Verhulst Nijeboer Direct Democracy En

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Direct DemocracyFacts and Arguments about

the Introduction of Initiativeand Referendum

Jos Verhulst & Arjen Nijeboer

With a contribution by Paul Carline


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Direct DemocracyFacts and Arguments about

the Introduction o Initiativeand Reerendum

Democracy InternationalBrussels 2007

www.democracy-international.orgwww.democratie.nu

www.reerendumplatorm.nl


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ISBN 9789078820031


Direct Democracy: Facts and Arguments aboutthe Introduction o Initiative and Reerendum

Translation: David CalderheadCorrection: Paul CarlineLayout: Stephan Arnold

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AcknowledgementsWe would like to express our grateul thanks to the ollowing people and bod-ies or their contribution to the creation o this book. Heiko Dittmer (Antwerp)and Bert Penninckx (Pellenberg) or their support or this project. MichaelEfer (Berlin), Matthias Leimeister (Berlin), Michael Macpherson (Berlin), andFrank Rehmet (Hamburg) or their assistance with the research. Gerald H-ner (Munich), Paul Carline (Edinburgh), and Michal Bauwens (Antwerp), re-

spectively, or their contribution o articles to the German, English and Dutcheditions. Stephan Arnold (Halle) or his design. Bruno Kaumann (Falun) orthe opportunity he provided to present this book at a series o conerences orthe Initiative & Reerendum Institute Europe, o which he is director, in theour corners o Europe.

A special word o thanks is due to Aimee Lind Adamiak (s), Bla Babi(Ljubljana), Thomas Benedikter (Bolzano), David Calderhead (Amsterdam),Nicolas E. Fischer (Copenhagen), Amalie Foss (Copenhagen), Louise C.Larsen (Copenhagen), Mira Hettesova (London), Daniel Kmiecik (Lille), An-dreas Linke (Berlin), Juan Carlos Madronal (Madrid), Magdalena Musial-Karg(Poznan) and Lilia Zaharieva (Aachen) or their extensive translation work,and to Paul Carline (Edinburgh), Mara Jesus Garcia (Madrid), Ronald Pabst

(Cologne) and Bartek Wisnewski (Warsaw) or their oten extensive prooread-ing and corrections.

Further thanks go to all the people and organisations in Europe who arecontributing to the distribution o this publication.

Finally, we would also like to express our heartelt thanks to everyone whosedonations made this publication possible.

Antwerp and Amsterdam, May 2007Jos Verhulst and Arjen Nijeboer


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ContentsAcknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1. The hidden power o democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2. What is democracy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3. Federalism, subsidiarity and social capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

4. The democratic person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

5. Lessons rom direct democracy in practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

6. Possible objections to direct democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

7. Direct democracy in the United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90

About the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

About the publishers o this work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96


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The twentieth century will not go down in history as thecentury o inormation technology, space travel or nuclearpower. It will not be remembered as the century o Fascism,Communism or Capitalism. Nor will it be the century o twoworld wars.

The twentieth century will be the century o democracy.

During the twentieth century, or the rst time in history,democracy became a global standard. Make no mistake, thestandard has not been really achieved anywhere, and democ-racy is continually crushed everywhere in the world. How-ever, with a ew notable exceptions such as Saudi Arabia andBhutan, every kind o regime lays claim to its democratic le-gitimacy. And they do that because they know that democra-cy has become the standard or the worlds population. Thatis a revolutionary act.

In the 19th

century, democracy was actually still only in itsinancy. The universal single vote system appeared rst inthe United States o America, but until the mid 19 th centurythat was generally restricted in most states to white menwho owned property. Women and people o colour were notconsidered competent to participate in the elections. Only in1870, ater the Civil War, were people o colour granted theconstitutional right to vote. American women had to wait un-til 1920. In the UK, workers rioted and ought hard or manydecades until late in the 19th century to achieve the right tovote. Suragettes demonstrated bravely rom 1904 to 1918,beore women over 30 and all men over 21 were given theright to vote. It was 1928 beore this was revised to includeall women over 21, and even this was ridiculed as the fapper

vote. In South Arica, too, disasters were predicted in theevent that universal voting rights would be implemented! Inhindsight, these objections to granting voting rights to work-ers, women and people o colour seem hollow and pathetic.

There is a hidden power that lurks in democracy. In recenthistory, democratic regimes repeatedly resisted apparentlyoverpowering dictatorial systems. Time and time again, themore democratic societies ultimately seemed to have thegreater vitality.

Two sources o power

Democracy derives its superiority rom two sources.

Firstly, a democratic regime is legitimate. In a real democracy,the orm o the regime is, by denition, sought ater by thepeople. It is logical that such a regime can rely on more inter-nal support than a dictator.

Secondly, a democracy is more productive. In an authoritarianregime, the ideas o the majority o citizens have little oppor-tunity to infuence decision-making. In a democracy, there isa much broader base o ideas.

Moreover, the selection o ideas is more ecient in a democ-racy. Democracy is nothing more than the social processingo individual ideas. New ideas always originate with individu-als, because only individuals can think. But the individualideas have to be considered, weighed against each other and

adapted to the conditions in society. People need each otherto correct the imperections in each others ideas. The hearto democracy is actually this process o the social shaping operceptions, in which the idea or proposal o a single per-son, oten already accepted by a smaller group (a political

party, action group or pressure group), has its pros and consweighed up by society as a whole. This perception-ormingprocess leads to a choice. But the choice always has to beexamined in an historical context; todays minority can betomorrows majority. The actual decisions in relation to thestream o image orming are like the timpani beats within anentire symphony.

In the medium to long term, democratic decisions will besocially superior to dictatorial decisions. Morally dubiousgoals, which do not serve the communal interest, will bytheir very nature seek their way via concealed channelsthat are shielded rom the light o open, democratic deci-

sion-making. Under democratic conditions, the best ideaswill be ltered out, so to speak, because we are better atrecognising others weaknesses than our own. The processo selection that occurs along the path o democracy caneed into society that which is benecial to it. This doesnot mean that the presence o democratic instrumentsnecessarily guarantees the quality o the moral initiativeso individual members o society. We can only trust thatsuch initiatives will emerge. But it does mean that morallyworthy aspirations cannot materialise without democracy.Politics can neverprescribe morality. But politics can createdemocratic instruments that allow the moral potential thatis dormant in individuals to be reed and put to work or thebenet o society.

Evolving democracy

Democracy is never complete. The rise o democracy shouldbe seen as an organicprocess. Democracy cannot stop devel-oping and deepening, just as a person cannot stop breathing.A democratic system that remains static and unchanged willdegenerate and become undemocratic. It is just such a proc-ess o ossication that causes societys current malaise. Wehave to ace up to the act that democracy in our societies isin dire straights.

Our current, purely representative democracy is in act theresponse to the aspirations o more than a century ago. Thissystem was suited to that time, because the majority o peo-ple could nd their political views and ideals refected in asmall number o clear-cut human and social belies, whichwere embodied in and represented by Christian, socialist orliberal groups, or example. That time is long past. Peoplesideas and judgements have become more individualised.

The appropriate democratic orm in this context is a parlia-mentary system complemented with the binding citizens ini-tiative reerendum (direct democracy), because such a systemprovides a direct link between individuals and the legisla-tive and executive organs. The greater the degree to whichcitizens incline towards individual judgements, and politicalparties lose their monopoly as ideological rallying points, thehigher will be the demand or tools o direct-democratic deci-sion-making.

1. The hidden power o democracy


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Indeed, a majority o people in Western countries want thereerendum to be introduced [see 1-1]. This act alone shouldbe decisive in also actually implementing it. Democracy liter-ally means: government by the people (Oxord English Dic-tionary). The rst step towards authentic government by thepeople necessarily involves people being able to determinethemselves how this government by the people is designedand put into practice.

Nevertheless, we see that the majority o politicians argueagainst the reerendum [see 1-2]. It is striking that the higherthe level o eective power they possess, the more vigorouslydo many politicians resist the reerendum [see 1-3]. In doingso, they actually adopt the same arguments that were previ-ously used to oppose the workers and womens right to vote. Itcan also be shown that these arguments have very little merit.In chapter 6, we look closely at the main counter-arguments.

In act, however, a glance at direct democracy in practice is su-cient to see that the objections are groundless. In Switzerlandin particular, a very interesting albeit by no means perect example o direct democracy has existed or more than a cen-

tury (see chapter 5). The Swiss can launch citizens legislativeinitiatives at all administrative levels. In certain instances, it isclear that the citizens are directly opposed to the preerenceso the political and economic elite. In reerendums on consti-tutional amendments and transerring sovereignty to interna-tional organisations, which are obligatory in Switzerland, thevoters reject a quarter o the parliaments proposals; when acitizens group collects signatures to orce a reerendum onordinary laws, as many as hal the legislative proposals are re-jected. But the people have not used their democratic rightsto turn Switzerland into an inhuman or authoritarian state!There is no death penalty in Switzerland and human rightsare not threatened in that country. Moreover, Swiss citizenshave no plans to surrender their superior democratic system.

