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    Spatial and Temporal Details in Intentions: A Cue to Detecting Deception

    LARA WARMELINK1*, ALDERT VRIJ1, SAMANTHA MANN1 and PR ANDERS GRANHAG2

    1Department of Psychology, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK2Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

    Summary: Research into lying about intentions is relatively new. Studies have suggested that lying about intentions can bedetected with statement analysing methods. This article describes two experiments. The first experiment investigates how muchspatial and temporal detail is given by people who are discussing a true or false intention in a 26-question interview. The resultsshowed that those with a true intention gave more spatial and temporal details. The second experiment examines these details in aone-question interview and whether the amount of temporal detail given can be manipulated by the phrasing of the question. Theresults showed that the amount of detail is much lower in these short interviews, but can be increased with specific phrasing. Thetheoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed. Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

    Lie detection methods have traditionally focussed on partici-pants lying about past events or about their opinions. They

    are usually based on the Undeutsch hypothesis, whichclaims that statements that describe an experienced eventwill have characteristics that differ from statements thatdescribe events that were not experienced (Steller, 1989).Researchers have recently turned their attention to peoplelying about their intentions (Granhag, 2010; Granhag &Knieps, 2010; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011; Vrij,Lea, Mann, & Granhag, 2010). Being able to detect these typesof lie is important because it deals with preventing criminaland terrorist acts, which is a vital part of security and intelli-gence work. One practical setting where detecting lies aboutintentions can be of particular importance is border control

    and transport security. Here, travellers are often asked whattheir plans are when they arrive at their destination. The maingoal for these systems is to let people without criminal intentpass through as quickly as possible while detaining those withmore mendacious intentions (Burgoon et al., 2009).

    Having an intention requires having an image of thefuture. Schacter and colleagues concluded that imaginingthe future relies, both cognitively and neurophysiologically,on the same processes that are used to remember the past(Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner,2008). That is, by using elements from memories createdby previous experiences, an image of a possible future isconstructed, much in the same way as images of past events

    are reconstructed by putting together different elements fromautobiographical memory. DArgembeau and van derLinden (2004) studied the clarity of participants memoriesof past events and images of the future. They found thatmemories of past event were rated by the participants asbeing clearer and more detailed than images of future events.The clarity of both past events and future events was higherif the event was positive and if it had occurred recently orwas expected to occur soon after the moment of describingit. As the clarity of images of both past and future eventswas affected by these same variables, images of past and

    future events appear to be related. This suggests thatalthough images of past events are clearer than images of

    future events, both can be discussed and rated in similarways. This suggests that lie detection methods used to detectlies in statements about past events may also work to detectlies in statements about future events.

    Intentions, defined here as future actions one is committedto execute, are generally remembered better than images ofthe future that are not going to be executed. The response timefor intention related stimuli is lower than the response timefor stimuli related to unintended future images (Goschke &Kuhl, 1993). In addition, intentions are remembered moreoften than unintended future images (Watanabe, 2005). Thissuggests that differences may emerge when people describe

    their true intentions compared with when they describe theirunintended future activities.Several lie detection techniques are based on the clarity and

    the level of detail of the statement to be classified (Vrij, 2008).For example, Statement Validity Assessment and RealityMonitoring contain criteria related to consistency and detail(Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Vrij, 2005), andtruth tellers typically give more detail than liars (DePauloet al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). A possible explanation for this is thatpeople remember more detailed information about experi-enced events than about imagined events (Johnson, 1988;Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Many differenttypes of detail have been studied as a cue to deception; and

    in this article, we focus on spatial and temporal detail. Spatialdetails give information about the spatial relationshipsbetween objects and people and also on the movement ofobjects and people. Temporal details give information aboutthe duration of an event, when it took/will take place, andhow it is embedded in context. Several studies have found thattruth tellers use more spatial and temporal details than liarswhen discussing past events (Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, 2008).Bond and Lee (2005) found that temporal and spatial detailswere more common than some other types of details, such asaffective or sensory details, whereas Vrij et al. (2004) foundthat spatial and temporal details are more common than cogni-

    tive operations. Because the interviews in Experiment 2 arevery short, it was decided to focus on these rather thancommon cues. Spatial and temporal cues were also consideredsuitable, because in both studies the participants discuss their

    *Correspondence to: Lara Warmelink, Psychology Department, Universityof Portsmouth, King Henry Building, King Henry 1 Street, Portsmouth,PO1 2DY, UK.E-mail: [email protected]

    Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

    Applied Cognitive Psychology, Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 101106 (2013)Published online 8 October 2012 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/acp.2878

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    travel plans. Travel is by definition movement in space, so itwas considered a topic likely to elicit spatial and temporaldetails.

