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DOCUMENT 93

VIET CONG POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF SOUTH VIET -NAM

JANUARY, 1971

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Document No. 93

VIET CONG POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF SOUTH VIET-NAM

INTRODUCTION

March, 1971

Knowledge of geographic divisions, sub-divisions, and their names is essential to the clear understanding of any country or political-military situation. This is especially true in South Viet-Nam because today there exists two systems of geographic and political nomenc1ature- -the Communist and that of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam (GVN).

The geographical and political divisions and sub­divisions used by the GVN are relatively stable and t end to change seldom eitre r in boundary or in name.

The Communist geography, on t he other hand, is extremely complex, plagued by frequent, and seemingly capricious, changes of both boundaries and names. To add to the problem the Communist geography is different from that of the GVN although identical names are frequently used. Sometimes these designate areas that 'are nearly contiguous sometimes they designate areas tha. t are not even near each other. Furthermore, the Communists have two geographies-­the political and the military. These are superimposed in a seemingly constantly shifting manner.

The Viet Cong uses historical divisions, natural terrain features and population links in drawing its boundaries. Of prime cnnsideration are the politico-military characteristics of the area. The Communists use traditional place-names which they think have greater appeal to the people than do newer GVN designations. They hope that this use of tradi­tional nomenclature will help legitimatize their "shadow govern­ment" in the minds of the people.

Boundaries of VC military regions change as military infrastructure echelons expand or contract as a result of tactical successes or rebuffs, or changes in lines of commu­nications. Shortages of cadres can prompt consolidations, or an area may be subdivided to facilitate an operational mission.

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VC provinces are grouped together into regions for Illilitary and political purposes. A region is called a khu as a Party political unit, quan khu as a Illilitary region (MR). Province nallles, as Illodified by the VC, relllain in use within the khu and quan khu superstructure.

Until the late 1967 preparations for the 1968 offensives the VC hesitated to alter province boundaries. Provinces are traditional political units, with which people identify, and ve strategy is based upon a cOlllbination of Illilitary and political thrusts. North Vietnalllese Defense Minister General vri Nguygn Giap wrote in 1969: "The combination of the a rmed forces with the political struggle, and the arllled uprising with the revolu­tionary war constitutes the Illain content of the 'waging an all­people and comprehensive war' forlllula."

Under Communist Illilitary-political theory, key mili­tary decisions are Party molded. Their implelllentation is conditioned by consultations between line commanders, centrally appointed political officers, and regional and local Party committees. (See Viet-Naill Documents and Research Notes No. 34, "The Party in Comllland, Political Organization and the Viet Cong Arllled Force. ") Even if One assullles the existence of sOllle purely Illilitary territorial control structures (e. g. the "front cOlllmands" discussed below), and assullles that senior militar y officers have the deciding voices when operations are in progress, their dependence upon local and regional party leaders is nonetheless real. It is they who marshal local guerrillas and try to obtain civilian support for VC and NVA moves. Political units can be shifted frolll one military jurisdiction to another, but their dislllemberment would rarely be advantageous to the VC. (See Viet-Naill Documents and Research Notes No. 81 "COSVN Resolution No. 14)

Some observers believe that the VC takes advantage of the confusion which results frolll incongruent VC-GVN boundaries to plan operations across Army of the Republic of Viet-Naill (ARVN) "tactical zones." The ve's frequent alteration of its own boundaries has occasionally Illade ARVN inter-province coordination difficult.

This research note, based prilllarily upon evidence frolll ve sources, aillls at providing an up-to-date understan­ding of the VC /NVA Illilitary-political geography of South Viet-

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Nam. It draws heavily upon pUblications of tre Headquarters, US Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam, and, for pre-1967 material, upon Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 23, "Viet-Cong Political Geography," by the late Albert E. Parmerlee.

Emphasis is placed upon showing the VC's re-struc­turing of its administrative sub-divisions to provide maneuver space for tactical units, and to facilitate control of area commands which support their politico-military operations, It stresses the flexibility of VC political geography. Boundaries and designations delineate an area of responsibility of a Party apparatus. Boundaries therefore change as the Party organi­zations are proliferated or consolidated, as well as with changes in military organization. Finally, a summary of the Commu­nist geography of South Viet-Nam as it was early in 1971 is provided.

Viet-Minh Geography

France, in her 19th Century occupation of Viet-Nam, coined names fur the three parts into which she divided the nation for administrative purposes: Tonkin for the North, Annam for the Center, and Cochin China for the South. (See Figure 1) These designations remained in common use until after World War II; the name Viet-Nam disappeared from the maps. However, Viet-Nam remained the designation used by most Vietnamese nationalists, Communist and non-Communist, for the state they sought to create.

