The Behavior Analyst 1987, 10, 147-160 No. 2 (Fall)

Walden Two: The Morality of AnarchyEvalyn F. Segal

San Diego State University

The utopian label is often pinned on calls for comprehensive change as a means of dismissing them fromserious consideration.... [S]ocial orders come and go, and those who indulge in utopian thinking maybe more prepared for ... the inevitability of widespread societal transformation.... Keeping utopia inmind can prevent our settling for minor reforms when more significant change might be possible. (Fox,1985, p. 55)

When ... I called myself a benign anarchist ... someone said that that was not like the dictatorshipof Walden Tvo. But Walden Two was anarchistic.... The functions delegated to [authority figures] inthe world at large were performed by the people themselves through face-to-face commendation andcensure. (Skinner, 1983, p. 426, emphasis his)

The issue for anarchists is not whether there should be structure or order, but what kind there shouldbe and what its sources ought to be. The individual or group which has sufficient liberty to be self-regulating will have the highest degree of order; the imposition of order from above and outside inducesresentment and rebellion where it does not encourage childlike dependence and impotence, and so becomesa force for disorder. (Barclay, 1982, p. 17)

Key words: Walden Two, utopias, communitarian movement, social engineering

A vision of a human future cannot do without theindispensable support of scientific expertise, but itencompasses more than the realm of science. Theutopia without science is empty, but science with-out utopia is blind. (Plattel, 1972, p. 97)

[There is a] common recognition among philos-ophers that facts cannot produce a value. Thinkingotherwise has been called "the naturalistic fallacy."... A fact only becomes a value when someoneapproves of that fact.... Fully grasping the argu-ment concerning the naturalistic fallacy leads oneto the basic question ofresearch on mortality: Whichnaturalistic fallacy should and must we commit?(Haan, 1982, pp. 1096-1097, emphasis hers)

If I am not for myself, who should be for me? IfI am only for myself, what am I? (The Talmud)

What are we to make ofB. F. Skinner'sutopian work, Walden Two, published in1948? It can be read as the ravings of aself-styled benign anarchist; a blueprintfor a sane, just, and peaceful world; acritique of post-industrial civilization; a

An earlier version (Segal, 1984) of this articleappeared in the proceedings (Keehn, 1984) of aconference organized by J. D. Keehn to usher in1984. (Permission to reprint has been granted bythe copyright holder, Master Press, Atkinson Col-lege, York University, Toronto, Ontario M3J 2R7.)I thank Peter Keehn for this advice and support.Send reprint requests to E. F. Segal, PsychologyDepartment, San Diego State University, San Di-ego CA 92182-0350.

prophetic grasp ofthe need for small scale(Schumacher, 1973); nostalgia for by-gone times when people lived in tribes orclose-knit agrarian communities andshared simple, self-evident values; a syn-thesis ofJudeo-Christian, Confucian, andbehaviorist ethics (see Waller, 1982); asales pitch for behavioral technology; amad scientist's plot against human free-dom; or a symptom of Skinner's com-pulsion, shared with G. B. Shaw, to"dream of things that never were, andask why not?"

Skinner was not the first psychologistto succumb to asking "Why not?" Mor-awski (1982) has uncovered four earlierutopias dreamt by well-known twentieth-century psychologists. William Mc-Dougall (1921) wrote one urging worlddomination by a genetic elite; HugoMunsterberg (1916) wrote one urging in-ternational pacifism; John B. Watson(1929) wrote one; and G. Stanley Hallpublished a utopian novella called "TheFall ofAtlantis" (Hall, 1920). One mightexpect Watson's utopia to prefigure Skin-ner's inasmuch as both are behaviorists,but in Morawski's account, Hall emergesas a nearer relation.G. S. Hall's utopian morality tale, "The

Fall of Atlantis," concerned the tension

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between selfish individualism and supra-individual and future-oriented values.Here is Morawski's (1982) account ofHall's "Fall of Atlantis":Atlantean citizens subordinated individual to socialdesires and celebrated a perception ofbeing 'uniquelyone with all Nature....' The fall of Atlantis wasnot cataclysmic, but rather a gradual degenerationinitiated by forces ofindividualism and by physicalchanges in the environment....

In Atlantis research was the ultimate expressionof the belief in human improvement. And of allscientific endeavors, psychology represented themost valuable.... [It] strove chiefly to give self-knowledge and self-control....

