Verifying a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Technical and Organizational Considerations

7/31/2019 Verifying a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Technical and Organizational Considerations

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SIPRI

Policy Paper

August 201233

VERIFYING A

FISSILE MATERIALCUT-OFF TREATY

Tcc Ogzt

Ct

shannon n. kile androber e. kelley


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STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL

PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into

conlict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966,

SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources,

to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

The Governing Board is not responsible or the views expressed in the

publications o the Institute.

GOVERNING BOARD

Gran Lennmarker, Chairman (Sweden)

Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia)

Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia)Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)

Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)

Susan Eisenhower (United States)

Ambassador Wolgang Ischinger (Germany)

Proessor Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom)

The Director

DIRECTOR

Dr Bates Gill (United States)

Signalistgatan 9

SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden

Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00Fax: +46 8 655 97 33

Email: [email protected]

Internet: www.sipri.org


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Veriying a

Fissile MaterialCut-of TreatyTechnical and Organizational

Considerations

SIPRI Policy Paper No. 33

SHANNON N. KILE AND

ROBERT E. KELLEY

August 2012


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SIPRI 2012

All rights reserved. No part o this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval

system or transmitted, in any orm or by any means, without the prior permission in

writing o SIPRI or as expressly permitted by law.

Printed in Sweden

ISSN 16520432 (print)

ISSN 16537548 (online)

ISBN 9789185114726


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Contents

Preace iv

Summary vAbbreviations vi

1. Introduction 1

Box 1.1. The nuclear weapon haves and have-nots 3

2. FMCT verification choices 4

Definition o fissile material 4

Coverage o pre-existing stocks 5

The scope o FMCT verification 7

Figure 2.1. Application to the nuclear uel cycle o IAEA saeguards and 6

proposed FMCT verification arrangements

3. FMCT verification tasks and tools 9

Closed-down and decommissioned plants 9

Facilities producing fissile material or non-proscribed purposes 10

Covert and undeclared acilities 14

FMCT verification adequacy 17

Table 3.1. Significant uranium-enrichment acilities in the nuclear 12

weapon-possessing states, as o December 2011

Table 3.2. Significant plutonium-reprocessing acilities in the nuclear 14

weapon-possessing states, as o December 2011

4. The design o an FMCT inspection system 19

Inspection rights and privileges 19

Managed-access procedures 22

Challenge inspections under an FMCT 23

5. The role o the IAEA in veriying an FMCT 25

The IAEAs comparative advantages in veriying an FMCT 25

Factors afecting the IAEAs suitability as an FMCT verification body 26

6. A proposal or the structure and operation o an FMCT 29

verification body

The structure o the standing verification group 29

The operation o the standing verification group 32

The relationship between the standing verification group and the FMCTO 33

Benefits or the IAEA 35

Box 6.1. The Iraq Action Team 31

Figure 6.1. The relationship between the IAEA and the proposed FMCTO 30

and standing verification group

7. Conclusions 36

Appendix A. Categories o IAEA saeguards agreement 38

Saeguards in the non-nuclear weapon states 38

Saeguards in the nuclear weapon-possessing states 40


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Preface

The idea o halting the production o fissile material or use in nuclear weapons

has gained new salience as part o reinvigorated international eforts to limit thesize o global nuclear arsenals and to promote concrete progress towards real-

izing the vision o a world ree o nuclear weapons. This Policy Paper ofers a

timely and insightul analysis o a key question that will need to be considered

when negotiations on a fissile material cut-of treaty (FMCT) are finally opened:

what organization should be given the responsibility or veriying compliance

with a uture FMCT?

Many diplomats and non-governmental experts have assumed that the Inter-

national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be given the FMCT verification mis-

sion, in light o its extensive experience in implementing nuclear saeguardsagreements in both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. However, the

authors o this Policy Paper challenge this conventional wisdom. They identiy a

number o technical and organizational constraints that the agency would ace

were it to add an FMCT verification mission to its existing portolio. They con-

clude that negotiators should instead create a dedicated verification body that

would be part o the IAEA but would operate autonomously, in coordination and

consultation with an independent fissile material cut-of treaty organization

(FMCTO) that would be created as a permanent treaty-implementation body.

I would like to express my appreciation to the authors or their work. Robert

Kelley has drawn on his insights and experiences rom his service as director o

the IAEAs Iraq Action Team and as a senior inspector with the agencys Depart-

ment o Saeguards to ofer a unique perspective on the challenges involved in

designing an appropriate organizational ramework or veriying compliance

with an FMCT. Shannon Kile, who heads the SIPRI Nuclear Weapons Project,

has written annually about developments in nuclear arms control or the SIPRI

Yearbook or nearly two decades.

Thanks are also due to the external reeree, to SIPRI researchers Vitaly

Fedchenko and John Hart or their valuable comments and support, and to Dr

David Cruickshank o the SIPRI Editorial and Publications Department, whoedited the text. Finally, I would like to express my deep appreciation and thanks

to the Norwegian Ministry o Foreign Afairs or its generous financial support

or SIPRIs work in connection with the project Achieving concrete, near-term

progress in disarmament, arms control and non-prolieration. This Policy Paper

is one o the outcomes o the projects activities.

Dr Bates Gill

Director, SIPRI

Stockholm, August 2012


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Summary

In recent years there has been renewed momentum behind international eforts

to open negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-of treaty (FMCT). Shouldthese eforts finally bear ruit, a key question that will have to be addressed in the

negotiations is what organization should be given the responsibility or veriying

compliance with the proposed fissile material production ban. One widely men-

tioned choice or this role is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in

light o its long experience in implementing nuclear saeguards agreements man-

dated by the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Prolieration o Nuclear Weapons (Non-

Prolieration Treaty, NPT). Many o the tools and procedures developed by the

IAEA or saeguards purposes could be directly applied to veriying a uture

FMCT.However, the IAEA would be hindered by a number o technical and organ-

izational actors in taking on the FMCT verification mission. It would ace par-

ticular challenges in veriying treaty compliance in the nuclear weapon-possess-

ing states without changes to its existing saeguards mandate and practices.

These would involve replacing subsidiary saeguards arrangements with new

agreements to enhance the agencys ability to designate inspectors and technical

experts, use advanced instrumentation and verification techniques, and deter-

mine other inspection modalities. The agency would also need a strengthened

mandate or collecting and analysing data rom ormer military fissile material

production acilities while at the same time protecting national security secrets

and prolieration-sensitive inormation.

A uture FMCT should provide or the establishment o a dedicated verifi-

cation bodya standing verification group (SVG)that would be ormally part o

the IAEA and would draw on the agencys experience and ormidable technical

skills in implementing saeguards. The SVG would unction autonomously rom

the IAEA Department o Saeguards in terms o interacting with states parties,

planning inspections and drawing conclusions about the compliance o parties

with their treaty commitments. The conclusions would be shared with an

independent FMCT organization (FMCTO) that would be responsible or over-seeing the implementation o the treaty and addressing compliance questions.

The aim would be to create a verification body, tailored specifically or an

FMCT, that would have the requisite legal mandate and technical capabilities or

inspecting what in some cases will remain highly sensitive nuclear acilities and

material contained therein.


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Abbreviations

CD Conerence on Disarmament

CSA Comprehensive saeguards agreement

CSP Conerence o the states parties

CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

DIV Design inormation verification

FMCT Fissile material cut-of treaty

FMCTO Fissile material cut-of treaty organization

HEU Highly enriched uranium

HSP Hexapartite Saeguards Project

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IPFM International Panel on Fissile Materials

LFUA Limited-requency unannounced access

NPT Treaty on the Non-Prolieration o Nuclear Weapons (Non-

Prolieration Treaty)

NRTA Near-real-time accountancy

OPCW Organisation or the Prohibition o Chemical Weapons

OSI Open source inormationSIAU Satellite Imagery Analysis Unit

SQP Small quantities protocol

SVG Standing verification group

TEP Tripartite Enrichment Project

VOA Voluntary ofer agreement

WAES Wide-area environmental sampling


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1. Introduction

In 1995 the Conerence on Disarmament (CD) adopted a mandate to negotiate a

multilateral fissile material cut-of treaty (FMCT) that, as well as banning theproduction o fissile material or nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices in a non-discriminatory manner, would be internationally and efect-

ively verifiable.1 It is now widely considered that the credibility o a uture

FMCT rests on the parties compliance with it being efectively verified. While

questions about whether this is achievable have slowed negotiations in the CD,

consensus is emerging that verification is possible, based on the existing system

o nuclear saeguards mandated by the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Prolieration o

Nuclear Weapons (Non-Prolieration Treaty, NPT).2

Most studies to date have assumed that the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) would be given primary responsibility or veriying an FMCT,

largely since it has decades o experience with implementing nuclear saeguards

agreements with countries around the world. Moreover, the new treatys verifi-

cation system would be likely to have significant overlap and convergence with

IAEA saeguards in terms o its legal mandate and technical tasks and tools. A

decision to give the FMCT verification mission to the IAEA would thereby be

consistent with the view held by many states that new organizations should not

be created to accomplish objectives or which existing bodies and mechanisms

have appropriate capacities and unctional synergies.