The Geneva Accords of 1954 which marked French withdrawal from Viet-Nam divided Central Viet-Nam (Annam) between the northern, Communist-led, Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (DRV) and the southern nationalist Republic of Viet-Nam. Meanwhile, most Vietnamese had been calling the three subdivisions by their Vietnamese names--Ba~ Ky (North Viet-Nam, Tonkin), Trung Ky (Central Viet-Nam, Annam) and Nam Ky (South Viet-Nam, Cochin China).

To the Viet-Minh, the Communist-led resistance movement of the 1950's and early 1950's, ''ky'' had a colo­nialist connotation. They replaced "ky" with "b~", while the GVN adopted "ph~'n" in place of ''ky.'' In the military reporting

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-CHI N A

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Figure 1. French divisions of Indochina to 1954. -

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J Ito. 0\. of the DRV and the VC, the names :;B::.:a::.c~:::;B,-,~(.l! Trung BQ, and Nam B~ continue in use, though they no longer correspond to formal political divisions.

With the outbreak of hostilities against the French in 1946, the Viet-Minh sketched its first military geography of Viet-Nam, dividing the country into 14 military regions, each grouping together a number of provinces, and commanded by a colonel or brigadier general of the VPA--the Vietnamese People's Army.

The setup proved cumbersome, and in March 1948, the khu were merged into six liGn khu -- inter-regions or inter -zones - - each under a joint military-political Communist command. (See Figure 2) Their boundaries were based upon topographic and ethnological as well as political consi­derations. Inter-Regions I and II covered the Tonkinese moun­tain areas, while III was the Red River Valley, including the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, the three together encompassing BKc B9. Inter-Region IV was what is now North Viet-Nam's panhandle plus the two northernmost provinces of South Viet­Nam and Inter-Region V was the remainder of Trung Bq. All of Nam B3 (Cochin China) was Inter-region VI. (See Figure 2)

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After a short-lived alteration of the map the Viet-Minh reverted to this arrangement and adhered to it throughout the war with the French.

Politics and Geography, 1954 to 1965

A h 2.. A The Nam B,? Regional Committee (Xu Uy Nam B,?) was

the Communist Party's principal organ in South Viet-Nam until 1951. It was then dissolved by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party -- the Communist ruling party of North Viet­Nam and replaced by the first Central Office for South Viet­Nam--COSVN, a control structure described below. COSVN's first chief was LlO Du~ii, who in 1957 became First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi. By then COSVN had been temporarily inactivated.

For about five years after the 1954 Geneva Accords, control of day-to-day Communist activities in the South was lodged in the Party committees of Inter-Regions V and VL (See Figure 2)

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VIET-l\IIKH

II\TER - REGIONS

BAC BO ( North Viet­Nam, Tonkin)

:"A:\I1 BO

TRCNG EO ( Central Viet-Kam Annarn )

( South Viet-Nam, Cochin-China)

Figure 2. Viet Minh Inter-Regions and the traditional Vietnamese regional designations.

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When in 1959, the Lao Dong Party Central Committee decided to undertake the military conquest of the South, new political-military control structures, and new lines on Commu­nist maps of South Viet-Nam were called for. In 1960 the Party authorized the reactivation of COSVN, a decision apparently not implemented until 1961. Meanwhile, in December 1960, the creation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet­Nam (NFLSVN or NLF) was announced. A typical Communist "front organization," it was charged with t he nominal leader-ship of "the revolution." Thirteen m.onths later, in January 1962, the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party was formally dis­solved, to be imm.ediately replaced by the People IS Revolutionary Party (PRP) also an avowedly "Marxist-Leninist Party." The NLF has acknowledged that the PRP is "the highest organization."

Actually, above them both, and above the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG)I announced in June 1969 is the post-1961 COSVN. It directs the Viet Cong main forces, the South Vietnamese People IS Liberation Armed Forces, (SVNPLAF, or PLAF, usually called the VC), nominally subor­dinate to t he NLF, and now to the PRG. In fact many VC units today are manned largely by Northern soldiers.

