Volume 12 Issue 1 | June 2021 Chinese Public

CPA

R Chinese Public Administration Review

Volume 12 Issue 1 | June 2021

Research Articles Shihua Ye, Xiaochen GongNonprofits’ Receipt of Government Revenue in China: Institutionalization, Accountability and Political Embeddedness

Lei Liu, Mingyue Li, May ChuPromotion for Performance? The working incentive of Chinese provincial environmental agency heads in pollution reduction

Hsiang Te Liu, Don-Yun ChenThe Effect of Public Servants’ Reinvention Reform Perception on Organizational Performance in Taiwan: The Mediating Roles of Public Service Motivation and Organizational Commitment

COVID-19 Commentaries Wanxia Zhao, Yonghua ZouSmart Urban Governance in Epidemic Control: Practices and Implications of Hangzhou

Ruthnande Kessa, Abdul-Akeem Sadiq, Jungwon YeoThe Importance of Vertical and Horizontal Collaboration: United States’ Response to COVID-19 Pandemic

Weixu Wu, Xinyu Tan, Qinzhi JiangCampaign-Style Paired Assistance: The Chinese Experience in Fighting the COVID-19 Pandemic

Huafang LiCommunication for Coproduction: The Informational Role of Nonprofit Organizations

Book Review Anna Vladislavovna Shashkova, Nicholas MartinEkaterina V. Kudryashova, Legal Regulation of Strategic Planning in Public Finance

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Editors

EDITORIAL BOARDBrazilEvan Berman, Fundação Getulio VargasChina (Mainland)Jing Bao, Chinese Public Administration

SocietyGuoxian Bao, Lanzhou UniversityZhenming Chen, Xiamen UniversityKeyong Dong, Renmin University of ChinaXiaoping Gao, Chinese Public Administra-

tion SocietyTaijun Jin, Soochow UniversityYijia Jing, Fudan UniversityJiannan Wu, Shanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShuzhang Xia, Sun Yat-sen UniversityXiaolin Xu, Huazhong University of Science

and TechnologyLan Xue, Tsinghua UniversityKaifeng Yang, Renmin University of China Chengfu Zhang, Renmin University of

ChinaZhirong Zhao, Zhejiang UniversityGuanghui Zhou, Jilin UniversityQianwei Zhu, Fudan UniversityHong KongHon Chan, City University of Hong KongIan Holliday, The University of Hong Kong

Martin Painter, City University of Hong KongKing K. Tsao, Chinese University of Hong

KongRichard Walker, City University of Hong

KongShaoguang Wang, Chinese University of

Kong KongNetherlandsPeter B. Boorsma, University of Twente South KoreaYun-Won Hwang, Chung-Ang UniversityChan-Gon Kim, Vice Mayor Central DistrictPan S. Kim, Yonsei University - WonjuM. Jae Moon, Yonsei UniversityTaiwanChung-yuang Jan, National Chengchi

UniversityUnited KingdomDaniel Harris, Overseas Development

Institute Politics and GovernmentUnited StatesBarry Bozeman, Arizona State UniversityBin Chen, City University of New York -

Baruch CollegeGregory Chow, Princeton UniversityJeanne Marie Col, City University of New

York - John Jay CollegeTerry L. Cooper, University of Southern

CaliforniaKenneth W. Foster, Concordia CollegeMary Hamilton, University of NebraskaYilin Hou, Syracuse UniversityEdward Jennings, University of KentuckyDonald Klingner, University of ColoradoZhiyong Lan, Arizona State UniversityWeiwei Lin, Rutgers University - NewarkSuzanne Piotrowski, Rutgers University -

NewarkAllan Rosenbaum, Florida International

UniversityDavid H. Rosenbloom, American UniversityE.S. Savas, City University of New York -

Baruch CollegeZixiang (Alex) Tan, Syracuse UniversityJonathan West, University of MiamiHua Xu, East Carolina UniversityMengzhong Zhang, Gannon University in

PennsylvaniaYahong Zhang, Rutgers University - Newark

Chinese Public Administration ReviewCPAR

FOUNDING EDITOR (2002-2020)Marc Holzer, Suffolk University - Boston

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFAnkui Tan, Sun Yat-sen University

EDITORSHuafang Li, Grand Valley State UniversityQiushi Wang, Sun Yat-sen UniversityLing Zhu, University of Houston

ASSOCIATE EDITORSQian Hu, University of Central FloridaAlex Ingrams, Leiden University, NetherlandsLiang Ma, Renmin UniversityMarkie McBrayer, University of IdahoHongtao Yi, Ohio State UniversityWenxuan Yu, University of XiamenYueping Zheng, Sun Yat-sen University

SECTION EDITORSGang Chen, University at Albany, State University of New YorkCan Chen, Florida International UniversityHeungsuk Choi, Korea UniversityTsai-Tsu Su, National Taiwan UniversityBo Wen, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

ASSISTANT EDITORSHanjin Mao, Rutgers University - NewarkMin-Hyu Kim, Dongguk UniversityChengxin Xu, Seattle University

PRODUCTION EDITORSDongfang Gaozhao, Florida State UniversityPinze Liu, Sun Yat-sen UniversityHang Qi, University of Missouri

Table of Contents

Nonprofits’ Receipt of Government Revenue in China: Institutionalization, Accountability and Political Embeddedness by Shihua Ye, Xiaochen Gong

Government funding constitutes a key source of revenue for nonprofits to survive. However, howto acquire government funding has not received sufficient scholarly attention yet, and the limited numberof studies yields threemajor limitations. In order to address this knowledge gap,we examine the extent towhichaccountability,institutionalization,andpoliticalembeddednessaffectnonprofits’receiptofgovernmentrevenueandtheamountacquiredfromthegovernmentfromtheperspectiveofinterorganizationalrelationship,particularly the government-nonprofit relations angle. Using two years panel data derived from a sampleof 382 social service organizations inGuangdongProvince,China, the research shows that nonprofits thatareaccountable to thegovernment,more formalized,andhold(oronceheld)cadrepositionsatcountyandmunicipallevelaremorelikelytoacquiregovernmentfunding.Theeffectofpoliticalcouncilmembershipandbeingaccountabletothepublicarerelativelylimited.

Promotion for Performance? The working incentive of Chinese provincial en-vironmental agency heads in pollution reduction by LeiLiu,MingyueLi,MayChu

PromotionisarguedtobetheprimaryworkingincentiveforChineseofficials.Differentfrompreviousstudies that focus on the provincial governors and party secretaries, this paper makes the first attempt toexaminewhether thecareer turnoverofChina’sprovincialenvironmentalagencyheads(PEAHs) isaffectedbytheenvironmentalperformancewithintheirjurisdictions.Theresultsshowthattheperformanceinreducingnationally targeted pollutants—i.e., sulfur dioxide (SO2) and chemical oxygen demand (COD)—is notnecessarilycorrelatedwithpolitical turnover,whichonlydependsonpolitical factorssuchas theagewhenassumingoffice,tenureoftheoffice,andiftheyarelocalpeople.Therefore,alackofpromotionincentiveisfoundamongChina’sPEAHsinlocalenvironmentalmanagement.Theirworkingincentiveisstraightforwardtop-downcontrol,making themmerely the implementersof economy-dominated local publicpolicy.Amorerobustandtransparentperformancemanagementsystem,toconnecttheprovincialenvironmentalperformancewiththePEAH’spoliticalcareer,issupposedtobebeneficialforChina’senvironmentalmanagement.

The Effect of Public Servants’ Reinvention Reform Perception on Organizational Performance in Taiwan: The Mediating Roles of Public Service Motivation and Organizational Commitment by HsiangTeLiu,Don-YunChen

This study investigates theeffectsofpublic servants’ reinvention reformperceptions,public servicemotivation(PSM),andorganizationalcommitmentonorganizationalperformanceinthepublicsector.ThereisverylittleresearchexploringthoserelationshipsinTaiwan,andthetopicisthusworthyofmoresystematicexamination. This paper utilizes the TaiwanGovernment Bureaucrats Survey II (TGBS II), which collected1,464 valid samples from the public sector and used structural equation model to test the hypotheses.Wefind that reinvention reform perception positively affects public servants’ PSM, organizational commitmentand organizational performance. Finally, results demonstrate that organizational commitment mediates therelationshipbetweenPSMandorganizationalperformance.

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Table of Contents

Smart Urban Governance in Epidemic Control: Practices and Implications of Hangzhou by WanxiaZhao,YonghuaZou Appropriategovernancetoolscanfacilitateurbangovernments’effectiveresponsestocrises.Supportedbyinformationandcommunicationtechnologies(ICTs),e-governmentinfrastructurecanbeemployedtoachievesmartgovernanceinepidemiccontrol.ExaminingthecaseofHangzhou,thispaperdiscussestheChinesemegacity’sadoptionofe-governmentinfrastructureasameansofcombatingtheCOVID-19epidemicandstimulatingrecoveringoftheeconomy.Thispaperalsosummarizesseveralpolicyimplicationsthatmayserveaspointsofreferenceforothercitieswhenformulatingtheircrisisresponsestrategies.Thepaperconcludesthatsmartgovernancerootedintheuseofe-governmentinfrastructurehasexhibitedgreatpotentialforpublichealthcrisismanagement.

The Importance of Vertical and Horizontal Collaboration: United States’ Response to COVID-19 Pandemic by RuthnandeKessa,Abdul-AkeemSadiq,JungwonYeo COVID-19hasdevastatedtheglobalcommunityatanalarmingrate.Conventionalapproacheslikecommandandcontrolareineffectivetorespondtothispandemic.Thecomplexandinterdependentnatureofthepandemicdemandscollaborativeeffortsamongactorsacrossdiversesegmentsanddifferentlevelsofgovernment.Collaborationiscriticalduringthispandemicbecauseitcanenableamorecoordinatedresponse,resourcescanbeshared,trustamongthepartiescanbeenhanced,andduplicationofeffortscanbeminimized.Inthiscommentary,drawingontheliteratureoncollaboration,wediscusstheimportanceofverticalandhorizontalcollaboration by examining theU.S. response to COVID-19. This commentary underscores the importanceof vertical and horizontal collaboration among all levels of government, private entities, and nonprofitorganizations ineffectively responding toCOVID-19andensuring thehealthandsafetyofAmericans.Thiscommentaryconcludesbymakingrecommendationsforimprovingbothverticalandhorizontalcollaborationduringthecurrentpandemicandfuturepublichealthemergencies.

Campaign-Style Paired Assistance: The Chinese Experience in Fighting the COVID-19 Pandemic by WeixuWu,XinyuTan,QinzhiJiang TocopewiththeCOVID-19pandemic,theChinesegovernmentinitiatedamedicalresourceallocationandassistancemechanismthatwascharacterizedasalarge-scaleandregionalmutualapproach.Specifically,thirty provinces deliveredmedical resources (e.g., medical staff, medical supplies, and livingmaterials) to“1+16”citiesseverelyaffectedbytheepidemicwithinasmallamountoftime,whichsolvedthedilemmaofmedical collapseandgovernance“downtime” in epidemicareas, therebychanging theprevalencecurveofthepandemicinChina.“Campaign-style”targetedassistancecanbeinterpretedbasedontheChinesedualparty-governmentmodelaswellasthegovernancemodelofverticalaccountabilityandhorizontalcompetition,drawing from previous experience of normalized “designated assistance.” Consequently, paired assistancecontributestointergovernmentalsituationsofdecreasingdivisibilityandincreasingcooperation.ThisstudyhasthepotentialtobringinsightstoothercountriesaroundtheworldthatarefightingtheCOVID-19pandemic.


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COVID-19 Commentaries

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Communication for Coproduction: The Informational Role of Nonprofit Organizations by HuafangLi Governmentsandcitizensneedtocoproduceabetterresponsetothecoronaviruspandemic.However,theunavailabilityandinaccessibilityofessentialinformation,theinformationasymmetrybetweengovernmentsandcitizens,themisinformation,andtheinformationoverloadallinfluencecoproductionadversely.NPOsworldwidearemakingusefulinformationavailableandaccessibletogovernmentsandcitizens,servingasinformationintermediariestoreducethedegreeofinformationasymmetry,increasinginformationcredibilitytolightentheinformationoverload,andclarifyingmisinformation.AlltheseinformationalrolesofNPOsarevaluabletogovernmentsandcitizensforfightingagainstthecoronavirusandcoproducingbetterhealthoutcomes.

Ekaterina V. Kudryashova, Legal Regulation of Strategic Planning in Public Finance by AnnaVladislavovnaShashkova,NicholasMartin Sincetheendofthetwentiethcentury,properstrategicplanninginthepublicsectorhasparticularlybecomethebestpracticeofpublicmanagementaroundtheworld.Significantsocialchangesandadvancesintechnologyinspiredthenewstrategicapproachandpushedthestateandpublicinstitutionstowardsmodernconcepts of public governance.One of them is the concept of the strategic and enabling state. This is thestaterelyingon theextensive interactionofdifferentactorsand feedback,rather thanon imposing its ideasunilaterallyandexercisingstrictcontrolovereachandeveryaspectofsociallife.

New Trends in Open Government Information Research in China by WenxuanYu Overthelast20years,Chinesepublicadministrationresearchhasprogressedremarkably,andthesefourarticlesdemonstrateasmuch.Since2002,CPARhasbeenpublishingpublicadministrationresearchonChina, thus providing a venue for international academics and practitioners to understandChinese publicadministration and its reforms.We hope to further contribute to the internationalization of Chinese publicadministrationscholarship, therebysupportingcollaborationamongChinaandothercountriesandregions,bothinacademicresearchandpraxis.

Introducing CPAR’s Highly Cited Articles by JinhanWan,BoWen Sinceitslaunchin2002,theChinesePublicAdministrationReview(CPAR)hascontinuedtoprovidereaderswithhigh-quality,cutting-edge,andinsightfularticlesrelatedtoaplethoraofpublicadministrationandpublicpolicytopics.Thejournalhasestablishedavibrantacademicplatformforexchangingideas,sharingknowledge,andnurturingdebate.Inthisvirtualissue,CPARispleasedtoreleaseitshighlycitedarticles(>10citationsinGoogleScholar)tohelpreaderslookbackonsomeofthemostfascinatingstudiespublishedinthepasttwodecades.

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CPAR is published the Center for Chinese Public Administration Research and the School of Government at Sun Yat-sen University

Nonprofits’ Receipt of Government Revenue in China: Institutionalization, Accountability and Political Embeddedness


Governmentfundingconstitutesakeysourceofrevenuefornonprofitstosurvive.However,howtoacquiregovernmentfundinghasnotreceivedsufficientscholarlyattentionyet,and the limitednumberofstudiesyieldsthreemajor limitations. Inorder toaddress thisknowledgegap,weexamine theextent towhichaccountability,institutionalization,andpoliticalembeddednessaffectnonprofits’receiptofgovernmentrevenueandtheamountacquiredfromthegovernmentfromtheperspectiveofinterorganizationalrelationship,particularlythegovernment-nonprofitrelationsangle.Usingtwoyearspaneldataderivedfromasampleof382socialserviceorganizationsinGuangdongProvince,China,theresearchshowsthatnonprofitsthatareaccountabletothegovernment,moreformalized, and hold (or once held) cadre positions at county andmunicipal level are more likely to acquiregovernmentfunding.Theeffectofpoliticalcouncilmembershipandbeingaccountabletothepublicarerelativelylimited.

INTRODUCTION

Establishing government-nonprofit partnershipasakeymechanismindeliveringsocialserviceshas spread globally over the past decades

(Salamon,2006),evenincludingauthoritarianregimes,inwhich(quasi)publicagencieshavedominatedthesocialservicedeliverysystemfordecades.Comparedwith government bureaucracies, nonprofits havebeendemonstratedtobemoreeffectiveandefficient(Domberger & Jensen, 1997; Savas, 1982, 1987)andmuchmore flexible and responsible inmeetingdiversified and localized social needs (Salamon,1987; Salamon & Anheier, 1998). The importantroleofprivateorganizationsasthepivotalprovidersof publicly funded social services has been widelyacknowledged by policy makers. Consequently, fornonprofits, particularly social service organizations(SSOs),governmentfundingconstitutesanimportantrevenuesourcetosurviveinincreasinglycompetitivemarket(Salamon,Sokolowski,&Haddock,2017).

The funding relationship between nonprofit and

governmentagencieshasbeenextensivelydiscussedin the studies of both public administration andnonprofit, respectively. The former predominantlyfocuses on how government agencies manage thecontractual relationship strategically to achievethe presumed effective outcomes advocated byprivatization theory (Moynihan et al., 2010; Slyke,2007),whereasthelatteremphasizeshowdependenceongovernmentfundinginfluencestheinvolvementofnonprofitsinpoliticaladvocacyfromthecivilsocietylens(LeRoux&Goerdel,2009;Lundberg,2017).Bycontrast,hownonprofitsacquiregovernmentfundingfromthegovernment-nonprofitpartnershiphasnotyetreceived sufficient scholarly attention (Dong & Lu,2019;Lu,2015),eventhoughithasbecomeacriticalconcernfornonprofitpractitioners.

Among the limited studies focusing on nonprofits’receiptofgovernmentrevenue,mostofwhichrevolvearound the interorganizational relationships amongnonprofits (e.g., interorganizational collaboration),the external environment in which nonprofitsoperate (competitive markets and niche location)

Address correspondence to Xiaochen Gong at [email protected]. View this article at cpar.net

Ye & Gong • 1


Keywords: accountability,institutionalization,politicalembeddedness,nonprofitreceiptofgovernmentreve-nue

Shihua Ye, Xiaochen GongNankai University, China

and organizations’ characteristics (e.g., advocacyactivities, formalization and professionalization)(Dong& Lu, 2019;Garrow, 2010; Lu, 2015; Rich,1989; Stone, Hager, & Griffin, 2001; Wood &Theobald, 2003). Three characteristics are emergedfrom the existing literature. First, all of the priorstudiesareconductedintheWesterncontextwithonlyoneexception(Dong&Lu,2019),whichpreventusto have a clear understanding of how government-nonprofit relations influence government fundingpreferenceinthenon-Westernsocieties,particularlyintheauthoritarianregime,wheregovernment-nonprofitpartnership isa relativelynewphenomenon (Jing&Hu,2017;Krasnopolskaya,Skokova,&Pape,2015).For instance, it’s widely known that in democraticsocieties, nonprofits being accountable to thepublicishighlyimportant.However,whatisthecaseinanauthoritarianregime?Besides,manynonprofitshavebeendemonstratedtoholdpoliticalconnectionswiththegovernments(Cheng&Wu,2020;Johnson&Ni,2015;Kim&Kim,2014),whereasbarelyanythingisknownastohowbeingaccountabletothepublicandpolitical embeddedness would influence nonprofits’receipt of government revenue. Second, theinconsistencyofthefindingsofexistingstudiesmakesitchallengingtohaveasystematicandcomprehensiveunderstandingofthedeterminantsofnonprofitreceiptof government revenue. For instance, the resultsconcerningprofessionalizationandformalizationaremixed(Dong&Lu,2019;Lu,2015;Seo,2016;Suárez,2010).Third,theprevailinguseofcross-sectionaldatareveals the constraints of data availability, inwhichtime-invariantheterogeneityacrossorganizationsarenot accounted for. Thus, a superior identification isneeded.

From the perspective of institutional theory, thisstudyaddressesthisknowledgegapbyframingthreetypes of strategies nonprofits exert in response toinstitutional pressures and expectations, includinginstitutionalization, accountability and politicalembeddedness.Itempiricallyexaminestheextent towhich those survival strategies influence nonprofits’receipt of government revenue. We place public-nonprofit partnership in the context ofChina,whileusinga two-yearpaneldata (2016and2018)witha

randomsampleof382SSOsinGuangdongProvince.

Theremainderofthisarticleisorganizedasfollows.Webegin by discussing the background, conceptualframeworkandhypotheses.Next,wesetoutthedata,sampling,andanalyticalapproachwithdetailsoftheprocess of empirical work. Finally, after analyzingour empirical results, a systematic discussionof thetheoreticalandpracticalimplicationsisincluded.

BACKGROUND, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, AND HYPOTHESES

SSOs and Receipt of Government Revenue in ChinaOverthelastfewdecades,Chinahasnotonlywitnessedaneconomictake-offbutalsoascale-upofthenonprofitsector (Spires, 2011). Given the unique politicalandsocietalcontextofChina, theburgeoningof thenonprofitsectorisusuallyviewedasaChina-specificcasewith distinct attributes. Inmost of the existingliterature,Chinese nonprofits are either viewed as anaturalsourceofdemocratization,suchasgrassrootsorganizations (Ho, 2001; Saich, 2000; Teets, 2014)or as a tightly controlled sector without autonomy,such as government-organized organizations (Unger& Chan, 1995). Either line of research has onlypartially captured the dynamic relationship betweenthenonprofitsectorand theChinesegovernment. Infact, the government-nonprofit relation is far morecomplicated and sophisticated due to the shiftingof political priorities over the past few years. Forinstance, the Chinese government, like its Westerncounterparts, has gradually tried to incorporate theideology and principles of privatization into socialgovernancebydevolvingtheresponsibilityforsocialwelfareprovisiontothenonprofitsector(Jing,2008;Teets, 2013;Zhao,Wu,&Tao, 2016).To set up itsown “contracting regime”, the central governmenthasissuedCircular No. 96(theStateCouncil,2013)and Notice No. 96 (Ministry of Finance, 2014) onpurchasing social services from nonprofits in 2013and 2014, respectively. Put simply, the Chinesegovernmentiscurrentlymorethanaregulator,anditplaysanimportantroleincollaboratingwithnonprofitsastotheprovisionofsocialwelfare.


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Incontrastwiththetraditionalapproachofdeliveringsocial services by the government or throughmass organizations, the government encouragessocial innovation by outsourcing to social forces.By introducing market mechanisms and robustperformance evaluations, the Chinese governmentcan not only stimulate incentives for implementingcontractsbutalsogreatlyimprovetheefficiencyandeffectiveness of social service delivery. However,recognizing the importance of nonprofits in sharingsocial responsibility does not necessarily mean thatcivilsocietyisallowedto“bloom”(Jing,2015;Teets,2013).Instead,tokeepthecivilsocietyasasubsidiaryto the state apparatus, the government employsdifferentiated control strategies over the SSOsaccording to their political leanings and the publicgoodstheyprovide(Kang&Han,2008).Specifically,the government encourages the development ofGONGOs and SSOs by contracting out socialservices with them while exerting strict controlover the advocacy-oriented organizations, such asorganizations focusing on LGBT, gender equality,laborrightsandenvironmentalprotection.

Scholars coined the concept of “administrationabsorbing politics” (xingzheng xina zhengzhi) todescribe the relationship between nonprofits andthe government in the era of privatization (Kang&Han, 2008).On the one hand, like theirWesterncounterparts, Chinese nonprofits adopt standardmanagementpractices,suchasprogramplanningandevaluation, quantitative performance measurement,and independent financial audits (the StateCouncil,2013). On the other hand, the government arrangesthe routine activities and operations of nonprofitorganizations to a varying degree and moreimportantly, appoints or nominates the leaders ofnonprofitorganizationstoserveatthegovernmentoritssubordinatebranches,suchasthepoliticalcouncil.Inotherwords,nonprofitorganizationsareabsorbedintotheadministrativesystem.

LikenonprofitsintheWesterncontext,itisalsonoteasyforChinesenonprofitstoprocuregovernmentfunding.Thenumberofregisterednonprofitorganizationshasincreasedfrom320,000in2005to866,000in2019

(Affairs, 2006-2017), which has led to increasinglyintense competition among nonprofit organizations.To acquire the limited amounts of governmentallocation, nonprofit organizations have to competewith one another and with government-organizedorganizations that are institutionally entrenched inthe government regime and share an exclusive trustwithgovernmentagencies.Meanwhile,afundamentalbarrierpreventingnonprofitsfromenteringthemarketfor social services is that the Chinese government,particularly the local government agencies, lacksadequateknowledgeaboutnonprofitsand thus takesadistrustfulattitudetowardsthem(Jing&Hu,2017).Toearngovernmenttrust,orinthelongrun,tosecurestate-led resources, nonprofit organizations not onlyhave to comply with the strict accountability andtransparencyrulesrequiredbythepurchasingpoliciesand laws but also build political relations with thegovernment (Spires, 2011). Among others, one ofthe most typical strategies that nonprofits adopt isto invite former cadres (mainly retired) to join theboardsortheleadershipofthenonprofitorganizations(Ho,2007;Johnson&Ni,2015;Ni&Zhan,2017);coupledwithholdingapositionatthepoliticalcouncilasnotedabove,nonprofitsthusbuildpoliticaltieswiththegovernment,whichhelpsthemaccessafavorablepolicytreatmentandmoregovernmentallocations.

To summarize, like its Western counterparts, theChinese government has embraced the ideology ofprivatization in the social governance system andhasstartedtheprocessofestablishinga“contractingregime”withthenonprofitorganizations,whichhas,in turn, reshaped the nonprofit sector.To survive inan increasingly competitive environment, nonprofitorganizationsaresupposedtoadoptthemanagementpracticesadvocatedby thenewpublicmanagement,adhere to the much stricter accountability rulespromulgated by the Chinese government, and forgepoliticaltieswiththegovernmentasastrategicchoiceinthefaceofadministrativeabsorptionandcontrol.

Nonprofits’ Strategical Responses to Institutional Pressure and Receipt of Government RevenueDrawing from institutional theory, the behaviors of


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organizationscanbegreatlyinfluencedbythehighlyinstitutionalizedenvironments theyareembedded in(DiMaggio&Powell,1983).The threemechanismsof institutions, consisting of strong coercive,normative and mimetic pressures (Scott, 1991),drive organizations to adoptmanagerial practices inconformity to expectations and standards requiredby institutional entities (Reitan, 1998) from whichorganizations gain the legitimacy and resourcesneeded to survive (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Earlyinstitutional theory studies either take organizationsmerelyasthepassivereceiversofinstitutionalpressureor overlook organizations’ agency (e.g., Selznick,1949, 1957),whereas ever since the introduction ofinstitutionalentrepreneurshipbyP.DiMaggio(1988),organizations’ agency and reaction to institutionalanalysis have been greatly emphasized (Covaleski&Dirsmith, 1988; P. J.DiMaggio&Powell, 1991;Oliver,1991).Oliver(1991)arguesthatasaresultofexternalpressureandexpectation,organizationsexertactive agency and take various strategic responses to survive. According to the degree of active agency,organizations’ reactions canbe identified as varyingfrompassiveacquiescencetoproactivemanipulation.Inthisstudy,wefollowthistypologyandsystematicallypropose the strategic responses nonprofits exert incopingwithinstitutionalpressure.

In the field of government procurement of socialservices, the government agency constitutes animportant role in triggering institutional constraintsand exerting pressure on nonprofits through theallocation of resources and conferral of legitimacy(Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004). To strive forgovernment purchase, nonprofits essentially exposethemselves to institutional pressures from thegovernment, conforming to the specific regulation,purchase criteria of social services and biddingprocessmandatedbythegovernment.Thus,followingorganizations’strategicresponsestosurvivalpressurederived from the institutional environment asproposedbyOliver(1991),thisstudyidentifiesthreedimensionstoexplorethedeterminantsofnonprofits’receipt of government revenue: institutionalization(with both professionalization and formalizationincluded),accountabilityandpoliticalembeddedness.

Specifically, institutionalization corresponds to theacquiescence end, as organizations have to adaptthemselves to the preceding institutional frame orstructure in a taken-for-granted and legitimate way.For instance, the organizations aspire to achieveisomorphism through adhering to the requirementimposed by the higher level of government orimitating successful management practices adoptedby other SSOs. Political embeddedness is close tothemanipulationend,themostproactiveresponsetoexternalpressure.AsithasbeenemphasizedbyOliver(1991)that,“asocialserviceagency,forexample,maycultivateoradvertiseitstiestoaninfluentialcharitablefoundationinordertodemonstratetootherpotentialpublic and corporate donors that it is deserving ofresourcesandsupport(p158)”,cultivatingpoliticalembeddedness with the governments are definitelyamongthecriticalapproaches.ParticularlyinChina,thegovernmentexertscontrolovertheallocationandacquisitionofresourcesavailabletononprofits,thus,establishingpoliticaltiesisastrategywidelyadoptedinnonprofitsector(Ni&Zhan,2017).Accountability,or to say, disclosing information to the funder ofresources falls somewhere in between acquiesceend and manipulation end. Accountability meansmuchmore than keeping to the rules, it attempts tochange the stakeholders’ perception and cognitionby offering information and ultimately, to achievethe organizations’ goals. Nevertheless, this is not adefinitiveclassification.

InstitutionalizationInstitutionalization captures the process of adheringto institutionalized norms, rules and expectations,aimingatbecomingisomorphicwithaninstitutionalcontext (P. J. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer& Rowan, 1977). As Frumkin and Galaskiewicz(2004) state, “organizations do not always embracestrategies, structures, and processes that enhancetheir performance but, instead, react and seekwaysto accommodate pressures following externalscrutinyandregulation”(p.285).Asthemainsourceof institutional pressure, government agencies areincreasingly appealing to the use of formalizedmanagementpracticesinorganizations,suchaslong-term strategic plans, independent financial audits



and quantitative performance evaluation (Hwang &Powell,2009;Suárez,2010).Organizationsadheringtothesenormativepracticesandcodesofconductaredeemed acceptable. As a result, institutionalizationis largely driven by the extent to which nonprofitorganizationspursuemanagerialprinciplesasexpectedby the government in the view of privatization andnew public management. Consistent with this lineof rationale, institutionalization ismuchmore likeadimension under government-nonprofit relationshipin theeraofoutsourcing rather thanacharacteristicofnonprofitorganizationasproposedbypriorstudies(Dong&Lu,2019;Lu,2015;Suárez,2010).

Drawing upon existing literature, we argue thatthere are two elements of institutionalizationthat may influence NPOs’ receipt of governmentrevenue:professionalizationandformalization.First,professionalizationmeasurestheshareofspecializedexpertiseandpaidpersonnelovervolunteer laborersin an organization (Brint, 1994). It is theoreticallyplausiblethatcomparedwithvolunteers,professionalsand full-time employees are more competent inadhering to occupational norms and standards, aswell as in carrying out rationalized managementpracticesadvocatedbynewpublicmanagement(P.J.DiMaggio&Powell,1991;Hwang&Powell,2009).The incorporationofprofessionals intononprofits isrecognizedbygovernment agencies asbeing in linewithinstitutionalnormsandasbeingqualifiedtosecuregovernmentgrantsandcontracts.However,empiricalfindings concerning the effect of professionalizationonacquiringgovernmentrevenuearenotconsistent.Focusingon the501 (c) (3)charitableorganizationsin the San-Francisco Bay Area, Suárez (2010)finds a significantly positive relationship betweenprofessionalization and the amount of governmentfunding received. By contrast, Lu (2015) conductssimilar research in Maryland, reveals a relativelylittle impactofprofessionalizationon the likelihoodofdrawingongovernment funding.Similarly,DongandLu(2019)findnosignificantrelationshipbetweenprofessionalization and receipt of governmentfunding. Confronted with the inconsistent results,furtherexplorationisdemanded.

Second, formalization is one of Weber’s (1947)bureaucraticidealtype,andcentraltohisconceptionof formalization is that organizational rules andprocedures, together with a set of normativemanagement practices and performance evaluationsbeing adopted within the organizations, promotesthe effective coordination of work (Briscoe, 2007;Juillerat,2010).Institutionalistsarguethatinstitutionalrules,theprocessesofformulatingrulesandfulfillingformalizedproceduresinorganizationsleadtohigherlegitimacy, especially when these endeavors are inline with the expectations and norms promulgatedby the principal stakeholders (AbouAssi & Bies,2017). Empirically, Dong and Lu (2019) find thatorganizational formalization has a positive impactonreceiptofgovernmentrevenueinChina,whereasother scholars reveal a reversed causality betweengovernmentrevenueandorganizationalformalization.FocusingonKoreannonprofits,Seo(2016)suggeststhat organizationswithmore funding received fromthe government tend to be formalized, given thatadministrative controls and supervision are usuallyaccompanied with government funding. However,nosolidconclusionisdrawnduetothelimitationsofcross-sectiondata.

H1a: Professionalization and formalization arepositively associated with nonprofits’ receipt ofgovernmentrevenue,respectively.

H1b: Professionalization and formalization arepositivelyassociatedwiththeshareofrevenuefromgovernment,respectively.