(The Swiss peoples dislike o the European Union is also as-sociated with the Unions undemocratic character.)

But direct democracy must not be idealised. It provides nosolutions in itsel. Direct democracy does however makeavailable the essential mechanism or producing useul anduseable solutions to modern problems. The introduction odirect democracy should not happen out o a mood o sud-den euphoria, but in a spirit o active and conscious readi-ness to wait.

Moreover, one should not underestimate the invigoratingimpact that will immediately result rom a radical choice or

the restoration and deepening o democracy. The decision ormore democracy is always also a decision or the right otheotherto have a voice. It is a declaration o aith in the moralorces and capacities that are latent in ones ellow citizens. Inour societies, which are poisoned by mutual distrust, thereis almost nothing else imaginable that can have such a heal-ing eect. The commitment to more direct democracy is bydenition a commitment to the other person, to their ree-dom o speech, to their intrinsic dignity. People who are onlyinterested in achieving their own goals have nothing to gainrom democracy. They would do better to put all their en-ergy into proclaiming and propagating their own individualpoint o view. Real democrats are interested in the individualpoints o view o others, because they know that people needeach other to hone and sharpen their ideas and intuitions, toimprove them and elaborate them. This social process o theorming and shaping o opinions constitutes the real core odemocratic lie. The closer people are brought into contact

with each other in a kind oederalism, the more easily andeectively can shared perceptions emerge (the link betweenederalism and direct democracy is discussed in more detailin chapter 3). Direct democracy and ederalism reinorceeach other. Together they orm a strong democracy (Barber1984) or integrated democracy.

Our democracy is a nonsense

We are currently a long way rom such an integrated democ-racy. Political decision-making generally takes place beyondthe infuence and even beyond the cognizance o the citizens.This applies to almost all European states.

Hans Herbert von Arnim is Proessor o Public Law andConstitutional Theory at the University o Speyer in Germa-ny. He has written several books on democracy and politicsand has acquired a reputation or exposing the oten sordidreality that lies behind the pretty ace o democracy. In hisbook Das System (The System; subtitle: The Machinationso Power), published in 2001, he lited the lid on the Ger-

man political system: I representative democracy meansgovernment by the people andorthe people (Abraham Lin-coln), it quickly becomes apparent that in reality all is notwell with the basic principles o what is supposed to be themost liberal democratic social system that has ever existed inGermany. The state and politics are on the whole in a condi-tion that only proessional optimists or hypocrites can claimis a result o the will o the people. Every German has thereedom to obey laws to which he has never given his as-sent; he can admire the majesty o a constitution to which hehas never granted legitimacy; he is ree to honour politicianswhom no citizen has ever elected, and to provide or themlavishly with his taxes, about the use o which he has neverbeen consulted. The political parties that take decisions in

this system have become monolithic institutions, accordingto Von Arnim. The political identication and satisaction oneeds, which in a democracy should proceed rom bottom totop rom the people to the parliament is completely in thegrip o the party leaders. Von Arnim also lays blame on thesystem o party unding, in which politicians can personallydetermine how much o the tax revenues their parties pri-vate associations just like any other can collect. Accordingto Von Arnim, it is not surprising that politicians continue toignore the ever-increasing clamour or reorm o the politicalsystem, because otherwise they would undermine their ownvery comortable positions o power.

In Great Britain, the Power Inquiry, a committee set up bysocial organisations and consisting o both politicians andcitizens, conducted a large-scale investigation into the stateo British democracy, and especially into the reasons whyso many citizens seem to be turning their backs on politics.They held hearings across the entire country, at which citizenswere invited to put orward their opinions, and published thereport Power to the People, which noted: The one actor eltto cause disengagement that runs through all the strands oour investigation is the very widespread sense that citizenseel their views and interests are not taken suciently into ac-count by the process o political decision-making. The depthand extent o this perception among the British public can-not be stressed enough. Many, i not all, o the other acceptedexplanations presented here can also be understood as varia-tions on this theme o weak citizen infuence. () This viewcomes through very strongly in the many public submissionsreceived by the Inquiry. (Power Inquiry, 2006, p. 72).


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In 1992, Proessor De Wachter careully mapped out thepolitical decision-making processes in Belgium. He con-cluded: In Belgium, the development o ormal democraticinstitutions has become stunted. More up-to-date designswhich would allow citizens to have a lasting impact on deci-sion-making are either denied or at best lead to the ailure totake decisions at all. (p. 71) The citizens or voters are weakplayers in the complex and utterly dense social network opolitical decisions in their country. They lack decisive means

o access to the highest levels o the power hierarchy and todecision-making. Everything is decided or them in an ex-tremely elitist manner. For people who are open to ideas odemocratic legitimacy, this assessment is both a disappoint-ment and an abdication. (p. 371)

In 2002, Dutch journalist Gerard van Westerloo inter-viewed Proessor Daudt, a celebrated political scientist.Daudt is seen as the Nestor o Dutch political science; acomplete post-war generation o political scientists wastrained by him. Proessor Daudt wiped the foor with theproposition that the Netherlands was a democracy, dismiss-ing it as ollows. Certainly, Daudt said, the undamental

rights are respected, but lets not use buzzwords to dressit up as something that it is not: a democracy with peo-ples representatives. () Our democracy is a nonsense.Because van Westerloo wanted to know what Daudts col-leagues thought about his views, he made a tour o theNetherlands, visiting dozens o social administration spe-cialists and political scientists. Daudts view was conrmedeverywhere. In Tilburg, Proessor Frissen stated: In theNetherlands, we are ruled by an arrogant elite, which hasnothing to do with democracy in the direct-democraticsense o the word. In Groningen, Proessor Ankersmitsaid: Politics in the Netherlands has been driven to theringe. Democracy as such can longer be recognised in it.Proessor Tromp rom Amsterdam: Politics in the Nether-

lands is walking down a dead-end street. A crisis is loom-ing, which cannot be avoided. Political parties are noth-ing more than networks o people who know and supporteach other. Proessor De Beus rom Amsterdam: Thelegitimacy o Dutch democracy is a large-scale orm o sel-deception and raud. Proessor Tops rom Tilburg: Thepolitical animal in the Netherlands is as good as tamed anddomesticated. Director Voerman o the DocumentationCentre or Dutch Political Parties: The parliament hasbecome nothing more than a rubber stamping machine.And according to political scientist Baakman rom Maas-tricht: We deceive ourselves that what we call democracyalso works as democracy. (Van Westerloo, 2002)

Loss o trust

The populace in most European states realises that deci-sion-making is being exercised with little democracy andhas largely lost its trust in the democratic nature o the in-stitutions.

In Germany, research by TNS Emnid, commissioned bythe Readers Digest magazine, showed that citizens trustin political parties decreased rom 41% to 17% in the tenyears rom 1995 to 2005. Trust in the parliament decreasedduring the same period rom 58% to 34%, and trust in thegovernment rom 53% to 26%. Under the surace, theresa big storm brewing, commented the political scientistKarl-Rudol Korte. This is much more than the traditionallack o interest in politics and political parties. People now

despise their ocial representatives. (Readers Digest On-line, 10 August 2005). According to a Gallup poll, 76% oGermans consider their politicians dishonest. (Die Zeit, 4August 2005)

A poll by SOFRES in 2003 showed that 90% o French peo-ple believe that they exert absolutely no infuence on nationalpolitical decision-making; 76% also believe this about localpolitics. (Lire la politique, 12 March 2003)

The Belgian sociologist Elchardus surveyed Belgians viewson democracy in 1999. He summarised: A large majority othe voters have the impression that their opinion and theirvoice do not permeate through politics into the policies. ()58% o those questioned had the impression that politicians,once elected, believe that they are too good or people suchas me. All this leads to more than a quarter o the elector-ate voicing their absolute distrust: in act there isnt a singlepolitician who I would dare to trust. Only 15% to 23% othe people questioned agreed with positive statements aboutpolitics and representation. It would appear to be no exag-geration to state that hal to three quarters o the electorate

eels powerless. (Elchardus, 1999, p. 36)

Polls held in 2004 by Maurice de Hond in the Netherlandsshow that the majority o the Dutch have little aith in thedemocratic content o their state. 70% disagreed with thestatement: Politicians currently listen better than ve yearsago. 51% disagreed with the statement: In the Netherlands,the voter plays an important role in the unctioning o thenational government; 47% agreed with this. 55% disagreedwith the statement: The Netherlands is a real democracy,while only 39% agreed with it. Another survey by De Hondin August 2005 was about corruption. Dutch people believeon average that 12% o the members o parliament and thegovernment are corrupt, and 18% o municipal and provin-

cial politicians. O the national civil servants, Dutch peopleon average think that 17% are corrupt, compared to 18% omunicipal and provincial civil servants. Moreover, a quartero those questioned admitted to personal experience withcorruption among politicians or, via acquaintances, havingknowledge o specic cases (www.peil.nl).