COSVNls reinstitution was regularized in Article 24 of the Lao Dong Party Regulations, published in Hanoi in 1961. It states: "Beside the organs mentioned above, the Central Executive Committee [the Politburo] may appoint a number of Central Committee members to establish a Central Office (or offices) whose responsibility is to provide guidance to Party work in particularly important Party divisions. The Central Office (Trung Uong Cue) is placed under the leadership of the Central Executive Co~rnittee. II Since 1961 COSVN has been lad by Lao Dong Politburo and Central Committee members drawn from the DRV's overlapping political and military !rerar­chies, plus a few Hanoi-selected PRP, NLF, and PLAF figures •

When the NLF was organlzlng its political network in the Republic of Viet-Nam, in late 1960, the military-political inter-regions were subdivided. One portion of Inter-Region V, stretching along the Central Vietnamese coastal plain from the DMZ to the northern boundary of Nam Bo was designated

" • /to, A'. as Southern Trung Bo (Mlen Nam Trung Bo). (See Flgure 3.) . .

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Western

Autonomous

Region

Saigon-Cholon

Gia Dinh

Special Zone

Figure 3. Six VC regional divisions of South Viet-Nam established in December 1960 coincident with the proclamation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam (NFLSVN).

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The other area into which Inter-Region V was divided at that time was the Western Highlands Autonomous Region (Khu Tu Tri Tay Nguyen). Set apart ostensibly to encourage Montag;'ard • insurgency by the promise of an autonomous high­lands zone, the Western Highlands Autonomous Region in fact was subordinated militarily to a Western Highlands Front Command, and politically to the Inter-Region V Party Committee, both manned largely by ethnic Vietnamese, not Montagnards. (See Figure 3)

Inter-Region VI, the Nam Bo Inter-Region, was also subdivided in late 1960. Figure 3 shows the four segments: Eastern Nam Bo (Mi~'n Dong Nam B?), Central Nam Be? (Mie'n

,.. r.. .,.."''' 10.) d Trung Nam B9), Western Nam B,? (Mlen Tay Nam B,?, an the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. The Communists thus gave the regions and the special zone traditional place names which continue to appear in captured documents even though some modifications in their boundaries have been made in the intervening years.

By early 1962 the old Trung BS; and Nam B$ Party Committees had become part of the new People's Revolutionary Party structure and subordinated to COSVN as was the head­quarters of the SVNPLAF. Subsequent changes in the Com­munist military-political geography of South Viet-Nam have been conditioned by COSVN's communications, transportaiion and control requirements as the areas of insurgency have expanded or contracted and as priorities have changed.

Soon after VC Southern Trung B~ was mapped in early 1960, Military Region 6 was carved out ~f it -- a broad belt across South Central Viet-Nam. (See Figure 4) The VC provinces of Qu~ng ~~, Phlidc Long, Bicl> Long, Ninh Thu~n, Llim £lAng, Tuy~n £j,,!c, and Bi'nh Th~n fell under the juris-diction of MR-6. (See Figure 4) •

The rest of VC Southern Trung Bo became the long, thin MR-5 stretching down the coast of the South China Sea from the DMZ to Cam Ranh Bay. (See Figure 4) Then, in 1964, two subregions (phiin khu) in it were designated. The two northernmost provinces, Qu.tng Tri and Th;ta Thi~n were set apart as a Northern Subregion, while at the southern end of the MR the cqastal provinces of Phti Yen and Kh,{nh Hoa formed a Southern Subregion.

Note:

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LAOS

The N orthe rn and Southe rn Subregions and the Western Highlands Front Command were subordinated to MR-5.

DMZ

NoAhern Subregion

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Southern Subregion

Phuoc Long

Binh Long

1 Binh Thuan

Legend:

:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:. Region Boundary

.................... Sub-Region Boundary

= Front Command Boundary

Province Boundary

Figure 4. VC Military Regions, Subregions and Front Command before United States troops entered the conflict in 1965.

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No comparable changes were made in the Nam Be) Inter-Regional structure between 1960 and 1965. However, in 1963 numbers were assigned to its subdivisions: Eastern Narrl B~ was styled Region 1, (just north of Saigon). Central Nam BS (south of Saigon), Region 2, Western Nam BS (the southern . , part of the Mekong Delta), Region 3, and the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Elinh Special Zone became Region 4. The Trung Be> Regions 5 and "6 retained their nUrrlerical designatims. The We~tern Highlands Autonomous Region was not nUrrlbered. The region replaced the large inter-region as the basic Communist military­political comrrland unit. (See Figure 4)

From time to time provinces have been given letter­number designations rather than their traditional names. But few VC geographical names become totally obsolete. SOrrle which seem to have been forgotten still crop up capriciously in captured documents and radio broadcasts,

VC Political Geography from 1965 to the 1968 Tet Offensive

By rrlid-1965 Hanoi had increased the tempo of NVA infiltration into South Viet-Narrl. United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) entered South Viet-Nam to assist the GVN in repelling the aggression. These new politico-military stresses brought about a major reorganization of the VC political geography of South Viet-Nam.

