VOLUME 35, NUMBER 2 2010 Vol 35 No 2.pdfReference Branch: Marine Historians Conduct Research at the National ... and search missions near Tarin Kowt. In addition to difficulties presented

VOLUME 35, NUMBER 2 2010

BULLETIN OF THE MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL PROGRAMDISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

PCN 10401220100

HISTORYDIVISION

PRESIDENTMARINE CORPS UNIVERSITYMajGen Robert B. Neller, USMC

DIRECTORDr. Charles P. Neimeyer

DEPUTY DIRECTORPaul J. Weber

CHIEF HISTORIAN Charles D. Melson

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANTCynthia M. Meyer

HISTORIES BRANCHCharles D. Melson (Branch Head);Charles R. Smith (Senior Historian);Dr. Fred H. Allison; Dr. Thomas M.Baughn; Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser; A.Rob Taglianetti; Paul W. Westermeyer

HISTORICAL REFERENCE BRANCHRobert V. Aquilina (Branch Head);Annette D. Amerman; Shelia Boyd;Beth L. Crumley; Lena M. Kaljot;Kara R. Newcomer

FIELD HISTORY BRANCHCol Stephen E. Motsco; LtCol MichaelI. Moffett; LtCol Gregory C. McCarthy;CWO-4 Timothy S. McWilliams

EDITING AND DESIGN BRANCHKenneth H. Williams (Branch Head);James M. Caiella; Andrea L. Connell;Dr. Stephen E. Evans; W. StephenHill; Robert A. Kocher; Gregory A.Macheak; Vincent J. Martinez; WandaJ. Renfrow; Jeanette L. Riffe

Marine Corps History Division3078 Upshur Avenue

Quantico, Virginia 22134Telephone (703) 432-4877http://[email protected]

Motto of the United States Marine Corps in the 1812 era

Historical Bulletin Vol. 35, No. 2 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS

About the Cover: An Afghan man and his son, withepilepsy, wait for medical care during CooperativeMedical Assistance in the village of Sperah,Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Free-dom on 9 December 2004.

Photo by Cpl Justin L. Schaeffer

From the Director: 100th Anniversary of Marine Corps AviationDr. Charles P. Neimeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Histories Branch: Task Force Genghis and Operation Asbury ParkErin F. Bergmeister and Dr. Nathan S. Lowrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Battle Valor in Khabargho, AfghanistanElizabeth J. Bubb and Dr. Nathan S. Lowrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

First to Write: Roosevelt Removes the Marines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13Wake Island DefenseCharles D. Melson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Book Review: Vietnam: Lost Victory?Lt David A. Melson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

In Memoriam: Major General Fred E. Haynes; Colonel John P. Murtha Jr.;Lieutenant Colonel John J. GuentherAnnette D. Amerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

First to Write: U.S. Marines in Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18Book Review: Peacekeeper Marines in 1983 Beirut BombingLtCol Gregory C. McCarthy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Reference Branch: Marine Historians Conduct Research at the NationalPersonnel Records CenterAnnette D. Amerman and Kara R. Newcomer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

This bulletin of the Marine Corps historical program is published for Marines, at the rate of onecopy for every nine on active duty, to provide education and training in the uses of military andMarine Corps history. Other interested readers may purchase single copies or four-issue sub-scriptions from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. The appro-priate order form appears in this issue.

“We can only know who we are by being certain ofwho we have been.” Gen Leonard F. Chapman Jr.

24th Commandant of the Marine Corps

2 Fortitudine, Vol. 35, No.2, 2010

ErrataIn the Fortitudine issue Vol. 35, No. 1, in the story “Combat Artist: ChiefWarrant Officer 2 Michael D. Fay,” it was stated that Lance CorporalNicholas G. Ciccone was assigned to K Company. Lance CorporalCiccone was assigned to L Company. Thanks for the update fromCiccone’s former Platoon Sergeant, CWO-3 John P. Galliker Jr.

VOLUME 35, NUMBER 2 2010

BULLETIN OF THE MARINE C ORPS HISTORICAL PROGRAM

Fortitudine, Vol. 35, No.2, 2010 3

From the Director

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

100th Anniversary ofMarine Corps Aviation

For the past year and one-half, theHistory Division has been working

on a multibook project that will com-memorate the 100th anniversary of thefounding of Marine Corps aviation.Marine Corps aviation began with thevery first Marine Corps aviator,Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham. InMay, 1912, Cunningham was officiallydesignated naval aviator five—he wasthe fifth naval service officer, trainedfor aviation duty—but he was first towear the uniform of a Marine. Cunningham was soon joined by a

fellow Marine, Lieutenant Bernard L.Smith. Smith was designated naval avi-ator six but was Marine aviator two.While the more famous Cunninghamwould rightfully be heralded in lateryears as the founding father of MarineCorps aviation, the significant contri-butions of Smith should be remem-bered as well. Movie-star handsomeand possessing a gregarious personal-ity, Smith’s view on Marine Corps avi-ation differed from Cunningham’s inone minor respect. While Cunninghamproposed that the Corps focus ondeveloping its aviation arm indepen-dent of the other services, Smithbelieved that both the Navy andMarine Corps needed to work on thisemerging technology together. Inmany ways, history has proven bothmen correct. Smith was not content to just focus

on theory. In January 1914, he, alongwith Second Lieutenant William M.McIlvain (Marine aviator three) and 10enlisted mechanics, took a Curtiss fly-ing boat and participated in theJanuary–February 1914 fleet exercisesoff Culebra, Puerto Rico. Smith andMcIlvain took turns taking a numberof Marine ground officers on flyingtours over Culebra and vividly demon-strated the utility of aviation to them—with the most important element beingthe added benefit that “organic” air-

craft gave to the Marine landing forcecommander. As war clouds loomed in Europe,

the Commandant sent Smith to be an“aviation observer” in Paris. Smithgathered intelligence on the aviationmethodology of the British, French,and Germans, and also collected infor-mation—he made a secret reconnais-sance mission to Switzerland—on howthese nations organized their air forcesfor combat over the Western Front. Heeven flew several combat missionsover enemy lines with French aviationunits. In 1917 and back in the UnitedStates, Smith helped to reorganizeMarine Corps aviation. Largely due toSmith’s recommendations, MarineCorps aviation was deployed in WorldWar I and was a success under thecommand of Lieutenant Cunningham.

Cunningham’s aviators, in just threemonths’ time, conducted 57 air

raids, shot down 12 enemy aircraft,and dropped 52,000 pounds ofbombs. One of Cunningham’s aviators,Second Lieutenant Ralph Talbot, andhis rear machine gunner, GunnerySergeant Robert G. Robinson, afterbeing attacked by 12 German fighters,succeeded in shooting down two ofthem even though Robinson waswounded multiple times. Both menbecame the first members of MarineCorps aviation to receive the Medal ofHonor. Perhaps Smith faded from view so

quickly after the end of World War Ibecause he resigned his commissionin 1920. Fortunately for the MarineCorps, Cunningham remained in uni-form and continued to help define therole of aviation for years to come. Asa civilian, Smith became the super-intendent and chief engineer for PanAmerican Airways in Key West,Florida. After a short flirtation with fly-ing for the Navy as a reservist, Smith

was back in the Marine Corps fold by1937 and became an advisor to theCommandant for the barrage balloonprogram on the eve of World War II.In February 1947, Smith was tragicallykilled when his automobile collidedwith a high-speed train in CoralGables, Florida. Gone but not forgot-ten, Lieutenant Smith should beremembered as one of the Corps’founding fathers of aviation. Whilecertainly not on the same level as thelong serving “father of Marine Corpsaviation,” Alfred Cunningham, Smithshould be seen as a very close secondfor the right to this coveted moniker.The centennial book project will be

about Marine Corps aviators and air-craft, past and present. Founding pio-neers like Alfred Cunningham,Bernard Smith, William McIlvain,Frank Evans, and Roy Geiger will beprominently featured throughout thecommemorative books. I hope allreaders will discover that today’sMarine Corps aviation was born out ofthe pioneering efforts of the firstMarine aviators.