A number o studies have also proposed that a uture FMCT should provide or

the establishment o a modest fissile material cut-of treaty organization

(FMCTO) to oversee and administer the implementation o the treaty. The pro-

posals have generally envisioned a body modelled on existing international

organizationsin particular, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Organization (CTBTO) and the Organisation or the Prohibition o Chemical

Weapons (OPCW)3which have similar unctions and tasks as permanent imple-

mentation bodies or arms control and disarmament treaties.4

1

Conerence on Disarmament, Report o Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon o Canada on consultations onthe most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty banning the production o fissile material or nuclearweapons or other nuclear explosive devices, CD/1299, 24 Mar. 1995. CD documents related to fissile

materials are available at

The use o the term fissile material cut-of treaty throughout this Policy Paper is not intended to pre-judge the outcome o uture negotiations on the treatys scope o application.

2 Treaty on the Non-Prolieration o Nuclear Weapons (Non-Prolieration Treaty, NPT), opened or sig-nature 1 July 1968, entered into orce 5 Mar. 1970, INFCIRC/140, 22 Apr. 1970, .3 The CTBTO will become operational when the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty enters

into orce. The CTBTO Preparatory Commission (commonly reerred to as the CTBTO), based in Vienna,Austria, was established to support and promote the treatys entry into orce, which includes the building o

the global International Monitoring System. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), opened orsignature 24 Sep. 1996, not in orce, .

The OPCW, based in The Hague, the Netherlands, was created to oversee implementation o the 1993Chemical Weapons Convention and resolve questions o compliance. Convention on the Prohibition o the

Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use o Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical


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2 VERIFYING A FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY

One authoritative group o experts, the International Panel on Fissile Materials

(IPFM), put orward in 2009 a drat text or an FMCT that provided or the

creation o an FMCTO as the main body or implementing the treaty and

addressing compliance concerns.5 The new body would consist o two organs: a

conerence o the states parties (CSP), under which subsidiary bodies could beestablished, and a small secretariat. The CSP would be responsible or overseeing

implementation and policy matters, including compliance concerns and issues

arising rom difering interpretations o the treaty. The secretariat, headed by an

executive secretary, would be responsible or the day-to-day administration and

implementation o the treaty, working under the supervision o the CSP. The

IPFM drat treaty did not provide or the establishment within the FMCTO o a

subsidiary body to take on verification tasks, consistent with the widely held

view that the main responsibility or FMCT verification should be given to the

IAEA.This Policy Paper examines the technical and organizational aspects o veriy-

ing a uture FMCT consistent with the 1995 mandate, with a ocus on the IAEAs

role. It concludes that, although the IAEA would have important comparative

advantages in implementing any FMCT verification regime, or that regime to be

efective requires adapting the agencys current structure, competences and prac-

tices to the new mission. The main recommendation is that negotiators should

create two bodies: a dedicated verification body that would be part o the IAEA

but would operate autonomously, in coordination with an independent FMCTO

that would be created as a permanent treaty-implementation body.

In order to determine the precise technical and organizational ramework or

an FMCT verification regime, this Policy Paper first sets out the tasks and object-

ives that any uture veriying body will have to carry out and then considers how

they can best be ulfilled. Chapter 2 briefly describes a number o key unresolved

issues regarding the scope and objectives o an FMCT. Chapter 3 lays out the

main inspection tasks under an FMCT in the nuclear weapon-possessing states,

in particular those related to the types o acility to be inspected, and highlights

several types o analytical tools and techniques or carrying out these tasks. (On

the definition o nuclear weapon-possessing state and related terms see box 1.1.)

Chapter 4 considers specific inspection methods and approaches o special rele-vance or an FMCT verification body, taking account o the experiences o the

IAEA in implementing saeguards agreements with the nuclear weapon-possess-

ing states. Chapter 5 assesses the compatibility o the IAEAs present mandate

and organizational practices with an FMCT verification role and identifies

Weapons Convention, CWC), opened or signature 13 Jan. 1993, entered into orce 29 Apr. 1997, .

4 Findlay, T. and Meier, O., Exploiting synergies between nonprolieration verification regimes: apragmatic approach, IAEA, European Saeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and

Institute o Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), Nuclear Saeguards: Verification and Nuclear MaterialSecurity, Proceedings o an International Symposium (IAEA: Vienna, 2001), Paper IAEA-SM-367/15/06.

5 International Panel on Fissile Materials, A fissile material (cut-of) treaty: a treaty banning theproduction o fissile materials or nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices with article-by-article

explanations, 2 Sep. 2009, .


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INTRODUCTION 3

obstacles to the agency taking on the role. Drawing on the evidence in chap-

ters 35 and on relevant precedents rom the OPCW and the CTBTO, chapter 6

proposes several organizational and operational changes or establishing a

dedicated FMCT verification body within the IAEA and considers how the new

body would work alongside an independent FMCTO. Chapter 7 presents the con-clusions and summarizes the main recommendations.

Box 1.1. The nuclear weapon haves and have-nots

The nuclear weapon states

The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Prolieration o Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Prolieration

Treaty, NPT) defines the nuclear weapon states to be those states that had manuactured and

exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967. By thisdefinition, only China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA are nuclear weapon states pursuant

to the treaty.

The nuclear weapon-possessing states

In addition to the five legally defined nuclear weapon states, our other states are now de acto

nuclear weapon states: India, Israel and Pakistan, which have never been parties to the NPT, are

known or, in the case o Israel, widely believed to possess nuclear weapons; and the Democratic

Peoples Republic o Korea (DPRK, or North Korea), which was an NPT party prior to its with-

drawal in 2003, has demonstrated a military nuclear capability. Collectively, these nine states are

reerred to here as the nuclear weapon-possessing states.

The non-nuclear weapon states

The NPT defines the non-nuclear weapon states to be all states (whether party to the NPT ornot) other than the five nuclear weapon states. The NPT definition thus includes the our de

acto nuclear weapon states. As used here, the term applies only to states that do not possess

nuclear weapons.


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2. FMCT verification choices

There remain significant diferences between CD member states over several

undamental issues let unresolved in the 1995 mandate that will have a directbearing on the design o an FMCT verification system. These have to do with

(a) the definition o the fissile material to be subject to verification; (b) the treat-

ment o stocks o fissile material produced prior to the treatys entry into orce;

and (c) the scope o the treaty (i.e. whether verification activities should cover

each state partys entire nuclear uel cycle or should instead ocus on a limited

core o acilities and activities).6 Negotiations on these issues will be shaped by

decisions about the desired level o assurance to be provided by the verification

system and the associated costs to be borne by the states parties. The outcomes

will determine the technical requirements and perormance criteria o the FMCTverification system and the degree to which it converges with current IAEA

saeguards.

Definition o fissile material

Material that can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction is essential or all

types o nuclear explosive device. The most common o these fissile materials are

highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium o almost any isotopic com-

position.

However, the 1995 mandate did not define the term fissile material, nor is the

term used in implementing IAEA saeguards. A number o options have been put

orward or defining fissile material or the purpose o uture FMCT negoti-

ations.7 There is general agreement that an FMCT should ocus on direct-use

nuclear materials, as defined or IAEA saeguards purposes: these are materials

that can be used or the manuacture o nuclear explosive devices without ur-

ther enrichment or transmutation.8 Many FMCT studies have proposed that

direct-use nuclear materials be made subject to verification only in unirradiated

orm in order to avoid several dicult challenges related to reactors and existing

stocks that would require significant inspection resources to address.9

6 For an overview o these issues see Schaper, A., Principles o the Verification or a Future Fissile Material

Cut-of Treaty, Frankurt Peace Research Institute (PRIF) Report no. 58/2001 (PRIF: Frankurt am Main,2001).