AccountabilityAccountability refers to “the means by whichindividuals andorganizations report to a recognizedauthority (or authorities) and are held responsiblefor their actions” (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).As amultifacetedconcept,itisreflectiveofacommitmentoranappropriaterelationshipwithstakeholders.Withthe use of an array of accountability mechanisms,typically including publicizing financial reports andothergovernance-relatedinformation(Meijer,2003),theorganizationsgiveanaccounttothestakeholders,who in turn measure organizations’ performance

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by external criteria (Ebrahim, 2005). Therefore,accountability helps organizations to maintain asenseoflegitimacybyshapingfavorableperceptionsof reputation and public trust among stakeholderseffectively(Becker,2018;Black,2008),andinturn,facilitates nonprofits to acquire recourse from thestakeholders.Anextensiveamountofempiricalstudiesonnonprofitfundraisingrevealthatbeingaccountableto donors brings in donations (e.g., Sargeant,West,& Jay, 2007; Zhou&Ye, 2019), yet relatively fewinvestigating the effect of resource mobilizing ofbeingaccountabletothegovernment.

Bardach and Lesser (1996) have argued thataccountability consists of two fundamentaldimensions: towhomanorganizationisaccountableandforwhatresults.The“whom”isusuallydefinedas how responsive and answerable the organizationis to its principals, while the “for what” is definedas the outcomes achieved for the organization andits principals. In nonprofit resource-mobilizingstudies, disclosing the information of organizationalperformance and governance has been identified askeyaccountabilitypractices(Curtin&Meijer,2006;Saxton&Guo, 2011).As for “to whom”, Ebrahim(2003, 2005) has proposed that nonprofits areaccountabletothreetypesofstakeholders:upwardstoauthoritiesanddonors,downwardstothepublicandclientsandinternallytotheirmissionsandstaff.

Aligned with this line of rationale, accountabilitymight influence nonprofits’ receipt of governmentrevenue in twoways. First, nonprofits hold upwardaccountability directly to the government throughdisclosinginformationtothegovernment,particularlythepotentialfunders,whointurnassessorganizations’performance. Second, in relation to the nonprofitsin social service delivering, beyond acting as aprinciple for nonprofit contractors, the governmentalso acts as an agent for thepublic in theprovisionofpublicservices(Ashley&Slyke,2012).Therefore,nonprofit should also hold downward accountabilityto the public, through which government agenciescouldbeanswerabletothecitizensforhownonprofitcontractors contribute to the general well-being byproviding social services (Kettner&Martin, 1998).

Thisleadstooursecondtwohypotheses:

H2a:Accountabilitytothegovernmentandthepublicare positively associated with nonprofits’ receipt ofgovernmentrevenue,respectively.

H2b:Accountabilitytothegovernmentandthepublicare positively associated with the share of revenuefromgovernment,respectively.

Political EmbeddednessPolitical embeddedness refers to “bureaucratic,instrumental, or affective ties to the state and itsactors” (Michelson, 2007). Extensive empiricalstudies inbothprivateandnonprofitsectors identifythatpoliticalembeddednessorpolitical tieswith thestate are beneficial to organizations in maintainingsurvival advantages, especially in seeking resourcescontrolledbytheauthoritarianstate(Baum&Oliver,1991;Faccio,2006;Xin&Pearce,1996;Zheng,Ni,&Crilly,2019).

The way that political embeddedness influencesthe acquisition of state-controlled resources varies(Johnson&Ni, 2015; Xin& Pearce, 1996). In thelight of prior studies, three typical ways have beenidentified. The first is that politically embeddedin political institutions could act as a signal oforganizational legitimacy and reputation (Johnson&Ni,2015;Ni&Zhan,2017).InChina,thepublic-nonprofitpartnership is a newphenomenon (Jing&Hu, 2017). As such, government officials have noexperience in this field, and often take a distrustfulattitude towards nonprofits (Klijn, 2002; Smith& Smyth, 1996). Organizational legitimacy andreputation, as the intangible capital of nonprofits,helps government agencies to avoid potential risksand to make sound resource-allocating decisions.Second, political embeddedness lends nonprofitseasierandfasteraccesstoinformationintermsofthepreferencesofgovernment agencies (Wang&Qian,2011),allowingnonprofitpractitionerstowritemorefavorable program proposals. Third, political ties,to some extent, facilitate the cultivation of personalties,whichbenefitsnonprofitleadersinearningtrustfromgovernmentofficials(Johnson&Ni,2015).Asa



result,governmentfundingispromised.Assuch,weproposethatnonprofitswithpoliticaltiescouldaccessmore resourcescontrolledby the state, especially intermsofgovernmentfunding.

H3a:Politicalembeddednessispositivelyassociatedwithnonprofits’receiptofgovernmentrevenue.

H3b:Politicalembeddednessispositivelyassociatedwiththeshareofrevenuefromgovernment.

RESEARCH METHODS

Sample and Data Sources WechooseGuangdongProvince as the focal regionofthisstudy.GuangdongProvince,usuallyknownforitseconomicboomandopennesstotheinternationalmarket,isalsothepioneerofsocialgovernancesystemreforminChina.In2012,Guangdongbecamethefirstprovincetoissuetheregionalpolicyregardingsocialorganizations purchasing social services (GeneralOffice of the People’s Government of GuangdongProvince, 2012). The data are collected from twowavesofthesurveyconductedbyourteam:thefirstwavein2016andafollowed-upwavein2018.1Unlikenonprofit in theUSthatareclearly identifiedby taxcodes,SSOs inChinahavenoofficialclassification.With the assistance of practitioners, we identifySSOs with the following characteristics: a) legallyregisteredasnon-governmentalandnon-commercialentities; b) providing services for the marginalizedgroups, such as poor and elderly people or peoplewith disabilities; c) having professional staff, suchassocialworkersandrehabilitators;andd)receivingprivate donations and public funding from the localgovernment.SincenolistofSSOsisavailable,inthe2016wave,wecompiledacompletelistbygatheringdatafrommultiplesources,includingtheGuangdongProvincialCivilAffairsBureau,themajormunicipalbureau of civil affairs, organizations’ websites, andregional-supportinginstitutions.Itisworthnotingthatthefoursourcesarenotmutuallyexclusivebutalwayscomplementeachother.Basedonthat,wedeterminedthesamplingframe,with1,124SSOsincluded.2

Given that the limitedsamplesizeandpossibly low

responserate,wedidnotadoptastratifiedsamplingmethod. Instead, we employed three types of data-collecting methods to improve the response rate.First, we sent e-mail invitations with a link to anonline questionnaire included to the organizationsforwhich an e-mail addresswas available. Second,for the organizations that had difficulty accessinge-mail,weaskedtheregional-supportinginstitutionsfor assistance with informing and connecting withthe targeted organizations. Phone calls are alsomade to invite these organizations to participate inthis research. Third, for the organizational leaderswho preferred interviews, we conducted face-to-faceinterviewsusingthestandardizedquestionnaire.With697organizationseffectivelyrespondingtothesurvey,theresponseratereaches62%in2016,whichis reasonable and acceptable in nonprofit studies(Baruch&Holtom,2008;Hager,Wilson,Pollak,&Rooney,2003). In2018,we re-invited the identified697organizationstoengageinourresearchbysimilarchannels.As part of this wave of the survey, someidenticalquestionsareasked.Wecollect428effectiveresponsesfrom697organizations,witharesponserateof61.4%(428/697=0.614).3Inthisstudy,weincluded382samplesafterdatacleaning.

Dependent VariablesWe include two forms of government revenue asthe dependent variables: the receipt of governmentrevenue (a dummy variable) and the proportion ofrevenue received from the government (%), sincean organization can acquire government revenue,but itdoesnotnecessarilymean itcouldgeta large

1 The interviewed organizations and the items of the survey are not identical for the two rounds of survey, in this study, only the same samples and items are chosen.

2 Considering that voluntary SSOs keep detached relationship with governments, only SSOs with professionals are included in this study. See Zhou and Han (2019) for reference where voluntary SSOs are not the major subjects of government procurement.

3 In the 2018 wave of the survey, we compiled a complete list by gathering data from the similar channels, which included the 697 organizations identified in 2016, some new founded organizations, and the organizations that have not engage in the 2016 wave of survey. Based on that, we determined the sampling frame, with 1,346 SSOs included. Among them, we re-invited the 697 organizations identified in 2016 to answer some identical questions asked in 2016 wave of survey. We collected 787 effective responses in total, with a response rate of 58.46%.

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share of government revenue. For governmentrevenue,weincludethosereceivedfromgovernmentagencies, institutions, community workstations andneighborhoodcommittees.

Independent VariablesInstitutionalization. Based upon previous studies(Lu,2015;Suárez,2010) and the realityofChineseSSOs,4we develop a professionalization indexwithsevenitems(seeTable1).Theitemiscodedas“1”iftheanswer toeitherof thesevenprofessionalizationitems listed in Table 1 is yes, otherwise coded as“0”.The professionalization score ranges from 0 to7,withthehigherscorerepresentingthehigherlevelof professionalization. An analysis of reliabilitybased upon Cronbach’s alpha is carried out todetermine the internal consistency of these items.A Cronbach’s α=0.7823 indicates a solid level ofinternalconsistency.Formalizationismeasuredbytheformalization index,usingfive itemsconstructedbyMosley(2011)(seeTable1).Theitemiscodedas“1”iftheanswertoeitherofthefiveformalizationitemsis “yes”, otherwise coded as “0”.The formalization

scorerangesfrom0to5(Cronbach’sα=0.7416).

Accountability. It is measured according to whomorganizations disclose information (“accountableto whom”) and the areas of information disclosure(“accountableforwhat”).Inlightofpreviousstudies(Nie, Liu, & Cheng, 2016; Saxton & Guo, 2011;Zhu,Ye, & Liu, 2018), we develop an informationdisclosure index with 14 items (see Table 1). Foraccountability to the government, the item is codedas “1” if the organization discloses information tothegovernment,whilecodedas“0”ifnotapplicable.Therefore, the accountability score ranges from 0to 14.ACronbach’s alphaof 0.8615 implies a highdegree of internal consistency of these indexes. Foraccountabilitytothepublic,theitemiscodedas“1”iftheorganizationdisclosesinformationtothepublic,whilecodedas“0”ifnotapplicable.Theaccountabilityscorerangesfrom0-14too(Cronbach’sα=0.7635).

Political embeddedness.Thepoliticalembeddednessismeasuredusingtwoquestions.Thefirstiswhetherthe organization’s leadership, boardmembers or thefounderholdorhaveonceheldapositionatanylevelofthegovernmentortheCommunistParty,suggesting

Table 1. Measurement of Independent Variables

Independent Variable Measurement

Professionalization(Yes=1; No=0)

If the organization: (a) has an executive director, (b) pays for the executive director, (c) makes the executive director a full-time position, (d) has an accountant, (e) has a cashier, (f) is staffed by paid personnel, and (g) only uses paid personnel in social service delivery.

Formalization (Yes=1; No=0)

If the organization has: (a) developed strategic plans, (b) kept quantitative records on programs and services, (c) evaluated its programs or services in the last three years, (d) formal job descriptions for every paid position, and (e) formal performance assessment for every paid employee.

Accountability(Yes=1; No=0)

If the organization disclosed the following 14 items to government agencies and to the public, respectively:(a) Annual report or yearbook (1 item)(b) Financial disclosure (5 items): Financial report, audit report, list of major contributors, sources of revenue by category, expenditures by category.(c) Performance disclosure (5 items): Staff composition and structure, organizational development plan, service or program report, organizational mission, vision, and values, number of employees, volunteers and beneficiaries.(d) Governance disclosure (3 items): Composition of board of directors, composition of leadership, any regulations.

Political embeddedness(Township=1; County=2;

Municipal=3; Provincial=4; State=5; No=0)

If the organization’s leadership, board member or founder: (a) hold or once held a position at any levels of government agencies, and (b) is an incumbent representative in either the PPCC or the PC. If yes, tell us the highest level.

4 In China, financing is required to be separated from accounting.



the highest level of the government achieved. Thesecondiswhethertheorganization’sleadership,boardmembersorfounder isanincumbentmemberof thepolitical council, including the People’s PoliticalConsultative Conference (PPCC) or the People’sCongress(PC),5andinformthehighestlevelofPPCCand(or)PCachieved.Forthetwoquestions,theitemis coded as6: “1” = township level, “2” = “countylevel”,“3”=municipallevel,“4”=provinciallevel,“5” = state level, “0” = otherwise. For both of thetwo questions, the highest levels that organizationsachievedareincluded.

Control VariablesControl variables identified by previous studies ashaving critical influences on nonprofits’ receipt ofgovernment revenue are also included in this study.Wefirstcontrolfororganizationalageandagesquare,since an inverted U-shaped relationship of age andnonprofits’ revenue is found (Zhu et al., 2018).Wealsocontrolorganizationalannualexpenditure,whichisdeterminedasapredictoroforganizationalcapacity(Ni&Zhan,2017;Zhuetal.,2018).Then,considerthat the Chinese government is very sensitive topolicyadvocacy(Hsu,Hsu,&Hasmath,2017;Kang& Han, 2008; Wu & Chan, 2012), along with theempirical evidence that nonprofits’ policy advocacyeffortsinfluencetheirreceiptofgovernmentfunding(Garrow, 2010), we construct a dummy variable tosuggest whether the organization engaged in anypolicyadvocacyactivities.7Theitemisassessedbasedonthestatement“Hasyourorganizationbeeninvolvedin any policy advocacy activities for the benefit ofyourclientsorforthepurposesofpromotingcertainpolicies?”It iscodedas“1” if replied towith“yes”andas“0”ifwitha“no”.

Data AnalysisTo assess the impact of a series of hypotheses onSSOs’ receipt of government revenue and the shareofrevenuereceivedfromgovernment,theregressionspecificationsareshownasfollows:

(1)

(2)where is a dummy variable to indicatewhether SSOi received government revenue at year t, while is the share of revenue fromgovernmentrevenuereceivedbySSOiatyeart.Threesetsofhypothesesareincludedinthemodel,inwhich

isavectorofinstitutionalizationmeasures; is avectorofaccountabilitymeasuresand is a vector of political embeddednessmeasures. indicates a seriesofcontrolvariables,and istheorganizationalindividualeffectwhile arandomdisturbance.

Specifically, we adopt a two-phrase process in thisstudy. First, for the analysis of a panel datasetwithbinary dependent variable, there are usually threeestimationtechniques:conventionallogitmodelwithaggregateddata(between-effectsmodel),fixedeffect(FE) logit and random effect (RE) logit (Maume,2004).Theregressionspecificationispresentedas:

(3)

where is the logistic cumulative distributionfunction, is a vectorof regressors, is a vector ofcoefficients,and istheorganizationalindividualeffect.

Inequation(1), foranyirepresentapooledlogit model without the organizational individualeffects, which can only analyze the differencesbetweenSSOs, but not the changeswithinSSOs. Ifthe organizational individual effects exist and is uncorrelatedwith , it is aRE logitmodel.When is correlated with , it is a FE logit model.A

problemwithFE logit is that it requireschangeson

5 Generally, government officials are still of great influence after they left the position (for instance, retiring). Therefore, we take incumbent and retired government officials into account. Comparatively, the representatives of the PPCC and the PC’s influence decrease once they leave due to the five-year term. As such, only the incumbent representatives of PPCC and PC are considered.

6 Note that PPCC starts at county level. But it will not affect our study since we choose the highest level of both PPCC and PC.

7 Even though, nonprofits are tightly controlled by the Chinese government, they still could initiate or engage in advocacy activities, especially the unsensitive forms, such as lobbying and negotiation.

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thedependentvariables,andonly thosewithstatueschangedaremaintainedinthemodel.Forinstance,theSSOsthatreceivedgovernmentallocationinthebothyearsaredroppedfromthemodel.Sinceourstudyisconcerned with both access to government fundingandtheamountacquiredfromgovernment,RElogitismoreappropriatefortestingH1a,H2a,andH3a.

Second, as for H1b, H2b, and H3b, the followingproceduresareadoptedinthelightofpreviousstudies(Wooldridge,2002;Zhang,Li,&Li,2014).Wefirstuse the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test todetermine the more appropriate model between thepanel data method and the pooled ordinary leastsquare approach.The results of the test indicate the

existenceofunobservedorganizationaleffectsinourdata.Therefore,thepaneldatamethodisadoptedsincethismethod couldmodel the unobserved individualeffects related to the same units. We then conductstandardHausmantesttoweighbetweenFEandRE.Theinsignificantp-valueforaHausmantestsuggeststhatindependentvariablesarenotassociatedwiththeunobservedeffects(P-value=0.214,0.135,0.301,and0.353formodel4-6aswellasfullmodel2inTable4respectively).Assuch,REmodelsareused.

Foreachofthetwodependentvariables,weincludefourmodels to test the hypotheses: onemodel eachfor accountability, institutionalization, politicalembeddedness,andonefullmodel.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables

Variable Frequency (n) Percentage (%)Receipt of government revenue (Yes=1) 434 56.80Share of revenue received from government Mean=0.43 S.D.=0.56Institutionalization -0.0172 Professionalization index Mean=1.98 S.D.= 3.05 Formalization Index Mean=1.31 S.D.= 1.01Accountability Be accountable to the government Mean=8.04 S.D.=9.12 Be accountable to the public Mean=7.01 S.D.=8.12Political embeddedness Cadre position (No=0) 554 72.51 Township level 65 8.51 County level 82 10.73 Municipal level 57 7.46 Provincial level 6 0.79 State level 0 0 Political council membership (No=0) 632 82.72 Township level 26 3.40 County level 42 5.63 Municipal level 59 7.72 Provincial level 4 0.52 National level 0 0Organizational age Mean=5.51 S.D.=4.11Annual expenditure (thousand RMB yuan) Mean=752.32 S.D.= 1955.16Advocacy activities (Yes=1) 92 10.47

Note: S.D. is short for standard deviation; N=764.



FINDINGS

Overview of the SampleTable 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of thetotal sample. Over half of the sample organizationsidentified received government revenue, which ismuchlargerthanthatofgrassrootsNGOs(Spires,Tao,&Chan,2014).TheaverageamountofgovernmentrevenuereceivedbySSOsisonly676thousandyuan,whileanobvious fundinggapexistsbetweenSSOs.Inaddition,themajorityofSSOsdonothavepoliticalconnectionswiththegovernmentintermsofholdingcadrepositions (72.51%)andbeingmembersof thepoliticalcouncil(82.72%).Theaverageorganization’s

age is 5.51. Taken together, these findings suggestthat SSOs in China are quite young and politicallymarginalized.

Factors Affecting the Receipt of Government RevenueWeintroducetwotypesofanalyses,onefornonprofits’receiptofgovernment revenueand theother for theshare of revenue received from the government inTable3andTable4,respectively.InModels1-3and4-6,wepresenttheempiricalresultsofourthreesetsof core independent variables separately, includinginstitutionalization, accountability and politicalembeddedness, and contrast them with the control

Table 3. Random Effect Model: Receipt of Government Revenue

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Full Model 1Institutionalization Professionalization 1.29 (0.33) 1.25 (0.24) Formalization 1.04***(0.05) 1.04** (0.06)AccountabilityAccountable to the government 1.42**(0.04) 1.31* (0.0 5)Accountable to the public -1.20 (1.05) -1.20 (1.06)Political embeddedness Cadre position (ref=0) Township level 0.90 (0.46) 0.90 (0.46) County level 0.67** (0.03) 0.65** (0.03) Municipal level 0.54*(0.02) 0.56*(0.02) Provincial level - - Political council membership (ref=0) 0.66 (0.16) 0.54 (0.15) Township level - - County level 0.24 (0.24) - Municipal level 0.45 (0.29) 0.46 (0.30) Provincial level - -Control variables Organizational age 0.36**(0.05) 0.34* (0.05) 0.34* (0.04) 0.29*** (0.05) Organizational age square -0.21** (0.02) -0.21* (0.02) -0.21* (0.02) -0.21*** (0.02) Ln annual expenditure 0.30 (0.42) 0.34 (0.42) 0.34 (0.45) 0.30 (0.42) Advocacy activities 0.11 (0.10) 0.11 (0.09) 0.11 (0.10) 0.13 (0.09)Constant -2.56***(0.14) -1.97***(0.12) -2.15***(0.16) -1.28***(0.13)Observations 764 764 764 764Number of groups 382 382 382 382

Note: Table shows coefficient with standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

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variables.TheFullModels1and2integratethethreeindependent variables and all the control variablesto comprehensively examine the influence of thekey predictors on nonprofits’ receipt of governmentrevenue.

InModel1,onlyformalizationisfoundtobestronglyassociatedwiththelikelihoodofacquiringgovernmentfunding; thus,H1a ispartiallysupported too.Model2 reveals that being accountable to the governmentin terms of publicizing the organizations’ yearbookand disclosing information in the areas of finance,performanceandgovernancesubstantiallycontributes

to the receipt of government revenue, whereasbeingaccountable to thepublichasnosuch impact.ThesefindingslendpartialsupporttoH2a.InModel3, compared with organizations without politicalconnections, the organizations whose leadership,board members or founders hold cadre positions atcounty level and municipal level are indeed morelikelytoreceivegovernmentfunding.Thisfindingisconsistentwiththestudiesongovernment-organizednonprofits (Ni & Zhan, 2017; Zhou & Ye, 2018).But the organizationswho aremembers of politicalcouncilsdonothaveanyeffectaspredicted,thus,H3aispartiallysupported.Inaddition,inFullModel1,all


Table 4. Random Effect Model: Share of Revenue from Government

Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Full Model 2Institutionalization Professionalization 0.19*(0.01) 0.15*(0.02) Formalization 0.17**(0.02) 0.13**(0.03)AccountabilityAccountable to the government 0.96***(0.02) 0.99*(0.03)Accountable to the public 0.83 (0.73) 0.85 (0.79)Political embeddedness Cadre position (ref=0) Township level - - County level 0.06**(0.01) 0.04**(0.01) Municipal level 0.07*(0.01) 0.08*(0.01) Provincial level - - Political council membership (ref=0) Township level - - County level 0.03 (0.22) 0.04 (0.23) Municipal level 0.02 (0.32) 0.02 (0.30) Provincial level - -Control variables Organizational age 0.07* (0.01) 0.08** (0.00) 0.08**(0.00) 0.09***(0.00) Organizational age square -0.93** (0.05) -0.93** (0.01) -0.93** (0.01) -0.89*** (0.03) Ln annual expenditure 0.09* (0.01) 0.09* (0.02) 0.09* (0.01) 0.07** (0.01) Advocacy activities 0.03 (0.12) 0.02 (0.13) 0.03 (0.12) 0.03 (0.14) Year DummyAdjust R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.27Observations 764 764 764 764Number of groups 382 382 382 382

Note: Table shows coefficient with standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.


thekeypredictorscontinuetohaveexplanatorypowerin predicting organizations’ receipt of governmentrevenue.

Theresultsoftheamountacquiredfromgovernment(see Table 4) are generally the same as that ofthe receipt of government revenue, except forprofessionalization. Both professionalization andformalizationhaveasignificantinfluenceontheshareofrevenuefromgovernment,whichlendsfullsupportforH1b.AsshowninModel4,H2bisagainpartiallysupported,asthegovernmentismorelikelytoallocaterevenue to organizations that are being accountableto the government but not those being accountableto the public. Model 6 reveals that organizations’leadershiporboardmembersholdingcadrepositionsatmunicipalandprovinciallevelishighlypositivelyassociatedwiththeshareofrevenuefromgovernment,whereashavingmembersofthepoliticalcouncildoesnot have any impact. Therefore, hypothesis H3b ispartiallysupported.InFullModel2,allthepredictors,except for political council membership and beingaccountabletothepublic,continuetocontributetotheamountacquiredfromthegovernment.

ComparingtheresultsofthetwoFullModels,wefindthatprofessionalizationincreasestheamountacquiredfrom government, whereas are not able to increasethe possibility of receipt of government revenuesignificantly. In addition, the amount acquired fromgovernment decreases as nonprofits age. Annualexpendituremayincreasethepossibilityofacquiringa larger amount of government funding but do notaffect accessing government funding. Nonprofits’policy advocacy efforts have no effect on both thereceipt of and the amount of government funding.Takentogether,weconcludethataftercontrollingforpredictors at the organizational level, including anorganization’s age, age square, annual expenditure,and advocacy activities, being accountable to thegovernmentandincreasingthelevelofformalizationalongside building political connections withthe government at county and municipal level ofgovernment are substantially conductive to SSOs’receipt of government revenue and the amountacquiredfromgovernment,respectively.

Robustness Check Tochecktherobustnessofouranalysis,first,weusedother formsof thedependentvariables, theabsoluteamounts(logform)ofgovernmentrevenue in2018.The results are consistent with our prior results.Second, random subsamples with various samplesizeswereadopted(Zhangetal.,2014),theresultsforwhicharesignificantlysimilartoourresultsinTable2.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

GiventheprominenceofgovernmentfundingforSSOstorealizefinancialstabilityandsustainabilitywithinthe privatization movement, securing governmentfunding isnotonlyapracticalconcernfornonprofitpractitioners but also a theoretical issue demandingfurther academic exploration. Besides, for policyentrepreneurs, government funding is one usefulapproach among the complex array of policy tools(Ashley&Slyke,2012).Improvingtheeffectivenessofthistypeoftoolmightbeachievedbyidentifyingthepreferrednonprofitscontractors.Fromtheperspectiveofinstitutionaltheory,weframethreehypothesesandtest them using two years of panel data (2016 and2018)derivedfrom382SSOsinGuangdongProvince,China. Specifically, we propose institutionalization,accountability and political embeddedness as thethree types of strategical responses to institutionalpressure, and examine the extent to which each ofthem influences nonprofits’ receipt of governmentrevenueand the shareof revenue fromgovernment,respectively. We find that institutional theorycontributes to better explanation of the influence ofgovernmentprocurementofservicesfromnonprofitinChina, inwhichnonprofit-governmentpartnershipisrelativelynewandgovernmentplaysadominantrolein shaping thedevelopmentofnonprofit sector. It isrevealed that as strategic responses, nonprofits thataremoreformalized,accountabletothegovernment,hold (or once held) cadre positions at county andmunicipal level of government agencies are morelikelytoacquiregovernmentfunding.Theeffectsofpolitical councilmembership andbeing accountabletothepublicarerelativelylimited.

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Specifically,theresultscontributetoourunderstandingofnonprofits’formalizationandprofessionalizationbyaddingnewevidencefromChina.InlinewithDongand Lu’s (2019) study, the significant coefficientsassociated with formalization demonstrate thatconformitywith institutionalized norms and rules iseffective for achieving government subsidies. Thatis,inordertogaingovernmentfunding,SSOsshouldformulate the institutional rules and procedures thatare compatible with institutional criteria and adoptcommonmanagement strategic tools that are highlyvalued by the government. Additionally, resultsshow that organizations staffed with full-time andpaid executives and professionalized accountantsand cashiers are muchmore likely to receivemoregovernmentgrantsandcontractsthanothernonprofits.

Our findings reveal a complicated mechanismentrenched in accountability, in which beingaccountabletothegovernmentispositivelyassociatedwith both the receipt of government revenue andthe amount acquired from government, whereas nocorrelation can be found with being accountable tothepublic.Thissuggeststhatthegovernment,astheallocator of public funds, is exclusively concernedwithnonprofits’answerabilityand responsiveness tothe government, although being accountable to thepublicissupposedtobetheprioritizedprincipleofthegovernment. The intricate findingsmight be China-specific. Unlike in liberal democracies, the Chineseofficials are appointed by their superiors, usuallyfrom a higher level of government agencies, whichleadsthemtohavestrongincentivestoholdupwardaccountabilitytotheirpowerfulsuperiorsratherthandownwardaccountabilitytothepublic(Chien,2010).Thus, the governments are only concerned withwhethernonprofitsdiscloseinformationtothemselvesor not. In addition, disclosing information mightcause trouble, such as criticizing and questioning anonprofit’s financial and governance performance,which often is regarded as a potential risk to socialstabilitybygovernments.This implies thatalthoughtheChinesegovernmentadoptsthesamemechanismof government-nonprofit partnerships as itsWesterncounterparts, it has its characteristics shaped byinstitutions it is embedded in. For instance, the

statistical insignificance of being accountable to thepublicrevealedfromtheresultsinducesustoreflectonwhatsocialinfluences,intheprivatizationera,thelackofthepublic’sinvolvementwouldbring.Furtherexplorationisneeded.

Seekingpoliticalrelationswithgovernmentagenciesatthepersonalandorganizationalleveliswidelytakenas themostproactiveresponseandausefulstrategythat nonprofits adopt in response to the externaluncertainties(Zhengetal.,2019).Thefindingsinourstudyarepartiallyconsistentwithpreviousliteraturethat, nonprofits’ board members holding cadrepositionsatcountyandmunicipallevelcontributestononprofitsaccessingtoandgainingmoregovernmentsubsidies. However, political council membershipdoes not approach statistical significance in gaininggovernment revenue. The statistically insignificanteffect of political council membership could be theresultofthespecialtythatinChina.Alltypesofsocialresources are largely in the hands of governments(particularlylocalgovernments)butnotofthepoliticalcouncils. Even though recent studies emphasizethe increasing importance of the Chinese politicalcouncils in “political consultation” and “democraticsupervision”(Cho,2002;Yan,2011),ourstudyshowsthelimitedinfluenceofmembersofpoliticalcouncilsongovernmentresourceallocation.

Identifying themost effective responseswhen facedwithinstitutionalpressureisanecessity.Thus,basedupon our findings, several practical implicationscould be drawn. First, nonprofits’ formalization andprofessionalizationarehighlyvaluedbygovernmentagencies in China. Nonprofits’ internal governance,such as formal structure and routines, greatly leadsto better access to resources and facilitates theirpossibility of gaining government revenue. Second,being accountable to government is identifiedas a survival strategy for nonprofits striving forgovernmentprocurementofpublicservices.Dealingwithinformationasymmetrybydisclosinginformationenablenonprofitstomoregovernmentrevenue.Third,considering the decisive role of government in theprocurement of public services, cultivating politicalembeddedness with government helps nonprofits



maintainafavorablepositioninacquiringgovernmentrevenue.Inparticular,thestudyrevealsthatpoliticalembeddedness is greatly driven by holding cadrepositions, which is of significant value in securingbothtangibleandintangibleresourcesthataretoughor costly for other nonprofits to reach. It is worthnoting that although those strategical responses toinstitutional pressure might be effective in gaininggovernment funds, as for SSO practitioners, theyshouldalsobeawareofthelong-termmanagerialeffectwhile taking advantage of the short-term financialgains. For instance, government funding gainedthrough formalization might crowd out charitabledonations,sincedonorssharedifferentpreferencesoforganizationcharacteristicswithgovernments(Zhuetal.,2018).

LIMITATIONS

The study is subject to three limitations. Firstly,this empirical study is constrained by therepresentativenessofthedataset.Sinceweonlyfocuson SSOs in Guangdong Province, the study cannotconfirmtheexternalvalidityof thefindingsandcanbarely generalize the results. Future studies mayemployamorecomprehensivedatasetonnonprofitsto explore the government-nonprofit partnership atthenationallevel.Thesecondlimitationrelatestothemeasurement of political embeddedness. The formsof political embeddedness vary with the politicalinstitution and the societal and cultural context ofcountries.Holdingacadrepositionandbeingpoliticalcouncilmembershiparetwoprimaryformsofpoliticalembeddedness in China, but this is insufficientto wholly capture the approaches of politicalembeddednessortomeasurepoliticalembeddednessinWesterndemocraticregimes.Futurestudiesmaygobeyondthesetwoformsofmeasurementanddevelopmorenuancedwaystoverifywhetherorganizationallegitimacygainedthroughpoliticalembeddedness iseffectiveacrosscountries.Lastly,itisstillinsufficienttomeasure accountabilitywith the degree towhichorganizations disclose their financial and programinformation, since it captures “how SSOs report totheir stakeholders” rather than the degree of “beingresponsiblefortheiractions”.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thisworkwassupportedbythepost-doctoralsciencefund(6619038)andgeneralprojectofTianjinsocialscienceplanningproject(TJSR20-005).

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Promotion for Performance? The working incentive of Chinese provincial environmental agency heads in pollution reduction


Promotion is argued to be the primaryworking incentive forChinese officials.Different frompreviousstudiesthatfocusontheprovincialgovernorsandpartysecretaries,thispapermakesthefirstattempttoexaminewhether the career turnover of China’s provincial environmental agency heads (PEAHs) is affected by theenvironmentalperformancewithintheirjurisdictions.Theresultsshowthattheperformanceinreducingnationallytargetedpollutants—i.e.,sulfurdioxide(SO2)andchemicaloxygendemand(COD)—isnotnecessarilycorrelatedwithpoliticalturnover,whichonlydependsonpoliticalfactorssuchastheagewhenassumingoffice,tenureoftheoffice,andiftheyarelocalpeople.Therefore,alackofpromotionincentiveisfoundamongChina’sPEAHsinlocalenvironmentalmanagement.Theirworkingincentiveisstraightforwardtop-downcontrol,makingthemmerelytheimplementersofeconomy-dominatedlocalpublicpolicy.Amorerobustandtransparentperformancemanagementsystem,toconnecttheprovincialenvironmentalperformancewiththePEAH’spoliticalcareer,issupposedtobebeneficialforChina’senvironmentalmanagement.