Jurisprudence was designed through research onhuman nature and operated with two rules: thepleasure and pain principles and the assessment ofthe social value of individual actions....The fall had resulted partly from the psycholog-

ical flaws of individualism and selfishness, and therevered field of psychology did not escape thesefaults.... The commercial preoccupations of sci-entists signalled the eventual demise ofthe scientificspirit. (Morawski, 1982, p. 1094)

If selfish individualism and commer-cialism do not corrupt utopia from with-in, the same vices, in the form of impe-rialistic capitalism, will destroy it fromwithout. That is the message of WaldenTres, a rueful Latin-American novella bya prominent Colombian behavior ana-lyst, Ruben Ardila (1979). In Ardila'sfantasy, a tiny Central American state en-gages the services of the best behavioranalysts to help turn the tropical landinto a "socialist-humanist" paradise.Progress is so rapid and peaceful that theruling junta dismantles the army and as-signs its career officers to useful work. Intime, however, the United States does theinevitable. Alarmed at the threat "so-cialist-humanism" may pose to U.S. in-vestments, the U.S. sends in the Marinesunder pretext of "defending human free-dom." The socialist nations, includingCuba, watch from the sidelines, makingno move to aid their newest sibling, forthe beleaguered little land had commit-ted the sin of going its own behavior-analytic way, "without Marx or Jesus,without Mao or Lenin" (Ardila, 1979, p.180).Ardila's parable serves to remind us

that The Kingdom of Skinner will notarrive any time soon, if for no other rea-son than that it goes against Realpolitik.

We need not fear International Skinner-ianism's becoming a threat to human sur-vival; the real threats lie in the currentworld "order." (See Schell, 1982, for aneloquent summary of our predicament.)

THE DIALECTIC OFMORALITY

Walden Two should be read along withSkinner's other major works on the hu-man condition, Science and Human Be-havior (1953) and Beyond Freedom andDignity (197 1). Together these three forman extended treatise on morality.

It is evident that humans need oneanother; we are too puny to survive alone,at least in recognizably human form. AsHobbes (1651/1939) told us three cen-turies ago, outside the support and pro-tection ofthe group, life is "nasty, brutishand short."' Or as Harry Morgan said inthe closing pages of Herningway's (1937)novel, To Have and Have Not, "No mat-ter how, a man alone ain't got no bloodyfucking chance."

In agreement with Hall and other mor-alists, Skinner has argued that our de-pendence on one another not only obligesus to live in social groups- it also obli-gates us to put the group's survival first.Not because the group has value in itselfbut because it is the sine qua non of thesatisfaction of our individual needs andthe realization of our individual aspira-tions.But if self-interest requires the group,

the group also gives rise to the moral andpsychological tensions Freud (1930/1962)described in Civilization and Its Discon-tents. Because the self-interests of indi-viduals are bound to conflict with eachother and with the interests of the group

' This passage is worth quoting in full: "What-soever . . . is consequent to a time of war ... thesame is consequent to the time, wherein men livewithout other security than what their own strengthand their own invention shall furnish them withal.In such condition there is no place for industry ...no navigation ... no knowledge of the face of theearth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; nosociety; and which is worst of all, continual fear,and danger of violent death; and the life of man,solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes,1651/1939, p. 161).

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as a whole, individuals must compro-mise some of their self-interest. How todo this equitably is the problem of hu-man morality.

In her thoughtful essay on the moralgrounds of social science, Haan (1982)draws a parallel between human moralityand science. Consensual truth, she says,is the goal of science; consensual equity,the goal of mortality. Both are reachedby similar dialectic methods. Haan char-acterizes the dialectic ofscience as "even-handed consideration, acceptance andevaluation of all evidence pursued withthe supposition and hope that the 'bestfit' to the data ... will be worked out"(p. 1102). Similarly, the dialectic of mo-rality is good-faith negotiation amongequal participants, all of whom mustspeak their needs and press their claimsforthrightly, while recognizing the rightof others to do the same, and being pre-pared "to engage in exchanges that canresult in their having less than they ini-tially thought was justified" (p. 1102).Parallel to the dialectic truth-seeking ofscience, "Morality is the shared interac-tive understanding about the ways thatmoral interchanges should be conductedand concluded" (p. 1102).Haan (1982) further notes that "The