7 See FMCT definitions: fissile material and production , Options raised by participants at theAustraliaJapan Experts Side Event on FMCT Definitions, Conerence on Disarmament, Geneva, 1416 Feb.

2011, .8 IAEA, IAEA Saeguards Glossary: 2001 Edition, International Nuclear Verification Series no. 3 (IAEA:

Vienna, June 2002), p. 33. Such material includes plutonium whose isotopic composition includes 80% orless plutonium-238; uranium containing a 20% or greater enrichment in the isotope uranium-235; and

uranium-233.9 For saeguards purposes, the IAEA defines unirradiated direct-use material as direct use material

which does not contain substantial amounts o fission products and which would require less time andefort to be converted to components o nuclear explosive devices than irradiated direct use material (e.g.

plutonium in spent uel) that contains substantial amounts o fission products. IAEA (note 8), p. 33.


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FMCT VERIFICATION CHOICES 5

Other nuclear materials could be made subject to verification under an FMCT.

There have been proposals to include other elements in the actinide series, in

particular americium and neptunium.10 In principle, these IAEA-defined alter-

native nuclear materials can be used in nuclear weapons. In practice, however,

this would pose new handling and abrication problems.11

Coverage o pre-existing stocks

The question o how to deal with stocks o fissile material produced beore an

FMCT enters into orce was let unresolved by the 1995 mandate. Many non-

nuclear weapon states have contended that the treaty should go beyond banning

uture fissile material production and cover existing stocks held or weapon pur-

poses. They argue that the existing stockpiles in some nuclear weapon states are

so large that a ban on uture production would have little practical efect on thenumber o nuclear weapons that could be produced.12 In contrast, the nuclear

weapon states have all either stated or indicated that existing stocks should not

be included in the treaty, arguing that the main purpose o the production ban is

to cap global inventories o fissile material. In light o their strong opposition to

including existing stocks, this Policy Paper proceeds rom the assumption that

any FMCT will primarily applyat least initiallyto the uture production o fis-

sile material and will leave stocks o previously produced weapon material

unconstrained.

A consensus has yet to emerge on the question o whether an FMCT should

require states parties to declare and place under international monitoring other

categories o pre-existing stock that are not currently dedicated to nuclear

weapons. Some studies have proposed that civilian fissile material (primarily in

the orm o separated reactor-grade plutonium), HEU and plutonium declared

excess to military needs, and fissile material designated or non-proscribed mili-

tary purposes (e.g. HEU reserved or naval propulsion reactors) should be subject

to verification.13 The purpose would be to provide assurance that these stocks

were not diverted or weapon use. It remains an open question whether states

will accept arrangements, which would be o varying degrees o intrusiveness, or

veriying declarations o these stocks under an FMCT. Veriying the non-diversion o HEU reserved or naval reactors would pose special challenges,

owing to the concerns o states possessing such reactors about inadvertently

revealing classified inormation about, or example, uel design.

10 The actinide series includes the 15 metallic elements with atomic numbers rom 89 to 103: actinium,thorium, protactinium, uranium, neptunium, plutonium, americium, curium, berkelium, caliornium, ein-

steinium, ermium, mendelevium, nobelium and lawrencium.11 Kelley, R. E. and Clayton, E. D., Fissible: a proposed new term in nuclear engineering, Nuclear Science

and Engineering, vol. 91, no. 41 (Dec. 1985).12 Rissanen, J., Time or a fissbanor arewell?, Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 83 (winter 2006). In add-

ition, Pakistan has argued or including pre-existing stocks under an FMCT owing to its concern that atreaty banning only uture production would permanently reeze its perceived ineriority in holdings o

weapon-usable fissile material vis--vis India.13 International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and Verifi-

cation o a Fissile Material (Cut-of ) Treaty (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, Sep. 2008), pp. 7685.


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Figure 2.1. Application to the nuclear uel cycle o IAEA saeguards and proposed

FMCT verification arrangements

Note: The dotted lines show the various aspects o the nuclear uel cycle subject to comprehensive

approaches (mirroring IAEA comprehensive saeguards agreements (CSAs) and additional protocols)

and ocused approaches (both a narrow- and a wider-scope version) to verification o a fissile mater-

ial cut-of treaty (FMCT). The arrows represent the passage o fissile material through the nuclear

uel cycle, rom mining to waste storage.

Mining and milling

Conversion

Enrichment

Fuel fabrication

ReactorsSpent fuel storage

facilities

Reprocessing

Equipment

manufacturers

Research and

development centres

Waste storage

Storage offssilematerial in civilian use

Storage of ex-weapon

material declared

excess for military use

Highly enriched

uranium reserved

for naval reactors

Verifcation of absence

of undeclared fssile

material production

CSA

Additional protocol

Narrow-scope FMCT

Wider-scope FMCT


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FMCT VERIFICATION CHOICES 7

The scope o FMCT verification

A third issue to be resolved in uture negotiations has to do with the scope o an

FMCT verification system. One option is a so-called comprehensive approach

that would apply to the entire nuclear uel cycle o a state party (see figure 2.1).The purpose would be to provide the same level o assurance about the non-

production o fissile material or weapon purposes in the nuclear weapon-

possessing states as is currently provided by the IAEA in implementing com-

prehensive saeguards agreements (CSAs, see appendix A) in the non-nuclear

weapon states. In efect, this would involve extending the comprehensive sae-

guards system to the nuclear weapon-possessing states. Proponents o this

approach point out that, in addition to providing a high degree o assurance, it

would ofer an important normative advantage in creating a uniorm and non-

discriminatory standard o verification in both the nuclear weapon possessorsand the non-possessors.14

Critics o the comprehensive approach say that it has two main drawbacks.

First, assuming that the FMCT would not cover pre-existing stocks o material,

ully comprehensive saeguards would be ruled out by the act that the nuclear

weapon states would have stocks o military fissile material produced prior to the

treatys entry into orce that would not be subject to verification arrangements.

Second, applying comprehensive saeguards in the nuclear weapon states, which

are not required to have in place state systems o accounting and control (SSAC)

comparable to those in non-nuclear weapon states, would be expensive.15 Inspec-

tion resources would have to be increased severalold over current IAEA levels

and would deliver only marginal benefits or the cost since these states are

already known to possess nuclear weapons.16

In contrast, a non-comprehensive or ocused approach would concentrate on

the most prolieration-sensitive production acilities and the treaty-relevant fis-

sile material produced by these acilities, with particular attention given to meas-

ures to detect undeclared fissile material production acilities or the clandestine

production o fissile material or weapon purposes in declared acilities (see

figure 2.1). In its most limited orm, a state party would be required to declare

and make subject to verification all uranium-enrichment and spent uel-reprocessing plants on its territory, regardless o their operational status or

capacity. Under this narrow-scope approach, measures would be applied only to

veriy the inputs and outputs o declared reprocessing acilities and to veriy the

absence o HEU production or weapon purposes in declared uranium-enrich-

ment plants. Under a wider-scope approach, verification measures based on

nuclear material accountancy could be applied at downstream acilities, such as

14 Schaper (note 6), pp. 3031.15 Comprehensive saeguards agreements (INFCIRC/ 153) require non-nuclear weapon states parties to

establish and maintain individual national systems o accountancy or and control o nuclear materialaccording to guidelines specified by the IAEA. See appendix A.

16 Persbo, A., A verified ban on fissile material production, Conerence on Fissile Material, Panel Per-spectives, United Nations Institute or Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva, 21 Aug. 2009, .


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storage sites and uel-abrication plants, that handle newly produced HEU or

newly separated plutonium, to provide assurance about the non-diversion o the

material.17

One o the main attractions o the narrow-scope approach is that it would

greatly simpliy the tasks to be carried out by the body responsible or veriyingan FMCT while at the same time reducing the associated operational and

administrative costs. It is assumed here that negotiators will choose this

approach to the FMCT, while leaving open the possibility that the treatys scope

could be broadened later.