    When someone lies about their intention, they basicallyexchange their true intention for an unintended future event.Because people give more detail when discussing an inten-tion than when discussing an unintended future image, wepredicted that people who tell the truth about their intentionsgive more spatial and temporal information than people whoare lying about their intentions (Hypothesis I). This hypothesisis tested in Experiment 1. Granhag and Knieps (2010), whoconducted an experiment in which participants rated theirown true or false intentions, found indirect support for thishypothesis. They found that participants rated their true inten-tions as clearer on temporal and spatial details than their falseintentions. However, unlike what we did in Experiment 1,Granhag and Knieps (2010) did not examine the number ofdetails that the participants could give.

    Experiment 1 was conducted in the lab. This is an unnatural

    environment for the participants and unrelated to the topic theyare discussing. To increase ecological validity, Experiment 2was conducted outside the lab, on the PortsmouthCaenferry. This setting resembles settings where interviews aboutupcoming travel are held in real life more closely than a lab.In such a setting, the longer interviews used in Experiment 1would be less feasible, considering the cost and time delayan interview would cause for a traveller. Therefore, Experi-ment 2 tests whether any effect found in Experiment 1 is stillpresent in Experiment 2. It is predicted that effects foundin Experiment 1 will be weaker or absent in Experiment 2(Hypothesis II). If truth tellers are more inclined than liars to

    give detail, specifi

    c questioning may increase the difference.Just asking the participants to give as much detail as possiblemay not be effective as both truth tellers and liars will thenfocus on providing more detail. However, questions that referto giving detail in a more subtle manner may work, and thiswas examined in Experiment 2. Because truth tellers are moreinclined to give detail than liars, it is hypothesised that truthtellers will respond more strongly to a subtle prompt than liars,increasing the difference between the two groups in reportingdetails. This increase in detail will lead to a better classificationof truth tellers and liars when a prompt is included (HypothesisIII). The question used prompted the participants specificallyfor time details, so we predict that this prompt would increase

    the difference between truth tellers and liars only in the amountof temporal details they give (Hypothesis IV).

    EXPERIMENT 1

    Method

    Participants

    Eighty-six participants were interviewed. Of these, 65 werefemale, 20 male and one person did not state gender ontheir questionnaire. They were on average 27.59 years old(SD = 12.34 years). There were 42 truth tellers and 44 liars.

    There were no significant differences in age or genderbetween them (all F< 1.07, all p> 0.252). Fifty-sevenparticipants were undergraduate students (in psychology,science and humanities), the other 29 participants were

    university employees (in administration, management, supportservices, etc.).

    Design

    The independent variable is Veracity, it is a between subjectvariable and consists of truth tellers and liars.

    The dependent variables were the amount of spatial detail,the amount of temporal detail and the amount of specifictimes that the participant gave. Spatial details place objectsor people in space or indicate their movement, for example:in it is in France, I went to Paris. Temporal details giveinformation about time, for example: in the afternoon,later or for two hours. Specific times (for example) attwo oclock, were coded separately. Temporal detail andspecific times were coded separately because they can some-times differ in the type of information that is given. Specifictimes always give precise information about when some-thing happened. Sometimes temporal detail has the samefunction, but sometimes temporal information is used by

    the speaker to create a flow in their narrative, without beingvery clear on when the discussed events actually occurred.All three variables were measured as frequencies.

    Procedure

    The participants were recruited via an online participant pooland advertisement. After a participant signed up to the exper-iment, a questionnaire was sent to them via e-mail. Thequestionnaire asked whether they had any travel plans inthe near future and if so where, when and why they weregoing. It also asked them to list all countries and major citiesthey had been to in the past 5 years. This information was used

    to allocate the participants to the conditions. Participants withplans to make a trip were placed in the truth tellers condition.Those who did not have a trip planned received instructions tolie. Liars were given a fake destination and fake reason fortheir trip. When they were given their fake destination, theywere asked to confirm they had never been there. These fakedestinations and reasons matched the destinations given bythe truth tellers. This matching was carried out to prevent adifference in travel destination and reason occurring betweenthe truth tellers and liars. The procedure means that the partici-pants were not randomly allocated to the conditions. Randomselection was impossible because allocation depended on theparticipants intention to travel, a factor that was beyond the

    experimenters control. Of course, it is possible in theory thatthere is a systemic difference between those who intendto travel within the next few months and those who do not.However, we cannot think of a theoretically plausible reasonwhy this would be the case.

