generation, inequality of income increases. The fact that democracy is rarely investigated as a causal factor is itself a political choice. Most sociologists are democrats: they are not likely to blame democracy for inequality.

Democracies are either unstable and thus prone to conflict or they find regime differences with other democracies and are more prone to conflict Gartzke and Weisiger, ’13, (Erik, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and Pro- fessor of Government at the University of Essex and Alex, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace,” Wiley Online Library, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 1, pages 171–185, March 2013, DOI: 10.1111/isqu.12046)//ergThe world is a dynamic place. Change is unending, even as the continuity of change creates knowable patterns of cause and effect. Yet, to say that change is constant is not to say that change is a constant. Such may be the case with interstate hostilities across the divide of domestic politics. Regime type differences may be one source of international conflict, just as similarities may promote relative peace (Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter and Huth 1996; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch 2001; Bennett 2006).1 However, the

assumption has been that the effects of similarities and differences (whatever they may be) do not change, that regime type is about as conflict-inhibiting or conflict-inducing at one moment in history as another, and that tensions within dyads remain unaltered by the ecology of regime types in the global system. Lord Palmerston's famous dictum suggests the need to assess the durability of friendships and enmities in world politics. Affinities may endure, but they should not be assumed to do so. The debate over the “autocratic peace”—whether jointly autocratic dyads are more peaceful than heterogeneous dyads, while remaining somewhat less peaceful than paired democracies—is a particularly prominent situation where researchers of all perspectives conceive of the impact of regime type as fixed with respect to time and place. We relax the assumption that conflict propensity is a static attribute of different types of dyads and instead treat the effect of regime difference or similarity as a dynamic product of changes in the systemic distribution of regimes. In so doing, we allow for the possibility that the impact of regime type as an organizing principle or focal point evolves with secular changes in the global distribution of regimes. Conflict among democracies is pathological when democracies are scarce and vulnerable. As democracies become more common, however,

preference heterogeneity increases, while the need to cooperate declines. This dynamic is so common as to escape conscious attention among international relations researchers. Biologists note that intraspecies competition ebbs with growing threats from other species (Zuk and Kolluru 1998). Railroad collusion increased with the emergence of other forms of transit (Conant 1962). Alliances and identities form or collapse conditional on an “other” (Walt 1987; Wendt 1992). Notions of democratic cooperation and identity have already become more varied as democracy has become more common (Zakaria 1997). Our analysis has implications for the broader logic of cleavages and the activation of political identities. Rather than an endpoint for history (Fukuyama 1992), or the beginning of an end (Marx 1957; Wendt 1999), our age may be yet another interlude before history repeats itself “all over again.” States, like groups and individuals, have numerous identities. Regime differences will be more or less salient depending on ecological conditions and on the identity and behavior of other states. Our research also reflects growing interest in integrating systemic and dyadic theories and empirical models (Harrison 2002).

Making other countries into democracies is bad—they make unreliable allies—prefer our extensive studiesGartzke and Gleditsch ’06, (Erik, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and Pro- fessor of Government at the University of Essex and Kristian Skrede, Professor and researcher at the University of Essex, “Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies,” American Journal of Political Science, Volume 48, Issue 4, pages 775–795, October 2004, Wiley Online Library, DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00101.x)//ergRecent research builds on the observation that democracies have more durable alliances to argue that democracies make more reliable allies. This need not be the case. Alliances serve as commitment devices, adding ex ante credibility to states' claims about ex post behavior. Variation in alliance durability must reflect differences in the desirability of formalizing alignments. Put simply, democracies are “most improved” by formal commitments. We offer two related explanations for why democracies might actually be less reliable alliance partners. Information costs for participating in policymaking and the advantages of organized interest groups combined with distributional incentives generated by the periodic turnover of governments may conspire to make informal commitments on the part of democracies problematic. Determining the net effect of democratic virtue and vice is best done empirically. We test alliance reliability by focusing on intervention, rather than on the duration or the number of commitments. Our results suggest that democracies

make less reliable allies. Contemporary wisdom in international relations holds that democracies make more reliable allies. Public review and ratification of international agreements, combined with respect for international law, are said to fashion formal commitments that are effectively binding on democracies. As evidence, researchers point out that democracies tend to ally together and that alliances involving democracies are more durable (see Cowhey 1993; Gaubatz 1996; Reed 1997). This view of the effectiveness of democratic commitments represents a remarkable break with the more pessimistic conception that held sway previously. Earlier observers often argued that democracies are “mercurial.” Executives in democracies are necessarily reliant on shifting public opinion and transient coalitions, making commitments contingent and thus leading to less reliability as partners than stable autocracies (Kennan 1996, 135–36). Claims of democratic reliability also appear to be in logical tension with explanations for the democratic peace that emphasize the ability of citizens to veto the mobilization decisions of political elites. The recent contest in Iraq highlights the impact of regime type on foreign policy. Bush administration officials initially sought significant assistance from U.S. allies. Contrary to the notion that democratic publics encourage adherence to international commitments, popular opposition to U.S. plans for a war led many continental democracies to interpret their NATO obligations as narrowly as possible.1 Similarly, while the “Arab street” voiced emphatic condemnation of U.S. policy, democratic Turkey, a close ally of long standing, was the lone U.S. ally in the region to refuse all U.S. requests.2 The Anglo-French response to German annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1939 provides the classical example of democratic unreliability. Czechoslovakia and France had concluded a defense pact, while Britain had publicly guaranteed the integrity of Czechoslovakia. Although the German attack in principle should have precipitated a war among the three powers, neither Britain nor France replied with force. France tendered a letter of protest after Hitler moved to occupy all of Czechoslovakia. Britain offered the legal ruse that it was not obliged to intervene since the declaration of Slovak independence terminated the state whose territorial integrity it had guaranteed. Popular opposition to war thwarted the ability to maintain security commitments by the two democracies, leading to abandonment of Czechoslovakia.3 Just as World War II was preceded by failed democratic commitments, the previous “great war” was precipitated in part by ambiguity over Britain's obligation to France. A number of signals led German planners to discount British resolve to intervene (Lebow 1981; Levy 1990). Word that British Foreign Secretary Grey had authorized preliminary talks with French military officials designed to develop a contingency plan for joint mobilization resulted in calls for his resignation. Grey was forced to publicly disavow British support for France, even though the entente clearly contemplated such an effort (Ferguson 1999, 56–81). In spite of formal guarantees of Belgian neutrality dating back to 1839, public opposition in the U.K. to the draft and to any increase in defense spending led German officials to expect that British involvement in the war could be made redundant by rapid mobilization and decisive defeat of France (the Schlieffen plan). Reiter and Stam argue that “[t]he events of the July crisis leading to World War I clearly illustrate the problem that democracies face: potential aggressors do not believe that democracies' commitments to come to the aid of one another are credible” (2002, 101).