Finally, this issue of Fortitudine fea-tures a story about one of the first

operations for the Marine Corps inAfghanistan. Two History Divisioninterns from the summer of 2009 andDr. Nathan S. Lowrey, who wrote asoon-to-be-published monograph onAfghanistan, give us a peek into oneof the early and quite successful oper-ations called Operation Asbury Park.Battalion Landing Team 1/6 of the 22thMarine Expeditionary Unit, along withcomponents of the Afghan NationalArmy and Afghan militiamen,deployed for 17 days in ZabolProvince. The excellent pictures showthe harsh environment that Marinesconfront during their missions inOperation Enduring Freedom.

q1775q


In April 2004, Colonel Kenneth F.McKenzie arrived in southernAfghanistan with 2,400 sailors andMarines of the 22d Marine Expe-ditionary Unit (MEU). Although only incountry for several months, they playeda critical role in Operation EnduringFreedom by spearheading CentralCommand’s annual spring offensive,Operation Mountain Storm. Operatingin the mountainous region north ofKandahar, their mission was to defeatthe anti-Coalition forces, secure themajor population centers, and supportcivil-military operations to facilitateUnited Nations-sponsored elections inOctober.The 22d MEU accomplished its

objectives through a three-phased strat-egy: it established Forward OperatingBase Ripley in Tarin Kowt, the capitalcity of Oruzban Province; conductedcompany-sized cordon and searchpatrols along neighboring river valleys;and engaged the enemy in mountain-ous sanctuaries. The 22d MEU also reg-istered countless voters, initiated over$300,000 worth of civil affairs projects,killed more than 90 Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, detained an additional131 persons of interest, and confiscatedmultiple weapons and ammunitioncaches. At the conclusion of the opera-tion, Lieutenant General David W.Barno, USA, head of Combined ForcesCommand-Afghanistan, remarked,“Never in the history of OperationEnduring Freedom has there been anoffensive operation like the one the 22dMEU conducted. Never have we beenthis successful. You have made historyhere.”According to Colonel McKenzie,

Operation Asbury Park was the “deci-sive operation of our deployment.” A17-day motorized search and attackpatrol, it was certainly the most decisiveevent to occur during the third phase.The basic plan was to “find, fix, and fin-ish the enemy,” by deploying a convoyto traverse 140 kilometers of narrowdirt roads in rural Zabol Province.

Histories Branch

Task Force Genghis and Operation Asbury Parkby Erin F. Bergmeister and Dr. Nathan S. Lowrey

Intern and History Writer

Photo by GySgt Keith A. Milks

A convoy of Marine Corps’ humvees from Battalion Landing Team, 1/6, navigat-ed the rugged terrain of south-central Afghanistan during Operation AsburyPark.

While traveling along Route Spartan,Task Force Genghis would pursue al-Qaeda and Taliban forces believed tobe operating near the six villages ofSiah Chub Kalay, Khabargho,Hazarbuz, Andar, Sandabuz, and DeyChopan. Although simple in concept,the operation required more detailedcoordination than the preceding cordonand search missions near Tarin Kowt.

In addition to difficulties presented bythe terrain, weather, and distance, thearea had received little Coalition atten-tion during the conflict, and numerousintelligence sources indicated that theenemy had consolidated on key terrain.Moreover, the Marines believed that theenemy had established ambush points,dug fortified po-sitions, and were oper-ating from active cave networks.Fortunately, thanks to a combination ofsignals intelligence, close air support,and the incorporation of indigenousforces, the operation achieved resultsthat far exceeded the Marines’ initialexpectations.

Led by Lieutenant Colonel Asad A.Khan, commander of BattalionLanding Team 1/6, the patrol wascomprised of 73 vehicles and 586coalition personnel. In addition to thesailors and Marines, a small contingentof Afghan National Army soldiers andlocal militiamen were also included.The militia forces were first in theorder of march, traveling in commer-cial sport utility vehicles. Advised byChief Warrant Officer-2 Oscar P.Chaney, they provided the convoy’sadvance guard. A portion of the bat-talion’s combined antiarmor platoonheaded up the main body, mounted inhumvees and armed with machineguns and guided missiles. Followingthe antiarmor vehicles were the battal-ion’s command element, the provin-cial governor’s force, and a small sig-nals intelligence detachment. CaptainPaul C. Merida followed with oneweapons and two rifle platoons fromCompany C. Mounted in humvees,Merida’s Marines were armed withsmall arms, machine guns, mortars,


and rocket launchers. The remainingvehicles from the antiarmor platoonprovided a rear guard.Task Force Genghis spent the

majority of 1 June gearing up andrefueling at Forward Operating BasePayne, located south of the 22d MEUheadquarters at Forward OperatingBase Ripley. That evening the Marinesvisited a nearby Afghan militia com-pound where they linked up withlocal fighters who would accompanythem during the impending patrol.The Americans and Afghans spent theevening, bonding with their new com-rades, and building trust and confi-dence by sharing a meal and enter-tainment.The patrol began moving toward

Siah Chub Kalay the next morning.While preparing to establish a cordonaround the village, the combined

force made its first contact with theenemy when 20 to 30 fighters en-trenched in the surrounding moun-tainside began firing small arms at theMarines below. While the Afghan mili-tiamen and antiarmor platoon Marinesmoved to the rear of the mountain,other Battalion Landing Team 1/6 ele-ments dismounted and movedthrough a series of orchards to set upa base of fire at the foot of the moun-tain.

Meanwhile the Marines called forassistance from both fixed and

rotary wing aircraft. In addition toHarrier jets, and Super Cobra andHuey helicopters from Marine MediumHelicopter Squadron 266, led byLieutenant Colonel Joel R. Powers, airassets also included Apache heli-copters and a Thunderbolt. The pilots

bombed the top of the mountainwhere the fire was emanating fromand the reverse slope where theyexpected the enemy to retreat. Afterhalting the airstrike, Company Cpushed up the forward slope, whilethe antiarmor platoon continued itsway around to the back of the moun-tain. A search of the area recovered lit-tle evidence of the engagement. Thiswas incredibly frustrating to theMarines, who were not yet familiarwith the enemy’s tendency to covertheir tracks, extract their wounded,and hide their weapons. Still, it was asuccessful baptism of fire that set thetone for the days ahead. After theengagement, the patrol established aperimeter defense and halted for theevening.The next morning, Task Force

Genghis headed toward Khabargho,


Under enemy rifle, machine gun, and rocket-propelled grenade fire, a Afghan militiaman and Marines from BattalionLanding Team, 1/6, advanced toward Taliban positions on a mountain near the village of Siah Chub Kalay, Afghanistan.


which involved the exchange of rifleand machine gun fire at close range,the Marines killed four enemy fightersand wounded another. Three Marineswere also wounded, includingSergeant Anthony L. Viggiani, whohad enveloped an enemy fightingposition and killed its occupants witha grenade, earning the Navy Cross.Marines pursued the enemy into thevalley until reaching a suspected cavecomplex, which two Lancers subse-quently bombed.

located about an hour and one-half tothe northeast. Upon arriving, the taskforce established a cordon around thevillage and began to methodicallysearch each building and residentialcompound for suspicious personneland contraband items. Shortly there-after, an Apache helicopter, providingoverhead cover, spotted a group of 15to 30 individuals attempting to flee upa draw on the outskirts of the village.While the helicopter and Harrier jetsengaged the group from the air, the

antiarmor platoon maneuvered toestablish a blocking position near thenortheast corner of the village; theantiarmor platoon then began firing atthe retreating enemy with its machineguns and guided missiles.

Meanwhile, Company C had dis-mounted its vehicles and pur-

sued the enemy on foot. As one pla-toon proceeded up the draw, itencountered a small enemy delayingforce. During the ensuing firefight,


While the pursuit continued, otherMarines remained in Khabargho tosearch the village. According to theAfghan militiamen, the town washome to a prominent Taliban leader.Although the villagers confirmed thisinformation, they also said that theleader and his companions had leftthe previous night, heading towardthe northeast. A search of the individ-ual’s home produced a number ofuseful documents. After a long day,resulting in 17 enemy killed in action,Task Force Genghis halted for theevening.

The next day, 4 June, the patrolresumed its patrol toward

Hazarbuz. Almost immediately, theMarines began to intercept radio sig-nals indicating that the enemy waswatching their convoy. As they con-tinued toward the day’s objective, itbecame increasingly difficult tomaneuver their vehicles. The terrainhad gradually shifted from an openvalley to a narrow passage borderedby steep slopes on either side.

rants to the north, south, east, andwest. Although several persons ofinterest lived in the town, an inspec-tion of their homes revealed that theoccupants had hurriedly departedbefore the patrol’s arrival. Late in theday, the combined force began toreceive small arms and machine gunfire from a ridgeline near the easternquadrant. The Marines returned fireand requested close air support fromthe Harriers, which strafed andbombed the enemy positions. Event-ually, a Specter gunship and Apachehelicopters also joined in the attack,which resulted in approximately 10enemy dead.

After staying in Hazarbuz for thenight, Task Force Genghis decid-

ed to remain in the area for anotherday. The Marines established anaggressive patrol system and discov-ered an enemy assembly area wherelocal sympathizers were preparingfood for as many as 200 fighters.Meanwhile, patrolling to the north,Task Force Bushhog (22d MEU’s

Moreover, rock outcrops provided nat-ural bunkers for the enemy to hidebehind while firing down upon thepatrol.Chief Warrant Officer-2 Chaney, in

the lead with his Afghan militiamen,halted the convoy as they neared asmall crater left by the explosion of animprovised explosive device. Sus-pecting that there might be otherdevices in the area, he radioed for theordnance disposal team to come for-ward. While Company C dismountedto provide security, the ordnance dis-posal team confirmed the presence ofmultiple explosive devices, linkedtogether and rigged to go off justahead of the patrol’s intended path.The team detonated one of thedevices in place in order to determinewhich frequency the enemy was usingso they could jam the enemy’s radiotransmissions.Shortly thereafter, the convoy safe-

ly reached Hazarbuz. Due to the largesize of the town, Task Force Genghisdecided to divide its cordon andsearch operations among four quad-


Sgt Ryan West (foreground) yelled at his Marines to take cover from enemy sniper fire during a firefight with Taliban insur-gents on a mountain range near the village of Siah Chub Kalay, Afghanistan.