    Those who were in the truthful condition were given thefollowing instructions: In the interview I want you toanswer the questions truthfully. Some people are asked tolie during the interview. The interviewer knows that somepeople may lie, but doesnt know whether you are tellingthe truth or lying. Your goal is to convince the interviewerthat you really are telling the truth. The liars instructions

    were:In the interview I want you to lie and pretend thatyou are travelling to [matched destination] and that you are

    going there for the purpose of [matched reason]. The inter-viewer knows that some people may lie, but does not know

    102 L. Warmelink et al.

    Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 101106 (2013)

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    whether you are lying or telling the truth. Your goal is toconvince the interviewer that you are telling the truth. Bothtruth tellers and liars had at least three days in betweenreceiving these instructions and interview and were told thatthey could prepare for the interview in any way they consid-ered appropriate.

    When the participants arrived for the interview, they weremet by the experimenter who asked them to sign an informedconsent form. The experimenter also verified whether theyunderstood the instructions (all participants did). They werethen brought to the interview room and interviewed by afemale interviewer. The interview was audio and videotaped.The participants could see the camera and audio recorder; theywere asked to try to ignore them and act as natural as possible.The interviewer had the list of questions (see Appendix)in front of her and asked them all in the same order. The inter-viewer always started with general questions, before movingon to more detailed questions. The reason for this is thatgeneral factual questions are typically asked first in an

    interview (Fisher, 2010), and it makes more sense to start aninterview with expected questions followed by unexpectedquestions than vice versa. Starting an interview with unex-pected questions is most likely to be perceived as odd. Theinterview questions were designed to elicit as much detail ofany type as possible from both truth tellers and liars. Becausetruth tellers tend to give more detail in all interviews, the detaileliciting questioning may have increased the difference indetail between truth tellers and liars. After the interview, theparticipants completed a questionnaire that asked for theirdemographics and motivation. After completing the ques-tionnaires, the participants were debriefed and given some

    sweets or a credit for the participant pool in exchange fortheir participation.

    Data analysis

    The interviews were transcribed and coded. The coder, blindto the veracity status of the transcript, reads each answercarefully and marked every spatial and temporal detail theinterviewee gave. The second rater, also blind to the veracitystatus of the transcripts, coded 10% of the sample. This coderwas given information about exactly what constitutes atemporal and a spatial detail. The second coder was givenone interview to practice on, which was then compared withthe first raters coding. On the basis of this comparison, thesecond coder received further training. After this, the secondcoder rated the other interviews independently. The correlationbetween the two coders was very high: r= .88 (p = 0.01) forspatial detail and r=0.98 (p< 0.001) for temporal detail.For the specific times, the first and second coder came tofull agreement.

    Results

    The average amount of words used by the participants in theinterviews was 1134 (SD = 889.6). The interviews lasted onaverage 447.5 second (SD = 274.54), 7 minutes and 27.5

    seconds. A multivariate analysis of variance was conductedwith veracity as the independent variable, number of spatialdetails, number of temporal details and number of specifictimes as the dependent variables and word count as a covariate.

    The multivariate tests show a significant effect of veracity(F(3, 81) = 2.70, p = 0.05, partial 2 = 0.09) and a significantcovariate effect of word count (F(3, 81) = 147.09, p < 0.001,partial 2 = 0.85). The between subject effects show that theeffect of veracity was significant for spatial and temporaldetails, but not for specific times (spatial: F(1, 85) = 4.26,

    p = 0.04, partial 2 = 0.05; temporal: F(1, 85) = 5.10,p = 0.03, partial 2= 0.06; specific times: F(1, 85) = 1.16,p = 0.28, partial 2= 0.01) (see Table 1 for Means and SDs).For spatial, temporal details and specific times, there isa significant effect of the covariate word count (all F(1,85) > 14.35, all p< 0.001, all partial 2> 0.15).