Region 5 shared a common boundary with North Viet­Nam (NVN) until June 1965. Then Hanoi subdivided the region into three commands: the Tri-Thi~n-Hu~'-Central Laos Mili­tary Region; the B-3 Front (Western Highlands Front Command, or VC T~y Nguy~n - Lower Laos Military Region); and a new Military Region 5. (See Figure 5.)

,.. A' The Tri-Thien-Hue-Central Laos MR

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Elevated to full regional status, the Northern Sub­region of the 1963 MR-5 was designated the Tri-Thien-Hue' Region in 1965. The name derived from the s~cond words of the names of its provinces, Qu:fng Tri and Th,ta Thien, and Hui;', the one-time Vietnamese royal c'apital, A regional Party Committee was formed to provide overall political guidance

TRI -THIEN- HUE Central Laos Military Region

Tay Nguyen­Lower Laos Military Region (B-3 Front Command or Western High­lands Military Region)

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LAOS

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TRI-THIEN­HUE-Central Laos Military Region

(New) Military Region 5

Figure 5. Map showing the three Military Regions and VC provinces

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in northern South Viet-N am following the reorganization _ of the old MR 5.

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directly subordinate to the NVA High Command. The region was also made responsible for operations in the central part of the Laos panhandle. It is often referred to as the Tri-Thi;;-n-Hue: Central Laos Military Region. Documents captured from this area also mention a Forward Military Command which may have included the DMZ, whose boundaries and specific respon­sibilities are not clear. The're have also been references to a Btnh-Tri-Thien "theater," adding Qulng Binh, the province in the DRV just above the DMZ, to the provinces immediately south of it. The Tr!-Thien-Hu~' region proper boasts a regional party committee of its own, thus distinguishing it from the purely military control status of the front commands.

The Tri-Thien-Hu~J_Central Laos MR is a buffer zone and an infiltration base for North Viet-Nam. Its military and Party organizations seem to report directly to Hanoi rather than via COSVN.

B-3 Front or Western Highlands Front Command

~ " The B-3 Front, also known as the VC Tay Nguyen-Lower Laos Military Region, or Western Highlands of Military Region (See Figure S) was made up of the VC provinces of Kontum, Gia Lai and Dac Lac and portions of Lower Laos. Initially a military headquarters, the B-3 Front did not have a political structure of its own. The MR-S Party Committee continued to exercise that power. Therefore, B-3 was not a region, but a "front command." This remained true, perhaps, until late 1967 when the T~y Nguyen-Lower Laos Military Region Party Committee replaced MR- 5 in providing political direction in the Highlands. Thus the area, whether called B-3 Front Command, Western Highlands Military Region, or the Tay Nguyen-Lower Laos Military Region, became a full-fledged military region with both military and political functions.

The New Region 5

The six VC coastal provinces below the Tri-Thi~n-Huei Central Laos MR, (Qu;tng Da, Quotng Nam, Qu.tng Ngai, Bi"llh f)tnh, Ph':' Yen and Kha'nh Hoa) were designated the rew MR-S. (See Figure 5) This new, contracted, MR-S· is a potent man­power base. Its heavily populated segments provide support to the resources-starved B-3 Front Command.

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A reorganization of the old MR-5 was to be expected. Its vast and diverse territorial expanse precluded the operation of an effective corrlInand and control system.

Military Region 6

As We know, MR-6 was formed in 1963 when VC Southern Trung B{l was divided. It remained intact until 1966 when Region 10 was formed (see below). Another change carne about in 1967 when the VC decided that Binh Thu~n Province was too large, and a new province, Bi'llh Tuy, was created frorrt parts of L~rrt B6ng and Bi'llh Thuan provinces. (See Figure 6)

Military Region 10

The present Military Region 10 was activated in October 1966, consisting of the VC provinces of Qu~ng Buc, Phu?dc Long and Bi'D.h Long. (See Figure 6) It was responsible for the establishrrtent of border base areas, and control of the southern segment of the Laos -Carrtbodia infiltration route. Its tasks include dealing with ethnic rrtinorities and land utilization problerrts in the large plantations of the three border provinces.

Military Region 1

South of Regions 10 and 6, abutting onto the Saigon­Cholon-Gia :Elinh Special Zone was Region 1, the designation accorded Eastern Nam Bo in 1963. Late in 1966 it began to feel the mounting Allied military pressure. Heavy casualties in t he ranks of the VC cadres, rrtade a change of military­political structures irrtperative. Accordingly the subordinate elerrtents of the region were consolidated into three provinces; Tay Ninh, Thii Bau Mot and Ba Long (also called Ba Bi.en). (See Figure 6) .