moral dialogue works to untangle legiti-mate self-interest and selfishness" (p.1103). This is the heart of the matter.The ecologist Garrett Hardin has put theproblem well in his discussions of the"tragedy of the commons" (1968) and"the carrying capacity as an ethical con-cept" (1978). Imagine a group of farmerswho share a common village pasture. Solong as the number of cattle grazing thecommons does not exceed the carryingcapacity of the land-its ability to re-plenish itself-this simple communitar-ian anarchy works to ensure that thecommunity's grazing land is efficientlyutilized. And it works equitably so longas each farmer puts about the same num-ber of cattle to graze as the others. Butthere is an economic advantage to thefarmer who exploits the compact by in-creasing his herd. An addition by oneinduces the others to add to their herds,to reestablish equity. Eventually the car-

rying capacity of the commons is ex-ceeded. Selfish individualism ruins thecommons, and in the end, all lose.Hardin (1978) argues:

Even if an individual fully perceives the ultimateconsequences of his actions he is most unlikely toact in any other way, for he cannot count on therestraint his conscience might dictate being matchedby a similar restraint on the part of all the others.. . . Tragedy is the price offreedom in the commons.Only by changing to some other system . ... canruin be averted. In other words, in a crowded worldsurvival requires that some freedom be given up.(pp. 245-246, emphasis his)

Moral equity demands that individualsfeel assured that any restraint on theirfreedom is balanced by like restraint onothers, and that all welcome restraint asbeing in their personal long-term self-in-terest.

Skinner's overriding concern in Wal-den Two and Beyond Freedom and Dig-nity was with just these issues, the trag-edy ofthe commons, the carrying capacityof the environment, and promoting themoral dialectic needed to achieve equi-table restraints on unbridled self-interest.Because the realization of individual in-terests requires the integrity of the sup-porting group, society needs to deviseways to assure that members' individualactions make contact with their long-termconsequences-for the welfare ofthe group.Haan (1982) says that "Our most

pressing social problem is not the pop-ulace's moral weakness but that socialinstitutions increasingly limit citizens'moral participation" (p. 1 103). I read thisin two ways. First, the technological com-plexity ofour society limits our ability toestimate long-term social and personalconsequences of actions and to assesswhich public or private actions are in factin one's interest. Second, the impersonalbureaucratic institutions of post-indus-trial society get in the way of citizens'assuming their roles as equal participantsin moral negotiations, even when theycome ready, like Ralph Nader or the Sier-ra Club, with an abundance of well-founded forecasts concerning the futureconsequences of present actions.

I conclude this section with a final bitof wisdom from Haan (1982):

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[A]ltruism ... does not produce moral balance be-cause the receiver becomes obligated while the giverbecomes morally superior. Instead ofreceiving gifts,people much prefer having what is legitimatelytheirs. Failure to understand that morality is bal-anced reciprocity is an endemic blindness of thewelfare state, which gives gifts instead of rights toparticipate in legitimate and rewarded work.... (p.1103)

THE MORALITY OFENGINEERING MORALITY

Walden Two sketches a system ofcom-munitarian social engineering whose goalis not a welfare state but balanced reci-procity. Like G. S. Hall before him, Skin-ner envisioned a world where psychologyis the preeminent science, and its chieftask is to teach self-knowledge and self-control.

Self-control is surely an essential ofthemoral dialectic, a necessary element inthe ability to assert one's own interestsforthrightly yet abide at times with lessthan one initially thought justified. ButSkinner, and behavior analysts generally,assume that humans are wholly a part ofnature, and hence wholly subject to nat-ural law. Our behavior, as much as ourorganism, is the determined result ofnat-ural, evolutionary forces outside our-selves. How can we possibly gain self-control over such a process? And howcan we function as free and equal partic-ipants in the moral dialectic if our be-havior is wholly determined by forcesoutside ourselves?

Garrett (1985) has some interestingthings to say on these questions. He makesa good case thatarguments over determinism vs indeterminism arebeside the point. Our freedom so far as we have orlack it is a function on the one hand of our powerover our environment and over ourselves and onthe other of the extent to which we are enlightenedabout what is really important. (p. 33)We can, on the one hand, take responsibility for

our lives in the sense that we can take stock of ouractions, thoughts, and psychological states and theconsequences they have on ourselves and othersand we can (to a certain extent) discriminate be-tween what is really important and what is not andchange ourselves accordingly.... [Limits to humanfreedom arise not from the determined nature ofbehavior but from] our limited power over the en-vironment and over ourselves and from the factthat too often we do not really know or lose sightof what is really important. (p. 35, emphasis his)