INTRODUCTION

Under China’s political system, the cadresplay a dominant role and exert significantinfluence on local governance (L. Liu,Wu,

Li, de Jong, & Sun, 2017; Yao & Zhang, 2015).According to the public choice theory, the behaviorof localofficials isdeterminedbytheirrationalself-interest,whichisshapedbytheirinstitutionalcontext(Edin, 1998). Across all external incentives to thebehavior of government officials, whether positive(suchasbonusesandpromotions)ornegative (suchas demotion, inspection, filing of lawsuits, andjudgments of subordinates) (Edin, 1998), promotionis arguably theprimary factor that influences, if notdetermines, thebehaviorofChineseofficials (Zhou,2007).Inordertogainrecognitionfromtheirsuperiorsand thereby promotion opportunities, local officialsspare no effort in improving their performances.Although criticized by some studies as being over-

simplified, over-ideal, and ignoring specific careermotivationoflocalofficials(Gao,2017;Kostka&Yu,2015;Mei&Wang,2017;Zheng,Kahn,Sun,&Luo,2014), promotion has still been the most prevalentand dominant explanation of the political rules andincentives in China’s bureaucratic system. For thisreason, promotion as a reward for the economicperformanceoflocalofficialsisregardedasoneofthemost important theories in explaining the economicmiracleofChinasincereformin1978(Zhou,2007).

Amidst China’s economic boom, the effects of itssuccess have been increasingly offset by its severeenvironmentalpollution. In fact,anestimated0.5 to1.3millionprematuredeathsperyeararecausedbyairpollution(ZhuChen,Wang,Ma,&Zhang,2013;J. Liu, Han, Tang, Zhu, & Zhu, 2016). Moreover,morethan80%ofthewaterfromundergroundwellsused by farms, factories and households across thedensely populated plains in China is unsuitable

Address correspondence to May Chu at [email protected]. View this article at cpar.net


Keywords: performancemanagement,promotionincentive,environmentalgovernance,environmentalagencyhead,China

Lei Liu*, Mingyue Li*, May Chu†

* Sichuan University, China† The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong


Liu, Li, & Chu • 21

for drinking or bathing because of contamination (Buckley & Piao, 2016). The graveness of China’senvironmentalproblemisalsoevidentinglobaldata.IntheEnvironmental Performance Index 2016 Report published by Yale University, China ranked 109thamong180countries(Hsuetal.,2016).

In1996,theStateCouncilapprovedthe“9thFive-YearPlanforNationalEnvironmentalProtection”madebytheNationalEnvironmentalProtectionBureauatthetime,whichproposedthatalltheprovincesandcitiesshould control the emissions of 12major pollutantswithinacertainlimitby2000(J.Wangetal.,2018).In 2001, the reduction of sulfur dioxide (SO2) andchemical oxygen demand (COD), excluding otherpollutants, was formally prescribed in the “10thFive-Year Plan for National Economic and SocialDevelopment”, the highest level ofChina’s nationalplans. Since 2006, the reduction of SO2 and CODhasbeenlistedintheFive-YearPlanfortheNationalEconomic and Social Development as a “bindingtarget”,whichmeansthepollutionreductionislegallyenforceable. To implement the pollution reduction,the national target is decomposed and assigned toeach province, the provinces then have the legalresponsibilitytofulfillthetarget.In2005,anexecutiveorder titled the “Decision of the State Council onImplementing the ScientificDevelopmentView andStrengtheningtheEnvironmentalProtection”stressedthatenvironmentalprotectionshouldbebroughtintotheassessmentcriteriafortheselection,appointment,andawardoflocalcadres.Thesystemaimstorectifylocalcadres’inactiononenvironmentalprotectionbybasinginparttheircareerprogressionontheireffortsinlocalenvironmentalmanagement(L.Liu,deJong,& Huang, 2016). However, with the continuouslysevere pollution problem, it remains questionablewhether the existing public personnel system hasprovided local cadres sufficient incentive to takepollutioncontrolseriously.

Officially, local leaders are responsible for theenvironmentalqualityintheirjurisdictions.However,forlocalleaders,pollutionreductionisonlyoneofthepublic affairs in local socio-economic development,and it must be coordinated with other affairs. In

general cases, pollution reduction is not prioritizedonlocalgovernmentagendas.So,theimpactoflocalleaders on pollution reduction is both critical andlimitedtosomedegree.Incontrast,fortheheadofthelocalenvironmentalagency,environmentalprotectionis their only duty. The local environmental agencyheadisthesoledepartmentcadreresponsibleforthemaking and implementation of the environmentalpoliciesatthelocallevel.Comparedwithlocalleaders,theimpactofthelocalenvironmentalagencyheadonpollutionreductionismoredirectandsubstantial.Inaddition,intheeyesofthepublic,theenvironmentalagenciesarealsoprincipallyheldaccountableforthedecliningenvironmentalconditions.Asanillustration,“inviting theenvironmentalagencyhead to swim intheriver”becameaninternetbuzzwordin2013whenthechairpersonofacompanyinHangzhouvowedtooffera200,000RMBrewardtotheheadofthelocalenvironmental agency if the headwould swim in apollutedriver.1

Admittedly, the role that the local environmentalagencyheadcanpracticallyplayinlocalenvironmentalmanagementisdisputable,becausetheiradministrativepower still falls short of their responsibility tosafeguard the local environment. On the one hand,the appointment of the local environmental agencyheadandtheoperationoftheenvironmentalagency,includingpersonnelandbudget,arecontrolledbythelocal government. So, if the decision-making of theenvironmentalagencycontravenesthepolicypriorityof the localgovernment (e.g., economicgrowthandsomebigprojects),itislikelythattheenvironmentaldecision-making must be a compromise. On theother hand, the current legislation only generallystatesthepoweroftheenvironmentalagencywithoutdetailed and specific explanations of enforcement,leading to ambiguous approaches and proceduresin environmental regulation, thus making theenvironmental agency head to safeguard the localenvironmentasexpected(Lo,Liu,Li,&Wang,2016).Furthermore,effectivecooperationbetweendifferent

1 “The environmental protection bureau head is swimming in the river” has become a buzzword. http://cpc.people.com.cn/pin-glun/n/2013/0221/c241220-20555932.html (Accessed August 23, 2019) (in Chinese)


government departments, which is necessary toenvironmentalmanagementgiven the complexityoftheproblem,isalsohinderedbytheinstitutionaldesignwhere the environmental agency is parallel to otherrelevant departments, such as land resources,water,andurbanmanagement.Thehierarchicalbureaucraticstructure renders it difficult and time-consuming fortheenvironmentalagenciestocoordinatetheirpolicieswithotherauthorities(L.Liuetal.,2016).

Nonetheless, this by no means implies that theenvironmental agency is entirely powerless in localenvironmentalmanagement.Sincethereformin1978and thedecentralization tomaintainandconsolidatenational political stability through regionalizedmanagement, the provincial governments havebecome the “first stops” of decision-making.Whenit comes to environmental management, provincialgovernments are the primary enforcers of nationalenvironmentalpoliciesandmakersof localpolicies.The environmental agency does hold authoritativepower in some aspects, including the supervisionof enterprises, the regulation of industrial access tolocalenvironmentalresources,andtheenvironmentalassessment of local planning. Also, the localenvironmentalagencyhasfullimplementationpowerof an environmental policy if it is formulated bythe local government (L.Liu et al., 2016;L.Liu etal., 2017). Furthermore, recent years have seen anincrease in the power of environmental agencies tomonitor enterprises (Huang&Liu, 2014). Sowhilelocal environmental agencies do not have absolutecontrol over major local decision-making involvingenvironmentalimpactsandaretosomeextentsubjectto the overall development strategy of the localleaders,theenvironmentalmanagementperformanceof the region is largely related to the attitude andcapacity of the head of the local environmentalagency.Inthissense,basedonthepromotionincentiveassumption,whether the local pollution reduction ispositivelycorrelatedwiththepromotionof thelocalenvironmentalagencyheadmaydeterminethedegreeof enthusiasm possessed by the official for doingtheirduties,whichinturnaffectslocalenvironmentalpolicy-making and implementation (L. Liu et al.,2017).

Therefore, this paper hypothesizes that the politicalturnover of provincial environmental agencyheads (PEAHs) is affected by provincial pollutionreduction.We examine the correlationwith a noveldatabase of China’s PEAH, which could be criticalinunderstandingtheinstitutionalincentiveinChina’slocalenvironmentalmanagement.Theremainingpartsofthepaperareorganizedasfollows.Section2firstdiscusses the literature on government performanceand its relationshipwithcadrepromotion.Section3presents themethodology of the study, followed bytheempiricalresultsinsection4andadiscussionofthe key findings in section 5. This paper concludeswithadiscussionofthetheoreticalcontributionsandpolicyimplicationsofthestudy.

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND CADRE PROMOTION IN CHINA

Performance measurement remains a central themeof thenewpublicmanagement (NPM) reformsincethe 1980s (Hood, 1991),which involves the settingof explicit standards and indicators to ensure thatpubliclyfundedservicesareproperlyevaluated.Sincethen,differentcountrieshaveadoptedNPMreformsforbettergovernmentperformanceandefficiency.InChina,performancemeasurementhasbeenofficiallyadopted into the public sector in the 1980s. Thissystem was supposed to be an evidence-based andresult-orientedmethodtoselectcompetentcandidateswhile retaining operational efficiency and assertingauthority over all sectors (Bromberg, 2009; Mu &DeJong,2018).Regardingthecriteria,somestudiesfind that the promotion prospects of an official arelargely determined by their performance within thejurisdiction, particularly economic performance (Y.Chen,Li,&Zhou,2005;Li&Zhou,2005);Pu,2018).For instance,Mei andWang suggest that the careerdevelopmentof local leaders ispositivelycorrelatedwitheconomicpolicyinnovation,butnototherpolicydomains (Mei & Wang, 2017). Meanwhile, otherssuggest that political connections and factionalismplay a dominant role in officials’ evaluations (Shih,Adolph,&Liu,2012).Toreconcilethecontradictoryviews,empiricalstudieshavebeenconducted,whichsuggest that the selection and promotion criteria





of officials at higher ranks include a mixture ofbenchmarks,suchaseconomicperformance,loyalty,andpoliticalconnections(Choi,2012;Jia,Kudamatsu,& Seim, 2015). In contrast, lower-ranked officials’prospects are mainly evaluated based on economicperformance(Su,Tao,Xi,&Li,2012).Thisdisparityin the promotion standard allows the ruling elite tosimultaneouslymaximize economic growth, aswellasminimize theadvancementofpotentiallydisloyalofficials(Landry,Lü,&Duan,2017).

SincemajorofficialsinChinaarenotselectedthroughgeneral elections, and their promotion is highlydependentonthedecisionofseniorofficials,thekeycriterionforofficialstoclimbupthepoliticalladderisnotlinkedtotheiraccountabilitytothecitizenry,butrathercompetenceandloyaltytotheirsuperiors(Li&Zhou,2005;Ma,Tang,&Yan,2015).Inthissystem,thelegitimacyofanofficialisbasedontherecognitionofhigher-levelgovernment,whichinturnformshis/her dominant incentive to work. Recent literatureonpolitical incentiveshaselaborated that, inanon-electoralsetting,officialswhodesirepromotiontendtosubjectthemselvesto,andexecutethewillof,thegoverningcore,evenattheexpenseofotheraspects(Liang& Langbein, 2015; Ran, 2013). This echoesthe observation that, in the past two decades, theChinese government’s unilateral focus on economicdevelopment has driven officials, especially localones,tostriveforoutstandingeconomicperformance.

Since 2006, the Chinese central government hasbeguntosetmorediversesocialdevelopmentgoalstoreplacethesoleemphasisoneconomicdevelopment,covering aspects such as environmental pollution,socialinequality,andsafety.Thus,thegovernmenthasestablishedmoretangibleandquantifiableassessmentcriteria for officials and their performance, therebyincreasing their incentive to work (Burns & Zhou,2010;Kahn,Li,&Zhao, 2015;A.L.Wang, 2013).Somestudieshaveevaluatedtherelationsbetweenthepromotionofcadresandtheirperformanceinothernon-economicaspects.Forexample,throughanalyzingdatafrom31provincialgovernorsfrom1978to2012,X.Chen,Qin,andWei(2016)suggestthatthehighertheprovincialenergyproductivity,themorelikelyitwas

forthegovernortobepromoted.Similarly,Cao,Kleit,andLiu(2016)arguethatprovincialpartysecretarieswithastrongmotivationtobepromotedwouldworkhardertopromoterenewableenergy,asprescribedbythe central government. Zhigang Chen, Tang,Wan,andChen(2017)highlightthatthepromotionoflocalofficialsandtheirtermsinofficesignificantlyimpactthelandscaleandefficiencyofurbanconstruction.Asfor environmental performance, Zheng et al. (2014)findapositivecorrelationbetweenmayoralpromotionandtheairpollutioncontrolintherespectiveregionsin examiningdata from86 cities between2004 and2009.BothPuandFu(2018)andLiangandLangbein(2015)suggestthatthepromotionoflocalleaderswasmore significantly related to visible pollutants thaninvisible pollutants.However, J.Wu,Deng,Huang,Morck,andYeung(2013)findnocorrelationbetweenenvironmental performance and the promotion oflocalleaders,asthelatterstilltendtobeheavilybiasedtowardsGDPgrowth.

Delvingdeeplyintotheissue,itisworthnotingthatin the political reality ofChina, promotions are nota simple upward movement along the hierarchicalladder.Inmanycases,horizontalmovementorevenastepdownintheadministrativerankingcouldalsobeconsideredapromotion.Forexample,LiandZhou(2005)seeashiftfromthepostofaprovincialgovernorto a head of a state department as a promotion because theofficialisapproachingthepowercore,despitethatbothpostsshare thesameadministrativeranking. Inasimilarvein,Tao,Su,Lu,andZhu(2010)deemita lateralmovewhenaprovincialgovernorbecomesa deputy head of a central departmentwith a loweradministrative rank. There is not a unified standardamong the current literature on what should beconsidered a promotionwithin theChinese politicalcontext. This study, however, would consider notonlytheadministrativerankingofaposition,butalsothe perceived political importance and power whendeterminingapoliticalpromotion.

In summary, it is generally accepted that there is apositive correlation between economic performanceandlocalofficials’promotion,whichalsoprovidesaninstitutional incentive forofficials tomaximize their

inputs. Regarding social aspects, such as pollutioncontrol,afewresearchinitiativeshaveexaminedtheimpactofenvironmentalperformanceonlocalofficials,butsofar,thestudiesexclusivelyfocusonprovincialand prefectural party secretaries and administrators.Thispaper is thefirstattempttofocusonprovincialenvironmentalagencyheads(PEAHs)andprovidesastatisticalportraitofthecharacteristicsofthisgroupofofficials,thussheddinglightonhowthebureaucraticsystemofChinacouldbefurtherenhancedtoimprovelocalenvironmentalmanagement.

METHODOLOGY

ModelIn the Chinese political context, local leaders,including governors, mayors, and local partysecretaries,areresponsibleforholisticsocio-economicdevelopment; in contrast, heads of environmentalagencies concentrate solely on environmentalmanagement. Therefore, the career prospects ofenvironmental agency heads supposedly depend ontheir localenvironmentalperformance,butnotothereconomic indicators. To empirically test for anypositivecorrelationbetweenthecareerturnover(CT)ofPEAHsandprovincialenvironmentalperformanceduring their terms of office, we may formulate thefollowingempiricalmodel:

(1)where is theenvironmentalperformanceof thePEAHi.Inthispaper, iscalculatedaccordingtothechangingrateofsulfurdioxide(SO2)andchemicaloxygendemand(COD)duringthetermofofficeofaPEAH,i.e.,

(2)

Althoughthe5-YearPlanplaysan important role inChina’senvironmentalmanagement,inter alia,target-based environmental performance management, thetimingofthecareerturnoverofthePEAHisusuallynot consistent with the end of 5-Year Plan. Thetenures ofmanyPEAHspandifferent 5-YearPlans.Therefore,wecannotmeasuretheirperformancewithtarget fulfillment, but rather only their performanceduring their tenure. In otherwords, this paper does

not answer how the career mobility of the PEAHis affected by the target fulfillment of 5-YearPlans,but simply their working performance in pollutionreductionduringthetermoftheoffice.SO2andCODhavebeenselectedbecausetheyhavebeenspecificallyand consistently identified as indicators for China’snational environmental target. Specifically, in 1996,the “9thFive-YearPlan forNationalEnvironmentalProtection” proposed the reduction of the majorpollutants, including SO2 and COD. In 2001,the reduction of SO2 and COD, excluding otherpollutants,waslistedinthe“10thFive-YearPlanforNationalEconomicandSocialDevelopment”.Since2006,thereductionofSO2andCODhasbeenlistedintheFive-YearPlanfortheNationalEconomicandSocialDevelopmentasa“bindingtarget”.Inthe12thFive-YearPlan(2011-2015)and13thFive-YearPlan(2016-2020),thereductionofSO2andCODwasstillone of the planning targets, although several newenvironmental indicators were added. Therefore,over thepast twodecades, thereductionofSO2 and CODhasconsistentlybeenoneofthemostimportantenvironmental policies in China, although theenvironmentalpoliciesandtargetsindifferentperiodshavebeenadjusted.Asthesamplesinthedatabaseofthe paper cover the PEAHs leaving the office from2000to2018,thepaperchoosesSO2andCODastwoconsistentandcomparableindicators.

In formula (2), for officials taking or leaving officein thefirsthalfof theyear t,weuse theyear t-1asthe statistical year; for officials taking or leavingofficeinthesecondhalfoftheyeart,weusetheyeartasthestatisticalyear.TheperformanceofaPEAHismeasuredby thedifferencebetween thepollutionemissionsbeforeandafterthePEAHtakesandleavestheoffice.So,thebasicprincipleforthismethodis,iftherearetwoPEAHsintheyeart,theenvironmentaldata of the year tisattributedtothePEAHwhoworksoverhalfoftheyeart.Forexample,ifaPEAHtakesofficeinthefirsthalfofyeart,theenvironmentaldataofyeartisthoughtnottoreflectthesituationbeforehe/she comes, so the data of the year t-1 is used asthestartingpointofhis/herperformance;ifthePEAHtakesofficeinthesecondhalfofyeart,thedataoftheyear tisused.



Weacknowledgethatitmaynotbeentirelyaccuratetoattributethelocalenvironmentalperformance,i.e.,

, solely to local environmental agency heads.However, in China’s target-based environmentalperformance management system and hierarchicalbureaucracy,upper-levelgovernmentstendtosimplyequate the performance of a local environmentalagencyheadtotheenvironmentalperformanceoftheconcernedregion.

Inadditiontoworkingperformance,previousstudieshavesuggestedthatthepersonalattributesofChina’scadres have a significant impact on their politicalturnover.Theseattributesincludegeneraldemographicindicators(Pu&Fu,2018;Yao&Zhang,2015),andpoliticalnetworkandmobility(Choi,2012;Jiaetal.,2015;Landryetal.,2017).Toaddress the issue,wehaveincludedthenecessarypersonalattributesofthePEAHs ( ) as control variables. Particularly, wehaveincludedtimeandspatialvariablestocontrolforthefixedeffectsoftheregionandtime.Standarderrorsareclusteredbyareas.Themodelfinallybecomes:

(3)

Data and CodingPollution data of this study, including the amountsof SO2 and COD, are obtained from national andprovincialstatisticalyearbooksindifferentyears.Forthe personal and career information of the PEAHs,there is no systematic database currently. Instead,weutilizesearchengines toextensivelycompile theinformation of the incumbent and past heads. ThePEAHinthispaperonlyincludesdepartmentheads.Unlike local party-government, where the partysecretary is more powerful than the administrativehead, in the administrative department such as theenvironmental agency, the administrative head hasdecisive power in environmental policymaking andimplementation,while the party secretary ismainlyresponsibleforthepartyaffairsandhasverylimitedimpact on environmental governance. Besides, thedeputy PEAHwho oversees the pollution reductionwork may share the responsibility with the PEAH.However, the information about the deputy head islargelyunknown.

After eliminating samples with insufficientinformation,we ultimately obtained 108 samples ofPEAHs: 30 incumbents and 78 past PEAHs.To thebest of our knowledge, all the publicly availableinformation of China’s PEAH has been included inthisdatabase.SixofthepastPEAHswereterminatedbecause of power abuse or serious dereliction withserious environmental and social impacts, which isclassified as abnormal turnover in this study. Sincewhatwe aim to examine is the correlation betweenthe cadres’ political turnover and local pollutionreduction, the 30 incumbent and six terminatedPEAHshavebeenexcludedfromtheregressionmodelandonlypresentedaspartofthedescriptivestatistics.We have also collected other personal informationonthePEAHstobetterdefinethegroupsofofficials,including their major subjects in college and theirworking experience in the respective environmentalagency. Other general demographic indicators likegender, ethnic origin, and party affiliation were notconsidered, because over 90% of PEAHs are men,Han ethnic group, and communist party members.Table1liststhevariablesintheregressionmodel.

As shown in Table 1, in the career turnover,“promotion” refers to the transferof anewpositionwhichisclosertothepowercoreofthegovernmentatdifferentlevels.Asmentioned,promotiontoanewposition in the Chinese political context could beeither the elevation of administrative ranking or theincreasingperceivedpoliticalimportanceandpower.Specifically, two types of positional displacementforPEAHsare considered as a promotion.Thefirstform of promotion is taking up a legally higher-ranked position according to China’s Civil ServiceLaw—e.g., from PEAH (department level) to theminister of a national ministry (ministerial level).The second form of promotion is a lateral transferto a position at the same legal level but one that isconsidered more powerful—e.g., from PEAH todepartmentsresponsibleforthefinancesoreconomyattheprovinciallevel,orprefecturalpartysecretariesormayors, or a position in theMinistryofEcologyand Environment at the central level. Conversely,if the new position is legally ranked lower or less



powerfulthanaPEAH,orfurtherawayfromanylevelof the power core, like the local People’s Congressor Political Consultative Conference, for instance,thecadre isconsideredasbeingdemoted.However,if aPEAHmoves to the localPeople’sCongressorPoliticalConsultativeConferenceaftertheageof59,theturnoverisregardedasalateralmove,becausetherequiredageoftheirretirementis60.Inaddition,ifaPEAHmovestoanewpositionthatislegallyrankedidentically, or retires after the age of 60, it is alsodefinedasalateralmove.

Forthecontrolvariables,“Age1”istheagewhenthecadrewaspromoted todepartment level for thefirsttime.Thisvariablecanberegardedasaninstrumentalvariable for an official’s political capacity in thebureaucratic system, which is decisive in one’spoliticalcareer.Forexample,HuChunhua,thecurrentVice Premier of the State Council, is thought to beone of China’smost prominent officials because hehasbeentheyoungestprovincialgovernorinChina’shistory. “Education” is also a general indicator of acadre’s work capacity. “Age2” is the age when thecadreassumedthepositionofPEAH.“Tenure”istheduration the cadre held the position of PEAH.Thisvariableisrelatedtoanofficial’scareerprospects intwoways.First,existingstudiesonChineseofficialshave suggested that the longer an official holds aposition, the larger possibility of inertia (Han &

Zhao, 2016). Second, if the upper-level governmentintendstocultivateandpromoteanofficial,thetenureforhim/herinacertainpositionshouldberelativelyshort. Supposedly, the longer an official holds thesame position, the possibility for his/her promotionis smaller. “Birthplace” and “network” are proxiesfor an official’s political connections. Regionalidentityissupposedtobemoreadvantageousinlocalbureaucracies because of their connections to localsociety. Similarly, it is likely that the official withworkingexperienceinthelocalpartycommitteeandgovernmenthasagreaterlikelihoodofbeingpromoteddue to their political connections with the powercore.“Area”isadummyindicatingtheregionofthePEAH.ThisisparticularlyimportantconsideringthelargeregionaldifferencesinChina’ssocio-economicdevelopment.2 “Year” is the timevariable to controltheimpactoftimeonthecareerturnoverofofficials.

Table 1. The Variables in the Regression Model and the Coding Rules

Variables CodingDependent variable Career turnover Promotion: 1, Lateral move/retirement: 0, Demotion: -1

Independent variables ( )

SO2 Changing rate of SO2 emissions during the tenure COD Changing rate of COD emissions during the tenure

Control variables ( )

Age1 Age when assuming office as PEAH Education Junior college: 1; Bachelor: 2; Master: 3; Doctor: 4

Age2 Age when promoted to department level for the first timeTenure Term of office as the PEAH (months)

Birthplace If the birthplace is the same as where the PEAH works: 1; Otherwise 0.

Network If the head has working experience in provincial or municipal Party committee or gov-ernment before holding the post of PEAH: 1; Otherwise 0.

Area The area where the PEAH works. East: 1; Central: 2; West: 3; Northeast: 4Year The time when the PEAH left the office.

2 According to China’s statistical policy, eastern area (10 provinces and direct-controlled municipalities) includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and Hain-an; central area (6 provinces) includes Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan; western area (12 provinces, autonomous regions and direct-controlled municipalities) includes Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qin-ghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang; north-eastern area (3 provinces) includes Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang.



RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of thevariables in the regressionmodel.The geographicaldistribution of our sample is even, with about twoPEAHsperprovince.

For the social and political network, local officials(56.9%)whowere born in the provinces theyworktendtohaveahigherchanceoftakinguptheroleasthePEAHs.However, cadreswhohave experiencesin party committees or governments do not possess obviousadvantagesintakinguptheposition.Regardingeducation,amaster’sdegreeisthemostcommonforPEAHs,accountingfor45.8%ofthesample,followedbyabachelor’sdegreeat38.9%.Overall,97%ofthePEAHshave at least a bachelor’s degree.However,lookingdeeplyintothedata,beingaPEAHdoesnot

require much professional knowledge and relevantexperience on environmental management. Only13.6%ofthePEAHsholdsadegreeinenvironmentalstudies,andonly26.5%oftheheadshadpreviouslyworked in environmental agencies. These lowpercentagesindicatethatintheprovincialbureaucraticsystem,PEAHsarenotconsideredaprofessionalrole.

Figure1showstheageofthecadreswhenassumingofficeasPEAH,with51.9%beingovertheageof50,andanaverageageof51.1.AccordingtothestatisticsinHu (2009) and on people.cn,3 the average age of China’sprovincialparty secretariesandministersofprovincial organization departments upon their firstappointmentare52.6and51respectively.Thisimplies

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

Variables Observation Category Frequency Percentage

Promotion 72Demotion 12 16.67Lateral move 43 59.72Promotion 17 23.61

Birthplace 72Same as working area 41 56.94Different from working area 31 43.06

Area 72

East 20 27.78Central 19 26.39West 27 37.5Northeast 6 8.33

Education 72

Junior college 2 2.78Bachelor 28 38.89Master 33 45.83Doctor 9 12.5

Network 72Experience in Party committee/government 28 38.89No experience in Party committee/government 44 61.11

Mean Std. Dev. Min MaxSO2 72 -0.06 0.53 -0.96 3COD 72 0.12 0.57 -0.83 1.81Age1 72 50.43 4.52 34 58Age2 72 41.65 5.00 30 56Tenure 72 62.83 34.46 10 145Year 72 2012.51 4.86 2000 2018

3 Analyzing the growing path of the 31 provincial Party committee secretaries: The average age at the beginning is 57 years old. http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/16602887.html (Accessed August 23, 2019) (in Chinese)



thatbeingappointedasthePEAHmeansthatthe prospect of getting into many higher-rankedpositionsisclosed.Inoursamples,noPEAHwaseverpromotedtoalegallyhigher-ranked position. All the promoted PEAHwerehorizontallymovingtoamorepowerfulposition.

As shown in Figure 2 about pollutionreduction, the management of SO2 was generally better than that of COD. Liangand Langbein (2015) attribute this to thelocal governments’ strategic implementationof the central policy, because SO2, as an airpollutant, is more visible and attracts morepublic concern thanCOD.Similarly, Pu andFu (2018) find the reduction in air pollutionwas more significantly correlated with thepromotionoflocalcadresthanwaterpollution.When comparing among the four regions inChina, theenvironmentalperformanceof thePEAHs in the western area was the worst,havingincreasedemissionsofSO2andCOD.ThisfindingalignswithH.Wu,Guo,Zhang,andBu(2017)work,whichsuggeststhatthespatial-socioeconomic structure of China isbeing reshaped by the westward movement of pollution.Meanwhile, the performance ofthe PEAHs in the northeastern region, i.e.,Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang province,appears to be the best, having over 20%reduction in SO2. This may be due to thenortheast revitalization strategy implementedbythecentralgovernmentsince2003,whichstressedindustrialrestructuringandupgradingthat was more environmentally friendly, thedevelopment of modern agriculture and theserviceindustry,andprotectingtheecologicalenvironment.

Previous studies of theChinese local cadreshavefoundthatthelongerthetenureofacadreinaposition,thelargerthepossibilityofinertia(Han&Zhao,2016).Thatistosay,thelengthofthetenurehasaninverserelationshipwiththe cadres’ performance. Figure 3 examines

Figure 1. Age of the PEAH when Assuming Office

29 2826

97

41 0

(46.8, 50](53.2, 56.4]

(50, 53.2](43.6, 46.8]

(56.4, 59.6](40.4, 43.6]

[34, 37.2](37.2, 40.4]

Num

ber o

f PEA

Hs

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Figure 2. The Pollution Reduction of the PEAHs in Different Regions

-0.3

-0.25

-0.2

-0.15

-0.1

-0.05

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

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East Central West Northeast

SO2 changing rate COD changing rate

Figure 3. Tenure and Environmental Performance of PEAHs

-1.5-1

-0.50

0.51

1.52

2.53

3.5

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

Tenure (months)

SO2 changing rate COD changing rate

Linear (SO2 changing rate) Linear (COD changing rate)



whetherasimilarpatternappliestoPEAH.Theresultshows that the longer thePEAHs’ tenure, theworsetheir performance in controlling SO2 and COD. Apossible explanation is that as their tenure extends,the official’s motivation to work decreases alongwiththeirexpectationsofbeingpromoted,leadingtoworseperformance.Althoughpreviousfindingsalsosuggestthatlocalofficialswithshortertermsofofficearelikelytoselectquickandlow-qualityapproachesto implement the environmental policies (Eaton& Kostka, 2014), it is agreed that when terms areshorterandmobilityishigher,theofficialsmayexpect

promotion more and be motivated to take measures to improvetheenvironment.

Testing the HypothesisTable3 shows the resultsof theorderedprobabilitymodel.Itneedstobepointedoutthat,intheChinesepolitical context, when approaching the requiredretirementageof60,somePEAHsmaynotwant toholdthecurrentposition,forreasonssuchashealthorlow expectations of promotion.Therefore, theywillmove to the localPeople’sCongressor thePoliticalConsultative Conference to take a back seat at the

Table 3. The Model Estimation (1)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)SO2 0.549*** 0.712 0.518 0.508 0.387 0.393 0.371 0.407

(0.154) (0.498) (0.471) (0.467) (0.340) (0.342) (0.317) (0.305)COD -0.0172 -0.270 -0.392 -0.422 -0.410 -0.421 -0.371 -0.369

(0.320) (0.498) (0.425) (0.409) (0.408) (0.402) (0.403) (0.383)Age1 -0.0835*** -0.0776*** -0.0902*** -0.0908*** -0.115*** -0.117***

(0.00593) (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0171) (0.0191)Birthplace 0.431*** 0.420*** 0.435*** 0.478***

(0.144) (0.136) (0.106) (0.142)Education -0.0498 -0.0771 -0.102

(0.0765) (0.0889) (0.102)Tenure -0.00720* -0.00783*

(0.00434) (0.00434)Network -0.277***

(0.0695)Year -0.000179 -0.0317*** -0.00129 -0.0205 -0.0264 -0.0380 -0.0375 -0.0362 -0.0282

(0.0326) (0.0111) (0.0310) (0.0339) (0.0423) (0.0385) (0.0395) (0.0354) (0.0409)2.area 0.765*** 0.828*** 0.762*** 0.957*** 0.898*** 0.882*** 0.883*** 0.845*** 0.882***

(0.149) (0.107) (0.148) (0.153) (0.0741) (0.0869) (0.0861) (0.108) (0.120)3.area 0.403*** 0.520*** 0.405*** 0.514*** 0.507*** 0.532*** 0.533*** 0.492*** 0.508***

(0.0970) (0.0333) (0.0912) (0.0973) (0.0862) (0.0777) (0.0785) (0.0695) (0.0765)4.area 0.348* 0.435*** 0.373*** 0.651*** 0.652*** 0.650*** 0.670*** 0.698*** 0.737***

(0.178) (0.0850) (0.140) (0.156) (0.158) (0.160) (0.161) (0.156) (0.179)Constant cut1 -1.056 -64.39*** -3.338 -46.07 -58.49 -82.06 -81.32 -80.16 -64.56

(65.60) (22.43) (62.43) (68.19) (85.70) (77.79) (79.88) (71.77) (82.96)Constant cut2 0.758 -62.62*** -1.509 -44.16 -56.58 -80.10 -79.36 -78.15 -62.53

(65.35) (22.18) (62.22) (67.97) (85.48) (77.57) (79.66) (71.51) (82.70)Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



age of 58 or even 57. In this case, it is difficult tojudgewhether themove is regarded as a retirementordemotion. Ifweconsider thePEAHgoing to thelocal People’s Congress or Political ConsultativeConference after age 57 as normal retirement, thenumberofdemotioncaseswillbeonlyfour,makingevenfewercasesofabnormalturnover.So,tocontrolsuch uncertainty and check the robustness of the regressionresults inTable3,were-codedthecareerturnoveras1forpromotionand0fornon-promotion,and gave estimates again with a probability model.The result is shown inTable 4, which is consistentwithTable3.

