G.R. No. 133917 February 19, 2001PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY",accused-appellants.YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend.1For automatic review is the Decision2of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamatalias"Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malaguraalias"Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8,3of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,4and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.The information against accused-appellants reads:That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana which are prohibited.CONTRARY TO LAW.5Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation against them.6Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.The antecedent facts are as follows:Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.7The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused- appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.8At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time that morning.9Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.10At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicle and overtook the "trisikad."11SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were accosted.12The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag.13Molina replied,"Boss, if possible we will settle this."14SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.15On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.16The demurrer was denied by the trial court.17A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision,18the decretal portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence from both accused who waived presentation of their own evidence through their counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection under Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided for by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate action as the case may be.SO ORDERED.19Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellants contend:I.THAT THE MARIJUANA IS IN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;II.THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; ANDIII.THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659(sic),IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.20The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.21Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.22Thus:Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.23The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;24and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).25The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made --- the process cannot be reversed.26As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with .a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrestin flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another ( arrest of escaped prisoners ).27In the case at bar, the courta quoanchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caughtin flagrante delictoin possession of prohibited drugs.28This brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.InPeople v. Chua Ho San,29the Court held that in cases ofin flagrante delictoarrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed inPeople v. Doria,30probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts,i.e.,supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.As applied toin flagrante delictoarrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify anin flagrante delictoarrest. Thus, inPeople v. Aminnudin,31it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of theMNWilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension."Likewise, inPeople v. Mengote,32the Court did not consider "eyes... darting from side to side :.. [while] holding ... [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed or was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also, inPeople v. Encinada,33the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding amotorelawhile holding two plastic baby chairs.1wphi1.ntThen, too, inMalacat v. Court of Appeals,34the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was "`standing at the comer of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them.'"35In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:Here, there could have been no valid inflagrante delicto... arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of V u, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.36It went on to state that Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" - an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the comer and were not creating any commotion or trouble...Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.37Clearly, to constitute a validin flagrante delictoarrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.38In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board atrisikad,accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when, SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants even before the arrest, to wit "Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and how did you know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to another person?A- Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and Molina, when they pass by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin one is Nazario Molina"39The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless SPO1 Pamplona could not have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of accused-appellants' name and address prior to the arrest.Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants' identity, and were, from all indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.Compared toPeople v. Encinada,the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant Encinada even before the arrest because of the latter's illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the consequent search were illegal, holding that "[t]he prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode themotorela.No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances."40Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.41Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of criminals.WHEREFORE,the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96, isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamatalias"Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malaguraalias"Boboy", areACQUITTEDand orderedRELEASEDfrom confinement unless they are validly detained for other offenses. No costs.SO ORDERED.[G.R. No. 123872.January 30, 1998]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs.RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA,accused-appellant.D E C I S I O NREGALADO,J.:Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was charged on August 22, 1994 for violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which alleges:That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered prohibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage and prejudice to the public interest.[1]The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from appellant who was assisted therein by his counselde parte.[2]Trial was held on scheduled dates thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant.He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount ofP500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.[3]It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in Dasmarias.Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant.That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana.It was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place.[4]Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs.He claimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket money and without any luggage.His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he would return to Baguio City.He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of theP500.00 which he had with him.Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she reportedly worked as a supervisor,[5]although, as the trial court observed, she never presented any document to prove her alleged employment.In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs.This Court, after an objective and exhaustive review of the evidence on record, discerns no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court.It finds unassailable the reliance of the lower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill motives can be attributed, and its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently self-serving in nature.1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the basis of insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers "testified only on the alleged transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is supposedly corrosive of the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon appellant's fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him, that informant was a vital personality in the operation who would have contradicted the hearsay and conflicting testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was collared by them.The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof, as amended, is as follows:SEC. 4.Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty ofreclusion perpetuato death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, some of the various modes of commission[6]being the sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said law.The text of Section 4 expands and extends its punitive scope to other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by including these who shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions."Section 4 could thus be violated by the commission of any of the acts specified therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering, giving away, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like.As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the transgressive acts alleged therein and attributed to appellant being that he administered, delivered, and transported marijuana.The governing rule with respect to an offense which may be committed in any of the different modes provided by law is that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed in one, two or more modes specified therein.This is so as allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be considered as a description of only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness.[7]In appellant's case, the prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing that he transported marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite.By that act alone of transporting the illicit drugs, appellant had already run afoul of that particular section of the statute, hence, appellant's asseverations must fail.The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer should have been produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court was essential in order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed by the State against him.These assertions are, however, much too strained.Far from compromising the primacy of appellant's right to confrontation, the non-presentation of the informer in this instance was justified and cannot be faulted as error.For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in which they had personally taken part.As such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed with by the prosecution,[8]more so where what he would have corroborated are the narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity is the prevailing legal presumption.Besides, informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police.[9]Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that course.[10]Finally, appellant could very well have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear before the court below,[11]but which remedy was not availed of by him.2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an unlawful warrantless search and seizure.He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities had already been apprised by their so-called informer of appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant.Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn.Once again, the Court is not persuaded.Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.[12]Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.This exclusionaryruleisnot,however,anabsoluteandrigidproscription.Thus, (1) customs searches;[13](2) searches of moving vehicles,[14](3) seizure of evidence in plain view;[15](4) consented searches;[16](5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;[17]and (6) "stop and frisk" measures[18]have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994.Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant.While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of the warrant applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery.Neither did this asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or were being brought by someone separately from, the courier.On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense.In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.In fact, the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier.Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when and the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up, and how he would do so.On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for, as both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in past operations. Moreover, experience shows that although information gathered and passed on by these assets to law enforcers are vague and piecemeal, and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant.If the courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers.3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.Under that provision, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.[19]On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could beclassifiedasonein cadence withthe instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).[20]These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught inflagrante delicto.The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.[21]Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized.In the past, our statutory rules and jurisprudence requiredprima facieevidence, which was of a higher degree or quantum,[22]and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even in the American jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its concept, probable cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of,[23]or an apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe that the accused person had committed the crime.[24]Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at least on the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof.[25]It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists."[26]It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time.The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects.Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did.Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for questioning.Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal.But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view.Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in appellant's luggage.It would obviously have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law.The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs.With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught inflagrante delicto,hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. To repeat, when the officers approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to open the traveling bag.Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal activities.When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conducted upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived either expressly or impliedly.[27]Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the supremacy of the law,[28]the case of herein appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right.[29]4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally, properly and adequately establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him) were the same marijuana examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court."Indeed, the arresting officers did not identify in court the marijuana bricks seized from appellant since, in fact they did not have to do so.It should be noted that the prosecution presented in the court below and formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks of marijuana together with the traveling bag and the carton box in which the same were contained.The articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that the marijuana turned over to the chemist for examination, and which subsequently proved positive as such, were the same drugs taken from appellant.The trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence, satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than those taken from appellant.Complementarily, thecorpus delictiwas firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting who categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contents of the traveling bag of appellant appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him where he had come from, and the latter readily answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the veracity of the report of the informer.No other conclusion can therefore be derived than that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from Baguio City.Coupled with the presentation in court of the subject matter of the crime, the marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being indian hemp, the guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in violation of the law is beyond doubt.Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming that he was not allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.Indeed, appellant has a point.The police authorities here could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 7438[30]which defines certain rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting, detaining, and investigating officers, and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof.Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court will not necessarily be struck down.Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his custodial investigation.Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or admission was elicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence.Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together with the documentary and object evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence in the court below.5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant.As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now providesinter aliathat the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more.In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty ofreclusion perpetuato death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,reclusion perpetuaand death.In the present case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides the rules to be observed in the application of said penalties.As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty ofreclusion perpetuais the proper imposable penalty.Contrary to the pronouncement of the courta quo,it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed.Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which such a conclusion may be gleaned or deduced.On the contrary, this Court has already concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,[31]the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of that case was also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty where the violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in said section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.[32]While the minority or the death of the victim will increase the liability of the offender, these two facts do not constitute generic aggravating circumstances, as the law simply provides for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death if the offense is attended by either of such factual features.In that situation, obviously the rules on the graduation of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply.In herein appellant's case, there was neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim.Hence, the basic rules in Article 63 of the Code govern.WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua.In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 145566 March 9, 2004PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee,vs.DINDO "BEBOT" MOJELLO,appellant.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61, finding appellant Dindo "Bebot" Mojello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death.1Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in an Information dated May 22, 1997, as follows:2That on the 15th day of December 1996, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Kota, Barangay Talisay, Municipality of Santa Fe, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12) years of age and with mental deficiency, against her will and consent, and by reason and/or on the occasion thereof, purposely to conceal the most brutal act and in pursuance of his criminal design, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, treacherously and employing personal violence, attack, assault and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflicting upon the victim wounds on the different parts of her body which caused her death.CONTRARY TO LAW.Appellant was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of "not guilty." Trial followed.On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.From the facts found by the courta quo, it appears that on December 15, 1996, at or around 9:00 p.m., Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a group which included Roger Capacito and his wife and the spouses Borah and Arsolin Illustrismo at the Capacito residence located at Barangay Talisay, Sta. Fe, Cebu.3Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home about an hour later. On his way home, he saw his niece, Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo Mojello, a nephew of Roger Capacito, walking together some thirty meters away towards the direction of Sitio Kota.4Since he was used to seeing them together on other occasions, he did not find anything strange about this. He proceeded to his house.5On December 16, 1996, between 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., the Rayco family was informed that the body of Lenlen was found at the seashore of Sitio Kota. Rogelio Rayco immediately proceeded to the site and saw the lifeless, naked and bruised body of his niece. Rogelio was devastated by what he saw. A remorse of conscience enveloped him for his failure to protect his niece. He even attempted to take his own life several days after the incident.6Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor launch bound for Cadiz City. On an investigation conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator of the dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial interrogation. His confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo Batobalanos and Manolo Landao. Batobalanos testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document were read to appellant who later on voluntarily signed it.7Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Fe-Bantayan.8On December 21, 1996, an autopsy was conducted on the victim's cadaver by Dr. Nestor Sator of the Medico-Legal Branch of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region VII.9Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of thelabia majoraand hymenal lacerations positively indicate that the victim was raped.10He observed that froth in the lungs of the victim and contusions on her neck show that she was strangled and died of asphyxia.11He indicated the cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and physical injuries to the head and the trunk.12In this automatic review, appellant raises two issues: whether the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in evidence; and whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.We now resolve.Appellant alleges that the lower court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the alleged extrajudicial confession which he executed on December 23, 1996. In his Brief, appellant avers that the confession which he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered into.13He argues that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights before the confession was taken from him.14Hence, his confession, and admissions made therein, should be deemed inadmissible in evidence, under thefruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.We are not convinced.At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on custodial investigation enshrined in Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides:Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda rights" stemming from the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court,Miranda v. Arizona.15It has been the linchpin of the modern Bill of Rights, and the ultimate refuge of individuals against the coercive power of the State.TheMirandadoctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda doctrine was based on the leading case ofPeople v. Galit16andMorales, Jr. v. Enrile,17rulings subsequently incorporated into the present Constitution. TheMirandadoctrine under the 1987 Charter took on a modified form where the right to counsel was specifically qualified to meancompetent and independent counsel preferably of the suspect's own choice. Waiver of the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter requirements compared to its American counterpart; it must be donein writing, and in thepresence of counsel.Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial investigation has evolved to provide formore stringent standardsthan what was originally laid out inMiranda v. Arizona. The purpose of the constitutional limitations on police interrogation as the process shifts from the investigatory to the accusatory seems to be to accord even the lowliest and most despicable criminal suspects a measure of dignity and respect. The main focus is the suspect, and the underlying mission of custodial investigation to elicit a confession.The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996, applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence.As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was undoubtedly apprised of hisMirandarights under the Constitution.18The courta quoobserved that the confession itself expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights.19As further proof of the same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant.20Appellant manifested on record his desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that before the investigation was conducted and appellant's statement taken, he advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even told appellant to answer only the questions he understood freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer.21Atty. Giduquio represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case.Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the contemplation of the Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate his competence and independence in representing appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover, appellant manifested for the record that Atty. Giduquio was his choice of counsel during the custodial proceedings.The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.22We ruled inPeople v. Continente23that while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel's appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.24The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. InPeople v. Dumalahay,25this Court held:The sworn confessions of the three accused show that they were properly apprised of their right to remain silent and right to counsel, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee.At 8:00 in the morning of the next day, the three accused proceeded to the office of Atty. Rexel Pacuribot, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. All of the three accused, still accompanied by Atty. Ubay-ubay, subscribed and swore to their respective written confessions. Before administering the oaths, Atty. Pacuribot reminded the three accused of their constitutional rights under the Miranda doctrine and verified that their statements were voluntarily given. Atty. Pacuribot also translated the contents of each confession in the Visayan dialect, to ensure that each accused understood the same before signing it.No ill-motive was imputed on these two lawyers to testify falsely against the accused. Their participation in these cases merely involved the performance of their legal duties as officers of the court. Accused-appellant Dumalahay's allegation to the contrary, being self-serving, cannot prevail over the testimonies of these impartial and disinterested witnesses.More importantly, the confessions are replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied. These factors are clear indicia that the confessions were voluntarily given.When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession.The confessions dovetail in all their material respects. Each of the accused gave the same detailed narration of the manner by which Layagon and Escalante were killed. This clearly shows that their confessions could not have been contrived. Surely, the three accused could not have given such identical accounts of their participation and culpability in the crime were it not the truth.Concededly, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon appellant's apprehension by the police authorities violated theMirandadoctrine on two grounds: (1) no counsel was present; and (2) improper waiver of the right to counsel as it was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the December 23, 1996 custodial investigation which elicited the appellant's confession should nevertheless be upheld for having complied with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1. Even though improper interrogation methods were used at the outset, there is still a possibility of obtaining a legally valid confession later on by properly interrogating the subject under different conditions and circumstances than those which prevailed originally.26The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely, voluntarily and intelligently entered into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with theMirandadoctrine under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. SPO2 Wilfredo Abello Giducos, prior to conducting his investigation, explained to appellant his constitutional rights in theVisayan dialect, notablyCebuano, a language known to the appellant,viz:27PASIUNA (PRELIMINARY) :Ikaw karon Dindo Mojello ubos sa usa ka inbestigasyon diin ikaw gituhon nga adunay kalabutan sa kamatayon ni LENLEN RAYCO ug nahitabong paglugos kaniya. Ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod, ikaw adunay katungod sa pagpakahilom ning maong inbesigasyon karon kanimo ug aduna usab ikaw ug katungod nga katabangan ug usa ka abogado nga motabang karon kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon. Imo ba nasabtan kining tanan? (DINDO MOJELLO, you are hereby reminded that you are under investigation in which you were suspected about the death and raping of LENLEN RAYCO. Under the Constitution you have the right to remain silent about this investigation on you now and you have also the right to have counsel of your own choice to assist you in this investigation now. Have you understood everything?)TUBAG (ANSWER) :Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)PANGUTANA (QUESTION) :Human ikaw sayri sa imong katungod ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod sa pagpakahilom, gusto ba nimo nga ipadayon nato kining inbestigasyon karon kanimo? (After you have been apprised of your rights under our Constitution to remain silent, do you want to proceed this investigation on you now?)TUBAG (QUESTION) :Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)PANGUTANA (QUESTION) :Gusto ba usab nimo ug abogado nga makatabang kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon? (Do you want counsel to assist you in this said investigation?)TUBAG (ANSWER) :Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)APPEARANCE : Atty. Isaias Giduquio is appearing as counsel of the affiant.PANGUTANA (QUESTION) :Ako usab ikaw pahinumdoman nga unsa man ang imo isulti karon dinhi magamit pabor o batok kanimo sa Hukmanan, nasabtan ba nimo kining tanan mo nga mga katungod nga walay naghulga, nagpugos o nagdagmal kanimo o nagsaad ba ug ganti sa kaulihan? (You are also hereby reminded that all your statements now will be used as evidence against or in your favor in any court of justice. Have you understood all your rights with nobody coercing or forcing you, or mauling or promising a reward in the end?)TUBAG (ANSWER) :Oo(Yes.)PANGUTANA (QUESTION) :Andam ka nga mohatag ug libre ug boluntaryo nga pamahayag? (Are you now ready to give your free and voluntary statement?)TUBAG (ANSWER) :Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)x x x x x x x x x(START OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)x x x x x x x x x.The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he was fully apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to counsel, as contained in such confession.28Appellant was properly assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial confession of appellant was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal Judge of Medellin-Daanbantayan and acting Judge of MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan and Madredijos. Judge Jaca declared that he explained to the appellant the contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. He subsequently acknowledged that when appellant subscribed to his statement, Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and his Clerk of Court were present as well as other people.29The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid requirements of the Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is admissible as evidence. The lower court was correct in giving credence to the extrajudicial confession of the appellant.On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial confession,yet he neither filed any case against the person who threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect,yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.InPeople v. Pia,30we held that "where appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged maltreatment; where there appears no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions." The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions.31To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere allegation of threat, torture, coercion, intimidation or inducement, without any proof whatsoever.People v. Enanoriafurther declared that another indicium of voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the confession which could have been known only to the declarant.32The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress, compulsion or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed.33Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption.34The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed.35In cases where theMirandawarnings have been given, the test of voluntariness should be subsequently applied in order to determine the probative weight of the confession.Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession remains unrebutted by his failure to present independent evidence that the same was coerced.It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement officers is to ensure that a suspect has been properly apprised of hisMirandarights, including the right to counsel. It is in the paramount public interest that the foundation of an effective administration of criminal justice relies on the faithful adherence to theMirandadoctrine. Compliance with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 by police authorities is central to the criminal justice system;Mirandarights must in every case be respected, without exception.Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional requirements under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It follows that the admission of culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore not "fruit of the poisonous tree" since the tree itself is not poisonous.Appellant also alleges that the lower court gravely erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, thereby sentencing him to suffer the death penalty despite the glaring insufficiency of circumstantial evidence against him. In his Brief, he argues that the evidence against him is insufficient to warrant his conviction of rape with homicide.The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape, coupled with thecorpus delictias established by the Medico-Legal Report and the testimony of Rogelio Rayco, leads us to no other conclusion than that of appellant's guilt for the rape of Lenlen Rayco on December 15, 1996. It passes the test of moral certainty and must therefore be sustained.However, the records do not adequately show that appellant admitted to killing the victim. Neither is the circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that by reason or on the occasion of the rape a homicide was committed by the appellant. The lack of physical evidence further precludes us from connecting the slaying of the victim to her sexual assault, given the quantum of proof required by law for conviction. No estimated time of death was given, which is essential in making a connection with the appellant's story that he went home after a night of drinking. The time when he and the victim were headed towards the seashore at or about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. of December 15, 1996 until the time when the victim's lifeless body was found at or about 4:00 a.m. of December 16, 1996 had a time variance of between six to seven hours. Although the circumstances may point to the appellant as the most likely perpetrator of the homicide, the same do not constitute an unbroken chain of events which would lead us to a reasonable conclusion that appellant was guilty of killing the victim. In other words, there are gaps in the reconstruction of facts and inferences surrounding the death of Lenlen. Appellant only admitted to boxing the victim when she shouted, then hurriedly ran away. The cause of death of Lenlen was cardio-respiratory attack due to asphyxiation and physical injuries; she was strangled to death and left on the seashore as manifested by the frothing in her lungs. No physical, scientific or DNA evidence was presented to pinpoint appellant as the person who killed the victim. Fingerprints, if available, would have determined who committed the homicide. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of rape with homicide considering the insufficiency of evidence which thereby created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt for the said special complex crime.Appellant should instead be held liable only for the crime of statutory rape, the victim Lenlen Rayco being then eleven years old. The sexual assault was necessarily included in the special complex crime charged in the Information dated May 22, 1997.The trial court should have awarded damages to the heirs of the victim. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is awarded upon the finding of the fact of rape.36Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 may likewise be given to the heirs of the victim without need of proof in accordance with current jurisprudence.37WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61 in Criminal Case No. B-00224 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Dindo Mojello is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Lenlen Rayco, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.Costsde oficio.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK,petitioners,vs.HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City,respondents.Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.CONCEPCION,C.J.:Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because,inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action forcertiorari, prohibition,mandamusand injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged,6(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein havenocause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contestedonlyby the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure ispurely personaland cannot be availed of by third parties.10Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusivelyto the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.11Indeed, it has been held:. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to thecorporationdid not relate to nor did it affect thepersonaldefendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of thecorporationand not the rights of theother defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raisedonlyby onewhose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendantswhose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights ofanother.Remus vs. United States(C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure doesnotextend to the personal defendants but embracesonlythecorporationwhose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court,12thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.tPetitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution13provides:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue butupon probablecause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shallparticularlydescribe the things to be seized.None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecificoffense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed wereabstract. As a consequence, it wasimpossiblefor the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performedparticularacts, or committedspecificomissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws orTo uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court14by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court15that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable causein connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining toall business transactionsof petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions werelegalorillegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized beparticularlydescribed as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination ofgeneralwarrants.Relying uponMoncado vs. People's Court(80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered,"16upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained,17such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this isthe only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunctionagainst unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows thatit cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is ofno value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court.20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, inMapp vs. Ohio(supra.):. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too,without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short,the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized thatthe purpose of the exclusionary rule to"is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin,we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause,we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it isnot possiblefor the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possi