The key to self-control is self-knowl-edge. We control our own behavior bypersonally manipulating the causes ofthatbehavior. Just as knowledge informs con-trol, so self-knowledge informs self-con-trol. People who want to exert respon-sible control over their own behavior, andso participate as equals in the moral di-alectic, must first understand the laws ofbehavior as they apply to us all. Thenthey must learn to discern (and not losesight of) what long-term consequences arereally important to their own and thegroup's interest.But there is another dilemma that re-

quires mention here-whether individ-uals whose behavior is at least partly theresult ofothers' deliberate manipulationscan be said to be morally equal to thosewho do the manipulating. (Is the pupilmorally equal to the teacher?) Haan(1982) says that "People cannot negotiatemorally in good faith ifthey feel helpless;they need hope that their legitimate self-interests will be heard and considered"(p. 1102).Here is one root ofthe widespread fear

of the planned control of human behav-ior. Because of his emphasis on plannedand institutionalized behavioral controlas a means of achieving moral equity,Skinner has been bitterly attacked as thearch example of the mad, power-hungryscientist, a dangerous totalitarian-com-munistic or fascistic, depending on theideological stance of the critic. It is cer-tainly legitimate to ask whether the meansofbehavioral technology are by their verynature incompatible with the end ofmor-al equity. Does behavior technology ren-der its beneficiaries morally weaker thanthe behavior technicians? Without hopethat their legitimate self-interests will beheard and considered? Morally helplessto negotiate in good faith?The saving answer comes down to bal-

anced reciprocity (or perhaps tribal an-archy-see Crowe, 1969; Fox, 1985).Built into the structure of any equitablegroup must be the fundamental require-ment that the rulers be subject to the samecontingencies as the ruled-indeed, thatthere be no such distinction as ruler vs.ruled. (A governor or executive is not a

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ruler, although some governors and ex-ecutives don't know that.)

Still, "equal under the law" is not ger-mane to the relation of parents to theirchildren, teachers to their pupils, behav-ior technicians to their clients. Unequalknowledge and skills do imply unequalpower. In these situations, other kinds ofbalanced reciprocity come into play. Be-havioral power consists mainly in thepower to reinforce or punish. Punish-ment and other modes of aversive con-trol breed rebellion and counterforce,whereas the change in behavior namedby reinforcement occurs only if the con-sequence ofaction is a reinforcer, in whichcase the client might be said to be par-ticipating in a (most of the time) mu-tually-advantageous compact or bal-anced exchange with the behaviortechnician.

Besides, ifpsychology's goal is to teachself-knowledge and self-control, then anypower imbalance between teacher andpupil is meant to be temporary and brief.Psychology's ideal goal is only reachedwhen the pupil becomes independent ofthe teacher (or becomes the teacher).

Individuals cannot gain self-controlwithout help. We do not choose our ge-netic heritage nor do we choose the for-mative experiences that shape the sort ofadults we become. If our intellectual andcreative capacities are to be fully realized,if we are to acquire interpersonal skillsand moral values consonant with the in-terests of the group and a repertoire ofknowledge and skills for self-control andself-expression, it can only be as the re-sult oflearning experiences that the socialmilieu provides for us. It is the group thatultimately determines the character of itsmembers. The wise society fosters re-search on behavior so that it can exploitthe resultant technology for the purposeof rearing intelligent, creative, thought-ful, loving, moral, and self-controllingcitizens.But that is social engineering, so feared

by so many. The fear is understandable.Who wants to envision a world of con-ditioned zombies? How can zombies ne-gotiate morally in good faith? If societyholds all the cards, what is to prevent it

from rearing masses of demoralized, de-humanized, degraded humans whose onlyfunction is to serve a governing elite (asGeorge Orwell, 1949, and Aldous Hux-ley, 1932/1946, and others have pro-phesied)? It may be that pain and terrorbreed rebellion, but with modern-day be-havior technology, is it not possible toeschew terror and rear contented zom-bies who will not want or even imaginerebellion?Some of the possible answers to such

fears are well-founded, others simplywishful, for, to be candid, all the evidenceisn't in. First, neither the human organ-ism nor the environment is long at rest,and creative innovation is the inevitableoutcome ofhuman interaction with a ki-netic environment. No matter how hardand earnestly tyrants tried to make zom-bies, even contented ones, surely humaninventiveness, combined with restless-ness bred ofmonotony, would foil them.

