Vertical integration in the post-IFQ halibut fishery

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Marine Policy 30 (2006) 341–346

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Vertical integration in the post-IFQ halibut fishery

Robert Dawson�

Departments of Economics and Environmental Studies, Washington College, Chestertown, MD 21620, USA

Received 18 January 2005; accepted 1 April 2005

Abstract

In some fisheries, claims have been made that quota programs have led to increased vertical integration, with processors

controlling quota and fishermen. In the US halibut fishery a quota program was designed specifically to maintain the small-scale

vessel nature of the fishery. This paper reports on what changes have been seen in the vertical structure of the halibut fishery and

offers some explanation for these changes. Results indicate that the specific rights granted can have significantly different effects on

the vertical structure of the industry. In the case of the halibut fishery vertical integration was avoided and market transactions

actually increased.

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Keywords: Fisheries management; Industry structure; Vertical integration

1. Introduction

The history of the US halibut fishery is well known.Due to increasing effort, fishing was restricted throughthe use of seasonal limitations, gear restrictions, and anannual total allowable catch. From 1977 to 1994 halibutcatch in the central Gulf of Alaska tripled, while allowedfishing days dropped from 47 to just two or three 24-hperiods per year [1]. The fishery had become a classicderby fishery. In response to the drastically reducedfishing season and over-capitalization, an individualfishing quota (IFQ) program was instituted in 1995 forthe Pacific halibut fishery.

One of the particular policy objectives in thismanagement plan was to ‘‘forestall a full scale reorga-nization of the fleet which might result in larger vesselsdominating quota at the expense of smaller vesselsy’’[2]. In the words of the proposed rule, the program wasdesigned to ‘‘assure that IFQs remain in the hands offishermen who have a history of past participation andcurrent dependence on the fishery’’ (57 FR 57130). Toattain this goal, two restrictions on the trading and

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ownership of quota were used. The first divides catchervessels into three different size classes and prohibitslarger vessels from buying quota from smaller vessels.The second institutes a so-called ‘‘owner-operator’’ or‘‘owner onboard’’ requirement for second-generationquota shares. Taken together, these two regulations alsohelp to ward off increased vertical integration, whereprocessors come to own and control the use of quota.

After the 1990 implementation of an individualtransferable quota system in the Mid-Atlantic surf clamand ocean quahog fishery, quota moved from the handsof the fishermen to the processors (and even banks).Some people within the fishery view this verticalintegration as a failure of the system and haveencouraged regulators—Congress and the regionalCouncils—to ensure that this does not happen again[3]. And, according to Tietenberg [4], market structureand vertical integration were two of the issues the OceanStudies Board’s Committee to Review Individual Fish-ing Quotas was charged with investigating . However,their task was monumental and vertical integrationreceived little to no attention in their final report Sharing

the Fish: Toward a National Policy on Individual Fishing

Quota.

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ARTICLE IN PRESSR. Dawson / Marine Policy 30 (2006) 341–346342

In an effort to fill this gap, this paper assesses theeffects of the restrictions in the halibut program on thevertical structure of the fishery. Outright purchase ofquota by processors, changes in contracting andbargaining power, and changes in spot markets sincethe inception of the program all shed light on thequestion. The effects of these rules also provide insightinto more recent and upcoming fisheries regulations.

1According to Jessica Gherrit of the NMFS Restricted Access

Management office in Juneau, Alaska, there may have been confusion

among fishermen as to what classification to choose because of a

related state law. Therefore, fishermen who, under Alaska state law are

considered Catcher-Processors, may not necessarily be considered a

CP according to federal law, yet, to avoid problems they self-described

as such.

2. The Halibut Quota Program

The basic structure of the halibut program is likethose seen elsewhere. A fisherman’s share of the fisheryis determined by his or her ‘‘quota share’’ (QS) thatspecifies what percentage of the yearly total allowablecatch the holder has rights to. At the beginning of eachseason, this share is calculated in pounds and each QSholder is allocated their share of individual fishing quotapounds (IFQ lbs).

