The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 18 | Issue 18 | Number 2 | Article ID 5482 | Sep 15, 2020

1

Vulnerable Populations Under COVID-19 in Japan: A Lull inthe Storm?

David H. Slater

Abstract: This is a collection of originalarticles on diverse vulnerable populations inJapan in the wake of the new coronaviruspandemic. The effects of COVID-19 are feltdifferently, with some among us at muchgreater risk of infection due to preexistinghealth and welfare conditions. For others,perhaps more than the risk of infection, it is theprecautions taken to mitigate the risk for thewhole population, such as lockdowns andbusiness closures, that have pulled away thealready fragile safety net of state and civilsociety organization (CSO) support, leading toincreased marginalization and social exclusion.The goal of this set of papers is to documentthe conditions of those that have been mostdirectly affected by the virus and to providebackground on the conditions that made themvulnerable in the first place, notably chronicconditions that are brought into more obviousrelief in light of emergency measures. Each ofthe authors had a pre-established relationshipwith those affected populations and employedvarious ethnographic approaches, some face toface, others digitally via Zoom interviews andSNS exchanges. In this moment of whatappears to be relative calm, we hope that ourcollection, quickly compiled in an attempt tocapture the ever-changing situation, will givesome insight into how those most vulnerableare faring in this time of crisis and provideinformation that will allow us to prepare betterbefore the next wave comes our way.

Keywords: COVID-19, vulnerable populations,health and welfare, disability, homeless,refugees, social media, sex workers, irregular

workers, foreign labor, small farmers,restaurants, business closures, Indian workers,Vietnamese workers, Nepalese workers,Japanese restaurants, sanitation workers,children, domestic violence.

Introduction

Japan has thus far escaped what could havebeen a much more severe breakout ofCOVID-19. As of August 1st, 2020, while mostcases and deaths have been concentrated inTokyo, nationwide there have been fewer than30,000 cases and under 1,000 deaths fromCOVID (Japan COVID-19 Coronavirus Tracker).In comparison with many other countriesaround the world, Japan has escaped thus farwith a lower count of serious casualties despiteexperiencing a dramatic shrinking of GDP(Mitsuru 2020) and loss of jobs (NHK 2020).But no one really knows how to explain theselow numbers (Rich & Ueno, 2020). Few saywith any certainty that the relatively mildeffects have been the result of intentionalplanning or systematical ly executedprecautions and mitigation efforts bygovernment agencies. Japan seems to havelucked out for reasons we may never fullyunderstand. The political narrative might shiftin time from one of “lucked out” to “well-managed,” (especially as mismanagement ofthe virus continues in much larger countriessuch as the United States, India and Brazil, forexample) but as yet, no one has taken credit fora job well done. While the comparatively low

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

2

numbers might breed relief, it is worrisomethat there remains uncertainty over how thiswas achieved, and thus cannot take concertedmeasures to be better prepared lookingforward. If public health experts in and out ofJapan are to be believed, we may get anotherchance soon to fully confront the virus in theevent of a second or even third wave of cases.The articles in this collection are preliminaryefforts to capture a pandemic whosedimensions are changing every day around theworld and in Japan.

The pandemic unfolded before us in slowmotion, maybe more so in Japan with its laterarrival and our almost constant mediamonitoring. We have all had to watch as thedisaster came our way after slicing throughother countries. In fact, most of the articles inthis collection report that the news fromabroad served as important warning signs,sometimes too late, often ignored or wishedaway, at best bringing about half-bakedm e a s u r e s w i t h o u t a c o h e r e n t a n dcomprehensive response. As the virus washedin and then washed out, most of us werewatching in puzzlement. And yet, even with thewarnings and subsequent lead time, many ofthe most vulnerable in society were still leftdisproportionately exposed to the risk ofinfection.

While it has often been said that the virus doesnot discriminate (Korte et al. 2020), that is ofcourse not entirely true. There are differentdegrees of vulnerability in any society, andeven though we know surprisingly little aboutthe patterns of infection on the individual level(who dies, who survives), if we adopt a broaderperspective, the effects on different populationsand their correlations to different levels ofexposure are more predictable. Sometimes, theparticular populations that are most vulnerableare well known to be so. So, when we seearguments that the most important pre-existingcondition is poverty (Braveman 2020), or thatthe virus acts as a “magnifier” of already

existing inequality (Vertovec 2020), it does notcome as a surprise. These patterns areemerging in fami l iar ways in g lobalcomparisons (United Nations 2020), as well assome preliminary studies of in-countryinequality that show similar correlations (forexample Mukherji 2020 in the US and Sa 2020i n t h e U K ) . W h i l e w e d o n o t h a v ecomprehensive macro-level data for Japan(although see Hashimoto Kenji in Tomei 2020),we know a good deal about pre-existingpatterns of vulnerability. Most who participatein community support or engage in activismsaw this coming, even if they could notcompletely prepare for it. As one soup kitchenvolunteer explained, “the same people alwaysseem to get hurt.” This time, awareness andeven anticipation of these negative effects werenot limited to those who were personallyfamiliar with these populations. For example,as soon as the we began hearing about“corona” (as it was first called), there was anincrease in mass media coverage of the viraldanger to the disabled, the homeless, andvictims of domestic violence. These populationsare featured anyway in news stories on aregular cycle of stories precisely because theyare chronically vulnerable. With the arrival ofthe coronavirus, this cycle shortened, and someof the s tor ies were moved f rom the“community” page to the news section. As onecolleague commented, “We cannot pretend thatwe did not see this coming.”