17 See Zhang, H., FMCT verification: case studies, IAEA et al. (note 4), Paper IAEA-SM-367/9/04.


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3. FMCT verification tasks and tools

As a practical matter, the main ocus o activity or any FMCT verification regime

will be on the nuclear weapon-possessing states, since the non-nuclear weaponstates parties to the NPT have already committed themselves not to produce

fissile material or nuclear weapons and are already subject to CSAs. While the

five nuclear weapon states produced fissile material or nuclear weapon in the

past, in the 1990s our o them publicly declared that they had ceased doing so;

the fith, China, has indicated inormally that it has also done so.18 In contrast,

the our de acto nuclear weapon states are known or widely believed to continue

to produce fissile material or weapon purposes (see e.g. tables 3.1 and 3.2 below).

Assuming that pre-existing stocks o fissile material are not covered by an

FMCT, the verification mission would consist primarily o providing assurancethat no uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or nuclear weapon pur-

poses takes place in the nuclear weapon-possessing states ater the treatys entry

into orce or those states. This would require an inspection regime that ocuses

on three categories o acility: (a) closed-down or decommissioned plants;

(b) acilities producing fissile material or non-proscribed purposes (e.g. or use

in naval propulsion reactors); and (c) possible covert and undeclared acilities.

The IAEA has developed a range o technical and analytical tools or imple-

menting monitoring and verification measures at all three categories o acility.

However, an FMCT verification regime would involve a greater ocus on acility-

specific issues than under the traditional saeguards approach to nuclear material

accountancy. In addition, it would have to address the unique inspection chal-

lenges posed by acilities that were ormerly used to produce nuclear weapon

material. These include special considerations arising rom the imperative o

protecting classified and prolieration-sensitive inormation.

Closed-down and decommissioned plants

The IAEA defines a closed-down acility as an installation or location where

operations have been stopped and the nuclear material removed but which hasnot been decommissioned. A decommissioned acility is an installation or

location at which residual structures and equipment essential or its use have

been removed or rendered inoperable so that it is not used to store and can no

longer be used to handle, process or utilize nuclear material.19 A acility is con-

sidered to be shut down i its operation is simply halted, nuclear material is still

in place and it could be restarted.

The verification o a acilitys closed-down status is straightorward. This is

mainly a matter o veriying that nuclear material has been removed rom the

18Arms Control Association, Fissile material cut-of treaty (FMCT) at a glance, Fact sheet, Apr. 2012,

.19 IAEA, Model protocol additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic

Energy Agency or the application o saeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), Sep. 1997, Article 18(c), (d).


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acility, which involves both accounting or nuclear material and design inor-

mation verification (DIV).20 Veriying the decommissioned status o a acility is

more complicated since a list o the essential equipment to be removed rom each

acility type must be drawn up and checked beore it can be considered decom-

missioned.21The IAEA has considerable experience with saeguarding closed-down and

decommissioned acilities. The agency would normally use a combination o

remote surveillance technologies (satellite or aerial monitoring) and on-site

containment and surveillance measures, including radiation monitoring, video

surveillance and photographic records. Instruments could be added, such as

temperature sensors on plant piping, that would provide high assurance that the

reactors are permanently closed. Ater initial on-site inspections to confirm that

essential equipment had been dismantled and removed, inspection visits to

decommissioned acilities would be required only inrequently.22

Facilities producing fissile material or non-proscribed purposes

A more dicult task under the FMCT will be to veriy that a acility that pre-

viously produced fissile material or nuclear weapons now produces the material

only or non-proscribed purposes. A related task will be to veriy that a plant

capable o producing fissile material or weapons is not covertly used to do so.

Verification o uranium-enrichment plants

In the case o uranium enrichment, verification would mainly involve measures

being applied at gas centriuge enrichment acilities (see table 3.1). The IAEAs

experience with saeguarding such plants is based on three major projects: the

Hexapartite Saeguards Project (HSP), the Tripartite Enrichment Project (TEP)

and the IAEAs Model saeguards approach to centriuge enrichment plants. In

the early 1980s the HSP developed a model saeguards approach or centriuge

enrichment plants based on providing or a limited number o unannounced

inspections (limited-requency unannounced access, LFUA) in a plants cascade

hall.23 In the 1990s the IAEAChineseRussian TEP developed concepts, pro-

cedures and techniques to acilitate the implementation o IAEA saeguards atRussian-built enrichment plants because their design and operation made the

IAEAs standard saeguards approaches dicult to implement.24 The Model

20 Boyer, B., Carroll, C. and Fagerholm, R., Evaluating the decommissioned status o a LWR and RRCA

acility to determine level o efort needed to saeguard acility, IAEA, Institute o Nuclear MaterialsManagement (INMM) and European Saeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA),

Addressing Verification Challenges: Contributed Papers, Proceedings o an International Saeguards Sym-posium, 1620 Oct. 2006 (IAEA: Vienna, 2007), Paper IAEA-CN-148/40, p. 161.

21 IAEA (note 8), p. 27.22 International Panel on Fissile Materials (note 13), pp. 96101.23

Naito, K., Hexapartite saeguards project: a retrospective, IAEA et al. (note 20), Paper IAEA-CN-148/97. The HSP consisted o Australia, Japan, the USA, Euratom, the IAEA and Urenco (owned by Ger-

many, the Netherlands and the UK).24 Panasyuk, A. et al., Tripartite enrichment project: saeguards at enrichment plants equipped with

Russian centriuges, IAEA et al. (note 4), Paper IAEA-SM-367/8/02.


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FMCT VERIFICATION TASKS AND TOOLS 11

saeguards approach to centriuge enrichment plants, which was approved by

the IAEA in 2006, applied the saeguards procedures and techniques developed

under the HSP and TEP to newer and larger enrichment acilities.25

An FMCT verification regime will have to provide credible assurance that an

enrichment acility does not produce HEU or use in weapons ater the treatysentry into orce. This will require veriying the absence o production at the

acility o uranium enriched higher than the declared maximum.26 One approach

to doing so, based on IAEA saeguards, would involve inspectors obtaining LFUA

to a centriuge plants cascade hall. Once inside, they would then be able to con-

duct a number o activities, in particular DIV, environmental sampling (so-called

swipe sampling) and flow enrichment monitoring.

This approach would be satisactory i ully applied to all centriuge enrich-

ment plants. However, it poses potential challenges or an FMCT verification

system or three reasons. First, the concept o LFUA, while undamental to sae-guards verification, might be problematic where the acilities to be inspected are

in remote, dicult-to-reach locations; this is the case, or example, with the

Shaanxi Uranium Enrichment Plant in China and with enrichment plants in

Russia. In the latter case, the 1993 RussianUS HEU Purchase Agreement

resolved the problem, at additional expense, by assigning monitoring personnel

to be permanently placed at the acility site, just outside the enrichment plant.27

Second, DIV inspections might be problematic to conduct in older acilities,

where the key pieces o equipment might not be readily accessible. Finally,

environmental sampling, while crucial or verification, can be seen by some states

as too intrusive, especially at acilities ormerly involved in military production

or co-located with areas that are of-limits under an FMCT. For example, it could

pick up either old particles or particles o material rom the remaining weapon

stockpile that could reveal classified nuclear weapon design inormation. These

problems are unlikely to be ully resolved without a revision o inormation

classification policies in the nuclear weapon-possessing states.

An FMCT verification system will also have to provide assurance that HEU

produced at an enrichment plant or a non-proscribed purpose (e.g. naval and

tritium-production reactor uel) is completely accounted or and not diverted or

use in weapons. This could present some operational diculties since nuclearweapon-possessing states would be likely to object to saeguards verification

procedures that have been developed or HEU-uelled research reactors on the

grounds that classified inormation might be revealed. Assuming these concerns

25 Bush, W. et al., Model saeguards approach or gas centriuge enrichment plants, IAEA et al. (note 20),

Paper IAEA-CN-148/98.26 Fuel or light water reactors typically consists o uranium that is enriched to 35% in the isotope

uranium-235; HEU or weapons usually consist o more than 90% uranium-235.27 RussianUS Agreement Concerning the Disposition o Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted rom

Nuclear Weapons, signed and entered into orce 18 Feb. 1993, . See also Bieniawski, A. J. and Balamutov, V. G., HEU Purchase Agreement,Journal o Nuclear

Materials Management, vol. 25, no. 2 (Feb. 1997). Under the terms o the agreement, the USA agreed to buy,over a 20-year period, 500 tonnes o HEU rom dismantled Soviet weapons that Russia would blend down

to low-enriched uranium or use as uel in civilian nuclear reactors.