In 2002, Gallup organised a mammoth poll on the degreeo trust o those questioned in 17 social institutions romthe army and trade unions to parliament and multination-als. This involved questioning 36,000 people in 47 coun-tries. O all institutions, parliaments appeared to enjoy theleast trust: an average o 51% o people had little to no trust,

whereas only 38% had a moderate to high level o trust. (DeWitte Wer, Spring 2003, p. 11). In 2004, the internationalcorruption watchdog, Transparency International, organ-ised a similar survey in 62 countries, in which no less than50,000 people were questioned about which social bodiesthey considered most sound and which most corrupt. Politi-cal parties were considered the most corrupt; in 36 o the 62countries they were at the top o this problematic list; withparliaments in second place. (Rotterdams Dagblad, 10 De-cember 2004)

One should not think, however, that this creeping process oloss o trust can simply carry on orever. A government thathas lost the trust o the majority o the citizens has de actoalready lost its legitimacy.


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1-1: Do people want direct democracy?

Yes. There is hardly a single Western country in which thereis not a (usually large) majority o the people who want di-rect democracy.

In 1995, the State o the Nation poll showed that 77% othe British people believed that a system must be introduced

whereby certain decisions are put to the people to decideby popular reerendum (Prospect Magazine, October 1998)According to a poll published by The Sun (15 March 2003),84% o British people wanted a reerendum on the EuropeanConstitution. At the same time, a poll appeared in the DailyTelegraph, according to which 83% o the British people want-ed to solve questions o sovereignty by means o national re-erendums; only 13% believed that this was the governmentsjob. The Guardian (29 February 2000) published a poll ac-cording to which 69% o British people wanted a reeren-dum on the new electoral system proposed by Prime Minis-ter Blair. This clearly shows that the British people want thelast word on the organisation o their political system.

In Germany, more than 4 out o 5 citizens want the citizen-initiated reerendum to be introduced nationally. From anEmnid poll in 2005, it became clear that 85% o Germanshad been won over (Readers Digest, 10 August 2005), andcomparable gures have come rom dozens o other polls.In 2004, Emnid also asked Germans whether they wanted areerendum on the European Constitution; 79% answeredin the armative. Previous polls showed that the Germanpreerence or direct democracy ran through all parties: oSPD voters, 77% were supporters, CDU voters 68%, FDPvoters 75%, Green voters 69%, PDS voters 75%. (Zeitschrit

r Direkte Demokratie 51 (periodical or direct democracyno. 51), 2001, p. 7)

According to a SOFRES poll, 82% o French people are inavour o the citizen-initiated reerendum; 15% are against(Lire la politique, 12 March 2003).

In the Netherlands, according to an SCP poll in 2002, 81%o the voters support introducing the reerendum. In 1997,an SCP survey showed that there was a large majority inavour o direct democracy in all our o the biggest politicalparties: 70% o the CDA Christian Democrat voters, 81% oPvdA Labour voters, 83% o VVD right-wing liberal voters,86% o D66 let-wing liberal democrat voters (Kaumannand Waters, 2004, p. 131). According to a NIPO poll in April

1998, 73% o the voters wanted a reerendum on the intro-duction o the Euro, and a poll in September 2003 showedthat 80% wanted a reerendum on the European Constitu-tion (which was actually held in 2005). (Nijeboer, 2005).Moreover, the Dutch people expect a lot rom democracy.The Nationaal Vrijheidsonderzoek (national reedom sur-vey) o 2004 shows that the promotion o democracy wasselected most (by 68%) as an answer to the question: What,according to you, is particularly necessary or world peace?

Gallup polled Europeans in mid-2003 on the desirability oa reerendum on the European Constitution. 83% o themconsidered such a reerendum as indispensable or use-ul but not indispensable; only 12% thought a reerendumuseless. The percentage in avour was even higher amongyoung people and those with higher education (Witte Wer,autumn 2003, p. 15)

The majority o people in the USA also want direct democ-racy. Between 1999 and 2000, the most extensive poll ondirect democracy that has ever taken place in the USA wascarried out. In all 50 states it was ound that there wereat least 30% more supporters than opponents; the averageor the whole US was 67.8% or, and 13.2% against, directdemocracy. It was striking that the more reerendumsthere were in a state in the 4 years beore the survey, the

higher was the number o supporters o direct democracy.In states with ew to no reerendums, an average o 61%were supporters; in states with an average number o reer-endums, 68% were supporters; and states with more than15 reerendums had an average 72% support. The 1999-2000 surveys conclusively demonstrate that the experienceo voting on initiatives and reerendums actually increasessupport or the process, comments Waters (2003, p. 477).There was also a poll on the desirability o a citizen initiatedreerendum at ederal level (the United States is, paradoxi-cally, one o the ew countries worldwide that never holdnational reerendums, although direct democracy is quitewidespread at the state and local levels). In this poll, 57.7%

were supporters and 20.9% opponents.

1-2: Does the political elite want directdemocracy?

No. From the opinion polls held among politicians, it gen-erally becomes clear that a majority o them are opponentso direct democracy.

In Denmark, members o the national parliament wereasked or their opinion on the proposition: There shouldbe more reerendums in Denmark. A large majority o themembers o parliament was against this. In three parties

the social democrats, let-wing liberals and central demo-crats there was even 100% opposition; in addition, 96%o the right-wing liberals and 58% o the conservatives wereagainst. Only a (large) majority rom the Socialists and theDanish Peoples Party was in avour. (Jyllands Posten news-paper, 30 December 1998)

In 1993, political scientist Tops conducted an opinion pollin the Netherlands among municipal council members.Less than a quarter were in avour o the introduction o thebinding reerendum (NG Magazine, 31 December 1993). Anopinion poll carried out by the University o Leiden oundthat 36% o all municipal council members were in avour

o introducing the optional reerendum, and 52% wereagainst it. Council members rom the VVD (right-wingliberals) and the CDA (Christian democrats) were evenon average 70% against. Only the Green Let (greens) andD66 (let liberals) produced a majority o council membersin avour o the optional reerendum (Binnenlands Bestuur(domestic government periodical, 18 February 1994).

In Belgium, the Instituut voor Plaatselijke Socialistische Actie(institute or local socialist action) conducted an opinionpoll among local social-democratic politicians about themunicipal reerendum. Only 16.7% were unconditionalsupporters o a binding reerendum. (De Morgen newspa-per, 31 January 1998)

Research by Kaina (2002) provides an interesting insightinto the dynamics o elite support. She examined the will-


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ingness o various elites in Germany to introduce directdemocracy. She divided them into a political elite, a tradeunion elite and an entrepreneurs elite, among others. Othe total elite, 50% expressed a high or very high degreeo support or direct democracy (among the general public,this is considerable higher, at 84%). There are large dier-ences between the various elites, however. In the trade un-ion elite, 86% expressed either a high or a very high level

o support, but in the entrepreneurs elite, the level o sup-port was only 36%. Among the political elite we see a pictureo extremes. In the post-communist PDS and the Greens,high-very high support was no less than 100%; with thesocial democratic SPD it was 95%, and with the liberal FDP78%, but in the CDU/CSU only 34%. (In act, a majorityin the German parliament has already approved an amend-ment to the constitution that introduces a airly good direct-democratic system; unortunately, a two-thirds majority isrequired and it is particularly the CDU politicians who haveblocked it.) I we look at the voters, however, all the partieswithout exception have a large majority support or directdemocracy. The conclusion: CDU politicians do not repre-

sent the people on this point and not even their own voters,but appear to be bowing to the wishes o the business elite.

1-3: Political power and direct democracy

What many politicians think about whether and to what ex-tent reerendums are desirable is very much linked to theirown proximity to political power. The more power they haveacquired within a representative system, the more they seemto oppose direct democracy. Some examples o this ollow.