Democracies are inherently unreliable—they are subject to popular sentimentGartzke and Gleditsch ’06, (Erik, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and Pro- fessor of Government at the University of Essex and Kristian Skrede, Professor and researcher at the University of Essex, “Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies,” American Journal of Political Science, Volume 48, Issue 4, pages 775–795, October 2004, Wiley Online Library, DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00101.x)//ergContemporary optimism about democratic alliance behavior is probably a healthy response to the excessive pessimism of the past. Still, a thorough examination of the determinants of alliance behavior suggests a complex relationship between regime type and reliability in which democracies offer both benefits and burdens as security partners. We believe that existing accounts suffer in at least two ways. First, the literature ignores the possibility that states have different incentives to ally. Differences in alliance behavior by regime type could be due to variation in supply (democracies are more reliable, and thus more sought after as allies) or demand (democracies are less reliable, and so have

more need to institutionalize their security partnerships). If regimes differ in their utility for alliances more than they differ in their ability to honor commitments, then democratic alliance behavior may reflect relative unreliability. Second, existing arguments exaggerate democratic virtues. Popular ratification of alliance treaties may augment commitment, but other features of democracy hinder reliability. Effective monitoring of government requires knowledge of the relationship between policies and outcomes. Yet, the payoff for being attentive to policy evaporates as individual votes become inconsequential in the large selectorates that characterize democracy.4 Although the broader public is attentive during crises, organized interests are likely to have disproportionate influence over the abstruse details of treaty provisions. The relative impact of public opinion and interest groups fluctuates along with issue salience, so that commitments stand different tests at different times in democracies. Similarly, regular leader replacement encourages incumbents to institutionalize policy.5 While institutions buttress the status quo, tensions between the interests of the administration that forges an alliance and the government that chooses whether to honor an agreement can lead democracies to be more brittle as security partners. As the preceding anecdotes suggest, governments that are answerable to popular preferences face a dilemma when confronted by unpopular alliance commitments. Attending to domestic demands will occasionally anger strategic partners, while contradicting the wishes of citizens is only ever easy when the public has little say. We develop two formal models of reliability and regime type based on reselection of governments and special interests. The net effect of the perceived advantages and the less sanguine notion of “mercurial” democracies is difficult to ascertain deductively. Instead, we let empirical analysis adjudicate the respective impact of countervailing forces affecting alliance reliability. We find that democracies are less likely than other regimes to intervene in wars on behalf of allies. The elements of our two related arguments will be familiar to any student of political science. Arrow's (1951) possibility theorem tells us that it is impossible to prevent cycling over policy in any representative system. Over time, the social preference changes, even if individuals preferences remain the same. Institutions limit the effects of cycling, but only by somewhat arbitrarily assigning winners and losers in the political process. Determining the rules by which decisions are made is thus inherently strategic. Of course, the same should be true in foreign policy. Alliance commitments that constrain future choice making limit the tendency of democratic policies to cycle unpredictably, but they can do so only by limiting the responsiveness of a government to its citizens.

Democracies are often corrupt and controlled by special interest groupsGartzke and Gleditsch ’06, (Erik, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and Pro- fessor of Government at the University of Essex and Kristian Skrede, Professor and researcher at the University of Essex, “Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies,” American Journal of Political Science, Volume 48, Issue 4, pages 775–795, October 2004, Wiley Online Library, DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00101.x)//ergWe accept that alliance commitments increase the probability that alignments will be upheld. However, this begs the critical question of the baseline. Institutionalizing agreements limits cycling, but only to the extent that it limits representation. Institutions are most desirable in situations where those in power fear that future choices challenge status quo interests. Democratic cycling means that the informal promises of incumbent governments must be treated with some suspicion by foreign powers. There is simply little reason for subsequent governments to feel bound by the weak commitments of previous administrations. The prospect that future governments will prefer dissimilar policies, and the effect of institutions in constraining choice, make it appealing for incumbent administrations in democracies to formalize their preferred policies, foreign or domestic. Democracies will tend to formalize international agreements in an attempt to generate greater stability and to overcome cycling, but this will only produce more reliable allies to the degree that democratic governments are unresponsive to shifting popular preferences. We find it implausible that democracies pay less attention to the evolving

preferences of their constituents than do autocracies.6 Research on special interest groups and issue salience suggests a second way to explain change that leads to democratic unreliability. Special interest groups often wield disproportionate influence in democratic political processes by providing needed resources to leaders. Special interests will be most influential when salience is skewed (some groups care intensely about an issue while most others do not), or when policy involves complex technical issues where the price of informed participation is relatively high. A change in the salience or complexity of issues, however, will alter political participation and shift winning policy outcomes. Advocates have an incentive to formalize policy to block the impetus toward policy change following changes in political salience or the cost of participation. Special interests will play an important role in fashioning alliance commitments when the salience of such issues is relatively low, but salience will increase when alliance commitments are called upon. Efforts to institutionalize temporary political advantage cannot be absolutely irreversible without contravening majority rule. The ability of special interests to leverage foreign policy through formal commitments also means that democratic alliances are subject to domestic opposition, and thus to failure. In the sections that follow, we first review the relevant literature on alliances and democracy. We then discuss our argument, presenting elements of two game theoretical models that formalize our claims about democratic politics and alliance commitments. In an empirical section, we test alliance reliability using interventions by third-party allies in interstate wars.