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were adequately addressed, some studies have concluded that appropriate verifi-

cation arrangements could be devised by measuring the quantity o HEU prod-

uced or withdrawn rom stocks to make HEU uel and then confirming that it isactually put into a reactor.28

28 See International Panel on Fissile Materials (note 13), pp. 7982.

Table 3.1. Significant uranium-enrichment acilities in the nuclear weapon-

possessing states, as o December 2011

Facility name Capacity

or location Type Status Processa

(thousands SWU/year)a

China

Lanzhou (new) Civilian Operational GC 500

Lanzhou 2 Civilian Operational GC 500

Shaanxi Civilian Operational GC 1000

France

Eurodi (Georges Besse) Civilian Operational GD 10800

Georges Besse IIb Civilian Operational GC 750011000

Indiac

Rattehalli Military Operational GC 1530

North KoreaYongbyond . . . . GC (8)

Pakistan

Kahuta Military Operational GC 1545

Gadwal Military Operational GC . .

Russia

Angarsk Civilian Operational GC 22005000

Novouralsk Civilian Operational GC 13300

Seversk Civilian Operational GC 3800

Zelenogorsk Civilian Operational GC 7900

United KingdomCapenhurst Civilian Operational GC 5000

United States

Paducah Civilian To be shut down GD 11300

Piketon, Ohio Civilian Being constructed GC 3800

Urenco Eunice Civilian Operational GC 5900

Areva Eagle Rock Civilian Plannede GC 33006000

( ) = uncertain figure; . . = not available; GC = gas centriuge; GD = gaseous difusion.

a A separative work unit (SWU) is a measure o the efort required in an enrichment acility to

separate uranium o a given content o uranium-235 into 2 components, 1 with a higher and 1 with a

lower percentage o uranium-235.b This acility is to reach ull capacity in 2016c India is believed to be producing highly enriched uranium (enriched to 3045%) or use as naval

reactor uel.dOther undeclared enrichment plants may exist.e Construction is to begin in 2013.

Source: Glaser, A. and Mian, Z., Global stocks and production o fissile material,SIPRI Yearbook 2012:

rmaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxord University Press: Oxord, 2012).


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Verification o plutonium-reprocessing plants

Currently there are over a dozen major reprocessing plants on the territories o

nuclear weapon-possessing states (see table 3.2). Even ater an FMCT enters into

orce, there will still be plants reprocessing plutonium or civilian purposes inthese and other states, as well as some acilities perorming military tasks not

prohibited by the FMCT. Additionally, some new reprocessing plants might be

built.

An FMCT verification regime will have to address two types o diversion

scenario: plutonium separation through undeclared activities and low-rate

diversion o plutonium rom a declared separation process. The IAEA has con-

siderable experience with applying saeguards to modern reprocessing plants

that would be relevant or an FMCT, based on the complex efort under way at

the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan.29

Older reprocessing plants, however, would present more dicult verification

problems, or two reasons. First, the large spent uel reprocessing acilities in the

nuclear weapon-possessing states were designed, built and operated without

IAEA saeguards requirements in mind. This would be likely to represent a major

challenge or an FMCT verification regime, since it could be extremely costly and

time consuming to conduct the initial DIV at these plants and to retrofit them

with the measurement and monitoring systems necessary or efective verifi-

cation.30 Second, a spent uel reprocessing acility always contains a significant

amount o hold-up materialthat is, residual nuclear material deposited during

earlier reprocessing.31 In theory, such material could be diverted or proscribed

purposes, especially i direct measurementor example, by the application o

near-real-time accountancy (NRTA)was not possible or technical reasons.32

This would probably be the case at most older reprocessing plants.

Verification o plutonium-production reactors

Since all o the dedicated military plutonium-production reactors in the nuclear

weapon states have already been either closed down or decommissioned, their

status can be readily verified. Veriying the status o plutonium-production

reactors in the de acto nuclear weapon states could be done in a satisactory wayi the inspected state were to allow the necessary procedures and technical tools

to be used. The state would have to declare the reactors and provide adequate

design inormation, at least at the level o detail that the IAEA requires or sae-

29 Johnson, S. J. and Ehinger, M., Designing and Operating or Saeguards: Lessons Learned From the

Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) (US Department o Energy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory:

Richland, WA, Aug. 2010).30 Johnson, S., The Saeguards at Reprocessing Plants under the Fissile Material (Cut-of ) Treaty, Inter-

national Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) Research Report no. 6 (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, Feb. 2009), pp. 23.31 Hold-up consists o nuclear material deposits remaining ater shutdown o a plant in and about

process equipment, interconnecting piping, filters and adjacent work areas. IAEA (note 8), p. 35.32 IAEA, Department o Saeguards, Division o Concepts and Planning, Reprocessing plants, chapter

SMC7, Saeguards Manual: Saeguards Criteria, 1 Oct. 2003, p. 12; and IAEA (note 8), p. 46. NRTA is a orm oa nuclear material accountancy or bulk handling acilities, such as reprocessing plants, in which the

inventory change data is maintained by the acility operator almost in real time.


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guards. Remote monitoring tools, in particular satellite imagery, could useully

supplement on-site inspections.

Covert and undeclared acilities

The most challenging task or an FMCT verification system will be to detect

covert or undeclared fissile material production acilities on the territory o a

state. For the IAEA, this will be unctionally equivalent to veriying the complete-

Table 3.2. Significant plutonium-reprocessing acilities in the nuclear weapon-

possessing states, as o December 2011

Facility name Fuel Design capacity

or location Type Status processed (tHM/year)a

China

Pilot Plant, Gansu province Civilian Operational LWR 50100

France

La Hague UP2 Civilian Operational LWR 1000

La Hague UP3 Civilian Operational LWR 1000

India

Trombay Military Operational HWR 50

Tarapur-1 Dual-use Operational HWR 100

Tarapur-2 Dual-use Operational HWR 100

Kalpakkam Dual-use Operational HWR 100Israel

Dimona Military Operational HWR 40100

North Korea

Yongbyon Military On standby LWR 100150

Pakistan

Nilore Military Operational HWR 2040

Chashma Military Being constructed HWR? 50100

Russia

Mayak RT-1, Ozersk Civilian Operational LWR 200400

Seversk Military To be shut down LWR6

000

Zheleznogorsk Military To be shut down LWR 3500

United Kingdom

BNFL B205 Magnox Civilian To be shut down LWR 1500

BNFL Thorp, Sellafield Civilian Operational LWR 1200

United States

H-canyon, Savannah River Site Civilian Operational LWR 15

HWR = heavy water reactor; LWR = light water reactor.

a Design capacity reers to the highest amount o spent uel the plant is designed to process and is

measured in tonnes o heavy metal (tHM) per year, tHM being a measure o the amount o heavy

metaluranium in these casesthat is in the spent uel. Actual throughput is oten a small raction othe design capacity.

Source: Glaser, A. and Mian, Z., Global stocks and production o fissile material,SIPRI Yearbook 2012:

rmaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxord University Press: Oxord, 2012).


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ness o a non-nuclear weapon states declaration under comprehensive sae-

guards.

The Model Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA enhanced investigatory

authority, provides a useul precedent or a uture FMCT inspectorate (see

appendix A). Under additional protocols based on the model, the IAEA has theright to request complementary access to sites in order to resolve incon-

sistencies in inormation provided in state declarations.33 While the specific pro-

visions or such access under an FMCT will depend on decisions about the

treatys verification requirements or the detection o undeclared production

acilities, the IAEA has already developed several applicable measures and tech-

niques or this task within the ramework o the Model Additional Protocols

strengthened saeguards.

Environmental sampling

The technique o environmental sampling is most efective or veriying activities

at, or near, declared or otherwise known nuclear acilities.34 Samples taken at, or

adjacent to, a site could reveal undeclared acilities or activities by detecting

characteristic signatures in their euents, or example, fission products such as

krypton-85 and noble gases rom reprocessing and HEU rom enrichment

activities. Following analysis by scientists at the IAEAs Environmental Sample

Laboratory, the results can help to provide assurance about the absence o

undeclared nuclear material and acilities on the territory o a state.