This territorial consolidation of the region into three provinces required the merging of Party structures at provin­cial and district leve Is.

The Saigon-Gia Binh Special Zone or Region 4

This metropolitan area Special Zone, 1960, was designated Region 4 in May 1963.

established in Srrtall in size

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LAOS

G,A L!.]

~ TAY"lGUYEN

\SPECIAL REGION

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SOU T H

CHI N A

SEA

CAMBODIA

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Figure 6.

RU'G ,AT op<'dol '.1iH1.'ry P~'wn

SOU T H

CHI N A

SEA

Lt'-(;END

VC Administrative and Military Subdivisions following the entry of U. S. and FWMA forces in the conflict in 1965.

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compared with the other regions, it had no provincial structures under it. Its missions oriented to its demographic character, were proselyting, intelligence gathering and terrorist activities in the capital area. Its population was increasing phenomenally as refugees from all over the Republic sought the security of the metropolis.

Rdng Sat Special Military Region or T -1 ° - I

Also known as T-10, the Rung Sat Special Military Region was separated from the rest of VC Bi~n Rca Province. (The Rtl'ng S~t is part of GVN Gia T:linh province). This special military region (difc khu quan s;1), established in April 1966, had the task of building a strong base area and interdicting the water line s of communication to the capital complex. It ex­ploited the area's geographic distinctiveness. R11ng S~t is a lightly populated, heavily forested, swampy area lying astride the river mouths leading to Saigon. (See Figure 6) By mid-1966, the special region had a functioning staff organization. A special region, differs from a military region in that in the special region both political and military control rests in the military organization.

Military Region 2 and 3

During the period from 1961 to 1965, COSVN firmly controlled the formidable VC infrastructure in a number of Mekong Delta provinces. Its area of influence included the VC Ca M~u and Rach Gia provinces, large parts of VC Soc

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Trang, Can Thd, Tra Vinh, Ben Tre provinces and the Cam-bodian border area. VC control began to weaken in 1966 and some political boundaries within MRs 2 and 3 were redrawn. Figure 6 shows the VC Military Region 2 and 3 south of Saigon prior to October 1967.

The Political Geograpby of the 1968 Tet Offensive

The Lao Dong Party in July 1967 directed that pre­parations be made for Phase One of the Winter-Spring Campaign (1967-68) involving coordinated attacks on cities throughout South Viet-Nam. It was to be the first phase of the VC/NVA "General Offensive and General Uprising" aimed at "final victory." Strong political controls were imposed and the vcl NVA cadre organized forward headquarters elements in, readi­ness for offensive operations.

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Tri-Thi~n-Hu~'_Central Laos MR

Even before the Party directive was issued, the Tri­Thi~n-Hue:Central Laos MR operating directly under the NVA High Command, had experienced a basic change in structure. In May 1967, its Party Committee dissolved the province Party Committee of Qu;tng Tr! and Th;ia Thi~n provinces replacing them with four inter-district or subregion committees, each administering several districts. (See Figure 7) While not autonomous in the direction of political and military affairs, their organizations corresponded in other respects to VC pro­vince echelons.

The four subregions of VC Tri-Thitn-Hu~'_Central • Laos MR are, as shown on Figure 7: SR-I, sometimes called the DMZ Front, SR-2, SR-3, and SR-4. The territories identified as Ba Long district of VC Qutng Tri province as well as those identified as V,'lng*A, V,i"ng Band V,'lng C in VC Thtla Thi~n province are outside the boundaries of the subregions; and their place in the chain of command is not clear.

Captured documents indicate that the reorganization was instituted to enable the VC to maintain closer contact with the districts, villages and hamlets of the area. There were no significant changes in the Western Highlands Military Region nor in Regions 5 and 6 at this time.

Reorganization of the Saigon area

It was clear to COSVN that the boundaries of MR-4 adjacent to Saigon enclosed a territory too limited for the concealment of the VC forces massing for the offensive. A large hinterland as a logistics base and a staging area was needed. Therefore COSVN made territorial and boundary changes at region, province and district levels involving MR-l, MR-4, T -1 0 (Rllng S~t Special Military Region) and Long An province south and west of Saigon in MR-2.

, *Vung is a term sometimes used to designate a minor

administrative division subordinate to a district or inter­district or to a subregion.

Legend:

-= Province Boundary

SR Boundary

Vung Boundary

Vinh Linh Special Zone

SR -1 (DMZ FRONT)

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SR-2

South China Sea

VUNG A ,-", , , ;

----, ," .,,, .... ,

Hue Central Laos MR

VUNG B 1'-I

LAOS r.. ,,'

IllflmrnTrTT1:~ " , ... 'I ~ .... - ...