Returning to our key research question of whethertherearepromotionincentivesforChina’sPEAHs,our

empiricalfindingssuggestthatthecorrelationbetweenSO2orCODemissionsreductionandcareerturnoverof PEAHs is not statistically significant. In otherwords,whencontrollingforotherinfluencingfactors,the PEAHs’ career turnover is not affected by theirperformanceinpollutionreduction.Instead,thecareerturnover of PEAHs was positively correlated withtheirbirthplace.Thisverifiesourassumptionthatlocalcadreshavemoreconnectionstolocalbureaucracies,and thus have greater chances for promotion. Thecareer turnoverofPEAHswasnegativelycorrelatedwith “Age1” (the age of assuming office as PEAH)and“Tenure”(thetermofoffice).IfPEAHswanttosecure a higher position in the hierarchical system,theyhave to climbup thebureaucratic ladder fasterthantheirpeers,asoldageandlongtermsareclearly

Table 4. The Model Estimation (2)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)SO2 0.807** 0.930 0.761 0.746 0.582 0.582 0.896 0.973

(0.401) (0.779) (0.861) (0.833) (0.620) (0.621) (0.796) (0.823)COD 0.0847 -0.256 -0.410 -0.522 -0.440 -0.440 -0.324 -0.339

(0.358) (0.684) (0.654) (0.656) (0.628) (0.627) (0.625) (0.642)Age1 -0.126*** -0.105*** -0.130** -0.131** -0.208*** -0.211***

(0.0258) (0.0375) (0.0543) (0.0530) (0.0691) (0.0722)Birthplace -0.0460 -0.0403* -0.0403* -0.0174 -0.0200

(0.0294) (0.0209) (0.0213) (0.0256) (0.0206)Education 0.770** 0.770** 0.877** 0.895**

(0.372) (0.371) (0.418) (0.439)Tenure -0.00381 -0.0214 -0.0331

(0.162) (0.156) (0.173)Network -0.0208*** -0.0214***

(0.00324) (0.00341)Year -0.228

(0.283)2.area -0.0305 -0.0687*** -0.0316 -0.0561 -0.0680 -0.0928 -0.0928 -0.0888* -0.0815

(0.0412) (0.0213) (0.0378) (0.0521) (0.0633) (0.0605) (0.0605) (0.0520) (0.0601)3.area 0.427*** 0.502*** 0.429*** 0.719*** 0.527*** 0.607*** 0.608*** 0.606** 0.663**

(0.0956) (0.0517) (0.0836) (0.127) (0.129) (0.230) (0.221) (0.236) (0.288)4.area -0.0265 0.134*** -0.0225 0.105* 0.0708 0.104** 0.104** -0.186** -0.149

(0.0766) (0.0364) (0.0646) (0.0552) (0.0451) (0.0519) (0.0495) (0.0893) (0.0963)Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



disadvantageous to promotion. Finally, if PEAHspreviouslyworkedinthelocalgovernmentorthepartycommitteebeforeassumingoffice,theypotentiallyhadalowerchanceofpromotion.Althoughthesignificancelevel of the coefficient of “network” is different inTable3andTable4,thesignsofthecoefficientsareconsistent.Apossibleexplanationis that leavingthelocal government or the Party committee may beregarded as a demotion because the government and thePartycommitteearethepowercenterofthelocalbureaucracy,therefore,promotionafterademotionismoredifficult.

DISCUSSION

China has witnessed a recent trend of incorporating environmental performance into the assessmentcriteria of cadres. However, the effectiveness ofincentivizing PEAHs to improve their performanceremains unknown.This study is the first attempt toinvestigate the institutional incentives of the localenvironmentalagencyheadattheprovinciallevel.

This research obtains three major findings. First,Chineseofficials’appointmentasPEAHsimpliesthatthey nearly have no chance of promotion to legallyhigher rank positions. At most, some of them are“promoted”tomorepowerfulpositionsthatisstillthesamerank,suchasthemayororthepartysecretaryinaprefecturalcity.Second,thepositionofPEAHisnotaprofessionalroleinthebureaucraticsystem,asPEAHsare more likely generalists instead of specialists.Third, the longer the PEAHs’ tenure, theworse theperformanceincontrollingSO2andCODemissions.All the findings indicate that environmental issuesinChinaarebeingmarginalized inpublicpersonnelmanagement, receiving insignificant attention in thebureaucraticincentivesystem.

With respect to the lack of a significant correlationbetween pollution control and career turnover, thisreflects that for PEAHs, their incentive to reducepollutionmainlycomesfromtop-downcommandinthelocalbureaucratichierarchy,insteadoftheopportunityforpromotion.Forquitealongtime,therehavebeendiscussionsaboutspeedingupenvironmentalreform

by implementing a vertical management system,like transferring the jurisdiction power over localenvironmentalagenciesfromthelocalgovernmentstotheMinistryofEcologyandEnvironment(L.Liu&deJong,2017).ThisstudysupportsthattheincentivesforimprovingtheperformanceofthePEAHswouldbe enhanced by a vertical management systembecause the agencieswould then be comparedwithothersimilarunits.Therefore, thesystemprovidesamoreequitablestandardthanifcomparingwithotherkindsofdepartments.

AspointedoutbyRan(2013), the incentivessetbythe central government regarding environmentalpolicy implementation at local levels are perverselystructured, causing a significant gap between thecentral government’s policy and its implementationoutcomes at local levels. This implementation gapcannotbeovercomebythelocalgovernmentsunlessthecentralgovernmentcorrectstheperverseincentivestructureforlocalenvironmentalpolitics(Ran,2013).Therefore,basedon this research,what is crucial toChina’senvironmentalmanagementisamorerobustperformance management system that adequatelybases thecareerprospectof the localenvironmentalofficials on their performances in environmentalmanagement.

Similarly, we find that PEAHs who had worked inthe local government or the party committee beforeassumingofficehadlowerchancesofpromotion,whichimplies that PEAHs are considered an unimportantposition in the public personnel system in China.Leavingthelocalgovernmentorthepartycommitteemayberegardedasa“demotion”becausetheyarethecentralorganizationsinthelocalbureaucracy.Gettingapromotionafterbeing“demoted”ismoredifficult.Furthermore, according to the estimation inTable 3andTable 4, the promotion of PEAHs is negativelycorrelated with “Age1”, meaning that the earlier aPEAHwas appointed, thegreater thepossibility fortheirpromotion.

CONCLUSION

Tosummarize,inthecurrentChinesepoliticalstructure,



aPEAHis justan implementerof localgovernmentpolicy,whoneitherhasapositiveincentivefor theirworknorhasenoughautonomyinlocalenvironmentalmanagement. This conclusion can be attributed tothis research and the fact that local environmentalagencies are affiliated with local governments, andthus cannot resist putting economic growth above environmental protection (L. Liu et al., 2017).Thispaper makes two contributions to the current debates onChina’senvironmentalmanagementbyexaminingtheinstitutionaldesign,specificallyinrelationtothePEAHsandtheirpromotionincentives.

On the one hand, this study expands work onpromotion incentives to include PEAHs andenvironmental performance, as previous work hadbeenlimitedtoanalysesofChina’slocalleadersandeconomic performance. Because of their relativelynarrowcareerpath, thePEAHsare less incentivizedto advance environmental goals when compared tolocal cadres focusing on economic development.Worsestill,theircareerprogressisnotcorrelatedwithworkingperformancebutotherpoliticalfactors,suchastheagewhenassumingoffice,tenureoftheoffice,andiftheyarelocalpeople.

On the other hand, this study offers an institutionalexplanation of the notable incomprehensiveness ofChina’senvironmentalmanagement.Attheprovinciallevel,thePEAHscanonlyfunctionwhentheireffortsdonot jeopardize their superordinate’s policygoals.Althoughtheoretically,localleadersattempttostrikeabalancebetweeneconomyandenvironment,inreality,thelatterisusuallycompromisedwhenconflictsarise.Without a positive working incentive and enoughautonomy,thePEAHsbecomemereimplementersofeconomy-dominatedlocalpoliciesandcanonlyexertlimitedinfluenceonlocalenvironmentalmanagement.

Last but not the least, this paper is a novel butpreliminary exploration of the promotion incentivefor this special group of cadres, PEAH. So, thereare several limitations of the research that may bebetteraddressedinfuturestudieswithmoreavailabledata.First, thesamplesize is relativelysmall foranempirical study. As the officials are not receiving

much attention, the publicly available informationforPEAHisscarceandfragmented.Second,nationalenvironmental policy has changedover time, so thereductionofSO2andCODmaynotpreciselycaptureall thekeyperformanceofprovincialenvironmentalmanagement in different periods, particularly afterthe “Air Pollution Prevention and Control ActionPlan” in 2013 and the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020),whenthecentralgovernmentemphasizesmoreon the importanceof air pollutants.Third, a similarinvestigationattheprefecturallevelwouldbeagoodcomplementtounderstandthecareerturnoverofthePEAH,whoaresupposedtohavegreaterflexibilityinclaimingorjustifyingtheirperformance.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ThisworkwassupportedbyNationalNaturalScienceFoundation of China (Grant number: 71704126),CUHKFacultyofSocialScienceDirectGrant,CUHKHKIAPS South China Program, and Hong KongRGC-ECSgrant(24606015).

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The Effect of Public Servants’ Reinvention Reform Perception on Organizational Performance in Taiwan: The Mediating Roles of Public Service Motivation and Organizational Commitment


Thisstudyinvestigatestheeffectsofpublicservants’reinventionreformperceptions,publicservicemotivation(PSM), and organizational commitment on organizational performance in the public sector.There is very littleresearchexploringthoserelationshipsinTaiwan,andthetopicisthusworthyofmoresystematicexamination.ThispaperutilizestheTaiwanGovernmentBureaucratsSurveyII(TGBSII),whichcollected1,464validsamplesfromthepublicsectorandusedstructuralequationmodeltotestthehypotheses.Wefindthatreinventionreformperceptionpositively affects public servants’ PSM, organizational commitment and organizational performance. Finally,results demonstrate that organizational commitmentmediates the relationship betweenPSMand organizationalperformance.

INTRODUCTION

Government reforms from the scientificmanagement movement in the 19th centuryhave been identified as improving the

productivity, efficiency and service quality ofgovernmentagencies(Heinrich,2003).Mostcurrentgovernment reforms are based on new publicmanagement(NPM),whichisamovementtoreinventgovernment(Osborne,1993;Kettl,2002).Governmentreinventionincludesconceptssuchastreatingcitizensas customers, market orientation, more governmentflexibility, responsiveness, and outcome orientation(Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Denhardt & Denhardt,2008). For instance, Fu&Chang (2019) show thatinnovationservesasapromisingmeansofimprovingpublic services in Taiwan. Hsieh & Huang (2019)also indicate that there is a significant difference incivil service promotion structure between publicmanagers and public employees. In recent decades,many administrative reform measures have been

implementedinanattempttoachieveadministrativeefficiency,includingreducingredtape,decentralizing,empowering, and offering incentives to improvepublicservicequality(Osborne&Gaebler,1992).

However, new public management, governmentreinvention, and market orientation have also beencriticized by many public administration scholars.Some of these criticisms target the overemphasison efficiency and sacrifice of public values such asequalityandfairness (Bozeman,2007),whileothersnotethatpublicorganizationsaretreatedasprincipal–agentrelationshipsratherthanatrusteeorbeneficiaryrelationship(Dunleavy&Hood,1994,p.7).Inaddition,publicservicemotivation (PSM)researchersbelievethataltruismisdiscountedbynewpublicmanagement(Perry&Hondeghem2008a;Perry&Vandenabeele,2008;Houston, 2009; Perry et al. 2009).Therefore,PSMisregardedasaviablealternativeinstrumentforsupportingnewpublicmanagementandgovernmentreinvention (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008a; Houston,

Address correspondence to Hsiang Te Liu at [email protected]. View this article at cpar.net

Liu & Chen • 35


Keywords: reinventionreform,publicservicemotivation,organizationalcommitment,organizationalperfor-mance

Hsiang Te Liu*, Don-Yun Chen†

* Ming Chuan University, Taiwan† National Chengchi University and Taiwan Institute for Governance and Communication Research, Taiwan

2009).

Government agencies are continuously seeking toimprovethequalityofpublicservices,butthegeneralpublic is inclined to believe that theproductivity ofcivilservantsisinferiortothatofprivatecompanies(Frank& Lewis, 2004). Over the last few decades,many studies have begun to explore employee jobmotivation (Rafikul & Ismail, 2008). Perry andWise (1990) are among the first to examine servicemotivationingovernmentsandarguethatthePSMisbasedonethicsandpublicinterestratherthanpersonalinterest(Houston,2006).

Inthe1990s,PSMhasbeenmorespecificallystudied,and concepts of public service motivation wereformulated.PSMisdefinedbyPerryandWise(1990,p.368)asthemotivationalinclinationofindividualstoward public institutions and organizations, whilemotivationisregardedasthepsychologicalneedthatarises when individuals face coercive power. EarlystudiesdividePSMintofoursub-dimensions:attractiontopolicy-making,commitmenttothepublicinterest,self-sacrifice,andcompassion(Perry,1996).However,otherstudiesdelineateonlythreedimensionsofPSM,namely public interest commitment, self-sacrifice,andempathy(Courseetal.,2008).Currently,PSMisgenerally perceived as altruistic,which indicates anemotionalresponsetopublicorganizationsandaformofprosocialbehavior(Perry&Hondeghem,2008a).

Perry (1996) developed the PSM scale, and manyscholarssubsequentlyconductedempiricalstudiesonthe relationship between PSM and job satisfaction,organizational commitment, and job performance(Huang, 2019). Naff and Crum (1999) found thatPSM affects job satisfaction and turnover intentionwhileMoynihan and Pandey (2007a; 2007b) foundno positive correlation between PSM and publicorganizations.Inotherwords,resultsareinconsistentand could be due to the impact of other mediatingvariables.

Individualschoosetoworkingovernmentdepartmentsorprivatecompaniesbasedonmotivationaldifferences(Jurkiewicz, Massey, & Brown, 1998). Houston

(2000) points out that civil servantsmust serve thepublic from an ethical perspective and care aboutthe community and public interest. Perry andWise(1990)pointoutthatgovernmentagenciesarebasedonrationalmotivations(themaximizationofpersonalinterest), norm-based (the desire to serve the publicinterest) and affectivemotivations (human emotion)(Kim, 2011). This study explores the relationshipbetweengovernmentreinvention,PSM,organizationalcommitmentandjobperformanceincivilservants.

Some theories point out that PSM can producepositive results (Huang, 2019), especially when theprosocialmotivationsofcivilservantsaregalvanized.Like the self-concept (Shamir, 1991), this viewsuggests multiple identities within individuals, andtheir satisfaction increases when public values areconsistent with their personal values. When civilservants consider themselves givers, their prosocialmotivationsarereinforced(Grant,Dutton,&Rosso,2008).Gould-Williamsetal.(2014)alsoindicatedthatself-conceptisthekeytounderstandingtheformationofpositiveattitudesandbehaviorsinPSMwhencivilservants involve themselves in meaningful publicservices. Therefore, we propose that governmentorganizations provide civil servantswith duties thatare consistent with prosocial identity to strengthentheirself-identification.Withsuchanincreaseinself-identification, organizational commitment and jobsatisfactionwillalsoincrease.

The Reinvention Reform in Taiwan and Its RamificationsSincethe1990s,Taiwan’sExecutiveYuanhasbeguntoplanfor the“GovernmentReformProject”whichincludes the reorganization and re-engineering ofthe public sector. Taiwan’s LegislativeYuan passedPension Reform in 2017, which affected publicservants’retirementfunds.Retiredcivilservantswhoreceivean18%preferentialinterestdepositwillstoppayingwithin twoandahalfyears,and thepensionreplacementratedecreasestoareasonablelevelfora10-yeartransitionperiod.ThePensionReformisalsoconsideredtobeonekindofgovernmentreinvention.

This study claims that the reform’s emphasis on

The Effect of Public Servants’ Reinvention Reform Perception on Organizational Performance in Taiwan


empowerment, participation, reducing red tape, andimprovingefficiencyandeffectivenessshouldpositivelyaffect civil servants’ public service motivation andthusfurtherimprovetheirorganizationalcommitmentand organizational performance. However, this isonly theoretical speculation.Whether administrativereform can improve the public service motivationremainstobeverifiedbyempiricalresearch.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Many empirical studies confirm that administrativereforms, including empowerment, , decentralization,andthereductionofredtapeimprovecivilservants’publicservicemotivation.Additionally,suchreformsfurtherenhancetheirorganizationalcommitmentandorganizationalperformance.Therefore,thisstudysetsup the following conceptual framework, as seen inFigure1above.

The Effect of Government Reinvention on PSM, Organizational Commitment and Organizational PerformancePSMisthoughttohaveapositiveinfluenceonsocialbehaviorandjobperformance(Wright,2007).Many

studieshavepointedoutthatcivilservantswhoplaceahighervalueonassistingothershavealowerneedforpersonalrewardsandincentives(Bright,2008;Wright& Pandey, 2008). It is also generally believed thataltruisticcivilservantswillhavehigherorganizationalcommitment, job satisfaction, and job performance(Castaing,2006;Cerase&Farinella,2006;Pandey&Stazyk,2008).

Some scholars of PSM have concerns aboutincorporating market logic into the government(Moynihan,2008;Houston,2009).Moynihan(2008)and Houston (2009) both point out that applyingperformance-based salary in the government willresult in goal displacement and may even reducejob motivation among civil servants. Perry andHondeghem(2008a,p.7)pointoutthatthecomparisonofPSMwithnewpublicmanagementandgovernmentreinvention may overlook some fundamentaldifferences,includingdifferencesinhumanresources,organizationalincentives,andinstitutionaldesign.

Perry andHondeghem (2008b, p. 276) indicate thatnew public management advocates for involvementinandempowermentofinstitutionaldesign.Existingcentralization, red tape, complex organizational


Figure 1. The Conceptual Framework

H1+

H4+

H2+ H3+

Public Interest

Organizational Commitment

Organizational Performance

ReformPerception

Policy Making

Compassion

Self-Sacrifice

Liu & Chen • 37

systems, and regulations result in disconnectionbetweencivilservantsandtheorganization,renderingitdifficulttomaintainservicemotivation.Therefore,Perry and Hondeghem (2008b, p. 276) advocateenabling self-government through empoweringparticipationindecisionmaking.

To develop empowerment and participationmechanisms for civil servants, the bureaucratic redtape must be reduced (Naff & Crum, 1999; Perry&Hondeghem,2008b), and the conceptof red tapereduction in government agencies is based on newpublicmanagementandgovernmentreinvention.PSMandgovernmentreinventionarecomplementaryratherthanconflicting.StudiesbyNaff&Crum(1999)andMoynihan&Pandey(2007b)confirmthecorrelationbetweengovernmentreinvention,redtapereduction,andimprovingPSM.

MohdNoor andOthman (2012) explore the impactofdecentralizationandparticipationonorganizationalcommitment and performance after 20 years ofgovernmental reforms in Malaysia. Specifically,MalaysiaintroducedtheModifiedBudgetingSystem(MBS) to encourage civil servants to participatein public affairs. In a survey ofmid-levelmanagerswithin theMalayasiangovernment,MohdNoorandOthman (2012) find that strengthening civil servantparticipationcanimproveorganizationalcommitmentperception.

In an examinationofKorea after the 1995financialcrisis,Oh and Park (2011) conclude that the eventsled to a series of government reinventions and theadoptionofnewpublicmanagementasareformtool.OhandPark’sstudyalsoconfirmsthattheemphasison empowerment and participation in governmentreinventioncanimproveorganizationalcommitment.In an exploration of human resource managers inAmericanstates,YangandPandey(2009)exploretheimpact of results-oriented reforms on organizationalcommitment. They also justify the relationshipbetween government reinvention and organizationalcommitment.

Smeenk, Teelken, Eisinga, and Doorewaard (2009)

find that both managerialism and organizationalcommitmentcanimproveorganizationalperformance.Theirresultsalsosuggestthatgovernmentreinventionhas positive effects on organizational performance.Niazi (2011) posits that government agencies mustbecome “learning organizations” and strengthenprogram planning, designing, implementation, andevaluation through the reinvention of educationand training. When civil servants can effectivelyperform their jobs andgaincompetitiveadvantages,organizationalperformancecanbeimproved.

Enders, de Boer, and Weyer (2013) argue thatorganizationalautonomyandcontrolinthereinventionof the education system can improve administrativeperformance.TheDutcheducationsystemstrengthensmanagerialdiscretionandinternalcontrol,withsuchreinventionsbeingjustifiedtoimproveorganizationalperformance.

Walker and Boyne (2006) use the British Labor’sprogram of public management reinvention as aresearch object to explore the impact of rationalplanning, devolution, delegation, flexibility,incentives, and enhanced choice on organizationalperformance.Walker,Damanpour,andDevece(2010)pointout thatmanagement innovationsarea featureofpublicmanagementreinvention,andmanagementinnovations are also thought to affect organizationalperformance management. It is also true for civilservantsthatadministrativereinventionscanimproveorganizationalperformance.Therefore,thefollowinghypothesesareproposed:

Hypothesis 1a: Government reinvention has a positive impact on PSM.Hypothesis 1b: Government reinvention has a positive impact on organizational commitment.Hypothesis 1c: Government reinvention has a positive impact on organizational performance.

The Effect of PSM on Organizational Commitment Civilservantswithprosocialmotivationsdemonstratethat PSM leads to beneficial outcomes to theorganization.According to Shamir (1991), the self-



conceptof individualscomprisesmultiple identities,and consistency between their roles and identitiesresults in perceived satisfaction. Individuals whoperceivethemselvesasgiverswillestablishprosocialidentities and believe that these identities embodytheirimportantvaluesandmotivations(Grant,Dutton,andRosso 2008).Gould-Williams et al. (2014) andVandenabeele (2009) point out that if organizationscanprovidemeaningfulpublicservices, thePSMofcivilservantscanleadtoamorepositiveattitudeandbehavior.

We assume that if government agencies can enableprosocialidentitiesincivilservants,theirself-conceptwill be strengthened, and they will demonstratebehaviors that are beneficial to the organization,which will, in turn, increase their organizationalcommitment (Gould-Williams et al., 2014; Kim,2012).PSMisbelievedtoberelatedtoorganizationalcommitment(Perry&Wise,1990),andmanystudiesassert that organizational commitment is the resultof PSM in public servants (Castaing, 2006; Park&Rainey, 2008; Taylor, 2008; Vandenabeele, 2009).However,otherstudiesregardPSMastheantecedentof organizational commitment (Camilleri, 2006). Ina study of France, Castaing (2006) finds that PSMprecedes organizational commitment and suggeststhat employing individuals with PSM can enhanceorganizational commitment. In an examinationof Australia, Taylor (2008) finds a relationshipbetween PSM and organizational commitment. Inan exploration ofMalta,Camilleri (2006) finds thatorganizational commitment strengthens PSM, withaffectivecommitmentbeingparticularlyinfluentialindirectlyaffectingPSM.Kim(2011)comestoasimilarconclusion,bydemonstratingthatPSMhasapositiveimpact onorganizational commitment in their studyoffirefighters.

Therefore,organizationalcommitmentisregardedasboth an antecedent and a result of PSM (Pandey&Stazyk, 2008). Likewise, for government agencies,whencivil servantshavehighPSM, theiremotionalattachmenttotheorganizationisalsohigh,whichinturnincreasestheirorganizationalcommitment,whichleadstothesecondhypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: PSM has a positive impact on organizational commitment.

The Mediating Effect of Organizational Commitment on the Relationship between PSM and Organizational PerformanceMany past studies on PSM regard PSM as a typeof prosocial behavior, and related to individual andorganizational performance (Houston, 2008; Pandey&Stazyk,2008;Huang,2019).However,fewstudieshave examined whether government reinventionaffectsPSM, and subsequently, affect organizationalcommitmentandjobperformance.

Ahmad, Ahmad, and Shah (2010) pointed out thatorganizationalcommitmentcanincreaseorganizationalperformanceperceptionintheirsurveyofemployees.This same relationship also likely holds for civilservants, and their organizational performance willincreasewhentheyhaveahighlevelofcommitmenttotheorganization.Riketta’s(2002)meta-analysisalsopointout thatmorethanonehundredarticles justifythe relationshipbetweenorganizational commitmentand organizational performance. From an empiricalviewpoint, when the civil servants’ organizationalcommitment is high, then they will have highorganizationalperformanceperception.

Ali,Rehman,Ali,Yousaf,andZia(2010)exploretherelationship between corporate social responsibility,organizational commitment, and organizationalperformanceandfindapositiverelationshipbetweenorganizational commitment and organizationalperformance. Moreover, Kim (2005) explore therelationship between affective commitment andorganizational performance in a sample of 1,739Koreancivilservantsandfindthatthetwoconstructshaveapositiverelationship.

Smeenk, Teelken, Eisinga, and Doorewaard (2009)find that European universities try to enhanceorganizational efficiency and effectiveness withmethodsfrommanagerialism.Butsomescholarsalsoargue thatmanagerialismwill reduce organizationalperformance. Smeenk, Teelken, Eisinga, andDoorewaardfinallyconfirmsthatbothmanagerialism

Liu & Chen • 39


and organizational commitment can improveorganizationalperformance.

Inasurveyof13,532federalemployeesinSwitzerland,Ritz (2009) finds that corporate management skillsand organizational commitments can increaseorganizational performance.Many studies have alsoarguedthatPSMpositivelyaffectsbothindividualandorganizationaljobperformance(Huang,2019).Alonso&Lewis(2001)foundthatPSMpositivelyaffectsjobperformance, and Vandenabeele (2009) found thatPSM may also affect job performance through themediating effect of organizational commitment. Forcivil servants, a highPSMwould improve their jobperformance through organizational commitment.In sum, this literature leads to the following twohypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: Organizational commitment has a positive impact on organizational performance.Hypothesis 4: Organizational commitment mediates the relationship between PSM and organizational performance.

METHODOLOGY

Sample, Instruments, and ProcedureThis study utilizes the Taiwanese GovernmentBureaucrats Survey II (TGBS II), which collected1,464 valid survey questionnaires through randomsampling from public servants who worked atgovernment agencies in Taiwan. Respondents wereassuredoffullconfidentiality.

Theprofileofthesample(belowinTable1)showsthat23.8%aresupervisors,51.4%arewomen,82.2%havebachelor’sdegrees,master’sdegrees,orPhDdegrees,and the average work experience in governmentagenciesis16.97years.

MeasuresDependent VariablesThe organizational performance was measured byrevisingtheitemsdevelopedbyKim(2005).Subjectsrespondedtoquestionsona0–10-pointscale,ranging

from 1 for “strongly disagree” to 10 for “stronglyagree.” Internal reliabilityCronbach’sαof the scalewas0.87.

Table 1. Characteristics and Background Information of Respondents (N = 1,464)

Respondent Characteristic Percentage

GenderMan 48.6%Woman 51.4%

PositionSupervisor 23.8%Non-supervisor 76.2%

Work experience

1-10 86.4%11-20 9.5%21-30 3.4%Over 31 .7%

Education

High school or below 2.1%College 10.3%University 36.5%Master’s 48.2%Doctor 3.1%

Independent and Mediating VariablesAlloftheindependentandmediatingvariablesusea6-pointscale,rangingfrom1for“stronglydisagree”to 6 for “strongly agree.” Reinvention reform ismeasuredby revising these itemsdevelopedbyHui& Lee (2000), leading to the internal reliability ofCronbach’sαofthescalebeing0.94.Organizationalcommitment is measured by revising these itemsdevelopedbyMeyer&Allen(1997),withtheinternalreliability of Cronbach’s α of the scale being 0.81.PSMismeasuredbyrevising these itemsdevelopedbyPerryetal.(2008),internalreliabilityCronbach’sαoffoursub-scaleswere0.69,0.64,0.89and0.79.

Controlling for Common Method Variance (CMV)CMV (common method variance) is defined as‘‘variance that is attributable to the measurementmethod rather than to the constructs the measuresrepresent’’ (Podsakoff et al., 2003). This studyaddressestheproblemofCMVusingthreemethods.First,respondentsareassuredofthefollowing:theiranonymityandconfidentiality;therebeingnorightorwronganswers;andtheirencouragementtoansweras



honestlyaspossible.Second,thisstudysimultaneouslyadopts6-and10-pointsLikertscalesinourmeasurestodiminishmethodbiases(seePodsakoffetal.,2003).Thismethodshouldreducemethodbiasescausedbycommonalitiesinscaleendpointsandanchoreffects.Besides,thisstudyalsocounterbalancestheorderofquestions relating to different scales and constructs,making CMV less likely, as the respondent cannotthen easily combine related items to cognitively“create” the correlation needed to produce a CMV-biasedpatternofresponses(Murrayetal.,2005).

Third,weuseHarman’ssingle-factortesttoassertthatour research is not pervasively affected byCMV.AHarman’ssinglefactorteststoseewhetherthemajorityofthevariancecanbeexplainedbyasinglefactor.IfCMVisanissue,asinglefactorwillaccountforthemajority of the variance in themodel.Thismethodloads all items from each of the constructs into anexploratoryfactoranalysistoseewhetheronesinglefactoremergesorwhetheronegeneralfactoraccountsforamajorityofthecovarianceamongthemeasures.Ifnot,theclaimisthatCMVisnotapervasiveissue.The single factor accounts for only 27.22% of the

covarianceamongthemeasures,thusmakingitclearthatCMVisnotapervasiveissueinthisstudy.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Validity and Reliability Analysis Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was utilized toassure the convergent validity of the latent factor.Thisprocedureallowsthecoherentitemstobehighlyconvergent on the same latent factor (Jöreskog &Söbom, 1993). In this article, LISREL 8.54 wasusedfortestinggoodnessoffitamongthevariables.According to the goodness-of-fit indicators of thestudy variables—χ2/df = 3.88, GFI = .99, NNFI =.98, PGFI = .76, RMSEA = .03—the models haveacceptablegoodness-of-fitindicators.

Notably,items’absoluteloadingvaluesλconstructedby the study were significantly larger than 0.50,thus above the level recommended by Hair etal. (1998), Bagozzi et al. (1991) and Fornell &Larcker (1981) indicating satisfactory convergentvalidity. Additionally, this study also examines thecorrelation coefficient matrix, because Messick

Table 2. Construct Loading and Model Fits

Constructs & Items Lambda Loading AVE CR Construct & Items Lambda Loading AVE CROrganizational Performance Reinvention Reform

OP1 0.77

0.71 0.91

RR1 0.92

0.84 0.95OP2 0.87 RR2 0.95OP3 0.85 RR3 0.95OP4 0.88 RR4 0.85

Organizational Commitment Public InterestOC1 0.84

0.72 0.89PI1 0.78

0.73 0.84OC2 0.81 PI2 0.92OC3 0.90

Attraction to Policy Making Self-SacrificePM1 0.76

0.61 0.83SS1 0.84

0.69 0.92PM2 0.78 SS2 0.80PM3 0.81 SS3 0.87

Compassion SS4 0.86CP1 0.79

0.70 0.88SS5 0.77

CP2 0.88CP3 0.83

Liu & Chen • 41


(1998) mentions that high correlation coefficientsmean a lack of discriminant validity. In general, acorrelation coefficient above 0.7 is considered tobe highly correlated, and all construct coefficients’absolutevaluesinthisstudywere<0.56, indicatingthatconstructshavesatisfactorydiscriminantvalidity.Ontheotherside,all thoseconstructs includingOP,OC,RR,PM,PI,CPandSSwererevisedfromscalesusedbypreviousexpertsandresearchersmanytimes.These experts had evaluated those constructs’ itemscarefully to measure their defined content (Polit &Beck, 2006), that also justified constructs’ contentvalidityinthisstudy.

Theaveragevarianceextracted(AVE)1andcompositereliability (CR)2 are calculated in this study. Theconstructs’ AVE ranges from 0.61-0.84 (>0.5) inthis study, which is above the level recommendedby Fornell&Larcker (1981). CR ranges from 0.83to 0.95 (>0.7), which is, again, above the levelrecommendedbyHairetal.(1998).TheAVEandCRvalue reconfirmsconstructs’ convergentvalidityandreliability.Finally,allconstructs’squarerootofAVE

are greater than inter-construct correlations, rangingfrom 0.78 to 0.92, thus reconfirming satisfactorydiscriminantvalidity(Fornell&Larcker,1981).