However, environmental sampling is not useul or the long-range, of-site

detection o most nuclear uel cycle acilities, with the possible exception o

plutonium-production reactors and reprocessing acilities. Moreover, the use o

of-site environmental sampling or FMCT verification purposes would entail a

steep learning curve or the IAEA. The agency has made little investment in

krypton-85 detection technologies and has largely deerred the development o

techniques to measure noble gases to the CTBTO.35 The IAEA would thereore

have to build a krypton-sampling network similar to the one put into place by the

CTBTO or make a cooperative arrangement to share the CTBTOs capabilities.

Such practical cooperation would be a positive development in many respects,

but experience has shown that it can be dicult to achieve because o diferencesin the mandates given to international treaty organizations.

Attempts to expand the application o environmental sampling to the entire

territory o a state are being made through the work currently under way on

wide-area environmental sampling (WAES) techniques. While WAES holds con-

siderable promise in detecting radionuclides emitted by reprocessing or enrich-

ment operations, the technology is not suciently mature to be able to reliably

33

IAEA, INFCIRC/540 (note 19), articles 410.34 For an overview o environmental sampling techniques see Piksaikin, V. M., Pshakin, G. M. and

Roshchenko, V. A., Review o methods and instruments or determining undeclared nuclear materials andactivities,Science and Global Security, vol. 14, no. 1 (Jan.Apr. 2006).

35 The CTBT noble gas verification component, CTBTO Spectrum, no. 8 (2006), pp. 2223, 25.


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detect, or example, aerosol emissions rom covert uranium-enrichment

acilities.36

Analysis o open source inormation

Analysis o open source inormation (OSI) can be helpul in veriying the absenceo undeclared acilities and activities.37 The IAEA defines OSI as inormation

generally available to the public rom external sources, such as scientific

literature; ocial inormation; inormation issued by public organizations, com-

mercial companies and the news media; and commercial satellite images.38 The

analysis o OSI can provide insight into a states nuclear uel cycle, including

evidence o sensitive uel cycle activities. It can also provide inormation about

the location o sites and acilities o interest, which can trigger inspections or the

targeted acquisition o satellite imagery.

The current IAEA efort in this area is small when compared to the totalresources devoted to saeguards inspections. An FMCT verification system

accordingly would need to develop a more robust OSI analysis programme that

would be designed to look or leads and indicators o undeclared acilities.

Commercial satellite imagery analysis

Satellite imagery has proved valuable to the IAEA as a support tool or preparing

inspections and or monitoring the status o saeguarded acilities, including or

detecting undeclared activities at declared sites. It also has been useul in

confirming or adding credibility to inormation about the location o possible

undeclared sites, and in monitoring locations that may be inaccessible or

unobservable through the traditional inspections process. However, it has limited

utility in providing initial identification o so-called areas o interest because o

the immense volume o imagery that must be acquired and analysed.39 Since its

creation in 2001, the IAEAs Satellite Imagery Analysis Unit (SIAU) has become

an integral part o the saeguards inspectorates planning and operations.

Commercial satellite imagery analysis is a powerul but expensive tool. The

SIAUs activities are constrained not only by the high cost o purchasing large

volumes o satellite imagery but also by the costs o maintaining specialized

personnel and extensive data libraries.40 In order to make efective use o theSIAU, an arrangement could be agreed whereby an FMCT verification body

could contribute, along with the IAEAs Department o Saeguards and other

36 Kalinowski, M. B. et al., Environmental sample analysis, eds R. Avenhaus et al., Veriying Treaty Com-

pliance: Limiting Weapons o Mass Destruction and Monitoring Kyoto Protocol Provisions (Springer: Berlin,2006); and Dillon, G., Wide area environmental sampling in Iran, ed. H. Sokolski, Falling Behind: Inter-

national Scrutiny o the Peaceul Atom (US Army War College: Carlisle, PA, Feb. 2008).37 Wallace, R. and Lundy, A., Using open sources or prolieration analysis, ed. J. E. Doyle, Nuclear

Saeguards, Security, and Nonprolieration: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy (Butterworth-Heinemann: Burlington, MA, 2008).

38

IAEA (note 8), p. 97.39 Pabian, F., Commercial satellite imagery: another tool in the nonprolieration verification and monitor-

ing toolkit, ed. Doyle (note 37).40 Chitumbo, K. et al., Satellite imagery and the Department o Saeguards, IAEA et al. (note 4), Paper

IAEA-SM-367/16/08.


25/52


departments, to covering the costs o satellite imagery analysis or the purposes

o their respective missions. The joint efort could be reinorced by member state

contributions aimed at strengthening the SIAUs analytical methods and

diversiying its sources o imagery.

National technical means o intelligence

An FMCT verification system could be useully supplemented by encouraging

states to provide relevant leads and inormation about suspected undeclared fis-

sile material production acilities. The national technical means (NTMs) o

intelligence on which this would be based include a variety o monitoring tech-

nologies (telemetry, space-based imagery, radar and electro-optical sensors, etc.)

and involve numerous technical intelligence disciplines.

In recent years several cases have highlighted the limits o the IAEAs cap-

abilities to detect covert or undeclared acilities as well as the agencys depend-ence on inormation provided by states with extensive intelligence resources in

detecting such acilities.41 Against this background, FMCT negotiators must

incorporate a well-defined mechanism to allow the verification organization to

receive intelligence inormation rom states related to treaty compliance while at

the same time protecting privileged sources.

FMCT verification adequacy

FMCT negotiators will have to decide what should be the appropriate balance

between the degree o assurance provided by a proposed verification model and

the costs associated with it. This raises the question o whetheror how closely

the technical requirements or an FMCT verification system should correspond

to those set or the existing saeguards system.

The technical requirements or comprehensive saeguards are specified in

terms o the ollowing our quantified detection goals.

1.Significant quantity. This is the approximate amount o nuclear material or

which the possibility o manuacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be

excluded.2.Detection time. This is the maximum time that may elapse between a

diversion o a given amount o nuclear material and the detection o that

diversion by saeguards activities.

3.Detection probability. This is the probability, i diversion o a given amount o

nuclear material has occurred, that saeguards activities will lead to detection.

4.False alarm probability. This is the probability that nuclear material account-

ancy data would indicate that an amount o nuclear material is missing when, in

act, no diversion has occurred.42

41 See e.g. Kelley, R., Critical mass: is Syria pursuing nuclear capability?, Janes Intelligence Review,vol. 22, no. 11 (Nov. 2010).

42 IAEA (note 8), pp. 2224.


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The detection goals were tailored to fit the main purpose o comprehensive

saeguards: to detect with a high degree o certainty and in a timely manner the

diversion o the minimum amount o fissile material considered necessary or the

production o one nuclear weapon.43

For an FMCT verification system, the standard saeguards detection goalsarguably should be adjusted in states that already possess nuclear weapons.44 For

example, the minimum amount o fissile material to be verified under an FMCT

could be based on a fixed proportion o the amounts o fissile material submitted

or verification rather than the minimum amount considered necessary to build a

nuclear weapon. Some experts have suggested that this proportion could be 1 per

cent o the fissile material inventory submitted or monitoring and verification

under an FMCT.45 This figure was inormally adopted as a quantity detection

goal in the IAEARussiaUSA Trilateral Initiative. The initiative was launched in

1996 to develop a system under which Russia and the USA could submit fissilematerial o weapon origin but deemed to be excess to their military needs to

permanent IAEA verification and monitoring without revealing classified

warhead design inormation.46

An obvious attraction o proposals to relax saeguards detection goals under an

FMCT is that doing so would reduce verification costs in the nuclear weapon-

possessing states. However, a decision to adopt revised verification criteria would

have to take into account other considerations as well. I the IAEA Department o

Saeguards were given the main responsibility or veriying an FMCT, or

example, it would be likely to ace a number o practical diculties in imple-

menting, with the same inspectorate, verification criteria with requirements that

difered rom those or the current saeguards system.47

43 For a critique o the IAEAs technical ability to detect material diversions rom enrichment and

reprocessing plants in a timely manner see Sokolski, H. D., Assessing the IAEAs ability to veriy the NPT,ed. Sokolski (note 36), pp. 67.

