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Critical Review of InternationalSocial and Political PhilosophyPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcri20
Violence in a spirit of love:Gandhi and the limits of non-violenceVinit Haksar aa School of Philosophy, Psychology and LanguageSciences, Edinburgh University, Edinburgh, UKVersion of record first published: 23 Jan 2012.
To cite this article: Vinit Haksar (2012): Violence in a spirit of love: Gandhi and thelimits of non-violence, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,15:3, 303-324
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2011.644422
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Violence in a spirit of love: Gandhi and the limits ofnon-violence
Vinit Haksar*
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, Edinburgh University,Edinburgh, UK
The paper considers how Mahatma Gandhi’s Law of Ahimsa (or non-violence) can be reconciled with the necessity of violence; some of thestrategies that Gandhi adopts in response to this problem are criticallyexamined. Gandhi was willing to use (outward) violence as anexpedience (in the sense of necessity), but he was opposed to usingnon-violence as an expedience. There are two versions of Gandhi’sdoctrine. He makes a distinction between outward violence and innerviolence. Both versions grant that outward violence is often necessaryand must be administered with compassion. On the more demandingversion, outward version is never justified, not even when it is neces-sary; it is at best excused or pardoned. On the less demanding version,outward violence under certain conditions is justified.
Keywords: Gandhi; non-violence; violence
Introduction
Mahatma Gandhi was once asked if it is ever possible to administer violencein a spirit of love. His reply was an emphatic, ‘No. Never’ (Gandhi 1949,vol. 1, p. 141). I suggest that sometimes we may have to administer vio-lence in a spirit of love (or at least compassion) and that in an importantsense Gandhi’s philosophy does allow for this possibility. Of course,Gandhi’s reply does have an initial plausibility for violence is terrible whilelove is wonderful and is typically associated with non-violence. But weshall see that things are more complicated, even as an interpretation ofGandhi; his views on non-violence were in effect less extreme and morecomplex than those who greatly influenced him, such as Christ and Leo Tol-stoy. Unlike the extreme pacifist, Gandhi was aware of the necessity of vio-lence and killing. But he was sometimes unaware of the complexity of hisown views. A person is not an infallible interpreter of his own philosophy!
Gandhi distinguished between outward or bodily violence and inwardviolence. Outward violence involves the actual infliction of injury on the
*Email: [email protected]
Critical Review of International Social and Political PhilosophyVol. 15, No. 3, June 2012, 303–324
ISSN 1369-8230 print/ISSN 1743-8772 online� 2012 Taylor & Francishttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2011.644422http://www.tandfonline.com
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victim. Inward violence involves harbouring hatred or ill will or malicetowards others. On the standard interpretation of Gandhi (the demandingversion), both forms of violence are always wrong:
Non-violence is both an attitude of mind and action consequent upon it. Nodoubt, there is life in vegetables. But the taking of vegetable life is inevita-ble. But it is none the less destruction of life. Only it may be regarded asexcusable. (Gandhi 1986, p. 307)
For Gandhi Ahimsa did not just consist in the absence of violence; it was apositive state that involved love, even of the evil doer (Bondurant 1965, p. 24).
He rejected the doctrine that the ends justify the means. For Gandhisince violence is always evil, it can never be justified, however, good thealleged results. This creates a problem. For as Gandhi was aware violenceis sometimes necessary or unavoidable in life even against human beings.The Gandhian answer is to say that expediency in the sense of necessitynever justifies the use of evil means, but it can sometimes excuse or pardonthe use of evil means (Haksar 2011).
Gandhi admits that his message of non-violence is as old as the hills.What is distinctive about his approach is that he stresses the power of com-passion, suffering and self-sacrifice as a method of promoting this aim; andthe use of non-violence as a creed as opposed to a convenient policy orexpedience. These two features are connected in the sense that one shouldpassionately practice non-violence in all spheres of life and such dedicationinvolves self-sacrifice. Those like Gandhi who believe in non-violence as acreed do so because they believe that they have a duty to follow the non-violent ideal to the best of their abilities in all areas of life. The power ofnon-violence, which includes the wonderful transformative consequences ofnon-violence, comes from a duty-based adherence to non-violence in allspheres of life. The voluntary suffering, the self-sacrifice and the adherenceto truth of the Satyagrahis, rooted in love or compassion, moves theoppressors to change their ways and sets an example for all.
Gandhi rightly conceded that ‘outward violence’ is sometimes unavoid-able. Those who regard non-violence as a creed must keep outwardviolence to a minimum, when necessary by voluntary suffering and self-sacrifice. Gandhi explicitly talks the language of violence in the spirit ofcompassion. When violence is unavoidable it ‘must be spontaneous, mustbe the lowest minimum, must be rooted in compassion, must have discrimi-nation, restraint, detachment at its back, and must lead us every moment tothe path of Ahimsa’ (Gandhi 1998, p. 43, added emphasis). And to thepath of Satya (or Truth), he might have added.
He attributed the failure of many non-violent movements to the fact thatthey were dominated by opportunists who used non-violence as an expedi-ent device in a specific area such as non-cooperation with the rulers. In a
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nutshell, Gandhi was willing to use (outward) violence as an expedience(in the sense of necessity) but he was opposed to using non-violence as anexpedience. This is a perfectly plausible and coherent position.
He associated violence with revenge or retaliation and thought violencebreeds violence in a vicious circle; in the long run the only way out of thiscircle is to follow the ideal of non-violence. Non-violence too is infectiousbut the circle here is a virtuous one. Non-violence is the law of our being,it encourages through the power of example, non-violence in the opponentand the spectator. The sincere suffering and sacrifices of the practitioner inthe practice of Ahimsa opens the eyes of the understanding of the opponentthrough the heart.
His non-violence is closely linked to Satyagraha (i.e. holding on to thetruth) and compassion for the opponent (Horsburgh 1968). The parties tothe dispute do not claim to have the monopoly of the truth, they appreciatethe opponent’s point of view and engage in a dialectical search for the truthwith the opponent; unlike violence which at best leads to a temporary set-tlement based on a Modus Vivendi. An important advantage of non-violenceover violence (e.g. capital punishment, terrorism) is that when the practitio-ners are mistaken, the cost and the suffering are borne by the practitioners,not the opponent. Gandhi sometimes (not always!) forgets that this consid-eration alone provides at best a presumption in favour of non-violence, thepresumption may be defeated, for instance, if and when there are lives ofinnocent third parties at stake, which are in imminent danger unless weresort to violence. In his moderate moments, he grants that even man-slaughter can sometimes be necessary to protect innocent people from aninsane aggressor (Gandhi 1960, p. 119).
