VOLUME 13, NUMBER 4 (2018)

The Naval Reserve:An Alternative

Perspective

Strategic Canadian Amphibious Sealift

Capability

Strategic Maritime Planning and the Role

of P&I Clubs

i CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW VOLUME 13, NUMBER 4 (2018)

(www.canadasnavalmemorial.ca)

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VOLUME 13, NUMBER 4 (2018) CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW 1

VOLUME 13, NO. 4 (2018)

Editorial BoardDr. Brian Bow, Vice-Admiral (Ret’d) Gary Garnett, Dr. Rob Huebert, Dr. Adam Lajeunesse, Dr. Danford W. Middlemiss, Dr. Marc Milner, Colonel (Ret’d) John Orr, Hugh Segal, Mark Sloan, Dr. Denis StairsEditor: Dr. Ann L. Griffi thsAssistant Editor: Douglas S. Th omasPhoto Editor: Timothy Hiu-Tung ChoiSubscriptions/Administration: Shannon LangtonGraphic Design: Kim Squared Inc.Printing: Advocate Printing and Publishing

Th e editorial offi ces of CNR are located at the Centre for the Study of Se-curity and Development (CSSD), Hicks Building, Dalhousie University. Th e mailing address is 1699 South Street, PO Box 15000, Halifax, NS, B3H 4R2.

Phone: (902) 494-3769Fax: (902) 494-3825Email: naval.review@dal.caWebsite: www.navalreview.ca

Canadian Naval Review is published by the CSSD at Dalhousie University. It is a professional journal examining a wide range of maritime security issues from a Canadian perspective. In particular it focuses on strategic concepts, policies, operations, history and procurement of the Canadian Navy, plus national security in general and marine/ocean aff airs. Th is initiative brings together members of the Canadian defence and aca-demic communities and is a component of the Centre’s Maritime Security Program.

Canadian Naval Review has three primary objectives:• provide a public forum for the discussion of the maritime di-

mension of Canada’s national security;• provide a public forum for the discussion of Canada’s naval and

maritime policies; and• provide a source for the public examination of Canadian naval

and maritime history and for the development of lessons learned.Th e material included in CNR is presented for the professional and general education of the readers. Articles, commentaries and opinion pieces are invited from the widest possible spectrum for the purpose of informing, stimulating debate and generally challenging readers. Th e opinions ex-pressed by the authors do not necessarily refl ect the opinions of the Edi-tor, Editorial Board, CSSD, the Department of National Defence, or the Canadian Navy.

Articles, opinion pieces, book reviews and letters may be submitted via email or mailed (with an electronic copy) to the address given above. Send to the attention of the Editor, Dr. Ann Griffi ths. Articles are to be in Word or WordPerfect format and no longer than 3,000 words. Articles must not have been published elsewhere. Citations should be kept to a minimum and articles must be accompanied by a 100-120 word abstract. Opinion pieces are to be 1,000-1,500 words. Book reviews are to be 500-750 words. Photos may be submitted with articles or commentaries but they must be at least 300 dpi, at an equivalent size to 5 by 7 inches, and internet im-ages cannot be used. Intellectual copyright will remain the property of the author, however, the right to re-publish articles initially published in Canadian Naval Review remains with the Editorial Board. Articles and commentaries written in French are welcome and, if accepted, will be published in French.

Copyright © 2018. ISSN 1715-0213 Canadian Naval Review

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 4 (2018) CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW 1

ContentsEDITORIAL: READY AYE READY FOR A CHANGING SEA 2 HUGH SEGAL

THE NAVAL RESERVE: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE 4 COMMANDER DENNIS WITZKE AND COMMANDER LUC TREMBLAY

STRATEGIC CANADIAN AMPHIBIOUS SEALIFT CAPABILITY 10 DAVID DUNLOP

STRATEGIC MARITIME PLANNING AND THE ROLE OF P&I CLUBS 16 HEINZ GOHLISH

MAKING WAVESAFTER THE NEW PROTECTEUR-CLASS, WHAT NEXT? 22 COMMANDER (RET'D) R.A. RUTHERFORD‘AMPHIBIOSITY,’ ‘BIG HONKING SHIPS’ AND ROYAL 24CANADIAN MARINES: A REASSESSMENT COLONEL (RET’D) P.J. WILLIAMSNATIONAL SHIPBUILDING STRATEGY: NOT PERFECT, 27NOT BROKEN HOWIE SMITHNEW FUNDING MODEL FOR VETERAN CHARITIES 30 DERMOD COOMBSTHE MULRONEY INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT IS LAUNCHED 31AT STFX WITH A FOCUS ON MARITIME SECURITY ADAM LAJEUNESSE

A VIEW FROM THE WEST: INDIA AND THE QUAD: BALANCING 33NATIONAL INTERESTS AND REGIONAL REALITIES JOCELYN SANDHU

DOLLARS AND SENSE: HOW IS THE NATIONAL SHIPBUILDING 36STRATEGY GOING? DAVE PERRY

WARSHIP DEVELOPMENTS: SNIPPETS 39 DOUG THOMAS

BOOK REVIEWS 41

Th e bow section of the future HMCS Harry DeWolf AOPV-430 is rolled out to meet the rest of the ship on 8 December 2017, at Irving Shipbuilding’s Halifax shipyard.

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2 CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW VOLUME 13, NUMBER 4 (2018)

EditorialReady Aye Ready for a Changing Sea

In the last three decades we have seen the world progress from the days of the Cold War, when two superpowers and their allies faced off worldwide, through the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Th e end of the USSR appeared to be the end of the bipolar world.

Th e unipolar world of Pax Americana that seemed to fol-low the collapse of the Soviet Union did not last very long. Whether aspirational or the ultimate self-serving illusion, Pax Americana has been challenged in many ways. It has been challenged by the rise of China, the so-called Arab Spring, the dilution, which began under President Obama, of the American will to engage internationally, and the multi-polar world of a revanchist Russian Federation, an Iranian Shia empire-build, the growth of non-state actors and more complex security challenges, not only for NA-TO but for essentially peaceful, non-aggressive states and communities worldwide.

Despite serious concerns about North Korea, it is interna-tional terrorism, with local but genuine risk, that has re-placed the more existential risk of thermonuclear destruc-tion. Th is more complex, but less civilization-threatening security context is now characterized by new and impor-tant conditions that defi ne the challenges we face. Th ese contextual realities include the following:

• New cyber technology and a determined will on the part of the Russians, Chinese, North Koreans, Iranians, not to mention non-state actors, to de-ploy weaponized versions thereof to destabilize competitors, weaken democracies and advance their tactical and strategic interests are a clear and present danger.

• With apparent encouragement/intervention from Russian covert engagement, Europe, the UK and the United States are consumed with inter-nal controversies – from the shallow to the more

profound. Th ese controversies diminish their focus on the ‘great game’ wherein the free and democratic states of the world compete with the authoritarian cultures of China and Russia, usu-ally through diplomatic and tactical economic measures, to sustain a global balance. Meanwhile China proceeds with its ‘One Belt, One Road’ eco-nomic and political expansion, Russia deepens its presence in the Middle East and its hostility and provocations in Eastern Europe, and Iran builds a Shia corridor through Lebanon and Syria to the Israeli border.

• Global trade expansion, so constructively respon-sible for the lift ing of millions out of poverty in India and China over the last few decades, faces a new twin challenge of protectionist national-ism and widening income gaps of the kind that can lead to economic dysfunction and instability worldwide.

• New and constructive technologies embracing deep machine learning, artifi cial intelligence, au-tomated and unmanned mobility on land, in the air, on and beneath the sea, and enhanced global positioning and surveillance capacities, illustrate a rare mix of challenge and opportunity for mid-dle powers like Canada, with modest but techni-cally advanced defence capacity.

• Enhanced meteorological instability related to global warming will increase in many parts of the world as will the ‘aid to the civil power’ exi-gency faced by military, police and fi rst responder forces. Th e impacts of global warming will hurt the poorest countries, and the poorest residents of more well-to-do countries hardest.

• Procurements planned many years ago and no-toriously slow in getting to the actual cutting of steel, like the National Shipbuilding Strategy, the slow-moving ship-borne helicopter procurement and the continuing dance around the political maypole regarding fi ghter aircraft , face the risk of not only being timed out by acute technological and economic change, but by  a changing global strategic balance that dilutes the salience of Cana-da’s present and planned military asset mix.