/ ,,/

South Viet-Nam

Quang Da Special Zone

Figure 7. Map showing the four subregions of VC Tri-Thien-Hue Central Laos MR at the time of the TET 1968 Offensive.

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These areas were organized into a number of sub­regions (also referred to as E or K sectors) with the following delineations (See Figure 8):

Subregion 1, includes districts from the former MR-4 and VC Tht B$:li M6t province of MR-l;

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Subregion 2, extends westward from the capital city and includes parts of northern VC Long An province in MR-2;

Subregion southern VC Long

3, south of the city, incloses areas of An province plus parts of MR-4;

Subregion 4, east and southeast of Saigon, includes portions of VC Ba Bi~n province and the Rdng S~t Special Zone;

Subregion Milt and a district

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"- ~ ~ 5, north of Saigon, consists of VC Thu Bau from the old MR-4;

Subregion 6, also referred to as the Saigon-Cholon Subregion, corresponds to the Saigon-Cholon city limits,

The small U -1 area, which includes Bi~n Rna city in VC Bi Bi~n province, and both Ba Bi~n and T~y Ninh provinces of the former MR-I continued to function as provinces subor­dinate to COSVN, but the VC has often referred to them as subregions.

This reorganization provided five separate corridors leading to Saigon, each with its own base areas, supporting a decision to crea1e a "steel belt" around Saigon. Furthermore, the subregions afforded pre-attack positions, withdrawal routes and temporary havens. Subregion 2, for example, contains a densely populated area stretching west to the Cambodian border through which the VC operated a line of communication between Saigon and what were then the Cambodian sanctuaries and bases of operation.

Coincident with this subdivision of military regions, administration was decentralized and alternate command head­quarters were established. Moreover, with the breakup of the Party committees in MRs 1 and 4, COSVN temporarily assigned its own personnel to the subregions. This, it was hoped, would solve the problem of cadre-staffing at lower levels, allocating key personnel to strategic spots.

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,(J.. LeGEND

_+_+ International oounda)'y

_ :vlilitary ~€gion (MR) "ound~, y

Special regiQ~ ,,~ subreglOn boun:1ary

I'rovic.ce 1Tino) bcu"-oa~~

Figure 8. VC Administrative and Military Subdivisions in the Southern portion of Viet-Nam during the Tet 1968 "General Uprising."

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The transition from military region to the new sub­region structures took five months, allowing the organizations to coexist until the changeover was completed in March, 1968. Then the MR organizations in the area around Saigon ceased to exist. SR-l with its special strategic and tactical signifi­cance for military objectives in Saigon, received orders directly from COSVN, while SRs 2, 3 and 5 were subordinated to COSVN through an intermediate level Regional Party Committee (PhSn Cuc), often referred to as T-4. It was later designated

• as SR- 7 and functioned as a mobile headquarters.

Military Regions 2 and 3

VC Regions 2 and 3 which had remained virtually intact under COSVN's direction until late in 1967, were also re-structured to facilitate the attack on Saigon as the Tet Offen­sive approached. As previously noted, VC Long An province was lifted out of MR-2 and subdivided into two subregions, the southern section, SR-3, linking Saigon with the Delta and the northern portion, SR-2, connecting the GVN capital with the VC supply bases in the Cambodian border area. (See Figure 8)

Because of heavy demands for support of VC activities in SR-3's Ch~u Thanh Distrist, which included T~n An city, the district was shifted to My Tho province. To relieve My Tho of the responsibility for administering three large cities

"'h" d~" .". --My T 0, Tan An an Go Cong -- a new VC Go Cong provmce was creat"d, in eastern My Tho, south of SR-3 (See Figure 8)

MR-3 was given control of the VC supply routes which cross Ha Ti~n and pass through thick, swampy forests to MR-3 logistic bases in central and southern VC Ca Mau province •

The Tet 1968 Offensive

The general offensive commenced with some success, but soon lost its momentum as the combat power of the Allies was brought to bear against the VC/NVA forces. Even more disturbing to Communist leaders was the unwillingness of the South Vietnamese populace to rise up in the wake of the VC intrusion. The political failure was evident even before the military thrust was broken. Before the middle of February 1968 the offensive had been blunted and by March the "Winter-

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Spring Campaign" had failed. During the Saigon area, COSVN sent representatives South Viet-Nam Liberation Armed Forces

operations in the from Headquarters, (SVNLAF), to each

subregion to supervise ITlilitary operations. SiITlultaneously, a COSVN Forward COITlITland Post headed by the COITlITlanding General of SVNLAF was established to direct tactical operations in the southern part of the Republic during the General Offensive.