As is stated above, however, the halibut quotaprogram is different from the standard individualtransferable quota program in its restrictions on thetransfer of quota. The first restriction is a restraint onthe size class of the vessel on which the IFQ lbs are beingfished. QS and IFQ lbs are divided into 3 differentclasses based on the type and size of vessel and a fourthbased on processing activity. Anyone wishing to processat sea must hold ‘‘A’’ shares, though there is norequirement that fish harvested under A shares actuallybe processed at sea. That is, anyone can use A shares,but if a processor wants to process at sea, they must useA shares. A shares are oftentimes referred to as ‘‘freezershares.’’ Shares for the three different size classes ofcatcher vessels are ‘‘B’’ for vessels greater than 65 ftlong, ‘‘C’’ for vessels 36–65 ft long; and ‘‘D’’ for vesselsless than 35 ft long. Aside from the need to hold Ashares to process at sea, thereby restricting transfers,anyone with a B length vessel may only fish B shares anda fisherman with a C length vessel may only fish B or Cshares. Owners of D length vessels may fish B, C or Dshares, so-called ‘‘fishing down.’’ The second restrictionrequires that once B, C or D shares (catcher vessel QS)are transferred, becoming second-generation quota, thenew owner must be on-board the vessel fishing thatquota. The only exception to this owner-on-boardprovision is for partnerships, corporations, and otherbusiness forms where it is either not possible or isimpractical to have the owner of the QS on-board theCV. For such recipients of an initial catcher vessel quotaallocation, it is permitted to have a hired master operatethe vessel, provided that the vessel is owned by the quotaholder. Therefore the restriction applies to (i) anyonewho did not receive an initial allocation of catcher vesselQS, and (ii) anyone not owning the vessel on which theQS will be fished.

3. Vertical structure post-IFQs

There is little literature on vertical integration incommercial fisheries (see [5,6]) on which to base anymodel of the vertical structure of this fishery. Further,empirical analysis is hampered by a lack of data and anytried-and-true way to measure the degree of verticalcoordination in an industry. Thus a case study of thehalibut fishery is presented. It follows in three sections,each dealing with one type or level of vertical coordina-tion. The first section is the outright purchase of QS andquota pounds by processors, the second deals with thestate of contracting and bargaining within the fishery,and the final section analyzes spot market transactions.

3.1. Vertical integration

To determine how much quota has been sold toprocessors is difficult because there are many differentclassifications of potential buyers and the potentialbuyers themselves chose these classifications when theyapply for their license to purchase quota. Theseclassifications include Catcher–Processor (CP), Broker,Catcher–Seller (CS), Mothership (MS), Retail, Restau-rant, Shoreplant, Tender, and Other. While the classi-fications may seem self-explanatory, some clarification isin order.

While one might normally think of a CP vessel as avessel from which fish is caught and then processed andpackaged on board (a freezer vessel), oftentimes in thisfishery if any processing at all is done on-board thevessel is classified as a CP. This includes something ascommon as head-and-gut processing.1 A Broker is abroker in quota, not fish. Catcher–Seller refers to thosefishermen who sell their catch at the dockside to passers-by or at a market. They are typically small-scalefishermen. An MS is a vessel that does not harvest anyof its own catch, but that takes catch from other vesselsand then processes that catch on board. Retail is theclassification for a retail store (as opposed to CS).Restaurant is surely self-explanatory, as is Shoreplant. ATender is someone who unloads a catcher vessel (andpays for the catch) and then turns around and sells thecatch to a shoreplant or some other buyer. Finally, the‘‘Other’’ classification is for anyone that feels they donot fit in any of these categories.

Because each of these ‘‘types’’ is legally able to buyquota, it was necessary to examine all sales of quotasince the inception of the program. Data was acquired

ARTICLE IN PRESSR. Dawson / Marine Policy 30 (2006) 341–346 343

from the Restricted Access Management (RAM) divi-sion of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)Juneau office, which administers the program. For thepurpose of this study, it is assumed that any fish caughtunder a freezer, or A, share is also processed at sea (defacto vertical integration) and so any trades within thiscategory are ignored.

The remaining data were sorted by the type of buyerinvolved in each transaction. Since this program wasdesigned to maintain the small-scale nature of thefishery, and the aim of this research is to evaluatechanges in the vertical structure of the fishery, it wasnecessary to evaluate each trade to see exactly what sortof buyer is involved. Because of the rather confusingclassifications of registered buyers, two different datasets were created from the overall set of trades.

The first data set used a very broad definition ofwhich buyers were truly processors. Any registeredbuyer listed as a CP, Shoreplant, or Mothership for anyyear, no matter if other classifications were also chosen,was identified as a processor. This likely represents anupper bound on the quota sales from fishermen to trueprocessors. Conversely, an alternative definition wasused that classified a buyer as a processor only if thechosen definitions were CP, Mothership, or Shoreplantfor all years in the data set. Using this more conservativedefinition will likely yield a lower bound on the quotasales from fishermen to processors.