In Sweden, only ve reerendums in total were held duringthe course o the 20th century. The positions o the most im-

portant Swedish parties the Socialist party and the Con-servative party varied according to whether or not theywere in power at the time. Beore the Second World War,the Swedish Conservative party was strictly against the re-erendum; ater the war, when this party was in oppositionor decades, it became an advocate o reerendums. Withthe Swedish Socialist party, things developed in exactly theopposite direction: this party began to reject the reeren-dum rom the moment they gained an absolute majorityin the Swedish Rikstag. Ruin (1996, p. 173) summarises itas ollows: Parties that belong to the opposition or occupya subordinate position display the tendency to deend thereerendum. Parties that sit in government or hold an ex-

ecutive position tend to display a dismissive attitude.

In Baden-Wrttemberg, the Christian Democrats (CDU)landed in the opposition ater the Second World War. Whenthe constitution or this German state was being drawn upin 1952-1953, the CDU argued or the introduction o thereerendum. The ruling majority at that time, in which thesocialist SPD was the most important partner, however,

was opposed to introduction. By 1972, the situation hadchanged: Baden-Wrttemberg was now ruled by a coalitiono Christian democrats and liberals. When the prospect oa change to the constitution was presented, the SPD tookthe initiative to also introduce reerendums. This createderce opposition rom the CDU. The peculiar situationemerged in which the SPD and CDU now adopted the verysame positions their opponents had held twenty years ear-

lier. There was ultimately a compromise: the reerendumwas introduced in principle, but with a gigantic threshold.In order to orce a reerendum, one sixth o the voters oBaden-Wrttemberg must register their signatures at thetown halls or council oces within a period o two weeks.Predictably, o course, not a single reerendum came aboutduring the subsequent decades. In 1994, a citizens groupwrote very politely: Unortunately, in view o this shitingo position, one cannot help thinking that whether a partywas or or against reerendums in the past was primarilydependent on whether that party was viewing the issuerom a government or an opposition perspective. (Stutt-

garter Memorandum, 1994, p. 23).

It is not only the division between opposition and govern-ment parties that plays a role. In the Belgian opinion pollcarried out in 1998 by the Instituut voor Plaatselijke Social-istische Actie mentioned above, it also appeared that localpoliticians with an executive mandate (mayors and alder-men) regarded the reerendum even less avourably thanpoliticians with a representative mandate (municipal coun-cillors), regardless o whether the latter belonged to the op-position or the ruling coalition parties. (De Morgen newspa-per, 31 January 1998)

Incidentally, the introduction o direct democracy is not theonly issue on which political parties routinely change their

standpoint depending on their share o power. The samephenomenon applies to the issue o limitations on thenumber o times a representative may hold the same oce.Among American voters, approximately 75% advocate lim-ited re-electability. By contrast, only 18% o the members othe individual state parliaments were in avour, with 76%being against any restriction. Among proessional lobby-ists, no less than 86% were in avour o unlimited re-electa-bility. This is not surprising, because limited re-electabil-ity threatens the old boys network that is so essential to agood lobbyist. One lobbyist even stated explicitly: Lobby-ists agree with the contention o the advocates o limited re-electability: this measure would sever the established links

and interere with the work o interest groups (OKeee1999). In Flanders, the system o limited re-electabilitywas originally part o the core doctrine o the Agalev greenparty. This party believed that mandate holders should onlybe allowed to renew their mandate once. When it came tothe crunch and some electoral heavyweights saw their po-sitions threatened by this measure, the party position wasimmediately modied.


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Democracy varies rom country to country, rom age to age.A hundred years ago, the universal single vote system ormen was disputed and votes or women appeared unthink-able. It now seems inexplicable that a time ever existed whenwomen were not allowed to vote and a rich man might have

more votes than a poor man. The same will happen with thereerendum. The time will come when nobody will remem-ber that there were earlier times when the people were notable to decide their ate directly.

Democracy evolves. What ater the diversity o orms odemocracy in dierent countries are currently the essen-tial characteristics o democracy? What enables a democracyto be distinguished rom a non-democracy? A dictator whocalls himsel democratic is still a dictator. There have to beobjective criteria to make the distinction possible. We call theentirety o these criteria the archetype o democracy.

In search o the archetype

Democracy means: government by the people. There are, ocourse, many other orms o government or state power. Inan oligarchy, or instance, a small elite group governs. In atimocracy, the rich people rule. In a theocracy, God is sup-posed to exercise the power.

The term democracy gained a much more positive recep-tion rom the twentieth century onwards. Virtually all statesreer in one way or another to the democratic ideal, even itheir regime is totalitarian. Democracy has prevailed, at leastat the ideal level. Things were dierent in the 18 th century.

Democrat was a requent term o abuse in those days.

Because state power is expressed via legislation, democracymeans that the people make the laws. In a democracy, thelaws derive their authority rom the act that the people ap-prove them in one way or another. The legislative power in anoligarchy relies on the approval o a minority, and on divineblessing in a theocracy. In a democracy, there is no authorityhigher than the people.

Laws impose obligations, not on the people as a whole, but cer-tainly on individual citizens. The individual members o socie-ty are expected to recognise the authority o the law because in

principle they also had the opportunity to help shape the law.This is how we arrive at Jean-Jacques Rousseaus concept othe social contract: legislation is the result o a social contractbetween equal and responsible citizens. In the democratic view,a law is only legitimate when those who are expected to comply withthe law are also able to contribute to shaping that law.

The concept o the social contract is best approached nega-tively, so to speak by a process o elimination. I the author-ity o legislation is not derived rom the authority o God, othe nobility, o owners o land, money or knowledge, then thesocial contract is the only remaining possibility. Laws derivetheir authority rom the act that there are voluntary agree-ments made between the members o the legal community.

Politicians oten reer to the social contract as an agreementbetween the people and the politicians. The contract is thenrenewed at each election, so to speak. But the philosopher

Thomas Paine already reuted this view in The Rights o Man(1791): It has been thought a considerable advance towardsestablishing the principles o reedom to say that govern-ment is a compact between those who govern and those whoare governed; but this cannot be true, because it is putting

the eect beore the cause; or as man must have existed be-ore governments existed, there necessarily was a time whengovernments did not exist, and consequently there couldoriginally exist no governors to orm such a compact with.The act thereore must be that the individuals themselves,each in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into acompact with each other to produce a government: and thisis the only mode in which governments have a right to arise,and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.(Paine, 1791, 1894, part 2, p. 309). A social contract is there-ore a contract between citizens, and a political system onlyemerges as a result o this.

How can citizens enter into a social contract with each oth-er? Obviously they must come together, discuss it and agreeit. This creates the rst specic instance o the democraticmeeting: the public assembly.

These public assemblies are also an historical reality. Insome small communities, or instance in the United Statesand Switzerland, public assembly still plays a role today [see2-1]. It is clear that the public assembly as such cannot workin a modern constitutional state with millions o citizens.But, at the same time, the public assembly still provides aninitial practical example o the democratic ideal. Thereore,let us rst examine the essential characteristics o the demo-cratic public assembly.

The principles o the public assembly

Certain principles exist in every democratic public assembly.

The principle o equality

The principle o equality orms the basis o the public as-sembly: all mature (in the sense o accountable) members othe community can take part in the public assembly and areaccorded equal weight in the decision-making.

It is not easy to base this principle o equality on a positiveprinciple. It is, however, very easy to establish the princi-ple o equality in a negative way. Ater all, the democraticideal is based on the undamental principle that there is noauthority higher than the people. This principle means bydenition that all appear as equals. I some o those attend-ing have more weight than others in the decision-making,merely by virtue o who they are, we nd ourselves back inthe oligarchy.

So each mature persons vote has the same weight. The his-tory o democracy in the twentieth century was largely a bat-tle or this principle, a battle that was conducted mainly onthree ronts: the universal single vote system (in which eachperson, regardless o their possessions, age or competencereceives an equal vote); womens right to vote; and the rightto vote regardless o distinguishing biological eatures (e.g.voting rights or the coloured people in South Arica).

2. What is democracy?


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The right o initiative

The right o initiative means that every member o the publicassembly has an equal right to submit proposals. Thereore,the public assemblys agenda is not set by an elite.

The right o initiative is nothing less than a special applica-tion o the principle o equality. It does not mean that thesubmission o proposals cannot be bound by rules. For ex-ample, such rules could speciy that a proposal must be sub-

mitted 14 days beore the meeting, or that a proposal must besigned by at least a hundred members o the meeting. Whatis essential is that the rules are the same or everyone.

Majority rule

In the ideal situation, there is unanimity: everyone agreeswith a proposal. However, unanimity will not usually beachievable. That is why majority rule is used. It is a conse-quence o the principle o equality and stems rom the desireto minimise disorder: by applying majority rule one achievesthe smallest number o dissatised people. One could alsoargue that any solution other than simple majority rule es-

sentially denies the principle o equality. Ater all, i we workwith a qualied (e.g. two-thirds) majority, this means that aminority can deny the majority its wishes or example i 60percent want option A and 40 percent want option B.