Autocracy GoodAutocracy is a good model for some countries—growth, government, and peace proveBesley and Kudamatsu, ’07, (Timothy, School Professor of Economics and Political Science at the London School of Economics, and Masayuki, Assistant Professor at IIES, Stockholm University, “Making Autocracy Work,” The Suntory Centre, DEDPS 48, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3764/1/Making_Autocracy_Work.pdf)//ergA key observation which motivates this paper is that autocratic govern- ment is not always a disaster in economic terms. Indeed, throughout history there has been growth and development in autocratic systems of government. For example, the British industrial revolution predates the introduction of free and fair elections with mass participation. Modern China is also a case in point with a spectacular growth performance in a non-democratic setting. Whether these observations damage the instrumental case for democracy is moot. After all, it is the counter-factual that matters ngrowth and de- velopment might have preceded at a greater pace were democracy present. But it is equally clear that whether one looks at democracy or autocracy there is a great deal of heterogeneity in their performance that cries out for explanation. This fact is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows estimated density func- tions for real GDP per capita growth rates among autocratic and democratic regimes that lasted Over full calendar years or longer.1 A regime is defined as a period in which authority characteristics of a country stay the same, ac- cording to the POLITY IV data set.2 Regimes are democratic if the Polity score is positive, and autocratic if it is non-positive.3 The striking fact that we will explore in more detail is that the distribution of autocracies has fatter tailso there are more very good autocracies and more very bad autocracies compared to democracies.4 The key challenge for students of political economy is to extract lessons from historical and contemporary experience about what makes government work in the general interest of its citizens. There is little doubt that building infrastructure, managing macro-economic policy, facilitating private trade and investment and protecting the vulnerable are all facilitated by e§ective government. In this paper, we will focus somewhat narrowly on the issue of why autocracy can sometimes be successful. This project is not intended as a defense of autocracy, but as means of gaining further insights into the institutional basis of good government. It also contributes to broader discus- sions about the di§erences in policy and performance between democracies and autocracies. The main focus of the paper is on the institutions that make government accountable n speciOcally Onding a means of removing poorly-performing leaders from o¢ ce. Democracies organize this through regularized contests for power in elections. However, the means of achieving accountability are more murky in autocratic settings. The analysis emphasizes accountability from a iselectoratei comprising insiders who have the ability to depose a leader.5 We show that autocratic government works well when the power of the selectorate does not depend on the existing leader remaining in o¢ ce. The framework can be used to contrast the performance of autocracy and democracy in terms of accountability of leaders. We then turn to identifying successful autocracies empirically. We look at a variety of methods and use these to pick out regimes that are robustly high performers. This sample of regimes provides a structured basis for some case study analysis. We are also able to looking statistically at the patterns of successful autocracies across countries. We then examine the idea that successful autocracies are able to generate accountability mechanisms in the absence of open contests for power.

Autocracies have more efficient governments than democraciesGautam, ’11 (Ritvik, “Why sometimes Autocracy is better than Democracy?” Casacio, August 3, 2011,

http://casacio.blogspot.com/2011/08/why-sometimes-autocracy-is-better-than.html)//ergOkay, I know this title is against the old popular belief about democracy and I am also aware of the number of wars and movements against autocracy. But in reality, sometimes (but not always) autocracy can be better and be more effective than a democracy. As we know, democracy is all about the people, for the people, by the people and to the people. It is all about representation and about the approval of the majority. And at times, infact at most of the times, this takes time , and hence decrease the efficiency of the government. In a democracy subject to a parliament, in most cases, a draft bill is constituted, presented in the public forum which is inturn subjected to debate and discussion, and going through various modifications and 'versions' of the draft, a bill is passed from that particular forum. In many cases, as in the case of India, there is no single public forum, and so that bill is passed to another level, which again undergoes debate and discussion, and finally after the approval of the bill from all the public forums, the bill is implemented. In most of the cases, there is a huge difference between the drafted and the implemented bill. In a democracy, as in the case of India, there are representatives, which are elected by a particular group of people as their representative. The more large the country, the more diverse the country, and hence more representatives. What if instead of so many representatives, we have a single person who can be considered as a whole and sole representative of the whole of the country, who would look into the needs of all kinds of people. And would actually work for the welfare of the country and it's people, who would think in favor of the country before than his own favor. That way the time in the approval of any bill could notably increase the efficiency of the government. This is the case with China. Why India lacks infront of the India? The answer is here. China is an autocratic country with visionary leaders, who want to see their country at the top of the world. India lacks in this. Even it has a few of them who thinks the same, their ideology gets diluted in the crowd of numerous representatives. Better law implementation, fast actions, this makes a country stronger. According to statistics, the time required to implement a bill in India (Democratic nation) is 1,420 days while in China (Autocratic nation) is a mere 292 days. The stats shows us all, an autocratic country, with visionary leaders works in a more efficient way. It makes some obvious decisions in a faster way. For example, prosecution of criminals, like Kasab, it's been nearly 2.5 years( that's nearly, 912.5 days) he has not been punished. While the whole nation knows what he did, and there is no doubt what his punishment should be, there is still on-going cases in the courts. This was an obvious case, and the prosecution of a criminal like Kasab in an autocratic country would have been much easier, faster and thus more efficient. So, all I want to say is that though democracy is considered to be better than autocracy, but at times autocracy can prove to be more efficient and work in a better way, provided we have the right kind of leaders, who are power visionaries and would genuinely work for the betterment of the country and the countrymen.