Maritime Special Purpose Force andan Afghan National Army platoon),led by Captain Jeffrey H. Buffa, hadencountered an enemy force. Theysubsequently requested close air sup-port and directed Thunderbolt aircraftonto the enemy positions.On the morning of 6 June, Task

Force Genghis resumed its patroltoward the village of Andar. TheMarines had received information sug-gesting that the enemy intended toattack their convoy and spent the pre-vious evening studying maps in aneffort to identify possible ambushsites. Because they expected anattack, it was no surprise when aCobra helicopter flying overhead spot-ted a suspicious group congregatingin a draw just ahead of the convoy’sroute. Although the patrol halted, dis-mounted, and prepared to engage theenemy, the group turned out to be acollection of herdsmen, women, andchildren.

Thankful that they had not overre-acted and attacked the civilians,

the task force remounted and contin-ued forward, intent on making up forlost time. As the task forceapproached a point where the roadnarrowed to a single vehicle’s width,with a steep slope to the right and a40-foot drop to the left, the enemysprang its anticipated ambush. In thefront of the convoy, Chief WarrantOfficer-2 Chaney and the Afghan mili-tiamen encountered more improvisedexplosive devices and received rock-et-propelled grenade fire from theirleft and sporadic small arms fire fromtheir right. In panic, the Afghan militi-amen abandoned their seven sportutility vehicles in the middle of theroad and sought shelter among therocks.Chaney realized that the Afghan

vehicles had effectively blocked theconvoy’s route out of the kill zone.Thinking quickly, he recruited fiveMarines from the main body of thecolumn, and they either drove theAfghan vehicles to the side of the roador pushed them over the embank-ment. The fast-acting Marines enabledthe antiarmor teams to move forwardand engage the enemy, whileCompany C dismounted and began

maneuvering against the enemy’sflank. Although the enemy saw thedanger and chose to retreat up adraw, a Cobra helicopter met them asthey attempted to flee.

After regrouping and removing theexplosive devices, the task force

continued on to Andar. The convoypulled through the village, althoughCompany C moved forward on footand conducted a more methodicalsearch of the area. In response torumors that a particular person ofinterest was hiding in the region, theMarines also inspected a nearby cavecomplex, which a Lancer bomber laterdestroyed. By nightfall, the patrol hadkilled at least three more insurgentsand only three of the Afghan militia-men had been wounded during theday’s fighting.After spending the night in Andar,

the task force continued to operate inthe area for another day. They estab-lished checkpoints, conducted localpatrols, resupplied the convoy, andworked on their vehicles. General

Olson and Colonel McKenzie also vis-ited the Marines, praising their aggres-siveness. One dismounted patrolbecame engaged in a firefight near thevillage, while further north Task ForceBushhog engaged another enemyforce with small arms and close airsupport. Twice during the day, onceprior to a helicopter resupply and thenagain after dusk, the task force direct-ed close air support against possibleenemy observation posts in the sur-rounding mountains. At the close of 7June, the Marines had killed another10 enemy fighters.

The following morning, the taskforce headed toward the village of

Sandabuz. Although the day’s originalobjective had been Ekrak, the Marinesdeemed the route too dangerous totravel and altered their destination.Approaching Sandabuz, they roundeda mountain and descended into a val-ley where the village was located.Shortly after dismounting from thevehicles, they began to receive smallarms and machine gun fire from both

Guided by another Marine, a rifleman with Battalion Landing Team, 1/6, firedhis light machine gun toward Taliban positions on a mountain near the villageof Siah Chub Kalay, Afghanistan.



flanks and their front. The Marinesquickly realized that the enemy hadestablished a triangular defense withfire points on the left and right sides ofthe pass and at the front of the town.While the antiarmor platoon drove

forward into the kill zone and beganreturning fire, the Afghan militiamenspread out to the left and Company Cspread out to the right. Meanwhile,supporting aircraft maneuvered behindthe mountain to block potential escaperoutes. Working together, the dis-mounted infantry and close air supportcleared the high ground of enemy.After securing the area, the task forcepressed forward to establish a cordonaround the village and search its build-ings. While moving through the town,they encountered more enemy, whichresulted in a brief firefight and thedetainment of several individuals.Rather than remaining in Sandabuz

for the night—the task force’s usualpractice—the patrol continued towardtheir final objective in Dey Chopan.While moving through a narrowmountain pass, the convoy came

under heavy small arms, machine gun,and rocket-propelled grenade fire.Having anticipated the attack, the dis-mounted infantry, working in concertwith close air support, fought its waythrough the ambush and cleared theenemy positions. In its battle againstapproximately 70, dug-in and heavily-armed aggressors, Task Force Genghiskilled 21 of the enemy, captured eightothers, and only three Marines werewounded.

Task Force Genghis spent the nightof 8 June just outside Dey Chopan.

In preparation of seizing its finalobjective, the Marines requested aSpecter gunship to attack suspectedenemy observation posts and strongpoints in the vicinity. The next morn-ing, following the arrival of ColonelMcKenzie, the convoy made its waytoward Dey Chopan. Shortly afterentering the village, the Marines inter-cepted radio traffic suggesting the pos-sibility of another ambush. Althoughthey run multiple mobile and dis-mounted patrols throughout the area,

the enemy had wisely departed.Task Force Genghis had originally

anticipated spending two days in DeyChopan, before traveling south toKiljot along a more travelable routeand quickly concluding the patrol.However, due to its remarkable suc-cess, higher headquarters extendedthe operation for seven days anddirected the Marines to retrace theirsteps, adding a stop at the village ofWeti. They completed the return trip atfaster pace, encountering limitedenemy contact on 13, 14, and 15 June.Although the enemy initiated contactin each of these cases, they had appar-ently lost their desired to fight and fledwhen met with superior firepower.Still, the task force killed four moreenemy fighters and wounded another.Operation Asbury Park ended on 18June, as the patrol returned to its baseand the 22d MEU began a well-deserved operational pause. Duringeight separate engagements, TaskForce Genghis had killed approximate-ly 90 of the enemy and wounded nineothers. q1775q

The 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed to south-ern Afghanistan early in 2004. Its mission was to

spearhead Central Command’s annual spring offensive bysecuring the rugged mountain region north of Kandahar.This sparsely populated area had received little attentionfrom Coalition forces during the ongoing conflict andbecome a sanctuary for renegade al-Qaeda and Talibanfighters. The responsibility for defeating these enemiesfell squarely upon the shoulders of Lieutenant ColonelAsad A. Khan and Battalion Landing Team 1/6, the expe-ditionary unit’s ground combat element. While the battal-ion carried out numerous operations during its four-month stint in Afghanistan, Operation Asbury Park wasthe most successful. During a two and one-half week-long search and attack patrol, sailors and Marinesengaged al-Qaeda and the Taliban on eight separate occa-sions, killing or capturing approximately 90 enemy fight-ers. In one firefight, occurring in the village of Khabarghoon 3 June, Sergeant Anthony L. Viggiani earned the NavyCross by enveloping and eliminating an enemy fightingposition that had pinned down one of his two fire teams.Task Force Genghis, numbering more than 500 per-

sonnel, departed on 1 June. The patrol’s primary objective

was to travel 140-kilometers to the northeast, betweenForward Operating Base Payne and Dey Chopan, search-ing six villages suspected of harboring enemy forces. Inaddition to a signals intelligence detachment, combinedantiarmor platoon, and rifle company, a platoon ofAfghan National Army soldiers and a contingent of localAfghan militiamen also accompanied the Marines.Overhead, aircraft from Marine Medium HelicopterSquadron 266, the expeditionary unit’s air combat ele-ment, provided close air support.After entering Khabargho on the third day of the

patrol, Task Force Genghis cordoned off the village byblocking visible routes of escape and then began search-ing the residential area. Captain Paul C. Merida andCompany C, with 2d and 3d Platoons leading, workedthrough the village from east to west. The Marines even-tually reached the edge of an escarpment overlooking abroad valley and adjacent mountain. As the now-dis-persed Marines viewed the scene, they spotted a group of10 to 15 individuals running into the valley, approximate-ly 1,500 meters to the north. At first, the Marines wereunable to determine if the runners represented friendlyAfghan militia or armed locals. Once the battalion’s air

Battlefield Valor in Khabargho, AfghanistanElizabeth J. Bubb and Dr. Nathan S. Lowrey

Intern and History Writer


officer sent out a section of Apache helicopters to inves-tigate, however, the Marines determined that the groupwas armed and attempting to hide among the rocks.After reporting the sighting to battalion headquarters,