Majority rule has an existential dimension. By accepting thisrule, we recognise human shortcomings. The existence o theminority shows that the discussion and perception-ormingprocess has been incomplete. At the same time, the majorityprinciple reminds us o the act that democracy must alwaysbe perceived as an historical process. Todays minority may betomorrows majority. Most new ideas initially meet with resist-ance and rejection, but may later become generally accepted.Majority rule can actually only operate properly when it is su-

ciently understood in the society or community in historicalterms. When a decision made by a majority against a minorityis perceived by that majority as an absolute triumph, outsideo all historical perspective, the quality o democracy suers.

The majority rule is at odds with all elitist tendencies. Authori-tarian movements never recognise majority rule. They alwaysoster one or other image o an avant-garde or elite that canimpose its will on the majority. Leninists will speak o the spear-head role o the communist party and o the dictatorship o theproletariat. National-socialists will point to elites based on racialcharacteristics. Religious undamentalists will reject equal rightsor women and dissidents, even i they constitute the majority.

In a mitigated, but even so still very real orm, this elitistprinciple also exists among the supporters o so-called rep-resentative democracy. Dewachter (1992, p. 70) puts it asollows: According to the basic concept o parliamentarydemocracy, the decisions are taken by a selection o phi-losopher-princes. Representatively distributed throughoutthe entire territory, a sample o representatives o the peopleis elected. Yet the elected members themselves are no longerrepresentative; they are not average, but are the best. Theparliament is the assembly o the best o the nation. Theormer Justice Minister o the Federal Republic o Germany,Thomas Dehler, expressed this like this: In my opinion, it isa misapprehension o the nature o democracy to believe thatparliament is the executor o the peoples will. I think thatthe nature o representative democracy is something quitedierent: it is actually a parliamentary aristocracy. Memberso parliament have the duty and the opportunity to act rom

a greater insight, a superior knowledge, than that o the indi-vidual citizen. (Quoted by Dewachter, 2003, p. 30)

For this clear expression o the elitist idea behind purely repre-sentative democracy, Dehler was applauded not only by ChristianDemocrats, but also by Liberals and Socialists. The dierencewith totalitarian systems in this context is that, in a purely parlia-mentary system, the elite must obtain a ormal majority rom thepeople. What the pure parliamentary system and the totalitarian

system have in common, however, is that they allow the imple-mentation o laws against the will o the majority o the people.

The mandate principle

Continuous unanimity is unachievable in a democracy. That iswhy majority rule is part o the democratic archetype. But thereis still another problem. Universal participation in the demo-cratic decision-making process will also be unachievable. Therewill always be members o the community who do not want totake part in deciding on certain matters: because they dont havethe time, because they believe that they have insucient knowl-edge, or because they have other reasons or not doing so. So, in

addition to majority rule, the mandate rule is also introduced:those who do not participate in the public assembly are consid-ered to have given a mandate to those who do take part.

The mandate rule cannot be avoided by imposing compulsoryvoting or compulsory attendance (moreover, such compulsoryattendance is undesirable; see inset 6-2). Even i it is decreedby law that all members o the community must participate inthe public assembly, an arrangement must always be made orthose who do not honour this obligation. The public assemblysdecisions will always be binding on the absentees as well.

Thus, the mandate principle has nothing to do with the dier-ence between representative decision-making and direct-dem-

ocratic decision-making. The mandate principle is a direct con-sequence o the act that, by denition, laws apply to everyonein the community. In other words: I cannot deny that a lawapplies to me personally by using the argument that I did nottake part in the creation o the law. By orgoing participation inthe decision-making on the law, I am automatically consideredto have given a mandate to those who actually made the deci-sion. Without this principle, every individual could withdrawrom the applicability o laws at their own discretion.

In a direct-democratic decision-making process via a publicassembly, thereore rom a ormal perspective there arealways two decisions to be made:

rst a mandate decision is made: each citizen decides eitherthat he or she will personally take part in the ad hoc parlia-ment that will make the decision, or that he or she man-dates ellow citizens (which is done by not taking part);

secondly, the public assembly then makes the decisionabout the issue under discussion.

From public assembly to reerendum

Up to this point we have assembled the ollowing elementsthat are unavoidable components or the operation o thepublic assembly and which we can consider as elements othe archetype o democracy: the principle o equality the principle o popular sovereignty (there is no authority

higher than the people); majority rule the mandate principle


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The public assembly is not practical in a modern democraticstate, except at the local level. But that is not a problem. Thepublic assembly as a type o democracy can happily be surren-dered. What is essential is that the undamental elements o thearchetype o democracy are retained. The public assembly is onlyone o the possible maniestations o the underlying archetype.

The public assembly model has its limitations. Beyond a cer-tain size o population, the town square simply becomes too

small. As a result, the public debate must take place some-where else: via the media, via district meetings, etc. The de-bate will last longer and be o a less direct nature. This ismore o an advantage than a drawback. There is more timeor consultation, more opportunity to see through alse ar-guments. Furthermore, we will no longer vote by a show ohands, but in the privacy o the voting booth. This type o se-cret ballot is undeniably a great benet: everyone can expresshis or her opinion ree rom social pressure.

Through these two changes, the public assembly is trans-ormed into a reerendum. A reerendum is essentially a publicassembly in which the participants no longer come together physi-

cally. But, at the same time, the citizens initiative reeren-dum still retains all the essential characteristics o the publicassembly: the principle o equality, the right o initiative, ma-jority rule and the mandate principle.

It is interesting that in historical terms particularly inSwitzerland this transition rom public assembly to reer-endum has also occurred by public initiative: In many can-tons, the reerendum and initiative devices were viewed asan acceptable replacement or direct communal assembliesand cantonal Landsgemeinden. Population growth wasmaking this type o public assembly impractical. In somecantons, such as Schwyz and Zug in 1848, the substitutionwas immediate and direct, with the reerendum introduced

as the Landsgemeinde was withdrawn. (Kobach, 1994, p.100-101)

Representative democracy

But the reerendum also has its limits. We cannot hold reer-endums on every issue: the costs to society o direct decision-making are just too great. Not only does each reerendumcost money. More importantly, each reerendum demandstime and eort rom the citizens: they must use their bestcapacities to orm an opinion about the issue that is underdiscussion, and then cast their votes.

O course, overtaxed citizens can rerain rom voting in thereerendum and, by doing so, provide a mandate to thosewho do vote. I there are too ew people interested, however,this procedure is also unusable. It is absurd to organise anational reerendum on a matter or which only a handulo voters eventually show up. Not only is the public assemblyunworkable, but even the systematic use o the reerendumbecomes impracticable.

Thus another solution has to be ound. The essential questionin this context is: when the reerendum is an unsuitable meth-od or making decisions, who will then actually make those de-cisions? The mandate problem with the reerendum normallysolves itsel: those entitled to vote and who actually do vote re-ceive the mandate o society. Because everyone is ree to acceptthis mandate or not, the principle o equality is not violated. Butwho is given the mandate i the reerendum doesnt take place?

Representative democracy is essentially a technique or solv-ing this mandate problem. Representative democracy must beimplemented as soon as the citizens have too little time or in-terest to cooperate in a decision that still has to be made. Thecosts to society or a reerendum on each separate subject are,at a certain time, according to the citizens themselves,too high inproportion to the democratic benet (direct access to decision-making or every citizen). That is why the citizens appoint axed parliament or several years; it receives the mandate to

make decisions on all the matters that the citizens do not wantto decide directly. The election o the parliament is thereore aspecial type o direct-democratic decision: the citizens decidewho will decide, and under what conditions, on the issues orwhich the people want to delegate the mandate.

The mandate received by the parliament is, thereore, a specialmaniestation o the mandate given to the eective voters in di-rect-democratic decision-making by the entire community. In di-rect-democratic decision-making (reerendum), the eectivevoters orm as it were an enormous ad hoc parliament that ismandated to decide on the subject. The only dierence withrepresentative decision-making (voting in the parliament) is

that the parliament received its mandate some time beorethe vote, and the mandate is given or a specic period otime. It is clear that this separation o mandating and decid-ing is not undamental. But it is, however, essential to under-stand that the parliament and the community o voters in areerendum have the same basis both logically and ormally.

The relationship between reerendumand parliamentary decision-making

The introduction o the representative parliament raises anew problem. How does one determine which issues thecitizens still wish to decide directly?

The supporters o the purely representative system have theiranswer ready. They argue that the parliament is all-poweruland they reject the reerendum. This severely damages theprinciple o popular sovereignty included in the archetypeo democracy. In the purely representative system it is onceagain possible to pass laws that are wanted by an elite, butwhich are rejected by the majority. As soon as the parliamentis installed, it can act reely against the will o the majority.The right o initiative, which ollows directly rom the princi-ple o equality, is rescinded.