Autocracies are generally just as if not more peaceful than democraciesPECENY et al, ’02, (MARK PECENY University of New Mexico CAROLINE C. BEER University of Vermont with SHANNON SANCHEZ-TERRY University of Minnesota, “Dictatorial Peace?” American Political Science Review Vol. 96, No. 1, March 2002, http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPSR%2FPSR96_01%2FS0003055402004203a.pdf&code=36edc7e4a2bbce9f13924f0d065b8fde)//ergIs there a dictatorial peace that resembles the democratic peace? This paper uses a new data set compiled by Barbara Geddes to examine the conflict behavior of three types of autocratic regimes— personalist, military, and single-party dictatorships—in the post-World War II era. We find some evidence that specific types of authoritarian regimes are peaceful toward one another. No two personalist

dictators or two military regimes have gone to war with each other since 1945. These dyads were not less likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes than were mixed dyads, however. Although single-party regimes were the only homogeneous dyad in this study to have experienced war, multivariate analyses of participation in militarized interstate disputes suggest that single-party states are more peaceful toward one another than are mixed dyads. Thus, while we have found no unambiguous evidence of a dictatorial peace to match the robustness of the democratic peace, there is substantial interesting variation in the conflict behavior of specific types of authoritarian regimes. The analysis presented here demonstrates that studies of the impact of regime type on conflict behavior must work from a more sophisticated conception of authoritarianism. Is there a dictatorial peace that resembles the demo- cratic peace? Previous research has shown that democracies almost never fight wars with one an- other and that democratic dyads are less likely to en- gage in any type of militarized dispute than are mixed dyads (Russett and Oneal 2001). But are democracies special, or is this type of conflict behavior replicated among other homogeneous dyads? Are similar author- itarian regimes peaceful toward one another? Existing literature on the conflict behavior of au- tocracies has not provided a satisfactory answer to this question because it is a pale reflection of the vo- luminous literature on the democratic peace. While some have found that authoritarian regimes are more peaceful toward one another than are mixed dyads (Oneal and Russett 1997; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997), others have found no sep- arate peace among authoritarian regimes (Russett and Oneal 2001). These findings are difficult to interpret because authoritarian regimes are treated as a residual category in studies focused on the democratic peace. Vastly different types of authoritarian regimes are coded as members of homogeneous dyads. If the per- sonalist dictatorship of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq attacks the revolutionary theocracy of Iran or if the communist regime of North Vietnam wars with the personalist dic- tatorship of Ngo Dinh Diem’s South Vietnam, existing practice would lead these to be considered wars among homogeneous dyads. Scholars have increasingly recognized the artificial- ity of the disciplinary division between the study of comparative politics and that of international relations. Domestic politics inevitably affects the foreign policies of states. The international system shapes the charac- ter of domestic political institutions and policy choices. Scholars of international relations have demonstrated conclusively that one cannot understand the central dy- namics of contemporary international politics without examining the political institutions and cultural norms of liberal democracies. Indeed, the systematic study of the foreign policy behavior of liberal democracies prob- ably represents the greatest contribution of interna- tional relations scholars in the ongoing effort to bridge the gap between the two subfields. Nearly half of the world’s states are governed by au- thoritarian regimes, however, and the foreign policies of this other half of the world’s political regimes have been subjected to much less systematic examination. We study the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes to deepen the integration of the comparative and in- ternational subfields of the discipline and expand our understanding of how political regimes shape foreign policy. Moreover, the democratic peace research has had important policy implications, shaping U.S. secu- rity policy to emphasize building democracy abroad. Similarly, important policy implications may come out of a deeper understanding of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes.

AT//Democratic Peace Theory Democratic peace theory is wrong, both historically and in theoryGautreaux, ’12, (Sergio, M.A. in International Relations from Webster University in Leiden, the Netherlands, and a B.A. in History, international consultant based in East Asia, “Examining the Democratic Peace Hypothesis: A Neorealist Critique,” International Policy Digest, 04.26.12, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/04/26/examining-the-democratic-peace-hypothesis-a-neorealist-critique/)//ergFlaws of the Democratic Peace Theory Even for a society unwavering in its messianic role in foreign affairs, the doctrinal implication for a theory which stands antithetical to history is alarming . During his eight years in office, Bill Clinton overextended the American military into regions of the world which were more concerned with settling centuries’ old ethnic rivalries than the future of their domestic political institutions. His successor, George W. Bush, used the theory as the primary justification for the war in Iraq, stating, “The reason why I’m so strong on democracy is democracies don’t go to war with each other…I’ve got great faith in democracies to promote peace. And that’s why I’m such a strong believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the broader Middle East, is to promote democracy.” At the time of writing, President Barack Obama’s foreign policy doctrines have not become anymore measured than his immediate predecessors with regards to what is geopolitically imperative, and what is too costly for the current economic constraints. American self-perceptions notwithstanding, all nation-states have acted in the interest of ensuring their own survival first and foremost, while paying little regard to another’s culture, norms, ideals, or institutions in pursuit of its ends . Diplomatic ententes and military groupings – from the Holy Alliance to NATO – have shifted to fit the realities of the current system and will continue to do so when the national interest is at stake. As such, the democratic peace hypothesis presents three substantial problems for the current Westphalian international model. The first flaw in the theory is one of conceptualization. The Polity Index, used by Russet in his examination of the democratic peace, is based on a faulty definition of democracy. In 1971, Yale University Professor, Robert Dahl, posited two very basic attributes of the system: competition and participation. The first state that granted full participation by way of universal suffrage and, as a consequence, met Dahl’s requirements for a democratic society, was Finland in 1906. While the Polity Index measures the spread of democracy from the year 1800 onwards, the data omits participation as a key attribute in its determination of democratic states. By omitting such a basic, yet vital, component of democracy and failing to properly conceptualize democracy, the very question of what it means to be a democratic state, bent on avoiding dyadic conflict, is called into question. Despite this conceptual flaw, most states listed as democratic by Russett and the Polity I-IV data do, in fact, promote universal suffrage (at least in theory) in the twenty-first century and would meet Dahl’s 1971 requirements (though Russett’s blanket assertion and inclusion of states without universal suffrage remains a point of contention for the emerging democracies). With this in mind, the second error in the logic of the democratic peace theory is with Russett’s “cultural/normative” model. The model assumes that a culture of peace is the standard across all democratic societies. While few would disagree that a Western liberal state such as the Netherlands is more peaceful than the various war-torn countries that comprise the very undemocratic societies of sub-Saharan Africa, the same comparison cannot be made between all democratic and autocratic societies. Studying the post-World War II era, in which numerous former colonies gained their independence and empires were systematically disbanded, one will find that the emerging democracies during this era, struggling with the formation of civil society structures and the demands posed by the market economy, had substantially higher crime rates than the ardently non-democratic societies. In addition, homicide rates for so-called “full democracies” – that is, states