The close control COSVN atteITlpted to exercise over the forces under its cOITlITland proved of no avail. Even the VC heirarchy has acknowledged that the Tet 1968 Offensive was ITlarked by a lack of coordination between the ITlilitary and political efforts. Noteworthy was the weak and ineffective control over ITlilitary forces under the subregions i direct COITl­ITland despite the present of COSVN representatives. For exaITlple, the subregions were unable to provide tiITlely rein­forceITlents where they could have exploited local successes. In SR-6, in particular, units infiltrating Saigon failed to co­ordinate with their SR-6 sapper guides.

It was therefore not surprising that in March 1968, COSVN, departing from norITlal Party policy, ITlade yet another change, placing priITlary control in the hands of the ITlilitary at each echelon in the subregions. It ordered SVNLAF Head­quarters, to aSSUITle direct control of all ITlilitary units in the subregions around Saigon in an effort to unify the ITlilitary cOITlITland directing the later stages of the VC /NVA attack against the city. COSVN converted each subregion, except SR-6, Saigon itself, into a ITlilitary "front" directly responsive to HQ SVNLAF. Only at COSVN level did a political Party COITlITlittee continue to participate in ITlilitary decision ITlaking.

In the creation of the front cOITlmands around Saigon, SR-6 was spared, but it was relegated to a ITlinor role in the operation. Though its Party COITlITlittee assuITled responsibility for political activities in Saigon-Cholon, ITlilitary responsibility for the city and Gia Dinh was divided aITlong the five regions surrounding the capital complex.

Heavy VC /NVA losses in February - March, the lack of rep1aceITlents and continuing Allied pressure prevented the VC/NVA froITl reconcentrating their units. Nonetheless the VC /NVA ITlounted the second phase of the "General Offensive and Uprising" against Saigon in May-June, 1968. SRs 4 and 5 were to have the principal roles, as SR-l and SR-2 supposedly

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had in the first phase. less effective than the zation.

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But the May-June Offensive proved even Tet attack, despite the post-Tet reorgani-

COSVN also appears to have tried a task-organization. It formed two military regions: T-4 to control Subregions 1, 2, 3, and 5, covering the territory north, west, and south of Sai­gon; and T-7 which controlled SR-4, SR-8 (U-l province), and SR-9 (Ba Bitn or Ba Long province), encompassing the territo­ry northeast, east and southeast of the capital. T-4 as a mili­tary region was a mission-oriented, ad hoc headquarters. The­re has been little mention of it following the 1968 operations. This has not been the case with T-7, which became MR-7.

Post Tet 1968 Boundaries

Following the VC Tet 1968 "General Uprising" the number­ed subregions or sectors often identified by the letter prefix "E" were retained on the VC military-administrative map of the area surrounding Saigon, the VC's so-called "steel belt". East of it VC Ba Long (formerly Ba Bi~n) province has retained its Sub­region 9 or E- 9 des ignation under the jurisdiction of MR- 7. Strategically located Tgy Ninh province, which was all but sur­rounded by what were then the VC Cambodian sanctuaries also retained its subregion status as SR-I0 or E-lO. Unlike SR-9, it was directly controlled by COSVN. (See Figure 9)

The evidence suggests that the traditional provincial Par­ty Committees of the VC provinces out of which these subregions were formed have not been revitalized since 1968. The Party structures now follow the lines of the subregions .

Military Region 7

The VC retained the May, 1968, T-7 organization, and later that year designated it MR-7, an intermediate headquar­ters between COSVN and SR-4, SR-8 (U-l province) and SR-9 (Ba Long province). Within it lies the municipality of Vung Tau, a resort area frequented by Allied troops, and such important installations as the GVN's Revolutionary Development Cadres Training Center and the National Police Training Academy.

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The People's Revolutionary Party has looked upon it with special interest. The Party created the Vung Tau Special Zone Chapter considered by COSVN a key VC organization in MR-7. The Special Zone Chapter is directly under MR-7 for nrllitary activi­ties but under the Ba Long Province Committee for political and administrative matters. (See Figure 9)

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* A third unsuccessful VC effort against Saigon occurred

during Tet 1969, referred to in enemy documents as the Februa­ry 1969 Offensive. As expected, the heaviest action took place in the area of control of the recently-formed MR-7. Under its command were some of COSVN's own maneuver elements as well as MR-7 forces.