The deenders o the purely representative system justiy

this system with two main arguments.

An imposed mandate is no mandate at all

First o all, the deenders o the purely representative systemstate that the citizens give a mandate to those elected andthat, as a result, the latter now possess the right to decide.

In doing so, they ignore the act that this type o imposed man-date creates an internal contradiction. A legitimate mandate,just like a legitimate git, can only be given voluntarily. Thisvoluntariness also means that the citizen must be ree not toprovide a mandate, but to opt or direct decision-making via areerendum.An imposed mandate is a sham mandate.An analogy can clariy this. Imagine that you are held up atnight by ve muggers who demand your wallet. They do,however, leave you the choice o which mugger you surren-


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der your money to. You hand over your money out o sheernecessity to the least unpleasant, who is later arrested by thepolice. Then, during the conrontation, the man says to you:I didnt steal your wallet at all; you gave me the wallet oyour own ree will. Ater all, you were entirely ree not to giveme the wallet. The perversity o this argument is clear. Youwere indeed ree to either give or not to give the money to this

particularvillain. But you were, however, orced (by the villainconcerned, among others) to surrender the wallet anyway

against your will. You were denied the reedom to keep thewallet yoursel. Replace the robbers in this analogy by politi-cal parties, and the wallet by your right to participate directlyin the decision-making process, and you get the argument inavour o purely representative decision-making. Just as yourreedom to surrender your wallet was a sham reedom, themandate in a purely representative system is a sham man-date, precisely because it is imposed. In this context, Frie-drich Nietzsche wrote: Parliamentarianism, i.e. the ocialpermission to be allowed to choose rom among ve politicalpoints o view, is popular among the many who would liketo seem independent and individualistic in ghting or theirviews to prevail. Ultimately, however, it makes no dierence

whether the herd has an opinion imposed on it, or that veopinions are permitted. (Nietzsche, 1882, 1999, p. 500)

The notion o purely representative democracy is an inter-nal contradiction (comparable with the term square circle),especially i the majority o people want direct decision-mak-ing. I the majority o people want direct decision-making, apurely representative system is undemocratic by denition,because by its very nature such a system is contrary to thewill o the majority (because being square implies the pres-ence o corners, a circle cannot be square by denition, be-cause the circle by its very nature has no corners).

Setting up a party oneselSupporters o purely representative decision-making stillhave a second argument. They say that everyone is still ree toset up a party themsel and to stand or a parliamentary seat.

However, this response ignores the principle o the peoplessovereignty. Popular sovereignty starts with the peoples op-portunity to be able to determine how a decision is made.It is very possible that the large majority o the people wantto express their opinion on a specic issue directly, whileonly very ew people aspire to have a seat in parliament. Ina democracy, this wish should be respected. Anyone who de-crees, against the wishes o the majority, that direct decision-

making is not permitted and that one must achieve changesby taking a seat in parliament, puts themselves above and inopposition to the people and violates the sovereignty o thepeople. I the people want to decide on a specic issue andthis is made impossible, then the people are clearly not theruling power. When an elite reuses the majority o citizensthe desired opportunity to make decisions directly, and putsorward the setting up o a personal party as an alternative,then they are patronising the majority and there is no ques-tion o democracy.

Research into the motivation or voting behaviour shows inno uncertain terms that the majority o voters do not vote justbecause they want to grant a mandate [see 2-2]. The majorityo the electorate vote strategically: given the existing system,which leaders appear to be least harmul? I the votes wereactually to be cast in a spirit o granting democratic man-dates, the current mistrust o the people towards their parlia-

ments which polls across the whole o Europe repeatedlyhighlight would be completely inexplicable. There are nomandataries in the real sense o the word sitting in parlia-ment; there are leaders, however, who are elected in preer-ence to others by the voters, simply because the electorate isnow orced to elect someone and just votes or the person (orparty) least likely to do any damage.

Thus there is a undamental dierence between political par-

ties that support the binding citizens initiative reerendumand those that resist its introduction. The latter must reallybe considered as vested power interests. Only those partieswhich unconditionally support the introduction o the bind-ing citizens initiative reerendum can be considered to beauthentically democratic, in the literal sense that they striveor an authentic orm o people power.

Parliament and reerendums

The purely representative system, thereore, cannot be con-sidered to be truly democratic. This system necessitates, a

priori, the appointment o a decision-making elite and opensup the possibility or introducing laws that are contrary to thewill o the people.

Nevertheless, the representative system can operate reasonablywell in one special situation. When the large majority o thevoters approves a purely representative system and i, moreo-ver, the majority o citizens principally identiy with one o theexisting political parties, the purely representative system isreasonably legitimate (because it is desired by the citizens).This situation existed to a greater or lesser extent, perhaps, inmany Western countries until approximately the 1960s.

But times have changed. The majority o citizens do want re-

erendums and most people no longer clearly identiy them-selves with one political party or other (see inset 1-1). Thesystem o political decision-making remains unchanged, butthe democratic decit is still drastically increasing, becausein this system the peoples ability to express their social con-victions continues to be eroded.

This can only be resolved by introducing the binding citi-zens initiative reerendum. In conjunction with the repre-sentative system, the binding citizens initiative reerendumcan provide a system that, on the one hand, contains the es-sential characteristics o the public assembly (equality, righto initiative, majority rule, mandate principle) and, on the

other, is still usable in a modern society. However, we mustthen introduce some new principles that determine how rep-resentative and direct-democratic decision-making interactwith each other. In particular, i we want to retain the essen-tial advantage o representative democracy (no popular voteon every issue), the citizens must be required to demonstratean active interest in direct decision-making. The parliamentor representative body would be considered to possess a man-date or all those issues on which the citizens do not activelymake known their desire or direct decision-making.

I a group o citizens wants to obtain a reerendum on a cer-tain matter, thereore, they must prove that a clear desire ordirect decision-making does actually exist among the people.In practice, this evidence is provided through the collectiono signatures to apply or a reerendum. In Switzerland, orexample, a reerendum is held at the ederal level i 2% o theelectorate request it.


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Hierarchy o laws

A law that is approved by reerendum must be higher in thelegal hierarchy than laws passed by parliament. There is anadditional provision that a law approved directly by the peo-ple cannot subsequently be scrapped by parliament. Ater all,i a reerendum is held, this means that the people want toexpress their own opinions about the issue concerned. Withthe reerendum, the democratic mandate is consequently

placed in the hands o the voters and not in those o themembers o parliament.

In Switzerland, this superiority o the peoples law is regulatedat ederal level by including the peoples law as part o the con-stitution. Because the Swiss constitution can only be changedvia a reerendum, this means that a decision by the people canonly be abolished by another decision by the people. The disad-vantage is, however, that the Swiss constitution has developedinto a strange mixture o general provisions (such as those thatusually tend to appear in a constitution) and very specic stipu-lations (that are normally regulated by ordinary laws).

That serious problems can arise on this point is shown by theexample o Oregon. The binding citizens initiative reeren-dum exists in this US state but, by simple majority, the stateparliament can abolish laws that are made by reerendum.This has actually happened. In 1988, or example, a peoplesinitiative was carried which provided or longer prison sen-tences or violent criminals. This law was subsequently re-pealed by the legislative chambers.

A popular initiative was later launched (Measure 33) in anattempt to prevent this type o occurrence. It proposed theollowing: laws created on the basis o a peoples initiative can only be

changed in the rst ve years by another peoples initiative;

ater ve years, a change can only be implemented i it se-cures at least 60% o the votes in both legislative chambers(Senate and House o Representatives).

However, the proposal was rejected by only a narrow marginin November 1996.

Participation quorums

In view o the mandate principle, it is absurd to introduceparticipation quorums or direct decision-making. The citi-zens who do not take part in a vote are considered to have

given a mandate to those who do. I one introduces participa-tion quorums, one opens the door to boycott actions by mi-norities. Suppose, or instance, that there is a participationquorum o 40% and that 60% o the electorate want to vote.Within the group keen to vote, 55% support the proposal tobe voted on and 45% oppose it. The opponents cannot winthe vote i they take part in the reerendum. But i they stayat home, however, they can win, because then the 40% quo-rum will not be achieved and the proposal will be rejected,against the will o the majority [see 2-2].

We have seen that the parliamentary mandate is only a de-rived orm o the mandate which the eective voters receivein direct-democratic decision-making. A parliament containson average only about 0.003% o the population and yet itcan still make decisions. So it makes no sense to suddenly in-troduce participation quorums o 20% or 40% or the ad hocparliament that is ormed by a reerendum. The mistake that

is made with participation quorums is that the people whostay at home are counted as either supporters or opponents(depending on the reerendum). In reality, they have chosennot to voice their opinion. That must be respected.

