Violation of a Lawyer's Oath

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“Violation of a Lawyer’s Oath”

The Lawyer’s Oath

I, do, solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,

I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly

constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;

I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid

nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a

lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to

the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any

mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

Submitted To:

Atty. Grace Tillah – Alasco

(Professor)

Submitted By:

Roshielle S. Mercado

(Student) Group 7, III-C



Year 1960 – 1971

CASE NO. 1

IN RE: SORIANO

Facts:

Clemente M. Soriano a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954 entered

his appearance in the present case which is PHHC and UP vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et.al. as “ Chief

Counsel of Record” for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio et.al. Atty. Soriano was in effect

asking this Court to exhume this case from the archives. His subsequent explanation did not,

however, serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action

should not be taken against him for entering a appearance at such a late date. Sometime during

the first week of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio in his own behalf and asattorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage his professional services in

two cases to wit: this terminated case (L-24114) and the case entitled: “ Varsity Hills vs. Hon.

Herminio C. Mariano” at their conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed atty.

Soriano of the precise status of each of the two cases, thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set

for hearing on October27, 1969, while the present case was still pendi;ng and the date of

hearing thereof was yet undetermined. In addition to Marcelino Tiburcio’s representations,

Atty. Soriano allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty. Antonio J.

Dalangpan that indeed these two cases were pending in this Court. So Atty. Soriano prepared a

letter-contract dated October 1969, by virtue of which he agreed to render professional

services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases. It was on the same dated October 8,

1969 that he then caused the preparation of his written appearance in the present case.

Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land

would find no justification if atty. Soriano were to render his professional services solely in the

Varsity Hills case, for in this latter case, the records of which we are in a position to take judicial

notice, an area of only about 19 hectares is involved, the bulk of the property claimed by the

respondents having been litigated in the present case.

Held:

We, find Atty. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusable precipitate in putting an officious

finger into the vortex of the case. He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member

of the BAR must needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or

under litigation. Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to

obtain the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then



he should, at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution.

Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he exerted efforts to

communicate with Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from being convinced that he really did so.

Nowhere in his written manifestations to this court did he make mention of such efforts on his

part. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere afterthoughts. When Atty.

Soriano accepted the two cases for the respondents, especially the varsity Hills case, he had notbothered at all to communicate with Atty. Doria, as the befitting thing to do when a lawyer

associates with another in a pending cause. He did not bother either to comprehend the

substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case, something which is

elementary in the lawyer’s trade. What Atty. Soriano should have done, in keeping with the

reasonable vigilance exacted of members of the legal profession, was to pay a verification visit

to the records section of this Court, which is easily and quickly accessible by car or public

conveyance from his office. If his office were situated in the province and he did not have the

time to come to the Supreme Court building in manila, he could have posed the proper query to

the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram.

We, find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of

his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no

less than his SUSPENSION from the practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at

the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he made to this Court. Atty.

Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he

has entered as Chief Counsel of Record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et.al.



CASE NO. 2

PATRICIO SALAMANCA VERSUS ATTY. FELICIANO R. BAUTISTA

Facts:

On March 28, 1948, the complainant sold his sugar mill located in San Jose, Nueva

Ecija, to Juan Torres, who promised to pay therefore the amount of Php.3000 on or before

March 30, 1949. As the price was not paid on the date due, complainant engaged the services

of herein respondent to prosecute his claim. Accordingly the corresponding complaint was filed

to recover said amount with interest, damages and attorney's fees, on August 1, 1953 in the

Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Served with summons three days later, Juan Torres

accompanied by his son-in-law, Vicente Jose, went to see the complainant for extra-judicialsettlement. The three proceeded to the respondent's house where after a short conversation,

the respondent typed in Tagalog, a document which he asked the complaint to sign, and the

latter signed after receiving P200 that came from Juan Torres, Salamanca claims — and so

testified — he did not know the contents of the document he signed. On the other hand

Attorney Bautista swore he translated it to him and that Salamanca otherwise knew it was an

amicable settlement. According to the Solicitor General, the contract signed by Salamanca

employing the services of respondent was also written in Tagalog; yet there is no claim of

deceit in the establishment of their professional relationship. Indeed, in San Jose, Nueva Ecija,

where the incidents occurred, Tagalog is generally understood, according to Justice of the

Peace Gelacio T. Yusi of that town. On the other hand the position of the client appears to beunbelievable on several counts. How could he swear he did not know what the P200-peso was

for? He knew it came from his adversary, who had asked him to "settle the case amicably" and

whose presence it was given to him. He was required to sign, according to him, a paper the

contents of which he allegedly did not know; and yet for several months he made no efforts to

have it translated — he having a grand nephew who was then studying law (Bienvenido

Salamanca), who by the way declared later before the investigator, that his said understood the

contents of the document, so much so that he told him (Bienvenido) way back in 1953 that his

case had been settled. Remembering that the document was signed in August, 1953 and that

Salamanca objected to it only in January, 1955, one is apt to inquire, why the delay? The

answer is, because the sugar mill could not be sold,3

Salamanca did not receive the P2000 and

did not want to get the sugar mill back. As respondent explained before the investigator, hisclient all but blamed him for their failure to sell the mill, and so they had a tiff which culminated

in this accusation.

When the Clerk of Court was commissioned to receive additional evidence for

respondent, he sent for the original record of the case (Salamanca vs. Torres) in the Court of

First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Having found therein that the question whether the compromise



agreement had actually been fully understood and approved by the client was debated before

the court, he reported the advisability of awaiting such court's decision and/or the Court of

Appeals' decision if any, on the factual issue. Copies of the report were furnished the parties;

and none of them objected to the suggestion. Said court record shows that copy of Salamanca's

complaint to recover P3000 pesos had been served on the defendant Torres on August 3, 1953.

Up to February, 1955 no step was taken or pleading filed in the case. Now, we think, if therehad been no compromise, the defendant would ordinarily have answered on time or the

plaintiff would have asked for default, and presentation of his evidence. No such move was

taken; obviously because both parties knew there was a settlement, which superseded the

court proceedings.

Held:

Because the circumstances do not support the allegation of deception to Attorney

Bautista, who, according to the evidence, enjoys a good reputation in the community in whichhe practices his profession. WHEREFORE, this complaint for malpractice must be, and is hereby

DISMISSED. So ordered.



CASE NO. 3

IN RE: GUTIERREZ

Facts:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar admitted to it on

October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro

he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and

together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this

Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the

penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent

was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion

of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal

laws of the Philippines." On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco,victim in the murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent

be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his

answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on

the authority of the decision of this Court. Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar

may be removed suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his

conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The

term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty

or good morals.

Held:

Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder

without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and

aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position

(respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs.

Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being

purged from the profession. The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who

measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a

candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but

require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither

dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or

else incur the risk of suspension or removal.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime

for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered DISBARRED and

his name STRICKEN from the roll of lawyers.

Documents

Violation of a Lawyer's Oath