Volume One: Contributed Papers || Science and Play

Science and PlayAuthor(s): Michael GoldmanSource: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,Vol. 1982, Volume One: Contributed Papers (1982), pp. 406-414Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192683 .

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Science and Play1

Michael Goldman

Miami Uniiversi ty

Many philosophers interested in problems of scientific progress-- what it is and whether it is possible--have in recent years, and with good reason, focused on the challenges directed by Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1975) to the traditional belief in progress by accretion. I have argued (in response to Feyerabend's proliferation theory) that the proper locus for a solution to these problems must be the social (or what I prefer to call the "material") conditions in which proposed competing theories must exist (Goldman 1980)X. Recently, Gonzalo Munevar has proposed similar criteria in his book Radical Knowledge (1981). Our approaches have much in common. Most importantly they eschew the wholly "intellectual" criteria offered by almost all philosophers; that is, criteria which focus entirely on a theory's ability to solve problems arising only in thought (whether they be called 'conceptual' or 'empirical' problems). Even Laudan, whose unwilling- ness to separate the problems of science from the problems of metaphysics or indeed from problems arising in other areas of human intellectual concern provides a notable advance over more typical approaches, nevertheless insists upon considering science (and, one must assume, the other intellectual pursuits as well) wholly in isolation from the social context with which it interacts (Laudan 1977). Munevar's position, and my own, depart in similar ways from this con- straint. Nevertheless, while I take my own account to be a refutation of Feyerabend's anarchistic epistemology in general and proliferation theory in particular, Munevar apparently sees his work as supportive of Feyerabend's overall program (and Feyerabend seems to agree, as he has written a Foreword to the book). This difference, I think, is in- structive, and I would like to investigate the reasons for it in this paper.

Mungvar, following Toulmin (1972) and Scriven (1972), uses an evolutionary model to generate his account of a "successful" scientific theory, an account which, informally, tells us "that a theory is 'better' than another if it allows us to 'get along' better in the

PSA 1982, Volume 1, pp. 406-414 Copyright ? 1982 by the Philosophy of Science Association



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universe. (Munevar 1981, p. 54). 'Getting along better' is glossed as follows:

(a) dealing with greater ease with our environment (our 'niche'); (b) increasing the number and diversity of environments that we

can deal with (enlarging our 'niche'); (c) coping with a continuously changing environment (which puts a

premium on flexibility of response)...(Munevar 1981, p. 54).

While I do not think that this account of 'getting alng' is ex- plicit enough to serve the purpose it is meant to serve, I do think that, to the extent it does, it is correct. It is condition (c) which is especially crucial (and which I stressed in 1980), for it suggests why it would be a fatal mistake to expect that any fixed mode of interaction with nature will have unlimited survival potential for human beings. Briefly, the reason is that even when conditions do not change dramatically we are faced with the pervasive problem of dealing with a continually diminishing supply of any given resource (and of crucial importance, of any known source of usable energy). Since it is human creative and productive activity which defines a resource it is clear that it is only continual and successful science, coupled with the ability of a population to rapidly assimilate the practical implications of that science that can assure the continued survival of the human species. Munevar is correct to point out the importance of being prepared for radical shifts in survival strategies. Such shifts are necessary even when circumstances themselves do not shift rapidly but where (as in the case of diminishing supplies of a critical resource) the shift is slow but inexorable.

It is also condition (c) which leads Munevar to stress the importance of play, which, as Lorenz (1950, 1954), he associates with curiosity, as a partial model for understanding science. It is this playful curiosity, which often leads to the development of theories with no irmediate payoff, that best enables the human species to be prepared for predictable as well as unpredictable changes, and hence that maximizes our survival potential.

It is clear how these considerations provide support for a proliferation theory of science. (As far as I can tell they provide no support at all for an anarchistic epistemology.) The greater the number of theories being actively pursued the greater the chances of hitting upon some result whose application will be just the thing for dealing with an unpredictable turn of events. Whether it be a re- spectable, though esoteric, branch of theoretical mathematics, a some- what disreputable astrology, or some border-line case like ESP, it would be foolish to deny that it is at least possible that some worth- while consequence will follow from its pursuit. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it seems that even if we do not expect any particular useful outcome, there is probably something socially valuable about experimentation and "curiosity" for its own sake: under the best circumstances the quality of mind which is encouraged by such experimentation, by such openness, can be of value to a culture even if



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some of the particulars it deals with are not. Such mental resources in the population can often be harnessed to the solution of pressing problems, even when their objects cannot be. Even when this is not possible, the very existence of such mental qualities is probably in- fectious enough to increase the average adaptability and flexibility of the culture.