• Th e very nature of being an eff ective member of the Canadian and allied military, air, land, sea and Special Forces at all ranks will change. Deep triangulated strategic intelligence requirements, capacities and protocols to inform either defensive deployments or specifi c tactical missions have al-ready altered and will keep on shift ing. As a result,

Type-45 destroyer HMS Dragon escorts the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov through the English Channel on 7 May 2014. Admiral Kuznetsov had been deployed to the Mediterranean as a show of force following the annexation of Crimea in March.

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military education in the combat arms and in mid-career development will also have to be open to new approaches and opportunities.

For all Canada’s military services, deepened military, cy-ber, analytics and operational intelligence must become a much higher priority. Th e 2017 Defence Policy Statement issued by Ottawa does, to its credit, refl ect the need for en-hanced investment and engagement in the world of large analytics and cyber research. As well, it goes beyond the simply defensive to actual active cyber measures neces-sary to protect Canadian security and weaken the aggres-sive capacities of the authoritarian regimes and unlawful non-state actors and proxies poised to advance their own interests by any means. Th is also will require an approach to the recruitment of cyber-capable younger Canadian Armed Force members and more integrated operational linkages among the Communications Security Establish-ment (CSE), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Armed Forces Intelligence, Canadian Border Ser-vices Agency and the RCMP.

All of this aff ords the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) an immense opportunity to streamline its own recruiting policies, the core educational and combat skills associated with command development and the immense potential of a robust, diverse and inter-generational approach to naval intelligence. Th e possibility of deploying the Naval Reserve to recruit young women and men with enhanced digital and cyber skills is a huge opportunity. Th is does not mean that navigational skills, discipline, weapons compe-tence, fi re safety, computer science, leadership and other shipboard capacities will no longer be necessary because, per force, they will. But, put simply, they will no longer be enough. Nor will the avionics, analytics soft ware and command and control functions of the past necessarily suffi ce going forward. Th e ability to be better informed than one’s enemies, whether they are tactical or strategic, real or potential, will matter as much as one’s kinetic reach and capacity. From the Arctic to the South China Sea, from the Mediterranean to the hurricane-ravaged parts of the Caribbean, Canada’s relevance as a naval partner,

combat-ready ally, or humanitarian responder will not only be determined by what platforms and complement it can deploy, but how much Canada/the RCN and allies re-ally understand about the global, regional, economic and local context into which they might deploy.

If the RCN of the future is to be both relevant and nimble, an approach to procurement that is tied only to multi-decade gaps between design, requirement defi nition and ultimate delivery may not work over the long haul. More fl exible procurement decisions, more interim capacity achieved through diff erent kinds of platforms, on, above and beneath the sea may also be required. Th ere will be a role for artifi cial intelligence and machine learning in enhancing naval operational acuity, systemic adaptability and real-time eff ectiveness on diff erent kinds of missions. Working with available and more nimble platforms from the private sector, as was the case with Asterix, is one of many ways forward. Th at the Royal Navy and the US Na-vy have been reduced in size may well also refl ect their will to use enhanced technologies to enhance the overall eff ectiveness of the fl eet.

Global uncertainty will require of Canada’s navy, and the women and men who serve it, greater fl exibility, agility and multi-capable deployments where diverse measures of engagement increase impact while confusing adversar-ies or competitors. ‘Skating where the puck will be’ will become at least as important as fi guring out who has the puck now.

Ready, Aye, Ready will always matter deeply. But what ‘ready’ means may have to change substantively to refl ect the requirements of the very diff erent world in which the RCN serves now and in the future. It is the sort of chal-lenge the professionals of the RCN have met superbly in the past, when rapidly changing circumstances required rapid fl eet expansion, focused refi t and weapon adjust-ment, and innovation. It is certainly a challenge the RCN can meet now.

Th e Honourable Hugh Segal, OC, OOnt

Lieutenant (N) Th omas Pohl delivers a brief during Exercise Sentinel Strait, which provided training for Naval Reserve Intelligence Offi cers at HMCS Montcalm in Quebec City, 15-16 January 2016.

Pat Brophy, director of UAV services at ING Engineering, prepares a ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicle for launch on HMCS Charlottetown during Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea, 29 February 2012.

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4 CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW VOLUME 13, NUMBER 4 (2018)

The Naval Reserve:An Alternative Perspective

Commander Dennis Witzke and Commander Luc Tremblay*

In 2015, the Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy ordered a review of the tasks assigned to the Naval Re-serve and the organization, establishment and occupation structure of the Naval Reserve. Th e genesis of the review was the Chief of Defence Staff ’s desire to privilege the part-time reserve over the full-time reserve and align the workforce to Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) priorities, while preserving the vital link to Canadian communi-ties. Th e Commander of the RCN defi ned the challenge as “establish[ing] realistic and measurable outputs, which will then inform a mission-derived organization, estab-lishment, and occupation structure.”1 Th e challenge was further bound with several assumptions, constraints and restraints, including:

• the Naval Reserve exists to generate sailors and of-fi cers, who can be employed at sea and ashore;

• reservists will provide predominantly part-time service;

• permanent full-time employment of naval reserv-ists will be minimized;

• reservists will not normally be assigned unique tasks distinct from the regular component;

• there will be no growth in funding or full-time positions; and

• the Naval Reserve will not train to be an augmen-tation force for domestic operations.

Almost three years of study, review, briefi ngs and deci-sions have resulted in an evolution of the Naval Reserve. It was positive evolution, to be sure, but not transformation. Canada’s defence policy lays out several Primary Reserve Initiatives, such as a modest increase in the number of Pri-mary Reserves, new roles that provide full-time capabil-ity through part-time service, the enlargement of existing roles, expeditionary capability in capacity building, and the creation of a service model, employment model and remuneration policies that attract and retain Canadians. Is there an option that meets these goals while also off er-ing the RCN strategic capacity, a presence in Canadian communities, and improved recruiting and retention?

Th e Naval Reserve off ers the RCN, through the Naval Re-serve divisions, a footprint in cities across Canada that would not otherwise have a naval or, perhaps, even a mili-tary presence. It also off ers the RCN trained sailors and offi cers, who are able to serve Canada in a part-time em-ployment model, and thus off ers cost-eff ective capacity. Th e current model, though, is fi rmly rooted in the Regular Force structure. Although this structure works well in the

Naval Reservists from HMCS York exercise their Freedom of the City in Toronto on 3 September 2010, as part of the Royal Canadian Navy’s centenary activities.

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The Naval Reserve offers the RCN, through the Naval Reserve divisions, a footprint in cities across Canada that would not otherwise have a naval or, perhaps, even a military presence.

VOLUME 13, NUMBER 4 (2018) CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW 5

full-time context, several weaknesses are exposed in the part-time context. First, it is diffi cult to generate sailors and offi cers in some occupations in a part-time model be-cause the training and experience requirements take too long to complete and are not easily modularized. Second, there is a large training, management and infrastructure overhead, and third, the structure is too limiting for the ‘new’ workplace and workforce, which makes it challeng-ing to retain sailors and offi cers long term.

Th e weaknesses in the existing model, though, also off er a signifi cant opportunity – an opportunity for transforma-tional change that creates a Naval Reserve that embraces and enables the ‘new’ workforce of the ‘millennial’ gener-ation,2 invigorates the RCN, strengthens strategic capac-ity, and bolsters recruiting and retention.

Much has been written about the millennial generation and its interaction with work.3 Undoubtedly this specifi c generation has a diff erent understanding of ‘work’ and the ‘workplace’ than proceeding generations did but that un-derstanding is more likely a logical evolution than a radi-cal leap. Today’s workforce wants the same things from an organization that yesterday’s workforce did. Th ey want to be proud of the organization they work for: they want to work for an organization that embodies – not just pro-fesses – profound ideals like ‘courage,’ ‘duty,’ ‘integrity’ and ‘loyalty.’ Th ey want to do meaningful work and they

want to have an impact. Th ey expect to have the opportu-nity to collaborate with others on challenging issues that matter to them and to the organization. And, fi nally, they want to learn and they embrace both continuous learn-ing and learning through doing – they want to work with experts and assimilate knowledge across a broad range of disciplines.

Born aft er 1984, millennials are generally seen as hard to manage and as having a sense of entitlement, which is confounding leadership at all levels within the private and public spheres. While it may seem that millennials represent a ‘new’ workforce, as noted earlier, they aspire to the same things as the previous generation: purpose-ful employment and the ability to make a positive impact while maintaining strong relationships both at work and at home. Millennials, though, have diff erent methodolo-gies and time expectations than preceding generations. Millennials are technologically inclined and many expect the instant gratifi cation that technology can readily pro-vide through platforms such as Facebook and Instagram. In general, they expect job satisfaction and professional fulfi llment as part of employment and not as a distant

There is an opportunity for transformational change that creates a Naval Reserve that em-braces the new workforce of the 'millennial' generation, invigorates the RCN, strengthens strategic capacity, and bolsters recruiting and retention.