44 Carlson, J., New verification challenges, Journal o Nuclear Materials Management, vol. 37, no. 4(summer 2009), p. 99.

45 Shea, T. E., The Trilateral Initiative: a model or the uture?, Arms Control Today, vol. 38, no. 4 (May2008).

46 Shea (note 45). The Trilateral Initiative participants agreed inormally that a change detected in onepartys monitored inventory o fissile material greater than 1% would constitute a strategic change that

could portend the partys intention to break out o the verification arrangements.47 IAEA, A cut-of o production o weapon-usable fissionable material: considerations, requirements and

IAEA capabilities, Statement made by Tariq Rau, Head o Verification and Security Policy Coordination, tothe Conerence on Disarmament, Geneva, 24 Aug. 2006, , p. 27.


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4. The design of an FMCT inspection

system

One immediate question that will have to be decided when FMCT negotiations

finally get under way is what orm the new treaty should take. Generally speak-

ing, there will be two main options or negotiators. The first is to drat a single

treaty containing both the basic treaty objectives and the details o the verifi-

cation system. This was the approach taken with the 1993 Chemical Weapons

Convention (CWC).48 The result was widely seen as a treaty that was cumber-

some to negotiate and generally inflexible in terms o allowing updates to the

verification system.

The second approach is to codiy the main political commitments and under-takings in a principal treaty. The detailed verification provisions can be set out in

a protocol or secondary agreement. In the case o the NPT, this came in the orm

o CSAs and additional protocols agreed between states parties and the IAEA,

based on model agreements.49 A major advantage o this approach is that it separ-

ates largely political issues rom largely technical issues and allows or an adapt-

able verification system that is suciently flexible to be updated over time.

Based on the experiences o implementing IAEA saeguards agreements and

the CWC, the ollowing sections highlight inspection methods and requirements

that should be taken into account in the drating an FMCT verification protocol

in order to improve the ability o a verification body to do its job.

Inspection rights and privileges

The credibility o the IAEA saeguards system, as it has evolved over our

decades, ultimately depends on an efective system o on-site inspections. While

there have been important advances in the monitoring technologies and nuclear

orensic practices or veriying the compliance o non-nuclear weapon states

with their saeguards agreements, the help and goodwill o the states with

nuclear acilities and material to be inspected remains an indispensable pre-condition or the agency to be able to carry out its work.

In practice, the willingness o many states to accept saeguards inspections has

been tempered by the restrictions that they place on IAEA inspectors. These

restrictions are oten set out in the provisions o the state-specific subsidiary

arrangements required under CSAs and other saeguards agreements (see

appendix A). They impose numerous constraints on IAEA inspection activities,

48 Chemical Weapons Convention (note 3).49

The model agreements are IAEA, The structure and content o agreements between the Agency andstates required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Prolieration o Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153

(Corrected), June 1972; and IAEA, INFCIRC/540 (note 19). While the NPT was concluded in 1968 andentered into orce in 1970, INFCIRC/153 was concluded in 1972 and the Model Additional Protocol

(INFCIRC/540) was adopted in 1997.


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such as procedures or designating inspectors, requirements or advance notifi-

cation o inspections, the right o states to have inspectors accompanied by

national ocials, restrictions on routine access, limits on the requency and

number o inspections, and explicit itemization o what inspectors may and may

not do at a particular declared acility.In the nuclear weapon-possessing states, the requirements or saeguards

transparency and disclosure must be balanced by the imperative o protecting

national security secrets and prolieration-sensitive inormation. These states

have regularly invoked this imperative as the rationale or placing detailed

restrictions on saeguards inspection arrangements on their territories. In some

cases, however, these restrictions could seriously impede the work o an FMCT

verification body in determining that a nuclear weapon-possessing state is in

compliance with its treaty obligations, particularly in providing credible assur-

ance about the absence o undeclared plutonium-reprocessing and uranium-enrichment activities on its territory.

Designation o inspection equipment and instrumentation

States routinely restrict inspection equipment and the manner in which it can be

used by saeguards inspectors. In some cases these restrictions serve to compli-

cate the inspectorates planning and logistics. For example, in the experience o

one o the present authors, one o the nuclear weapon-possessing states reuses

to allow any electronic media used by saeguards inspection teams to be taken

out o the country. As a result, inspectors must review on site some kinds o col-

lected data, such as images taken by video cameras. This adds to travel costs and

extends duty assignments by several days. It also decreases the ability o person-

nel at IAEA headquarters to visualize field conditions and limits oversight o

inspections or quality control purposes. Moreover, the IAEAs experience with

saeguards inspections has been that i one state manages to restrict or prohibit a

specific item o equipment, then others will invariably demand equal treatment.

These deficiencies could be addressed during the drating o an FMCT

verification protocol by explicitly providing or the use by inspectors o key

categories and items o equipment. The provisions should define inspection

equipment in general terms, so that the adoption o new technologies by inspec-tors would not require the renegotiation o basic agreements. For example,

language allowing the use o generic digital image recording systems with on-

board storage would be preerable to that speciying a particular model or design

o camera. This would avoid the problems experienced by the OPCW, which has

been unduly restricted in its equipment lists because they were specified in too

much detail in the original treaty language. In addition, an FMCT verification

protocol should provide or the periodic convening o an expert-level technical

working group to update the lists o approved inspection equipment.

Designation o inspectors

The designation o inspectors can be a problem in arms control treaty verification

arrangements. States have a legitimate interest in barring entry to individuals


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THE DESIGN OF AN FMCT INSPECTION SYSTEM 21

they believe may be involved in espionage to gather military and commercial

inormation. Some states, however, abuse this right to keep the number o

designated saeguards inspectors so low as to impede the inspectorates logistics

and operational planning.

The de acto nuclear weapon states currently limit the designation o inspec-tors by the IAEA in several ways. For example, the detailed arrangements or the

implementation o the IAEAs item-specific saeguards agreements with India,

Israel and Pakistan contain unduly restrictive provisions that can be used to limit

inspector rosters to a size that efectively excludes inspectors rom many coun-

tries. In addition, these states exercise the right to reject designated inspectors

on short notice and without explanation. As a result, they can exclude the

agencys best inspectors. Another practical consequence o these restrictions is

the resulting pressure on the IAEA to reduce costs by only carrying out inspec-

tions when designated inspectors are available to visit two or more countries onone mission, which can limit the intensity o inspection activities. The cumu-

lative efect o these constraints has been to reduce the efectiveness o sae-

guards inspections.

A diferent approach to inspector designation was incorporated in the Chem-

ical Weapons Convention.50 The OPCW annually updates its list o approved

inspectors. A state party has no right to strike of names rom the list immediately

prior to a challenge inspection; this can only be done as part o the regular annual

updating. I there is no response by a state party within 30 days o receipt o the

list, this is understood as acceptance o the list by the state party.

A similar approach to designating inspectors was adopted in the Model Add-

itional Protocol, which establishes a useul precedent or a uture FMCT verifi-

cation body. Under additional protocols based on the model (see appendix A), all

saeguards inspectors approved by the IAEA Board o Governors are considered

to be designated to any state with an additional protocol in orce. 51 The accept-

ance o an individual inspector is assumed, unless a state inorms the IAEA Dir-

ector General otherwise within three months. As with comprehensive saeguards

agreements, i a state were to repeatedly reject competent inspectors, with the

intention o impeding meaningul inspections (as determined presumably by the

IAEA Secretariat), this would be grounds or the Director General to reer thematter to the Board or consideration and action.

In addition, the Model Additional Protocol requires states to issue multiple-

entry visas to saeguards inspectors.52 This requirement was introduced in order

to avoid the situation under the CSA system in which the visa application process

required by many states or each inspection introduced weeks o delay and gave

states early warning o an impending inspection.53 In practice, however, many

states still ignore this requirement.

50

Chemical Weapons Convention (note 3), Verification Annex, Part II.51 IAEA, INFCIRC/540 (note 19), Article 11.52 IAEA, INFCIRC/540 (note 19), Article 12.53 Joyner, D. H.,Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Prolieration Treaty (Oxord University Press: Oxord, 2011),

p. 63.


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Use o sampling and other verification techniques

Some states have prohibited or placed limits on the use o technical tools and

scientific techniques by IAEA inspectors that are essential or ulfilling sae-

guards verification tasks. In particular, the restrictions routinely placed on theuse o physical sampling and other technical tools, especially at enrichment and

reprocessing plants, need to be addressed during the negotiation o an FMCT

verification protocol. The protocol should explicitly provide or the right o

inspectors to use physical sampling techniques and, i necessary, to remove

samples rom a site or laboratory analysis. The inclusion o such provisions

would be important or enhancing the efectiveness o an FMCT verification

system as well as building international confidence about the parties compliance

with the treaty.