Further, humans, like animals, do in-deed rebel against force and terror. Whenhuman intelligence is engaged by thestruggle against terror, sooner or (toooften) later, terror must lose out.2 In ourcentury, we have seen many (though byno means all) terrorist regimes over-thrown, some from within, some fromwithout, some to be replaced by moreenlightened societies, others, alas, by freshtyranny.One technique always open to "mor-

ally violated people ... [is to] covertlyfight back in bad moral faith, even iftheybecome passive and pseudo-stupid"(Haan, 1982, p. 1102). Schell (1986) andWeschler (1983), in important recent NewYorker essays, suggest that altogether newand ingenious methods ofnonviolent po-litical and cultural resistance are beingdeveloped in Poland-Solidarity is onepart of it. These innovations in peaceful

2" 'Sometimes we forget how close engagementis to exhaustion,' a Polish friend told me one after-noon. ... 'It's a mistake to imagine that a beaten-down and apparently defeated class can't suddenlyemerge defiant and fierce, with a fierceness broughton by precisely the things that were making it ex-hausted'" (Weschler, 1983, pp. 102, 105). Takenote that here fierceness means fierceness of deter-mination, not of action.)

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resistance may in time lead Poland outof deep oppression even if not out of theSoviet sphere; and what is more, the Pol-ish experience may teach important les-sons to the rest of the world.3

If terror cannot indefinitely support aregime, what about those contented zom-bies who have been conditioned withoutbenefit of terror by positive reinforce-ment methods? We can imagine them asnot so very unlike the rock-and-televi-sion-zonked walking dead we find amongus today. May not capitalism (or com-munism) -cum rock porn cum computergames cum hot tubs and televisionsmiles-become ever more efficient amachine of enslavement as it wakes upto the possibilities of rationally-engi-neered positive reinforcement? What ifour present bread-and-circuses worldturns into a cake-and-space-carouselsworld?

In the short term, any perversion ofhuman society is possible. If other hu-man-made disasters do not get us first(overpopulation; nuclear obliteration;triage; depletion of water tables, forests,arable land, the ozone layer; pollution ofair, water and earth), it seems virtuallycertain that the balance-sheet mentalitieswho run the post-industrial nations willin time catch on to the immense powerand economy of systematic, rationalizedpositive reinforcement. They will use itever more efficiently to turn whole pop-ulaces into happy zombies, just as AldousHuxley (1932/1946) predicted in BraveNew World. (Living in southern Califor-nia, I sometimes think that day has al-ready come.)But in the long run, that, too, must fail.

Technocratic society needs intelligent,

I "Today it is precisely in the societies under se-verest and most philistine governance-in SouthAfrica, in Eastern Europe, in Latin America-thatmuch of the finest imaginative literature is beingcreated.... The 'censorship' of the free and mass-market economies is wonderfully light.... But itcorrodes, it trivializes.... 'Do not forget,' saidBorges, . . . 'that censorship is the mother of met-aphor.' Banishing or hounding serious poets to theirdeaths ... is a hideous tribute to their importance.It is a tribute nevertheless...." (Steiner, 1986, p.36).

imaginative, critical, creative workers.People cannot be zonked and creative atthe same time. Individuals trained to theintelligent skepticism needed to servicetechnocracy will grow restive under astultifying social order. They will findothers like themselves and organize re-sistance-even the resistance of pseudo-stupidity. Eventually, human imagina-tion and intelligence will subvert anysocial system that does not respect thehuman need to create, invent, experi-ment, devise new challenges for humanimagination and intelligence to play upon.

Skinner argues in Walden Two and Be-yond Freedom and Dignity that anysociety that discounts human nature, hu-man needs and interests, ultimately self-destructs. So it is, not only for terroristregimes, but as well for regimes deploy-ing the more sophisticated technology ofpositive reinforcement against the trulyhuman interests of their populaces. Aculture that cannot count on the whole-hearted and intelligent support of itsmembers must eventually give way to onebetter equipped to resolve the require-ments of social living with the facts ofhuman nature-unless human societysimply vanishes.

Perhaps halfthe world is now enslavedby terror and the other half by economicreinforcers dispensed by rapacious ex-ploiters of our labor, our imaginations,and our precious habitat. Commissars,caliphs, and cowboys restlessly finger theirnuclear triggers and long for a thermo-nuclear joust, while the rest of us pursueour private Pompeiian pleasures and qui-etly pray that no artificial means or heroicmeasures will be used to prolong ourmushroom agony. There may soon be noone left to worry about social engineer-ing's threat to human freedom. Our pres-ent predicament leaves us with few, ifany, alternatives to engineering a moralsociety, provided we want to avert thegreatest immorality of all, eternal ther-monuclear night.