The VC lost many of its cadre personnel during the un­successful offensives. Acute losses to the VC infrastructure have also resulted from the large scale movement of people from contested rural areas to urban areas under GVN control. High level VC cadre who have "rallied" to the GVN believe that the emphasis on nrllitary activities, to the neglect of maintain­ing a political infrastructure designed to inspire "people's revo­lutionary activity" was a mistake. Future reorganizations may be designed to encourage greater attention to the political work necessary to regain popular support and recruits for guerrilla warfare. *

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Documents captured in late 1970 and early 1971 mention subdivisions of command which are new and undelineated. As further alterations are made, they too will bear the VC mark-­the boundaries for command and control being altered to accom­modate political and military calculations. For instance, follow­ing the United States and Vietnamese 1970 operations in Cam­bodia, the VC consolidated Subregions 2 and 3 Party organiza­tions into a new Long An Subregion. (See Figure 9)

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*See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 81, "COSVN Resolution No.l4" and No. 82, "COSVN Preliminary Report on the 1969 Autumn Campaign. "

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This research note does not delineate the areas of Cambo­dia and Laos over which the VC maintained control for varying periods of time. As Figure 9 indicates the Tr~-Thien-Hu~' Military Region includes Laotian territory. (A s long ago as 1953 the Viet Minh was assisting the Pathet Lao to establish its bases). The Tay Nguyen - Lower Laos Military Region inclu­ded both Laotian and Cambodian territory. Military Regions Z and 10, als 0 border on what were extensive VC /NVA sanctuary areas in Cambodia. COSVN itself was located in a Cambodian haven adjacent to Tay Ninh Province (Subregion 10).

Of these sanctuaries an SVNLA headquarters political officer wrote in 1969; "The 930 kilometer common frontier with Cambodia constitutes our base area. It is also a direct rear area for the SVN battlefield. Supplies and men from the large rear area [North Viet-Nam] have to cross this area. "* Preci­sely how COSVN mapped Cambodia has not yet been ascertained. Nor is an NVA map of those provinces of Laos in which it has operated available.

Figure 9 shows the Viet Cong's principal military-politic­al divisions of South Viet-Nam as they were designated in Jan­uary, 1971. To assist in locating them a parallel GVN map of the Republic is appended as Figure 10.

The boundary between the two Vietnams is the 17th paral­lel with the narrow Demilitarized Zone running on either side of it. Reading southwards from it the principal VC command echelons at the begiD.ning of 1971 were;

I Trt-Thien-Hug MR composed of the B-5 Front which in-

cludes the Vix;.h Linh Special Zone, the Southerrunost tip of North Viet-Nam, and the Demilitarized Zone along the 17th Parallel; SR-l, sometimes called the DMZ Front, SR-Z, SR-3, and SR-4;

Quting £la Special Zone which is coterminus with VC Q .. r.' . uang eva proV1nce;

MR-5 (Central Trung B9) made up of a Northern Subregion and a Southern Subregion;

* See Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 88, "The Viet-Cong's March-April 1970 Plans for Expanding Control in Cambodia, " Document 1.

lAOS

CAMBODIA

G U l F OF

S I A M

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SOU T H

CHI N A

SEA

SOU T H

CHI N A

SEA

LEGEND

Figure 9, Current VC Administrative and Military Subdivisions.

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PHU QU~.:'~ (IC'''N .. , ....... )

Figure 10.

Military Region! Corps boundary Province boundary

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Autonomous municipality

III Military Region

Capital Special Zone

IV Military Region

Current Government of Viet-Nam Administrative Subdivisions and Military Regions.

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B-3 Front which consists of the VC inland provinces of Kontum, Gia Lai and f)ac Lac;

MR-6 (Southern Trung B~) which controls the VC provin­ces of Tuy~n flU-c, Ninh Thuiln,' ~m flong, BiOh ThuS-n, and Bitm Tuy; . •

... , MR-lO which encompasses the VC provinces of Quang fluc, , ~

Phtldc Long, and Binh Long;

,.. . MR-7 (a truncated Eastern Nam Bo) WhlCh controls VC

Ba Long province (SR-9), SR-8 (U-l pro'vince), and SR-4;

The VC subregions around the Saigon complex (SR-6) reading clockwise are SR-5, SR-8, SR-4, Long An SR (former­ly SRs 2 and 3) and SR-I;

MR-2 (Central Nam BS) which includes the VG provinces 10) - ,.) • "" --"..

of Kien Ttfdng, Kien Phong, An Giang, My Tho, Go Gong and '"", Ben Tre; and

MR-3 (Western Nam Bo), the southernmost military re­gion, which controls the VG provinces of ViDh Long, Tra. Vinh, Can Thd, R~ch Gil., So'c Trang, and Gil Mau.

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