Vulnerability is best charted from manyperspectives. Thus, even with the mostdeveloped set of quantitative researchcompiled by the Japan Institute of Labor andTraining (JILT 2020), this and other macro-levelstatistical correlations miss some of themechanisms that link infection to vulnerability.Ethnographic work, such as our collection, canidentify indicators of risk and vulnerabilitymore specifically than general correlations of“poverty” or “inequality.” Rather than bystatistical metrics, ethnography has the abilityto profile those most vulnerable, in part by

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

3

taking note of their ability (or lack of ability) tocope with exposure in their immediateenvironment. While this appears to be roughlycorrelated with indicators associated withsocial class or inequality (income andoccupation, for example), those who cannotpractice social distancing, do not haveprotective equipment, and cannot stay homeare at higher risk. We might call those in thiscircumstance as being in the “first circle” ofeffect, including the sick, homeless,incarcerated, and institutionalized; those whoexperience immediate risk of infection, not bychoice or chance, but rather simply because itis characteristic of the conditions of their life.These groups are well represented in ourcollection.

Withdrawal of support

The slow approach of the virus shaped how thispandemic was experienced by everyone. Unlikethe earthquakes in Kobe in 1995 or Tohoku in2011, where there were explicit triggeringevents, our anticipation of and early efforts tobrace for the arrival of the coronavirus cannotbe fully separated from our experience of thevirus itself. The threat of the virus, and effortsto prepare for and to mitigate its effects,seemed to occur simultaneously. Thesemitigation efforts revealed a wider range ofvulnerability beyond those who risk immediateexposure to infection, a group we mightconsider being in a “second circle” of effects.Paradoxically, for those in this group,mitigation efforts have been more damagingthan the effect of the virus itself. Althoughthese mitigation efforts were ostensiblydirected to protect society as a whole, theyoften ended up marginalizing or even excludingcertain populations from the support theyneeded to survive. As these mitigation effortsoften coincided with the withdrawal ofgovernmental and volunteer services (stay athome, social distancing, etc), those most

dependent on those services were hurt most.The calculation of sacrifice—subjecting the fewfor the good of the many—is not a newphenomenon in Japan or anywhere else. But theprecautions against infection often tore apartthe thin and in most cases already recedingstate safety nets and compromised the effortsof the heroic few who work in CSOs (civilsociety organizations): the churches andmosques, helpers, volunteers and the rarelycompensated workers who run the soupkitchens, day care centers, shelters, and othersupport sites.

A first observation relates to the social andeconomic effects of this pandemic in Japan as awhole, particularly within this second circle.Even with so few cases and deaths incomparative perspective, we have seen a moresevere contraction of the economy by July 2020than we did during the Lehman Shock of 2008(Jiji 2020). Japan's labor ministry reports thatmore than 40,000 people nationwide have lostor will lose their jobs due to the coronavirusoutbreak (NewsonJapan 2020). A more seriousresurgence will predictably have more drasticeffects on everyone, and the consequences forthe populations who are usually supported byCSOs will be especially dire. A number ofCSO’s supporting these vulnerable populationshave greatly scaled back their support, whileothers have stopped their activities completely.As we see in the col lect ion, for manypopulations, without this help, what was oncean already precarious situation quickly turnsinto an impossible one. Soup kitchens close andhomeless people do not eat for days. Women’sshelters close and women become trappedinside their house with their abuser. Thisfallout is a testament to the importance of CSOgroups in the support of at-risk populations. Italso exposes the lack of reliable governmentalsupport and safety nets in place. This collectiondocuments the government’s inability toeffectively respond to existing need, even in theface of what could be considered a relativelyminor scare regarding coronavirus in Japan.

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

4

This should be a wake-up call.

Second, unlike in recent disasters in Japan,where collective hardship increased empathyand stimulated feelings of fellowship thatbrought in waves of new volunteers (Avenell2013), in this pandemic we have seen theopposite. Despite the uptick in news coverageof the situations of the vulnerable, we saw farfewer volunteers. Instead of images like thetens or hundreds of thousands of young and oldrushing to dig rubble or hand out onigiri inKobe City or Minami-Sanriku, this year saw avery different dynamic. In large part due to fearof infection, many under-staffed and under-funded CSOs cut back their services or closedaltogether. While this withdrawal of serviceshurt the vulnerable populations that they servemost immediately, many of these groups havebeen so damaged that they, like many smallerbusinesses, will probably never re-open. Moregenerally, it is probable that the institutionalintegrity of the civil society sector itself hasbeen damaged by this crisis in ways that willhave much longer-term consequences. Evenafter the threat of the coronavirus has passedthere wil l be many fewer and weakerinst i tut ions in place to promote andaccommodate volunteers if and when theyreturn to the scene. 1995 is sometimes called“Year One of the Volunteer Age.” I hope that2020 is not the final year of that age.