    Discussion

    The results show that the participants veracity affected theamount of spatial and temporal detail they gave in theirinterview. Truth tellers gave more spatial and temporal detailthan liars, which supports Hypothesis 1. Truth tellers did not

    significantly mention more specific times than liars, whichmay have been caused by the low occurrence of mentioningspecific times by both truth tellers and liars (Table 1).

    Experiment 1 was conducted in the lab. Although the truthtelling participants were discussing their own intentionsrather than intentions induced by the experimenter, this isstill a rather artificial set up. The participants were in astrange place that was unrelated to their intention, and theintentions they spoke about could occur weeks or months later.They also knew about the interview several days beforehand.To increase the similarity between the experimental situationand the real life situation of interviews at border controlor transport security, Experiment 2 was conducted on thePortsmouthCaen ferry. The participants were interviewedabout their intended actions on the day after they disembarked.

    EXPERIMENT 2

    Experiment 2 investigates whether the finding that truthtellers mention more spatial and temporal information thanliars when talking about an intention also occurs in a morenatural setting and with shorter interviews than in Experiment 1(Hypothesis II). It also investigates whether more temporalinformation can be elicited by using a time prompting

    question. Because truth tellers are more inclined to mentiontemporal information than liars, it is hypothesised that truthtellers will respond more strongly to a subtle time prompt thanliars, increasing the difference between the two groups inreporting temporal information. This increase in detail willlead to a better classification of truth tellers and liars when aprompt is included (Hypothesis III). The increase is predicted

    Table 1. Study 1: The amount of spatial and temporal details andspecific time given as a function of veracity

    Truth M (SD) Lie M (SD)

    Spatial details 38.50 (32.43) 31.45 (19.97)a

    Temporal details 30.43 (18.76) 24.68 (15.39)a

    Specific times 0.36 (0.96) 0.16 (0.65)

    N.B.aindicates significant differences

    Spatial and temporal details in lie detection 103

    Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 101106 (2013)

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    to be in the temporal information variables only, because theprompt is specifically directed at time (Hypothesis IV).

    Method

    Participants

    A total of 84 people travelling on the PortsmouthCaen ferry

    (36 males and 48 females) took part. Their average age wasM=58years old (SD = 12.6).

    Design

    We used a two (Veracity) by two (Question) between-subjectsfactorial design. The Veracity factor consists of liars versustruth tellers. The Question factor consists of time promptversus control. As in Experiment 1, the dependent variableswere the amount of spatial detail, the amount of temporal detailand the amount of specific times that the participant gave. Thesame coding scheme was used as in Experiment 1.

    ProcedureIn order to increase the ecological validity, this experimentwas conducted outside the lab. The experiment took place onthe PortsmouthCaen ferry, a 6-hour journey, because it wasbelieved that this would be a good place to find participantswho intended to travel further. The experimenter approachedpassengers on the ferry and asked whether they wouldagree to be interviewed and audio taped for a study about liedetection. An estimated 75% of the passengers who wereapproached volunteered to take part. This percentage ofvolunteers is relatively high, possibly because most passengerson the ferry were not too busy. If they agreed to participate,

    they were asked to sign an informed consent form. The exper-imenter asked for their sex, age and their plans for their trip.The last question was used to establish ground truth. Theparticipants were randomly assigned to be a truth teller or liar.The interviewer was blind to veracity condition. The truthtellers (N= 42) were then given the following instructions:An interviewer will come and ask you for details about yourtrip. Please answer truthfully. Try to convince the interviewerthat you are telling the truth. The liars (N=42) were told:An interviewer will come and ask you for details about yourtrip. Please lie to them and pretend you are making a differenttrip than the one you in fact are going to make. Try to convincethe interviewer that you are telling the truth. Liars were not

    given any instruction about what their lie should be. Allparticipants had a few minutes to prepare, during which theexperimenter collected the interviewer, who had waited else-where while the participant was briefed. The participants weregiven the opportunity for extra preparation time, but noneneeded this. The interviewer introduced him/herself, gavethem the Dictaphone to speak into like a microphone and askedthe passengers for their plans at their destination via a singlequestion, using either the control question or time prompt ques-tion. The control question was: Please describe in as muchdetail as possible what you are going to do today at your desti-nation? The time prompt question was: Please describe in as

    much detail as possible what your time-table is for today at yourdestination? The interviewer listened attentively and allowedthe passenger to say as much as they wanted but did notask follow-up questions. When the passenger had finished

    answering the single question, the interviewer thanked the pas-senger for taking part in the experiment and gave him/her adebriefing form and a bag of sweets. The entire procedure (frombeing approached by the interviewer to receiving the debriefingform and candy) lasted only for a few minutes.