with a long-established history of democracy (e.g. Western Europe and the United States) – increased at an alarmingly higher rate than their non-democratic counterparts during this same time period. To use a specific example, the world’s current hegemon and most powerful democracy, the United States, regularly experiences violent civil unrest, has the tenth highest homicide rate per 100,000 people (just behind the Republic of Moldova and ahead of Uruguay), and experienced a violent civil war that claimed the lives of 650,000 Americans just a century and a half ago. Moreover, if democratic decision-makers did actually employ their society’s supposed culture of peace into their policy formation when faced with international conflict escalation, they would do so at all stages and in all instances, including when faced with a hostile challenge from a non-democratic state. History, however, shows that is not the case. During the years 1899-1999, five of the world’s current most powerful (expressed in terms of military potential; determined using quantitative troop, aircraft, and nuclear arms levels) democracies – the United States, India, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel – engaged in interstate conflict on no less than twenty-five occasions. Furthermore, in twenty-nine of the recent intrastate conflicts, twenty-three of the prevailing regimes were either democratic throughout the dispute or at certain times during the dispute. Such realities call into question the assertion that democratic societies have a culture of peace that pervades decision-making. The third and final logical flaw of the democratic peace is that the theory itself is a myth, as democracies have gone to war with each other numerous times throughout history when it was in their interest to do so or when their sovereignty was threatened by another. From the time of the Greek wars of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE, there have been at least 14 conflicts involving states that would be listed in the “democratic” category of the Polity I-IV indexes. When one alters the already contentious definition of “war,” the number of conflicts increases to at least twenty-three and includes such international disputes as the long-running American-Indian War of the 19th century (the Iroquois tribe had a complex but recognizable system of democracy), the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr by the French, and the Allied (British) bombings of Finland during the Second World War. By using the very same conceptualizations that Bruce Russett and other liberal theorists use to categorize democracies, one is able to determine that their very argument – that democratic states never go to war with one another – is simply wrong.

Statistical and empirical evidence about democratic peace is inconclusiveGartzke and Weisiger, ’13, (Erik, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and Pro- fessor of Government at the University of Essex and Alex, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace,” Wiley Online Library, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 1, pages 171–185, March 2013, DOI: 10.1111/isqu.12046)//ergThat democracies do not fight each other, or that they fight only rarely, is now one of the most widely accepted empirical findings in political science.2 Initial studies that found what later came to be known as the democratic peace (Babst 1964; Small and Singer 1976) encountered skepticism, as the discovery was incompatible with the realist precept that second image politics was largely irrelevant to international affairs. Early challenges to the democratic peace, both qualitative (Layne 1994) and quantitative (Spiro 1994; Farber and Gowa 1997; Gowa 1999), often originated from the realist camp. Over time, however, more extensive and careful quantitative research, most notably a series of studies by Russett, Oneal, and coauthors (Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Oneal, Oneal, Maoz and Russett 1996; Oneal, Russett and Berbaum 2003; Oneal and Ray 1997; Oneal and Russett 1997, , 1999a1999b1999c; Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001), have addressed many methodological concerns with prior studies, creating a consensus within the field that the empirical relationship between joint democracy and peace is genuine.3 An intense but increasingly one-sided debate has occurred between those who treat democratic peace as a dyadic observation (Maoz and Abdoladi 1989; Bremer 1992; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001) and those who argue that democracies are generally more peaceful (Benoit 1996; Ray 1995; Rummel 1996; Rousseau et al.

1996). This debate has clear normative implications, even as its results sharpen theoretical insight: An explanation for the monadic relationship is typically unable to account for a dyadic observation, and vice versa. For example, Kant's assertion that citizens in a republic are naturally loath to spill their own blood (Kant 1972[1795]) implies a monadic, not a dyadic phenomenon. With evidence mounting that the democratic peace is primarily a dyadic phenomenon, attention has increasingly focused in recent years on theoretical arguments designed to explain why democracy inhibits conflict only in dyads. Growing consensus on empirics has not been paralleled by agreement about why such a relationship should exist, however. In this “second generation” of democratic peace research, scholars face a major obstacle to theoretical advancement. Since efforts to theorize the democratic peace are largely inductive, the central empirical prediction of any new theory is something that is already known (or believed). Assuming that theoreticians have done a competent job, it becomes increasingly difficult to select among competing democratic peace theories based on the theory's ability to explain the democratic peace (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003; Huth and Allee 2002, 2003). In this context, a premium must be placed on the generation of novel theoretical predictions. Extending the empirical domain of democratic peace theories is the only way to adjudicate among multiple explanations, all of which nominally account for the democratic peace observation.4 Partly for this reason, the initially heterodox assertion that peace among like regimes may not be limited to democracies has attracted increasing attention (Oren and Hays 1997). The “autocratic peace” involves a class of arguments about the conflictual consequences of regime similarity and difference. Theories disagree over whether democratic and autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent. Early studies of the autocratic peace typically focused on certain geographic regions. Despite having little democracy, low levels of economic development, arbitrary national borders, and widespread civil conflict, Africa experiences surprisingly little interstate war. Several studies attribute the “African peace” to historical norms and to the strategic behavior of insecure leaders who recognize that challenging existing borders invites continental war while encouraging secessionist movements risks reciprocal meddling in the country's own domestic affairs (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990).5 However, these arguments fail to address tensions between individual (state, leader) interests and social goods. The security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggressively despite lacking revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978). Initial statistical evidence of an autocratic peace emerged in a negative form with the observation that mixed democratic–autocratic dyads are more conflict prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic dyads (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997). Studies have sought systematic evidence for or against an autocratic peace. Oren and Hays (1997) evaluate several data sets, finding that autocracies are less war prone than democracy–autocracy pairs. Indeed, they find that socialist countries with advanced industrialized economies are more peaceful than democracies. Werner (2000) finds an effect of political similarity that coexists with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She attributes the result to shared preferences arising from a reduced likelihood of disputes over domestic politics. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the broad category of autocracy into multiple subgroups and find evidence that shared autocratic type (personalistic dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas) reduces conflict, although the observed effects are less pronounced than for joint democracy. Henderson (2002) goes further by arguing that there is no empirically verifiable democratic peace. Instead, political dissimilarity causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that similarity of both political and economic institutions encourages peace. In the most sophisticated analysis to date, Bennett (2006) finds a robust autocratic peace, though the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited to coherent autocratic regimes. Petersen (2004), in contrast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and finds no support for the claim that similarity prevents or limits conflict. Still, the bulk of evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, even among nondemocracies. The autocratic peace poses unique challenges for democratic peace theories. Given that the democratic peace highlights apparently unique characteristics of joint democracy, many explanations are predicated on attributes found only in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace implies that scholars should focus on corollaries or consequences of shared regime type, in addition to, or perhaps even instead of democracy. In this context, arguments about democratic norms (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998 , 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed on leaders by