Vulnerable Labor

For many who have stable or what issometimes still called “regular” employment atlarger companies, the hardship was staying athome, working remotely, and being isolatedfrom others. While these lifestyle changes werenot easy to adjust to, these employees wereable to protect themselves and their coworkersfrom viral exposure. On the company side,while it required rethinking work patterns,these changes allowed many companies to

reduce labor costs during this period. It is notonly Netflix and Amazon that have made moneyduring the pandemic—many companies savedmoney through teleworking, so much so thatthey are planning to incorporate elements ofteleworking in their post-COVID business plans(Hayashi, Watanabe & Ogawa 2020; Sugiura2020). For higher level employees working atlarger companies with a secure job, who haveenough space and equipment at home tocomplete their tasks relatively uninterrupted,the money saved on transportation andsheltering at home (not to mention the 100,000yen given to all residents by the government)often meant that their income actuallyincreased during the pandemic (as mine did.)

While our collection does not cover thispopulation, it has long been noted thatteleworking allows employers to take overliving spaces and time through invasivesurveillance (Jahagirdar & Bankar 2020) whileworkers are forced to absorb work costs(Shearmur 2020), problems that have beenexacerbated during the coronavirus pandemic.While some changes in work patterns may benecessary in the short term, not all workers cansustain this sort of overhead in the long term,and it is difficult not to see this as furthererosion on the already diminished stability andsecurity of “regular” workers. (For discussion,see Kawaguchi 2020).

While we have many reports of job loss, it isdifficult to draw precise conclusions acrossdifferent populations about the rising numbersof jobs lost. Many lost jobs simply do not showup in these numbers if they are short term,limited contract or otherwise more informal, apattern increasingly common in Japan andmany other countries. The vulnerabilities ofthese working populations are periodically theobject of reflection, but in the time ofCOVID-19, the risks to “irregular” workershave become more obvious. We might think ofthis group as living in the “third circle” ofexposure. Beyond these most vulnerable

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

5

populations who suffered from increased ratesof exposure and withdrawal of support, these inthe third circle suffered due to consciouschoices of employers that reflect the prioritiesof companies protecting their profit marginsover the welfare of their workers. Theseworkers are sometimes called “essential” bythe media in Japan and beyond (whichthroughout this pandemic seems to havedesignated as essential those workers whoproduce something the rest of us would feelinconvenienced if we had to do without). Asnoted above, while we would like to havesystematic large-scale data that correlates anddisambiguates the different points in anindividual’s profile (income, medical status,work history, etc.) with infection and deathrates as well as job loss, protection practices,and beyond, even without clear macro-leveldata, vulnerable populations are not so difficultto identify by the work expectations placedupon them. At the top of this large andheterogeneous group, are the front-lineworkers, including doctors who are usuallyregularly and securely employed, althoughmany nurses, and other hospital staff are not.They are thus working at greater levels of risk.Below this group, in terms of social prestige,are those doing some sort of “contact work,”meaning contact with the public, with food(growing, serving or preparation, especiallymeat), or delivering goods. These workers areoften cleaning or working in transit or security.These are workers who usually do not have theoption to quit working—if they do not work,they get fired, and if they get fired, they do notget paid. Some of these workers do not havehealth insurance and few enough savings tolast very long without a paycheck. So, theywork. They often go without sufficient personalprotective equipment (PPE) even in situationswhere social distancing is not possible (or notprofitable for their employer). Thus, many ofthese workers find themselves doublyvulnerable, once from the immediate threat ofinfection and then occupationally vulnerable.

In the rhetorical shift from the glorification ofpostwar “regular workers” to celebration of“freedom and flexibility,” there was thecreation of a whole range of contract statusesthat for a time obscured insecurity of thisgroup of workers. There were moments whentheir vulnerability came to light -- most clearlyin the Lehman Shock of 2008 and its aftermaththat turned into a political point of contestationaround Haken Mura (tent villages of thehomeless) (Shinoda 2009). But in 2020,irregular workers found that their job statusentailed not only instability but also exposureto the coronavirus, and in some cases, a threatof loss of governmental benefits andprotections that all residents are supposed tohave. While the Japanese economy as a whole isincreasingly reliant on this sort of flexiblelabor, these workers are the first to have theirhours slashed, their pay reduced, and to be laidof f . Within this group, some receiveappreciation for their sacrifice—for examplefront line workers, even as they are asked towork overtime without overtime pay and oftenwithout PPE. But many irregular workers,whether due to their race, nationality, socialprejudice around the nature of their work, orthe fact that they chose this kind of work overmore “regular” work, often face questions fromsociety and government regarding theireligibility for protection, compensation, andsocial respect. Often, their irregular workstatus allows employers to force them tochoose between financial hardship (when theychoose not to work to protect their health) andpossible infection (when they choose to workdespite the health risk). Our collection exploresthis dilemma amongst sex workers, foreignworkers, freelancers, and dependent workers.