    Data analysisThe short interviews were transcribed and coded by the samerater as in Experiment 1. Twenty five percent of the samplewas coded for reliability by the second coder, who had someexperience with coding for spatial and temporal details. Shewas given exact definitions and examples of both types ofdetail. The correlation between the two coders was high:r= .70 (p< 0.001) for spatial detail and r=0.94 (p< 0.001)for temporal detail. All interviews were reliability coded bythe third coder for specific times. After the first run, theyagreed of 83 on 84 interviews. The remaining case wasagreed upon after discussion.

    Results

    The average number of words used by participants in the inter-views was 33.7 (SD = 20.71). The interviews lasted on average46.77 second (SD = 17.93). A multivariate analysis of variancewas conducted with Veracity and Question as the independentvariables, word count as a covariate and the number of spatialdetails, number of temporal details and number of specifictimes as the dependent variables (see Table 2 for the meansand SD). The multivariate tests show a significant effect ofQuestion (F(3, 77)=4.42, p = 0.01, partial 2 =0.15) and asignificant covariate effect of word count (F(3, 77) = 12.71,

    p< 0.001, partial 2

    = 0.33). There were no signifi

    cant effectsfor Veracity (F(3, 77) = 2.09, p = 0.11, partial 2 =0.08)or the interaction effect between Veracity and Question(F(3, 77) = 0.93, p = 0.43, partial 2 = 0.04). Hypothesis IVwas related to temporal details but not to spatial details;and univariate Veracity tests are therefore justified despitethe absence of a multivariate Veracity main effect. As wepredicted in Hypothesis IV, Veracity has a significant effecton specific times (F(1, 83)=6.22, p = 0.02, partial 2= 0.07),but not on spatial or temporal details (all F(1, 83)< 0.33, all

    p> 0.57, all partial 2< 0.004). Question has a significanteffect on specific times (F(1, 83) = 13.18, p = 0.001, partial2= 0.14), but not on spatial or temporal details (all F(1,

    83)< 0.60, all p> 0.44, all partial 2< 0.008). The covariateword count had an effect on spatial (F(1, 83)= 22.02, p

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    (F(1, 83) = 1.61, p = 0.21, partial 2 = 0.02). There were nosignificant univariate Veracity by Question interaction effects(all F(1, 83)< 1.69, all p> 0.20, all partial 2< 0.02).

    Discriminant analysis showed that in the prompt condition,61.9% of participants were classified correctly based onspecific times (l =.91, w2(1)=3.88, p =0.049). The modelhad a lie bias, 76.2% of liars, but only 47.6% of truth tellerswere correctly classified. In the control condition, 54.8% ofparticipants could be classified correctly based on specifictimes (l=.95, w2(1)=2.03, p =0.16), which is not signifi-cantly above chance level. In other words, the prompt questionincreased accuracy as predicted in Hypotheses III and IV.

    GENERAL DISCUSSION

    Experiment 1 revealed a significant effect of Veracity onspatial and temporal details, but not on specific times. Thissupports Hypothesis 1. Experiment 2 showed a significant

    difference between truth tellers and liars on specific times,and this supports Hypothesis II. The results of the discriminantanalysis showed that classification of truth tellers and liars wasenhanced by asking a subtle time prompt question, supportingHypothesis III. As predicted in Hypothesis IV, the effect of thetime prompt was on a time related detail. There was no signif-icant interaction effect between veracity and question in themultivariate or univariate tests, so the support for HypothesesIII and IV is not unequivocal. The reason why specific timeswas significantly affected by Veracity in Experiment 2, butnot in Experiment 1, while temporal detail was significantlyaffected by Veracity in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment

    2, may lie in the difference in length of the interviews in thetwo Experiments. The Means (Tables 1 and 2) of specific timeswere in fact not very different between the two experiments; inExperiment, 1 the SDs were higher. The mean word count andthe mean amount of temporal details were around 30 timeshigher in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. It seems thatgiving spatial and temporal detail is dependent on the opportu-nity to use many words. The specific question asked inExperiment 2 resulted in participants giving a specific timerelated reply rather than vaguer spatial or temporal information.