democratic institutions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman 2001a) all invite additional scrutiny. While it is theoretically possible that a democratic peace and an autocratic peace could arise from independent causal processes, logical elegance and the empirical similarities inherent in shared regime type provide cause to explore theoretical arguments that spring from regime similarity in general. Another source of novel empirical variation for second-generation democratic peace research involves temporal dynamics in the relationship between regime type and conflict behavior. Cederman (2001a) raised this possibility in arguing that an appropriate interpretation of Kant requires viewing the democratic peace as a macro-historical learning process in which the effects of the democratic peace strengthened over time. Indeed, criticisms of the democratic peace often focus on “near misses,” most of which occur in the nineteenth century (Layne 1994; Elman 1997). At the same time, however, there is evidence that the democratic peace may have weakened after the Cold War (Sobek, Clark and Kimball 2006; Gowa 2010). Of course, such dynamic effects may be spurious, arising from failures to control for variables that trend with democracy over time (Gartzke and Weisiger 2013b) or even more prosaically from deficiencies in standard measures of democracy that may overstate the prevalence of democracies in earlier time periods.6 To the extent that they exist, however, temporal dynamics in the relationship between shared regime type and conflict behavior provide another novel empirical relationship that can be used in refining theories of liberal peace. A third empirical characteristic of democracy that deserves mention is its distinctly non-random distribution. Today, Europe is almost entirely democratic; Africa and the Middle East are predominantly autocratic.7 Indeed, it is impossible to fully explain transitions to and from democracy without reference to the regional mix of regime types (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). This clustering in turn influences the democratic peace: A country may be more likely to democratize (Gleditsch 2003), and a new democracy may be more likely to survive, if the country finds itself in a democratic neighborhood (Cederman and Gleditsch 2004). Clustering by regime type is certainly appealing given the key prediction of the democratic peace; democracies should prefer democratic neighbors, as this makes conflict unlikely. However, regime type clustering does not emerge in an organic fashion from conventional democratic peace theories, since none of the most common arguments (norms, constraints, information, identity) explicitly considers geography. Further, the rationale used to reconcile geographic clustering by regime type with democratic peace theory implies precisely that it is difference in regime type that is particularly pernicious to peace. The desire of democracies to encourage or compel regime change in autocratic neighbors must mean that the security dilemma is especially intense between unlike regimes. Autocracies, in turn, must prefer autocrats as neighbors, if for no other reason than that insecure democrats incline toward undermining autocracies.

Other factors influence level of regime peace other than democracy/regime typeGartzke and Weisiger, ’13, (Erik, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and Pro- fessor of Government at the University of Essex and Alex, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace,” Wiley Online Library, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 1, pages 171–185, March 2013, DOI: 10.1111/isqu.12046)//ergAt the same time, however, important questions remain about how democracy causes peace among nondemocracies, especially in light of the focus on democratic dyads as the locus of empirical liberal peace. The spread of democracy is far from the only major change to the international system over the past two centuries. Indeed, Gartzke and Weisiger (2013b) find that economic development is a better explanation than systemic democracy for a broad global decline in interstate conflict. Our theoretical perspective thus contrasts with constructivism and the systemic democratic peace literature in at least two ways. First, we view the impact of the system on states as resulting from innate attributes of states, dyads, and the system, rather than from some social consensus about similarities or difference. Whether identities form in a largely malleable social context, or whether preferences and identities are largely exogenous factors that are then triggered differently by evolving strategic conditions, is interesting, vastly important, and difficult to observe. Either is possible.

We believe we have found a context in which each prospect can be explored vigorously. Second, we give more weight to the possibility that system effects may not be benign or progressive . Rather than assuming that world politics will become more cooperative as nations become increasingly democratic, we consider the possibility that systemic change can impact dyads in positive or negative ways . Theories of social identity formation that depend on an “other” imply that sameness must be reevaluated as difference declines. If enemies can become friends as context evolves and differences evaporate, then friends can also become enemies as similarities become ubiquitous and remaining differences seem more salient. Democracy has not made the world any less finite. Resources must be distributed and prerogatives allocated, and so frictions remain. Whether democracies will be able to resolve these frictions peacefully (or not) is a worthy subject for debate.

Their overly optimistic approach to democracy prevents peace by ignoring other methods to achieve peaceGartzke and Weisiger, ’13, (Erik, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and Pro- fessor of Government at the University of Essex and Alex, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace,” Wiley Online Library, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 1, pages 171–185, March 2013, DOI: 10.1111/isqu.12046)//ergDemocratic peace research offers a vision of the future of politics here on earth that has tremendous normative appeal. We all hope that the countries of the world can continue to form a more cooperative system. However, the role of scholarly research is not to enunciate our hopes and dreams (or our fears), but to focus as nearly as possible on what we can derive from logic and infer from available evidence. If the results of such an inquiry are not so optimistic as we should like, we may at least be forewarned. News that the world is not necessarily going to become more peaceful with the fruition of democracy may even mobilize efforts to achieve normative change by other measures, efforts that may not materialize if we become complacent in our optimism. Today and in the recent past, democracies exhibit higher levels of cooperation, and less conflict, than other regime types (Doyle 1997). Our research suggests the need to treat democratic peace as conditional. No endeavor as important and tenuous as world peace should be allowed to rest on a single support. Certainly no one wants to abandon democracy. Instead, researchers should be helping to bolster existing positive insights about the causes of peace, an effort that will no doubt also impact normative initiatives as well. If there are many paths to peace, or possibly even synergies or complementarities in promoting international cooperation, the discovery and elucidation of such relationships is one of the most important contributions international relations researchers can make to seeking to improve the human condition. While this analysis may raise more questions than it answered, we hope that our efforts serve as a stimulus to “think outside the democratic peace box” which has informed but also constrained so much of resent research in international relations. One implication of this study is the need to pay much greater attention to system-level influences on the behavior of dyads. Research of a generation or two ago was dominated by systemic theories, models, and empirical work. The system fell out of favor as theory and evidence pointed to the critical role of the dyad as the locus of interstate conflict. Rather than advocating a return to systemic analysis, we believe that the maturation of dyadic theory and statistical analysis may afford an opportunity to begin to re-examine systemic influences in the context of dyadic analysis, as we have done here. Dyads do not function in isolation. Dyadic behavior, properly understood, includes the system. Thus,

“bringing the system back in” is a logical next step for international relations. Indeed, it is system-level effects that uniquely characterize international politics.