We also feature some populations who havemanaged their risks under COVID-19 by takinggreater control of their own immediatesituations and have greater autonomy andresources to negotiate and develop strategiesof survival. In our collection, these includeJapanese restaurateurs (who own their own

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

6

ventures and have deve loped goodrelationships with their communities);independent farmers (who have developedflexibility of product and distributionstrategies); and sanitation workers (who havesecured safer working conditions throughstrong unionization). This is not to say that norestaurants will close, no farmers will go out ofbusiness, or that no sanitation workers willbecome sick. Each of these groups are subjectto some level of infection and populational riskin this depleted economy. Nevertheless, theyhave all proven to be more resilient because ofstrong connections with other workers andconsumers, changes in working conditions toprioritize health rather than profit, and theability to collectively chart a way forward toaddress the effects of governmental mitigationorders. These cases offer important lessonsmoving forward, even if such lessons aredifficult to apply to society as a whole.

Data and Method

We hope that there will be no need to revivetesting regimes or institute contact tracing orto count cases or deaths in the hundreds ofthousands. But in part because we managed toescape what others in the world did not, welack the ability to generate statisticallysignificant data that correlates infectionpatterns with social class, educational profiles,or even occupational positions. Without thesestatistical profiles, it probably means that it willremain difficult to determine the social andeconomic correlations that have emerged inevery other hard hi t country , wherevulnerability is directly linked to poverty, socialexclusion, and political powerlessness.Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe thatJapan will be exempt from these correlationsespecially now that watching the widelyinconsistent adherence to mask and shelteringrequests have disabused us of the myth ofJapanese uniformity or compliance with

authority. Without large-scale data, it isdifficult to imagine governmental effortanticipating, preventing, and mitigating thesort of resurgence that most health expertsexpect in the near future, that we are alreadyseeing around the world, and, as of August2020, perhaps in Japan, notably in Tokyo.Reminded that this is a government whoannounced with great fanfare that it wasmailing out two masks per family—not the sortof proactive or imaginative response thatinstills confidence—we view the future withtrepidation.

Ethnographic work contributes a different sortof data that focuses on the person inside thecrisis and on the immediate conditions thatimpact that person. Some of the articles focuson policies that define and often constrainvarious populations such as the disabled, ordependent Nepalese women. Others focus onthe often-failed responses to the pandemic atthe institutional level, as in the cases of Indiancooks and Vietnamese technical traineeinterns. Each author was asked to include thevoices of those at risk in their article. Thisrequired different research methodologies. Insome cases, such as victims of domesticviolence or children in children’s homes, mostcontact was through support organizations thatrepresent these groups. In fact, where thepopulation in question was most dependentupon external support, the authors’ systematicinclusion of these supporters’ voices tells animportant part of the story. Usually, ourcontact was more direct. Since the authorsalready had connections based on previousresearch or support efforts, we were able tocall upon that network to provide readers withan understanding of the bigger picture. Thisenabled researchers to trace the effects ofcoronavirus on the ground faster than in mostcases. No one started from scratch.

The order to social distance and stay at homepresented immediate complications in thecollection of data (however intrepid the

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

7

researcher). Some of whom we write abouthave no health insurance, so direct personalcontact with them would put them at great risk.Some researchers did rely on minimal face toface contact, albeit briefly, always in a maskand adhering to social distancing guidelines.Most of us quickly set up and revived personalconnections through digital media, oftenextending the personal check-ins that most ofus were already conducting through longer andmore focused questions and exchanges. In fact,as Bảo noted, the Vietnamese technical internswere often more articulate and detailed in theirtexts than in “face to face” Zoom interviews.Different digital approaches sometimes provedto be unexpectedly productive. In particular,articles on freelancers and Kabuki-cho workersshowed that the careful scouring of digitalbulletin boards and select twitter feeds wereeffective research strategies due to thecentrality of these sites for target populations.These sites have been unusually active duringthe crisis, as many people were out of work andhad extra time on their hands. As such, it waspossible to see the effects of the crisis on thesepopulations unfolding in real time online aspeople voiced worries and dissatisfactiondigitally. In this way, digital methods becameless a way to compensate for the impossibilityof face to face ethnography, and more so anadaptive research strategy productive ofunexpected insight.

For most of us, the mass media providedimportant insights into the health situationsand proved to be a useful way to chart publicopinion. Authors were asked to reference thesearticles as much as possible to enable readersto check the unfolding of the crisis. Wherethere were English language versions of someJapanese news articles, we have made an effortto reference those as well.

Contributors to this collection are of diversenationality and background Some are more ofan activist bent, others academic. Ourdisciplines also vary—a testament to the value

of ethnography. Our authors range fromestablished senior scholars to graduatestudents and one undergraduate. All of theauthors are connected to Sophia University inone way or another, as students or faculty,current or past. I am fortunate to take part in anetwork with so many talented scholars, whoare also actively engaged in society andworking to bring these two pursuits together.