Finally, we can also note that the turnout or a reerendummust not be compared with the turnout or elections. In elec-tions, all kinds o issues are on the agenda or in the partymaniestos: the current ones and all the new topics that may

present themselves in the next our or ve years. A reeren-dum has only one specic issue on the agenda, so it is logicalthat the turnout or this is lower than or elections.

Arguments are sometimes put orward or a low quorum,precisely to avoid possible boycotting. However, this stand-point is illogical. Either a quorum is so low that it is bound tobe met: then, to be sure, boycotting is ruled out but at thesame time the quorum itsel is pointless. Or the quorum isso high that it is unlikely ever to be achieved: then boycottingis possible. There is no third possibility.

It also needs to be remembered that participation quorums

are basically impossible or parliamentary or municipal coun-cil elections. Ater all, i such a quorum were not to be met,the legislative and administrative system would just grind toa halt. There are no good reasons or not having a quorum orthis kind o election but insisting on one or reerendums. Ithe group making a decision by reerendum is required tobe suciently representative, then the same requirementmust apply a ortiori (even more stringently) or parliamen-tary elections. Suppose that a participation quorum o 25% isset or a reerendum and at the same time no quorum is setor parliamentary elections. A reerendum in which 20% othe electorate votes will be declared invalid. But a parliamentthat is elected by only 5% o the electorate, however, can stillmake legitimate decisions decisions based on an indirect

citizen participation o 5% whereas the rejected reeren-dum result can boast a direct citizen participation o 20%.That is illogical. Moreover, the mandate that is given to par-liament is much more ar-reaching than the mandate givento the voters by those who stay at home in a reerendum.Ater all, nothing can be said with certainty about what ar-reaching decisions will be made by all the members o par-liament. During the course o a parliamentary sitting, newtopics and drat legislation that could not have been oreseenare constantly being put onto the agenda.

Finally, some supporters o a participation quorum reer to theso-called danger o compartmentalisation. By this they mean

that citizens would only vote or the issues which their owngroup is concerned about. For instance, in a reerendum onan action plan to deal with armyard manure, only the smallsection o the population who are cattle armers would vote.

This objection rests on the alse premise that people onlyvote to deend their own groups interests. The reality is di-erent (see chapter 6, point b). In countries or states withoutparticipation quorums, such as Switzerland and Caliornia,there is no evidence o compartmentalisation. The practicalprogress o direct-democratic votes makes any compartmen-talisation eect improbable a priori. For example, on anyone reerendum voting day in Switzerland there are almostalways several reerendum issues to be voted on at the sametime. These reerendums are on the most diverse subjectsand concern not only the ederal and cantonal levels, but alsothe municipal level. Thus people are not normally called tothe ballot box or the sake o one single specialised issue.


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On the contrary, it is the parliamentary system that is highlyexposed to the temptation o compartmentalisation. Inter-esting examples o this are precisely the armyard manureaction plan or the prohibition o tobacco advertising in Bel-gium. Economic interest groups can, via their contacts witha small group o specialised members o parliament, exer-cise unprecedented pressure on the decision-making. Direct-democratic decision-making would make it much more di-cult or such interest groups to play a winning hand.

The quorum in the parliament

Sometimes the participation quorum or reerendums is de-ended by making a comparison with the quorum that ap-plies in many parliaments. Votes in the parliament are otenonly valid provided at least 50% o the members o parlia-ment cast their vote. In the analogy, a popular vote could onlybe valid provided at least 50% o the people cast their votes.

The analogy is alse, however. We have seen that the parliamentis logically equivalent to those who vote in a reerendum, notwith the total number o people entitled to vote. A member o

parliament has a current contract with the citizens: he or shehas entered into this contract or a specic period to undertakethe social decision-making insoar as the citizens themselves donot want to decide. The Member o Parliament (MP) must theo-retically always be present at the votes in the parliament, there-ore. I he or she intentionally stays away, this is a breach o thecontract with the voters. The 50% quorum in the parliament is aweak refection o this obligation. It is not a happy arrangement,because it works in avour o the polarisation between majorityand minority in the parliament. In its turn, this polarisation isirreconcilable with the contract that exists between members oparliament rom the minority, and their voters. I these mem-bers o parliament are part o the minority, they can justiablyclaim that their presence in the parliament is pointless: they

can never aect the decisions. These members o parliamentare, thereore, unable to honour their contracts with the voters,which is not their own ault, but a result o blocking by their col-leagues rom the majority. It would be better to replace the 50%quorum in the parliament by a rule in which the absence o amember o parliament would be sanctioned by dismissal andreplacement by an unelected candidate rom a dierent party.

The reerendums area o authority

It must be possible to hold a reerendum on all the issues orwhich a representative decision is also possible. It is in con-

fict with the right o initiative to deny the citizens the rightto direct decision-making on certain issues. However, directdecision-making must be subject to the restrictions that alsoapply to representative decision-making. Three points are es-pecially important in this context: The decision-making must occur at the proper level. For

example, one cannot reorm the social security system atprovincial level, or abolish the generation o nuclear powerat municipal level.

The proposals to be voted on must be in accordance with thebasic rights and reedoms as established in the constitutionand the international treaties concerning human rights.

However, the people must have the right to change the con-stitution by reerendum and must also be given direct-dem-ocratic control over entering into treaties. Treaties must al-ways be subject to a time limit and be terminable. In anyother case, the peoples sovereignty would be restricted inan unacceptable manner.

The political elite has a strong tendency, prompted by dis-trust, to exclude direct-democratic decision-making or cer-tain subjects. One nds this attitude not only among politicalleaders, but also among academics and proessors. An exam-ple is the Recommendation issued by the scientic commit-tee o the commission or political renewal (2000) or thecommittee o Belgian members o parliament who are con-cerned with political renewal. In this we can read: Tax mat-ters are excluded rom a popular vote in most countries; the

reason is based on the justied ear that in the reerendumor the popular consensus the people will almost always optor a lowering o the expenses they bear, whereas at the sametime they demand that the government provide the same oreven better services. Following on rom this, the proessorsadvocate the exclusion o issues that exclusively or mainlyconcern tax or budgetary topics. Their argument is not onlyanti-democratic; it is also alse to the extent that they do notmention the clearly contradictory example o Switzerland.Here there are no restrictions on reerendums on tax issues,without this adversely aecting the national budget (see alsochapters 5 and 6).

Right o petition

Smaller groups o citizens (e.g. 0.1% o the electorate, about45,000 signatures in Great Britain) must be able to put some-thing onto the parliamentary agenda (right o petition), eveni insucient signatures were collected to obtain a reeren-dum. This is a direct result o the nature o the parliamentitsel: it is the institution where decisions are made aboutsocially relevant issues on which the citizens themselves donot want to decide. The act that several thousand citizenssubmit a petition already makes the subject into a sociallyrelevant issue.

The right o petition and the citizens initiative reerendumare linked in a multi-stage direct-democratic procedure. Acitizens initiative starts as a petition group. I, or example,43,800 signatures are collected, the citizens proposal en-ters parliament as a petition. I the parliament adopts theproposal, the initiative ends. In the other case, the citizensinitiative can orce a reerendum i it has a higher numbero signatures (e.g. 2% o the electorate, around 900,000 inGreat Britain). The voters must then also be inormed o theparliaments recommendations or considerations, which willcertainly orm a signicant part o the social debate. The par-liament can also be granted the right to submit an alternativeproposal in addition to the peoples proposal. Then, in the

reerendum, the voters have the choice between three alter-natives: the status quo, the peoples proposal, or the parlia-mentary alternative (this type o system exists in Switzerlandand Bavaria). This kind o measure can ensure that there is acloser bond between the parliament and the people (see alsochapter 6, point e).


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items on the agenda themselves, and include items that arebrought up by the town administration and other commit-tees and boards.

The OTM participants are provided with several recom-mendations. In some municipalities, the actual OTM is alsopreceded by an inormative pre-Town Meeting, at whichcitizens can seek urther inormation about the items on

the warrant. In the warrant itsel, one can nd recommen-dations rom various committees or many o the items tobe voted upon. The town counsel, a lawyer specialised inmunicipal legislation, plays an important advisory role atthe OTM itsel.

Voting is by a show o hands or by standing up, but ordelicate items there is a change to secret written ballots.One problem with the written ballot is its time-consumingcharacter (typically three-quarters o an hour or voting andcounting). Nevertheless, the opportunity or secret ballots isessential to avoid social pressure on controversial topics.