Captain Merida ordered 2d Platoon, which had been situ-ated on the company’s left flank and was closest to theenemy, to pursue. The three rifle squads ran forward;Sergeant Anthony L. Viggiani leading 1st Squad, SergeantRyan P. West leading 2d Squad, and Sergeant Brian R.Endicott leading 3d Squad. Before long, irregular terrainmade communication between the small units and coor-dination of their movements difficult. Sergeant Viggianirecalled that “the radio transmissions were pretty jackedup . . . we had no idea where our second squad was,because of the mountains.” First and 3d Squads continuednorth for approximately 2,000 meters, near where theyhad first spotted the fleeing enemy fighters, while thesound of machine gun fire emanated from 2d Squad’sposition.By this time, 1st Squad had reached a draw on the

western side of the valley, and Sergeant Viggiani slowedhis Marines to proceed through the narrow passage incolumn. First Sergeant Earnest K. Hoopii intervened,however, directing him to split the squad into two fireteams; Corporal Mack, on the right, led 1st Team, and

Corporal Ciancivlly Georges, on the left, led 2d Team.Sergeant Viggiani and First Sergeant Hoopii positionedthemselves near the center of the squad. On the far sideof a small mountain separating the two squads, SergeantEndicott and 3d Squad moved down the eastern side ofthe valley. First Sergeant Hoopii recalled that “the terrainstarted to get more difficult as we went along. We werespread thin. There were a lot of huge rocks to hide in,under, around, behind of, on top of; it was just difficult.”Meanwhile, one of the battalion’s combined antiarmorteams had positioned itself on high ground to the rearand fired a guided missile over the rifle squad toward theenemy’s positions.As the two squads pushed forward, they received

unexpected orders to halt. They were told to wait for theremainder of Company C to link up with them and forone of the Harriers to bomb the enemy positions—unfor-tunately, the 2,000-pound bomb failed to detonate.Anxious that the delay would enable the enemy toescape, First Sergeant Hoopii informed Captain Meridathat he was continuing forward; the company comman-der radioed back that signals intelligence suggested theenemy was leaving a delaying force behind to impede theMarines’ progress.As First Sergeant Hoopii conveyed the warning to 1st


Marines, assigned to Battalion Landing Team, 1/6, searched the village of Khabargho, Afghanistan, for arms cachesand Taliban insurgents during Operation Asbury Park.


Squad, Corporal Georges’ team spotted several armedfighters, engaged them in a short firefight, and woundedone of them. Following the exchange, Sergeant Viggianifirst moved his squad forward and then directedCorporal Mack to position 1st Team on top of the moun-tain, where it could provide Corporal Georges’ team withcovering fire. Once 1st Team was situated, Viggianiclimbed the steep embankment himself to check on 1stTeam’s positions. Two minutes later, Hoopii urgentlyradioed Viggiani from the draw: “Get down here now!We got a problem! Bring a frag!” It turned out that a con-cealed force of three enemy fighters had pinned downCorporal Georges’ team with small arms fire, woundingtwo Marines in the process. Corporal Randy S. Wood washit by a ricochet fragment below his left eye, while LanceCorporal James E. Gould received a bullet through hiscalf muscle. Although First Sergeant Hoopii attempted toentice the enemy to surrender, he received no responsefrom the fighters. Sergeant Viggiani, the only Marine on scene with frag-

mentation grenades, raced down the slope to FirstSergeant Hoopii’s location and asked, “Where they at?”Hoopii recalled, “I showed him where the gunfire wascoming from and told him to use his grenade.” After ask-ing Hoopii to provide covering fire, Viggiani maneu-

vered among the rocks and around the enemy fightingposition. He later described the action:

Move down. Grenade is already in my hand.Rifle is up. Trying to be quiet and trying to moveso I can see if I can find a hole . . . There’s a holeabout maybe three feet in diameter, like if I didn’thave any gear I could jump straight down into it. Isaw like robes move. I fired a few shots in. Hemoved. I saw skin, like on his arm. I fired aboutthree more shots. Prepped the grenade and tooktwo steps and dove. It went off and **** flew every-where.

The exploding grenade killed two of the enemy out-right and wounded a third, who attempted to flee thescene. Corporal Georges quickly shot the escaping fight-er, who attempted to crawl back to the cave beforedying.By this time, First Sergeant Hoopii and Corporal James

R. McIlvaine, the platoon’s forward observer, had movedto Sergeant Viggiani’s position. As soon as the shootingstopped, Hoopii recalled that “we started to laugh, wehigh-fived each other.” Their impromptu victory celebra-tion was suddenly cut short, however, as another enemyfighter opened fire from a position on the western side

Barely visible among the rocks, Marines, assigned to the Battalion Landing Team, 1/6, deployed against entrenchedTaliban fighters in a valley near the village of Khabargho, Afghanistan, during Operation Asbury Park.



of the draw. Viggiani explained: “We get pinned upagainst this rock . . . Me and him try to get as skinny aswe can. We slam ourselves against these rocks. Roundsare skimming all over the place. I get fragmentation inmy leg from a round skimming off a rock.” The twoMarines returned fire and covered each other as theyleapfrogged toward nearby rocks for shelter. Meanwhile,Corporal McIlvaine, situated higher on the eastern slope,had spotted and shot another enemy fighter further upthe draw, who was taking aim with a rocket-propelledgrenade. “He probably saved [our] life,” said Hoopii.Further ahead, enemy fighters continued to resist the

Afghan militia force, which had followed the fighters upthe valley until the Apache helicopters flew in and neu-tralized them. “The Apaches saved [us] that day . . . they[were] awesome,” recalled Viggiani. Once the situationhad calmed down, the Marines consolidated the wound-ed, collected the weapons, and assessed the situation.Captain Merida had arrived with the company head-quarters element by this time, and he directed First

Sergeant Hoopii to evacuate the wounded and bringback more ammunition. Before long, however, theyreceived word from battalion to halt their pursuit andreturn to the village. As the Marines withdrew, a secondenemy fighter surrendered to the platoon, raising its totalfor the day to four enemy killed in action and threeenemy captured, one of whom was wounded and diedshortly thereafter.Although the Marine infantry, Army aviation, and

Afghan militia had succeeded in killing 14 enemy fight-ers dur ing the battle, Sergeant Viggiani’s actions stoodout from the rest. In recognition of “his outstanding dis-play of decisive leadership, unlimited courage in the faceof enemy fire, and utmost dedication to duty,” hereceived the nation’s second highest award for valor.Viggiani humbly remarked afterward that “it is a greathonor to be awarded the Navy Cross, but I did what anyother Marine would have done in that situation . . .everything is a team effort, it is no one individual’sactions that win battles.” q1775q


An Apache helicopter flew close air support for a Marine as he searched for arms caches and insurgents near the vil-lage of Khabargho, Afghanistan.


The U.S. Marine Corps has had itssurvival as an institution threat-

ened often throughout its history. Alittle over one hundred years ago, theCorps survived one of its greatestthreats, as it struggled to find a mis-sion in the new, steam-poweredNavy, which saw no need for Marinespreventing mutinies or sharpshootingfrom tall masts. The threat came fromPresident Theodore Roosevelt, per-haps the most progressive, energetic,and reform-minded man to holdoffice in the twentieth century.Roosevelt was a great supporter ofthe Navy, but he was committed tothe modernization of the Navy. Navyreformers, who saw the Marine Corpsas an anachronism, found inRoosevelt a sympathetic audience.As the following excerpt describes,

Roosevelt’s attack on the MarineCorps strengthened the Corps in theend and helped transform the MarineCorps from an eighteenth centuryorganization into the modern expedi-tionary and amphibious armed ser-vice it is today.This excerpt is from Lieutenant

Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, Progressand Purpose: A DevelopmentalHistory of the United States MarineCorps 1900–1970. For an electronicversion of the book, see <http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/hd/general/publications.htm> under 1973.�The Marines did get some notoriety

of sorts when the former AssistantSecretary of the Navy, TheodoreRoosevelt, in his last year as Presidentin 1908 caused the removal of Marinesfrom naval vessels. Efforts to removeMarines from ships had been made bya group of naval officers from1890–94, led by the Marine Corpsantagonist, Captain William F. Fullam,USN. These early efforts were rejectedby the Secretary of the Navy but wereagain brought up in 1908. This timethe pleas fell on the sympathetic earsof the President who issued anExecutive Order which defined the

duties of the U.S. Marine Corps andspecifically left out duty on boardnaval vessels. Not only were theMarines withdrawn from ships, but, torub it in, the Washington Post, in afeature article, declared that the Armywas to get the Marines by transfer tothe Army infantry. The newspaperstated:

Mr. Roosevelt had not onlyreached this conclusion, but hastaken preliminary steps towardthe practical development of theplan. He already has conferredwith officers of the general staff,and also with General LeonardWood, who is known to be closeto him in military matters.General Wood and the membersof the general staff are formulat-ing a scheme outlining thePresidential ideas.