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1. Forthe years 1995–2001, the table shows 3 different statistics.The first for each year, for QS and IFQ, and for bothupper and lower bounds, is simply the number of unitsthat were traded from a harvester to a processor. Second iswhat percent of total trades those vertically integratedtrades represent for the year. Finally, for QS only, totaltrades for the year is added to the total allocation of Ashares for the year and this is divided by the totalallocation to all classes to determine what percent of thefishery was vertically integrated in each year. For the years1996 and on, the measure is cumulative. That is, theprevious years’ trades are included in order to see howvertical integration has changed over time.

At the onset of the program, assumed verticalintegration at the upper bound started at 2.60%, andat the lower bound was 1.58%.2 Table 1 shows that foran upper bound, all trades of catcher vessel QS resultingin increased vertical integration by approximately 1.68percentage points, up to 4.28%. The lower bound showsan increase of one half-percentage point, up to 2.04%vertical integration. More importantly, however, be-cause freezer shares can actually be held by anyone, it is

2Initial vertical integration was calculated by sorting the initial

issuance of QS by the same method used for sorting later trades.

Because new allocations were made up until 2000, that year’s final

allocation was used at the total.

possible to have these shares traded away fromprocessors to independent fishermen. That is, integra-tion of B, C, and D shares may be offset by sales of Ashares to independent fishermen.

A similar analysis of IFQ lbs trades shows what canbe thought of as a temporary increase in verticalintegration since IFQ lbs sales are only valid for theyear. These trades show an upper bound range of0.9–2.9% and a lower bound range of 0.0–1.6% of IFQlbs being vertically integrated in any 1 year.

What is curious about this is that as processorsconsolidate QS and IFQ on their vessels, they could buyadditional vessels and continue buying quota. Theowner on board requirement of second-generationcatcher vessel quota does not apply to those processingcompanies that received initial allocations. If theprocessor were to buy a new vessel, the processor wouldbe within their rights to buy quota and hire a master tofish from that new vessel. Much was made of processorsowning quota in the surf clam and ocean quahog fisheryin the eastern US that led, in part, to the Congressionalmoratorium on quota programs. Yet this has nothappened to any great degree in the halibut; at mostvertical integration of quota increased by just over oneand a half percentage points.

Related to this is the restriction on transfers between sizeclasses. As originally written, shares could only be tradedwithin their size class. At the behest of the harvesters, thiswas changed in 1998 so that smaller vessels were allowedto buy quota from larger vessels. The question was, sincethe intent of the program is to maintain the small-scalecharacteristic of the fishery, why not let smaller vessels buyQS and IFQ from larger vessels? In terms of maintaining asmall-scale fishing fleet, two advantages come fromallowing fishing down but not allowing the opposite.The first is that the smaller vessels remain and have alarger pool of quota to buy from if the need or desirearises. But, secondly, if there is to be any new entry ofactual vessels, it encourages entry into the smallercategories, for the same reason above—there is potentiallymore quota available.

3.2. Contracting

Conclusions regarding contracting stem from theoverwhelming evidence that under both the US IFQand Canadian IVQ programs bargaining power hasshifted from the processing sector to the harvestingsector. It is important to remember the enormouschanges in the fishery pre- and post-IFQ in order tounderstand this shift in power. Prior to quota manage-ment the halibut fishery was a classic derby-style fisherywith harvesters racing to catch fish within only two orthree 24 h periods. The fleet was so large and so effectiveat catching fish that this was all the longer it took toharvest the entire year’s allowable catch. Because this

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Table 1

Trades of halibut QS and IFQ lbs from fishermen to processors

Year Upper bound Lower bound

QS IFQ lbs QS IFQ lbs

1995 Trades 1,102,322 111,593 778,712 77,644

% for year 2.13 2.23 1.51 1.55

Cumulative integration (%) 2.94 1.81

1996 Trades 1,264,441 115,580 85,651 3582

% for year 2.49 2.87 0.17 0.09


1997 Trades 643,238 85,759 399,164 53,999

% for year 1.55 1.70 0.96 1.07


1998 Trades 259,579 39,669 16,717 2947

% for year 1.13 1.33 0.07 0.10


1999 Trades 434,101 44,141 103.681 16,005

% for year 1.26 1.01 0.30 0.37


2000 Trades 797,313 40,052 165,246 0

% for year 2.94 0.89 0.61 0.00


2001 Trades 1,069,905 132,773 0 0

% for year 3.73 2.75 0.00 0.00


Source: NMFS.