Gandhi thought that non-violence was the law of our species and violencewas the law of the brute; violence is against the law, not the man made lawbut ‘the law made by Nature for man’ (Gandhi 1986, p. 253). The relation-ships of non-violent love are much more fundamental and commonplace inhuman evolution than violence and antagonism. If this were not the case, hesays in Hind Swaraj, the human race would have perished ages ago.
He believed that violence was evil in itself and in its results and thatnon-violence was good in itself and in its results. He thought that violence,at least in its outward form, involved injuring or harming the victim of vio-lence. He included psychological injuries as part of injuries. Injuriesinvolve pain, suffering, disablement, death, etc.; so we can see the plausi-bility of the view that violence is inherently evil. He believed in the sanc-tity of life and thought that harming a person or indeed any sentient beingwas never justified unless it was for the good of the victim or with the con-sent of the victim (Gandhi 1986, p. 308).
It is sometimes suggested that Gandhi allows exceptions to the viewthat violence is always wrong and never justified. He frequently said thatthough non-violence was the best morally speaking, when the choice is
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between cowardice and violence, violence is preferable: ‘if you cannot actnon-violently, you should defend yourself violently rather than be cowards.But the ability to die smiling at the hands of a brother without retaliation,physical or mental, is the highest bravery’ (Gandhi 1963, p. 270). However,this is not necessarily an exception to the view that violence is alwayswrong; it could be that though violence is not as bad as cowardice, it isstill wrong; it is at best the lesser of the evils. This is the standard interpre-tation of Gandhi (Gruzalski 2001, ch. 3, Haksar 2011).
Perhaps one way of reconciling the absolute non-violent view with theview that there have to be some exceptions in practice would be as follows:according to Gandhi the law of non-violence does not admit of exceptions,so violence is indeed always wrong and never justified. Given human limi-tations and imperfections some amount of violence is necessary andunavoidable, but the ideal of non-violence ‘must not be lowered because ofour weakness or imperfection’ (Gandhi 1960, p. 93). For Gandhi the lawof non-violence was an ideal, but it also contained the principle that vio-lence was always wrong. The ideal of non-violence by itself does not implythat departures from non-violence are necessarily morally wrong; the prin-ciple against violence does. Gandhi derives this principle from the principleof the sanctity of life (Gandhi 1986, p. 257), which in some version or theother is at the basis of many civilized legal and moral codes.
The need for violence
Gandhi sometimes justifies killing but never violence: ‘the good use of vio-lence is inconceivable’ (Gandhi 1986, p. 308), the law of non-violenceadmits of no exceptions. He says he has ‘never permitted violence. Theonly thing lawful is non-violence’ (Gandhi 1986, p. 344). This extremeview has to deal with the objection that violence is often necessary. Gandhiadmits that even killing is sometimes justified on paternalistic grounds:‘Should my child be attacked with rabies and there was no helpful remedyto relieve his agony, I should consider it my duty to take his life’ (Gandhi1960, p. 120). He allows mercy killing of animals also; such cases are notreally cases of violence in the evil sense, since they are motivated by com-passion; and they do not involve harm to the victim.
The really difficult cases for Gandhi’s doctrine of non-violence arecases where we need to use violence against the aggressor in self-defenceor in order to protect innocent third parties from the aggressor. Typically,in the case of using violence against the aggressor, the aggressor is injuredand harmed; that is why such cases present more of a problem for Gandhithan cases of justified paternalism. He thinks we should love even our ene-mies and he takes this to imply that we must not harm anyone, not evenour enemies. He was against violence in the sense which involves harm orinjury. For Gandhi a necessary condition of justifying the use of intense
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force, as in killing, is that we attempt to benefit rather than harm the indi-vidual against whom the force is used. Gandhi used this principle to ruleout revolutionary violence (Gandhi 1949, vol. 1, ch. 48). He criticizes the(violent) revolutionary for killing or robbing people not for their own goodbut ‘for the supposed good of society’ (Gandhi 1986, p. 308).
But there is a problem here for Gandhi. Gandhi rightly admits thatsometimes there is a need to inflict outward violence to protect innocentthird parties. Could the (violent) revolutionary not appeal to this necessity,especially when the state fails to perform its function of ensuring the secu-rity and welfare of its citizens? Gandhi was against the use of violence as ameans for social and political change. But the revolutionary could complainthat he too believes in the need to inflict violence as a lesser of the evils,not for self-interested reasons but in the interests of innocent victims ofsocial injustice.
Admittedly, much of terrorist and revolutionary violence is motivatedby hatred, revenge or malice. But what if the revolutionary gets convertedto the view that he should only administer violence when it is motivatedby love or compassion? Such a revolutionary will resort to violence withgreat care. The danger involved to third parties must be clear and presentand the violence should be essential for substantially reducing this danger.Robbery (a la Robin Hood) includes violence or the threat of violence butit may sometimes be necessary when all other options for alleviating pov-erty have failed. But killing people in order to establish a utopia in thefuture is much more controversial even from a purely consequentialist pointof view. For as so often happens with violent revolutions, the hoped forutopia remains a dream.
Perhaps, there would be more scope for optimism if the revolutionariesadministered violence in a spirit of love or compassion. Violence with lovemay not have much of the wonderful transformative effects that non-violence has, but it is less likely than violence without love to lead to thebrutal cycle of violence. Violence with love can preserve some (not all) ofthe important features of Gandhian Satyagraha, such as adherence to thetruth. If we go in for war or for violent resistance to a regime, one shouldadmit one is liable to make mistakes and try to create opportunities for ajust solution to the problem with the opponent. Bhagat Singh is an exampleof a violent revolutionary who, especially towards the end of his short life,was moving in the direction of combining violence with compassion. Afterthrowing the bomb in the central legislative assembly he gave himself upvoluntarily to the authorities; also he committed the crime not for self-interested reasons but for the sake of publicizing the injustices done to fel-low Indians by the British Raj. Some of the IRA terrorists too attempted tominimize violence by giving advance warnings of the time and place ofimpending bomb explosions. On the other hand, much of contemporaryterrorism seems to take pride in maximizing violence.
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The principle that violence is always wrong, along with the fact thatsome degree of violence is necessary, implies that we cannot avoid beingsinners (or at least wrong doers). Our job on Gandhi’s view is to try tominimize the extent to which we sin. Our frailties can explain why we aremuch further from the ideal than we need to be; but they cannot explainwhy we do not reach the ideal. Quite apart from human weakness, the idealis in principle unattainable as long as we remain embodied creatures: ‘Thevery fact of his living – eating, drinking and moving about – necessarilyinvolves some himsa, destruction of life, be it ever so minute’ (Gandhi1986, pt 4, ch. 39). Only when the atman (soul) is free of the body can itattain perfection.