The Navy Department counteredthis rumor by submitting a detailed

statement to the House Naval AffairsCommittee. It was made clear that “Itis of the utmost importance that theMarine Corps remain absolutely underthe control of the Navy Departmentand all war plans thus far laid downprovide for the close cooperation ofthe Marine Corps with the Navy,afloat and ashore.” The President ofthe General Board, Admiral Dewey, ina letter to the House Naval AffairsCommittee, reiterated the importanceof Marines within the Department ofthe Navy because of the need for anexpeditionary force to assist the fleetin seizing and holding advancedbases. His high regard for Marinesstemmed back to his Manila Bay vic-tory when he asserted: “If there hadbeen 5,000 Marines under my com-mand at Manila Bay, the city wouldhave surrendered to me on May 1,1898, and could have been proper lygarrisoned. The Filipinos would havereceived us with open arms, and there

First to Write

Roosevelt Removes the Marines


would have been no insurrection.”It is interesting to note that this

friend of the Marine Corps, AdmiralDewey, was in favor of the President’sExecutive Order 969, but for differentreasons; none were sinister. He saidthat “while the Marines will no longerform parts of the crews of the ships,the Navy is to have the services of thisfine corps for the important and nec-essary duties laid down in that order.”Outwardly, it would appear that itwas a family fight between the Navyand the Marine Corps. But of course itwas not. It became quite politicalbecause it involved the actions of thePresident of the United States and hisuse of the Executive Order. The rami-fications of the use of this order notonly affected the Navy and MarineCorps but touched on prerogatives ofCongress.The right to issue such an order

without special provision of law wasassumed on the ground that thePresident as Commander in Chief ofthe Army and Navy could dispose of

the naval forces according to his judg-ment. In a vote two months later, theSenate would dispel this view.The controversy thus became a

matter of principle involving Presiden-tial powers vis-a-vis Congressionalprerogatives. Some strong Congres-sional leaders upheld the President onthe basis of separation of powers.Among the Senate luminaries support-ing the President were William E.Borah, Robert M. LaFollette, andHenry Cabot Lodge.

The newspapers had to reorient thepeople who followed the contro-

versy from November 1908 to March1909. They had to identify exactlywhat Marines were and what they did.The public was learning, in popularnewspaper fashion, that the Marineshad been involved in the “Naval War”with Spain, that Marines served onmost naval vessels, including theMaine, and thus participated in all thenaval battles of the war. They learnedthat Marines were with Dewey at

Manila Bay and Sampson at Santiago.They learned that in addition to TeddyRoosevelt’s “Rough Riders,” therewere Marines in Cuba who fought theSpaniards to capture GuantanamoBay. They further learned that in addi-tion to the U.S. Army in thePhilippines and its occupation force,the Marines had, at the end of 1901,over 2,000 men in the Philippines.They became aware that Marinesfought alongside of the Army againstthe insurrectionists. The public wasreminded of Marines like MajorLittleton W. T. Waller and places likeSamar.The intricate matter of restoring

Marines to naval vessels was resolvedin March 1909. Senator Eugene C.Hale, Chairman of the SenateCommittee on Naval Affairs, tackedon to the Naval Appropriations Bill aproviso that eight percent of theenlisted men on board battleships beMarines. Notwithstanding the spiriteddefense of the President’s action, theSenate, by a vote of 51 to 12, adopted


the amendment restoring the MarineCorps to the ships of the Navy. Thosevoting in the negative were allRepublicans and members of thePresident’s party, the majority party.In the waning hours of his administra-tion, in fact the day before he leftoffice, President Roosevelt struck hiscolors, but only halfway. On 3 March1909, he issued orders restoring theMarines to ships, but placing themunder the orders of the captains of thevessels on which they were to serve.1

The technicality was that under theold order of things Marines had hadspecific duties. One of these was tomaintain certain guns of the sec-ondary battery. Now the President’sorder placing them under the direc-tion of the ship’s captain made it pos-sible to assign the Marines any sort ofduty on board ship and conceivablyremove them from all guns.The General Board of the Navy

could envision difficulties arising outof this portion of the order and con-

sequently recommended to the newSecretary of the Navy, George L. vonMeyer, and the new President,William Howard Taft, that it bechanged. So it was that on 26 March1909, three weeks after Mr. Roosevelthad left office and sailed to Africa fora lion hunt, President Taft issued amemorandum from the White House:

Upon the recommendation ofthe General Board it was decid-ed at the Cabinet meeting todaythat the amendments to the reg-ulations adopted on 3 March inregard to the Marines should berevoked and the old regulationsshould be restored.

The Marine Corps and friends ofthe Marine Corps on the NavalAppropriations Committee had wonout. Benjamin Standish Baker, a pop-ular correspondent for the BostonTranscript, had written:

. . . it is common to hear offi-cers both of the Army and of the

line of the Navy admit that whenit comes to being in constantand effective touch with mem-bers of Congress, and thussecuring desired legislation andfavors, the Marine Corps is easi-ly leader.

The point is that the controversy in1908 was a blessing in disguise for theMarine Corps if not TheodoreRoosevelt. If the action of thePresident diminished for the timebeing the duties of the Marine Corpsby taking Marines off naval vessels,the resulting publicity reminded theAmerican public, including theCongress, that there was such an orga-nization called the Marine Corpswhich definitely shared the tasks ofdefense of the United States with theArmy and Navy. q1775q

*Inauguration day for the incoming Presi-dent of the United States was 4 March (in 1909),and it was not until the 20th Amendment wasratified in 1953 that it was changed to 20January.

The 8 to 22 December 1941 defenseof Wake Island provides an inter-

esting example of Navy and MarineCorps cooperation before the adventof “jointness.” Recognized for its strate-gic location, the U.S. Navy began todevelop facilities including an airfieldin January 1941. This work was under-taken by some 1,200 civilian contrac-tors supervised by Mr. Daniel Teters.At the time, it was also an airport forthe Pan American Airlines clippers. InAugust, the U.S. Marines of the 1stDefense Battalion under Major LewisA. Hohn arrived to provide for surfaceand air defense with what wouldeventually total 450 men. As theclouds of war gathered, CommanderWinfield S. Cunningham along with 67officers and sailors arrived inNovember. Also present were five U.S.Army Air Corps communicators assist-ing bombers with radio communica-tions. Final reinforcements arrived bycarrier with Marine Fighting Squadron211 led by Major Paul A. Putnam. Thisdisparate group fought a sustained air

and surface battle for two weeksagainst Japanese air and naval forces.The gallant defense against impossibleodds was with the cooperation of allinvolved from civilian contractorspreparing defenses, the Pan Am clip-per flying search patrols, and the

Marines providing air and surfacefighting power. Though ending indefeat, it provided a model for successat Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, andAmerican Samoa and highlighted thevalue of interservice, civil and militaryteamwork. q1775q

Wake Island Defenseby Charles D. MelsonChief Historian

National Museum of the Marine Corps

18900 Jefferson Davis HwyTriangle, VirginiaOpen 9am to 5pmEvery day exceptChristmaswww.usmcmuseum.org


Prados, John. Vietnam: The History ofan Unwinnable War, 1945–1975.Lawrence, KS: University of KansasPress, 2009.

Attempting to explain the VietnamWar in totality is perhaps one of the

most daunting challenges facing con-temporary historians. John Prados’Vietnam: The History of an UnwinnableWar, 1945–1975 is the most recententrant in this contentious field. It con-tains thorough research into the UnitedStates’ political and military bureaucra-cies of the period. However, its primaryconclusion that “people, legislatures,and media” should have directed U.S.involvement in Vietnam is weakened byquestionable analogies to the 2003 inva-sion of Iraq and a lack of rigorous analy-sis. Marine Corps or U.S. Navy officerswho read Prados’ book will find manyquestions unanswered about bothVietnam and Iraq. Intended to rebut claims that the

United States could have “won” theVietnam War under different leadership,Prados’ book examines the strategicdecisionmaking leading to and duringthe conflict. Prados’ primary thesis isthat the foreign policy decisions ofPresidents Eisenhower, Kennedy,Johnson, and Nixon successively nar-rowed the options available to Americandecisionmakers, resulting in aninevitable “quagmire.” He contends thatthis result might have been avoided hadthe various administrations engaged in a“general political debate.” Various presi-dential-level decisions to intervene inVietnam are compared with a growing“political consciousness” that Pradosidentifies as the origin of the antiwarmovement.The extensive examination of the

antiwar movement derives, in part, fromthe book’s origin as a history of thatmovement. Prados’ appears to hold outthe antiwar movement as the “generalpolitical debate” that he implies mighthave avoided further involvement inVietnam. However, the effectiveness of