Having admitted all this, however, it is necessary to raise considerations which seriously undermine much of it. Where Munevar goes wrong, I think, is in his failure to recognize the material circumstances which make such "play" possible. It is revealing that he notes that the "play" of certain species ends when the animal reaches maturity. Similarly we all recognize that play is more characteristic of the behavior of human beings when they are still children, though of course it is never fully extinguished in adults. What is pertinent about these facts is that play characterizes the behavior of animals only when their survival needs are not threatened; that is, when short term needs have already been assured either by the previous production of enough surplus to see them through the play period or by the labor of others (parents, for instance). Summarizing the social scientific work on play of recent years, D. E. Berlyne points out that "play is usually abandoned promptly as soon as a clear biological emergency is encountered." (1969, p. 815).

It is crucial to notice, then, that whatever its long-term signifi- cance, play is completely parasitical in the immediate and short term. This or any culture must make the decision to permit play, because play does not provide the players with the necessary elements for their immediate physical survival. Parents permit their children to play not merely, or even primarily, by providing verbal cues but by providing them with the essentials for physical existence. The age at which play must end as characteristic of the individual's behavior may be fixed in the case of animals but is obviously not fixed in the case of human beings. There are class differences at any given time and, over time, the age changes, with the general trend having been toward higher ages. This is normally a cultural matter, contingent in large part upon the ability of the working members of the culture to provide enough surplus to support the players.

When I say that a culture must make the decision to allow some of its members to engage in play (be it scientific or otherwise) it should be understood that the mechanisms for doing this are as varied as the social, economic, and political structures of those cultures. With straightforwardly centralized economies the mechanisms are corre- spondingly straightforward. But even in nominally decentralized economies such mechanisms exist: more or less money is made available for scholarships in certain academic areas; enrollment in certain programs is opened up or closed down; laws prohibiting certain kinds of research (for instance, recombinant DNA, fetal experimentation) are passed. Even more dramatically, a culture may make certain resources completely unavailable. For instance, space research is possible only to the extent that the culture is willing and able to produce the



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necessary hardware. In general, any form of scientific research re- quires, implicitly, the cooperation of vast numbers of non-scientific personnel. It is always a social decision, though not always a self- conscious social decision, to provide that cooperation.

This is the locus of my objection to Munevar's position. It is a pre-condition of any culture's ability to permit its able-bodied (or able-minded) members to "play" that the culture have enough material surplus to support them and their activities. This in turn means that the culture has, at least in the present and for the foreseeable future, solved its survival problems. To the extent that some approach to science has contributed to that solution we can agree with Mune4var that that approach is "better" than other contenders. But under what conditions can a culture continue to provide resources to any and all players of the science (or any other) "game"? This is a way of raising some of the very practical questions about the distribution of resources to science, questions which add a practical, critically pressing dimension to the philosopher's intellectual inter- est in criteria of scientific truth and scientific progress.

It is my contention that the kind of social munificence implicit in a call for the support of the widest variety of scientific approaches is possible only under the most fantastic, science-fiction- esque circumstances, namely when the culture is so very wealthy in terms both of resources and of available productive techniques that problems of survival are not even remotely pressing. In this case, of course, science will have already proved as successful as we can pos- sibly hope it to be, and whatever scjience remains to be done will re- semble play in its most basic sense. We will expect no practical results from this science either in the short or long term because there will be nothing important left for it to do. Science will have approx- imately the same status as chess: there may be problems to solve, but they will be wholly self-contained problems. Nothing whatever will turn upon their solution.

All of this is a way of reiterating the fact that the "play" as- pect of science is parasitical upon the already successful (and, perhaps, rather stodgy) approaches to science in so far as those approaches contribute to the production of the material surplus which makes such play possible. Given a society with limited resources-- financial, human, material--it is extremely important to make rational allocations of those resources to competing scientists (as well as to other worthy non-scientific endeavors). It would be entirely irra- tional (in the very practical sense of self-destructive) to squander resources on approaches which have either long ago proven fruitless (eg., astrology, witchcraft) or which cannot or do not even try to make a persuasive case that they will bear fruit. To be sure the notion of "bearing fruit" is unclear (I will have more to say about this below) but the main point I wish to accentuate here is that there are very real constraints upon what a culture can and cannot support in the way of scientific "playfulness" and that these constraints are



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in part defined by the successes or failures of science itself.

Of course it is necessary to admit that the implementation of such constraints may backfire: a genuinely valuable innovation may lurk just around the astrological corner. But as a practical matter this is irrelevant. No real culture can afford to squander its resources in any and every direction, and once we admit (with Feyerabend) that no methodology holds an eternally privileged position with respect to survival potential, then we are always at risk.