The OTMs decisions can still be repealed via a reeren-dum. In Massachusetts, the signatures o 300 registeredvoters are required, and the OTMs decision will only berepealed i a majority o at least 20% o the registered vot-ers opts or this. In special circumstances, additional OTMscan be convened.

How many citizens attend the Town Meetings? In the USAone has to register as a voter. The percentages indicated areor the our states with ull OTMs: Maine: 28.17%; Vermont:26.03%; New Hampshire: 22.60%; Massachusetts: 11.89%.In act, these percentages should be increased by about 10%,because around one-tenth o the names on the lists are thoseo registered voters who have moved house in the mean-

time. According to the survey by Zimmerman (1999), theattendance level seems to depend heavily on the size o thecommunity. In communities with less than 500 inhabitants,usually more than one third o them attend. In the Connecti-cut towns with more than 20,000 residents, attendance isaround 1 percent (Zimmerman p. 165; gures or 1996). Se-riously low attendances have also been noted in communi-ties where the Town Meetings powers are limited.

Zimmerman (p. 173-174) polled municipal ocials aboutthe quality o the debate at the OTM. In Massachusetts,82% rated the quality as excellent or good, 16% as rea-sonable and 2% as dubious. Zimmerman also asked them

to rate the quality o the decisions. In Massachusetts, 86%o the ocials considered the decisions excellent or good,14% reasonable and 1% dubious. The gures are similarin the other states.

In the southern Brazilian city o Porto Alegre, a novel sys-tem or the direct-democratic preparation o the city budgethas been operating via public assemblies since 1989 (Ab-ers, 2000). This system was introduced by the let-wingPartido dos Trabalhadores (Labour Party), which won asignicant election victory in 1988. At public assemblies,neighbourhood residents decide their priorities or publicservice investment and then elect representatives who at ahigher level district and city organise and ollow up thedecisions made with the municipal services. Besides localpublic assemblies, there are also thematic meetings, or ex-ample, about education or the economy and taxes.

Public assemblies provide a very lively orm o direct de-mocracy, and are certainly very workable at a local level.Nevertheless, the public assembly also has some disadvan-tages compared to the reerendum. The absence o the se-cret ballot is the most important basic objection. Moreover,the public assembly requires an individual contributionthat is made at a single specic time and it thereore moreeasily excludes some voters rom participating.

2-2: Boycott with participation quorums

The municipal reerendums in German abundantly illus-trate the destructive operation o participation quorums.

In Baden-Wrttemberg, the municipal reerendum wasintroduced as early as 1956 (it was not introduced in theother German states until the 1990s). However, the Badenlegislation is very restrictive. One o the most serious re-strictions is the quorum rule: at least 30% o the electoratemust vote in avour o the citizens proposal, otherwise the

ballot is void.

This rule gives more weight to the votes o the opponentso the citizens initiative than to the votes o its supporters,because the non-votes o the abstainers are added to theno-votes o those opposed to the initiative.

The reerendum in Reutlingen (1986), about the buildingo an air-raid shelter, illustrates this eect strikingly. On 20March 1986, the municipal council (CDU majority) haddecided to build a bunker or civil protection. A citizensinitiative against this was switly set up, with supportersincluding the Greens and the SPD, and on 18 April the nec-essary signatures were submitted or holding a municipal

reerendum on the issue.

The municipal council and the CDU mounted a deliberateboycott against this initiative. Any participation in discussionevenings and suchlike was systematically reused. In the verylast week beore the vote, the CDU suddenly broke its silencewith an advertisement and a pamphlet that was distributedas a newspaper supplement and was signed by the mayor,among others. This contained a bareaced encouragement toboycott the vote: ... proessional and cool heads must nowact sensibly not emotional, but smart voting behaviour.So you can just stay at home this coming Sunday; ater all,you are only being asked to vote against the building o the

bunker. Even i you do not vote, you will be expressing yourapproval o the decision made by the municipal council. Youhave extensively placed your trust in the CDU or many yearsin the elections. You can also trust us on this question.

The result was that only 16,784 o the 69,932 registeredvoters took part in the vote; only 2,126 voted in avour othe bunker. The citizens initiative came to grie on the 30%quorum, despite the act that only 3.4% o the voters werein avour o the bunker. The quorum rule ultimately ena-bled a small minority o the people to have its way against alarge majority. Various other municipalities in Baden-Wrt-temberg held municipal reerendums on similar plans orshelters. Overall there was a large majority against buildingsuch acilities, which people considered to be unnecessary.(An opinion poll showed that 70% o the inhabitants oBaden-Wrttemberg opposed the bunkers.) In Nrtingen,


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a municipality close to Reutlingen, there was also a citizensinitiative against a similar bunker. The local CDU did notcall a boycott there. The result was that 57% o the elec-torate took part in the reerendum and 90% o the votersrejected the building o the bunker. The citizens initiativewas thereore successul in this instance. In another mu-nicipality, Schramberg, the citizens initiative against the lo-cal bunker plans was also successul, despite a call rom the

CDU to boycott it. On this occasion, the text o the CDUscall or a boycott was prematurely leaked, so that the bun-kers opponents still had time to respond and counter themanoeuvre. The local newspapers also published criticismso the CDUs boycott call. In the end, 49.25% o the elec-torate in Schramberg participated in the reerendum; theminimum 30% turnout quorum was achieved and 88.5%o the voters were against the bunker.

A boycott can also be conducted along organisational lines. Awell-known example comes rom the town o Neuss, wherethe rst municipal reerendum in Nordrhein-Westalen washeld on 3 September 1995. The subject was the building,

close to the town hall, o a hotel which would destroy someo the town centres green belt. The CDU majority succeededin getting the public vote to ail because o the participationquorum o 25%. It is generally known that when reeren-dums in large towns concern building plans in a single spe-cic district, relatively ew people will vote, because they donot eel personally aected by the issue or have the impres-sion that a lack o knowledge o the local situation meansthey cannot judge properly (a reerendum in Antwerp onthe design o the municipal square in Ekeren, or instance,will attract very ew voters rom other districts such as theSouth or Hoboken, the majority o residents o which willhave never even been to Ekeren in person). The municipalcouncil o Neuss used a series o measures to discourage

the voters. Postal voting was not allowed (although or thecouncil elections 15% o the votes were submitted by post).Instead o the 100 polling stations that were provided orthe council elections, only 30 locations were opened or thisvote. Result: only 18.5% o the electorate took part in the re-erendum. O these, it is true that almost 80% were againstthe municipal councils hotel plan, but because the quorumwas not achieved, the citizens initiative was declared void.

In Belgium, on 10 April 1995, a law was implemented thatprovided or non-binding and non-compulsory reeren-dums at municipal level. A participation quorum was set at40% o the electorate. I less than 40% o the electorate par-

ticipate in the reerendum, the ballots must be destroyeduncounted.

Although the reerendums were non-compulsory and non-binding and, moreover, a very high signature threshold o10% was imposed, this led to initiatives in a number otowns. In 1996, in the municipalities Genk and As in Lim-burg, the citizens requested a reerendum on the construc-tion o a commercial complex on the site o an abandonedmine. In the As municipality, the municipal council decidedto decline the reerendum, but a vote was held in Genk on 13October 1996. Only 37.47% o the electorate turned out orthe vote and, in the name o Belgian democracy, the ballotswere not counted but were destroyed. Middle-class organisa-tions and an extreme let-wing party had called on peoplenot to vote. The rst reerendum held under the new lawwas immediately a victim o a successul call or a boycott.

In Gent, on 14 December 1997, a citizens initiative reer-endum was held on the city councils planned constructiono the so-called Belort car-parking garage in the city centre.The city council had decided in advance that it would con-sider the result as binding, but the SP and the VLD, whichormed the majority coalition in Gent, called on the votersto boycott the ballot. On this occasion the boycott ailed bya small margin, because 41.12% o the electorate turned out

and o these 95% voted against the car park.

In Sint-Niklaas, on 28 June 1998, a reerendum was heldon the construction o an underground car park. As inGent, the quorum was just met: 40.28% o the electorateturned out. O these 92% voted against the car park. Thevote was a touch-and-go aair because the largest party inSint-Niklaas, the Christian Democratic CVP and the localNCMV (traders organisation), had called on people not tovote. The reerendum is a bad ormula. Whoever votes yesonly ensures that those who vote no achieve the required40%. The yes voter would do better to stay at home, ac-cording to local CVP chairman Julien Vergeylen (Gazet van

Antwerpen newspaper, 17 June 1998). The socialist leader,Freddy Willockx, said: The problem is that because o theCVPs call or a boycott we do not have an objective pictureo what the people really want. There were probably some70% to 80% o the Sint-Niklaas voters eectively againstthe car park, but we will never know that with certainty(Gazet van Antwerpen, 29 June 1998).

Although the pa

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