Descriptive Statistics and Inter-CorrelationsTable 3 presents the square root ofAVE and inter-correlationsamongstudyconstructs.Twosignificantfindingsarenotable.First,squarerootsofAVEareallgreater than inter-construct correlations, suggestingthat this study’s constructs all have satisfactorydiscriminantvalidity.Secondly,allofthecorrelationsamong research constructs are in the predicteddirection.

In summary, the correlations among independentvariablesanddependentvariablesaremoderatelylow.However,noneexceeds0.56, indicating theabsenceofmulticollineaarityinthisstudy(seeMessick,1998).

On the other side, discriminant validity is alsoconfirmedwhereMaximumSharedVariance(MSV)and theAverage SharedVariance (ASV) were bothlowerthantheAverageVarianceExtracted(AVE)forallconstructs (seeHair,etal.,2010).Table3showsthat theASVandMSVvalueareall lower than theAverageVarianceExtracted(AVE)forallconstructsinthestudy.


1

2

Table 3. The Square Root of AVE and Inter-Correlations

Organi-zational Commit-

ment

Policy Making

Public Interest

Rein-vention Reform

Self-Sacrifice

Organiza-tional Per-formance

Compas-sion ASV MSV AVE

Organizational Commitment (0.85) 0.09 0.20 0.72

Attraction to Policy Making 0.29 (0.78) 0.03 0.09 0.61

Public Interest 0.25 0.14 (0.85) 0.10 0.31 0.73Reinvention Reform 0.29 0.17 0.18 (0.92) 0.05 0.08 0.84

Self-Sacrifice 0.28 0.16 0.56 0.20 (0.83) 0.13 0.31 0.69Organizational Performance 0.45 0.15 0.17 0.28 0.18 (0.84) 0.07 0.20 0.71

Compassion 0.24 0.13 0.40 0.13 0.56 0.19 (0.84) 0.10 0.31 0.70

Note: The figures in the parentheses indicate the square root of AVE of the study constructs. MSV = Maximum Share Variance, ASV = Average Share Variance.


Hypotheses TestingThis study uses structural equation models (SEM)to test our proposed hypotheses. First, this studyincorporates demographic variables, such as gender,supervisor, subordinate, educational attainment, andseniority into the SME model. The demographicvariables are controlled for, prior to the pathcoefficients being calculated. Table 4 shows theresults, including the path coefficients, the standarddeviation, and the t-values (absolute value). Table4 demonstrates that reinvention reform positivelyaffects attraction to policy-making, commitment tothe public interest, self-sacrifice, and compassion,where thepathcoefficientsare0.17,0.18,0.20,and0.13, respectively, and all have p-values less than0.01,meaningthatthereissupportforH1a.ThisresultdovetailswithNaffandCrum(1999)andMoynihanand Pandey’s (2007b) findings where reinventionreformhasapositiveimpactonPSM.

Thepathcoefficientbetweenreinventionreformandorganizational commitment is 0.20, with a p-valueless than 0.01, suggesting evidence for H1b. Theseresults fitwithMohdNoor andOthman (2012) andOhandPark(2011)findingsofapositiverelationshipbetween government reinvention and organizationalcommitment.

Thepathcoefficientbetweenreinventionreformandorganizationalcommitmentis0.16,withap-valuelessthan0.01,suggestingsupport forH1c.Theseresultsconform to Enders,deBoer andWeyer (2013) andWalker, Damanpour, and Devece’s (2010) results—there is a positive relationship between governmentreinventionandorganizationalperformance.

ThepathcoefficientsbetweenPSMandorganizationalcommitment are 0.22, 0.09, 0.10 and 0.09, with allp-values being less than 0.01, providing supportforHypothesis2.These results echo thefindingsofGould-Williamsetal.(2014),Kim(2012),andPerryandWise(1990)thatPSMhasapositiveinfluenceonorganizationalcommitment.

The path coefficient between organizationalcommitmentandorganizationalperformanceis0.39,withap-valuelessthan0.01,indicatingthatthereissupport forHypothesis 3 and also providing furthersupport for the findings ofHouston (2008), Pandeyand Stazyk (2008) andVandenabeele (2009).Manystudies regardPSMasakindofprosocialbehavior,which increases organizational performance bymediatingorganizational commitment. In this study,themediatedrelationshipistestedthroughthemethodsuggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) and Sobel(1982).

Table 4. Path Coefficients (Coefficients, STDEV, T-Values)

Path Coefficients Standard Deviation T Statistics (Absolute Value)Reinvention Reform -> Attraction to Policy Making 0.17*** 0.03 6.02Reinvention Reform -> Public Interest 0.18*** 0.03 6.21Reinvention Reform -> Self-Sacrifice 0.20*** 0.03 7.18Reinvention Reform -> Compassion 0.13*** 0.03 4.78Reinvention Reform -> Organizational Commitment 0.20*** 0.03 7.46Reinvention Reform -> Organizational Performance 0.16*** 0.03 6.20Attraction to Policy Making -> Organizational Commitment 0.22*** 0.03 8.04Public Interest -> Organizational Commitment 0.09*** 0.03 2.98Self-Sacrifice -> Organizational Commitment 0.10*** 0.04 2.61Compassion -> Organizational Commitment 0.09*** 0.03 2.78Organizational Commitment -> Organizational Performance 0.39*** 0.03 13.91

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Liu & Chen • 43


Followingthislogic,PSMistheindependentvariable,organizationalcommitmentisthemediationvariable,and organizational performance is the dependentvariable.Aftercalculatingthemediationeffect,the‘a’coefficientis0.08(p<0.00);thebcoefficientis0.42(p<0.00);theccoefficientis0.23(p<0.00);andthec’coefficientis0.20(p<0.00).Theseresultsconfirmthat organizational commitment partially mediatesthe relationship between PSM and organizationalperformance.Inaddition,weconductaSobelindirecteffect test where ab coefficient is 0.03 and Z valueis5.77(p<0.00),indicatingthatthereisanindirecteffect.The1000samplebootstrapwasusedtotesttheindirect effects, while the 95% confidence interval(CI)wasfrom0.02to0.05,anditdidnotcontain0,indicating that the indirect relationship does exist,thus providing support for Hypothesis 4. That is,civil servants’ organizational commitment mediatesthe relationship between PSM and organizationalperformance. If civil servant management canincrease PSM, it can further enhance organizationalperformancethroughorganizationalcommitment.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study provides support for the notion thatreinvention reform positively affects attraction topolicy-making, commitment to the public interest,self-sacrifice, and compassion. We also find thatreinventionreformincreasescivilservants’PSM.Thecharacteristics of centralization, red tape, complexorganizational systems, and regulations result in adisconnectbetweencivilservantsandtheorganization,which prevent civil servants from maintainingPSM.Reinvention reform is considered to cultivateempowermentandparticipationmechanismsforcivilservants,whichinturnincreasescivilservants’PSM.

Some people believe that PSM and market-oriented administrative reforms are not necessarilycompatibleandthatcivilservantswillresistreformsand cooperation, and even weaken PSM. However,this study shows that most civil servants supportadministrative reform and professionalism in publicmanagement, including relevant general rolesand obligations of an efficient government, which

echoes the findings of Kearney et al. (2000) andNalbandian(1999),respectively.Ifcivilservantscanconsider administrative reform as an improvementinorganizationalefficiencyandanimportanttoolforimproving citizen satisfaction, the reform will notnegativelyaffectPSM.Rather,asaresultofaltruisticmotivation, the reform might even strengthen theirPSM,organizationalcommitmentandorganizationalperformance.

Second, attraction topolicy-making, commitment tothepublic interest,self-sacrifice,andcompassionallpositivelyinfluenceorganizationalcommitmentinthepublicsector.PSMisonekindofprosocialbehaviorwhichisconsideredtoleadtobeneficialoutcomestotheorganization.Ifpublicorganizationscanprovidemeaningful public services, civil servants’ PSMcanleadtogreaterorganizationalcommitment.

PreviousstudieshaveshownthatPSMisassociatedwith organizational commitment (Kim, 2006;Xiaohua, 2008). However, these studies did notexamine subdimensions. This study explored howthe subdimensions of PSM affect organizationalcommitmentandfoundarelationshiptoorganizationalcommitment.

This study finds that civil servants’ organizationalcommitment positively affects organizationalperformance,andorganizationalcommitmentmediatesthe relationship between PSM and organizationalperformance.Those civil servantswho commit to apublicorganizationhavebetterjobperformancethanthosewithlowerorganizationalcommitment.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Government agencies can improve civil servants’public service motivation through administrativereform, which will further improve civil servants’organizationalcommitment.Civilservants’attractionto policy-making, commitment to the publicinterest, compassion, and self-sacrifice deserve tobe strengthened in the public sector. In general,transformational leadership is based on job caringand further inspires civil servants to be attracted to



policy-making, commitment to the public interest,compassion,andself-sacrifice.Thecentralizeddesignoftraditionalgovernmentagencieseasilymakescivilservantsindifferenttotheirworkand,inturn,reducetheirorganizationalcommitment.

When government agencies and supervisors canimprovecivil servants’altruisticbehavior, thencivilservants’organizationalcommitmentisstrengthened.This study confirms that PSM is an antecedentof organizational commitment. If civil servantscan improve their attraction to policy making,commitmenttopublicinterest,compassion,andself-sacrificeontheirjob,theirorganizationalcommitmentwill increase. In addition to making reasonableadministrative reforms,work education and trainingcanbeusedtoenhancecivilservant’sadministrativeethicsandcitizenserviceorientation.

Improvingcivilservants’organizationalcommitmentcan increase their jobperformance.Asweknow,allthemethodsoftransformationalleadership,humanitymanagement, decision-making participation,empowerment, and delegation can improve civilservants’organizational commitment, andultimatelyimprovetheirorganizationalperformance.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Thisstudyusesprobabilitysamplingfortheirresearchsamples, but it is still possible that the sampledoesnot represent thepopulationbeing studied, resultingin a “sample bias” or “selection bias”. More largesamplesareneeded,particularlyinexploringthepathrelationshipsindifferentissueareas.

This study mainly explores the causal relationshipbetween SEM construct, but SEM also faces manychallenges.BollenandPearl (2013)argue thatSEMhaseightmyths,includingthatSEMsarenotequippedtohandlenonlinearcausalrelationshipsandSEMsdonotapplytoexperimentswithrandomizedtreatments.Thisstudydidnotmeasurethepossibilityofnonlinearcausal relationships,nordid itconductexperimentaldesignsinrandomizedtreatments.Futureresearchcancontinuetouseexperimentaldesignmethodstodetect

linear and nonlinear relationships, while combiningtheorywithalternativedataforfurtherexploration.

Somescholarsbelievethatexperimentaldesignistheonlywaytotestforcausalrelationships,butthereareother scholarswhobelieve there are the otherwaystodetectcausality.Inatraditionalregressionmodel,the causal relationship can be established betweentheindependentvariableandthedependentvariable.Thisstudymethodologicallyadvancesscholarshipbyexploring the ‘path’ relationship, which, we argue,is more meaningful than a ‘causal’ relationship.Ultimately,SEMisanappropriatemethodtoexaminethesetheoreticalrelationships,whichshouldbeuedinfuturescholarship.

Bozeman and Su (2015) use Gerring’s concept toevaluate23PSMdefinitionsbetween1990and2012,andtheyfindthatPSMisunabletodistinguishamongconceptsofmotivation,beliefs,values,attitudes,andbehaviors.Moreover,PSMisoftenconfusedwiththoseconcepts of “prosocial motivation” and “altruisticmotivation” (Chen & Xu, 2016). Perry (1996) firstestablishesfourPSMmeasurementconstructs,whichinclude attraction to policy-making, commitment tothe public interest, compassion, and self-sacrifice.EventhoughChenandXu(2016)identifythatPSMis getting more and more attention in the Chinesecommunity, they argue that future research mayabandon Perry’s (1996) definition andmeasurementand, thus, return to “the motivation to drive publicservice behavior.”Therefore, future research shouldreferto“SelfDeterminationTheory”todevelopmoreappropriatemeasurements.

PSM may have biases due to cultural or personalfactors,especiallyculturaldifferencesarounddifferentcountries,andwewouldneedtocollectmoredataandconductmore research to examine such differences.This study is based on quantitative methods, andthere is room for more qualitative research in thefuture to supplementour research resultswithmorecontextualized knowledge. Therefore, a range ofqualitativemethodscouldbeadoptedtoimprovethedepthofresearchinthisfield.

Liu & Chen • 45


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors thank the National Science Councilfor project funding, grant NSC100-2410-H-004-097-MY2. We also like to thank the workingteam behind the Taiwan Government BureaucratsSurvey (TGBS) forproducing theTGBS IIdataset.Please acquire the TGBS I & II dataset fromSurvey Research Data Archive at the AcademiaSinica from the following website: https://srda.sinica.edu.tw/browsingbydatatype_result.php?category=surveymethod&type=1&csid=24.

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service motivation and the performance ofgovernmentemployee inChina.Canadian Social Science,4(2),18–28.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Hsiang Te Liu is an associate professor in theDepartmentofPublicAffairs,MingChuanUniversity.Hisresearchinterests includeresearchmethodology,humanresourcemanagement,organizationalbehavior,opinionsurvey.E-mail:[email protected]

Don-YunChen isa fullprofessor in theDepartmentof Public Administration, and a research fellow inTaiwanInstituteforGovernanceandCommunicationResearch. He is leading a multi-year project calledTaiwan Government Bureaucrats Survey (TGBS).Hisresearchinterestsincludedemocraticgovernance,bureaucratic politics, e-governance, public policyanalysis & management, and health policy. E-mail:[email protected]

APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE ITEM

ReinventionReformPerception1.IthinkthatExecutiveYuan’sreformcanachievethegoalofadministrativereorganization.2. I think that Executive Yuan’s reform canachievethegoalofelasticizingtheadministrativeorganization.3.IthinkthatExecutiveYuan’sreformcanachievethegoalofimprovingeffectiveness.4. Overall, how much you support for theorganizational changes in this administrativereorganization?

OrganizationalCommitment1. The institutions I serve are usually able toachievetheorganizationalgoals.2.TheinstitutionsIserveareusuallyabletosolvecitizen’sproblems.

3.TheinstitutionsIservewillnottreatthecitizendifferentlydependingonthepersonalbackground.

OrganizationalPerformance1.Whatisyourorganizationalperformanceinthepasttwoyears?2.Whatistheperformanceofyourcolleaguesinthepasttwoyears?3.Whatistheperformanceofthesupervisorinthepasttwoyears?4. Overall, what is the performance of theorganizationyouhaveservedinthepasttwoyears?

PublicServiceMotivationAttraction to Policy Making

1.“Politics”isadirtywordforme.(R)2.Idon’tcareabouteverybehaviorofpoliticians.(R)3. The exchange of opinions and mutualcompromiseinthepolicyprocessismeaninglesstome.(R)

Commitment to Public Interest1. I will make a selfless contribution to thecommunityinwhichIlive.2.Providingpublicservicesisacivilresponsibilityforme.

Self-Sacrifice1. It is more meaningful to contribute to thepeople and society than to my personal careerdevelopment.2.IthinkthatitisworthwhiletoloseopportunitiesforpromotionwhenIdothosethingsbeneficialtothepublic.3.Itismyresponsibilitytocontributetothepublic.4. I think that “contributing to society” is moreimportantthan“takingitfromsociety.”

Compassion1.WhenIseethatavulnerablepersonisvictimized,Ialwaysfeelunbearable.2.Ioftenobservethatpeopleareinterdependent.3. Many social welfare and social assistanceprogramsareindispensable.



Smart Urban Governance in Epidemic Control: Practices and Implications of Hangzhou


Appropriate governance tools can facilitate urban governments’ effective responses to crises. Supportedbyinformationandcommunicationtechnologies(ICTs),e-governmentinfrastructurecanbeemployedtoachievesmartgovernanceinepidemiccontrol.ExaminingthecaseofHangzhou,thispaperdiscussestheChinesemegacity’sadoptionofe-governmentinfrastructureasameansofcombatingtheCOVID-19epidemicandstimulatingrecoveringoftheeconomy.Thispaperalsosummarizesseveralpolicyimplicationsthatmayserveaspointsofreferenceforothercitieswhenformulatingtheircrisisresponsestrategies.Thepaperconcludesthatsmartgovernancerootedintheuseofe-governmentinfrastructurehasexhibitedgreatpotentialforpublichealthcrisismanagement.

INTRODUCTION

The outbreak of infectious disease and theepidemicpotentialpresentseverechallengesforurbangovernance(Comfort,2006;Campanella,

2006). Infectious diseases are characterized byrapid spread, long periods of incubation, andwide-ranging influence. Because they are constrained byinformation lag, traditional technologies are oftendifficult to employ in efforts aimed at controllingepidemicsincities.Inresponsetothischallenge,urbangovernments are increasingly employing information and communication technologies (ICTs) to enablesmart governance in the prevention and control ofepidemics.

When the COVID-19 epidemic broke out in early2020, the Chinese government took many extrememeasures to control the spread of the epidemic,including quarantining the more than 50 millionresidentsofHubeiprovince.However,thecoronaviruswas still able to spread to China’s major cities.COVID-19 isahighlycontagious infectiousdisease,which can be transmitted between humans evenbeforetheinfectedindividualsshowsymptoms.These

factorsmakeitmoredifficulttocontrolepidemicsinthe high-density and high-mobility urban settings.Some urban governments have adoptedmany “low-tech” measures. For example, some governmentshaveplacedobstaclesonroads tobarstrangersfromenteringtheir jurisdictions,andsomehaveorganizedpeopletomonitorpotentiallyinfectedpersonsandtoevensecure thedoors to theirhomes.Theseextrememeasures,however,canresultinmanysocialconflicts.Besides, these measures require the government toinvestconsiderablemanpower,andfrequentphysicalcontact among individuals will further increasethe risk of cross-infection. Worse still, the lagging,inaccurate, or incomplete information collected viatraditionalmethodsisnotsufficienttoproperlyguidethegovernment’sintervention.Incontrast,somelocalgovernmentshavemobilizedICT-basede-governmentinfrastructuretoimplementsmartgovernanceaimedatepidemicdetection,prevention,andcontrolinamoreexpeditiouswayandatalowercost.

Based on the case of Hangzhou, China, this paperexamines the Chinese megacity’s deploymentof e-government infrastructure to achieve smartgovernance in epidemic control. Here, smart

Address correspondence to Yonghua Zou at [email protected]. View this article at cpar.net


Keywords: e-government;crisismanagement;smartgovernance;epidemiccontrol;COVID-19

Wanxia Zhao*, Yonghua Zou†

* East China University of Political Science and Law, China† Zhejiang University, China

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governance refers to a government’s ability to apply ICTs and intelligent activities in processinginformationandmakingdecisionsaimingatachievingbetter governance outcomes (Scholl & Alawadhi,2016).Asan innovative formof theproductionanddelivery of government services through ICT-basedapplications (Ho, 2002), e-government can serve asan important infrastructure to deliver informationand integrated services to citizens. E-governmentis regarded as infrastructure because it providesthe basic systems and services for improving theefficiencyofgovernmentoperationintheinformationera. The e-government infrastructure includes avariety of facilities (such as computers, sensors,Internet of Things, 5G network, etc.), technicalexpertise (such as algorithms, computing power,etc.),andinformationplatforms(suchasmanagementsystems,databases,etc.).Asacriticalkindofpublicservice, crisis management can benefit from thee-government infrastructure in numerous ways,includingsharinginformation,developinggovernancetools,coordinatingvariousstakeholders,andformingcollective actions. Facilitated by e-governmentinfrastructure,thegovernmentcanpartnerwithotherstakeholderstorespondtocrisesmoreeffectivelyandresultinbetteroutcomes(Meijer,2016).

Thepaperisstructuredasfollows.Thesecondsectionprovides a brief review regarding the facilitation ofe-governmentforcrisismanagement.Thethirdsectionsuggests how e-government infrastructure may beappliedinvariousscenariosassociatedwithepidemiccontrol. The fourth section examines Hangzhou’suse of smart governance in epidemic control andeconomicrecovery.Thefifthsectionprovidespolicyimplications and a conclusion.Thispaper can serveto advance our understanding of how e-governmentinfrastructurecanbeutilizedtomanagepublichealthcrisesandtoachievesmarturbangovernance.

E-GOVERNMENT FACILITATES CRISIS MANAGEMENT: A BRIEF REVIEW

With the rapid development of ICTs, an increasingnumberofgovernmentshaveemployede-governmentas an administrative reform strategy. Since its

emergenceinthe1990s,e-governmenthasundergoneseveral stagesof evolution that reflect technologicalsophistication and interaction with users – fromone-way communication (simple informationdissemination) to two-way communication (requestandresponse),andthentotheintegratedgovernmentservices for efficiency, effectiveness, and user-friendliness (Moon, 2002; Smith & Teicher, 2006).E-government isexpected to improveadministrativeefficiency,promotepublicparticipation,andestablishacitizen-centeredgovernmentfunction(Ayansoetal.,2011;Khan&Park,2013).

Supported by ICTs, e-government has becomecritical to governments reinventing themselves,as it has changed the content and functions ofgovernment institutions and their interactions withotherstakeholders(Ho,2002).Becausee-governmentallowscitizenstoaccessinformationthroughefficientprocesses, itnotonlyenhances thequalityofpublicservice delivery, but it also enhances democracy byallowing more direct citizen participation (Ahn &Bretschneider,2011;Pereiraetal.,2018;Ho,2002).This perspective suggests that e-government hasbrought more than a technological breakthroughin public service delivery; it has also has promoteda shift in philosophy regarding governance and inhow governments operate (Dunleavy et al., 2006.Twizeyimana&Andersson.2019;Ho,2002).

E-governmenthasbeenadoptedinnumerousfunctionalareas,includingcrisismanagement.Researchershavedemonstrated that e-government has great potentialin managing various types of crises more quickly,withwiderparticipation,andatalowercost(Janssen&Estevez,2013).First,e-government infrastructureis capable of providing common platforms for thedevelopment of crisis management tools due to itsextensive databases and its ability to gather real-timedatafromavarietyofsources.Consideringthatcrisesaremostoftenuncertainandunique(Oscarsson& Danielsson, 2018), e-government infrastructureenablesgovernmentstoadapttoevolvingconditionsand thus to deliver new functionalities to addressthespecificneedsofspecificcrisesatvariousstages(Devadoss&Pan,2004).Additionally,e-government

infrastructure can provide relevant agencies with acollaborative system that permits them to exchangeinformation quickly and efficiently, which is highlycriticaltocrisismanagement(Turoff,2002).Throughutilizing the advantages of various advancedtechnologiestoshareinformationandformcollectiveactions, e-government infrastructure facilitates theabilityofthegovernmenttodevelopsmartgovernancearrangementsthatcanresultinamoreeffectivecrisismanagementprocessandbetteroutcomes (Scholl&Alawadhi,2016;Meijer,2016).

There has been considerable literature regardinghow local governments at various levels employe-government to facilitate daily administrationand provide more integrated service to citizens(Ho, 2002; Moon, 2002), but research regardinghow e-government is used for crisis management,especiallyepidemiccontrol,remainslimitedthusfar.AnexampleisfoundinDevadossandPan(2004),whodiscuss how Singapore employed its e-governmentinfrastructure to manage the SARS crisis in 2003,focusingonthesystemsofinformationdisseminationandcontacttracing.ConsideringthatseventeenyearshavepassedsincetheSARSoutbreak,itisnecessarytoexaminethenewpotentialofe-governmentincrisismanagement in the context of new technologicaldevelopments.Assuch,thispaperattemptstonarrowthe literature gap between e-government and crisismanagementthroughanalysisofthelatestpracticeofthecityofHangzhou inemployinge-government tocopewiththeCOVID-19pandemic.

SMART GOVERNANCE IN EPIDEMIC CONTROL: ICT USAGE SCENARIOS

Thecoreideabehindsmarturbangovernanceliesinthe notion that stakeholders can take advantage ofICTs embedded in the e-government infrastructureto solve urban problems and realize value forsociety (Zook,2017).Smartgovernance is achievedthrough stakeholders’ collaboration around theICT applications, which can be used in numerousscenariosrelatedtoepidemiccontrolandcanfacilitatea government’s dynamic interventions within thecomplex urban environment (Massaro et al., 2019;

Glasmeier&Christopherson,2015).

Information Collection, Sharing, and DisseminationReal-time and accurate information is critical tothe improved efficacy and efficiency of emergencyresponsetasks.Inthegovernanceofepidemiccontrol,stakeholders need continuous access to all mannerof information so that they can appropriately plan,make decisions, and allocate resources (Drapalova&Wegrich, 2020)Furthermore, information sharingand dissemination are important for stakeholders’collaborativeeffortsinthepreparation,response,andrecoverystagesofepidemiccontrol(Gaoetal.,2008).To meet this demand, it is necessary to use ICTsembedded ine-government tohandle information inasystematic,collaborativemanner(Meijer&Thaens,2018).

Modern ICTs have shown great potential in thecollection, sharing, and dissemination of epidemic-related information. For instance, as the spread ofdiseaseisstronglyassociatedwithspatialfactors,thegovernmentandpublicneed to identifywhichareasareathigherriskofthespreadofcontagion.ThiscanbeachievedviatheWeb-basedGIS,whichcanprovidea real-time and dynamicway to represent epidemicinformationonmaps(Gaoetal.,2008).Furthermore,considering that infectious diseases are related tohumanmobility,mobilephonedata,andothersourcesofbigdatacanbeused to traceanepidemic spreadpattern. The information associated with diseaseoutbreak can both suggest useful recommendationstoofficialsandinformthepublicsuchthatpeoplearemorealertandlesspanicked.

Surveillance and Diagnosis Ifanoutbreakoccurs,effectivesurveillanceservesasameansbywhichstakeholderscanrespondquicklytothreats,whichinturnenablesgreaterpreventionofthespreadofdisease(Massaroetal.,2019).Forinstance,itismandatedthatpeoplesuspectedofbeinginfectedwithCOVID-19mustbequarantined for14days inaquarantineareaorathome.ICTscancontinuouslysurveilthosepeople’sactivitiesandhealthconditions.They can also track the infected person’s travel

Zhao & Zou • 53


trajectory and identify the people with whom theinfectedpersonmayhavebeenincontact(Heymann,2020). ICTs also effectively reduce labor costs andhuman-to-human contact in epidemic control; forinstance,aninfraredthermometermountedonadroneand robots can be used to check body temperatureand to allow for food delivery to quarantine areas,which reduce non-infected individuals’ exposure toenvironmentslikelytobeinfected.

ICTs can also play a role inmedical diagnosis andpsychologicalcounseling.Forexample,manypeoplehave symptoms, such as fever and cough, but theyarenotnecessarilyinfectedwithcoronavirus.Ifthosepeople all flock to the hospital at once, they couldexhaust the hospital’s available medical resourcesandmaycausecross-infection.Anonlinediagnosticsystem capable of determining whether the patientshouldgo to thehospital for further treatmentcouldhelptopreventsuchasituation.

Risk Assessment and Trend PredictionICTs have great potential in epidemiological riskassessment and trend prediction (Massaro et al.,2019). For instance, the government can assess therisks associated with various types of gatherings,which can then permit it to arrange for appropriatemedical resources to ensure the potential risks canbe managed in the best possible way (Heymann,2020). Analysis and modeling based on big dataand artificial intelligence can also predict epidemicdevelopment trends. For example, considering thatthereissignificantpopulationflowbetweencities,thegovernment can use big data stemming from ticketpurchases and mobile payments to predict wherepeople will flow to and from and where they willgather,whichwould,inturn,enablethegovernmenttopredictwhereepidemicoutbreaksaremost likelytooccur(Massaroetal.,2019).Riskassessmentandtrend prediction can provide real-time guidance forthefuturedirectionofpublicintervention.

THE PRACTICE OF HANGZHOU

Hangzhou and Its Achievements in Managing the COVID-19 Crisis

Hangzhou, the capital city of Zhejiang Province insoutheastChina, is amegacitywith a population of10.36 million people. Over the past few decades,Hangzhou has experienced the rapid growth of theInternet industry, earning a reputation as “China’sE-business Capital” and spawning a host of high-techenterprises,includingInternetgiantAlibaba.TheboominthedigitaleconomyandemergingindustrieshasmadeHangzhouamagnetformigrants–in2019,Hangzhou had a net population inflow of 554,000(Zhejiang Bureau of Statistics, 2020), ranking firstamongChina’smegacities.

As a megacity with high population mobility,Hangzhou has achieved outstanding records inmanagingtheCOVID-19crisis,whichisreflectedinthe low infection rate and rapid economic recovery.First,Hangzhousuccessfullycontrolledtheepidemicwithin a short period and maintained a very lowinfection rate and zeromortality rate. InHangzhou,thefirstCOVID-19casewasreportedonJanuary19,2020, that is, four days before Wuhan was lockeddown.Asofthewritingofthispaper,thelatestlocalcase (except for imported cases) was reported onFebruary 29, meaning that Hangzhou successfullycontained thevirus inaboutonemonth.During thisperiod,Hangzhoureported187domesticcasesintotal(HangzhouHealthCommission,2020).Itmeansthatitsinfectionrateisonly1.8/100,000,oneofthelowestamongmajorChinesecities.MostofthesecaseswererelatedtoHubeiprovince,suggestingthatCOVID-19did not spread on a large scale in Hangzhou. Evenmore impressive is that Hangzhou’s COVID-19mortalityrateiszero(HangzhouHealthCommission,2020),thebestrecordamongthemegacitiesofChina.Second, during the outbreak. Hangzhou quicklyachievedeconomicrecoveryandsocialnormalization.Thisisreflectedinthecity’seconomicrecoverylevel–inthefirstquarterof2020whentheepidemicwasatitsworst,Hangzhou’sGDPstillreachedanominalgrowthrateof4.61%(HangzhouBureauofStatistics,2020), rankingsecondamongthe toptencitieswiththe strongest economies nationwide. Hangzhou is acity thatworkedearlyon toseekabalancebetweenepidemiccontrolandsocialfunctioning(Chengetal.,2020).Whentheepidemicwasmostsevere,residents



were still able to relyon the innovativehealthcode(to be discussed in Section 4.3) to maintain urbanmobility,whicheffectivelydecreasedsocialconflicts.

Hangzhou’s achievements can be attributed to thecity’s ICT-based governance tools supported by thee-governmentinfrastructure.Inrecentyears,torealizeitspursuitofbecoming“theLeadingCityofChina’sDigital Economy,” the Hangzhou municipality hasheavily invested in e-government infrastructure,including the city-wide digital governance platformthat can provide databases, computing power, andalgorithms for various domains of urban affairs.Hangzhouutilized its epidemicmanagement systemto effectively control the epidemic and inventeda series of governance instruments such as healthcodes to promote economic recovery. Both theepidemic management system and the health codesaredevelopedbasedonthecity’sdigitalgovernanceplatform.

In China, numerous other cities have adoptedHangzhou’s practices that led to the successfulmobilization of its e-government infrastructure tocombatCOVID-19, and the central government hasimplementedsomeof thesepractices throughout thecountry.ThisperspectivesuggeststhatHangzhouisasuitablecaseviawhichtoexaminehowe-governmentinfrastructure can be applied to public healthcrisis management. In this case study, we focus onHangzhou’spracticesaimedataddressingtwoseverechallenges:epidemiccontrolandeconomicrecovery.

Epidemic ControlBefore the government officially announced theepidemicon January23,2020, tensof thousandsofHubei people, many who were potentially infected,had flowed into Hangzhou. In response to thiscrisis, Hangzhou has taken full advantage of itsstrong digital infrastructure. On January 26, 2020,the local government andAlibaba jointly developedthe country’s first Public Service and ManagementPlatform(PSMP)forthepreventionandcontroloftheCOVID-19 epidemic.With the city’s e-governmentinfrastructure andAlibaba’s technical supports, thisplatformwascompletedinjustoneday.PSMPserves

various functions, such as information collection,resourceoptimization,surveillance,anddiagnosis.

Real-timecollection,reporting,analysisofinformationis a prerequisite for the prevention of an epidemicoutbreak inacity. In theearlystageofanoutbreak,thegovernmenturgentlyneedsaccesstoaplethoraofdetailed and complex information such as potentialpatients’locationsandtrajectories,anddataregardingwhomthepotentialpatientsmighthavecontactedorwillcontactaswellasotherclues.Atotalof9,810closecontactshadbeentracedinthecitybyJune24,2020(HangzhouHealthCommission,2020).Furthermore,aprimaryadvantageofPSMPisthatitcancollectandreportmulti-channel information in real-time,whichcan avoid information lag and distortion resultedfrom the traditional reportingmethods.Also, PSMPcanoptimizethedistributionofmedicalsupplies.Forinstance,anonlinemaskreservationsystemcanallowforthedistributionofmaskstothosewhoneedthemmost, and this ensures that resources are distributedfairly.