Vietnamese perspective are historieswritten by Vietnamese leaders from bothsides of the conflict over the last thirtyyears. Fewer recent sources are citedand, unlike American official sources,Vietnamese sources are usually acceptedas genuine. The disparate treatment ofsources results in an unbalanced narra-tive that over emphasizes the VietnamWar as an American political phenomenaand not a civil war with internationaldimensions.The choice of sources is a less crit-

ical shortcoming of Prados’ book thanthe repeated comparisons of theVietnam War to the 2003 invasion ofIraq and the subsequent conflict there.Many of the comparisons are conclu-sory, relying on speculative analogiesor similarities in language used by pol-icy makers. The use of the term“surge” is, for example, cited as a signthat leaders in both conflicts relied onsimilar decisionmaking processes toarrive at equivalent conclusions. The Iraq War comparisons seem

increasingly inapt as U.S. forces with-draw from Iraq. If nothing else, analogiz-ing Iraq and Vietnam illustrates the dan-ger of analyzing the “lessons of Vietnam”without adequately defining them orhow they have continuing relevance toconflicts in entirely different geopoliticalcontexts. The research that supportsPrados’ conclusions about Vietnam doesnot support his claims about the currentconflict in Iraq that has yet to conclude. John Prados’ Vietnam: The History of

an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975 while aproduct of admirably thorough researchinto U.S. policy, is not the definitive his-tory of the Vietnam War. Anyone chargedwith directing future conflicts will notfind an explanation of the “lessons ofVietnam,” whatever they may be.However, it is worthwhile reading forthose seeking a provocative account ofthe shortcomings of national decision-making processes or for those interestedin the continuing debate over whatmeaning Americans wish to ascribe tothe Vietnam War. q1775q

his implication is undermined by failingto explore, for example, the U.S.Constitution’s apportionment of politicalpower and other legal regimes structur-ing the United States national securityapparatus. The intense focus on American poli-

cy, persuasive or not, is not balancedwith detailed examination of otheraspects of the war. While the bookreflects thorough research into theworkings of the United States’ govern-ment during several presidential admin-istrations, it falls short of the “unifiedfield” analysis described in the introduc-

tion. In particular the Vietnamese side ofthe war is inadequately described.While Prados includes personal narra-

tives from members of the antiwar move-ment and even the curious inclusion ofhis own recollections of the Vietnam eraas a student, there is no discernableVietnamese voice. Vietnamese social,religious, or ethnic aspects of the conflictremain unaddressed. Indeed, one mightconclude that the Vietnam War was anAmerican policy concern and not a civilwar influenced by local nationalism andpolitics. Most of the sources for the

Book Review

Vietnam: Lost Victory?by Lt David A. Melson

JAGC, USN


Retired Major General Fred E.Haynes, 89, died 25 March 2010 in

New York City. Born 5 January 1921,in Dallas, Texas, and educated atSouthern Methodist University,General Haynes was commissioned asecond lieutenant in the Marine CorpsReserve in June 1942.As a captain, Haynes was a veteran

of the battle of Iwo Jima and, later inlife, a founder of the Iwo JimaAssociation of America. After servingas an Associate Professor of NavalScience at the University of Texas,Haynes served in Korea in 1954 as theExecutive Officer, 2d Battalion, lstMarines. Before earning his Mastersdegree in International Affairs atGeorge Washington University in 1963,Haynes attended the Air War College atMaxwell Air Force Base and served onthe staff of the Secretary of Defense. From 1966–67, he served as both

Commanding Officer, 5th Marines, andas Chief of Staff, Task Force X-Ray, lstMarine Division in Vietnam. As a gen-eral officer he served as legislativeassistant to the Commandant of theMarine Corps and subsequently com-manded the 2d Marine Division. InJanuary 1973, Haynes was assigned asSenior Member, Military ArmisticeCommission, United Nations Com-mand in Korea, before taking com-mand of the 3d Marine Division. Heretired from the Marine Corps withmore than 40 years of service in 1977.Based upon his extensive experi-

ence handling prisoners of war,General Haynes also advised presiden-tial candidates and sitting presidentson the treatment of enemy combatants.He strongly advocated humane treat-ment of all prisoners, not only becausehe believed “it was the moral thing todo,” but also because humane treat-ment often provided valuable intelli-gence at a time when the lives of ser-

vicemen and women depended on it.General Haynes, along with co-authorJames A. Warren, wrote the World WarII novel The Lions of Iwo Jima. It is afirsthand account of the 4,500 Marinesfrom Combat Team 28, 5th MarineDivision, during the battle for Iwo Jimain 1945. Just prior to his passing,General Haynes participated in the65th anniversary of Iwo Jima Reunionand Symposium at the NationalMuseum of the Marine Corps atQuantico, Virginia.General Haynes’ medals and deco-

rations include the Legion of Meritwith Combat V, and gold stars in lieuof second through fourth awards, theBronze Star with Combat V, theCombat Action Ribbon, PresidentialUnit Citation with one bronze star,Navy Unit Commendation, theAmerican Campaign Medal, theAsiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal withone bronze star, the World War IIVictory Medal, the Navy OccupationService Medal with “Asia” clasp, theNational Defense Service Medal withone bronze star, the Korean ServiceMedal, the Vietnam Service Medal withtwo bronze stars, the Republic ofVietnam Army Distinguished ServiceOrder, the Republic of Vietnam Crossof Gallantry with Palm, the Republic ofVietnam Cross of Gallantry UnitCitation, the United Nations ServiceMedal, the Republic of VietnamCampaign Medal, and the KoreanOrder of National Security Merit.Colonel John P. Murtha Jr., the first

Vietnam combat veteran elected toCongress, passed away 8 February2010 at the age of 77. Born in NewMartinsville, West Virginia, on 17 June1932, Murtha was raised in Westmore-land County, Pennsylvania. After leaving Washington and

Jefferson College in 1952, Murthaenlisted in the Marine Corps where he

earned the American Spirit HonorMedal. Rising through the ranks tobecome a drill instructor at ParrisIsland, he was selected for OfficerCandidate School. While in commandof the 34th Special Infantry Company,USMCR, in Johnstown, Pennsylvania,he completed his undergraduate edu-cation at the University of Pittsburgh in1962. With the war in Vietnam escalating,

Murtha volunteered for active duty andservice overseas. He was assigned asthe S-2 Intelligence Officer in 1stBattalion, 1st Marines, during 1966–67.Wounded twice in a span of a monthand one-half, Major Murtha was laterawarded the Bronze Star Medal withCombat V for service during the peri-od of 18 August 1966 to 1 July 1967.His citation reads in part that Murtha“displayed exceptional professionalskill and resourcefulness in planning,organizing, and executing an extensiveintelligence collection and reportingsystem within the regiment.Disregarding the dangers of hostilemines and sniper fire, he traveled

In Memoriam

Major General Fred E. HaynesColonel John P. Murtha Jr.

Lieutenant Colonel John J. Guentherby Annette D. AmermanReference Historian

Col Murtha receiving the Bronze Star.


extensively throughout the” area toobtain valuable information and inter-view key persons.Murtha continued to serve the

Corps as a reserve officer—even afterbeing elected a Congressman fromPennsylvania’s 12th District in 1974—until his retirement as a Colonel in1990. Upon his retirement from theCorps, Murtha was awarded theDistinguished Service Medal for per-sonally effecting “substantial, benefi-cial, and lasting changes to the MarineCorps Reserve.” Murtha continuedserving in Congress until his death.Commandant of the Marine Corps,

General James T. Conway recalled firstmeeting the Congressman in 2006,when he told the general that “youcan’t have everything, but tell me thetwo or three things you need and I’llget it.” Conway said he figured havinga fellow Marine in such a powerfulposition was a good thing—not know-ing at the time that the Congressmanoften said something similar to otherservice chiefs. Throughout his servicein Congress for 35 years, Murtha sup-ported the military through positionson several defense related committeesand as a member of Congressional del-egations to Vietnam and the SovietUnion.For his Marine Corps service,

Murtha is entitled to the following mil-itary awards and decorations: DefenseService Medal, Bronze Star withCombat V, Purple Heart with one gold

star, Combat Action Ribbon, Presiden-tial Unit Citation, Selected MarineCorps Reserve Medal, NationalDefense Service Medal with onebronze star, Vietnam Service Medalwith two bronze stars, Armed ForcesReserve Medal with bronze hourglass,Republic of Vietnam Meritorious UnitCommendation (Gallantry Cross withpalm and frame), Republic of VietnamMeritorious Unit Commendation (CivilAction with palm and frame) andRepublic of Vietnam Campaign Medal.Lieutenant Colonel John J. Guenther

passed away on 29 October 2009 at hishome in Arlington, Virginia. ColonelGuenther was 79. The Hazelton,Pennsylvania, native enlisted in theMarine Corps in 1948 and was a com-bat veteran of the Korean War, includ-ing the September 1950 landing atInchon and the bitter fighting duringNovember–December at the ChosinReservoir. Colonel Guenther’s aptitudefor the intelligence field was apparentearly in his career, and he subsequent-ly served at Guantanamo Bay duringthe 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, twotours of duty in Vietnam, and in EastGermany during the 1970s. After retir-ing from active duty in 1979, ColonelGuenther became a senior intelligenceofficer in a civilian capacity for theMarine Corps. He rose to the positionof Assistant Director of Marine CorpsIntelligence before retiring in 1994.His many military awards included theLegion of Merit, Bronze Star with

Combat V, and two Joint ServiceCommendation Medals. Among hismany civilian awards were thePresident Rank Award for MeritoriousSenior Executives, the NationalIntelligence Distinguished ServiceMedal, and the Department of theNavy’s Superior Civilian ServiceAward. On 19 July 1996, the MarineCorps wing of the Navy and MarineCorps Intelligence Center at DamNeck, Virginia, was dedicated as“Guenther Hall” in recognition ofColonel Guenther’s lifelong contribu-tions to the Marine Corps intelligencefield. His many professional associa-tions included membership in theAssociation of Former IntelligenceOfficers, the Naval Intelligence Profes-sionals, the Marine Corps CryptologicAssociation, and the Marine CorpsIntelligence Association. At the time ofhis passing, Colonel Guenther wasworking on a projected history ofMarine Corps intelligence. His enthu-siasm for this project was evident dur-ing research visits to the Marine CorpsHistory Division where he took greatenjoyment in sharing his knowledge ofthe historical evolution of MarineCorps intelligence. Despite obviousfailing health, this proud and courte-ous warrior always managed a warmand engaging smile, and ever readywit. He will be deeply missed by all ofus who had the good fortune to haveknown this fine gentleman andMarine. q1775q

Following World War II, the U.S.Marine Corps often found itself

called to perform dangerous yetimportant missions that fell short ofopen warfare. Noncombatant evacu-ations were the most common, butMarines were often called to per-form peacekeeping duties as well.In August 1982, President Ronald

W. Reagan ordered the 32d MarineAmphibious Unit to land in Beirut,Lebanon. Various Marine amphibi-ous units would remain in Beirutuntil February 1984 in an attempt tobring peace and stability to the war-torn Mediterranean nation. On 23

October 1983, the 24th MarineAmphibious Unit was deployed atBeirut’s airport when a suicidebomber drove a truck full of explo-sives into the headquarters buildingof 1st Battalion, 8th Marines. This excerpt is from Benis M.