Naval reservists from Calgary’s HMCS Tecumseh introduce members of the public to the division’s rigid-hull infl atable boat at the 2011 Calgary Stampede.

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remuneration for time served. Simon Sinek, a British/American author and motivational speaker, well-known for his views on millennials, argues that corporate lead-ership must help employees learn the necessary skills to be successful in today’s work environment.4 Senior lead-ership must play a critical role and ensure the employee fi nds personal and professional fulfi lment. A nurturing work environment, where the leadership is engaged and responsible for the employees’ professional development, will help form trust and deep connections with the orga-nization. To recruit and retain this ‘new’ workforce, an organization must be willing to change and adapt its poli-cies and strategies.

Th e Naval Reserve is the ideal organization to recruit this new workforce. Th e primarily part-time employment and access to varied CAF and RCN-managed occupations, ranging from support to operational trades, provide many opportunities for personal and professional growth and nurture the desire of many millennials to work to enhance social good. Th e fl exible employment model provides university students the ability to earn money while enrolled in post-secondary education, and the ethnic, gender and language diversity of Naval Reserve divisions provides an environment that is rich in opportunity for personal growth. Th ese opportunities are well recognized and contribute to the success of Naval Reserve recruiting. Historically, the Naval Reserve has always been able to increase intake in response to increased demand.

Th e Naval Reserve could also be the ideal organization to develop and retain the new workforce – either as long-term reservists or as an intermediate step to enrollment in the Regular Force – but right now it isn’t. Historically, a large portion of naval reservists leaves within fi ve years of enrollment. Many factors contribute to this, including: professional and academic commitments; irreconcilable

confl icts with personal life; lack of support from full-time employer or academic institution; timing, notice and type of employment opportunities; and lack of opportunities.5 To become the ideal organization to develop and retain young Canadians, then, the RCN must adopt innovative practices that engage and sustain interest. It must adopt practices that lead to a realization of continuous learning and personal and professional growth, employment that provides meaningful work with positive outcomes, and the ability to infl uence decisions and make a diff erence. Let us briefl y consider these factors.

To become the ideal organization to develop and retain young Canadians, the RCN must adopt innovative practices that engage and sustain interest.

Let’s start with continuous learning. Currently the Naval Reserve occupation structures mirror the Regular Force structures. Although the model works well for full-time sailors, it doesn’t, despite an evolution toward modular-ized training, work as well in the part-time construct. Th e challenges are, predominantly, the training require-ments in relation to the naval reservists’ availability and the skill-fade that occurs when the reservists return to their civilian life. In the current model, a reservist enrolls into an occupation and completes environmental and oc-cupation-specifi c training until reaching the Operational Functional Point (OFP). Th is is, ideally, by the end of the second summer of training but, in certain occupations, can take much longer. In fact, there are instances of peo-ple who remain unqualifi ed aft er fi ve years. Furthermore, aft er reaching the OFP, the sailor is expected to develop and progress within the chosen occupation. Th is creates two additional challenges:

PCT-62 Moose at sea on 6 October 2014, during introductory activities for that year’s Maritime Security Challenges conference in Victoria, BC. Th e Orca-class Patrol Craft , Training (PCT) vessels were completed 2004-2008 to help train RCN regular force and reserve members in at-sea competencies.

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• the sailor spends a long time in training before being qualifi ed in an occupation and, even then, is not likely to have the experience required to be suffi ciently profi cient in the occupation to back-fi ll or augment a Regular Force sailor of the same qualifi cation; and

• career progression is diffi cult – or diffi cult to ra-tionalize – because it is intuitive, in an occupa-tion-driven structure, that occupation profi ciency is key to advancement. It will be diffi cult for re-servists to progress beyond the entry level because of the training and experience requirements.

A workable alternative would be to recruit sailors and offi cers into the Naval Reserve without assigning an oc-cupation. A person who met the enrollment prerequisites could be enrolled and entered into basic military training and naval-environmental training so he or she could be employed in a ship and exposed to a variety of experienc-es. Aft er one summer of training, the RCN would have a pool of trained sailors and offi cers ready to surge and sup-port domestic operations. Furthermore, sailors and offi -cers could select further occupation training informed by their experience at sea, which is likely to result in a better person-job fi t and, consequently, enhance retention. On selection of an occupation, a naval reservist would proceed on occupation training during the second summer and, in most cases, achieve the OFP.6 Aft er achieving the OFP, these sailors would be fully qualifi ed to work in the RCN within their chosen occupation. Further to the changes in the occupation qualifi cation process discussed above, this proposal would eliminate the requirement for addi-tional occupation-specifi c training (beyond the OFP) for promotion and progression. More importantly, since ad-vancement would no longer be tied to occupation-specifi c

training, sailors and offi cers could develop personally and professionally through train-ing and experiences not currently available to them. Hypothetically, any sailor, post-OFP, could forego the next occupational training in favour of another opportunity based on personal desire and availability. For example, a post-OFP marine technician could also be qualifi ed as a small boat coxswain. Sailors would be encouraged, and provided opportu-nities, to develop as sailors and offi cers in the capacity that best suits personal interests and schedules.

Th is alternative model could also provide a signifi cant upside for support occupations. In the current structure, it is diffi cult for sailors and offi cers in support occupations to spend

time at sea. Th e preponderance of employment and ex-perience opportunities exists ashore and, therefore, the requirement for environmental training and other at-sea opportunities is less than for the operational occupations. Although it would most likely be in a limited fashion, ear-ly exposure to sea-going opportunities could have a tre-mendous impact on the Naval Reserve and foster a sense of belonging in the RCN. Naval Reserve divisions would greatly benefi t from this by having a greater number of sailors within the support occupations with at-sea experi-ence to mentor and develop new recruits.

Although it would likely be in a limited fashion, early exposure to sea-going opportunities could have a tremendous impact on the Naval Reserve and foster a sense of belonging in the RCN.

Th e second element to consider is the question of mean-ingful work. Th e existing process requires a sailor attain the OFP before he or she is able to be gainfully employed. In some occupations, such as naval warfare offi cer, attain-ment of the OFP can take several years of part-time train-ing. As noted earlier, many millennials want meaning-ful work that contributes positively to the organization’s strategy and they want to engage now, not later. In the proposal here, the sailor or offi cer is available for experi-ential opportunities by the end of the fi rst summer and, by the end of the second summer, is fully qualifi ed in a chosen occupation. Th e ability to experience life at sea, and then select a bespoke development path will enable a reservist to defi ne ‘meaningful’ work and then pursue ful-fi llment over time, even as personal defi nitions of success mature. Intrinsic rewards, such as believing your work has meaning, the ability to make choices in your work-life

Rear-Admiral Tyrone Pile, Command of Joint Task Force Games during the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, looks through the laser sight on a .50 calibre machine gun mounted on an Orca-class PCT. Th e Orca-class ships are not usually armed, but doing so on a regular basis would provide unique training opportunities that may help attract and retain part-time reservists.

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and feel ownership for accomplishments, developing a sense of competence, and the ability to see progress, have been shown to have a more signifi cant infl uence on re-tention and engagement than extrinsic rewards. A struc-ture that is agile, fl exible and responsive will promote and support these intrinsic rewards and encourage naval reservists to volunteer and engage beyond the minimum requirements. Finally, on-the-job learning and the unique experiences associated with being in the RCN (such as travel, fi ring a weapon or being a ship’s team diver) that civilians would be unlikely to experience should be capi-talized upon.

What about a role in decision making? Th e Regular Force model, on which the current Naval Reserve mod-el is based, is rigidly hierarchical and restrains decision making to the formal chain of command. Th e proposal here breaks out of the occupation hierarchy aft er the OFP and allows sailors and offi cers opportunity to seek train-ing and experience opportunities that aff ord personal and professional growth. A merit-based advancement system that recognizes and promotes the key characteristics of leadership, courage, duty, integrity and loyalty will re-ward those sailors and offi cers who seek out opportunities

and grow through experience. Although allowing choices on personal and professional development and facilitating the build-up of rich experiences will foster engagement, we should also provide opportunities for sailors and of-fi cers to engage in the decision-making process – in other words, to take ownership of ‘their’ Naval Reserve early and oft en in a career.

A structure that is agile, fl exible and respon-sive will promote intrinsic rewards and encourage naval reservists to volunteer and engage beyond the minimum requirements.