    The two experiments combined show that the amount ofspatial and temporal detail participants give about that futureimage is influenced by whether or not they truly plan to

    execute the intention and the phrasing of the questions. It islikely that the effects of intention and phrasing are caused bydifferent processes. The fact that recalling a truthful intentionleads to the recall of more details is most likely the result of agreateractivation of truthful intentions. That is, the human brainseems to prioritise intentions (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993), presum-ably this helps in remembering that you have an intention andwhat the intention is. It may also help to execute the intention(Marsh, Hicks, & Bryan, 1999). This greater activation of truth-ful intentions probably leads to a greater mental availability ofdetails either by stimulating the formation of a more detailedepisodic future image or by activating a more detailed mental

    script of the future event (Granhag & Knieps, 2010; Atance &ONeill, 2001). The phrasing of the questions does not in itselfmake the future image or script more detailed, but rather itprompts the participants to say more about that image. It

    may be that the extra details mentioned need to be activelyretrieved and that participants do not do think about themwhen they are not prompted, or, alternatively, they do thinkabout them when they are not prompted but decide againstmentioning them. Regarding the latter, research has shown thatpeople have a lot of information available to them that they donot convey without being prompted to do so (Fisher, 2010;Fisher, Milne, & Bull, 2011). Future research may investigatewhich of these hypotheses is true. If these details need tobe actively retrieved, memory enhancement techniquesmay be beneficial to extract more detailed information. Ifthe interviewee holds back these details, then they should beencouraged to answer a question in as much detail as possible.

    Two aspects of the experiments may benefit real-life situa-tions where investigators attempt to distinguish between trulyintended and unintended future images. First, the more spatialand temporal detail someone gives the more likely it is thatthey are describing a true intention, if the interview is long.If the interview is very short, a participant mentioning a

    specific time is a sign they are telling the truth. Second, thespeaker can be prompted to give more temporal information,and such prompts will affect those with a true intention morethan those with a false intention, thereby increasing thenumber of correct classifications of truth tellers and liars.

    To conclude, the present experiment shows that longerinterviews contain more differences between truth tellers andliars than short ones. However, even in very short interviews,there are cues to deception. Specific phrasing of the questioncan elicit these cues in short interviews and improve theclassification of truth tellers and liars.

    ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

    The authors would like to thank Jo Fraser and EdwardAgobiani for their help in data collection.

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    plans. Japanese Psychological Research, 47(1), 4045.

    APPENDIX 1

    THE QUESTION LIST OF EXPERIMENT 1.

    (1) Where are you travelling to?(2) What is the main purpose of your trip?

    (3) Have you made this trip before?(4) If you made it before, did you go for the same

    purpose?(5) If the previous time(s) was for a different reason, what

    was the purpose then?(6) What is the most important place youll go to on

    your trip? Follow up until the participant picks onesituation/event that is in one particular place, if he/she has more than one image make them pick theclearest, most typical one.

    (7) Do you have a mental picture of this? yes or no?(8) In your picture, where are you?(9) Who else is there?

    (10) Please tell me in as much detail as possible what youcan see, hear, smell, taste and feel?

    (11) Please tell me in as much detail as possible what youimagine youre going to do in this picture?

    (12) Do you want to add anything?(13) How are you going to travel to your destination?

    (14) How long will the journey take?(15) With whom are you travelling?(16) If you have to wait during your journey, for example in

    the airport or changing train stations, what will you dowhile youre waiting?

    (17) Please describe in as much detail as possible what youcan see/ hear during the journey?

    (18) What is the first thing you will do when you arrive?(19) Do you want to add anything?(20) Please tell me in as much detail as possible what you

    had to do to plan this trip?(21) Please tell me in which order you did the planning?

    Whatfi

    rst, what second, what last?(22) What was the easiest to plan?(23) What was the hardest?(24) While you were preparing your trip, did you make any

    alterations to your original plan?(25) If so what and why?(26) Do you want to add anything?

    106 L. Warmelink et al.

    Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 101106 (2013)