PSMPalsoimprovestheefficiencyofsurveillanceanddiagnosis.Thesurveillanceregardinghomequarantinesis usually a labor-intensive task. In Hangzhou, forexample, up to tens of thousands of people per daywere quarantined at home. If traditionalmethods ofsurveillanceareemployed,alargenumberofworkerswillberequired,whichcouldleadtocross-infection.Through PSMP, quarantined people can report theirhealth status, and this has greatly minimized thephysicalcontactbetweenthequarantinedindividualsandthehealthworkers.Thisplatformalsopermitsthepublic tocheck to seewhether theyhavecome intocontactwithpatientsbasedontheirtraveltrajectories.In addition, thepublic can consultwithdoctors andpsychologists online to receive early diagnosis andguidance.Inshort,PSMPhasfacilitatedtheformationand implementation of reasonable intervention andstabilizationofsocialemotionviareal-time,accurate,anddynamicepidemic-relatedinformation.

Economic RecoveryOnce the epidemicwasbetter controlled,Hangzhoubeganfocusingoneconomicrecovery.AsHangzhou’s

Zhao & Zou • 55


foreigntradeeconomyconstitutesanimportantpartoftheglobalproductionchain,resumptionofproductionisparticularlyimportantforthecity.Moreover,sinceCOVID-19 hit the Chinese economy pretty hard,the resumption of production in other areas becameimportant to thesupportof theHubeiprovinceafterit was under quarantine. Many local governments,however,havebeen reluctant to letbusiness resumeproduction due to fears that the outbreak mightrebound. To quickly promote economic recovery,Hangzhouproposedasmartsolutionthatconsistsofthreeinnovativegovernanceinstrumentsincluding“acode,”“amap,”and“anindex.”

“A code” is the health code used to dynamicallymonitor workers’ potential risks of becominginfectedwith the virus.Businesses have been eagerfor workers to return to their factories and officessince the Lunar New Year Holiday, but it remainsdifficult to identify the risks associated with theworkers, who are from all over the country andmaybeinfected.Atraditionalhealthcertificate,whichindicatesaperson’shealthstatus,ispaper-based,andthe informationon thecertificatecaneasilybecomeinvalidated.Forexample,ifaworkerholdingapaperhealthcertificatecomesintocontactwithaninfectedperson,theinformationonthecertificatewillnolongerbevalid.Therefore,citiesdonotmutuallyrecognizepaper health certificates. Hangzhou addressed theproblem of workers’ across-jurisdiction movementwith a dynamically updated health code. In anAPPdevelopedbyAlibaba,apersonwillbegivenoneofthethreetypesofQRcodes–red,yellow,andgreencodes–basedonbigdata,whichincludesinformationabouttheworker’shealthstatus,theworker’splaceofdeparture, and theworker’s contactwith potentiallyinfectedpeople.Theredcodesuggeststhatworkers,suchasthosefromhard-hitareasorthosewhohavehad close contact with infected people, are at thehighestrisk.Theyellowcodeindicatesslightlylowerriskthantheredcode,whilethegreencodeisgiventopeoplewhoarenotatriskofinfection.Peoplewithredandyellowcodesarerequiredtobeisolatedfromthegeneralpopulationforacertainnumberofdays,whilethosewithgreencodescanflowfreelyfromonelocationtoanother.Basedonthecolorof thehealth

codesthataredisplayedviaworkers’cellphones,andwhich areupdated in real-time, thegovernment andbusinessescandeterminewhetheritisappropriateforworkerstoreturntowork.Thisinnovativeinstrumentnot only provides a flexiblemechanism to generateanindividual-basedsolutionforepidemiccontrolbutalsolinkscommunityorganizations’groundworkwithgovernments’micro-levelmanagement(Chengetal.,2020).

“Amap” is the epidemic map used to dynamicallyassess each jurisdiction’s epidemic risk, and inturn determine whether it is safe to resume workat businesses based on their locations. Stratifiedaccordingtotheassessmentresults,eachjurisdictionisratedveryhighrisk,highrisk,secondaryrisk,lowrisk, or very low risk; these ratings are representedon themapby red,orange,yellow,blue, andgreen,respectively. In high-risk jurisdictions, epidemicprevention and control should continue to be thetoppriority; in low-risk jurisdictions,businesses areencouragedtoresumework.

“Anindex”refers to thesmart trafficpatencyindex,whichisusedprimarilytomeasuretheflowoftrafficwithin a jurisdiction. The normal operation of abusinesscannotbeseparatedfromtheflowoflabor,rawmaterials,andproducts.Duetotheepidemic,manycheckpointshavebeensetupbetweenjurisdictionstocheck travelers’ temperatures and other symptoms;some jurisdictions even shut down highways to barworkers from entering. Based on the smart trafficpatency index, local governments can adjust theintensityofepidemicpreventionandcontrolpromptly.Asa result,manycheckpointsalonghighwayswereclosedtoensurethattrafficcouldflowwell.

Thankstothesemeasuresandtherelativeguaranteesthey provided, Hangzhou became the city with thehighestCOVID-19 cure rate; itwas also oneof theearliest cities to successfully recover its economy.These systematic and dynamic solutions cannot beachieved without the supports of the e-governmentinfrastructure.Hangzhou’s smart governancemodel,whichaimstoreducethespreadofdiseaseandenableeconomicrecovery,hasbeenadoptedbymanyother



Chinesecities,whichwerequicktolearnthespecificsofthemodel.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Hangzhou’spracticesdemonstratethate-governmentinfrastructurecanpermitacitytoeffectivelycombatCOVID-19.At the timeofwritingof thispaper, theCOVID-19pandemiccontinuestoplaguetheworld.Given this, it is worthwhile to analyze Hangzhou’sexperiences and lessons learned to assess how theymight apply to and benefit the world’s cities. Ofcourse, Hangzhou is subject to circumstances thatmakeituniqueandhavethuslenttothecity’ssuccessrelatedtothepandemic.First,unlikethoseassociatedwith many Western democratic countries, China’sgovernments possess greater power to mobilize theresourcesrequiredbythee-governmentinfrastructure.Second,unlikethecountriesthatprioritizeindividualliberty (Cheng et al., 2020), Chinese people areinfluenced by Confucian culture and thus tend tobelieveincollectivism,whichfacilitatescasetrackingandsurveillanceduringoutbreaks.Despitethepoliticaland cultural differences among countries, however,Hangzhou has had some fairly generic experiencesthatmayprovevaluabletoothercitiesthroughouttheworld.Neitherpoliticalandideologicalbarriersshouldhindercountries’orcities’fightagainsttheCOVID-19pandemic, as the virus is capable of spreading andposingsimilarchallengeswithinthedifferentcountries,andnocountrycanrespondtosuchahugecrisisalone(Chengetal.,2020;Yang,2020).Sincetechnologyisnotlimitedbynationalboundaries,differentcountriescan adopt suitable technologies to strengthen theirrespectivee-government infrastructure to respond toCOVID-19.Perthisperspective,Hangzhou’spracticecan yield certain policy implications, which can beused as a point of reference not only for Chinesecitiesbutalsoforothercountriesandcitiesseekingtodeveloptheircrisismanagementstrategies.

First,ICTsanddatashouldbedevelopedviathenotionthattheyarepartofacity’simportante-governmentinfrastructure necessary to crisis management.Hangzhou’s advantage in epidemic prevention andcontrol is largelydue to its long-term investment in

andmaintenance of smart city facilities and data.Amajor e-government infrastructure in Hangzhou istheCityBrain,whichisoneoftheearliestICT-basedurbangovernanceplatforms inChina.Supportedbyvarious ICTs, including5Gconstruction, Internet ofThings, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, andother technologies, this e-government infrastructureprovide a solid capacity for developing instrumentsfor data collection, instrument development, andcomputing in crisismanagement.The e-governmentinfrastructure provides a commonplatform, throughwhich various innovative governance instrumentscanbedevelopedquickly.Apieceofevidenceisthatthe development of PSMP was completed in onlyone day and the development of Hangzhou healthcode only took seven days.Without the support ofthe e-government infrastructure, these two criticalgovernanceinstrumentscouldnothavebeencompletedin such a short time. Besides, smart governance inepidemic control is inseparable from the extensivedatabaseprovidedbythee-governmentinfrastructureanditsability toobtainreal-timedatafrommultiplechannels. For instance, theCityBrain ofHangzhoucancollectmorethan80millionpiecesofdataperday;this data comes from eleven government agencies,includingpolice,transportation,tourism,healthcare,etc. (Hangzhou Municipality, 2019). During theepidemic control, the data collected by PSMP andthehealthcodecanlinkthedatasetoftheCityBrain,whichcananalyzethedataandfeedtheresultsbacktotherelevantgovernmentagencies.Therefore,iftheepidemicweretotakerootinanyoftheseplaces,thegovernment could respond quickly and implementinnovative governance strategies. In this way, thee-governmentinfrastructureenablesvariousagenciestoworkinamorecoordinatedmannerandfacilitatethe development of smart governance to respond tothecrisismoreeffectively.

Second, inaddition tohardwareanddata, there is aneed to create a favorable institutional environmentinwhich to use e-government to control epidemics.ICTs can shape institutions by enabling them toovercome institutional inertia; however, ICTs alonecannotguaranteebenefitswithoutproperinstitutionalsafeguards (Yang, 2003; Yang, 2020). Hangzhou’s

Zhao & Zou • 57


practices demonstrate that a sound institutionalframeworkcanallowe-government infrastructure toreachitsfullpotential.Beforethisepidemic,Hangzhouhad launched many digital governance projects,including the “visit once atmost” project that aimstouseICTstooptimizeefficiencyamonggovernmentagencies and enhance public service capabilities(Huang&Yu,2019).HangzhouhasalsoestablishedaDataResourcesAdministrationBureau,whichaimstopromote cross-departmental collaboration regardingdata sharing and complex public issues solutions(Waugh&Streib,2006;Liu&Zheng,2015).Drivenby these endeavors, an institutional environmentconducivetosmartgovernancehasbeenformed.

Third, the government should work closely withbusinesses, social organizations, and residents toachievesmartgovernance.Forinstance,Hangzhou’ssmart governance in epidemic control would bedifficult to realize without the cooperation of thelocal flagship company Alibaba. Alibaba is thegovernment’s partner of the Hangzhou City Brainproject, as well as the main developer of PSMPand the health code. It not only provides technicalsupports for various smart solutions but also serves as abridgebetween thegovernmentand thepublicviaitsAlipay,whichmostHangzhouresidentsuse.Otherprivate businesses and social organizations havealsoparticipatedinsmartgovernancethroughouttheoutbreak.Forinstance,manye-commercebusinesseshave implementedcontactlessservices to reduce therisksofcross-infection,andmanysocialorganizationsandvolunteershaveputinconsiderableefforttohelpresidentswhoareunable touse smartdevices.Asaresult,viathee-governmentinfrastructure,Hangzhouhas formed a cooperative means of governancecomprisedofdiversesubjects,achievingatriplewinforthegovernment,businesses,andresidents.

Hangzhou’s practice of using e-governmentinfrastructure to manage crises has also shed lighton problems that need to be addressed, such as thedigital divide, public surveillance, data privacy, andinformationsecurity(Clarketal.,2003).Forexample,some elderly people are incapable of using mobilephones to get health codes; also, putting such a

massiveamountofdatainthehandsofprivatefirmscreates significant information security risks (Yang,2020).Theseproblemsnotwithstanding,Hangzhou’sexperience indicates that the rapid deployment ofICTs in e-government can change the way urbanproblemsareunderstood. Inaddition, the ICT-basede-government infrastructure has exhibited greatpotential to facilitate cities to assume greater control over the epidemic, which ensures that they will beabletoachievesmarturbangovernanceandwillthusbemore resilient when confrontedwith unexpectedshocks.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

WanxiaZhaoisanAssociationProfessorattheSchoolofPoliticalScience andPublicAdministration,EastChina University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai,China.Herresearchinterestsincludepublicpolicy and sustainable development. She obtainedher doctoral, master’s, and bachelor’s degrees fromIndianaUniversity,TsinghuaUniversity, andPekingUniversity, respectively. She can be reached [email protected].

Yonghua Zou is a ZJU100 Young Professor at the School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China. His research interests include urban governance, housing policy, and healthy cities. He received his doctoral degree in Urban Studies from Temple University, and master’s degrees from Indiana University and Tsinghua University. He can be reached via [email protected].



The Importance of Vertical and Horizontal Collaboration: United States’ Response to COVID-19 Pandemic


INTRODUCTION

The emergence and progression of the coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) have created unprecedented challenges to society. Once

understood as a local epidemic in a province in China, COVID-19 soon became a wicked problem accompanied by multiple sets of complex and intractable challenges. As of October 22, 2020, there are 41,317,207 confirmed cases, and 1,132,732 deaths in 215 nations and territories around the world (Johns Hopkins Corona Virus Resource Center, 2020). The exponential increase of the cases has overwhelmed medical capacities and health care staff in many countries, which created additional threats to patients with other surgical emergencies or pre-existing conditions (Sadiq & Kessa, 2020). Different approaches adopted to tackle the spread of the disease, such as lock-downs or travel bans, have been limited by the need to balance issues in other dimensions, such as national and local economy, unemployment, and social welfare. Other countermeasures, such as school

closures or mandatory face covering, have ignited unexpected social contentions among groups with different perspectives. Limited information about the disease may have facilitated irrational behaviors, such as panic buying of necessary goods like toilet paper, hand sanitizers, and face masks, at the beginning of the pandemic. The media’s framing about the disease may have also contributed to increasing inequality, xenophobia, exclusion, discrimination, and so on (United Nations, 2020).

Some studies find that conventional approaches, especially command and control by a single authority, are not very effective in tackling the pandemic (Lee et al., 2020). The complex and interdependent situation engendered by COVID-19 challenges individual actor’s problem-solving capacities by asking them to do more with less (Comfort, 2007; Weible et al., 2020; Yeo & Lee, 2020). Multifaceted issues and problems have generated either too much or too little information for individual actors to make sense of emerging situations or to make sound decisions (Boin

Address correspondence to Ruthnande Kessa at [email protected]. View this article at cpar.net


Ruthnande Kessa, Abdul-Akeem Sadiq, Jungwon YeoUniversity of Central Florida, USA

COVID-19 has devastated the global community at an alarming rate. Conventional approaches like command and control are ineffective to respond to this pandemic. The complex and interdependent nature of the pandemic demands collaborative efforts among actors across diverse segments and different levels of government. Collaboration is critical during this pandemic because it can enable a more coordinated response, resources can be shared, trust among the parties can be enhanced, and duplication of efforts can be minimized. In this commentary, drawing on the literature on collaboration, we discuss the importance of vertical and horizontal collaboration by examining the U.S. response to COVID-19. This commentary underscores the importance of vertical and horizontal collaboration among all levels of government, private entities, and nonprofit organizations in effectively responding to COVID-19 and ensuring the health and safety of Americans. This commentary concludes by making recommendations for improving both vertical and horizontal collaboration during the current pandemic and future public health emergencies.

Keywords: collaboration, vertical collaboration, horizontal collaboration, COVID-19, public health emergencies

Kessa, Sadiq, & Yeo • 61



& Hart, 2003; Moynihan, 2008). Given the wicked nature of the pandemic, we argue that collaboration is imperative to fight COVID-19.

In this commentary, we define collaboration as “any joint activity by two or more agencies that is intended to increase public value by their working together rather than separately” (Bardach, 1998, p. 8). During a large-scale crisis like COVID-19, there is an increasing necessity for collaboration among actors across diverse segments and different levels of government (McGuire & Silvia, 2010; Weible et al., 2020; Yeo & Comfort, 2017). Collaboration enables a more coordinated response to emergencies and crises (Comfort, 2007; Waugh & Streib, 2006). Through trust-based working relationships, actors share experiences, information, and resources, and identify better ways to allocate limited resources (O’Sullivan et al., 2013; Sobelson et al., 2015; Yeo & Lee, 2020; Zakocs & Edwards, 2006). Moreover, collaboration enhances the ability to develop distributed cognition that improves sensemaking of the complex and dynamic environment and helps to develop collective response strategies and operations (Lee et al., 2020; O’Sullivan et al., 2013; Zakocs & Edwards, 2006). Overall, collaborative efforts typically produce a greater outcome than the sum of individual efforts.

In this commentary, drawing on the literature on collaboration, we explore vertical and horizontal collaboration during the response to COVID-19 in the U.S. and discuss why the presence of both vertical and horizontal collaborations have not led to the expected outcomes—flattening the pandemic curve and reducing the number of lives lost and the impacts on the community nationwide. In particular, we discuss important conditions for effective collaboration and provide pieces of evidence from the current pandemic response in the U.S. to support our arguments. Although vertical collaboration and horizontal collaboration are not mutually exclusive in practice, we separate them here to explore their presence during the United States’ response to COVID-19. In the following section, we define vertical collaboration and explore the vertical collaboration among different actors during the pandemic response in the U.S. Next, we define

horizontal collaboration and demonstrate several examples of how different sectors within the U.S. collaborated horizontally to respond to COVID-19. Then, we discuss why such collaborations have not contributed much to the current pandemic response in the U.S. and provide evidence from practice to support our arguments. Lastly, we conclude this commentary with some recommendations for improving the efficacy of both vertical and horizontal collaborations during the management of the current pandemic as well as future public health emergencies.

VERTICAL COLLABORATION

We define vertical or hierarchical collaboration as multi-interconnections among different levels of government hierarchy (Rubado, 2019). According to the federalism system of governance in the United States, there are three levels of government—federal, state, and local. This division reflects a pyramid structure based on resource reliance (Rubado, 2019). The collaboration among the three government levels sometimes includes negotiations regarding the allotment of resources or information depending on the nature of the circumstance. In most cases, when there is a crisis, local governments always look up to the state and federal governments for assistance because they are frontline responders, and as such, it is easy for their resources to get depleted first (Jung & Song, 2015). Unfortunately, for the local and state governments, the federal government was too slow to take the lead in responding to the global health pandemic when the World Health Organization (WHO) first declared it a global pandemic (Xu & Basu, 2020). Hence, local and state governments had to step up initially by themselves to respond to COVID-19. For example, the State of Washington declared a state of emergency (on February 29, 2020) before the federal government did (on March 13, 2020) (Perper, Cranley, & Al-Arshani, 2020). Despite this late action, the federal government eventually realized that it is imperative to engage with both state and local governments to be able to respond effectively to the COVID-19 pandemic (Haffajee & Mello, 2020).

COLLABORATION BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS

After the federal government declared COVID-19 a public health emergency on March 13, 2020, to curtail the spread of the virus, all states had to comply with this declaration by the federal government (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2020). After this declaration, many federal agencies, such as the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and FEMA, along with Vice President Mike Pence, were put in charge of the emergency response by President Donald Trump. Vertical collaboration between the federal and state governments enables the states to acquire and allocate essential resources, such as personal protective equipment, and avail themselves with CDC-provided knowledge and training on emergency protocols regarding the virus so as to ensure public safety and well-being of the community.

There are myriad examples of vertical collaboration between the federal government and state governments. For example, the federal government sent United States Army Urban Augmentation Medical Task Forces to the State of Texas at the behest of Governor Greg Abbott, to help respond to COVID-19 (Office of the Texas Governor, 2020). In addition, the federal government has collaborated with state health departments and hospitals to respond to COVID-19 by conducting contact tracing, disease surveillance, and testing (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2020). Furthermore, the federal government has released $2 trillion in aid relief under the CARES ACT to support states and local governments as well as families and individuals. This funding that state governments received from the federal government will enable small businesses and frontline service providers like hospitals to sustain themselves during the pandemic. The funds will also allow testing to be more available to residents and empower the states to continue to meet the needs of the residents and do more testing to stop the spread of COVID-19 (United States Department of Treasury, 2020).

COLLABORATION BETWEEN FEDERAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

This pandemic is an opportunity for federal and local governments to collaborate and to build a stronger relationship (Haffajee & Mello, 2020), especially at a time when local governments are experiencing a significant decline in revenues due to COVID-19 (Lucia, 2020). For example, a recent survey conducted by the National League of Cities found that on average, cities expect a 13 percent reduction in their 2021 general fund revenues compared to 2020 (Lucia, 2020). The federal government has the potential to build the capacity of local governments to enable them to produce better outcomes, such as an effective response to the pandemic by providing funding and access to the resources that they need to be resilient—the ability of communities to bounce back from a crisis—during the current pandemic (Rubado, 2019).

During COVID-19, the federal government has been providing guidelines to local governments to implement and follow. For instance, the CDC issued guidelines for the opening of schools, disinfection and hygiene amid the pandemic to ensure the health and safety of citizens, but local governments still have to develop their plans to ensure an effective response (CDC, 2020). In addition, the CDC and the Department of Housing and Urban Development have issued guidelines for the homeless since they are at risk for COVID-19. Local governments must follow these guidelines to ensure the health and safety of the homeless community (Benavides & Nukpezah, 2020). Furthermore, the federal government has distributed COVID-19 unemployment benefits to help low-income households secure their lifestyles, especially housing and food, while also trying to keep local businesses from closing down (Benfer, 2020). As the pandemic continues to manifest itself at the local level, local governments are the frontline responders coordinating emergency assistance and providing the necessary medical equipment and resources their citizens need to cope with the pandemic. Local governments can do this successfully because of the support they receive from the federal government and their extensive experience in responding to disasters.



COLLABORATION BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Residents are mostly in direct contact with the state and local governments rather than the federal government because most of the services are provided by these lower levels of government (White House, n.d.). State governments, and especially local governments, have experience responding to different natural and man-made disasters. Vertical collaboration between state and local governments can increase the likelihood of success in responding to COVID-19 since both entities understand the needs of their communities and how to reach out to them to meet those needs (Bowman & Parsons, 2009). This pandemic has caused a great deal of harm to state and local governments. For instance, COVID-19 has impacted their economies, depleted their budgets, and reduced their tax collections (Lucia, 2020). Similarly, New York counties, Los Angeles County, and Georgia local governments the state of North Carolina experienced a significant decline in sales tax receipts (Dzigbede, Gehl, & Willoughby, 2020).

It will be more difficult for local governments to meet their future needs as a result of the devastation caused by this pandemic (Dzigbede, Gehl, & Willoughby, 2020). Therefore, a vertical collaboration between state and local governments is needed now more than ever to alleviate the impacts of COVID-19 on local governments. There are many examples of such vertical collaborations between state and local governments during COVID-19. For example, the Governor of New York, Andrew Cuomo, collaborated with the Mayor of Savannah, Georgia to combat COVID-19 through the provision of expertise and resources (e.g., test kits and face coverings) (Evans, 2020). This and other similar vertical collaborations between state and local governments are necessary to ensure an effective response to COVID-19, especially if there is a second wave of the pandemic (OECD, 2020).

HORIZONTAL COLLABORATION

When agencies or entities at the same level engage in joint action, this is considered horizontal collaboration

(Jung & Song, 2015). According to Kapucu and Garayev (2012), horizontal collaboration provides immense benefits to the parties, such as better communication, a smoother exchange of resources, and quicker establishment of informal relationships. We focus on two types of horizontal collaboration. The first is interlocal and the second is intersectoral (Jung & Song, 2015). Interlocal collaboration entails interaction between two or more governments at the same level. In the context of the federalism structure in the United States, horizontal collaboration can be implemented as joint actions between two or more local governments, or between two or more state governments, or between the U.S. government and other nations. Intersectoral collaboration entails interaction between entities from different sectors. For example, a state government might collaborate with nonprofit organizations, private entities, etc. In this commentary, we discuss examples of both types of horizontal collaboration during the United States’ response to COVID-19.

Interlocal CollaborationThere are myriad examples of local governments collaborating to respond to COVID-19. One example of such collaboration is that between the Cities of Cape Coral and Mount Dora, Florida, to host virtual 5K races for their residents (Florida League of Cities [FLC], 2020). The races were organized to help their residents improve their health and wellness during the COVID-19 pandemic.

States governments, too, are working together to respond to the challenges posed by COVID-19. For example, the governors of seven states—Maryland, Massachusetts, Louisiana, North Carolina, Virginia, Michigan, Ohio—are collaborating to purchase 500,000 rapid-result COVID-19 tests worth $3.5 million from a private company (Queram, 2020).

Due to the unprecedented nature of COVID-19, national governments are reaching out to one another to share information and resources to combat COVID-19. This is no surprise as similar collaborations have been successful in addressing challenges, such as the Ebola virus or smallpox (Kituyi, 2020). For example, the



United States has provided $2.4 billion to support other countries in the fight against COVID-19 (Ingram, 2020).

Intersectoral CollaborationIn this section, we will focus on the intersectoral collaboration between each of the three levels of government and the private and nonprofit sectors. Local governments have the least amounts of discretionary resources relative to state and federal governments. This is why they need to collaborate with private and nonprofit organizations to respond to COVID-19. The City of Miami Beach collaborated with a private clinic to offer in-home testing for senior residents (FLC, 2020). Similarly, the Cities of Oakland Park, Fort Lauderdale, and Wilton Manors, Florida collaborated with a nonprofit, Feeding South Florida, to organize food distribution events for their residents (FLC, 2020).

States are working with private and nonprofit organizations on myriad fronts to address the extraordinary challenges posed by COVID-19. For example, the Governor of California, Gavin Newsom collaborated with Apple and Tesla to manufacture medical masks and ventilators, respectively (Bollag, 2020). In addition, Governor Newsom collaborated with local nonprofits to establish a Californians For All website, which will provide a platform for volunteers to sign up and support efforts to ameliorate the pandemic by donating blood and delivering meals, among other services (Koseff, 2020).

During the initial onset of COVID-19, there were significant shortages in medical equipment and supplies in the United States (Sadiq & Kessa, 2020). As a result, the federal government collaborated with the private sector to augment the manufacture of medical devices and supplies. Specifically, the federal government worked with Ford Motor Company and GM to increase their production of medical equipment and supplies (Sadiq & Kessa, 2020). In addition, the federal government, through the Food and Drug Administration, is collaborating with the American Red Cross to collect convalescent plasma as a potential treatment for COVID-19 patients (American

Red Cross, 2020).

Based on the above discussion, it is clear that the unique nature of COVID-19 has engendered a spirit of collaboration between the three governmental levels and the private and nonprofit sectors. Through cross-sector collaborations like those mentioned above, these entities can continue to build trust and strong relationships that will serve them well in future public health emergencies (Sadiq & Tyler, 2017).

WHY COLLABORATIONS HAVE NOT PRODUCED EXPECTED OUTCOMES IN THE U.S.

Fragmentation across collaborations may be a plausible cause of the inefficacy of current collaborations to fight COVID-19 in the U.S. despite the myriad examples in practice (Ollove, 2020). For effective emergency or crisis management, integrative and systematic co-production among whole community actors is imperative (Yeo & Lee, 2020). Given the large-scale and complex characteristics of problems created by COVID-19, the U.S. may need a more integrative and coordinated response system operating at the meta-level, which can leverage the capacities and resources of individual collaboration units (Comfort, Yeo, & Scheinert, 2019; Yeo & Comfort, 2017). However, observed collaborations have been highly segmented. The efforts of each collaboration unit often remain within certain areas rather than being shared across other collaboration units. The fragmentation may cause a concentration of responses in some areas but a lack of responses in other areas. Therefore, we argue that fragmentation and disconnection across existing collaborations may be why some vertical and horizontal collaborations work better than others, and why the presence of collaborations did not lead to the expected results nationwide. But what has been leading to such fragmentation? Many conditions are necessary for effective collaboration across all segments of society in managing emergencies and crises. We discuss the most relevant to the U.S. case and provide some pieces of evidence from the current pandemic response in the U.S. to support our arguments.



Weak CommunicationGood communication across all participants is an essential condition for effective collaboration (Comfort, 2007; Comfort, Yeo, & Scheinert, 2019; Dolinskaya et al., 2011; Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010). Communication can be defined as “the process of understanding and sharing meaning” (Pearson & Nelson, 2000). Amid COVID-19, there were myriad examples of bad communication in the form of mixed messages from some state governors to their respective local officials, which contributed to the ineffective response (Benton, 2020). For example, Governor Ron DeSantis of Florida issued a statewide stay-at-home order, and a day later the Governor issued another order that undermines the restrictions put in place by local governments to curtail the spread of the virus (Contorno, 2020). The Governor then said that the second order—“supersede any conflicting official action or order issued by local officials in response to COVID-19”—does not go against the local government COVID-19 restrictions, thus causing more confusion (Contorno, 2020).

Weak CoordinationCoordination of tasks is critical for effective collaboration (Nolte & Boenigk, 2013). Coordination is making sure all stakeholders are working towards a common goal through the integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, and communication to support incident response (Sadiq & Tyler, 2017). The response to COVID-19 at the federal level was not well coordinated, which led to disjointed and different responses at the state level (Ollove, 2020). For example, some states issued lockdowns while others opened their economies even when COVID-19 cases were on the rise (Ollove, 2020). The presence of weak coordination from the U.S. federal government also negatively impacted the response in other ways. For example, U.S. manufacturers shipped medical supplies, such as ventilators and respirators to foreign buyers who were already responding to the pandemic (Zhang, Mansfield, & Pulver, 2020). This decision contributed to the shortages of medical supplies in the U.S. and greatly undermined U.S. response to COVID-19 (Sadiq & Kessa, 2020).

Weak ControlAnother important condition for effective collaboration is control (Comfort, 2007). In a dynamic environment created by COVID-19, it is imperative to have and maintain control. Control is “the capacity to keep actions focused on the shared goal of protecting lives, property, and maintaining continuity of operations” (Comfort, 2007, p. 195). In the case of the U.S, there was no shared goal in terms of protecting lives. For example, the federal government and some Republican state governors (e.g., Governor Ron DeSantis) were more concerned about opening up the economy, while some Democratic state governors (Governor Andrew Cuomo) were in favor of reducing the spread of the virus.

Weak CognitionIt is important to make sure those responding to the pandemic have cognition for the collaboration to be effective (Comfort, 2007). Cognition entails having a good understanding of the risk posed by COVID-19 to the community and acting on the information (Comfort, 2007; Lee et al., 2020). Amid COVID-19, there was no clear understanding of the risk posed by the virus, and there was a lack of agreement between the national and state leaders and public health officials regarding the role of science in decision making (Xu & Basu, 2020). For example, the U.S. President and some other state governors did not respect the views of public health officials who have a good understanding of COVID-19. In some instances, they even contradicted public health officials on the treatment for COVID-19, thus leading to an ineffective response to COVID-19 (Xu & Basu, 2020). For instance, the U.S. President consistently advertised hydroxychloroquine as an effective treatment for COVID-19 at the same time as public health experts debunked the claim of the President (Hetherington & Ladd, 2020). Also, the delay in COVID-19 data collection and reporting by the states undermined cognition of the virus. Normally, U.S states are supposed to collect COVID-19 data and send them to the CDC, but instead, states sent the data to their health departments and local communities before sending the data to the CDC (Xu & Basu, 2020). This delay in COVID-19 data collection and reporting contributed to the ineffective response by



the U.S. (Xu & Basu, 2020).

Weak Trust Trust is a critical condition for effective collaboration (Kapucu, Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010; Sadiq, Tharp, & Graham, 2016). Trust can be defined as “the extent to which a person is confident in, and willing to act on the basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another” McAllister (1995, p.25). During COVID-19, trust among different levels of governments has been on the decline. The absence of trust has led to an unprecedented level of friction between the U.S. federal government and the other levels of government in comparison to other countries (Kettl, 2020). Moreover, the relationship between the U.S. federal government and the state government has been chaotic, especially at the outset of the pandemic. For example, the U.S. federal government competed with state governments on the procurement of medical equipment and devices, thus driving up prices (NBC News, 2020). The absence of trust has, indeed, undermined the U.S. response to COVID-19.

CONCLUSION

This commentary applies insights from the collaboration literature to the current pandemic response in the U.S. to highlight the importance of collaboration. We provide ample examples of both vertical and horizontal collaborations in multiple domains of the pandemic response in the U.S. We also point out the inefficacy of observed collaborations in producing expected results. We identify fragmentation across collaboration units as a plausible cause of the current inefficacy of collaborations in the pandemic response nationwide and discuss possible factors of such fragmentation across the collaborations.

We still argue for the importance of vertical and horizontal collaboration, as they were evident in notable cases of combatting COVID-19 in many parts of the world (see, for example, Yeo & Lee, 2020). Collaboration still plays a significant role in pandemic management in the U.S. despite the increasing number of new confirmed cases or deaths. A significant amount of information and resources have been shared through

both formal and informal channels within the vertical and horizontal collaborations. Besides, collaborative efforts have been made to improve the situation. Yet, more integrative efforts across both vertical and horizontal collaborations are necessary for the U.S. to be more effective in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic and future public health emergencies.