Th is alternative model is not perfect – it would be chal-lenging to implement and sustain for a number of reasons. First, both military components of the RCN, Regular and Reserve, are solidly rooted in tradition and their cultures will resist changes as signifi cant as those proposed here. Sailors identify with cap-tallys and occupations, and any changes to these would have to be very carefully managed. Culture change is always diffi cult and especially in an or-ganization as large as the RCN. Second, there would be a greater requirement for accurate records to manage the number and variety of qualifi cations an individual could hold and to optimize employment. Th e RCN Strategic Plan 2017-2022 highlights the need to develop business processes that will deliver a better Recognized Person-nel Picture.7 However, despite the major strides that have recently been made in data management and reporting, substantial hurdles remain especially with regard to data integrity. Finally, the training establishments would need to be more fl exible, more agile and more capable of deliv-ering training. To do just that, the RCN is in the midst of a complete overhaul of its training systems as it implements the Future Naval Training System Strategy. Similar to the data management challenges, this new model would fur-ther stress scant resources as the training system is pre-pared to leverage the capabilities of the future fl eet.

ConclusionTh e RCN is a sea-going institution and service at sea must remain foundational to the development of sailors and of-fi cers. Key to this is ensuring recruits are introduced to ships early and exposed to the demanding and harsh en-vironment of the sea. Th is shared experience will create a sense of identity and belonging on which to base further development. From this foundation, sailors and offi cers can follow personal and professional interests through training and experience opportunities that will develop deep connections and relationships with their peers and more importantly with the organization writ large.

Although implementation of the model proposed here Th e Royal Canadian Navy Strategic Plan 2017-2022 outlines the key activities and goals that the RCN seeks to accomplish within the next fi ve years.

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structure supported by the right enablers, the RCN can maximize naval output by its reservists whether on part-time or full-time service. Although more in-depth study is required before this model can be implemented, the les-sons learned could inform changes to the management of all RCN occupations. Th e small size of the Naval Reserve coupled with the change of mission away from the Kings-ton-class ships presents a unique opportunity to challenge the status quo and look at innovative ways to attract, re-cruit, retain and employ sailors in the service of the RCN and Canada.Notes* Th is article is the opinion of the authors, and does not represent the opin-

ion of the Department of National Defence or the government of Canada. 1. Department of National Defence, “Strategic Initiating Directive for Naval

Reserve Task Defi nitions and Organization/Establishment/Occupation Structure Review,” 26 January 2015.

2. Bruce N. Pfau, “What Do Millennials Really Want at Work? Th e Same Th ings the Rest of Us Do,” Harvard Business Review, 7 April 2016, avail-able at https://hbr.org/2016/04/what-do-millennials-really-want-at-work.

3. Shelly Kramer, “Why Millennials Quit: Understanding a New Work-force,” Talent Culture, 9 June 2017, available at https://talentculture.com/millennials-quit-understanding-new-workforce-report/.

4. Simon Sinek, “Simon Sinek on the Millennial Question,” Tom Bi-lyeu, 10 January 2017, available at www.success.com/podcast/simon-sinek-on-the-millennial-question.

5. Naval Reserve Recruiting and Retention Project, “Phase Two. Sponsor Re-search Report 2005-15,” Although 12-years old, many of the barriers to retention remain valid for the millennial generation.

6. Th is statement is based solely on training time and not on the individual’s ability to complete or succeed in the training.

7. Department of National Defence, “Royal Canadian Navy Strategic Plan 2017-2022,” 2017.

Commander Dennis Witzke is the offi cer accountable to the Di-rector of Naval Personnel and Training for RCN Organization and Establishment. He was a member of the sub-working group that looked at the Naval Reserve structure during the Naval Re-serve Review discussed at the beginning of this article.

Commander Luc Tremblay is the offi cer accountable to the Director of Naval Personnel and Training for RCN-managed occupations.

would be challenging, several advantages would be real-ized. First, it would provide fl exibility and choice to new recruits. Th ey would not be forced to choose an occupa-tion early on and before fully understanding the implica-tions of the decision. Furthermore, they would be exposed to sea-going life early, which is foundational to a naval career. Th is should result in better person-job fi t and in-crease both performance and retention.

Second, new sailors and offi cers would be given access to training opportunities within and outside of their chosen occupations, which would give them freedom of choice and the ability to develop personally and profession-ally according to their defi nitions of meaningful work and success. Th is would also facilitate meeting diff erent people and the opportunity to cross-train in many fi elds, such as cyber and intelligence, developing the broad skill sets and experience required to be a successful reservist. Finally, it would provide those in mainly shore or support occupations the opportunity to experience life at sea and feel like they are part of the naval institution.

With the right occupation structure sup-ported by the right enablers, the RCN can maximize naval output by its reservists whether on part-time or full-time service.

Th ird, this model directly supports many of the Primary Reserve Initiatives introduced in Strong, Secure, Engaged. Th e ability to qualify quickly in a traditional military oc-cupation and then gain training, skills and experience in burgeoning capabilities such as ‘light urban’ search and rescue or cyber will enable reservists to engage construc-tively and profoundly in the national interest.

Th e release of Strong, Secure, Engaged off ers a renewal op-portunity for the Naval Reserve. With the right occupation

Th e Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels HMCS Shawinigan MM-704 and HMCS Moncton MM-708 are anchored in Rankin Inlet, Nunavut, during Operation Nanook on 25 August 2016. Initially meant to be crewed entirely by reservists, the Kingston-class ships have since adopted a mixed crew of regular forces and reservists.

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Canada has the longest coastline on the planet and a proud maritime heritage. However, it is the only G8 coun-try without an amphibious sealift capability. It has been said that a self-contained sea-based amphibious force is the best kind of fi re extinguisher because of its fl exibil-ity, reliability, logistics simplicity and relative economy. Amphibious capability is the ability to transport and launch troops and vehicles via ships and aircraft , as well as launching of ground-targeted weapons from the sea.

Having an amphibious sealift capability would reduce the CAF's dependency upon its allies to move forces and supplies into an area of operations.

An amphibious sealift capability is not something that Canada envisions, but it is something that Canada needs. In today’s chaotic and uncertain security environment, there will be situations which arise in regions of the world that will not be conducive to fl ying in conventional forces, and Canada will need a strategic amphibious sealift ca-pability. While the adoption of this capability would cer-tainly enhance the joint interoperability among the CAF’s air, land and sea elements, the greater payoff would be the interoperability Canada will gain with its amphibious allies.

In order to project its military power across the seas and

provide adequate coastal defence for Canada, the Cana-dian Armed Forces (CAF) are dependent upon Canada’s many allies for assistance. Beyond Canada’s shores, the capability to undertake peace operations, including eff ec-tively rendering humanitarian assistance and disaster re-lief (HA/DR), will be a critical requirement for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in the future. With a true amphibi-ous capability Canada’s naval forces would be well posi-tioned to contribute meaningfully to joint action ashore and support the sustainment of joint operations from sea, while preserving the ability to defend Canada’s freedom of action through naval combat operations. Th e multi-pur-pose nature and versatility of a fl eet with such a capability, both independently and as part of an allied or coalition task force, would allow Canada to deploy credible naval forces worldwide, on short notice.

Canada currently relies upon its allies to assist with ship-to-shore movement in regions where functional infrastruc-ture is unavailable. Having an amphibious sealift capabil-ity would reduce the CAF’s dependency upon its allies to move forces and supplies into an area of operations. An amphibious sealift capability would make the CAF a more robust and reliable contributor to international operations. Another advantage is the capacity to move and deliver bulk supplies and heavy equipment into areas of operations; an extremely costly and limited option when conducted by air, and impossible without functioning airports.

Strategic Canadian Amphibious Sealift Capability

David Dunlop

A Canadian Army M777 howitzer is disembarked from a chartered vessel at Riga, Latvia, on 12 August 2017 as part of Operation Reassurance. Without a dedicated amphibious capability, Canada can only land such heavy equipment in intact and secure ports facing little to no opposition.

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With all the advantages that an amphibious sealift capa-bility provides, it is very puzzling why Canada has not yet adopted this capability like so many of its allies. Th ere are those who oppose the development of this capability in Canada because it would constitute such a large institu-tional change. However the true reason Canada has not yet adopted an amphibious sealift capability is due to fi s-cal constraints. A growth in the force, the procurement of ships, connector vessels, amphibious vehicles, aircraft , training, and the research and development for it all, come with a pricetag which Canada currently cannot aff ord.

An amphibious sealift capability would prove to be a sound investment since it is something Canada has used in the past, could have used recently, and will be required to use in future operations. Th is capability would have been benefi cial during recent operations to provide HA/DR. And although the capability is not specifi cally men-tioned in Canada’s latest defence policy, it would certainly enhance the CAF’s ability to complete the missions laid out in its pages.