In the absence of any guarantees, and when we are dealing with approaches to science which are radically different from already successful ones, it is very important to be able to identify the approaches which are worthy of support from those which are not. Does the philosopher have anything to contribute to this very practical issue once it is admitted that none of the traditional philosophical attempts to demarcate "true" science from "mere metaphysics" or "pseudo-science" will do? Agreeing with Munevar that we can know, ex post facto, which approaches were better than others is not very heT- TuT in the practical case.

Two kinds of approach for such decision making come to mind: approaches which focus on the method by which such allocation decisions should be made and approaches which focus on the content of such decisions.

Those who despair of finding universally applicable characteristics of the content of successful science are, not surprisingly, inclined to favor approaches which focus on the method by which allocation decisions should be made. Thus, Feyerabend's suggestion that direct democratic procedures be used in such allocation decisions is an example of the methodological approach, and one can easily imagine others. For instance, a Marxist might insist that only those approaches consistent with the interests of the most progressive class of society ought to be supported; this claim would then have to be supplemented by an account of what the interests of that class are and how we might identify a given scientific approach as consistent or in- consistent with it. (This seems in part to ke the editorial commit- ment of the journal Science for the People).

Without passing judgment upon the validity of either of these (or other possible) methodological approaches, I would like to suggest that the content is more important than the method, and that there are at least a few suggestions about the content of preferable approaches to science that the philosopher can make even in the absence of the reassuring traditional dogmas. Let me emphasize that what follows is highly speculative and is presented in large part to generate discussion about this most important issue.

Two preliminary precautions are in order. (1) It is probably not possible to answer the kind of question posed here in the abstract. That is, the specific approaches to science which are worthy of sup-



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port will have to be decided in the context of the real historical circumstances in which the questions arise. At one time, for instance, alchemy might be a legitimate approach, while at another time it might not be. The reason for this difference will become clearer below. (2) The question before us concerns the allocation of what are unambiguously surplus resources. We must admit, at least if we accept Munevar's account of a successful science, that an approach which is generating "results" or has a recent history of generating results, deserves our support. We are concerned here only with resources available above and beyond what is necessary for that support.

My suggestion is that a useful starting point is to consider what it is that we assume when we assume that the systematic methods of science are going to be more helpful to us in our struggle for survival than are the unsystematic (even if true) rules of thumb, folk- lore, habits, family and tribal traditions, etc., that science (whatever its content or style) is supposed to replace. One assumption, it would seem, is that the universe is lawful in a more profound sense than is suggested by the mere regularities implicit in these other techniques. This in turn means acknowledging that these other "strategies" will work only to the extent that they are instances of limited, localized applications of more universal relationships. Given this assumption it is plausible to insist that the kind of mind most suitable for doing the science which will ultimately be useTfulto human beings in their struggle for survival is the kind of mind not overly impressed by localized applications or temporary successes. It is the kind of mind which "drives toward universality", which insists that local successes (whether spatially or temporally localized) be explained by more and more universal relationships. It is further plausible to insist, therefore, that our limited resources be allo- cated to those approaches which respect this drive toward universality, rather than those satisfied with mere parochial success. This is especially important because it is quite possible that this "quality of mind" is a quality not selected for by Darwinian mechanisms, precisely because in the short run and at the tribal or family level, the ability to operate with "rules of thumb" (and not be concerned with profounder implications of them) has survival potential. We no longer live in that kind of environment, however.

Munevar insists upon the importance of theoretical mathematics, and he does so on the (not unreasonable) ground that there may be un- foreseen applications of even the purest mathematics. Plato also stressed the importance of mathematics, but he saw it as a pedagogical stepping stone to an understanding of universal truths. I think Plato's account is quite plausible if we understand it in the psychological sense I am suggesting here (and without Plato's ontological presuppositions). Mathematicians (for example) deserve support from the materially productive community because their way of thinking, of approaching problems, recognizes the kind of universality ultimately necessary for a practical understanding of a changing universe, a universe in which rules of thumb, traditions, etc., have very little survival value. It is impossible to be more specific than this because



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individual cases have to be judged on their individual merits (keeping this criterion in mind) and the kind of arguments to be made in individual cases may vary enormously. In addition, the picture is compli- cated by sociological factors. Whatever the intrinsic merits of an approach to science, some can and do become associated within a given culture with irrationality, with self-indulgence, with a kind of parochial, tribalized mentality. Certainly that has been the recent history of many "cult" sciences such as astrology. Under these circumstances support for such approaches is highly counter-productive, for such support tends merely to give credence to a cultish, parochial mentality so inimical to the universal outlook required of the scien- tist.