Sometimes we may have to harm an individual in order to protect inno-cent third parties. At times Gandhi was, like Tolstoy, reluctant to admitsuch a possibility; he rashly gives a guarantee that if you are willing to sac-rifice your life to save your ward ‘the whole of the violence will beexpended on you and your charge will be left unscathed’ (Gandhi 1998, p.19). But at other times he was aware that sacrificing oneself by interposingoneself between the aggressor and the innocent third party will not alwayssave the life of the third party, but will result in the death of the third partyand the interposer.
Gandhi admits to the need to use of violence against the dangerous‘lunatic’, as well as against animals, to protect third parties. But why notagainst the sane thug or mass murderer who would otherwise kill innocentpeople? (Orwell 1949). Gandhi thinks that the sane person unlike theinsane (and unlike animals) can respond to reason and compassion. In HindSwaraj, Gandhi gives the moving example of a thief who gets convertedby Gandhian tactics. Gandhi’s own life provides some of the most impres-sive evidence of the power of non-violence. During the partition riots,Mountbatten famously said ‘In the Punjab we have 55,000 troops, andlarge-scale rioting on our hands. In Calcutta our forces consist of one man[Gandhi] and there is no rioting . . . may I . . . pay my tribute to the one-man boundary force?’ (Tendulkar 1963, vol. 8, p. 111). But appeals to rea-son and/or to the heart do not always work with sane people, at least in theshort or medium term. The most we can do is to work towards a worldwhere the need for violence gets less and less.
It is a favourite device of states to claim that the force they use is notviolence because it is legitimate. It would be more honest to admit thatwhen the state kills an individual in order to protect third parties, this isviolence. This admission also has the advantage that those who want tominimize the use of violence, will try to devise ways of minimizing suchstate violence in the future; indeed Gandhi himself argued that we shouldencourage the growth of non-violent armies, so that there will be less needin the future for the state and its citizens to use violence. NotwithstandingGandhi, even in the case of paternalistic violence, it might be better to call
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it violence so that we feel the need to reduce such violence in the future.For instance, suppose we use corporal punishment for a child’s own goodbecause we have no other way of helping the child. The admission thatsuch punishment involves violence is a reminder to us that we need to dis-cover better methods of influencing the child. Similarly with other forms ofpaternalistic violence such as the use of Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT)in the treatment of the mentally ill. Violence in such cases, even when it iswith the consent of the patient and even when it does not involve the useof evil means is intrinsically bad in the sense that other things being equalthe less the violence the better. Gandhi would say that such cases are notreally cases of violence in any evil sense as long as the relevant peoplebenefit on the whole from such treatment. We are not sacrificing an individ-ual for the sake of others; we are at most making him worse off in somerespects so that he may benefit on the whole.
Two versions of Gandhian non-violence
One can interpret Gandhi in two ways – the demanding version and the lessdemanding version. On the former, which is the standard interpretation, out-ward violence is always wrong, though sometimes it is pardonable orunavoidable; similarly inward violence is always wrong. On the less demand-ing version outward violence is sometimes permissible, provided the agent isacting from compassion and provided he keeps the outward violence to theminimum necessary: ‘A votary of Ahimsa [i.e. non-violence] thereforeremains true to his faith if the spring of all his action is compassion, if heshuns to the best of his ability the destruction of the tiniest creature . . .’(Gandhi 1927, pt 4, ch. 39). He says,
a non-violent man is one who is free from attachments and aversions. Forinstance, Harishchandra saw . . . that he had to cut off the dear head of some-one whom he adored. . . . Violence does not consist in the act of cutting offsomeone’s head; it consists in the motive behind the act.
(Gandhi 1980, pp. 100–101)
He frequently stresses that violence is a quality of the heart (Gandhi 1986,pp. 316, 347–348).
On this less demanding version, we can justify the killing of an aggres-sor to protect a ward under our care, assuming there is no other way outand assuming that there is purity of heart. Tolstoy, who greatly influencedGandhi, considered the objection that violence may sometimes be necessaryin order to save an innocent third party from an aggressor. He dismissedthis objection too quickly by saying that we can never be certain that theaggressor will carry out his intentions (Tolstoy 1986, pp. 30–31). This is aweak reply for sometimes the danger may be so great and imminent that
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we may need to take action against the aggressor. Gandhi, at least at times,saw the force of such objections: ‘True Ahimsa’ demands that sometimesto save society from the mischief of monkeys ‘we have to kill them’(Gandhi 1949, vol. 2, p. 69).
On the less demanding interpretation, outward violence is sometimesjustified; such outward violence is not really violence provided it is reallynecessary and provided there is no inner violence. This view may havesome plausibility in the case of justified paternalism where there is noinjury or harm intended. But it seems like a sleight of hand in cases whereviolence is inflicted on an individual, not for the individual’s benefit, but inorder to protect third parties or in order to perform one’s duty, as in thecase of Abraham or Harishchandra.
On the less demanding version, we can be really concerned about thewelfare of an aggressor and kill him even when we know that this does notpromote his welfare. For we may also be concerned with the welfare ofinnocent third parties. ‘True ahimsa’ demands that we take the well-beingof all the relevant parties into account. We saw earlier that Gandhi (on thestandard interpretation) stressed that violence is always wrong, never justi-fied and that ‘its good use is inconceivable’. But the less demanding ver-sion too claims that the good use of violence is inconceivable. True, on theless demanding version ‘outward violence’ is justified under certain condi-tions, but when it is justified there is no violence in the real (i.e. evil)sense.
Even the demanding version grants that there can sometimes be killingwithout real violence, as when we kill an individual for his own good orwith his own consent. The difference is that the less demanding versionallows us sometimes (in order to save third parties) to use ‘outwardviolence’ even when we are not acting for the good of the victim or withhis consent. On the standard version we can at best be pardoned for killingan aggressor in order to save the life of an innocent third party, but suchkilling is always wrong; whereas on the less demanding version such ‘out-ward violence’ can be justified. But this does not mean that the ends justifythe means; for on this version ‘outward violence’ when it is justified, doesnot involve the use of evil means. Both the versions deny that the endsjustify the means.