R. Dawson / Marine Policy 30 (2006) 341–346344

amount of fish was caught in such a short period oftime, much of it was frozen.

Since quota management began, however, the seasonhas stretched to 8 months. This allowed the market tochange from a primarily frozen-fish market to primarilyfresh. Prior to the IFQ program, approximately 17% ofhalibut was processed fresh, while post-IFQ thatnumber has jumped to 59%. The shift from a primarilyfrozen fish fishery to a fresh market allowed the entry ofnew processors as well. The need for freezing capacitywas a barrier to entry, and without that barrier theprocessing sector saw a change in structure.

According to the US General Accounting Office [7],between 1995 and 2001, 68 halibut processors exited themarket while another 56 relatively small processors (lessthan 100,000 lbs of halibut processed in a year) entered.3

This entry was by both processing plants and broker/reprocessors, which Matulich [8] describes as being‘‘analogous to an auctioneerymaximiz[ing] revenue to

3The GAO notes that not all exit was due to changes in the halibut

fishery. ‘‘For example, one processor with a freezing operation bought

halibut, but its primary business was buying salmonyWhen the

supply of farmed salmon increased, contributing to price decreases, the

owner decided to sell the plant.’’ Others closed because of ‘‘poor

business decisions unrelated to the IFQ program,’’ another’s plant

burned down, and still others closed because of ‘‘personal reasons’’

([7], p. 6).

the quota holder by leveraging excess capacity amongprocessors, given wholesale demand at any particularpoint in time.’’ While brokers/reprocessors do havevertical ties to harvesters, they are limited to specifyingquantity, date of delivery, and location of delivery.Regarding other entry into the processing sector, actualentry by primary processors was minimal and some ofthe entry of new processors was actually harvestersbecoming processors themselves [8].

As the primary product shifted from frozen to freshhalibut and new processors entered the market, whole-sale prices rose 66%.4 According to Matulich, evengiven the increase in the value of halibut, 100% of thebenefit went to harvesters. That fishermen benefitedfrom this, rather than processors, shows that bargainingpower must have shifted. And proof that these changesled to greater bargaining power for the fishermen comesstraight from the mouths of the processors.5

4According to Matulich ([9], pp. 37–39) the ‘‘average wholesale price

for traditional processed halibut’’ in 1992–1993 was $1.82/lbs. Of this,

$1.11/lbs was due to ex-vessel cost. In 1999–2000 this increased to

$3.01/lbs, with $2.29/lbs being ex-vessel cost. For custom processing in

2000, average wholesale price was $3.07/lbs. and $2.23/lb was ex-vessel

cost.5Processors, of course, would have something to gain in future

programs if they can show that under this IFQ program they were

harmed. This is discussed below.

ARTICLE IN PRESSR. Dawson / Marine Policy 30 (2006) 341–346 345

Processors have expressed their dissatisfaction with theprogram. In 2002 Congressional testimony, Ralph Hoardof Icicle Seafoods [10] stated that while Icicle was in favorof rationalization of fisheries, they do have complaintsabout how the halibut program was structured. Thesecomplaints are related to their large investment in freezingcapacity made in the late 1970s when the derby fisherydeveloped. As the season grew shorter and shorter,additional freezer capacity was needed. As Hoard says,oftentimes there would be ‘‘3 to 4 million pounds ofhalibut waiting to be delivered’’ at once. With rationaliza-tion, Hoard continues, ‘‘The quality of fish being deliveredis far superior to the pre-IFQ fishery. The added value ofthe catch in the market is a lot higher. Unfortunately,100% of that value has gone to the harvesting sector’’(emphasis added). He continues, ‘‘Our profit margin onhalibut and sablefish during the first 6 years of the IFQprogram is $20,000,000 less than it was the 6 yearsprevious to the program.’’