Canada shares many of the same international interests as its allies, and regularly participates in international secu-rity and relief operations. However, by being the only G8 state without an amphibious sealift capability, Canada is diminishing its political signifi cance on the world stage by limiting its military involvement to maritime opera-tions. Th e global security situation is ever-changing and Earth’s human population will grow dramatically by the year 2025, of which 60% will be concentrated in littoral regions. Th erefore, one can imagine a myriad of situations where Canada might need to intervene in these regions, and in order to do so, an amphibious sealift capability will

be critical. Th is capability would improve national secu-rity and interoperability with allies, reduce Canada’s reli-ance upon other states, and allow for the projection of a more robust force into diff erent theatres globally.

Amphibious sealift capability would improve national security and interoperability with allies, reduce Canada's reliance upon other states, and allow for the projection of a more robust force into different theatres globally.

Among the appropriate sealift options, the most practi-cable are ships specifi cally designed and purpose-built for expeditionary or amphibious operations and possess-ing capacities to move the force in its entirety. Among other features, amphibious ships provide a secure base for generating local air superiority and local air mobility assets. Th ey may also act as a secure base for an initial HQ location, as well as provide logistics and supply facili-ties. Th ese are fl exible, specialized military assets that are highly valued by Canada’s allies, and by the international organizations to which Canada belongs. Amphibious as-sets are likely to be in great demand on all three oceans in the uncertain future security environment. Th e list of capabilities amphibious platforms provide ranges from evacuating citizens from hostile shores (non-combatant evacuation operations), to the tactical recovery of an air pilot, to all points in between. Canada’s navy will need to become better equipped for peace-support operations, in-cluding rendering HA/DR assistance at sea. Th e RCN will also need to sustain joint operations from the sea, have robust command and control capabilities and contribute to joint actions ashore. Such measures will improve the future fl eet’s agility and capacity to respond to confl icts and disasters at home and abroad.

In choosing a strategic sealift capability, several states have generally selected the battalion as the standard unit in the design of expeditionary ships, all with amphibious deliv-ery capabilities as well as dockside unloading. Besides the longstanding US amphibious capability, other allies that are re-investing in this area include the UK, France, Aus-tralia, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy.

Th ese ships have capabilities that can be assigned to high-profi le humanitarian missions overseas where the opportunity to ‘show the fl ag’ arises. Additionally they can also serve domestic emergencies. However, the fun-damental need and task is to provide mobility and sup-port for training, readiness and deployment of Canada’s land-locked army. Unless the minimum of at least four Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) and two Landing Heli-copter Assault (LHA) ships is provided for both Atlantic

A CH-124 Sea King helicopter from HMCS St John’s lift s a water bladder to South Caicos Island, 16 September 2017, as part of Canada’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation aft er Hurrican Irma.

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and Pacifi c embarkation locations (one of each LHD/LHA would normally be in periodic refi t or maintenance), avail-ability for humanitarian and national security missions is by no means certain. Needed are types of ships that can transport a ground force and are robust enough to be able to carry and deploy air defence and ground attack ele-ments. Th e possible use of naval assets for command and control must be part of the expeditionary package. Th e requirement is for a prudent choice of ships, adequately sized with the fl exibility and growth potential to meet changing needs over their lives of 40 to 50 years, a period in which Canada’s population, economic power, external interests and defence requirements will grow. Th ese ships should be capable of providing space and infrastructure for medical support, and for off shore command and con-trol HQs.

Recent operations aft er Hurricane Irma by the RCN and allied navies have highlighted a pressing need for Canada to consider the acquisition of dedicated ‘peace-support’ ships to meet the unique demands of HA/DR. Special-ized naval vessels dedicated to this mission would off er an adaptable solution to address catastrophes worldwide. Th ey would represent a visible symbol of Canada’s com-mitment to bringing stability to fragile states and helping societies recover in the aft ermath of crisis. Such strategic amphibious ships would act as a sea-base, with features that include a substantial sealift capacity to move person-nel, vehicles, force logistics and humanitarian materiel into theatre. Th ere would be equipment to transfer cargo

at sea, and deck space to accommodate and operate me-dium/heavy-lift aircraft and landing craft . Th ese landing craft would act as the ship-to-shore connectors to project, sustain and support a force ashore, as well as to recover it. Th e internal space could be dedicated to a joint operation HQ, act as a fl oating civil-military coordination centre, as well as medical and dental facilities with accommoda-tions for evacuees.

Specialized naval vessels dedicated to 'peace-support' missions would offer an adaptable solution to address catastrophes worldwide.

Such vessels would likely be among the most heavily used assets in the future Canadian maritime force inventory. Th ey would be capable of anticipatory pre-positioning or rapid deployment, be able to carry large volumes of hu-manitarian cargo, emergency vehicles and related sup-plies. Th ese vessels would also be able to accommodate Vertical and/or Short Take-Off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft for joint operations. With these features, such peace-support ships would be an ideal platform for Ca-nadian joint action across a range of relatively permis-sive expeditionary scenarios. Situations where the ships would be used include the evacuation of non-combatants from zones of incipient confl ict, and support to forces ashore during confl icts. Moreover, such vessels would likely emerge as the principal Canadian defence diplo-macy assets. Th ey could be deployed routinely to regions

of strategic interest to Canada, with a range of personnel and joint capabilities to strengthen regional capacities and strategic partnerships. More broadly, they could conduct goodwill missions with other federal agencies and non-governmental organizations.

Th e Canadian navy cannot now provide ap-propriate ships to transport ground force troops with associated air support, equipment and stores. Th e planned two Protecteur-class and interim AOR ships will each have a very small measure of this capability but are be-ing designed for employment primarily as re-placements of the old AOR fl eet supply ships in direct support of long-range operations of future frigates. Th ey are not designed to carry troop formations. Subject to availability, they will not eliminate reliance on chartered sealift when speed of delivery is a key requirement.

A force development plan that provides for app-ropriate manning and training for a force de-signed for expeditionary missions is required

A MV-22 Osprey takes off from USS America LHA 6 during integration testing for the F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, visible upper right, in November 2016. Th e USS America-class is one option Canada should consider.

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with a command element that serves as the at-seaor land-based HQ for the entire force and allowsa single command to exercise control over all ground,aviation and combat service support forces. A ground combat element would provide the force with its main combat punch, built around an infantry battalion rein-forced with armour, artillery, amphibious vehicles, engi-neers and reconnaissance assets. Th e deployment of these assets is totally mission dependent. Th e force must al-ways be capable of dealing with the worst-case scenario and always have the capability of being augmented and sustained by additional follow-on forces. Aviation combat elements that consist of medium- to heavy-lift helicopter assets, air defence and ground attack aircraft either fi xed wing (VSTOL) or rotary wing, and all necessary ground support assets will be a required element of any strategic sealift capability. An on-board service support group will provide the force with mission-essential support such as medical/dental assistance, logistics, supply and mainte-nance, and forward ship-based operation capabilities.

A base like Shearwater on the Atlantic, with its generous facilities including a long runway and railway infrastruc-ture in close proximity to the Halifax Harbour, would be a critical element to a dedicated sealift capability. Shear-water is an ideally located part of any Canadian sealift ex-peditionary force. Similarly, Esquimalt is the location of choice for basing sealift ships on the West Coast, although the limitations of the Victoria airport and lack of a suit-able railhead on the island would favour Vancouver as the West Coast port of embarkation.

When humanitarian disasters strike at home or overseas, one of the most prominent responses the government of Canada can deploy are the ships, aircraft and personnel of the RCN.

Th ere are large numbers of classes of amphibious ships around the world with each having its basic specialized mission. For example, the US Navy has amphibious com-mand ships (LCC), amphibious assault ships (general pur-pose) (LHA) and amphibious assault ships (multi-purpose) (LHD). Most contemporary amphibious assault vessels are conceived with built-in aviation facilities, as well as a stern well-dock for operating much faster ship-to-shore connec-tors. Major amphibious vessels can act as command ships, with facilities for an embarked staff and large communica-tion suites as well as robust command-and-control systems. Th e HA/DR role is of particular importance. Amphibious vessels off er a unique and oft en critical capability, able to transfer large amounts of supplies and/or engineering and rescue equipment even without the availability of harbour

facilities. Th is has made these ships attractive to navies that would otherwise never contemplate the possibility of am-phibious assault operations in the traditional meaning of the term. Many of Canada’s allies have placed great empha-sis on dedicated amphibious sealift capabilities.