I’d like to thank the Sophia University Instituteof Comparative Culture for its support of thisproject.

Outline of papers

The Politics of Etiology

In our attempt to calculate risk of infection, wesearch for causes and individual vulnerabilitiesthat are then generalized into characteristics ofsubpopulations or whole populations. We callthese comorbidities - for example respiratoryillness, diabetes, and hypertension in the caseof COVID-19 (CDC 2020). These are oftentreated as given health conditions that areinvoked as variables to explain subsequentinfection rates and patterns. And while thecomorbidities of COVID-19 are very real,vulnerability is, as always, as much a social andpolitical issue as it is biomedical. That is to saythere is a history to this biological conditionwhich developed over time and has led aparticular population to be vulnerable inparticular ways. The virus is opportunistic, andeven though the infection patterns are not yetwidely understood, it seems impossible to makeany sense of its path apart from theseenvironmenta l condi t ions . As such,vulnerability is a social fact in and of itself --something that needs to be explained,unpacked, and situated historically, socially,and politically. Each of our authors worked to

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

8

explain the social facts and to interrogate theconditions that led these populations to be intheir respective situations.

For example, in the first circle of exposure,while Bookman notes that many disabledpeople have a higher risk of infection, hisarticle examines the social context and politicals t r u g g l e t h a t s u r r o u n d s i s s u e s o finstitutionalization and the transformation ofthe urban environment. As someone who is adisabled person himself, he sees clearly how,for example, the lack of accessible ramps andelevators has worked against disabled peopleseeking key resources during this coronaviruscrisis. He also shows how these problems arenot only the result of crisis reaction but areequally a function of a longer history of fundingand policy formation within different levels ofgovernment. Even as the disabled andcaregivers express anxiety over the future, insituating COVID within this context ofinstitutionalization in Japan, Bookman is able tohighlight the role of disability activists fightingto improve the situation.

Figure 1: Author illustrating the difficultyof Tokyo navigation

Tokyo’s homeless population is overwhelminglyolder and male, many with respiratoryimpairment, all of which put them at high riskof serious infection. But as Ikebe and Slater

point out, these features are directly linked to apattern of neglect, especially regarding thelack of health insurance and medical care.When you have no home, you cannot shelter inplace, and living on the street makes itimpossible to create the sort of protectivebarriers that the governor of Tokyo has calledfor. In a more systemic way, the reduction ofwelfare payments and the withdrawal of socialservices for the homeless (and many othersmost in need of the state support) increasetheir risk and place an impossible burden onthe shoulders of a few NPOs who support them.Based on current ethnography and previousinterview research, this article captures thestreet survival strategies and some supportgroups’ efforts to help these people.

Figure 2: Four of the many asylum seekerswithout health insurance in Tokyo

If the virus enters the Shinagawa DetentionCenter, or indeed any closed institution, it isimpossible to protect those inside. Thegenerally poor health of the refugee asylumseekers is a well-documented medical fact, onethat is directly traceable to poor diet, lack ofmovement, and uneven distribution of medicinewithin the detention centers. It is alsoimpossible to overlook the immediate danger ofthe lack of freely circulating air through thecrowded conditions of the detention center. Itis for this reason that not only refugeedetention centers, but even jails around theworld have been releasing those trappedinside. As Barbaran and Slater show throughinterviews of detained and released refugee

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

9

applicants, the underlying problem is the lackof a coherent immigration and refugee policy,and the overuse of detention centers as apunitive measure against those who apply forasylum in Japan. Because Japan’s refugeerecognition rate is notoriously low—fewer than1% of applications for refugee status areaccepted—thousands of refugees have beenforced to choose between detention andreturning to the home-country persecution theyfled from in the first place.

Figure 3: A lesson at one of the Children'sHomes

Institutionalization, even when not punitive inintent, can be dangerous. This is especially truewhen people are working under socialdistancing or stay-at-home orders. As notedabove, all institutionalized populations are atrisk in times of pandemic, so much so that insome contexts, a decision is made to completelyseal off that population. Rossitto documents thestruggle inside what are sometimes called“Children’s Homes,” institutions for childrenwhose families are alive but cannot take care ofthem due to poverty, domestic violence, ordivorce. These are non-profit institutionslicensed by the state that depend heavily onvolunteer and low-paid staff to create afunctional and supportive environment. Overthe past few months, fear of infection has led toa near-complete lock down of these facilities,prohibiting access not only by parents (who are

often still involved with their child’s life), butalso outside staff who support the educationaland social needs of the children. This articleaddresses both the institutional challenges thehomes face during these uncertain times, andthe day to day challenges they face insupporting this vulnerable population.