WALDEN TWO'S VALUES

The moral and social values Skinneradvanced in Walden Two in 1948 are just

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what one would expect from a sensitiveand prophetic analyst ofthe human scene.They are much the same values that latersocial thinkers have advocated (e.g.,Schumacher, 1973), and the reasoningbehind them is now familiar. The groundof Walden Two's values is simply the sur-vival of human civilization.

Small ScaleSkinner advocated smaller communi-

ties in place ofour current megalopolises.Anyone who has visited the great citiesof the world in recent years can attest tothe most visible horror of the megalop-olis: nerve-rending traffic and air ladenwith the noxious waste products of thecombustion engine and heavy industry.

Small scale is human scale. Crowdingis unpleasant and stressful. Large citiesare impersonal. It is easier to care aboutthe welfare of people one knows thanabout anonymous hordes. Accountabil-ity is better on the small scale. Those whomanage a society's institutions should beaccessible and answerable to the citizen-ry. Small scale makes it possible to reviveancient, anarchic forms of participatorydemocracy. Walden Two's managers andgovernors were not elected, but ratheremerged from the existing managers andgovernors through systematic appren-ticeship. But the managers and governorsand their apprentices had to be ever-re-sponsive to the needs and wishes of thecommunity, because their job securitydepended on the welfare of the com-munity. Members were frequently que-ried about their needs and wishes, andtheir satisfaction (or lack thereof) withcommunity policies and practices. Smallscale makes it possible for social insti-tutions to respond quickly and thus en-ables social experimentation. Policies andpractices can be tried out and promptlymodified or discarded if they prove un-workable or lead to dissatisfaction. In anevolutionary society, nothing is writtenin stone.

Small scale works against the devel-opment of castes, and for moral equity.The managers and governors (and psy-chologists) of Walden Two received no

special privileges to match their specialresponsibilities. They shared the lot ofthe community. Every member of Wal-den Two had to contribute a certainamount of labor to the community, andeveryone, including managers and gov-ernors, had to discharge some ofthe laborobligation in menial physical work. Skin-ner (1948/1976) explains why:The really intelligent [person] doesn't want to feelthat [their] work is being done by anyone else.[They're] sensitive enough to be disturbed by slightresentments which, multiplied a millionfold, mean[their] downfall.... [Besides,] brains and brawn arenever exclusive.... [It's] fatal to treat brawn as ifthere were no brains, and perhaps more speedilyfatal to treat brains as if there were no brawn. Oneor two hours of physical work each day is a healthmeasure ... but there's a better reason why brainsmust not neglect brawn ... the manager must keepan eye on the managed, must understand [their]needs, must experience [their] lot.... It's our con-stitutional guarantee that the problems of the big-muscle user won't be forgotten. (p. 52)

Small scale fosters balanced reciproc-ity and good-faith moral negotiationamong equals. It obliges managers andgovernors to rely on positive incentivesto motivate the work of the communityand to shun force, both because thetechnocrats' personal accessibility makesthem ready targets ofmembers' outragedresponse to force, and because the techn-ocrats share the daily life of the com-munity and no more wish to be subjectto force than anyone else does.4There are economies of scale that are

available only to large populations, butthese economies must be weighed againstthe high cost of supplying the necessitiesof life to impacted populations and dis-

4"Edney ... reviewed experimental data show-ing that cooperative behavior is indeed more com-mon in small groups.... [H]e listed the following'functional benefits' of reducing group size: Im-proved communication helps sustain necessaryfeedback; greater visibility ofmember distress dur-ing scarcity enhances the probability of remedialaction; individual responsibilities are harder toavoid; alienation is reduced; and the role of moneyis reduced.... 'The improved focus on the groupitself, the greater ease of monitoring exploitativepower, and the opportunities for trust to developamong individuals with face-to-face contact are alsoenhanced' "(Fox, 1985, p. 52, quoting Edney, 1981,p. 28).