We saw that according to Gandhi the ideal of non-violence does notadmit of exceptions and must not be lowered because of our weaknesses.But the less demanding version too could grant this. When we kill anaggressor to save an innocent third party, this is not an act of real violenceand therefore it is not a proper exception to the ideal. However, even onthe less demanding version, killing for self-defence is never justified, but atbest pardonable; this is because such killing is typically not motivated bycompassion but by self-interest, it is done ‘for the sake of one’s perishablebody’ (Gandhi 1998, p. 45).
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Gandhi in general was more sympathetic to the interests of humans thanof animals. But he argued that though it is pardonable to kill a snake out ofself-defence, it is never justified and it would be a nobler act to let oneselfbe killed by the snake. This is consistent with his view that it is Ahimsa (ornon-violence) to kill a snake or a monkey or even a human being in orderto save a third party; it would not be nobler to let the third party be killedthough it may be nobler to let oneself be killed (rather than the aggressor).Gandhi plausibly stressed that when we kill another for self-interested rea-sons, as in self-defence, we are typically not acting out of compassion. Butwhen we kill the aggressor to save a third party, we could be acting out ofcompassion for the third party and therefore the outward violence could bejustified: ‘the unavoidable destruction caused for the purpose of protectingone’s ward cannot be regarded as Himsa [i.e. violence]’; it could be an actthat springs from benevolence ‘Suppose a man runs amuck . . . killing any-one that comes in his way. Anyone who dispatches this lunatic will . . . beregarded as a benevolent man’ (Gandhi 1960, p. 119).
The difference between the two versions is not just an academic pointof no practical significance. For instance, when there is a choice betweensacrificing the life of an innocent third party and killing the aggressor, thedemanding interpretation says it is nobler not to kill the aggressor. True, itencourages us to sacrifice our own life in order to protect the third party;but if that is not likely to work the option of killing the aggressor is at bestexcusable, it would be nobler (presumably because it embodies Ahimsa) tolet oneself and the third party be killed by the aggressor but not kill theaggressor. To some people this would be a reductio ad absurdum of thedemanding version. The less demanding version does not imply that itwould be nobler to let the third party die but it does imply, like thedemanding version, that it would be nobler to let oneself die if the choicewas just between one’s own life and that of the aggressor; so that if I couldsave the third party by either killing the aggressor or by letting myself bekilled the latter would be the nobler thing to do; it would embody Ahimsa.
The two versions are partly discrepant with each other but are bothfound in the writings of Gandhi. Often he adheres to the demanding ver-sion, for instance
while it is true that the mental attitude is the crucial test of Ahimsa, it is notthe sole test. To kill any living being or thing save for its own interest ishimsa however noble the motive may otherwise be.
(Gandhi 1986, pp. 277, 308)
At other times he advocates the less demanding version: ‘Non-violence is aquality of the heart. . . . There is violence always in the attachment to one’sego. . . . If there is no such attachment, then there is no violence’ (Gandhi1986, pp. 347–348).
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One suggestion would be to reconstruct if not interpret Gandhi in away that reconciles the two versions. The demanding version can be under-stood as an ideal of non-violence that we should all strive towards, whilethe less demanding one can be regarded as a moral principle that we mustnot violate or a second best below which we must not fall. This is impor-tant and true but it misses out something crucial in Gandhi, namely theidea that sometimes evil is necessary and that evil does not necessarilycease to be evil when it is necessary (Haksar 2011). The recognition of thefact that violence remains an evil even when it is necessary, should on theGandhian view, remind us to work wholeheartedly towards a better worldwhere the need for violence becomes less and less. That is part of what isimplied by Gandhi’s view that non-violence should be a creed, not anexpedience.
On the less demanding version, when ‘outward violence’ is justified itceases to be an evil (though it remains intrinsically bad in the sense thatthe less of it the better, other things being equal); consequently, on this ver-sion the creation of a better world where such violence is minimizedbecomes less of an urgency than it does on the demanding version whichrecognizes that violence is an evil. So it is important to stress that on theGandhian view the demanding version provides a moral principle (that vio-lence is always morally wrong) as well as a moral ideal. This is consistentwith the less demanding version serving as a back up or second best. Theelement of truth or value in the less demanding version is that it remindsus that when ‘outward violence’ is necessary, it should be administered ina spirit of compassion. Of course some people may find the demandingversion too demanding and they may prefer the view that the demandingversion should only provide them with a moral ideal. Perhaps the moralprinciple also provided by the demanding version is for the devotees only!
Non-violence, moral dilemmas and the principle of double effect
On the standard Gandhian view, violence is always wrong and unjustifiableand we have a duty always to avoid it but sometimes when it is necessarywe can be excused or pardoned. This strategy poses difficulties for Gandhi.Gandhi says that in some cases we actually have a duty to kill the aggres-sor and that in such cases not to kill would be a sin: ‘He who refrains fromkilling a murderer who is about to kill his ward (when he cannot preventhim otherwise) earns no merit, but commits a sin’ (Gandhi 1998, p. 41).Gandhi (on the demanding version) seems to be involved in a moraldilemma of the strong kind in the sense that whatever we choose we wouldbe doing wrong. If we do not kill the aggressor, we sin in allowing theinnocent ward to die; if we kill the aggressor we sin because we injure theaggressor without his consent.
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Could one appeal to the principle of double effect? According to thisprinciple you must never intentionally do a wrong; evil means must neverbe used. However, if as a result of your not doing wrong, some terriblethings happen, this is very regrettable, but you cannot be held responsiblefor it. Many Catholics who do not believe in non-violence subscribe to thisprinciple; they think it is morally permissible to kill the aggressor to saveinnocent lives. If one combines the principle of double effect with strictnon-violence, some very radical conclusions follow. One must not kill theaggressor when this involves harming him, even when the alternative maybe the death of many innocent people including oneself: ‘if a senselessman is left alone and no one tries to resist him, he is sure to exhaust him-self. Indeed it is not quite inconceivable that the loving sacrifice of manymay bring an insane man to his senses’ (Gandhi 1998, p. 76). In suchextreme moods Gandhi believes that the Right course must be followed,whatever the cost; though he reassures us that with God’s help non-vio-lence will triumph, at least in the long run. Critics could ask what weshould do in the short and the medium run? Gandhi’s answer, in his lessextreme moods, is that when self-sacrifice does not work, we should fallback on the second best, i.e. (outward) violence with compassion.
Gandhi was a great believer in integrity. He did not want people blindlyto follow him. He thought people should follow their own Dharma andtheir own conscience. So if some people do not share his faith in non-violence but believed that violence was required to save innocent third par-ties then it is their duty to be violent. However, he was aware that this didnot solve the dilemma that sometimes faces the believer in non-violence.Violence (even against animals or humans) is sometimes a duty for each ofus (as long as we live in society), and the non-violent sage cannot escapethe dilemma by hiring someone else to do the dirty work for him (Gandhi1960, p. 130).