Therefore, we recommend that careful and deliberate attention should be paid to creating a conducive environment that would facilitate collaboration across vertical and horizontal collaborations. For example, carrying out joint pandemic preparedness exercises can help to share cognition and responsibilities across discrete collaboration units before the outbreak of a pandemic. On the flip side, conditions that could potentially impede or distract coordination across collaboration units, such as framing of political issues, needs to be discouraged. It is also important to establish some institutional arrangements that support the unity of commands and controls for managing diverse perspectives and interests that may cause conflicts or confusion. The success of these implications depends on open communication and transparent information sharing across all participants (Comfort 2007; Lee et al., 2020). Similarly, mutual respect has to be ensured during communication, and reciprocity should follow information sharing. All these ideas may contribute to trust-building that would facilitate integrative efforts across vertical and horizontal collaborations, and hence improve the efficacy of collaboration at the collective-level, resulting in expected pandemic response outcomes.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Ruthnande Kessa is a Ph.D. student in the Public Affairs Ph.D. Program at the University of Central Florida. Her research interests include public procurement, public-nonprofit partnerships, emergency management and crisis and cross government collaboration. E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Abdul-Akeem Sadiq is an associate professor in the School of Public Administration at the University of Central Florida. He is also the Director of the Master of Public Administration and Master of Public Policy. His research focuses on community flood risk management, organizational disaster preparedness,



mass fatality management, and collaborative governance. Dr. Sadiq has published over 40 peer-reviewed articles and several book chapters. His publications have been featured in several top journals including Ecological Economics, Risk Analysis, Public Administration Review, Natural Hazards Review, and Natural Hazards. His teaching interests include public administration, emergency management, homeland security, and public policy. E-mail: [email protected]

Jungwon Yeo, Ph.D. is an assistant professor of emergency and crisis management and public administration in the school of public administration at the University of Central Florida. Her primary research interests include behaviors, inter-organizational collective action, and decision making in times of crisis and in normal times. Her work has appeared in The American Review of Public Administration, International Journal of Public Administration, Natural Hazards Review, Safety Science, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, and so on. She is a recipient of 2019 Emerald Literati Awards of Excellence, outstanding paper of all published pieces in Online Information Review in 2018. E-mail: [email protected]




Campaign-Style Paired Assistance: The Chinese Experience in Fighting the COVID-19 Pandemic


To cope with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese government initiated a medical resource allocation and assistance mechanism that was characterized as a large-scale and regional mutual approach. Specifically, thirty provinces delivered medical resources (e.g., medical staff, medical supplies, and living materials) to “1+16” cities severely affected by the epidemic within a small amount of time, which solved the dilemma of medical collapse and governance “downtime” in epidemic areas, thereby changing the prevalence curve of the pandemic in China. “Campaign-style” targeted assistance can be interpreted based on the Chinese dual party-government model as well as the governance model of vertical accountability and horizontal competition, drawing from previous experience of normalized “designated assistance.” Consequently, paired assistance contributes to intergovernmental situations of decreasing divisibility and increasing cooperation. This study has the potential to bring insights to other countries around the world that are fighting the COVID-19 pandemic.

With the global prevalence of the highly infectious COVID-19 virus, an increasing number of countries are being hit hard

by the pandemic. The chief challenges were a surge in patients, extreme shortages of medical staff and supplies, and sharply increasing numbers of cases that exceed the public health services capacity. Due to a series of strict quarantine management measures in the epicenter of the pandemic, the resource supply capacity of governments and social organizations can rarely meet local medical, living and production demands. Hence, how to supply assistance quickly and effectively, thereby establishing a stable order for severely affected areas, has become a significant practical problem that most countries have confronted in this megacrisis (Lomborg, 2004; Comfort et al., 2012).

As the provincial capital of Hubei, Wuhan is a transportation hub with a population of over 10 million. During the early stage of the pandemic, more than 5 million people moved in and out of Wuhan due

to the Spring Festival travel rush (Chen et al, 2020). Data analysis results showed that the vast majority of confirmed cases in various provinces of China were highly correlated with this population migration (Lai et al., 2020). Difficulty in diagnosis, an increasing number of infected medical staff and extreme shortages of medical resources resulted in the tragedy of severe cases as well as high death rates in Hubei Province and Wuhan city in the early stage of the pandemic (Huang et al., 2020). Despite its 61 large-scale and well-functioning comprehensive hospitals, Wuhan’s public health system was on the verge of collapse; in particular, as recently as February, more than 3,000 medical workers in Hubei Province were infected (NHCPRC 2020). The confirmed cases in Hubei Province accounted for 80.8% of those in the whole country (59.7% in Wuhan), and the death toll there accounted for 97.2% (83.3% in Wuhan) (see Figure 1).

Air, water, and land channels for arrivals in and departures from Wuhan were shut down on January

Address correspondence to Xinyu Tan at [email protected]. View this article at cpar.net


Keywords: COVID-19 Pandemic; Paired Assistance; Central-Local Relations of China; Hubei Province

Weixu Wu*, Xinyu Tan†, Qinzhi Jiang^

* Tsinghua University, China† East China University of Science and Technology, China^ Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China


23, when the pandemic was confirmed by the Central Medical Expert Group, following which Wuhan entered a 76-day lockdown. Other cities in Hubei Province also entered a quasi-lockdown state that lasted for approximately two months. Meanwhile, the Chinese government initiated its most massive medical deployment since 1949. From January 24th to March 1st, 29 provinces and the army dispatched 344 medical teams consisting of 42,322 medical staff, including 11,416 doctors and 28,679 nurses, as well as more than 15,000 specialists in severe medical infection, respiration, circulation, and anesthesia (NHCPRC, 2020). Of the medical teams working in the severely affected provinces, 90.9% of the volunteers (38,478) were from 29 provinces, which effectively alleviated the dilemma of medical resource exhaustion.

The government, hospitals, private enterprises, social organizations, and the general public were all involved in the process of assistance. Regarding the critical role of paired assistance in fighting COVID-19, this study aims to demonstrate the assistance model of resource coordination and regional mutuality, which are considered Chinese characteristics and can be interpreted based on the Chinese logic of governance.

PAIRED ASSISTANCE: NORMALIZED AND CAMPAIGN STYLE

Path Dependency of Paired AssistancePaired assistance refers to assistance through partnerships between different regions, industries, and even departments to support a certain region or industry by forming a cooperative exchange and supportive relationship (Zhong, 2013). The Chinese paired assistance mechanism can be traced back to the 1950s when it was first applied to mutual assistance between urban and rural areas. Gradually, paired assistance evolved into a normalized assistance mechanism that covered multiple areas (e.g., economic, education, health) in minority regions as well as poor areas. Paired assistance has been widely recognized and applied to the crisis management and disaster management fields; specifically, paired assistance can be applied to the process of recovery and reconstruction for areas that have just undergone major projects, severe natural disasters, and public health crises.

In summary, paired assistance relies on two vital approaches, normalized and campaign-style paired assistance, which are characterized by government-dominated multiparty and collaborative governance.

Figure 1. Epidemic Trend and Medical Assistance in Hubei Province

Source: NHCPRC (2020)

Wu, Tan, & Jiang • 73


As the essence of designated assistance, the normalized model has been adopted mostly by developed regions in the process of providing paired assistance (medical treatment, education, antipoverty resources, etc.) to poor areas. For example, the National Health Commission (NHCPRC) established “one-to-one” assistance contract relationships between 963 Class 3A comprehensive hospitals and 1,180 county-level hospitals in 834 poverty-stricken counties during 2016-2018, and these relationships were guaranteed by an evaluation and supervision mechanism (NHCPRC, 2019). In contrast, short-term, task-based campaign-style assistance has been widely adopted to cope with sudden events such as major natural disasters and public health crises. For instance, to accomplish post-disaster reconstruction after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, a targeted assistance mode of “one province to one county” was implemented in 19 provinces and lasted three years.

Paired Assistance: Wuhan and the Remaining 16 CitiesPaired assistance for Hubei Province was divided into two components, one of which was prioritized assistance from the central government as well as local provincial governments to Wuhan. The other

vital component was assistance from the remaining 16 cities in Hubei Province. Starting on February 6, the Chinese government initiated a “one province to one city” paired assistance mechanism, followed by two pairing schemes issued by the NHC from February 7 to February 10. Under these pairing schemes, 19 provinces were designated to undertake targeted assistance for the 16 other cities of Hubei Province outside Wuhan based on the epidemic class, human resource reserves, and medical resource gaps of the recipient cities (see Figure 2).

A set of necessary conditions were required to initiate (trigger the mechanism of) paired assistance to Hubei. In China’s national governance system, only the CPC Central Committee and the State Council have the power to initiate “one province to one city” paired assistance. First, this kind of short-term, large-scale, cross-province, and cross-ministry medical staffing and material resource mobilization must be authorized and coordinated by the central government. Neither a single province (such as Hubei) nor a single ministry (such as the NHC) has the power and resources to conduct large-scale paired assistance. Second, the premise of implementing medical paired assistance to the epidemic areas in Hubei Province was the lockdown

Figure 2. The Paired Assistance for Hubei Province



Figure 3. The Paired Assistance for Hubei Province

Figure 4. Epidemic Trend and Medical Assistance in Hubei Province

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

5-Feb

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19-Feb

26-Feb

4-Mar

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Source: NHCPRC (2020); Hubei Government (2020)

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throughout these areas and the quasi-lockdown of other areas of China. Regarding the suspension of the population mobility of approximately 60 million people in Hubei Province, only the central government could make such a political decision. Third, due to the high political and economic costs of the large-scale lockdown and material mobilization, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council initiated the lockdown and paired assistance to Hubei Province only after reaching a consensus on the severity of the novel coronavirus epidemic. The medical judgment on the nature of the virus and the assessment of the severity of the epidemic required a process of policy-making, and local governments in China mostly follow the logic of “making less trouble for the central government.” It is clear that local governments in Hubei Province were not quick enough in responding to the epidemic in the initial stage. Moreover, local governments are subject to “The Chinese Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases” when releasing information about an infectious disease.

The Chinese government implemented quasi-targeted emergency assistance before publishing the target list. A total of 165 medical teams consisting of 19,916 medical personnel from 30 provinces and the army arrived in Hubei before February. Of this personnel, 18,226 medical workers from 152 medical teams were assigned to hospitals in Wuhan, and 1,690 medical workers from 13 medical teams were assigned to 11 cities outside Wuhan, such as Huanggang, Xiaogan, and Ezhou. In the whole province, the proportion of medical assistance for 16 cities increased from 9% to 23% from February 10 to March 1. In total, 31,097 doctors were allocated to Wuhan, and 7,381 doctors were allocated to the other 16 cities (see Figure 3). The supporting doctors from other provinces worked side by side with local doctors in Hubei Province, showing a strong spirit of professionalism and sacrifice and restraining the spread of the local epidemic throughout the whole country since Wuhan was the primary epidemic-stricken area. In addition to the assistance of a large number of medical staff, a total of 1.767 million tons of epidemic prevention supplies and living materials, as well as 4.196 million tons of production materials (e.g., electric coal and fuel oil),

most of which were provided by other provinces (see Figure 4), were delivered to Hubei from January 27 to June 4. After the accomplishment of the medical aid mission, medical assistance teams left Hubei Province from March 17 to April 15.

So far, the NHCPRC has not disclosed the details of how it matched each province/city with each city/county for the paired assistance to Hubei Province. However, the following characteristics could be identified from the observation of the paired assistance operations in February and March.

First, the unified deployment of medical manpower and material resources was planned. Wuhan city had the largest patient scale and was the first and foremost city that needed assistance. Military medical teams from 30 provinces and major medical supplies were provided to assist Wuhan.

Second, the NHC comprehensively considered the medical resources and epidemic situation of each province and aimed to achieve a regional balance. For example, Beijing, Shanghai, and Sichuan, which have abundant medical resources, not only dispatched medical teams to Hubei, but also retained additional medical forces in the province to be used as a regional reserve. Beijing and Shanghai also had to cope with the large-scale quarantine pressure of the entry population.

Third, among the 16 severely affected Hubei cities other than Wuhan, most received paired assistance from two provinces. For example, Chongqing and Heilongjiang Provinces provided paired assistance to Xiaogan (the second most severely affected city), Shandong and Hunan to Huanggang (the third most severely affected city), Guangdong and Hainan to Jingzhou (the fifth most severely affected city), Liaoning and Ningxia to Xiangyang (the sixth most severely affected city), and Inner Mongolia and Zhejiang to Jingmen (the ninth most severely affected city). Most Hubei cities received “one province to one city” paired assistance. For instance, Jiangxi provided paired assistance to Suizhou (the fourth most severely affected city), Jiangsu to Huangshi, Fujian to Yichang,





Guizhou to Ezhou, Yunnan to Xianning, Guangxi to Shiyan, Tianjin to Enshi, Hebei to Shennongjia, and Shanxi to Xiantao, Tianmen, and Qianjiang, three small cities that are geographically adjacent.

A CHESSBOARD: INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION IN PAIRED ASSISTANCE

Vertical Bureaucratic Control and Horizontal Intergovernmental Cooperation The targeted assistance provided to Hubei Province by other provinces involved the short-term, large-scale, transregional mobilization of national resources. Consequently, on the one hand, positive responses of local governments to vertical commands from the central government were indispensable. On the other hand, a horizontal collaboration between local governments, which might normally relate to one another under peer competitive logic, was of equal importance.

First, the Chinese central government established a coordination mechanism based on a series of strong decision-making commands. Aiming to exercise a unified command over the country’s pandemic prevention and control, the Leading Group of the CPC Central Committee for Novel Coronavirus Prevention and Control, headed by the premier, was set up on January 25. Covering almost all central ministries and commissions, the leading group had extensive power to issue a series of joint prevention and control measures that involved every ministry and

commission. Moreover, inspectors from the Central Discipline Inspection Commission as well as central steering groups were dispatched to the provinces for investigation and supervision. Most significantly, serving as the head of the central steering groups, a deputy prime minister of the State Council took charge of frontline supervision and displayed the role of director and coordinator in paired assistance.

Second, the anti-pandemic leading group gradually accomplished its political assignments and anti-pandemic tasks based on administrative contracts. Drawing from the one-party government structure of Chinese central and local governments, all levels of government established anti-pandemic leading groups to respond to the central executive orders (Li 2015); therefore, the isomorphic responsibility from the horizontal and vertical one-party government organization enhanced the functional foundation of paired assistance (see Figure 5).

Third, relying on the Chinese public health network, which was activated by vertical subordination and horizontal management mechanisms, paired assistance was fulfilled in the bar-block (vertical-horizontal) authority system (Zhu & Zhao, 2018). For instance, public hospitals and centers for disease control and prevention, as well as territorial governments, were responsible for vertical health commissions. When the epidemic entered an emergency state, the divisibility of the vertical and horizontal axes decreased, while cooperation across regional levels strengthened. For example, the provinces could fulfill the requirements of targeted assistance by delivering medical materials and rapidly establishing interprovincial assistance relationships under the guidance of the public health network of the health commission.

Assistance Model: An Innovative Approach to Addressing Governance DowntimeBased on two-dimensional criteria (i.e., region and hierarchy), rescue supplies were effectively dispatched and distributed. Due to the spread and quarantine measures of the COVID-19 pandemic, governments and social organizations located in

Figure 5. Structure of Actors in Paired Assistance

severely affected areas were twice confronted with governance “downtime.” Congestion situations related to personnel, information, and supplies occurred as a result of a large amount of external assistance being poured through the top-down unified distribution method of the bureaucracy. For example, in the early phase of the pandemic, aiming to avoid becoming stuck in the coordinated warehouse allocation process (Qian, 2020), most hospitals in Wuhan turned directly to society for medical supplies, bypassing the higher-level administration. Specifically, local governments obtained discretion beyond the top-down resource allocation in the process of paired assistance, thereby bypassing governance downtime and enabling supporters to communicate directly with recipients (Zhang & Xu, 2020). Accurately identifying the assistance demand of the targeted cities, the supporting provinces delivered doctors, medical teams, and materials directly to the target hospitals, which alleviated the problems of information overlap and asymmetry.

The implementation of assistance provision was enhanced under the leadership of senior officials (Stazyk & Goerdel, 2011). The higher the official level in the Chinese bureaucracy, the more resources could be mobilized, as was shown in the frontline command process of the vice-premier of the State Council. Similarly, the provinces dispatched high-level officials, who played the frontline coordination commander role, to the target cities together with the medical teams to ensure the availability of medical team assignments and materials in addition to medical teams and medical and living supplies. The execution efficiency of the de-layered organizational structure was significantly enhanced by this innovative approach.

Vertical Accountability and Horizontal CompetitionChina is a state that has a tradition of centralization. Activated by institutional rules of fiscal federalism with Chinese characteristics and the promotion of competition (Qian & Roland, 1998; Li & Zhou, 2005; Zhou, 2007), the government has constructed an accountability mechanism based on the vertical

subcontract logic and an incentive system based on the horizontal competition logic (Wu, 2013; Zhong, 2018). Local governments are subject to both vertical accountability to higher levels of government in terms of personnel management and fiscal restraint (Jae, 2015), and horizontal accountability to local councils and the judicial system in terms of the budget and judicial review. Nonetheless, local governments have still obtained limited decentralization of accountability and ample space for independent behaviors in terms of local resource allocation owing to information asymmetry related to vertical accountability as well as the limitations of horizontal accountability under the integration of party and government (Yu & Gao, 2012; James et al., 2009).

On the one hand, vertical accountability of local governments to the central government has been greatly strengthened during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Chinese central government sent party and government leading officials at all levels to take command on the front line; those who failed to undertake such political assistance tasks were inevitably punished by their superiors, as in the appointment and removal of the top officials of Hubei and Wuhan. Potentially, personnel appointments could account for local officials’ loyalty and task execution (Edin, 2003). Consequently, central policymakers’ orders to fight COVID-19 could be rapidly implemented at all levels in terms of the dual-track of the party and government, as most local government officials are CPC members.

On the other hand, an underlying competition mechanism exists in different local governments throughout the whole process of paired assistance. Political pressure from superiors and the general public, along with a strong sense of morality, intensified horizontal intergovernmental competition, leading to approaches to implement efficient measures or deliberately increase workload so that governments could satisfy the requirements for assistance.

Furthermore, influenced by the collectivist cultural tradition of East Asia, local governments were in accord with superior governments in fighting COVID-19 instead of acting on an individual basis in



the horizontal competition. As noted previously, the rapid and massive concentration of medical teams and medical and living materials from other provinces to Hubei immediately followed instructions for assistance from the central government. Moreover, the production capacity of medical materials in China underwent a significant increase. As of April 7, the daily production capacity of disposable medical protective suits, medical N95 masks, and chloroquine phosphate had reached more than 1.5 million, 3.4 million, and 100,000, respectively (MIITPRC, 2020). Increasing production capacity in China could be regarded as a resource guarantee for paired support.

In contrast to the paired assistance for postdisaster reconstruction after the Sichuan earthquake in China, which lasted 1-3 years, this paired assistance for fighting COVID-19 was characterized by rapid entry and exit. In addition, the cost of the rescue supplies was covered by the supporting provinces, which could be interpreted as a horizontal fiscal transfer between governments, accompanied by short-term subsidies from the Chinese central government (NHSPRC, 2020). As far as the provinces were concerned, normalized and campaign-style paired assistance costs are controllable in the short term. For example, in 2008, the Chinese central government expressly stipulated that every province’s assistance budget for the postdisaster reconstruction of earthquake-stricken areas should be not less than 1% of the local fiscal revenue of the province in the previous year (GOSCPRC, 2008); thus, most of the supporting provinces retained more than 80% of their critical care forces to fight COVID-19 in their jurisdictions (Li, 2020).

CONCLUSION

In the official Chinese nationalist discourse system, fighting COVID-19 in Hubei was viewed as a defensive action that manifested national cohesion and promoted the Chinese national spirit. As the essence of reversing the spread of COVID-19 in Hubei, campaign-style paired assistance is similar to a short-term blood transfusion that aimed to buy the necessary time for Hubei to restore its hematopoiesis function.

The experience of Hubei revealed that the functional cooperation networks covering local areas under the overall command of the Chinese central government were critical to the pandemic emergency response. After all, whether the fight against the epidemic could succeed relied on the “short bar of a wooden barrel.”

Fundamentally, campaign-style paired assistance for Hubei depended on the unique system of government led by the CPC, followed by the high level of support from doctors, public employees, and the general public for assistance action in China. Can the experience of China in paired assistance be replicated? Due to the unique national conditions, China’s experience, although useful, is difficult to replicate.

First, in terms of the central government’s coordination, support, and enhancement of mutual assistance between local governments, despite differences regarding the epidemic situation, intergovernmental relations and emergency response systems in different countries that implement federal or unitary systems and democratic or non-democratic systems, the overall goal of pooling superior resources to assist severely affected areas is explicit (Schnall et al., 2017).

Second, it is obvious that paired assistance that responds to the epidemic on a large scale within a short period of time requires strong governmental capability. However, it is challenging to replicate or extend the Chinese anti-pandemic model in other countries, especially those organized with federal states (Zhong, 2018). The response measures of federal and state governments will inevitably be hampered by a lack of consistency and certainty (Knauer, 2020). Drawing on the historical experiences, federalism had successfully dealt with many kinds of crises, but leadership was indispensable. Polarized competition between political parties and weak leadership of the federal government would weaken the cooperation between the central government and the local government in epidemic prevention (Rozell & Wilcox, 2020).

In addition, short-term campaign-style paired assistance also has limits, including the unsustainability of supplying high levels of human and material input,



local differences in assistance demands, competition arising from excessive assistance, and unequal distribution of assistance among recipients. Therefore, functionally designated assistance with a lower assistance intensity and a focus on education, health care, anti-poverty efforts, and other issues could remain sustainable and normalized.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Weixu Wu is assistant professor in School of Public Policy and Management School at Tsinghua University. His research focuses on comparative political economy and regional economics, the Taiwan issue. Email: [email protected].

Xinyu Tan is assistant professor in School of Social and Public Administration at East China University of Science and Technology. His research focuses on organizational behavior and human resource management in Chinese public sectors. He is the corresponding author of this article. Email: [email protected].

Qinzhi Jiang is a doctoral student in School of International and Public Affairs at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. His research focuses on public policy andcomparative politics. Email: [email protected].



Communication for Coproduction: The Informational Role of Nonprofit Organizations Huafang LiGrand Valley State University, USA


Governments and citizens need to coproduce a better response to the coronavirus pandemic. However, the unavailability and inaccessibility of essential information, the information asymmetry between governments and citizens, the misinformation, and the information overload all influence coproduction adversely. NPOs worldwide are making useful information available and accessible to governments and citizens, serving as information intermediaries to reduce the degree of information asymmetry, increasing information credibility to lighten the information overload, and clarifying misinformation. All these informational roles of NPOs are valuable to governments and citizens for fighting against the coronavirus and coproducing better health outcomes.

INTRODUCTION

To fight against the coronavirus and coproduce better health outcomes, governments and citizens need to work together. The WHO

(2020) advises the public to wash hands often, wear masks, maintain social distance (six feet), and stay at home if necessary to fight the coronavirus more effectively. All these useful methods to contain the spread of the coronavirus cannot be effective without citizen coproduction (Li, 2020b).

The coronavirus pandemic is not only a virus pandemic but also an infodemic (Chen & Liu, 2020). Ideally, if the information is available, accessible, and symmetric between the public and governments, and the public trusts governments, citizens would comply with governments’ policies to coproduce better responses to fighting the coronavirus. However, in reality, essential information is not always available and accessible; governments and individuals cannot make optimal decisions to fight the coronavirus. Information asymmetry also exists between citizens and governments. Governments do not always know the citizens’ different information preferences and needs. Therefore, governments cannot design an

optimal communication strategy to satisfy citizens’ heterogeneous information needs. Ineffective communication could influence the coproduction of better public health outcomes adversely (Li, 2020a; Palumbo, 2016). The information asymmetry issue further lowers the already low public trust in government (Alon-Barkat, 2020; Frank & Salkever, 1994). The declining public trust in government, therefore, worsens the fight against the coronavirus (Fukuyama, 2020).

How can essential information on effectively responding to the coronavirus be made available and accessible? How can governments effectively communicate with citizens, regain their trust, and motivate them to coproduce better responses to win the war against the coronavirus? Governments themselves alone may not be the answer. Table 1 summarizes various levels of information credibility and trust across different sectors. In general, government disease control agencies retain authoritative virus information, which has a high level of credibility. However, distrust in governments worldwide limits the use of such authoritative information. The private sector cannot help increase the levels of information credibility and trust because of the public perception

Address correspondence to Huafang Li at [email protected]. View this article at cpar.net


Keywords: coproduction, nonprofit organization, informational role, information preference, information credibility


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of businesses’ profit-maximizing nature. Nonprofit organizations (NPOs) are perceived as credible and trustworthy because of their non-distribution of profits constraints and social missions, which are not in the line of maximizing profits (Hansmann, 1980).

Table 1. Information Credibility and Trust across Sectors

Credibility TrustGovernment Authoritative LowBusiness Uncertain LowNonprofit Credible HighGovernment + Nonprofit

Credible authoritative High

Therefore, NPOs can help provide essential information and help governments to improve communication efficiency, public trust, and coproduction performance by serving as credible information intermediaries (Li, 2020b; Tsai et al., 2020).

INCREASING INFORMATION AVAILABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY

To fight the coronavirus pandemic, governments and citizens also need to fight the infodemic together (Chen & Liu, 2020). The unavailability and inaccessibility of essential information, the information asymmetry between governments and citizens, the misinformation, and the information overload all worsen the infodemic. In addition to their various roles in improving the performance of health crisis management, such as providing funds and services, the informational role of NPOs can help fight the infodemic and thus fight the coronavirus pandemic more effectively.

First, NPOs can make essential useful information available and accessible to the public. When essential information about the coronavirus is not available and accessible, both governments and citizens cannot make deliberative decisions to contain the spread of the virus and save lives. For example, at the early stage of the coronavirus pandemic, even the very necessary information about confirmed cases and death rates

that are essential to government policy-making and individual decisions was not available. It was difficult for any country to decide to close its borders. It was also difficult for countries to collaborate to fight the coronavirus. Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (2020), a nonprofit research center, is among the first to provide such essential information and made it easy to access. It created an interactive map showing real-time coronavirus information around the world (Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, n.d.). Its data soon became one of the most widely used data sources and are still helping organizations and individuals to make decisions on containing and fighting the coronavirus (Dong et al., 2020).

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) in the United States serves as another example of providing essential information to fight the coronavirus. NVOAD is an organization that coordinates a group of NPOs to better respond to natural disasters and other public crises (NVOAD, n.d.-b). During the coronavirus pandemic, NPOs in the U.S. need to know where their charitable resources can be most effectively used. For example, they need to know where to find information on how many sets of personal protective equipment (PPE) should be donated to which hospital. NVOAD serves as an information platform that makes the demand and supply information available and accessible and coordinates resources to be sent to the front line. To fight the coronavirus, NVOAD also used the Disaster Agency Response Technology (DART) to gather and distribute information about volunteers to help match them with the places that need them most (NVOAD, n.d.-a).

Another example is the “Global MediXchange for Combating COVID-19 (GMCC)”, a collective initiative launched by the Mayun Foundation, Alibaba Foundation, and The First Affiliated Hospital of College of Medicine, Zhejiang University in China (GMCC, 2020). The GMSS publishes various COVID-19 related manuals (gmcc.alibabadoctor.com/prevention-manual) in eight different languages. For example, the GMCC published and distributed the Handbook of COVID-19 Prevention and Treatment


to 219 countries and districts to help fight the virus (GMCC, 2020). GMCC significantly increases the availability and accessibility of critical information about COVID-19 prevention and treatment.

SERVING AS INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES

Second, NPOs as information intermediaries can reduce the degree of information asymmetry between governments and citizens. Making information symmetric can enhance public trust, which can improve the performance of citizens’ coproducing responses to comply with governments’ coronavirus control policies (Li, 2020b). If citizens’ information preferences are homogeneous, governments can use an optimal one-size-fits-all communication strategy to satisfy the information needs. However, citizens’ information preferences and needs vary. Some individuals need more information than others to make their decisions. Therefore, to fight the coronavirus infodemic, governments need to understand different citizens’ heterogeneous information preferences. Based on the theory of System 1 and System 2 thinking (Kahneman, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), Li (2020a) categorized individuals with different information preferences into Type I and Type II citizens. System 1 uses fast intuitive thinking based on a limited amount of information, even though more information is available and accessible. System 2 requires more information to make a slow and rational decision. Type I citizens mainly use System 1 to make decisions and seek less information that can be consumed with lower material and cognitive costs, while Type II citizens primely use System 2 when making decisions and seeking more information that requires higher material and cognitive costs (Li, 2017, 2020a, 2020b).

Governments need to strategically communicate with different types of citizens to satisfy their information needs. In general, the availability of essential information will satisfy Type II individuals’ needs because they will actively acquire and consume additional information bearing their own costs. Even if governments did not provide such information,

Type II citizens might still be able to find and consume information on the coronavirus from scientific outlets and then take precautions, such as voluntary self-quarantine. However, governments should provide and communicate essential information to Type I citizens to nudge their compliance with policies for fighting the coronavirus. Essential information is sufficient for the Type I individuals because they do not need additional information to make their policy compliance decisions.

However, Type I citizens are less likely to comply with the policies if they distrust governments. When the public distrusts governments, NPOs or voluntary groups can serve as credible information intermediaries that could further help governments to increase Type I citizens’ compliance rates. For example, NVOAD uses its existing network to help distribute credible information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). NVOAD also uses CDC guidelines to train volunteers who further disseminate credible information to the communities they serve (NVOAD, n.d.-b).

In China, volunteers established a group called Anti-2019-nCoV (A2N) to help the Chinese government to distribute credible information for fighting the coronavirus (A2N, 2020; Woo, 2020). A2N introduces itself as a voluntary group that is dedicated to communicating real and valuable information. It aims at helping people to understand the real situations of the coronavirus and thus helping them to better fight the virus (A2N, 2020). Nonprofit organizations in Zhejiang Province, China, also served as information intermediaries to increase information credibility and build mutual trust between residents and local governments. For example, community-based organizations in Zhejiang collected and tracked COVID-19 information through health QR codes and connected and mobilized residents to trace the sources of COVID-19 cases and contain the spread of the virus (Cheng et al., 2020). Cheng and colleagues (2020) also suggested that community-based organizations work together with governments to prevent and control COVID-19.

Communication for Coproduction: The Informational Role of Nonprofit Organizations



Li • 85

INCREASING INFORMATION CREDIBILITY

NPOs also play an important role in increasing information credibility that can lighten the information overload and clarify misinformation. The coronavirus pandemic is also a pandemic of misinformation. Fake news, conspiracy theories, rumors, and misinformation about the virus are overwhelming in the midst of battling this global health emergency. Health authorities have warned that information overload can make it more difficult for people to obtain credible sources and reliable guidance about the coronavirus pandemic (WHO, 2020). In the U.S., a Pew Research Center survey conducted in the second week of March 2020 found that 48 percent of Americans reported seeing at least some made-up news about the coronavirus outbreak. Three months later, the Pew Research Center found that many people are seeing exaggeration and conspiracy theories. Thirty-eight percent of Americans believed that the coronavirus outbreak had been exaggerated. 71% of Americans reported that they had heard at least “a little” about a conspiracy theory that the coronavirus outbreak was intentionally planned by powerful people, including 19% who had heard “a lot” about this (Mitchell et al., 2020).

In responding to the information overload and misinformation about the coronavirus pandemic, the U.S. National Council of Nonprofits (2020) announced, “first and foremost, we all need to keep open lines of communications with our boards, employees, volunteers, donors, and the people we serve. As part of that, we should continue to share information and resources from credible sources, such as the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.” The First Draft, a nonprofit that works to empower people with the knowledge, understanding, and tools needed to build resilience against harmful, false, and misleading information, is providing an online resource hub, dedicated training and crisis simulations for reporters covering COVID-19 all over the globe (First Draft, 2020). First Draft is also using its extensive CrossCheck, which is a network dedicated to building a sustainable model of newsroom collaboration, to help newsrooms respond

quickly and address escalating content that is causing confusion and harm. First Draft is empowering journalists to respond to the evolving challenges of digital journalism by working together during the pandemic because accurate and reliable information is needed more than ever before (Mantzarlis, 2020).