Supporting this is Knapp’s 1997 ‘‘Initial Effects of theAlaska Halibut IFQ Program: Survey Comments ofAlaskan Fishermen.’’ This survey of 300 fishermenelicited the following comments (among others) regard-ing prices in the market: ‘‘Better quality product—betterprice;’’ ‘‘Price is usually higher. The halibut derbyflooded the market and quality was down. We can nowcompete with Canadians for fresh fish market through-out season;’ and, ‘‘Seems to be more competitive amongbuyers for product—translates into higher price forproduct’’ ([11], p. 247). This last comment is particularlytelling. Now that the larger market for fresh halibut canbe exploited, processors must compete more intenselyamong themselves. This leads to more bargaining powerfor the harvesters and thus higher prices. Where oncehalibut fishermen had little bargaining power, Matulichhas stated in personal communication, that bargainingpower has shifted so drastically that fishermen are ableto ask for higher prices upon delivery, and if theirdemands are not met, freely leave to find a differentbuyer who will meet their price.

The British Columbia halibut fishery has seen thesame result since the 1991 introduction of individualvessel quota (IVQ) management.6 Casey et al. [12]report that, in the BC fishery, ex-vessel prices haveincreased. The authors explicitly point out that in theBC fishery, like the Alaskan fishery, there has been entryby smaller, more specialized, processors. Because thereis no longer the need for massive freezing capacity, entrycosts are much lower. This entry into the processingsector has brought on more competition for the input.This is interesting to contrast with Love et al.’s pre-IFQ

6The Canadian halibut IVQ program runs much like the US IFQ

program. The difference is that quota is actually associated with a

particular vessel, and consolidation of quota is limited to 1% of the

overall quota per vessel.

result that ‘‘season duration and processor marketpower exertion at the vessel level is evident’’ [13, p.250]. This led to rent being captured by the processingsector during derby-style fishing. Since the rationaliza-tion of these fisheries, however, that distribution of renthas shifted to the harvesting sector.

3.3. Spot market transactions

One further development in the processing sector thatdeserves discussion is the development of a new auctionsystem for fresh halibut. The Auction Block, as it iscalled, was developed after the institution of the IFQsystem. It takes advantage of the combination of freshproduct and the ports along the Alaskan road system. Afee is charged for the auction service and, if harvestersdesire, boats can be off-loaded, the fish packed on ice,and trucks loaded for a further fee.

An auction is, of course, the antithesis of verticalcoordination. While the Auction Block is not extensivesince few ports are actually located along the road system,one result of the IFQ program has been the developmentof an institution where there are no vertical ties.

4. Changes in vertical structure

Whether or not there has been a change in the level ofvertical coordination can be answered in two parts. Priorto IFQ management, harvesters and processors necessarilyhad some vertical ties. Matulich [8] states that even thoughit was possible for a harvester to deliver to a differentprocessor, ‘‘capacity restrictions tended to result in theformation of ‘‘traditional’’ delivery patterns’’. DaveFraser, a long-time participant in the North Pacificfisheries, puts it another way, somewhat deflating the ideathat there were formal ties. He says, ‘‘To the degree thatprices tended to be similar between plants in a given town,boats went to processors to whom they had ties for otherspecies (i.e. salmon markets)’’ [14]. When there were nosuch ties, he continues, they simply went to the processorwith the shortest line. Since IFQ management, however, itis clear that harvesters are able to move amongstprocessors to a greater degree. The second developmentof note is the establishment of the Auction Block. Prior toIFQ management, a dock-side auction system like this wasimpossible.

The lengthening of the halibut season, the ensuingshift to a primarily fresh market, and the effects this hadon the processing sector have clearly led to theweakened vertical ties in this fishery. Excess freezingcapacity, ease of entry, and the institution of a new spot-market have all given harvesters more choices and morepower. Policy makers can look at the halibut IFQprogram as a model of how to design a quota program

ARTICLE IN PRESSR. Dawson / Marine Policy 30 (2006) 341–346346

that avoids increased vertical integration and evenimproves the standing of the harvesting sector.

But while the halibut IFQ program was successful inmaintaining the small-scale nature of the fishery, it hashad the side effect of causing a not insignificant changein the processing sector. Bargaining power shifted awayfrom processors to the harvesting sector and processorshave seen profits decrease. The natural reaction to thiswould have been for the processors to vertically integratethereby lowering costs and guaranteeing the availabilityof input. Those processors that owned and operatedcatcher vessels prior to the program and who wereallocated initial catcher vessel quota could havepurchased more quota, yet this did not happen.