Figure 4: United Nations infographics onDV during COVID-19

While we are all told to stay home for our ownprotection, for victims of domestic violence(DV), home is the most dangerous place to be.In a situation so bad that the UN has coined theterm “shadow pandemic,” Ando explains thecontinual fear and ever-present danger to(mostly) women living with perpetrators whohave lost a job, are anxious over money and thefuture, and are staying home. Nakajima Sachi,one of the leaders in the movement to supportvictims of DV, worked with Ando to documentthe perpetual stigma surrounding DV and itssurvivors that has been compounded by thewithdrawal of already meager support underCOVID-19, such as DV hotlines and the fewshelters. Ando juxtaposes women’s voices andJapanese legal policies from family registers todomestic violence laws that expose women andprivilege men, even confirmed perpetrators ofdomestic violence.

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

10

Figure 5: "Theories are hanging aboutsaying that 'Freelancers are responsiblefor themselves' but freelancers also pay

taxes, and have the right to say, 'Dosomething about it..'" (Twitter,@yoppymodel, March 17, 2020)

Entrepreneurial Work During thePandemic

The increase in irregular work (hiseki sha-in),including part-time, contract, subcontract, andfreelance, has become an increasinglyimportant part of Japan’s neoliberal economy.As Uno and O’Day point out , the Abeadministration promotes this sort of work as apath to “personal freedom,” although thecoronavirus disaster has resulted in manybeing laid off, often without compensation fromtheir employers, forced to search for whateverwork is available. When governmental supportalso appeared to be threatened, tech-savvyfreelancers organized an online protest andpetition. The mass unemployment put intoperspective the relationship between theirambiguous status in a changing marketeconomy and their political status as citizens.Through a thorough search of online sites thathave become increasingly important as themain (and often only) connection among theseirregular workers, the authors assembled

digital posts which revealed their struggle foreconomic survival, social recognition, andpolitical rights.

While freelancing may be a relatively new workcategory in Japan, those involved in sex workhave long been engaged in freelancing.Freelancers and sex workers share a marginaland unstable position despite their importancein the economy. Giammaria points out that inaddition to this instability, the hosts andhostesses of Kabuchi-cho often suffer fromsocial prejudice -- prejudice that is experiencedby sex workers around the world, but alsodraws on much older imagery of pleasurequarters in Japan. Without job security, whiledoing what many call “essential” labor, theirsafety deteriorates quickly, as the intimatenature of their work puts them at unusuallyhigh risk. Suffering media accusations thattheir work is the source of Tokyo’s recent largeoutbreak of infections even led to a call for fothe state to withhold their 100,000 yencompensation payment. Like the article by Unoand O’Day, this article brings together themany voices of workers as they talk (text) oftheir struggles to stay afloat in the face of ever-changing popular opinions while living outsideof the main f lows of work and soc ia lrespectability.

Figure 6: Vietnamese Technical Trainee

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

11

Intern protesting outside of theVietnamese Embassy in Tokyo. His signsays, "Please help us go back."

Foreigners Laboring Under COVID-19

Foreigners facing restrictive visa regulationsoften struggle to make ends meet while beingexploited by their employers. They do not havethe resources to address this exploitation andare often unable to access the support systemsto which they are legally entitled. Even whenthe epidemiological threat is less than thatfacing other groups covered in this collection,the virus continues to act in these situations asa “magnifier” of pre-existing vulnerabilitieswhich compromise protection, information, andsupport. Vietnamese technical trainee interns,covered by Bảo, are in Japan on a governmentprogram, ostensibly as part of a skill-transferfrom Japan to “less developed” countries (theTechnical Intern Training Program), but by mostaccounts it functions primarily to bring low-costlabor to struggling businesses in rural Japan.Their work is necessary and valuable, even ifmost Japanese workers do not choose to do itthemselves. Many interns who were luckyenough to keep their jobs during the pandemichave been expected to work with little or noprotective equipment. If the firms contractingtheir labor through these programs losebusiness, these workers have their hours cut tothe point where they can no longer afford to payrent. Despite being initially eager to bring theseworkers over to cover labor shortages, after thecoronavirus hit, neither the contractingemployers nor the overseeing governmentagencies have been willing to take responsibilityfor them when their labor became unnecessary,risky or costly, leaving them stranded andwithout assistance.

Wadhwa’s article discusses the difficultposition Indian restaurants across Japanexperience. While the owners’ problems areshared by those of their Japanese restaurateurcounterparts—struggling to cover rent in theface of a dwindling clientele—their situationwas made worse when they were asked to closeunder the state of emergency directives. TheIndian cooks brought over by the owners areparticularly vulnerable. With no work, noability to change jobs due to visa restrictions,and social isolation, they are trapped. Like theVietnamese interns, the Indian cooks areusually only paid while they work. Because oftheir visa status, they are not covered byJapanese labor and welfare laws. Most havecome to Japan with the intent to send moneyback to their families in India. Instead they arenot working, most are eating through theirsavings and are afraid to go outside for fear ofinfection. Through the voices of both ownersand cooks, Wadhwa reveals differentexperiences within a single ethnic community,and even a single enterprise that has been tornapart by the virus.