Frank, U.S. Marines in Lebanon,1982–1984. For a PDF version of thebook, see <http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/hd/general/publications.htm>under 1987.

The BombingDawn broke over Beirut at 0524

local time on Sunday, 23 October 1983.The temperature was already a com-

fortable 77 degrees F, but perhaps a bitwarm for 24th Marine Amphibious Unit(MAU) sentries posted around theperimeter of the MAU headquarterscompound at Beirut InternationalAirport. They were in full combatgear—helmets, upper body armor—and carried individual weapons. Sinceit was Sunday, the compound was rel-atively quiet for a modified holidayroutine was in effect. Reveille wouldnot go until 0630, and brunch wouldbe served between 0800 and 1000. Inthe afternoon, there would be time towrite letters, read, and perhaps toss afootball about. In the afternoon there

First to WriteU.S. Marines in Lebanon


might be a barbecue—hamburgers, hotdogs, and all the trimmings.

Relatively little traffic was observedin the early morning hours on the

airport road which runs betweenBeirut and the airport terminal. Thisroad is just west of and runs parallel tothe MAU compound. The Marines hadbeen warned to be alert for suspiciouslooking vehicles which might, in fact,be terrorist car bombs. And so LanceCorporal Eddie A. DiFranco, manningPost 6 (See Figure 1), one of the twoposts in front of and south of thebuilding housing the headquarterscompound and attached elements ofBLT 1/8 (Battalion Landing Team 1/8,built around the 1st Battalion, 8thMarines), closely watched a yellowMercedes Benz stake-bed truck, whichentered the parking lot south of hispost. The truck circled the lot once,then departed, turning south at thegate and heading towards the termi-nal.A little less than an hour later—it

went down in the reports as0622—DiFranco saw whatappeared to be the sametruck enter the same park-ing lot. This time, the vehi-cle accelerated to the west,circled the lot once, thenheaded toward the wire bar-ricade separating the park-ing lot from the BLT build-ing. Turning right, it ranover the wire barricade andsped between Posts 6 and 7into the lobby of the build-ing, where it detonated withthe explosive force of morethan 12,000 pounds of TNT.Manning Post 7 was

Lance Corporal Henry P.Linkkila, who heard thetruck as it sped across theconcertina fence. He insert-ed a magazine into his M-16rifle. He chambered a roundand shouldered his weapon,but could not fire. The truckhad already entered thebuilding.Lance Corporal John W.

Berthiaume was guardingPost 5, at the fence justbelow the southwest corner

of the BLT headquarters. He correctlyguessed the truck’s mission, but couldnot react in time either to fire at thetruck or to take cover in his guardbunker. He was knocked to theground by the explosion.Sergeant of the Guard Stephen E.

Russell was at the main entrance of thebuilding at his post, a small sand-bagged structure that looked towardthe back entrance to the building,when he heard the truck as the driverrevved up its engine for the dash intothe lobby. Russell turned to see thevehicle pass through the permanentfence encircling the compound, andhead straight for his post. He won-dered what the truck was doing insidethe compound. Almost as quickly, herecognized that it was a threat. He ranfrom his guard shack across the lobbytoward the rear entrance yelling, “Hitthe deck! Hit the deck!” Glancing overhis shoulder as he ran, he saw thetruck smash through his guard shack.A second or two later the truckexploded, blowing him into the air

and out of the building. Severelyinjured, Russell regained conscious-ness and found himself in the roadoutside the BLT headquarters withdebris from the explosion all aroundhim .It had finally happened. An explo-

sive-laden truck had been driven intothe lobby of a building billeting morethan 300 men, and detonated. Theexplosion had collapsed the BLTbuilding, reducing it to rubble in sec-onds.

When the last body had beenretrieved from the ruins and the

final death count had been tallied, itreached a total of 241 Americans. Ofthis number, 220 were Marines; theremainder, Navy medical personneland soldiers assigned to the MAU. Forthe Marines, this was the highest lossof life in a single day since D Day onIwo Jima in 1945.The suicide attack by a single ter-

rorist changed the course of Americanpresence in Lebanon. q1775q


Geraghty, Col Timothy J. Peacekeep-ers at War: Beirut 1983–The MarineCommander Tells His Story. Washing-ton DC: Potomac Books Inc. 2009.

This book takes up one of the sad-dest and most difficult chapters in

modern Marine Corps history, theBeirut deployment that yielded the 23October 1983 bombing that killed 220Marines and 21 other U.S. servicemen.It is a story that has not improved withtime and one that the author strugglesto address completely decades later.The foreword is written by GeneralAlfred M. Gray, 2d Marine DivisionCommanding General, at the time ofthe bombing and future Commandant.Colonel Geraghty was the com-

manding officer of the 24th MarineAmphibious Unit, which arrived inMay 1983 and found a quickly deterio-rating security situation. Marines wereinitially deployed as a multinationalpeacekeeping force (along withBritish, French, and Italian troops)after the June 1982 Israeli invasion ofLebanon to pursue the PLO. Shakynegotiations among Lebanon’s warringfactions (Sunni and Shiite Muslim,Maronite Christian), along with occu-pying neighboring states—Israel andSyria—proved an unstable mix thatwould make the peacekeepers’ mis-sion impossible. In what would be ahaunting harbinger of future wars, theMarines were initially greeted as liber-ators, then targeted as occupiers, andviewed as taking sides in a civil warthat was only about halfway throughits 15-year course (1975–90). Geraghty states on multiple occa-

sions in the book that the uncoordi-nated Israeli withdrawal in September1983 left a security vacuum on theadjacent high ground that was quicklyfilled by forces opposed to the Marinepresence. He discusses escalatingartillery exchanges and cites his suc-cessive weekly situation reports warn-ing of a worsening security situation. While this untenable situation

would have challenged any comman-

der, the security situation still appearsto have been severely mishandled. Inretrospect, the April 1983 U.S. Embassysuicide bombing that killed more than60 people should have been a warningthat this horrific tactic was a “clear andpresent danger.” Geraghty notes thatBeirut was already known as the carbomb capital of the world. Yet, the author defends his move to

the airport barracks. While he says hewas uncomfortable with the location, itwas required to avoid shelling. Heasserts that the security of BeirutInternational Airport was not his job,that he did not have the ability to con-trol civilian traffic, and that the truckbomb was of such magnitude it didnot matter precisely where it detonat-ed. He even seems to defend the sen-try’s weapons not having magazinesloaded. Colonel Geraghty had a stellarcareer but was caught flat-footed onthat October morning.

The overriding issue relative to thebarracks bombing is the comman-

der’s responsibility for security.Colonel Geraghty points out that hewas not relieved for cause but remainsbitter a quarter century later for criti-cism he received. He and the severelywounded battalion commanderreceived career-ending nonpunitiveletters of caution from Navy SecretaryJohn F. Lehman Jr. However, it is worthcontrasting this response to the swiftsacking of several leaders in the negli-gent desert abandonment death of oneMarine at Twentynine Palms threeyears later. On the national command authority

level, the author highlights the bafflingbreakdown between President RonaldW. Reagan and the late DefenseSecretary Caspar W. Weinberger overwhether the U.S. would retaliate. Somesenior Reagan administration officialswere convinced that the Presidentordered a response and that theSecretary of Defense refused to carry itout. Weinberger later claimed lack ofcertainty about the sponsors of the

attack (Iranian-backed Hezbollahwhose leaders now dominate theIranian government today) which theauthor rightly dismisses. In his foreword, General Gray com-

plains that he could not brief the LongCommission, the Pentagon’s officialinvestigative body, about the after-action-review, but then he statesuncritically that Commandant GeneralP. X. Kelley accepted the commission’sfindings in their entirety. The commis-sion completed their work in a brisk45 days, and the entire senior chain ofcommand accepted its conclusions. Gray argues that Commandant

Kelley’s Senate Armed ServicesCommittee testimony was compellingand holds up to this day. But James R.Locher, a committee staffer, contendsin his book, Victory on the Potomac:The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies thePentagon (Texas A&M UniversityMilitary History Series: 2002), thatKelley’s testimony was disastrous,damaging his well-earned goodwilland killing whatever chances he hadfor becoming Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff.There is an excruciating discussion

about a handful of Marines trapped inthe rubble but unable to be removed.The author’s and General Gray’sefforts in the aftermath of the bombingwere plainly superb, and the fact thatthe survivors’ families view ColonelGeraghty positively speaks highly ofhis character.