Moral dilemmas of the strong kind that Gandhi is involved in implythat we are sometimes morally required to do something that is morallyimpermissible. Ruth Marcus has argued that there is nothing logically inco-herent in a moral code that sometimes requires us to do what is impermis-sible (Marcus 1987). A moral code can fulfil its purpose if it can guide usby telling us what the best thing to do in the circumstances is; a necessaryevil is sometimes the best thing to do. And though we have to choosebetween impermissible evils, the recognition of such predicaments shouldmake us more determined to work for a better world where such conflictsbecome less frequent.
Self-sacrifice
Both the versions we have considered so far make a common assumptionthat is controversial. They both assume that the non-violent option (which
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is not to be confused with cowardice) is always morally superior to vio-lence against the aggressor; when there is a choice between sacrificingone’s own life and killing the aggressor, self-sacrifice is morally superior.
Gandhi considers the case of women running the risk of dishonour. Heclaims that a woman who is as pure as Sita cannot be defiled by any vil-lain: ‘The veriest ruffian becomes, for the time being tame in the presenceof resplendent purity’ (Gandhi 1961, p. 93). Many do not share this idealof ‘resplendent purity’. Even those who do would admit, as indeed doesGandhi, that very few have reached this ideal and the rest do not yet havethe capacity to tame the ruffian non-violently. How are they to defend theirhonour until they have reached the ideal? He advises such people to appealto God for help and be ready to die with self-respect by taking poison orperhaps by learning some yogic practices that teach one how to die(Gandhi 1963, p. 208)!
He admits that many people are not trained in the non-violent methodand until they acquire the capacity to defend themselves through the non-violent method, they may have to rely on violence in emergencies. Hethinks we should have non-violent armies to deal with external and internalthreats but he admits that when the ‘capacity for non-violent defence islacking, there need be no hesitation in using violent means’ (Gandhi 1963,p. 267). The use of violence is at best a second best for Gandhi. But manywould argue that the use of violence is sometimes morally superior to theGandhian ideal of voluntary self-sacrifice. Is there really a presumption infavour of the non-violent option when this option is understood in theGandhian sense which involves the suffering and self-sacrifice of the inno-cent? Critics would argue that if an innocent woman is confronted with anevil assailant, and if she has a choice between her own death (even if itembodies Ahimsa) and the death of the aggressor, it is better to advise herto kill the assailant. Even in the long run, rather than teach people the art ofdying why not teach them things like martial arts for self-defence purposes?
Gandhi frequently said that his Sarvodaya was concerned with thewelfare of all; he was opposed to utilitarian doctrines that were willing tosacrifice the welfare of some for the sake of the many. Yet he must answerthe charge that by encouraging people to sacrifice their lives, he too wassacrificing their (and their dependants’) well-being:
If one side ceases to retaliate, the riots will not go on. What does it matter ifeven a few lakhs are killed in the right manner out of the forty crores ofIndia? If we can learn the lesson of dying without killing, India which is cel-ebrated in legend and history as Karmabhoomi – the land of duty – willbecome a virtual Eden – the image of the kingdom of Heaven on earth.
(Gandhi 1963, p. 276)
Violent revolutionaries too use a similar argument – they justify the killingof millions because it will ultimately lead to paradise on earth, such as the
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communist utopia. Gandhi replies (at least partly in a consequentialist vein)that the violent revolutionaries are using evil means and this will corruptthe ends they are seeking. In fact, the communist utopia will not be real-ized, whereas he is certain that the non-violent method if pursued properlywill lead to eventual success.
There are several problems here. One is that, especially in the case of amass movement, there is no guarantee that non-violence in its purest formwill be pursued. Gandhi was aware that Satyagraha has worked in the caseof individuals but ‘has not been perfected for application by large massesof mankind. . . . Hence during the Hindu–Muslim quarrel it proved a failureon the whole’ (Gandhi 1963, p. 271). Secondly, even if the non-violentutopia is realized in the distant future, has the movement not sacrificed thelives of those who die in the non-violent struggle?
His answer to this last charge is interesting. He points out that in vio-lent struggles too people get massacred, only more frequently. And heappeals to the paradox that man gains his life by losing it. Gandhi appealsto another worldly interpretation of this paradox as well as to a this-worldlyinterpretation. Gandhi frequently reassures us that at death only the bodydies, but the soul survives. If the martyr has done good deeds he will gethis rewards in the future, the ultimate reward being Moksha (spiritual sal-vation). This will only comfort those who accept the underlying metaphys-ics. But he also contends that the martyr’s spirit will live on in this world:‘all true and solid work makes the worker immortal by the survival of hiswork after his death’. He is very impressed by the power of suffering andself-sacrifice when combined with compassion. He thinks that Christ haswon not only in the other worldly sense, but also in this world: ‘as theworld’s history has abundantly shown. What does it matter if the body hasdissolved in the process, so long as by the Christ’s act of non-resistance,the forces of good are released (by) society?’ (Gandhi 1963, p. 271). Inorder to show that Christ has won in this world, Gandhi stresses that onlyChrist’s ‘body has dissolved’.
Gandhi argues that though his non-violent utopia would be built on thesacrifice of the martyrs, the martyrs would have gained life by losing it.Does the idea of gaining life by losing it have enough literal truth to makethe argument work? The answer one gives will depend upon the metaphys-ics and ethics one adopts (Haksar 2008). Many believers in a humanisticethics and metaphysics would reject the idea of flourishing in an afterlife.As for survival in this world after one has died, many humanists wouldargue that the person does not survive his bodily death. Perhaps, our spiritcan survive in the sense that our work survives or the causes we believe inand identify with survive or in the sense that we can survive in our descen-dents or in our spiritual heirs (if we have any!). But sceptics will say thatsuch survival is not the survival of the individual. Even when his deathembodies the principle of Ahimsa, and even if the wonderful consequences
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follow in this world, the martyr will not be anywhere to enjoy the non-vio-lent paradise on earth!
Admittedly, a person can sometimes gain (at least spiritually!) frommaking sacrifices. Gandhi himself chose the life of voluntary poverty. Heclaimed that he was much richer as a result of it. And so he was spirituallyspeaking. He was much better off in terms of well-being in that lifestylethan if he had chosen a more wealthy lifestyle. The important point is thathe survived in this world to enjoy the fruits of renunciation; this appearsnot so in the case when one sacrifices one’s life, as indeed he eventuallydid. When one sacrifices one’s life, one may gain in the next world butdoes one gain in this world?