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posing of their waste products; the ex-pense and sluggishness of the attendantbureaucracies; and the loss ofcontact withthe natural realities of life. Skinner en-visioned a decentralized network ofWal-den Twos which would jointly availthemselves of economies of scale whereindicated, while preserving the advan-tages of small scale in other areas. "Ap-propriate Technology" is the currentname for this.A student once objected to me that the

small scale ofWalden Two would not beconducive to Skinner's expressed dreamof fostering great art. The student arguedthat, for example, only a large, concen-trated population can support a reallyfirst-class symphony orchestra. There hasto be a large pool of people so that therare individuals with musical talent willbe in sufficient supply, and so that thepopulation can take care of its subsis-tence needs without burdening its artistswith mundane tasks. Actuallly, thereshould be an overabundance of trainedmusicians, the student argued, so thatcompetition for scarce orchestra slots willgoad them to reach for ever higher stan-dards of excellence. And the populationconcentration has to be large enough toprovide audiences-symphonic music,after all, isn't everyone's cup of tea.

This view ignores history. The greatcities ofEurope were no more than townsby our standards when art reached per-haps its highest excellence. Shakespeare,Vivaldi, Bach, and Mozart wrote for smallaudiences by current standards. Few ofMichelangelo's Italian contemporariescould have seen his paintings on the ceil-ing of the Sistine Chapel.

Great art seems to need neither largeconcentrations ofpeople nor the artificialstimulus ofcontrived competition to goadartists to excellence. What it surely doesneed is appreciative, discerning audi-ences and patrons who are willing to pro-vide subsistence to professional artists.Genius is a rare commodity, but as forartistic talent, that may well be a basicpart of the human heritage, the humanneed to experiment, to play, to seek andcreate variety and novelty. All known hu-man cultures have produced fine art, and

honored their artists. A community neednot be wholly dependent on the rare in-teraction between genetics and the en-vironment that brings forth a genius. Itcan rely principally on the strategy offostering everyone's talents, and provid-ing support, encouragement, and trainingfor those intent on an artistic vocation.5It must also see to the development ofdiscerning audiences, but those, like art-ists, are made, not born. It is training thatmakes connoisseurs. Cultural traditionalone has made Italians discerning andappreciative critics ofopera; Russians, ofballet; Viennese, Salzburgers, and Bos-tonians, of symphonic music-not anynational genetic predisposition for one oranother of these art forms.

Respect for the CarryingCapacity of the Environment

It is remarkable that in 1948, whenmuch of the world was just turning fromwar production to the frenzied produc-tion ofconsumer goods, Skinner had theprescience to propose a communitarianlife based on respect for nature and con-servation of its resources. He foresawcommunal ownership of essential ma-chinery and technological gadgetry, anda high standard of living built upon em-inently nonmaterialistic values. Life inWalden Two was not bereft of technol-ogy; on the contrary, Skinner advocatedits maximum use to free people from

I "[N]o poet, however inspired, is wholly the be-getter of his poem. The informing context of per-sonal creation is always social and collective....Above all, it is in art and literature that the Mes-sianic challenge, the potential of human ripeningand deliverance, is enacted and transmitted acrosstime. The poet is responsible toward the claims andprovocations ofthe ideal just because a certain per-sonal impotence has freed him from the mire, fromthe compromise ofactual power" (Steiner, 1986, p.36).

6 "[A] work ethic that has no further justificationthan work itself and is divorced from other valuesis susceptible to bring driven by narrow self-inter-est, and it risks that conceptions of achievementwill be distorted into forms that are indifferent ifnot antithetical to the public good" (Spence, 1985,p. 1292).

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onerous labor.6 Walden Two would sure-ly have had its full complement of com-puters and robots. Nor was life in WaldenTwo devoid of interesting variety. Withsmall scale assuring everyone's full par-ticipation in the community, and tech-nology to shield workers from tedium,Walden Two could count on everyone'spitching in with a good will to get thecommunity's work done. And with anenthusiastic work force, no one had towork very much. Skinner estimated thatabout four hours a day would suffice.Members had an abundance ofleisure forcreative personal pursuits.