The book is a somewhat dissatisfy-ing and painful walk. The author

correctly places the Marine barracksbombing as the beginning of suicidalIslamic jihad attacks on the West, actsof war that were not substantiallyresponded to by multiple U.S. presi-dents until after 9/11. The senselessmass slaughter of peacekeepers wasboth shocking and portentous. LikeColonel Geraghty, the entire countryhas been unwillingly thrust into waragainst suicidal Islamists that shows nosigns of abating. q1775q

Book Review

Peacekeeper Marines in 1983 Beirut Bombingby LtCol Gregory C. McCarthy


Reference Branch

Marine Historians Conduct Research at theNational Personnel Records Center

by Annette D. Amerman and Kara R. NewcomerReference Historians

On any given day, the historians ofthe History Division’s Reference

Branch refer numerous people to theNational Archives and RecordsAdministration’s National PersonnelRecords Center (Records Center) in St.Louis, Missouri, in order to obtaincopies of individual military servicerecords. Unfortunately, requests to theRecords Center sometimes go unan-swered for six months or longer, orthe requestor may receive a responsethat the service record was lost in afire that swept through the center in1973. Unbeknownst to the majority ofthose waiting for copies of servicerecords is that there are thousands ofdedicated Records Center employeesbehind the scenes who struggle eachday to meet the increasing demand forrecords from all branches of the armedforces.In order to obtain a better under-

standing of how the Records Centerworks and to gather some informationon several Marine Corps Medal ofHonor recipients, two ReferenceBranch historians visited the RecordsCenter in early April to meet with thethree active duty Marines, stationed inthe Marine Corps’ Liaison Office, andthe Records Center staff. The week-long visit was “eye-opening,” informa-tive, and productive, prompting thetwo of us to share our experience. The Records Center is the reposito-

ry of millions of military personnel andmedical records of discharged anddeceased veterans of all services dur-ing the 20th century as well as main-taining records of millions of civilianemployees of the Federal government.The Records Center offices andrecords storage areas are located pri-marily in a five-story building on PageAvenue. The facility opened in 1955and covers nearly five acres. Two stor-age areas of the complex run 900 feetend-to-end and have floor-to-ceilingshelving full of records. Each shelf

contains standard one cubic footarchive boxes, two deep, of militaryservice or health records. The methodfor finding a specific record variesdepending on the branch of service,time period, and/or technology thatwas in use at the time of the RecordsCenter’s acquisition of the record. Forexample, the service records for theMarine Corps are filed under the indi-vidual’s service number, making this avital piece of information that everyrequestor should include when sub-mitting a request.

Standing inside the stacks of the fifthfloor, which primarily houses Navyand Marine Corps records, was over-whelming and gave us an appreciationfor just how daunting it is to locate theexact service record a requestor isseeking. Currently, the Records Centeris experiencing a backlog of morethan 90,000 requests—while seeming-ly staggering, a minimum of 30,000requests must be maintained to keepthe entire facility functioning and

employees gainfully employed.Signs of the 1973 fire are readily

visible throughout the facility, whetherit is the singed or burned recordsthemselves or the visible signs of thestructural reworking of the drains onthe roof. Contrary to popular belief,no Navy or Marine Corps servicerecords were lost in the fire whichdestroyed the sixth floor of the build-ing. With 80 percent of the Army’s andArmy Air Corps’ service records lost inthe fire, often Marines are mistakenlytold their records were lost as well.Although highly frustrating, individu-als receiving this response whenrequesting Marine records should callthe customer service phone numberincluded in their reply letter to requestthat a second attempt be made tolocate the desired record.

With the 55 year old building’s lifecoming to an end, a new, more

capable facility is being built north ofSt. Louis and is expected to be open inthe summer of 2011. The new facility

Historians Kara Newcomer and Annette Amerman take a moment with the ChiefWarrent Officer and Sergeant of the Marine Liaison Office, National PersonnelRecords Center, St. Louis, Missouri.


will incorporate the lessons learnedfrom the 1973 fire and the decades ofprotracted and complicated searching.Environmental controls will slow thedeterioration process, and records willbe reorganized to make searching eas-ier. As records pass 62 years of age,the storage area they are held in willtransition into an archive area wheremore preservation measures will beimplemented. The new facility willalso consolidate the military serviceand medical records with the civilianpersonnel records, which are currentlyhoused at various satellite sites aroundthe St. Louis area. The new facility willoffer greater convenience for thoseresearching military and civilian ser-

vice records by having all recordsunder one roof.

With the tours complete, we werequick to begin the process of

reviewing and digitizing severalrecords of Marine Medal of Honorrecipients. The Marines of the MarineLiaison Office were especially kindand accommodating to us during thisportion of our site visit. The ChiefWarrant Officer in charge ensured thatwe were provided with ample workspace that could accommodate ourcomputer and scanning equipment,escorts to and from the researcherroom as required, and more thanenough material to keep us busy.

While working in the Liaison Office,we were privy to the amount of workand level of dedication that each ofthe three Marines provide to Corps’veterans and family members eachday. It was obvious that these Marinestook pride in providing the very bestservice possible. While not directlyinvolved in the Marine Corps historicalprogram, they are helping to preserveCorps’ history every day through theirknowledge and professionalism. Thecivilians of the Records Center werealso most accommodating, particularlyconsidering that space in the research-er room was at a premium and wouldfill up quickly. They were profession-al, knowledgeable, and provided top-notch service to us. It was a pleasureworking with such professionals asthese.

The records we concentrated onduring this visit should be readily

recognized by Marines and historians:George C. Reid, John A. Hughes,Daniel J. Daly, Randolph C. Berkeley,Albertus W. Catlin, Eli T. Fryer, WalterN. Hill, and Wendell C. Neville. Eachrecord was unique and often con-tained little-known information andlong-forgotten images of the Marines.

Maj Roy S. Geiger signs the Oath of Office in 1912 for Walter E. McCaughtry, whowas an early enlisted aviator.

Little-known or forgotten pictures cansometimes be located in the servicerecords. Shown here is Maj George C.Reid, Medal of Honor recipient, in fulldress uniform in 1912.


With the diminutive size of the MarineCorps during the tenure of many ofthese Marines, it became common-place to see the original signatures ofother high profile Marines, secretariesof the Navy, and even futurePresidents on the paperwork foundwithin the service record books thatwere examined. Among the signatureswe found were those of John A.Lejeune, Littleton Waller T. Waller,Dion Williams, Smedley D. Butler,Josephus Daniels, and Franklin D. andTheodore Roosevelt. Decades beforecomputers, e-mail, or evenroutine long-distance tele-phone calls, handwritten, type-written, and telegraphedrequests for transfer, reim-bursement, or notifications fillthe records of these veneratedMarines. Even more surprisingto both us was the strange andrandom information that wasalso maintained, such as the1925 request by ColonelRandolph C. Berkeley that theflock of chickens being housedin his Marine Corps’ Norfolkhome be removed—the Com-mandant agreed.

The biggest surprise wasundoubtedly the condition

of the records. Considering theage of many of the records thatwere reviewed, one mightimagine that the paper wasbeyond legibility; however thedocuments inside the foldersoften were in remarkableshape. Because correspon-dence and penmanship washeld in high regard in the daysbefore typewriters, high qualitybond paper was often used forthe documents. Though theink on the documents is oftenvery acidic and has beenknown to “eat” through thepaper, thankfully, this was notthe case for the records wereviewed.The materials collected by

the historians will become apermanent part of the specificMarine’s biographical file heldin the Reference Branch. Thiswill allow future historians to

fill in the missing pieces of the famousmembers of the Corps and add anoth-er dimension to the history of theMarine Corps operations in Haiti,Santo Domingo, China, and elsewhereduring the early 1900s.For those interested in visiting the

facility or obtaining copies of servicerecords, we recommend starting theprocess by reviewing the informationon the Records Center located on theirwebsite at www.archives.gov/veterans/military-service-records. Remember,for Marines, it is very important to

identify the Marine’s service numberprior to contacting the Records Center.This important detail can be locatedon the veteran’s separation documentsand even on their “dog tags.” If youhave neither of these items, you maywish to contact the county clerk in theMarine’s home county, a potentialgold mine for information, as manyMarines after World War II would reg-ister their separation documents withthose offices. Local newspaperarchives may also yield unexpectedinformation. q1775q

Two signatures of two of the “Giants of the Corps” are seen on this letter notifying 1stSgtDan Daly of his transfer. Commandant John A. Lejeune’s large signature dwarfs that ofMedal of Honor recipient, Eli T. Fryer (at bottom).


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