DOMINGO VERGARA, SR., petitioner, vs.HON. JOSE T. SUELTO Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Davao City, Branch IV, MANOLITO GUINOO ROMEO MONTEBON and PORFERIO CABASE respondents.

 NARVASA, J.: G.R. No. 74766 December 21, 1987

Two issues are involved in the instant special civil action of mandamus.

FACTS:

1) Petitioner Vergara is the owner of a commercial building consisting of 3 sections, each of which is separately occupied by the private respondents as lessees;

2) the defendants' lease contracts, two of which were written, were all on "a month to month basis, originally prescribed a monthly rental of P350.00, later increase to P450.00;

3) because the defendants all defaulted in the payment of their rentals for many months, Vergara's lawyer sent each of them a letter "(1) demanding payment of their unpaid rentals, (2) terminating their lease contracts on 2 grounds: non- payment of rentals and plaintiff's need of the property for some other purpose, and (3) demanding that defendants vacate the leased premises not later than the end of said month of December 1985; "

4) the defendants sent Vergara a joint reply stating this confirmation to leave the said premises. However, they requested for extension for another 3 months due to economic reason, & for them to find new space. In addition, defendant Montebon also paid a part of his arrearage;

5) later however, the defendants wrote Vergara another letter; this time, they refused to leave the premises on the ground that the lot on which the building stands, though titled in Vergara's name, was part of a tract of land Identified ordered reverted to the public domain by the RTC in a decision rendered in a Civil Case.

6) Vergara wrote back, reiterating his demand to vacate; his reply having ignored, he referred to the Lupon ng Barangay; and when the controversy was not settled by conciliation, he instituted the ejectment suit at bar.

Petitioner Vergara commenced in the MTC of Davao City an action for unlawful detainer against the private respondents GUINOO, MONTEBON and CABASE.

In their answer to the complaint, 3 defendants — 1) denied Vergara's ownership of the building2) claimed that their lease contract was null and void; 3) claiming that they had been "occupying the premises in the concept of an owner;, 4) claimed that by virtue of the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case declaring null and void the title issued over a certain- of which Vergara's was formerly a part, they were claiming Vergara's land "as their share as member of Salandanan et al Landless Association," which was "a recognized intervenor" in the case.

Vergara filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 5

Defendants filed an "Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss." 8 They argued, among others, that —

1. It "cannot be resolved by mere resort to summary judgment," that issue having arisen from Vergara's claim "of possession and ownership over the commercial building and the land.

3. The Court had no jurisdiction over the case because "the real issue involved ... is title and/or ownership of the property and not physical possession," and "this case should not be by accion interdictal but accion de reivendicacion . "

MTC (respondent Judge):

1. denied the defendants' motion to dismiss bec. -MTC believes there was Unlawful Detainer. Which, in accordance with Section 33 of BP 129 said court has authority to resolve the issue of ownership if only to determine the issue of possession.

2. denied Vergara's motion for summary judgment. On the ground that -... there was material allegations of facts in the complaint constituting plaintiff's cause of action. The rule gives the court limited authority to enter summary judgment. Upon a motion for summary judgment, the court's sole function is to determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried.

ISSUE 1: WON the appropriateness of a summary judgment may ever be so self-evident in a case so as to grant the plaintiff's motion therefor by the Trial Judge.

ISSUE 2: WON application for a writ of mandamus against a municipal trial court be filed directly with the Supreme Court considering that jurisdiction to issue this extraordinary writ is also possessed by the Court of Appeals as well as the Regional Trial Court.

SC HELD:

1. Even if the answer does tender issues and therefore a judgment on the pleadings is not proper-a summary judgment may still be rendered. If he can show to the Court's satisfaction that "except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," that is to say, the issues thus tendered are not genuine or patently unsubstantial.

In this case, the defendants' answer appears on its face to tender issues. But the issues thus tendered are not genuine. Premises considered, the propriety of a summary judgment cannot be disputed.

The remedy properly available to the petitioner, however, is not the writ of mandamus. Well known is the rule that mandamus issues only to compel performance of a mandatory, ministerial duty.

2. Such a direct recourse to the Supreme Court should not be allowed. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance.

Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals.

Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

In the case at bar, however, to apply the policy by referring the action to the Regional Trial Court of the district would serve no useful purpose. It would on the contrary work injustice to the petitioner to whom the relief rightly due has already been withheld for many years. The case having been filed before this Court as early as 1986, and having already been subject of an extensive exchange of pleadings, it should and will now be decided without further delay.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Judge denying the petitioner's (plaintiff's) motion for summary judgment, and declining to reconsider the same, are hereby annulled and set aside.

Said respondent Judge is hereby commanded forthwith to render a summary judgment in favor of the petitioner (plaintiff) against the private respondents (defendants), in accordance with the prayer of the former's motion for summary judgment.

The appropriateness and correctness of a summary judgment in the premises having already been adjudged by this Court, His Honor is further commanded to direct execution of the judgment immediately upon its rendition. This decision is immediately executory and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. Costs against private respondents.