Figure 7: Indian Cook in the kitchen

The dependents—wives and children—ofNepalese workers (most of whom are alsocooks) in Tanaka’s article lack even theminimal protections that their visa holderhusbands can claim. Members of a new wave of

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

12

migrants, the Nepalese have become the 6thlargest migrant group in Japan. Based on yearsof work within this community, Tanakadocuments the struggles of migrant womenwho have been forced to flee their homes, inthis case due to domestic violence brought onby the extreme conditions of COVID-19 life.Like Japanese victims of domestic violence inAndo’s article, these women must fight socialstigma within the Nepalese community, butthey also are forced to access a Japanese publicwelfare system where they face racial prejudicethat often excludes them from support servicesthat they are legally entitled to. Theseobstacles are common experiences for theincreasing number of migrant workers andfamily members who have moved to Japan;women are even more vulnerable. This articleshows how even a slight disruption can createan impossible situation with great danger forthose affected.

Figure 8: Distribution of visa types ofNepalese in Japan

Resilience Through Controlling theirEnvironment

Some of our articles provide a more positiveoutlook. Each of these cases show that byworking together, the immediate viral risks canbe managed and new practices can mitigate thenegative effects of the lifestyle changes forcedupon them due to the coronavirus. TheJapanese restaurant owners Farrer writesabout, while financially challenged, usually

manage their own spaces, the flow of peoplewithin those spaces, and their own resources.They can serve food indoors, offer take-out, orchoose to close temporarily. In their case,ownership entails control and grants theopportunity to shelter in place (stay homecompletely), or if going out, to keep a safesocial distance. Farrer outlines the manydiff icult f inancial choices that theseentrepreneurs have to make, but as someonewith years of involvement with the local foodcultures of Tokyo, he also points to what hecalls “community-based resilience” -- thenetworks of trust and support that havedeveloped over time both within an enterpriseand with their customer base. These factorsal low many restaurateurs to manageimmunological risk and the anxiety associatedwith it, leading to adaptive and sustainableplans for moving forward, at least so far.

Figure 9: The author taking out dinner athis local restaurant

At the other end of the supply chain are thesmall, independent farmers studied by Kondoand Lichten. These farmers have fared betterthan many during this time of crisis, despite thethreat to sales. In response to living throughthe dangers of radiation in 2011, as well as

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

13

more generally in dealing with the risks thatare always part of farming, many had alreadymoved away from a single product flow todiversify their product lines and expand theirnetworks. When farmers began to feel theeffects of COVID-19, many were able to identifynew customers and develop new distributionmethods, including online sales. Due to strongcommunity ties with other farmers and theircustomer bases, they were able to ensure foodsecurity and enough product flow to stay afloat.These farmers teach the importance offlexibility, rather than simply size, as the key toresilience.

Figure 10: An promotion by local farmersto promote sales

Both of the populations share important traitswith the city sanitation workers that Deguchiand Matsumoto describe. Being front-line“essential” workers picking up unsecuredconsumer trash carries great risk of infection,but as city employees they have a strong unionthat is responsive to their needs and has beenable to, for example, secure them PPE(personal protective equipment). Even thoughthey suffer from the age-old stigma for doing“unclean work,” their union has helped tostrengthen the connection between them andthe communities they serve. During theCOVID-19 crisis, sanitation workers reportedincreased levels of appreciation shown by theircommunit ies for the ir sacr i f ice and

commitment. However, the authors cautionthat waste management is being sold off toprivate companies who hire non-union workerswho lack the protections that ensure safeworking conditions and job security. This bodesill for sanitation workers in any futurepandemic.

Figure 11: A thank you letter to thesanitation workers for their hard work

Readier for the next time? Building backbetter?

Based on these preliminary studies, it isdifficult to identify any bases for effectiveresponses coming from government in theevent of a future pandemic. Governmentsupport systems are often difficult to access,and when secured, are usually inadequate toaddress the problem, particularly for marginalpopulations. Civil Society Organizations, whencal led upon to do more than providecompensation, have generally provedinadequate to respond to the rather mildcoronavirus effects thus far experienced inJapan. While some scholars have called for a

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

14

substantial expansion in government benefits tokeep more people from falling into theunderclass (Tomei 2020), there is littleevidence that th is is part o f the Abeadministration’s agenda. If this was a practicerun -- a dress rehearsal so to speak -- largeswathes of Japan have reason to worry.

All of our articles address groups that werevulnerable to begin with, and who havesuffered disproportionately, even as some farbetter than others. Of course, we examinedonly a sample of sectors affected by thepandemic. There is much research to be done.Outside of Japan, most studies have focused onmore elite company workers, many teleworkingfrom home, and on mental health. (It wouldappear that this is, at least in part, becausemuch of this work can be done online.) Ourcollection is, of course, incomplete. Given theopportunity, we need to hear voices from smallfactories and police forces, constructionworkers and convenience store and fast foodfranchise employees. We need to hear fromthose in delivery work, where profits andincreased hiring have occurred despite the lackof safety measures which have led to lawsuitsin the United States against companies likeUber Eats and Amazon (Reuters 2020). Thereare many more groups to cover, and we arecertainly not yet able to gauge all the effectsthis virus will have on Japan and the world. Wehope that our collection will stimulate otherresearchers to pursue the stories andexperiences of other vulnerable populationsbefore the next wave of coronavirus strikes.