From the Gandhian perspective the answer is that such sacrifices (whichembody Ahimsa)‘ennobles those who lose their lives and morally enrichesthe world for their sacrifice’ (Gandhi 1949, vol. 1 p. 47). Sceptics couldask that even if the martyr morally enriches the world does he benefit him-self in this world? Gandhi would say that his moral well-being in thisworld would be enhanced. But even if this is so and even if a person’smoral well-being is a substantial part of his overall well-being it is not thewhole of his well-being. Gandhi himself believed that the ‘End to beachieved is human happiness combined with full mental and moral growth’(Gandhi 1960, p. 100).
Perhaps, many individuals (including many atheists) identify so passion-ately with the causes they believe in that their sacrifice gives meaning andfulfilment to their lives. But the cost of a person’s sacrifice (even when itembodies Ahimsa) in terms of happiness and achievement might in somecases be so great as to outweigh the moral and spiritual well-being thatmay accrue to the agent as a result of the sacrifice (Haksar 2010). That isone reason why we regard it as a sacrifice! Even when the sacrifice is vol-untary, it could be a real sacrifice. And we must not forget the cost in termsof well-being of some of the innocent dependants of the Satyagrahis, whonever volunteered for the struggle. If we concentrate only on this world,even if Gandhi is right that sacrifices are less on the non-violent approachthan on the violent approach, will not the principle of Sarvodaya (welfareof all) be violated by each of the approaches?
Gandhi’s preference for killing oneself or letting oneself be killed ratherthan killing the aggressor, reflects his attitude to death. He does not thinkof death as an evil but the ‘truest of friends’. He says death at any time isblessed but it is twice blessed in the case of the warrior who dies for hiscause. It delivers us from agony and ‘ever gives us new chances, newhopes . . . every brave man welcomes such a death whenever it comes tohim’ (Gandhi 1963, p. 286, added emphasis); death in this quote is soobviously only death of the body. Death of a martyr (or rather of hisbody?) is so wonderful for the martyr and for society in general thatGandhi even feels the need to warn people not to hanker after it. It is very
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revealing that the reason he gives for not lusting after martyrdom is notthat death is bad for the martyr (for it is not); the reason is that it is thekiller who will be harmed by his wrongdoing and we must not want thekiller to go morally astray (Gandhi 1963, p. 286)! On this view the realevil with the assassination of Gandhi was that his killer Godse was ruinedmorally by that act, Gandhi himself was ennobled by it.
Gandhi believed in human well-being but it is the well-being of thesoul that is important for him. The killer has harmed himself, his soul, byhis wrongdoing; the innocent victim has not been harmed. This is also thedoctrine found in Plato who said that the criminal harms himself by hiswrongdoing, not his victim. This view goes against the conventionalhumanist ethics and raises several issues. If death is not such a bad thing,why is murder so wrong? It would be at worst like a crime against prop-erty. On Gandhi’s view the body is like a garment: the soul after death willget a new garment, until it achieves Moksha. But then why is violence soterrible? In the Gita, Krishna actually used the simile of the body beinglike a garment, along with other arguments, to urge Arjuna to overcome hisinhibitions against killing his relatives in a just war.
For Gandhi violence involves injury in the sense of harm. We must notharm even our enemies. But why should the Satyagrahi allow himself (andhis dependants) to be harmed? Gandhi consoles us with the thought thatthe Satyagrahi cannot be harmed even if he is killed. But then why not killmy enemy since killing him will not really harm him? It may be suggestedthat my enemy will be harmed by my killing him assuming that he is anevil man; he will suffer in the next life. But surely on the Law of Karmawhich Gandhi believed in, it are his evil deeds rather than my killing himthat will harm him.
Even if death is not such a bad thing, murder of the innocent wouldstill be an evil because people typically do not want to die and becausethey are innocent and so (at any rate on the conventional view) have notforfeited their right to life. Many do not want to die because they do notagree with the Gandhian view of death. And even of those who agree thatthe body is like a garment, many do not want their most cherished garmentdestroyed by another person. So murder still remains a substantial evil. Butin the case of the martyr who welcomes death (without lusting for it), mur-der of the martyr becomes less of an evil! It may even be a bit like aidingvoluntary euthanasia, one difference being that the martyr does not typi-cally consent to the murder.
We often admire self-sacrifice when it leads to good consequences. Andsometimes we admire a person for self-sacrifice because it is the sort of actthat leads to good consequences even though it did not do so in the partic-ular case. But there are many cases of misguided self-sacrifices, such asSati, even when it is voluntarily undertaken, which most of us do notadmire and we criticize attempts to ennoble such people. This would
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suggest that we do not regard self-sacrifice as intrinsically good. Again, ifwe can reach a peaceful solution without self-sacrifice, this seems prefera-ble to reaching a solution based on self-sacrifice, other things being equal.Does this not suggest that self-sacrifice is not intrinsically good?
Admittedly, a peaceful solution is preferable to a violent one, otherthings being equal. But it is important to realize that a presumption infavour of a peaceful solution is not the same as presumption in favour of anon-violent solution. For Gandhi’s non-violence can involve the self-sacri-fice of the innocent protestors. Is such self-sacrifice inherently (i.e. apartfrom consequences) preferable to the use of violence against the aggressor?Gandhi appeals to the sanctity of life. To kill another violates that person’ssanctity of life. When the Satyagrahis allow themselves to be killed there isalso a violation of the sanctity of life, but the violation is not committed bythe Satyagrahis. Again, something like the principle of double effect is pre-supposed.
At least once he admitted that his faith in the superiority of non-vio-lence could be a ‘fascinating delusion’ (Gandhi 1960, p. 106). In that eventcould he have regarded the self-sacrifice as a heroic failure, which couldstill be admirable? Many would have admired the sacrifices made in theattempts to conquer Everest, even if all such attempts failed. But if weknew they were all doomed to fail, fewer would retain their admiration,unless perhaps we regard it as a great achievement to get as near as possi-ble to the goal. Gandhi could argue that even though self-sacrifice per se isnot intrinsically good, self-sacrifice, when it is required by Ahimsa, isintrinsically good; it is the embodiment of Ahimsa, quite apart from thegood consequences. Sati even when voluntarily undertaken and the sacri-fices connected with Everest are typically not required by Ahimsa. Butwhen there is a choice between one’s own life and that of the aggressor (asin the above discussion) Gandhi could plausibly say that losing one’s ownlife is morally superior provided this is done out of compassion for theaggressor – for then one’s self-sacrifice would embody Ahimsa.