Similar provisions could be added or new types o technical tools andmethods, including those based on so-called novel technologies (e.g. laser-based

spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence systems). These are being

developed under the auspices o the IAEAs Novel Technologies Project or the

detection o undeclared nuclear material, activities and acilities.54 They would

be directly applicable to the FMCT verification mission, in addition to supporting

saeguards implementation.

Managed-access procedures

The current saeguards system aces a special challenge in the nuclear weapon-

possessing states. In many cases, activities that are declared and subject to

saeguards inspection are adjacent to, or co-located with, activities that are not

subject to saeguards (e.g. nuclear weapon assembly and disassembly, weapon

material recycling etc.); the latter are not declaredas distinct rom undeclared

and cannot be inspected.

The drating o FMCT-specific inspection provisions would thereore have to

include so-called managed-access procedures or carrying out inspections o

acilities declared by nuclear weapon-possessing states that require verification

but which may be co-located with non-declared acilities or non-declarednuclear material rom pre-existing stocks. This would involve ormulating a

detailed approach to inspections that would attempt to balance the inspectorates

need or access to acilities in order to veriy the absence o clandestine enrich-

ment and reprocessing activities with the legitimate concerns o states about

protecting national security secrets and prolieration-sensitive inormation.

FMCT negotiators could use as a model two unctionally similar sets o

managed-access inspection procedures rom existing international legal agree-

ments. The first is the elaborate procedures developed in connection with the

54 For a description o the IAEAs Novel Technologies Project see Khlebnikov, N., Parise, D. and

Whichello, J., Novel technologies or the detection o undeclared nuclear activities, ed. Sokolski (note 36).


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THE DESIGN OF AN FMCT INSPECTION SYSTEM 23

challenge inspection system o the Chemical Weapons Convention.55 Many o the

general procedures set out in the CWC would be directly relevant or an FMCT

verification body, although there would be obvious diferences with respect to

the specific instrumentation and technical tools used by inspectors. The second

set is contained in the Model Additional Protocol, which specifies both of-siteand on-site arrangements by which IAEA saeguards inspectors can carry out

enhanced investigations in non-nuclear weapon states. These are conditioned on

the requirement that such arrangements shall not preclude the Agency rom

conducting activities necessary to provide credible assurance o the absence o

undeclared nuclear material and activities at the location in question.56

Under an FMCT, in most managed-access situations the inspectorate could use

simple saeguards verification techniques. However, in some cases it would be

problematic or FMCT inspectors to use in ormer nuclear weapon production

acilities the tools and techniques employed by IAEA inspectors in the non-nuclear weapon states. Particular concern has been raised about the use o

environmental swipe sampling, which could be used to identiy the isotopic com-

position and morphology o particles o weapon material and reveal classified

nuclear weapon design inormation.57 This and related concernssuch as those

about the acilities at which naval reactor uel is abricatedwould have to be

addressed explicitly during the negotiation o an FMCT verification protocol.

Challenge inspections under an FMCT

The concept o challenge inspections could be built into an FMCT verification

system based on the CWC model. This permits a state party, on identiying a con-

cern about another partys compliance with the convention, to request that the

OPCW Technical Secretariat conduct a challenge inspection. Under a so-called

red light approach, the inspection is implemented by the Technical Secretariat

unless the OPCWs 41-member Executive Council decides, by at least a three-

quarters majority vote, to reject the request.58 In practice, the challenge inspec-

tion procedure has never been invoked since the CWCs entry into orce in 1997,

although compliance concerns had been raised. Similarly, the special inspection

procedures provided or in CSAs are largely dormant.59 In both cases, this reluc-tance has been due primarily to political assessments made by states parties o

the unpredictable and potentially negative consequences o calling or an inspec-

tion. Parties to the CWC have instead chosen to clariy compliance concerns

through the OPCWs routine verification mechanism or through the measures or

bilateral consultation and other orms o clarification provided or in the CWC.

55 See Hart, J., On-site Inspections in Arms Control and Disarmament Verification , Verification Research,Training and Inormation Centre (VERTIC) Research Reports no. 4 (VERTIC: London, Oct. 2002),

pp. 5053.56 IAEA, INFCIRC/540 (note 19), Article 7(a).57 International Panel on Fissile Materials (note 13), pp. 7982.58 Chemical Weapons Convention (note 3), Article IX and Verification Annex, Part X.59 IAEA, INFCIRC/153 (note 49), paras 73, 77.


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The CWC parties reliance on these and other confidence-building measures

presents a useul precedent or the design o a uture FMCT verification system.

One o the basic aims o the system should be to encourage states parties to

undertake steps to enhance transparency and build confidence about their com-

pliance behaviour.60 This would be consistent with a traditional view o multi-lateral arms control and disarmament treaty regimes: that they should include

concrete provisions or the states parties to be able to demonstrate compliance to

each other under what ideally should be a cooperative understanding o mutual

obligations and responsibilities.

60 Hart (note 55).


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5. The role of the IAEA in verifying an

FMCT

The IAEAs comparative advantages in veriying an FMCT

The case or the IAEA to adopt or absorb the FMCT verification mission is a

compelling one in terms o expertise, technical capabilities and cost efective-

ness. The IAEA is an independent intergovernmental organization in the United

Nations system and has a total staf o more than 2200, including approximately

250 saeguards inspectors.61 The agency has in place sophisticated methodologies

and procedural routines or nuclear material accounting and control that, along

with a process or state evaluation, orm the basis o its nuclear saeguards

system. In addition, the definition o saeguards set out in the IAEAs statute is

suciently flexible to accommodate an expansion o the agencys current sae-

guards mission.62 Indeed, the statute expressly provides or the IAEA to take on

assignments aimed at promoting worldwide nuclear disarmamentone o the

underlying goals o the FMCT. In addition, a number o international con-

ventions and treaties have already given roles to the IAEA related to its work in

promoting sae, secure and peaceul nuclear technologies.63

As many studies have noted, there are obvious synergies and convergences

between the main objectives and tasks o the existing saeguards system and

those o a uture FMCT verification system. The cornerstone o IAEA saeguardsis the comprehensive saeguards agreement (see appendix A). All non-nuclear

weapon states parties to the NPT are obligated to implement this type o trad-

itional saeguards agreement, which is based on nuclear material accountancy

measures and intended to provide assurance o the non-diversion o declared

nuclear material. Following the findings o undeclared nuclear activities in Iraq

and North Korea in the early 1990s, CSAs have been supplemented by new volun-

tary agreements based on the Model Additional Protocol (see appendix A).64

These require states to provide expanded declarations covering all aspects o

their nuclear uel cycle activities and to grant the IAEA broader rights o accessto nuclear-related locations and activities.

The IAEAs strengthened saeguards system seeks to provide credible assur-

ance o not only the non-diversion o declared nuclear material, but also the

absence o undeclared nuclear material and activities.65 This entails two technical

61 Monterey Institute or International Studies, Center or Non-Prolieration Studies, International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat, Inventory o International Nonprolieration Organizations andRegimes, 12 Oct. 2010, ; and Potterton, L., Training the

IAEA inspectors,IAEA Bulletin, vol. 51, no. 2 (Apr. 2010).62 Statute o the IAEA, opened or signature 26 Oct. 1956, entered into orce 29 July 1957, , articles III and XII.63 See IAEA, Treaties, conventions & agreements related to the IAEAs work, .64 IAEA, INFCIRC/540 (note 19).65 IAEA,IAEA Saeguards: Staying Ahead o the Game (IAEA: Vienna, July 2007), pp. 9, 11.


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verification objectives: (a) to detect in a timely manner the diversion o specified

significant quantities o declared nuclear material rom peaceul use to pro-

scribed military purposes; and (b) to detect undeclared nuclear material and

activities on the states territory.66 Many o the methodologies and techniques

developed by the IAEA pursuant to these objectives would be directly applicableto the FMCT verification mission.

The combination o CSAs and additional protocols provides the basis or non-

nuclear weapon states to demonstrate compliance with an FMCT. These states

have already given a commitment not to produce fissile material or nuclear

Documents

Verifying a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Technical and Organizational Considerations