Ships with these capabilities have a diverse range of uses other than combat. Amphibious ships would provide the RCN with the ability to perform a ‘peacetime helping role’ for which the Canadian public has an expressed appetite. When humanitarian disasters such as typhoons, earth-quakes, or hurricanes strike at home or overseas, one of the most prominent responses the government of Canada can deploy are the ships, aircraft and naval personnel of the RCN. Ships and their crew provide self-sustaining, self-contained humanitarian assistance, as sailors can live aboard and be fed from their ship’s galleys without straining local resources. On site, these ships could aid in the evacuation of residents and tourists, repair infra-structure and provide supplies to stranded citizens. Hav-ing such dedicated amphibious sealift capabilities would better equip the RCN to provide humanitarian aid, re-spond to natural disasters (especially in remote stretches of coastline), engage in search-and-rescue operations and participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions. As platforms from which the full range of helicopter support operations can be conducted, as well as VSTOL fi ghter op-erations, if necessary, ships of the LHA/LHD type would provide an important part of the necessary fl eet balance and fl exibility needed to meet government mandates for Canada’s navy.

Th ere are several ships that would make excellent options. Any one of these LHDs would be a substantial fl ag ship for the RCN and a game changer for Canada. First, is the Spanish Juan Carlos-class, a 27,500 ton 230.8m (758ft ) LHD that has four decks, a dock and garage for heavy cargo, a habitability deck, a hangar and light cargo garage and a fl ight deck with a 12° sky-jump. Th is LHD runs on

HMCS Regina and USCGC Mellon, along with three Orca-class patrol training craft and two Kingston-class maritime coastal defence vessels, dock at Canada Place in Vancouver during exercises to prepare for the 2010 Winter Olympics. With its transcontinental railhead and large international airport, Vancouver would play an essential role in supporting RCN amphibious ship operations.

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combined diesel-electric and gas turbine (CODELOG) propulsion systems. Th e electric engines are powered by one gas turbine and two diesel generators. Two pod-type propellers of 11mw each support the system with a maxi-mum sustained speed of 21 knots. Th e ship is equipped with four 20mm guns and four 12.7mm machine guns, however armaments can be upgraded as required. Th is LHD is a multi-purpose vessel that can be used as an air-craft carrier as well as for amphibious and HA/DR opera-tions. Th e Australian navy has already acquired two Juan Carlos (Canberra-class) LHDs – HMAS Canberra and Adelaide – which are now operational. Australia’s naval humanitarian response is centred on this helicopter dual-purpose platform, which can carry four landing craft , 100 vehicles, six to 10 helicopters and over 1,000 troops (short term). In early 2016, HMAS Canberra responded to a typhoon in Fiji with over 100 tonnes of humanitarian supplies, and a complement of several hundred engineers, carpenters, electricians and plumbers, all of whom were able to access even the most remote areas in the Fijian ar-chipelago using the ship’s helicopters and landing craft . Turkey has also bought this LHD, now being constructed.

Th e next option is the Italian Trieste-class. Th e fi rst of the Italian Trieste-class is a 33,000 ton, 245m (803ft ) LHA, with a maximum speed of 25 knots. It was laid down in July 2017 and is expected to be commissioned in 2022. It is equipped with two gas mt30 turbine engines (CODELOG) models from Rolls Royce with improved weight/power ra-tio effi ciency. It can accommodate 1,064 personnel (crew and battalion strength). It has a range of 7,000 nautical miles (nm) and can sail over 30 days without storing. Th e Indian Navy may also acquire this LHA. Th is class has similar characteristics to the Juan Carlos-class but is able to carry more aircraft and humanitarian relief equipment, has better armaments and a top speed of 25+ knots.

Th e third option is the German Blohm-Voss-class design, a 23,000 ton, 209m (686ft ) LHD, with a beam of 31.3m (103ft ) and a draft of 6.45m (22ft ). Its main propulsion plant of six diesel-electric generators and two electric mo-tors gives it a maximum speed of 21 knots. Th e robust, proven and economical diesel-electric propulsion sys-tem driving two CODELOG propulsion plants is simple

to operate and maintain but provides a superior acoustic signature, vulnerability and shock resistance as well as a shallower navigating draught than other propulsion ar-rangements, such as pod-mounted drives. It can accom-modate 1,434 personnel (crew and battalion strength) and provides a cost-eff ective means of transporting and sup-porting a mechanised battalion and its vehicles, equip-ment by helicopter, landing craft , hovercraft and raft s. It has a range of 10,000 nm and can sail over 30 days without storing. Th is LHD design uniquely incorporates a stepped multi-purpose deck aft , which can be a landing spot for helicopters, with horizontal hangar access, or used for the stowing of up to 54 TEU containers, allowing the ship to carry a large amount of logistic support equipment and stores without interrupting fl ying operations, as the large 4,800m² main fl ight deck remains clear with four landing spots and vertical hangar access. Th e main fl ight and multi-purpose decks are served by a 24-ton slewing crane. A spa-cious 985m² well-dock plus four davit positions can carry up to eight landing craft of various types. Vehicles are stowed on a special 2,250m² vehicle deck, with roll on/roll off (Ro-Ro) access via stern and side ramps. Th is LHD class is equipped with theatre-level command and control for amphibious op-erations, extensive casualty evacuation and hospital facilities and is capable of carrying 1,000 tons of cargo. Th ese capabili-ties make this ship superb at HA/DR operations and general support to remote stations and islands.

Fincantieri’s Multirole LHD design was selected to replace Italy’s Giuseppe Garibaldi light aircraft carrier, and steel was cut 12 July 2017.

Known better for its submarines, surface combatants and logistical support ships, Germany’s Th yssenKrupp Marine Systems has also off ered the Blohm+Voss-class LHD in its product line.

Th e fourth option is the USS America-class, a 45,000 ton, 257m (844ft ) LHA with a beam of 32m (105ft ) and a draft of 7.9m (26ft ). Th ere are several of these LHAs ei-ther in service, under construction or planned. It has a crew of over 900 sailors and can carry two Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCACs) and one utility landing craft (LHA-8 and beyond). Armaments include two rolling air-frame missile launchers, two Evolved Sea Sparrow missile launchers, two 20mm Phalanx, two close-in weapon sys-tem mounts and seven Twin .50 bmg machine guns.

Th e fi nal option is the French-built Mistral-class, a 21,300 ton (full load), 199m (652ft ) LHD with a beam of 32m

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(105ft ) and a draft of 6.3m (21ft ). It has a crew of 160 sail-ors. It can carry up to four landing craft , up to 59 vehicles, up to 16 heavy-lift or 35 light helicopters, and has a troop capacity of 450 for long durations. It has three diesel and one auxiliary diesel alternators with two Azimuth thrust-ers of 7mw each and two fi ve-bladed propellers giving it a top speed of 18.8 knots. Armed with two Simbad launch-ers, and four 12.7mm m2-hb Browning machine guns, two Breda-Mauser 30 mm/70 guns are also included in the design. Th ere are three of this class now operational in the French Navy with a further two of these ships having already been sold to the Egyptian Navy.

With the exception of the Mistral-class, all other classes can carry, as a minimum, at least one full Canadian army regiment strength with the Trieste-class able to carry clos-er to one Canadian battalion strength, if required, and the USS America-class able to carry at least one Canadian battalion/brigade strength for forced landings with all equipment. All have exceptional command-and-control capabilities. Both Juan Carlos- and Trieste-classes are fi t-ted with up to four Landing Craft Mechanized (LCMs) with room for up to 46 Leopard II tanks per ship. All classes can carry updated LAV IIIs along with all support vehicles. Th e Juan Carlos-, Trieste- and America-classes carry as a minimum at least 10-12 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, Griffi n helicopters and/or up to 15 attack or reconnaissance helicopters and up to 24 VSTOL aircraft (8A Harrier or F35B), with a signifi cant capability for un-manned aerial vehicles. (Th e Mistral-class is unable to carry any VSTOL aircraft .)

Th ey all have substantial triage hospitals with room from 70 to 100+ patients along with x-ray and dental facilities and pilot briefi ng rooms. Th ey have a signifi cant HA/DR capability with the ability to carry up to 144+ large con-tainers. Any one of these ship classes would give Canada the potent amphibious sealift capability it has been sorely missing and give the Canadian government the fl exibility and agility to respond quickly to crises around the world. Th ese ships (with the exception of the America-class) could be built either in Canada or Spain, Italy, France

or Germany with contracts awarded to the best bidding shipyard.