Gandhi criticized himself for not going far enough in the direction ofself-sacrifice in the pursuit of Ahimsa. He censured himself for taking milkbecause it was essential for his survival; also for not having the moralstrength to refrain from killing a snake in self-defence. Gandhi was verysevere on himself, as saints sometimes are, but even he would have agreedthat Satyagrahis should not make the ultimate sacrifice when there is apeaceful solution to the problem that does not require such self-sacrifice.
While recruiting volunteers for the non-violent movement, even whenthey consent to join the resistance, one should be cautious before invitingthem to risk their lives in pursuance of a cause that may be misguided orthat may be just but unlikely to succeed. Gandhi was, especially in his lateryears, aware of such dangers. He knew he was fallible and confessed thathe had made important and costly mistakes. Although he had total faith in
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Ahimsa, he agreed that he might be living in a ‘fool’s paradise’, he wasvery much aware of his own ‘bankruptcy, not that of non-violence’. Herealized the need to refute the charge that his movement involves the sacri-fice of the innocents including the sacrifice of the Satyagrahis.
Part of Gandhi’s answer is that Satyagrahis should not follow him blindly(as they sometimes did!) but follow their own ‘inner voice’ or conscience(Gandhi 1960, p. 68). He also warned people that non-violence requiredgreater bravery than violence. So the volunteers joined the movement at theirown peril. Similar advice was given to the ordinary citizen – each person,including those who follow Ahimsa, must decide for himself or herself whento make compromises with violence (Gandhi 1998, pp. 94–95). This is not todeny that the leaders too bear responsibility for the relevant mistakes. Violentmethods too involve such problems and Gandhi stressed that in the long runthey involve greater loss of lives, including innocent lives.
Although Gandhi and his followers frequently appeal to the wonderfulconsequences of non-violence, he was far from a typical consequentialist.For him the best way of propagating Ahimsa was to ‘be the change you wantto see in the world’. He combined a mixture of the different approaches; inaddition to consequentialism he believed in virtue ethics as well as in de-ontological or duty-based ethics (Haksar 2008). He said that we should con-centrate on the means and that the results (or the ends) are out of our controland are ultimately in the ‘hands of God’ (Gandhi 1960, p. 104). This doesnot quite mean that the consequences are not important (Horsburgh 1968,pp. 41ff.). He repeatedly stressed the power of non-violence to change theworld, perhaps his point was that we also need the grace of God to achievethe result. Consequences certainly mattered to him in the sense that he wascommitted to the eventual triumph of Non-Violence. Perhaps, a sophisticatedconsequentialist could include the power of example as a method of promot-ing the noblest values. Gandhi approves of the passages in the Gita whichask us to promote the welfare of the world in a detached spirit. Admittedlythe Gita asks us to do our duty without attachment and without worryingabout the fruits of our action for oneself. But this does not mean that weshould neglect the welfare of humanity; indeed his own life was exemplaryin its dedication to the service of others.
However, his preference for the non-violent method over the violentone is not just based on the better long-term moral and spiritual conse-quences but also on what he regards as the inherent superiority of the non-violent method; for the self-sacrifice of the practitioners embodies Ahimsaand morally and spiritually enriches the world, quite apart from the goodlong-term effects. This claim of Gandhi’s does not presuppose the morecontroversial claim of Gandhi’s that violence is never permissible. For onemight maintain that the non-violent method is inherently superior to theviolent one for the reason mentioned above, even if violence is permissible.Thus it would be consistent to argue that in the case of self-defence even if
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one violates no duty in killing the aggressor, the super-erogatory act ofallowing oneself to be killed (in the cause of Ahimsa) would be morallyand spiritually enriching. Indeed one might contend that since one goesbeyond the call of duty, it is even more enriching than it would be if itwere a duty not to kill the aggressor.
Conclusion
According to Gandhi violent deeds involve the use of force that cause injuryin the sense of harm or damage to life or property. Even when there is noviolent deed there is violence in thought when we have hatred or maliceagainst people. Gandhi thought such emotions may be directed against theact but not the actor, we should hate the sin but not the sinner. Retributivistswould complaint that this is not a plausible strategy in cases where the agentis intimately associated with his evil acts. Gandhi could reply that we canlove the sinner for even the greatest sinner is potentially divine. He believedin the power of non-violence to awaken the divine potential, though hewould agree that many people do not realize their potential in this life.
Gandhi followed Christ in thinking that we should love even our ene-mies. But he did not think that we should treat the good and bad alike. Heused love in the sense of compassion and respect; he thought that goodpeople earn our respect, while the evil doer should be an object of pity, nothatred (Gandhi 1998, p. 23). Although not hating the evil doer, Gandhibelieved in non-violent non-cooperation with evil and with the evil doeruntil he has mended his ways. Such non-cooperation can sometimes evenlead to the death of the evil doer; this can happen as a side effect but itmust never be part of any strategy of the non-cooperator (Gandhi 1998, pp.53–54); here again he assumes the doctrine of double effect.
There is much to be said for the view that violent emotions like hatredand malice against the evil doer should be replaced by non-violent oneslike compassion and pity. Quite apart from the effect on others, the non-violent emotions are better for the person who has them.
On the less demanding version a motive like compassion can turn anotherwise violent act into a non-violent one, without attachment to the ego,there is no violence. Gandhi used this idea to support outward violence forthe defence of third parties but not for self-defence. Suppose we kill anaggressor to protect his potential victim from him. Here we may be moti-vated by respect for the potential victim without hating the aggressor, inaccordance with the view that we should hate only the sin. And we couldkill the aggressor reluctantly because saving the innocent third party with-out killing the aggressor is not an available option. Such killing may beviolence in ordinary usage but unless it is violence in an evil sense it doesnot involve the use of evil means.
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Can we extend this idea still further to the case of the use of outwardviolence for self-defence? When we use outward violence for self-defence,assuming we use the minimum necessary violence, we should do so with-out any hatred or malice for the aggressor and in a spirit of detachment. Ifthere is no violence in our hearts there need be no violence in an evil senseeven when there is outward violence, provided the outward violence is nec-essary. Even wars can be fought, in a spirit of detachment (as commendedin the Gita), without hating the enemy. The idea that hatred is alwaysrequired to fight a war is factually incorrect. For instance, in the FirstWorld War the British soldiers played games with their German counter-parts during the Christmas truce; and there are cases where armies haveshown great consideration towards prisoners of war. If a particular war can-not be fought without whipping up hatred, it would be best if it were notfought!