“Democracy” is not the determining factor for peaceGartzke and Weisiger, ’13, (Erik, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and Pro- fessor of Government at the University of Essex and Alex, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace,” Wiley Online Library, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 1, pages 171–185, March 2013, DOI: 10.1111/isqu.12046)//ergA second, related implication involves identity. Debates about the self, community, and the other are endemic to the study of politics on all levels because politics is social. The dyad is too small a unit to contain everything of relevance in international relations, just as ignoring or downplaying dyadic “micro-foundations” is a mistake. Dyadic research will increasingly find it necessary to draw on insights of constructivist theory to explain the origin of affinities even as constructivists can benefit from using incentive-based dyadic models as a framework to examine how identity becomes behavior. Our findings suggest that a growing democratic community need not lead to reduced conflict among democracies, while increasing cooperation among autocracies is perhaps best explained by a growing sense that they are under threat by powerful democracies. The development of antagonisms may be based on socially constructed categories, but this is not the same as saying that no such antagonisms exist. Competition may persist, even as the specific structure of friendships and enmities is likely to evolve. Nations will continue to compete in a material world. Yet, who is “us” and who “them” will depend on malleable notions of the other. Recognizing that social identity is not itself a remedy for the security dilemma should help to focus attention on where fissures are likely to develop and what kinds of fault lines are most pernicious. This in turn leads to a third implication of our research. Difference is most likely an important proximate determinant of conflict. Following Fearon (1995) and the bargaining school of war causation, it would be incorrect to say that difference “causes” disputes, since states or other opponents will often forge bargains by mutual consent. Instead, difference provides the basis for conflict and serves to define the realm where force becomes an option. Regime type difference is just one among many possible bases for difference. Realist theory emphasizes power disparities as a cause of conflict. While in our view power relations are less salient as a precipitant than other factors, it is important that realist theory has captured one other possible basis for tension among states. Other differences (ethnic, religious, linguistic, ideological, cultural) can serve to create groups with different interests. These relationships may operate in similar ways to that reported here for dynamic changes in the distribution of regime type. Future research may explore these possibilities, mindful that reality is invariably more complex and surprising than we anticipate.

Democratic peace theory assumes that states with differences struggle to cooperate—that’s false, there is generally much more peace Gartzke and Gleditsch ’06, (Erik, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, and Pro- fessor of Government at the University of Essex and Kristian Skrede, Professor and researcher at the University of Essex, “Identity and Conflict: Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide,” European Journal of International Relations 12.1 (Mar 2006): 53-87, 135-136. Proquest, http://search.proquest.com/docview/211998050?accountid=11091)//ergOur results are certainly not consistent with Huntington's clash of civilization thesis. However, we argued at the outset that theories linking culture and conflict are interesting beyond this particular conception of identity. Since theories linking culture and conflict seem plausible and intuitive, retain considerable face validity in popular opinion, and remain a subject of recurrent reference by policy-makers, it would seem valuable to examine more closely why the

empirical evidence offers so little support for the hypothesis that cultural dissimilarity breeds conflict and that cultural similarities unite. In our view, arguments about identity and conflict may be partially correct, but in ways that in turn nullify some of the more galvanizing assertions about the cultural bases of conflict. Culture and identity may be valuable in explaining the disposition of interests and supply of issues, or identifying where states potentially could cooperate and where issues are likely to arise among states with common ties. Culture arguments alone, however, do less well at explaining which differences are intractable while others seem to be addressed through negotiation and compromise. Research on the causes of warfare has increasingly focused on distinguishing between factors leading to competition or conflict and factors leading to the breakdown of diplomatic remedies for conflict (see Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2002; Reiter, 2003). Difference can divide, but divisions are only a necessary (not sufficient) condition for warfare. As much as history shows that different cultures clash, it also shows that they coexist peacefully. Indeed, peoples of differing identity normally live side by side amicably (see Fearon and Laitin, 1996). In this sense, we should turn the clash of civilizations thesis on its head - rather than speculating about how difference can lead to conflict, we should ask why differences so often coincide with peace and why some actors are able to develop a sense of community and 'we-ness' by reference to shared ties, while other culturally similar clusters fail to generate pacifying bonds. The puzzles of peace and conflict can in part be explained by looking inside the state. Modern nation states normally include multiple linguistic, religious, and ethnic cleavages. Except in unusual cases where extreme measures are adopted, these differences will not simply go away. As such, their basis for conflict can be recurrent and damaging, unless lasting solutions are sought that remedy the underlying tensions. A key objective of the state is to ameliorate or manage tensions among identity groups with potentially differing interests. The formation of a common identity through civic nationalism is one such remedy, but others include formal and informal methods of power sharing that facilitate cooperative interaction and national stability (see, for example, Roeder, 2002; Sisk, 1996). Perceived cultural differences are often based on distinctions that appear salient at a given moment in time, but perceived differences also vary substantially across time, suggesting that identities are more malleable than often assumed.34 Anarchy limits the solutions available to sovereigns, but it does not alter the fundamental desirability of obtaining such solutions. Because social identities are not readily altered through all but the most extreme types of warfare, conflict based on culture threatens to be intractable and damaging to the interests of sovereign states. However, this also suggests that states have incentives to work hard to establish bargains to address cultural differences at the national and international level. Paradoxically, precisely because sameness is safe, relatively minor differences between similar groups invite contests that participants expect will be limited in duration and intensity. States can, and typically do, negotiate their conflicts. The recent Albanian revolt in Macedonia was defused from escalation to a major civil war and a potential internationalized conflict in part because the Albanian government was unwilling to support the ethnic Albanian rebels and because the Macedonian government was willing to contain Slav hardliners, favoring armed retaliation (see Gleditsch, 2005). In a much-referenced article in Foreign Affairs, Gurr (2002) argued that 'Ethnic Warfare [is] on the Wane', in large part because states had learned to better manage conflict and prevent escalation, after the temporary increase in armed conflicts after the Cold War. Future research on conflict and identity would benefit from examining how shared ties and differences influence not only tension, but also conflict management. Diplomacy is as much a part of international relations as is warfare. Since the two are substitutes as well as complements (states can fight or bargain, or both) we should not be surprised that even very serious differences do not need to yield additional warfare.