A second "quality of mind" that it makes sense to encourage when we assume that science can provide us with the theoretical understanding which makes possible survival techniques, is a sense of potency. If 'drive toward universality' is a vague concept, I have to admit that 'sense of potency' is at least equally vague. It is fairly easy to see what is meant here when we discuss technologies. Many people urge that certain technologies not be implemented (nuclear power, gen- etic engineering, are examples) either because the power implicit in the use of such technologies is greater than they feel human beings are capable of handling or because it is greater than they feel human beings should handle. (This is not to say that there are not other reasons for caution in the use of these techniques; that is not the issue here.) I would assess these attitudes as a fear of human potency, and would argue that human survival is not possible until such fear is overcome. It is more difficult to see how this applies to the case of theory-creation, but certainly it would imply that support be denied to "magical" forms of science such as voodoo, witchcraft, etc., which define a realm of occult power over which human beings have little or no control. (This does not mean that we shouldn't try to find out why these approaches "work" within limited populations, but, as I said above, our explanatory base must be one which is more universally applicable: physiology, psychology, etc.)

My claim, then, is that a "drive toward universality" and a sense of potency are two characteristics necessary to a culture which has come to depend upon science for a significant contribution to its survival techniques. I certainly do not claim to have made a decisive case for these two characteristics, and it was not my intention to do so. Rather, my intention was to suggest that there are criteria quite different from the ones typically proposed in philosophical literature for the allocation of resources to one or another approach to science, and that these criteria can be discerned only if we recognize, with Munevar, that science plays a significant role not merely in our understanding of the world, but in our living in the world.

My argument can be summarized as follows:

(1) Theoretical science is parasitical upon the materially productive sectors of society.



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(2) Such science can contribute to human survival by providing the theoretical tools useful in the creation and application of survival techniques under changing environmental circumstances.

(3) The limited material resources of a culture define corresponding limits to the extent and diversity of approaches to science which the culture can support.

(4) Therefore, uncontrolled proliferation is not possible, and decisions have to be made about the distribution of such surplus as is available for science.

(5) First priority must go to those approaches currently proving fruit- ful, or which can plausibly be supposed to do so shortly.

(6) Further surplus must go to those approaches likely to promote in the population the psychological attitudes most appropriate to the use of scientific techniques for survival; among these are an appreciation of universality and a sense of potency.

Notes

1This paper was written while I was studying under a National En- dowment for the Humanities Residential Fellowship for College Teachers. I am grateful to my colleagues in that program for their suggestions, and to Peter Schuller, my colleague at Miami University, with whom I have discussed these issues.

2In "Against Feyerabend: The Meaning of Progress in Science"(1980) I tried to give a criterion of scientific progress which makes use of the concept of social reproduction, and offered a quantifiable criterion of social reproduction.

3Some may object that there is an important difference between that science which leads to technological advance and that science which provides understanding. This seems a dubious distinction at best, especially today when the interaction between science and technology is at its height. But even if it were so, my arguments would remain unchanged for it is the former kind of science which would, of neces- sity, take priority.

4Many Marxist critics have insisted that the choice of methodologies in the social sciences has always been dictated by political considerations. The claim that such influences have been felt in the physical sciences is also, if less frequently, made. See any early issue of the journal Fusion for examples.



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References

Berlyne, D.E. (1969). "Laughter, Humor, and Play." In Handbook of Social Psvcholozy, Volume III. Edited by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Pages 795- 852.

Feyerabend, Paul. (1975). Against Method. London: New Left Books.

Goldman, Michael. (1980). "Against Feyerabend: The Meaning of Progress in Science." In Research in Philosonhy and Technologvf Volume III. Edited by Paul Durbin. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press. Pages 28-38.

Kuhn, Thomas. (1962). The Structure of- Scientific Revolutions. Chicago; University of Chicago Press.

Laudan, Larry. ( 1977). Progress and Its Problems. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lorenz, Konrad. (1950). "Ganzheit und Teil in der tierischen und menschlichen Gemeinschaft.,' Studium Generale 9: 455-499. (As reprinted as "Part and Parcel in Animal and Human Societies: A Methodological Discussion." (trans.) Robert Martin. In Lorenz (1971). Pages 115-195.)

- -----------? . (1954). "Psychologie und Stammesgeschichte." In Die Evolution der Organismen. 2nd ed. Edited by G. Heberer. Jena: G. Fischer. Pages 131-172. (As reprinted as "Psychology and Phylogeny." (trans.) Robert Martin. In Lorenz (1971). Pages 196-245.)

-----------. ( 1971). Studies in Animal Behavior,$ Volume II. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Munevar, Gonzalo. (1981). Radical Knowledge. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Scriven, Michael. (1972). "The Concept of Comprehension: From Semantics to Software." In Language Comprehension and the Acquisition of Know1ed&Qe. Edited by Roy 0. Freedle and John B. Carroll. Washington: V.H. Winston and Sons. Pages 31-39.

Toulmin, Stephen. (1972). Human Understandir_nf Princeton: Princeton University Press.



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Volume One: Contributed Papers || Science and Play