5. Effect on future fishery management plans

The question then becomes: Was subsequent manage-ment affected by this? The American Fisheries Actstructured the North Pacific pollock fishery as processorcooperatives. Harvesters are specifically associated witha particular processor, thereby creating de facto verticalintegration. But according to Brent Paine, ExecutiveDirector of United Catcher Boats, the pollock fisherywas highly vertically coordinated before the AFA wasenacted [15]. Further, the North Pacific FisheriesManagement Council noted in 1995 that increasingvertical coordination was quite possibly an inevitableoutcome of ‘‘a maturing pollock fishery’’ ([16, Appendix2 p. 66] ; see also [17]).

To exactly what degree the inevitable verticalcoordination in the pollock fishery versus a desire toavoid the outcome of the halibut fishery influenced thedesign of the pollock program is difficult to determine.However, it is easy to see that the processing sector wasnot happy with their fortunes in the halibut fishery andhad no desire to see that repeated. Thus a system ofprocessor cooperatives guarantees processors their sameability to process. However, there is good reason tobelieve that the processors in the pollock fishery wouldhave maintained their positions because there are so fewpollock processors in this fishery and there was already ahigh level of vertical integration. Further, pollock isprocessed differently from halibut. There is no marketfor fresh pollock, thus no fresh market could emergefrom any extension in the season.

The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab fisheries arethe latest to see rationalization. The proposed rule forthe quota system governing that fishery was publishedon 29 October 2004 (69 FR 63200) specifying a ‘‘twopie’’ program with one set of quota for harvesters andanother for processors (see [18]). Restrictions onprocessors owning harvester QS are perhaps even morerestrictive, requiring a corporation or partnership toown at least 20% by a US citizen with at least 150 days

of experience at sea. Interestingly, processor quota canbe held by anyone.

Looking into the future, the Pacific Fishery Manage-ment Council is in the process of developing arationalization plan for their groundfish fishery. What-ever form it does take, again, it is not hard to imaginethat the experiences of the halibut fishery will influenceits final form as has undoubtedly happened in the NorthPacific pollock and crab fisheries.

References

[1] Ocean Studies Board, Commission on Geosciences, Environment,

and Resources, National Research Council. Sharing the fish:

toward a national policy on individual fishing quotas. Washing-

ton, DC: National Academy Press; 1999.

[2] Pautzke C, Oliver C. Development of the individual fishing quota

program for sablefish and halibut longline fisheries off Alaska.

Presented, September 4th to the National Research Council’s

Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas. Anchorage,

AK: 1997.

[3] O’Malley. Comments made before the Ocean Studies Board of the

National Academy of Sciences. Boston, MA: May 7, 1998.

[4] Tietenberg, T. Personal communication via e-mail. April 7, 1998.

[5] Gallick E. Exclusive dealing and vertical integration: the efficiency

of contracts in the Tuna industry. In: Masten S, editor. Case

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[8] Matulich SC. Personal communication via e-mail, July 31 and

August 4, 2003.

[9] Matulich SC. Testimony before Subcommittee on Fisheries

Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans, Committee on Resources,

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Fishing Quotas. February 13, 2002.

[10] Hoard R. Testimony before Subcommittee on Fisheries Con-

servation, Wildlife, and Oceans, Committee on Resources, United

States House of Representatives, Hearing on Individual Fishing

Quotas. February 13, 2002.

[11] Knapp G. Initial effects of the Alaska halibut IFQ program:

survey comments of Alaska fishermen. Marine Resource Eco-

nomics 1997;12:239–48.

[12] Casey K, Dewees C, Turris B, Wilen J. The effects of individual

vessel quotas in the British Columbia halibut fishery. Marine

Resource Economics 1995;10:211–30.

[13] Love H, Burton D, Silva G, Lei S. Regulatory controls and

market power exertion: a study of the Pacific halibut industry.

Natural Resource Modeling 1995;9(3):229–53.

[14] Fraser D. Personal communication via e-mail, November 11 2004.

[15] Paine B. Personal interview, November 22, 2000.

[16] North Pacific Fishery Management Council. Development of the

Individual Fishing Quota Program for Sablefish and halibut

Longline Fisheries off Alaska. Anchorage: North Pacific Fishery

Management Council; 1997.

[17] North Pacific Fishery Management Council. Social Impact

Assessment for Inshore/Offshore 3. Achorage: North Pacific

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[18] Fina M. Rationalization of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands

crab fisheries. Marine Policy 2005;29(4):311–22.

Documents

Vertical integration in the post-IFQ halibut fishery