References

Avenell, S., 2013. The Evolution of DisasterVolunteering in Japan: From Kobe to Tohoku.In Natural Disaster and Reconstruction in AsianEconomies (pp. 35-50). Palgrave Macmillan,New York.

Braveman, Paula. 2020. “COVID-19: Inequalityis Our Pre-Existing Condition,” UNESCOInclusive Policy Lab, 14 April.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC). 2020. Coronavirus Disease 2019(COVID-19) - People with Certain MedicalConditions, 17 July.

Jahagirdar, R. and Bankar, S. , 2020.EMPLOYEES PERCEPTION OF WORKPLACEMONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE. PEOPLE:International Journal of Social Sciences, 6(1).

Hayashi, Eiki; Watanabe, Kana & Ogawa,Manami. 2020. “Stop logging hours: Japanfinds flexibility in age of telework,” NikkeiAsian Review, 16 May.

Japan COVID-19 Coronavirus Tracker.

Japan Institute of Labor and Training. 2020.『新型コロナが雇用・就業・失業に与える影響』(new coronavirus infectious diseases Impact ofnew corona on employment, employment andunemployment), 31 July.

Jiji Press. 2020. Japan Estimates FY 2020 GDPGrowth at Minus 4.5 Pct. 30 July.

Kawaguchi, Minoru. 2020. 『コロナで「オンライン階級」が生まれた　東浩紀と藤田孝典が斬る「社会の歪み」』(In Corona, “Online classes”were born -- “Social distortion” cut by AzumaHironori and Fujita Takanori), Goo News, 23May.

Korte, K.J., Denckla, C.A., Ametaj, A.A. &Koenen, K.C. 2020. “Stigma: Viruses Don’tDiscriminate and Neither Should We!” HarvardT.H. Chan School of Public Health, HarvardUniversity.

NHK World. 2020. “32,000 workers in Japanfired amid pandemic,” NHK World - Japan, 17July.

Mitsuru, Obe. 2020. “Japan GSP to shrink 4.7%in fiscal 2020, BOJ says,” Nikkei Asian Review,

APJ | JF 18 | 18 | 2

15

15 July.

Mukherji, Nivedita. 2020. The Social andEconomic Factors Underlying the Incidence ofCOVID-19 Cases and Deaths in US Counties.MedRxiv. 14 July.

NewonJapan. 2020. Coronavirus Blamed forover 40,000 Job Losses. 30 July.

Reeves, Richard V. & Rothwell, Jonathan. 2020.“Class and COVID: How the less affluent facedouble risks,” Brookings, 27 March.

Reuters. 2020. “Amazon to Hire 100,000 NewWorkers as Onl ine Orders Surge onCoronavirus Worries,” The Japan Times, 17March.

Rich, Motoko & Ueno, Hisako. 2020. “Japan’sVirus Success Has Puzzled the World. Is ItsLuck Running Out?” The New York Times, 26March.

Sá Filipa. 2020. Socioeconomic Determinantsof Covid-19 Infections and Mortality: Evidencefrom England and Wales. VOCeu/CEPR. 08

June.

Shearmur, Richard. 2020. Remote Work:Employers are Taking over our Living Spacesand Passing on Costs. The Conversation. 19June.

Shinoda, Toru. 2020. Which Side Are You On?Hakenmura and the Working Poor as a TippingPoint in Japanese Labor Politics. The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 14-3-09, April 4.

Sugiura, Eri. 2020. “Coronavirus MeasuresPromise Relief for Japan’s Labor Crunch,”Nikkei Asian Review, 12 May.

Tomei, Toshio. 2020. 『日本人は｢格差拡大｣の深刻さをわかっていない』(Japanese do notunderstand the seriousness of the ‘wideninggap’), au One - Economy/IT, 30 June.

Vertovec, Steven. 2020. “Covid-19 andEnduring Stigma,” Max-Planck-Gessellschaft,27 April.

United Nations. 2020. COVID-19 PandemicExposes Global ‘Frailties and Inequalities.’

This article is the introductino to The Special Issue: Vulnerable Populations UnderCOVID-19 in Japan. See the Table of Contents here.

Please also read our previous special Pandemic Asia on the impacts of COVID-19 in thelarger Asia-Pacific region, edited by Jeff Kingston, delivered in Part 1 and 2.

David H. Slater is professor of cultural anthropology at Sophia University. He has worked onyouth and labor, capitalism and social class, and urban space. Since 2011, he has beenworking on oral narrative, first of disaster and survival in Voices from Tohoku, then ofmothers displaced from Fukushima, of youth activists and of homeless men in Tokyo.Currently, he is working on a related oral narrative project, Voices from Japan, that isfocusing on foreign refugees seeking asylum in Tokyo through the collection of oral narrativesand support efforts through the Sophia Refugee Support Group.