Gandhi poses the problem that when we kill in self-defence we are act-ing in our own interests and how can this be done in a spirit of detach-ment? Admittedly, sometimes we defend ourselves out of a sense of duty(e.g. because we have a duty to look after our families or a duty to societyto get rid of the aggression) but typically individual self-defence is notdone for any high-minded reason. But it does not follow that it is not legit-imate. True Ahimsa or universal love demands that we give due weight tothe well-being of all the parties (including ourselves?).
When we kill the aggressor and risk our lives to protect an innocentthird party we could be acting out of compassion for the third party andget moral credit for our conduct. Typically in self-defence we do not getmoral credit for our conduct, for we are motivated by self-interest, but itdoes not follow that what we do is morally impermissible. There are plentyof acts that are permissible but for which we do not deserve moral credit;and Gandhi himself gives some examples of these while discussing non-cooperation (Haksar 2008).
Of course purity of heart is not enough. Even when there is no innerviolence we may use more outward violence than is required. Outward vio-lence even when it springs from compassion can be misguided and redun-dant (Gandhi 1986, p. 256). A good deal of modern warfare is faceless; theperson dropping bombs from a distance may just be pressing a button with-out seeing the victims and without any hatred or malice for the victims.This is consistent with the view that violence in a spirit of love is betterthan violence out of hatred and revenge. The latter is more likely to beabused and to lead to a cycle of violence. Since we have to use outwardviolence to some degree, it is better from the Gandhian perspective toadminister it in a spirit of love (or compassion or at least the absence ofhatred); this is the best way to minimize the use of such violence. This isalso in harmony with Gandhi’s view that we should have love (or at least
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not have any hatred or malice) towards all, including those who regard usas their enemy.
The distinction between violence in an ordinary sense and violence in anevil sense helps to make sense of some of Gandhian thought. Violence in anevil sense is a subclass of violence in the ordinary sense. I have suggested,following Gandhi, that one of the features of the former is the presence ofviolent emotions such as hatred and malice. A second important feature isthat violence in an evil sense reflects disrespect of the individual againstwhom outward violence is used. These two features often go together butby no means always. The first one is concerned with the quality of the emo-tions of the agent, the second with whether the agent’s deed violated anyrights of the individual against whom violence was directed. I might act outof compassion for a person but due to ignorance my act may violate therights of that person. Gandhi himself stressed duties rather than rights, sohis variant of the second feature above is that there is ‘no violence withoutinfraction of duty’ (Gandhi 1961, pp. 160–161). Infraction of duty on thepart of the person inflicting the violence can be a result of the violation ofthe rights of the individual against whom violence is directed but it may bethere sometimes without the corresponding violation of rights.
Gandhi uses violence in a pejorative sense ‘the good use of violence isinconceivable’. One way of reconciling this with his view that we mustsometimes use violence is to admit that violence is an evil but sometimes itis a necessary evil. Another way is to distinguish, as I suggested earlier,between two senses of violence. Some such distinction is presupposed insome of Gandhian philosophy, especially by the less demanding versionaccording to which ‘outward violence’ is not evil but permissible when cer-tain conditions are satisfied; also by the violence involved in some caseswhere paternalism is justified. Such violence, even when it does notinvolve the use of evil means, is intrinsically bad in the sense that the lessof it there is the better, other things being equal. Elsewhere I have arguedin a similar vein that there are two senses of coercion: coercion in the evilsense and coercion in a non-evil sense, and that only the former is forbid-den by Gandhi (Haksar 2003, ch. 7).
It is fashionable to praise Gandhi but not follow him. This is largelybecause his philosophy of suffering and self-sacrifice appears too demand-ing. Some people think that unattainable ideals are unnecessarily demand-ing and can lead to the ideals getting discredited. Others such as Tolstoyand Gandhi (Gandhi 1986, vol. ii, pp. 284–285) believe that complete andunattainable perfection has an awesome quality and can stir us to action ina way in which moderate perfection cannot (Haksar 2010). For Gandhi andTolstoy the ideal of non-violence cannot be totally attained; while the idealshould be stated without exceptions, those who follow it have to compro-mise with it to different degrees, depending upon their capacities, and theircircumstances. Those who find the ideal of non-violence too demanding
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can travel towards it at a slower rate. On the Gandhian view that is not asmeritorious or as effective as those who follow it to the limit of theircapacities, but it is much better than travelling in the reverse direction,which is what most of the world does.
There is the objection that the merit one acquires by following the non-violent ideal would be cancelled on Gandhi’s account by the demerit oneacquires by violating the principle that violence is morally wrong. To thisit might be replied that when violence is necessary, one can be excusedfrom blame even though one has done a wrong. However, on the Gandhianview a condition of being excused for necessary violence is to pursue theideal of non-violence and to work for a better world where the need forviolence gets less. So presumably, in order to acquire moral merit, one hasto pursue this ideal to some degree beyond the minimum that is requiredmerely to atone for the violence in which one has taken part.
It has been suggested to me that Gandhi’s central point is surely thathumans should cooperate and settle disputes without violence and coercion,by Satyagraha, and convert the proponents of violence and power politicsto nonviolence: that the massive use of violence by states, empires and(violent) revolutionary movements are the fundamental injustice of thetwentieth century. The individual cases of violence discussed by me are notof central concern to Gandhi. I would reply that Gandhi stressed that non-violence, if it is to be truly effective, should be followed as a creed, in thesense that it should be followed in all walks of life to the best of our abili-ties. It is to Gandhi’s credit that, unlike the typical pacifist, he himself tookindividual (alleged) counter examples to his principle of Ahimsa seriously(Orwell 1949). He agreed that in some directions we have to compromise,but he believed that specially while seeking social and political change, weshould (whenever possible?) use only non-violent methods vis-à-vis ouropponents. But it was not just animals and ‘lunatics’ that sometimes had tobe killed. He even supported the decision to send the Indian army todefend Kashmir during 1947–1948, since non-violent defence was not alive option. At the very same time his conduct towards Pakistan remainedexemplary, he put moral pressure on the Indian Government until it agreedto give Pakistan the financial assets that belonged to Pakistan. Violence ina spirit of love! His successful protest on behalf of Pakistan was in factone of the factors that led to his assassination. It is arguable that his self-sacrifice had some transformative effects on his Pakistani opponents. Tothis day he is widely admired in Pakistan.
AcknowledgementsI am grateful to the following for helpful suggestions: Richard Bellamy, MukulKesavan, Gurpreet Mahajan, an anonymous journal referee and, above all, JamesTully.
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Note on contributor
Vinit Haksar is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and an Honorary Fel-low, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, Edinburgh Univer-sity. He has written several books and published many papers in anthologies and inacademic journals of philosophy, politics and law.
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