Canada, however, must have enough naval, air force and army personnel to man these amphibious peace-support ships. Recruitment and training of more sailors, airmen and army personnel into the CAF will be vital, possibly bringing up CAF strength by at least 4,000-5,000.

Hopefully, the Canadian government will learn from the experiences of its NATO allies and Australia and recog-nize the unique abilities of dedicated, multi-role strategic amphibious sealift ships such as these, and the innova-tive missions they could enable Canada to take on, amid a changing geostrategic environment.

ConclusionTh ere is no denying the current Defence Department fi s-cal constraints, but there is also no denying the fact that many of Canada’s allies believe that an amphibious sealift capability brings with it enhanced fl exibility to conduct military operations, HA/DR and the ability to collabo-rate with allied states on matters of global importance. If Canada were to spend (as a minimum), at least $5 billion more annually on national defence or 2% of Gross Do-mestic Product as is the target for NATO countries, this amphibious sealift capability would not only be possible, but these peace-support ships could easily be built in Can-ada from existing LHA/LHD amphibious ship designs al-ready being built or under construction worldwide. Th ere would be absolutely no lasting negative eff ects on Cana-da’s defence needs in the future, or on Canada’s economy if this were done. To try to achieve this capability under current fi scal constraints would be diffi cult at best. To ac-complish this perhaps the Victoria-class submarines may have to be utilized in service for several years longer than their shelf-life.

David Dunlop is a retired RCN Petty Offi cer 1st Class Naval Com-bat Information Offi cer with over 41 years experience as a Tacti-cal Data Coordinator for Command.

A USN Landing Craft , Air Cushion offl oads an ambulance on to a beach during Exercise Bold Alligator 2017, which took place along the US eastern seaboard October 2017. Th e ability to land emergency assets on to unprepared areas is crucial in the aft ermath of some natural disasters which may render port facilities inoperable.

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Strategic Maritime Planningand the Role of P&I Clubs

Heinz Gohlish

Maritime sanctions are one of the tools used to convince a target state to engage in behaviour acceptable to the globalorder, usually in response to a specifi c action deemed harmful to international interests. Clearly, among the most important actors needed to make maritime sanc-tions eff ective are ship owners. However, ship owners operate on a profi t-making basis, and sanctions may be problematic and contrary to their own interests. As an in-ternational industry, ship owners are unlikely to take an altruistic view in pursuit of more narrow political objec-tives that do not concern them. Nevertheless, ship owners can be encouraged to comply if their own assets are at risk and, short of military or police action, the most eff ective pressure point comes from their Protection and Indem-nity (P&I) Club, particularly if the P&I Club operates in the region where the sanctions are being enforced.

Canadian Naval Review recently published a thought-provoking article by Dr. Robert Huish of Dalhousie Uni-versity which highlighted the importance of P&I Clubs in successfully implementing eff ective maritime sanctions against a target rogue state – or not.1 Th is premise intro-duced a valid and serious point of an external commercial organization aff ecting the legally constituted policy of a governmental or international authority.

Th ere are circumstances in which the commercial mari-time world collides with strategic maritime objectives normally reserved for naval and military planners. Th e matter of maritime sanctions is certainly one of them. However, it is not the only one and commercial shipping may also diverge from governmental objectives in areas of

potential war activity and policies aff ecting piracy. In all three, the commercial solutions or interests may not be in line with government or international policies.

P&I Clubs are international players who seldom feature in naval or governmental thinking but yet are closely involved with ship owners and operators in exactly the area where there may be a serious divergence among governmental objectives, naval and military planning, and commercial interests.

From the perspective of a government or military poli-cy-maker, the go-to organization for the coordination of international maritime policy is the International Mari-time Organization (IMO). Th is UN secretariat is a highly eff ective inter-governmental body which represents the interests of national authorities in international mari-time aff airs. However, its primary remit is safety at sea with respect to ships, mariners and the environment.2 It does not support or foster commercial interests, nor does it wish to be involved in disputes among members or to take a political stance. It is therefore not necessarily the right organization to force commercial maritime interests to comply with governmental objectives. Who then?

Th is makes the recent CNR article so timely. It has intro-duced the P&I Clubs – international players who seldom (if ever) feature in naval or governmental thinking but yet are closely involved with ship owners and ship operators in exactly the area where there may be a serious divergence

USCGC Boutwell WHEC 719 approaches a cargo ship in the Arabian Sea in support of United Nations sanctions in February 2003.

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among governmental objectives, naval and military planning, and commercial interests. Policy-makers should therefore be asking: what are these P&I ‘Clubs,’ who are the people behind them and how can they help (or hinder), for ex-ample, international maritime sanctions?

It is the objective of this article to investigate these questions and to suggest where P&I Clubs may be of assistance to naval planners and policy-makers. To do so requires at least a ru-dimentary understanding of how P&I Clubs are structured, how they work and how they have an impact across the international maritime community.

Structure of P&I ClubsTh e main P&I Clubs operate as mutual associations to provide third-party liability insurance to ship owners and to off er legal/contractual services associated with operat-ing ships worldwide. As mutuals they are non-profi t busi-nesses but still subject to all relevant fi nancial regulations and best practices.

A ship owner becomes a member of his (or her) chosen club for all his vessels (a large owner will likely have more than one club). Th e members agree to appoint about 20 of their fellow owners to form the Board of Directors. Th e board (part-timers) appoints a management staff (full-timers) to manage the club on their behalf. Th e manage-ment formally reports to the board about four times per year.

Member premiums for their entered ships are paid on an annual basis. If total claims for a club exceed the estimate for the year, premiums are augmented through ‘addition-al calls’ shared by all members on a percentage premium basis. Policy years are ultimately balanced and closed af-ter about four years. Th e nature of their work makes P&I Clubs top-heavy with maritime lawyers, but they also em-ploy a scattering of mariners and commercial executives.

P&I Clubs exist for one purpose only: to indemnify ship owners or ship charterers for their worldwide legal and contractual liabili-ties incurred in the operation of their ships.

Th ere are currently only 13 principal P&I providers world-wide. Th ese are spread out as follows: UK (UK Club, West of England, Steamship Mutual, North of England, Stan-dard, Ship Owners’, London, Britannia); Norway (Gard and Skuld); Sweden (Swedish Club); Japan (Japan Club); and USA (American Club).3 Th ese clubs compete fi ercely

for business but they also cooperate very closely with each other in the pooling of large claims and their common reinsurance policy through a contract known as the In-ternational Group Agreement (IGA). Together, these 13 clubs subject to the IGA include about 91% of the world’s commercial shipping activity in terms of gross tonnage.4 Th ese 13 P&I Clubs are known as the IGA Clubs or the Group Clubs.

Th e P&I Clubs within the IGA have a large underwriting department headed by a senior manager who reports di-rectly to the board. All members are vetted on entry and annually thereaft er. For new members, the application procedure includes all conventional underwriting criter-ia (exposure, spread of risk, compliances and previous in-surance records) as well as many additional criteria such a classifi cation, port state control activity, registration (fl ag), crew, trade, benefi cial ownership and standard con-tracts (non-standard contracts are approved (or not) on an ad hoc basis). Existing members are reviewed annually through a lengthy process involving a detailed analysis of the claims record as well as changes in contracts, operat-ing conditions and premiums to be paid, usually fi nally agreed during a face-to-face meeting with the ship owner. Each year some members are not renewed.

Every other P&I insurer is simply ‘the rest.’ Of these only the China P&I Club and the Korea P&I Club are note-worthy. Th e China Club has applied to join the IGA and will likely do so in the near future. Th e Korea Club (of course not including North Korea) is more problematic as the major Korean ship owners are already entered with an IGA Club. Th e remaining non-IGA insurers are small and regional in scope. Some specialize in charterer’s liabilities (as opposed to ship owner’s liabilities). Th ere are also sev-eral would-be mutual associations which attempt to em-ulate the IGA Clubs in their local regions (such as Iran) but make almost no impact. Th ere is therefore a large gap between the IGA Clubs and the other commercial P&I

Th ese 13 P&I Clubs form the International Group of P&I Clubs. Together, they cover some 91% of the world’s shipping by tonnage.

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insurers. Th ey should be treated as separate entities and one should not generalize across the two groups. In short, only the 13 IGA Clubs matter.