Terrorism Disadvantage

Link/Turns CredibilityInternational surveillance practices are key to combat terrorism—the aff hurts international credibilityRotella, ’13, (Sebastian is a senior reporter at ProPublica and a foreign correspondent and investigative reporter, “How the NSA’s High-Tech Surveillance Helped Europeans Catch Terrorists,” ProPublica, June 19, 2013, http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-nsas-high-tech-surveillance-helped-europeans-catch-terrorists)//ergARIS — In 2007, Belgian police were keeping close watch on Malika el-Aroud, a fierce al-Qaida ideologue whose dark eyes smoldered above her veil. The Moroccan-born Aroud had met Osama bin Laden while living in al-Qaida’s stronghold in Afghanistan. She gained exalted status when her husband posed as a journalist to blow up the renowned Ahmed Shah Massoud, the chief of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, just two days before the Sept. 11 attacks. Aroud later returned to Europe, remarried and started an Islamist website that attracted a group of French and Belgian extremists. Led by her second husband, Moez Garsallaoui, half-a-dozen of them went to Waziristan, where they joined several thousand al-Qaida fighters, including a Latino convert from Long Island, learned to make bombs and plotted against the West with terrorist kingpins. The authorities — American, Belgian, French, Swiss, Italian, Turkish — were all over them. U.S. surveillance had tracked their radicalization, their emails from Pakistan, even calls made to their mothers before they trudged through snowy Iranian mountains. An intercepted photo that Garsallaoui sent his wife showed him holding a grenade launcher. He claimed to have killed U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan and described his escape from a missile strike: “I came close to dying.” The militants took precautions, changing laptops and using Internet cafes. But they were no match for top-secret, real-time NSA intercepts. Some of the monitoring was approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. “We were inside their computers,” a source said. As debate rages in the United States about the National Security Agency’s sweeping data-mining programs, I’ve been on a reporting trip overseas, where I’ve been talking to sources about the controversy and how differing U.S. and European approaches to counterterrorism can complement each other. On Tuesday, NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander, told a congressional committee that his agency’s surveillance programs helped stop more than 50 terror plots in the U.S. and abroad. Five years ago, I was based in Europe covering terrorism, running from one attack or aborted plot to another. As the Brussels investigation shows, these cases frequently combined the high-tech reach of the U.S. counterterror apparatus with the street skills of foreign agencies. In November 2008, Pakistani and U.S. agents swooped into Kandahar and nabbed Bryant Neal Vinas, the convert from Long Island and al-Qaida militant. He cooperated with the FBI, admitting that he discussed an attack on the Long Island Rail Road with top al-Qaida figures. Days later, a drone strike killed Rashid Rauf, a Pakistani-British operative who helped plan the London transport bombings and the “liquid bomb” plot to blow up planes in 2006. Three Belgian and French militants returned home, where police arrested them after intercepts picked up menacing chatter. Vinas pleaded guilty. Aroud went to prison, and investigators believe her second husband Garsallaoui died in the land of jihad. Other cases benefited from close cooperation. In Germany in 2007, U.S. monitoring detected a suspect checking the draft file of an email box at an Internet cafe in Stuttgart. Armed with that lead, German security services deployed surveillance at numerous Internet cafes in the city. The investigation resulted in the dismantling of a Pakistan-trained group plotting to attack U.S. military targets in Germany. As several European sources told me, if an extremist in Marseilles was talking about nefarious activities with an extremist in Geneva over the Internet, chances were good that U.S. intelligence agencies would find out and inform the French and Swiss. Not because of sources on the ground, but because U.S. agencies could detect the communications through computer servers in the United States. The reaction here to the U.S. debate has been bemused. European terrorist hunters seem surprised that the revelation of the NSA data-monitoring programs is big news. The technological capacities of U.S. agencies have been an integral component of dramatically improved teamwork against terrorism during the past decade. “In the fight against terrorism, intelligence-sharing is

essential,” said Jean-Louis Bruguière, who served for more than two decades as a top French antiterror magistrate before retiring in 2007. (He declined to discuss the NSA’s role in investigations.) “Cooperation with American services has always been trusting and excellent.” At the same time, some European experts see the furor as a sign that the strengths of the American giant intertwine with its weaknesses. U.S. agencies devote huge resources to sophisticated technology to the detriment of analysis and human spying, they say. As a result, they say, U.S. agencies sometimes appear overwhelmed by the sheer volume of information. “The problem is not collecting information, it’s understanding it,” said Alain Bauer, a well-connected French criminologist who has served as a presidential adviser. “What is the sense of such programs? They are too big. They will not work. We are a former colonial empire. We know the value of human intelligence. It is more efficient and less expensive than technological fetishism. Fortunately, we do not have enough money to do it the other way.” Spy agencies such as France’s DCRI and Britain’s MI5 have long experience cultivating human sources. In early 2008, Spain’s Civil Guard broke up a plot to bomb the Barcelona subway thanks to a French informant. He was a Pakistani who infiltrated the network in the training camps and traveled with the would-be bombers to Spain. He sounded the alarm when the attack seemed imminent. I have met many American agents who are adept at operating in foreign cultures. Diversity adds value. U.S. agencies can send Pakistani-Americans to work in Islamabad and Mexican-born officers to Mexico City.