Misinformation worsens when a nation’s leader delivers confusing information. For example, after suggesting on April 24, 2020, that injecting disinfectants into human bodies would kill the coronavirus, the U.S. President Donald Trump claimed three days later that he was being sarcastic and is not taking responsibility for people ingesting disinfectants (O’Connor, 2020). Such irresponsibility from a leader is dangerous in a pandemic. President Trump further weakens the vulnerable trust in governments by criticizing the CDC and other administration agencies (Acemoglu, 2020; Fukuyama, 2020). The conflict between President Trump and the Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer leaves Trump supporters to discredit “the woman in Michigan” by opposing the Governor’s “stay-at-home” order and ignoring the information about social distancing and wearing masks (Gabriel & Martin, 2020). The political polarization is not helping restore the public’s trust (Fukuyama, 2020) and brings additional challenges to governments in coproducing with citizens to fight the coronavirus (Li, 2020b). However, voluntary associations can help clarify misinformation. For example, the Chinese Association of West Michigan (CAWM) provides reliable information from credible sources such as the CDC to help clarify misinformation and persuade the Chinese communities to comply with the policies in Michigan. The CAWM also utilizes its bilingual advantage to translate information written in English into Chinese to benefit those facing language barriers. In addition, its volunteers also translate information from credible sources written in Chinese to English to clarify misinformation (CAWM, 2020). By increasing information credibility, NPOs such as the First Draft and the CAWM helped and are continuing to help curb the spread of misinformation in tandem with the outbreak of the coronavirus.

CONCLUSION

To fight the coronavirus pandemic, which is also an infodemic, governments and citizens need to coproduce a better response together. However, the unavailability and inaccessibility of essential information, the information asymmetry between governments and citizens, the misinformation, and the information overload all influence the coproduction adversely. The declining public trust in governments worsens the fight against the coronavirus. NPOs all over the world are making useful information available and accessible to both the governmental and individual decision-makers, serving as information intermediaries to reduce the degree of information asymmetry, increasing information credibility to lighten the information overload, and to clarify misinformation. All these informational roles of NPOs are valuable to governments and citizens for fighting against the coronavirus and coproducing better health outcomes.

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Palumbo, R. (2016). Contextualizing co-production of health care: A systematic literature review. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 29(1), 72–90.

Tsai, L. L., Morse, B. S., & Blair, R. A. (2020). Building credibility and cooperation in low-trust settings: persuasion and source accountability in Liberia during the 2014–2015 Ebola crisis. Comparative Political Studies, 53(10-11), 1582-1618.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science, 185, 1124–1131.

WHO. (2020). Advice for public. https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-for-public

Woo, E. (2020). COVID-19 and Chinese Civil Society’s Response. Stanford Social Innovation Review. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/covid_19_and_chinese_civil_societys_response


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Book Review: Ekaterina V. Kudryashova, Legal Regulation of Strategic Planning in Public FinanceAnna Vladislavovna Shashkova*, Nicholas Martin†

* Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Russia† University of West London, United Kingdom



Since the end of the twentieth century, proper strategic planning in the public sector has particularly become the best practice of public

management around the world. Significant social changes and advances in technology inspired the new strategic approach and pushed the state and public institutions towards modern concepts of public governance. One of them is the concept of the strategic and enabling state. This is the state relying on the extensive interaction of different actors and feedback, rather than on imposing its ideas unilaterally and exercising strict control over each and every aspect of social life.

Supra-national institutions like the OECD, World Bank and the United Nations have issued recommendations for implementing good principles of strategic governance for different countries and have published detailed guidelines in this field.

With its strong traditions of planned economy traced back to Soviet times, Russia has come out with its own updated paradigm of strategic planning, taking it to the forefront of public management practice in the twenty first century. In 2014 Russia adopted a special Federal law N 172-FZ of 28.06.2014 “On strategic planning in Russian Federation” which has constituted a new development in social life. This law presents an advanced level of social and political consensus on the configuration of governance in Russia. The aspirations to build a system of strategic planning became, literally, a rule of law.

There is a wide and persistent academic discussion

on the problems of strategic planning in the social sciences. These debates are of a multidisciplinary nature, involving politics, sociology, management sciences and law. A number of new books on strategic vision have appeared recently and became best-sellers in the international academic space (Joyce, 2015; Bryson, 2018; Drumaux & Joyce, 2018). These books rely on the practices of countries all over the world building towards a contemporary approach to strategic management. The theory of strategic planning is crystallising currently from both historic and modern practices. Previous and current Russian studies in the field contribute substantially to this process. However, the topic of strategic planning in Russia is mostly discussed in individual articles rather than in collections of essays or books, although the problem certainly does deserve fundamental monographic research. In this sense the legal regulation of strategic planning in public finance has importance as fundamental research.

The study focuses specifically on legal problems. This scope is due to the fact that in Russia the political and social consensus on strategic planning has blossomed into legal regulation; indeed, this can be considered a particular feature of the Russian approach. Not many countries have a special conceptual legislative act on planning. Nonetheless, the monograph may still be described as multidisciplinary with a focus on legal aspects. In this respect the reviewed book follows the international tradition of studies in this field. The monograph is a sequel to previous publications and the author was already involved in multi-disciplinary and international essay collections (Kudryashova,

Legal Regulation of Strategic Planning in Public Finance (Pravovoe Regulirovanie Strategicheskogo Planirovaniia v Sfere Gosudarstvennykh Finansov) by Ekaterina V. Kudryashova, Moscow, RU: Institute Zakonodatelstva i Sravnitelnogo Pravovedeniia, 2019. Address correspondence to Anna Vladislavovna Shashkova at [email protected]. View this article online at cpar.net


2014); and this experience impacts the methodology and style of the book.

The research focuses on the legal aspects of planning in public finance. This limitation also resembles the genesis of modern public management concepts in Russia in the twenty first century. Here public finance was the engine in the progress of strategic planning implementation. Once performance budgeting was introduced in Russia, the documents on financial reform envisaged a special law on strategic planning. The special law was to be adopted as an important link to budgetary reform in Russia. Programs and performance budgeting were the initial steps and strategic planning itself began to institutionalise somewhat later. It could be expected that strategic planning would have preceded, but the public governance reality has its own logic (Shokhin & Kudryashova, 2019).

The monograph illuminates the achievements of social sciences on strategic planning. Social sciences by the end of the twentieth century presented strategic planning as the method of public management “from the future to the present”. It is important that in the strategic planning paradigm the future is not any more a better version of the past and present. The future can be totally different, and it can be neither better nor worse. It is one of the main characteristics of the strategic approach. The planning relies on prognoses and projections. The paradox of our epoch is that the projections and forecasts are much in demand as never before in the history, but their accuracy decreases drastically. All these social science outcomes are systematically analysed in the reviewed book as applied to the legal regulation.

The monograph states that the law has to find the appropriate means to reflect the strategic planning and explains its main features in the contemporary context. The rule of law needs to accommodate the goal-setting process and the cut-off horizon requirements. The horizon here means the limitation in terms of time, resources, risk, territory etc. The law should contain the horizon as a mandatory provision. Without that horizon all the legal norms about planning become

simply declarations, losing their legal substance.

The book argues that the law has to shape the due course of the goalsetting procedure. The Federal law on strategic planning sets out the two main goals for Russia: social-economic development and national security. These goals are supposed to be developed further in the strategic documents. Goalsetting and the cut-off horizon are the key elements of strategic planning legal regulation realised nowadays by means of a framework law according to the monograph.

Strategic planning is a recognised means and institution of political communication between the government and society and this aspect is mentioned in the book. Here, the reasoning of the monograph comes into the field of reviewers’ academic interest - the key issues of political inter-relations between the government and society including the key business actors. Certain points in the monograph related to the communications aspects enable us to start a deeper discussion.

As it appears from the author’s discourse, strategies and strategic plans have a great mobilising importance for society, especially once they become legal regulation. The plans present the picture of the future, they form rational expectations of economic agents and stimulate their economic activity in the direction desired by the government. This presents the communications functions of such plans in the economy. The mobilising function of such plans is commensurate with the level of public confidence in the state and the willingness of the main actors to follow the trajectory of the country’s leader and the government. This was postulated in one of the early empirical articles on public planning (Wood, 2000). Historical experience shows that any lack of trust between society and the government cripples the impact of even the best strategic planning. Depending on the level of confidence in government the economic entities either rely on the plans proposed by the state and thus put them into effect, or, expressing distrust, do not take into account state planning, thereby reducing the impact of the government plans.

Shashkova & Martin • 89


Some minor aspects are perhaps missing for a complete and cogent study of the reviewed research. Nowadays government and corporations are often closely inter-related. The state corporations are there realising the public interest. The state corporations are usually created under public law while keeping some features of private legal status. This duality in the status of state corporations, combining both public and private elements, permits the transmission of strategic goals to society in the most efficient way. State corporations are created primarily in the public interest, i.e., to provide public services and to perform significant, essentially public functions. The state corporations are usually created not in general or generically, but with specified goals focusing on important areas of the economy and social and business relations (Shashkova, 2019). Corporations of this type are vehicles for promoting economic development as well as the means for resolving social tensions.

The financial activity of the state within the corporate actors is transformed into the financial activity of the public entity thus the state indirectly proliferates into the financial system. State corporations perform their mission using public funds - decentralised public finance funds. Therefore, public corporations are actors of strategic planning in the field of public finance. They have a very special role, and it is closely related to implementation of the state’s strategies. The companies become conductors of the strategic goals in the society; and this fact cannot be discarded in the debates on public governance and strategic planning. It is worth mentioning that even restrictions or the withdrawal of funds in certain business areas can broadcast the strategies of the state. For instance, the state may determine the maximum share of foreign capital in certain corporations or a maximum participation in certain sectors of the economy. The choice of those limitations or business sectors depends on the strategic goals and preferences. France imposes certain limitations in agriculture, the UK in the financial services sector. Those are their priorities and strategically significant fields.

Another dimension of the enabling state and corporations’ interaction is that the strategies and goals

are sometimes elaborated by elected politicians but together with business leaders. So strategic planning is no longer confined to the public administration itself and the main business actors may be directly involved in the whole planning process.

Despite having a conceptual law on strategic planning, Russian legislation fails to reflect properly the role of state corporations, let alone the role of private business actors in interactive strategic processes. The special role of the state companies and other significant business actors in the strategic and enabling state needs to be clearly outlined in multi-disciplinary fundamental study, though this problem is not addressed in the reviewed book. Reasoning in this direction could lead the author to an important loophole in the legislation which needs to be tackled. The focus in the book on the doctrinal concept of strategic planning legal regulation may justify this omission from the study, but only partially.

Nevertheless, this critical remark about the role of business actors in strategic planning does not undermine the high level of the research. The critical point is rather an invitation to further discussion and research, than any hindrance to the high appreciation the book deserves.

Indeed, the book readily falls within any categorisation of top multidisciplinary studies and can be strongly recommended for both academics and practitioners in politics, sociology, and law. Given that the book has a great theoretical part, it covers a wider range of issues than just current issues of planning in Russian public finance. “Legal regulation of strategic planning in public finance” is a significant input to the study of the rule of law and strategic management interaction and a contribution to the modern theory of strategic planning.

“Legal regulation of strategic planning in public finance” meets the requirements of international academic research and needs to become accessible to the academic community. Centres for Slavic, East European or Eurasian studies are becoming integral to prominent universities all over the world. Their


Book Review: Ekaterina V. Kudryashova, Legal Regulation of Strategic Planning in Public Finance

Shashkova & Martin • 91


libraries, intended for academic focus groups, would be incomplete without this valuable acquisition.Although the book is in Russian, it should not, however, be reserved only for specialised collections. It belongs to the broader academic context when taking into account its inter-disciplinary and international findings. The author is not solely focused on Russian experience and illustrates her ideas with cases from different countries. Bearing in mind recent changes in the context worldwide this research on strategic planning is timely and relevant for international academic audiences. Globalisation has forced the world to shrink and become more open, so best practices are spreading very rapidly. There are therefore more and more common points for discussion between academics from different parts of the globe. As a result, the book will be an interesting work for the international community as well.

REFERENCES

Joyce, P. (2015) Strategic management in the Public Sector. New York, USA: Routledge.

Bryson, J. M. (2018) Strategic planning for public and nonprofit organizations: A guide to strengthening and sustaining organizational achievement (5th Ed.). London, UK: Wiley.

Drumaux, A., & Joyce, P. (2018) Strategic management for public governance in Europe. IIAS series: governance and public management. London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.

Kudryashova, E.V. (2014) State planning and budgeting in the Russian Federation. In Joyce, P., Bryson, J.M., & Holzer, M. (Eds.) Developments in strategic and public management (pp. 149-160). London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.

Kudryashova, E.V. (2019) Financial safety within hierarchy of strategic planning purposes of the Russian Federation Pravo. Zhurnal Vysshey shkoly ekonomiki, 2019(2), 124–138. https://doi.org/10.17323/2072-8166.2019.2.124.138

Shokhin, S. O., & Kudryashova, E. V. (2019). Macroeconomic coordination in the Eurasian Economic Union: strategic aspects. Russian Law Journal, 7(3). 38-52

Shokhin, S. O., & Kudryashova, E. V. (2020) The

dualistic model of strategic planning – Russian experience. In Proceedings of the 36th International Business Information Management Association (IBIMA), 2020.

Shashkova, A.V. (2019) Regulating principles of disclosure of information to shareholders in accordance with G20/OECD modified principles. In Proceedings of the 33rd International Business Information Management Association Conference, IBIMA 2019, 1931-1936.

Wood, S. (2000). Why ‘indicative planning’failed: British industry and the formation of the National Economic Development Council (1960–64). Twentieth Century British History, 11(4), 431-459.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Anna Vladislavovna Shashkova is a Professor of the International Law Department and a lecturer at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University). She is an Academic Supervisor of Executive MBA in MGIMO School of Business and International Proficiency. Since 1 September 2015 she is an Honorary Consul for St. Vincent and the Grenadines in Moscow. She is a practical lawyer and admitted to the Moscow Region Bar Association. She is also an author of 23 books on different aspects of Russian law and politics, co-author of 2 books on Russian Corporate & Business Law. She has numerous publications in Russian & foreign periodicals.

Nicholas Martin is Emeritus Professor at the University of West London, United Kingdom at their Claude Littner Business School. He is also an Emeritus Professor at China’s Hunan Normal University. He spent over ten years sitting on the University of Cambridge’s Audit Committee and involved in the University’s governance. He has degrees from the University of Cambridge and is a Barrister-at-Law of the Honourable Society of Gray’s Inn and a Chartered Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Securities and Investment. He has served on the Boards of multiple public sector organisations and has been involved and spoken frequently on topics relating to public enterprises/state corporations, in particular relating to privatisations and PPP.

New Trends in Open Government Information Research in ChinaWenxuan YuXiamen University, China


Although open government information (OGI) or government transparency is considered an essential component of good governance,

over half of existing OGI laws worldwide were enacted and enforced in the past 20 years. China enacted its open government information law, The Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information in 2007, despite the fact that it is a non-democratic and authoritarian regime. After its implementation in 2008, the Chinese central government has been supplementing and revising the law to further enhance transparency. Still, research on open government in China is scarce (but see Piotrowski, Zhang, Lin & Yu, 2009; Tan, 2014; Yu, 2011), despite the fact that this piece of legislation is quite important for the country’s administrative and political reforms. Since the policy’s passage, Chinese scholars have been actively promoting the idea and improving its implementation. However, the majority of the research on open government information is normative and prescriptive, with most empirical studies focusing on evaluating the performance of open government information among central and local governments or developing evaluation schemes to assess the practice. With few exceptions (Ma, 2012; Wu &Yu, 2017; Yu, 2013), there is a paucity of research that examines government transparency as the dependent or independent variable, with a particular lack of quantitative studies on the matter. In tandem with the fast development of public administration research in China, recently Chinese public administration scholars have begun to study OGI quantitatively using advanced and cutting-edge research methods and design. In 2019, organized by Professor Qiushi Wang of Sun Yat-sen University, Journal of Public Administration Review, a leading academic journal on public administration in China, published a group

of three articles on OGI in China. The three articles employ cutting-edge quantitative research methods and designs, such as quasi-experiment design, difference-in-difference models, propensity score matching, and spatial econometric model. These articles have interesting research questions, solid research designs, and findings with significant theoretical and practical implications. They represent the current quality of public administration research conducted in China and indicate the achievement Chinese academics have made in developing the field. It is a pity that these pieces of quality research are written in Chinese, which is not conveniently accessible to an international audience. Therefore, I take it upon myself to introduce these articles to a broader international audience. Not only do these articles illustrate the quality of research Chinese public administration scholars are conducting, they also contribute to the much broader international field of OGI research. In this article, I also include a quantitative article on OGI published in April 2020, which was published by a multi-disciplinary Chinese academic journal, Ecological Economy, and written by a public administration doctoral student. The reason why I include the article is not only because it is the latest quantitative academic article on the topic published, but also it demonstrates the quality training and research of future Chinese PA scholars.

In the following paper, first I summarize the four articles respectively. It should be noted that these are not verbatim translations, but rather I introduce these articles with my own interpretation and comments. I end with a closing discussion.

1. 刁伟涛,任占尚.(2019).公众参与能否促进地方债务信息的主动公开 — 一项准实验的实证研究,公共行政评论.2019(5),93-114.

Address correspondence to Wenxuan Yu at [email protected]. View this article at cpar.net



Weitao Diao & Zhanshang Ren. (2019). Can initiative disclosure of local government debt be promoted by public participation? — An Empirical Study Based on a Quasi-Experiment. Journal of Public Administration Review. 2019(5), 93-114.

Citizen participation is one of the core themes in public administration research. Scholars have widely studied the effects of citizen participation and its determinants. However, the actual and real effects of citizen participation on government reforms and policymaking are hard to be ascertained, mainly due to issues with the endogenous relationship between citizen participation and government reforms and their performance. In this article, the authors examine the effects of citizen participation on administrative reforms in the context of OGI. Their main research question is whether citizens’ request for local government debt information leads to more proactive government disclosure. Although this research question is interesting, it is very difficult to empirically test via traditional research methods, such as survey instruments or interviews, because of reverse causation. Specifically, citizens are more likely to file open government information requests in localities with more transparency. The author innovatively employs a quasi-experimental design to address the potential issue with endogeneity.

Inspired by James Ben-Aaron (2017), the authors filed open government information requests in December 2017 on local government debts to the randomly selected 170 county governments in the three provinces—Jiangsu, Shandong, and Zhejiang--thus securing 141 valid responses (an 82.9% response rate). Subsequently, in 2018, they conducted a national study to evaluate the performance of county government debt information disclosures. First, they employ a Difference in Difference (DID) analysis whereby they compare the 2017 and 2018 OGI performance of counties. By utilizing this quasi-experimental design and various robustness tests, they convincingly conclude that citizens’ open government requests significantly cause more proactive government information discourse. To further validate their findings, they further conduct a Propensity Score

Matching (PSM) analysis to compare the treatment groups (counties they filed requests to) to other similar counties in provinces other than the three provinces. Their hypotheses are supported and their findings are cross-validated.

2. 李晓芳,孟庆国,王友奎.(2019).绩效信息公开与政府响应 — 基于政府门户网站建设第三方评估数据的断点回归分析.公共行政评论,2019(5),115-214.Xiaofang Li, Qingguo Meng, & Youkui Wang. (2019). Performance information disclosure and government response: A RDD analysis based on the third party evaluation data of government portal. Journal of Public Administration Review. 2019(5), 115-214.

In this article, Li and his co-authors creatively capitalize on a quasi-natural experiment to empirically examine how openness of performance information affects government behavior and performance.

Chinese E-government is grounded in the government web portals of the mid-1990s. Beginning in 2002, a private consulting firm, Saidi Consulting Inc., started to publish its annual evaluation reports for central and local Chinese governments and their agencies in order to promote and improve the quality of government online portals that deliver public services and government information. The consulting firm evaluates and ranks its subjects, with public release of their findings every year. However, since 2013, the firm has not released all ranking information to the public, with only the top 100 rankings—the top performers— being published. The authors consider it a classic quasi-natural experiment scenario since the number 100 is arbitrary, and the termination of the full release of the rankings in 2013 is rather random. Utilizing a regression discontinuity design, the authors explore how these selective releases of performance information affect government behavior and performance. After a series of extensive models and robustness checks, the authors find that releasing performance information increases competition among those entities being evaluated. Those ranked among the top 100 perform differently than those


Yu • 93

not ranked in the top 100. Specifically, for those ranked in the top 100, their efforts to further improve their performance as measured by the designated performance indicators decreased, while those ranked below 100 paid much more attention to improving their measured performance.

Although third-party evaluations are prolific, it is relatively under-studied in public administration scholaarship, with few exceptions (e.g., Yu & Ma, 2015a, 2015b). To improve its traditional performance evaluation system, the Chinese government has been encouraging and promoting the idea in recent years, as more people belive that independent third-party evaluations would improve governmental responsiveness and accountability. Despite this being an area of research with promising theoretical and practical contributions, empirical articles remain rare. This article takes a small but important step in developing third-party-evaluation research for China specifically, but also for scholarship more broadly.

3. 刘金东,薛一帆,管星华.(2019).财政信息公开为何陷入“低水平陷阱”? — 基于地方标杆竞争视角的研究.公共行政评论,2019(5),75-92.Jindong Liu, Yifan Xue, & Xinghua Guan. (2019). Why does fiscal information disclosure fall into “low level trap”? —A perspective of benchmarking competition. Journal of Public Administration Review. 2019(5), 75-92.

Fiscal information discourse is a true test of the performance of open government information efforts in China (Wu & Yu, 2017). In this article, the authors aim to evaluate the performance of fiscal transparency among Chinse provincial governments. Utilizing the Public Policy Research Centre of Shanghai University of Economics and Finance’s panel dataset of Chinese provincial government transparency, the authors find that the degree of fiscal transparency within provinces fluctuates significantly from 2010 to 2018, while the overall level of fiscal transparency remains rather low and hardly improves across time. To explain these interesting phenomena, the authors posit that, due to various political and economic reasons, provinces are competing among each other. On one hand,

they want to be more fiscally transparent because the central government requests it (Reputation Hypothesis). On the other hand, they do not want to risk the potential damage fiscal transparency can cause (Risk Hypothesis). Therefore they try to compare and compete with their neighboring province(s) that maintain similar geographic and economic characteristics. By conducting an unsymmetrical spatial analysis, they find that their Risk Hypothesis is supported. Based on their findings, they recommend that the Chinese government design and revise relevant institutions and regulations to reduce the risk effect, thereby incentivizing local governments to enhance fiscal transparency.

4. 范亚西.(2020).信息公开、环境监管与环境治理绩效 — 来自中国城市的经验证据.生态经济,2020(4),193-199.Yaxi Fan. (2020). Information disclosure, environmental regulation, and environmental governance performance: Empirical evidence from Chinese cities. Ecological Economy, 36(4), 193-199.

Despite the fact that the Chinese government has won popular support due to stunning economic growth and improved quality of life, environmental pollution has become a serious threat to the Chinese ruling party’s legitimacy. Over years, the Chinese central government has been using environmental transparency as a tool to motivate and control local governments in the implementation of its stringent environmental regulations. In this article, the author tries to empirically test the effects of environmental transparency on the performance of environmental governance using air quality indicators. Using a hierarchical panel data set at both city and provincial levels, the author hypothesizes that environmental transparency can significantly reduce pollution and provincial level environmental monitoring, with controls moderating the effects of environmental transparency on pollution reduction. Their findings indicate that transparency alone is important, but provincial monitoring and control alone do not significantly reduce pollution. Instead, the interactive effects of provincial control and city level transparency are significant. Their findings

New Trends in Open Government Information Research in China



Yu • 95

reveal the causal mechanism of environmental transparency on pollution reduction with robust data and methodological techniques.

As mentioned before, the four articles reviewed here aim to identify and explain the causal relationship between OGI and other important policy matters. As Whetten (1989) points out, a good theory is to answer why questions. Thus, these articles have potential to make significant contributions to the field of OGI research. However, these articles are not without limitations. I highlight two potential issues here. First, the authors of these articles do not engage with the international academic literature. Yes, they conduct a literature review, which cites geographically diverse pieces. But their sole purpose is to describe and explain Chinese cases and phenomenon. Therefore, the value of these articles is significantly reduced. Second, the English proficiency of these authors needs further improvement. The English titles and abstracts contain many typos and grammatical errors. Most of them are directly translated from Chinese, which is rather difficult to understand for an international audience. Here, I do not revise the English titles and abstracts because then it would be difficult for international academic and scholars to locate them.

Over the last 20 years, Chinese public administration research has progressed remarkably, and these four articles demonstrate as much. Since 2002, CPAR has been publishing public administration research on China, thus providing a venue for international academics and practitioners to understand Chinese public administration and its reforms. We hope to further contribute to the internationalization of Chinese public administration scholarship, thereby supporting collaboration among China and other countries and regions, both in academic research and praxis.

REFERENCES

Ben‐Aaron, J., Denny, M., Desmarais, B., & Wallach, H. (2017). Transparency by conformity: A field experiment evaluating openness in local

governments. Public Administration Review, 77(1), 68-77.

Ma, L. ( 2012) . Zhengfu xinxigongkai de yingxiangyinsu: Zhongguo dijishi de zhengju [The determinancts of government open information: Evidence from Chinese prefecture-level govenrments], Qingbaozazi, 2012(9), 142-146.

Piotrowski, S. J., Zhang, Y., Lin, W., & Yu, W. (2009). Key issues for implementation of Chinese open government information regulations. Public Administration Review, 69, S129-S135.

Tan, Y. (2014). Transparency without Democracy: The Unexpected Effects of C hina’s Environmental Disclosure Policy. Governance, 27(1), 37-62.

Whetten, D. A. (1989). What constitutes a theoretical contribution?. Academy of Management Review, 14(4), 490-495.

Wu, J. & Yu, W.(2017). Zhongguo chengshi caizheng toumingdu yu zhengfu xinrin [Fisical transparency and government Trust in Chinese cities], Gonggongxingzhengpinglun, 2017(6), 127-148.

Yu, W. (2013). Zhengfu toumingdu yu zhengzhi xinren: Jiyu 2011 zhongguo chengshi fuwuxing zhengfu diaocha de fenxi [Government Transparency and Political Trust: An analysis based on the 2013 Service-Oriented Government Survey in China.Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli. 2013(2), 110-115

Yu, W. (2011). Open government information: Challenges faced by public human resource management in China. International Journal of Public Administration, 34(13), 879-888.

Yu, W., & Ma, L. (2015a). External government performance evaluation in China: Evaluating the evaluations. Public Performance & Management Review, 39(1), 144-171.

Yu, W., & Ma, L. (2015b). External government performance evaluation in China: a case study of the ‘Lien service-oriented government project’. Public Money & Management, 35(6), 431-437.

Introducing CPAR’s Highly Cited ArticlesJinhan Wan, Bo WenCity University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong


Since its launch in 2002, the Chinese Public Administration Review (CPAR) has continued to provide readers with high-quality, cutting-

edge, and insightful articles related to a plethora of public administration and public policy topics. The journal has established a vibrant academic platform for exchanging ideas, sharing knowledge, and nurturing debate. In this virtual issue, CPAR is pleased to release its highly cited articles (>10 citations in Google Scholar) to help readers look back on some of the most fascinating studies published in the past two decades.

To begin with, there are two incisive discussions of several interesting theoretical issues of public administration. One is Huang’s research (2002), which serves as an informative guide to deepen our understanding of the nature of public policy. His study tackles the research question from the angle of problem-solving and argues that public policy has not only three positive functions – namely the production, allocation, and exchange of public interests – through which objective differences can be reduced and a solution to public problems can be achieved, but also one negative function, that is, the consumption function, which cannot be thoroughly eliminated but should be restrained to minimize its adverse effects. Another exceptional article comes from Rosenbloom (2017), who focuses on the normative dimension of public administration and claims that efficiency has not always been and need not be the dominant public administrative value. In order to analyze public administrative values in a more organized way, his paper puts forward a framework to distinguish between public administrative values that are intrinsic or ancillary to agencies’ core missions and those that are mission extrinsic. By doing so, the author

refines the extant frameworks for analyzing public administrative values and moves the analysis of public values forward.

In addition to the scholars’ sharp thoughts on theoretical issues, some comparative studies on the recently emerging forms of governance are equally noteworthy. Adopting a comparative perspective, Funkhouser and Pu (2004) examine the origin, evolving definition, underlying values, and organizational structures of performance auditing in the U.S. and China. Their piece emphasizes the important roles played by performance auditing in improving government accountability and public trust and pinpoints the similar opportunities and challenges the two countries face. Using the state of Victoria and the federal government in Australia as case studies, Smith and Teicher (2006) argue that through refocusing the purposes and tools of government, governance and service delivery can be improved under e-government initiatives. The authors also notice that despite the positive effects brought about by e-government, the public sector faces challenges regarding managing e-government setups, such as interagency coordination and the design of services for citizens.

Other similarly strong work focusing on China has also appeared in CPAR. For example, Liu’s work (2008) examines an increasingly crucial issue; that is, how to cultivate civic engagement and increase social solidarity in a rapidly transitioning society. By capitalizing on the case of community governance innovation in Shanghai, his article terms citizens’ participation in neighborhood governance as “empowered autonomy”. The empirical evidence in his paper demonstrates that state-led democratic governance can expand the institutional spaces

Address correspondence to Bo Wen at [email protected]. View this article at cpar.net



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and resources for local residents to extend their horizontal networks and thus exert an empowering effect on civic development in China. Similar to the work of Liu (2008), Yang (2002) examines how institutional context impacts the effectiveness of citizen engagement. Based on data collected from interviews and a focus group, his study examines why authentic citizen participation has no root in Danwei society and how the New City Community Building movement promotes city residents’ self-governance and enhances their sense of citizenship. With a deep examination of the accompanying challenges and problems of the movement, his findings provide a strong foundation for other researchers to conduct further investigation on the cultivation of civil society and political democratization in China. Moreover, scholars continue to focus on issues regarding public policy innovation in China. By looking into the policy initiation, implementation and diffusion process of Yantai’s “Service Promise System” in detail, Foster’s article (2005) unveils the forces and mechanisms of public policy innovation and innovation diffusion in contemporary China at large. His argument on how and when innovative policies are generated and transferred to other jurisdictions deepens our understanding of the dynamics of Chinese politics and the functioning of the Chinese administrative system, as well as offers enlightening clues for future research on policy innovation and diffusion. Last but not least, scholars also show a strong continuous interest in the topic of China’s administrative reforms. Lan (2002) reviews the trajectory of China’s administrative reforms at the local level. By assessing the impacts of China’s local government reforms, identifying the deep-seeded problems arising therefrom, and proposing several directions for further changes, his work offers us a broad view of China’s administrative reform, from which we can witness the successes and challenges of China’s political modernization and reflect on the lessons learnt from this process.

The above retrospection of these highly cited articles is a small sample of CPAR’s contributions to the field of public administration (PA) research over the last twenty years. It showcases the breadth of research perspectives, the richness of research themes, and the

plurality of research methods the journal encompasses, as well as, broadly speaking, the vitality and dynamism of PA research. Although it cannot exhaust all the outstanding studies appearing in CPAR, this can greatly help readers grasp the research paradigms of some core issues and the topical trend in the field of PA. Emerging scholars can surely benefit from this review and ponder on what they can contribute to further strengthen the link between macro (institutional) and micro (psychological/behavioral) levels of research in the Chinese PA system.

REFERENCES

Foster, K. W. (2016). Chinese public policy innovation and the diffusion of innovations: an initial exploration. Chinese Public Administration Review, 3(1/2), 1-13.

Funkhouser, M., & Pu, J. Y. (2019). Government performance auditing in the US and China: Lessons drawn from a comparative review. Chinese Public Administration Review, 10(2), 65-78.

Huang, R. (2006). On the nature of public policy. Chinese Public Administration Review, 1(3/4), 275-282.

Lan, Z. (2006). Local government reform in the People’s Republic of China: Stipulations, impact, cases and assessment. Chinese Public Administration Review, 1(3/4), 209-220.

Liu, C. (2016). Empowered autonomy: The politics of community governance innovations in Shanghai, China. Chinese Public Administration Review, 5(1/2), 61-71.

Rosenbloom, D. H. (2017). Beyond efficiency: Value frameworks for public administration. Chinese Public Administration Review, 8(1), 37-46.

Smith, R. F. I. (2016). Improving governance and services: can e-government help?. Chinese Public Administration Review, 3(3/4), 62-70.

Yang, K. (2006). From “Danwei” society to new community building: Opportunities and challenges for citizen participation in Chinese cities. Chinese Public Administration Review, 1(1), 65-82.


ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Jinhan Wan is a doctoral student in the Department of Public Policy at the City University of Hong Kong. She obtained a Master’s degree in law from Tsinghua University and a Bachelor’s degree in political science and public administration from Tongji University. Her research interests include public administration, politics in contemporary China, regulatory governance, and international relations. Email: [email protected]

Bo Wen is currently an assistant professor in the Department of Public Policy at the City University of Hong Kong (CityU), with a disciplinary focus on behavioral public administration and institutional analysis. He also examines the intergovernmental relationships, public personnel management, and the environmental politics of China. Prior to his arrival at CityU, he studied at the University of Southern California (USC) where he earned his Ph.D. in public policy and management. His work appears in Public Administration Review, The China Quarterly, The American Review of Public Administration, among others. He is also the recipient of a grant from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC). Email: [email protected]

Introducing CPAR’s Highly Cited Articles


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