Operation of P&I ClubsP&I Clubs exist for one purpose only: to indemnify ship owners or ship charterers for their worldwide legal and contractual liabilities incurred in the operation of their ships. Such liabilities include cargo, crew, collision, prop-erty damage, pollution and wreck removal among oth-ers. For example, cargo liability works as follows: the ship owner does not have an insurable interest in the cargo per se but only a liability for loss or damage to the cargo while it is in his care, custody and control and under an ap-proved contract of carriage, usually a bill of lading. Actual cargo insurance is taken out by the cargo owners but this usually excludes maritime contracts and the sea voyage. Th erefore the cargo owner/shipper needs an indemnity for loss or damage to the cargo during the sea voyage or, if the cargo is sold, up to the point where the cargo owner-ship switches to the buyer/receiver.5 It is the P&I ‘cover’ that enables this process to happen.

P&I cover can be described as the lubricant of international seaborne trade. Without P&I cover, world seaborne trade would come to an immediate and grinding halt.

En route to a specifi ed destination, any ship deviation from the voyage stipulated in the bill of lading (b/l) will fall foul of the terms governing the b/l. Bills of lading terms are usually given legal eff ect by national authori-ties through a Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.6 At voyage destination, the Master may release the cargo only to au-thorized parties, as evidenced by their being in possession

of the original bills of lading. Th ese, and other, safe-guards should, in theory, make it unlikely for a club to cover the liability for an unauthorized voyage or unlawful cargo, as was suggested in the article by Dr. Huish.7 Other indemnities work in a similar manner but subject to diff erent conventions such as the Civil Liabilities Convention (tanker pollu-tion from cargo), Marpol (ships’ bunkers pollution), Athens (cruise ship passengers), London (property damage) and others. Details will vary across a wide range of international jurisdictions.

P&I Clubs therefore deal not only with insurance (protection) but also with the legal and contractual obligations (indemnity) of operating ships. Th e P&I indemnities are relied upon by cargo shippers and receivers (as noted above), banks (letters of credit),

port authorities (dock damage and stevedore injuries), governments (environmental damage) and any other third party who has an interest in the successful comple-tion of the voyage. P&I cover can be described as the lu-bricant of international seaborne trade – known in the industry as the ship’s ‘ticket to trade.’ Without P&I cover, world seaborne trade would come to an immediate and grinding halt.

It should be emphasized that P&I cover is not open-ended. Th e cover is in fact tightly defi ned within the Rule Book that is issued to each member at the beginning of each new policy year. Th is outlines precisely what is covered as well as certain events which are not covered.8 For exam-ple, the rules clearly state that sanctioned cargo or illegal trade is not covered.9 No two members have exactly the same terms and there will be variations in clauses, premi-ums and deductibles, but all will be within the scope of the rules. In addition, each entered vessel is issued with an annual Certifi cate of Entry which refers to the rules and any special terms, a copy of which should be placed on board the vessel. Th is is the ship’s evidence of P&I cover and is available for inspection by port state control.

Th e infl uence of a P&I Club is in line with the size and quality of its membership. Individually this is moderate and the variation among P&I Clubs that are part of the IGA is not great. However, collectively the 13 clubs of the IGA form a powerful legal force and lobbying body. Th e IGA clubs do not collude but they do cooperate in three areas for their own self-interest:

1. Individual clubs cover their members for the fi rst $10 million of any claim. Above that, up to $100 million, all 13 clubs contribute via an agreed for-mula through the IGA in what is called the ‘pool.’

2. For claims over $100 million, the clubs, collectively

Th e International Maritime Organization headquarters in London, UK, is lit up in blue as part of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.

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via the IGA, purchase reinsurance in the commer-cial market,10 led by marine syndicates at Lloyd’s, up to $2.1 billion.

3. Claims in excess of the market reinsurance, and up to $3.1 billion, fall back into the pool. If nec-essary, the clubs are empowered by their rules to make an ‘overspill’ call on all ship owners in all 13 clubs. Fortunately, to date this has never happened.

If the numbers seem a bit excessive, think of a 20,000 TEU container ship or a cruise ship with 6,000 passengers and 2,000 crew. Th e liability claims on such a ship could be enormous. Th e just completed wreck removal and passen-ger claims of Costa Concordia will likely top out at $1.5 billion.11 In fact, the IGA states that the pooling agreement can cover ship owners for claims up to $7.75 billion.12 No commercial insurance company can compete with that as they must allocate ‘capacity’ to their cover limits, whereas the P&I Clubs secure their limits through ‘mutuality,’ that is, by the willingness of ship owners to pay unspecifi ed

future calls on demand by their club.13 By harnessing the mutuality across 91% of the world’s ship owners, the P&I Clubs within the IGA achieve their infl uence and power.

When sanctions were imposed on Iran, the 13 IGA Clubs complied instantly. P&I cover for Iranian ship owners was cancelled im-mediately, with a premium loss of millions of dollars to the main club exposed to this business.

One further important point needs to be made before dis-cussing the impact of the clubs and how they might inter-act with strategic planners. We have not yet mentioned how clubs compel their members to follow the rules. On the face of it, it appears possible that a ship owner could join a P&I Club, pay his premiums and then go his own way. However, the clubs have two eff ective weapons at their disposal to prevent this from happening:

1. Any breach of the rules, breach of an approved contract (mainly bills of lading and charter par-ties), non-payment of premiums, breach of In-stitute Warranty Limits (IWL), defi ance of War Exclusion Zones, non-compliance of sanctions, transporting contraband cargo or submitting false information on which the underwriter would have relied, whether deliberate or inadvertent, re-sults in an immediate and automatic cancellation of cover for that vessel or voyage. If the breach is deliberate or persistent or through gross negli-gence, the cancellation can be made retrospective, that is, from inception and could apply to all the member’s entered ships.

2. Th e clubs are indemnity insurers, not direct in-surers. Th erefore, when cover has been cancelled for a ship owner, there is no recourse by third parties against the clubs. When cover is cancelled

Th e bulk grain carrier MV Marathassa leaked 2,700 litres of fuel oil while anchored in English Bay off Vancouver in April 2015. Since February 2017, the ship has been covered under Standard Club P&I, one of the 13 IGA Clubs.

HMCS Winnipeg escorts a World Food Program vessel in the Gulf of Aden in April 2009 at the height of the Somali piracy attacks.

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retrospectively, all existing claims will no longer be supported and fi les will be closed. A member will likely have hundreds of active claims; a large member may have over a thousand. Again, the claimants will have no direct recourse against the club.

Cancellation of cover is a serious event but exercised fre-quently (most oft en due to non-payment of premiums).

If a businessman is in trouble, he will likely say ‘call my lawyer’; a ship owner will say ‘call my club.’

While the P&I Clubs can enforce their rules, they can-not physically stop illegal trade. If a ship owner breaches the rules but there is no incident, the owner may get away with it. If there is an incident, and almost every voyage has the potential for an incident, the owner will be ex-posed to cancellation. A sub-standard single-ship opera-tor may take such a risk but a reputable ship owner or one with exposed assets will not.

Impact of P&I ClubsIt should now be evident that the 13 IGA P&I Clubs, indi-vidually and collectively have a very detailed knowledge of commercial seaborne transport as well as a close work-ing relation with almost all shipping companies world-wide. It could be inferred that the senior management of P&I Clubs have an unrivalled understanding of all of the following: maritime practice; international trade; com-mercial shipping; maritime conventions; maritime insti-tutions; and maritime law across multiple jurisdictions. And they have at their disposal day-to-day contacts directly with the key ship owners who make the globalization of maritime trade happen. In addition they have access to their own network of legal and commercial representatives in each trading port around the world. Th is confl uence of knowledge, experience and contacts is arguably unique.

Despite their business rivalry, P&I Clubs do work together when they must. For example, when sanctions were im-posed on Iran, the 13 IGA Clubs (and others) complied instantly. P&I cover for Iranian ship owners was cancelled immediately, with a premium loss of millions of dollars to the main club exposed to this business (Steamship Mutual). Owners of non-Iranian ships trading into Iran but entered with an IGA Club were given precise instructions on their duty of care to ensure only compliant cargo was carried. However, the caveat here is that the clubs do not off er a vet-ting service and they cannot directly enforce compliance with sanctions or other edicts.

Th erefore, even though P&I Clubs remain commercial or-

ganizations whose sole interest is their ship owner mem-bers, the clubs within the IGA are uniquely placed to har-ness their experience, information and contacts to achieve wider objectives via international bodies such as the UN/IMO. At strategic or maritime planning levels, the follow-ing should be relevant:

• With 13 IGA Clubs, each with about 20-25 ship owner board members, there are about 300 ship owners to whom there is direct access via the P&I Clubs. It can safely be assumed that these are the key ship owners worldwide and the leaders in the ship owning industry. Th e board members will represent every maritime state and every seaborne trade. On a specifi c policy matter, having this group on board has in eff ect covered the worldwide shipping community.