Frequently and eloquently, Skinnerwrites in Walden Two of the dawning ofa Golden Age of Art. This was no merebread-and-circuses ploy to keep themasses doped and compliant. On thecontrary, Skinner recognized that playfuland creative self-expression is an urgenthuman need, the highest reach ofour hu-man capacities. Arts, crafts, sports, theplayful pursuit of pure science and in-vention would abound. There would besomething for everyone. In Skinner'sWalden Two, amateur musicians foundothers to join them in an evening of so-so chamber music for their own pleasure;more accomplished performers and com-posers found small but appreciative au-diences for their performances. The com-munity was awash in members' paintingsand sculptures, some in traditional andothers in experimental styles. Somemembers cultivated flower gardens intheir leisure time, others held a dance,others tinkered in the lab or shop or readin the library or rehearsed a play or tooka group of youngsters on a nature hike.There is an amusing scene in Walden

Two in which some skeptical visitors fromthe Big City are standing around a bul-letin board packed with small-print no-tices of the week's social and culturalevents. One ofthe visitors expresses sur-prise at the smallness ofthe print and theabsence of colorful posters urging mem-bers' attendance at the various functions.The host explains that there is no need,and little point, in overselling events. Ina community with abundant leisure andopportunity to cultivate tastes and inter-

ests, a small-print notice of an event suf-fices to quicken the heartbeat of inter-ested members. Hype would be all wrong,because ifthe event itselfdid not providesufficient incentive for attendance, whywaste anyone's time with it? It was notas though anyone had to worry about theprofitability of an entertainment indus-try, and no one's livelihood depended onthe size of the audience they drew.

Skinner was quite right. Look at thesmallness of the print in the notices ofevents in any college newspaper, or in theprogram of an academic meeting. In mycity, one ofthe most popular newspapersis a free weekly made up of a fat sectionoffine-print notices ofthe week's culturalevents; another fat section of free fine-print classified advertising; a section withnews and articles of general interest andtheatrical and musical reviews; and a hypesection with lurid commercial advertise-ments of rock bands, nightclubs, andmud-wrestling by semi-nude youngwomen. Presumably the lurid ads pay forthe rest of the newspaper, but if the pur-veyors ofhype were dispensed with, couldnot the paper survive by charging readersfor the information that is now offeredfree? I do not see why not, provided thepublishers were content to make costs andjust a little more.My city has an art institute whose

membership is open to all who choose tocall themselves artists. It has about 800members, who submit about 250 artworks for public exhibition each month,from which jurors select about 90 for themonthly show. Inasmuch as only a hand-ful of art works is sold each month, itmust be that members pay their yearlydues, create their works of arts, and sub-mit them to the critical scrutiny of thejurors for just the pleasure ofmaking art,exhibiting it on occasion to the public,and having the fellowship and appreci-ation of other artists.

I know several amateur chamber-mu-sic groups that have met weekly for years.Occasionally one gives a free public per-formance. It must be that the musiciansmeet weekly for the sheer pleasure ofmaking music together, and that theyperform publicly without pay simply for

156 EVALYN F. SEGAL

the encouragement that public perfor-mance provides to improve their playing.

I know an 82-year-old widowed barberwho has had the same barber shop for 35years, and still charges the same $1.95for a haircut that he charged when heopened the shop. The shop is the centerof his social life. He figures that if hecharged the going rate for his mediocrehaircuts, he would have few customersand little to do all day. At night he goesto a community dance hall and dancesuntil closing time.The painters, the musicians, the barber

would thrive in Walden Two. As wisepeople have always known, a satisfyinglife is not to be found in an excess oftoysand gadgets. With care, a musical instru-ment will last a lifetime, a painter's onlymaterial needs are paints and canvas, abarber's shears can be resharpened. Nov-elty, variety, challenge, and companion-ship are essential, but the compulsive ac-quisition of material things (with itsresultant waste of earth's limited re-sources) does not secure these humanrequisites. They are more likely to flowfrom working on a new and difficult pieceof chamber music, setting oneself a newpainting problem to solve, or from thevariety of people who drop into the bar-ber shop or the dance hall for a haircutor a polka and a sociable chat.

Self-ControlFor a society to survive, it must pro-

vide subsistence to its members, whilerespecting the carrying capacity ofthe en-vironment and the subsistence needs offuture generations. It must provide forthe satisfaction of the human needs forcommunity and affection, as well as au-tonomy and self-realization, in a way thatequitably balances the conflicting inter-ests of individuals and the group. A rootproblem for moral equity lies in the mo-tivation ofbehavior. An individual's ac-tions, however pleasurable in the shortterm, may have consequences in the longrun that are harmful to the individualthemself, or to other individuals, or tothe group. But potential consequences faroff in the future are not the things thatmotivate behavior. It is the promise of

immediate reinforcement that impels usto act, the threat of immediate punish-ment that deters us. When the immediateconsequences of an act are the very op-posite of its long-term consequences (asis often the case), it is the long-term con-sequences that tend to lose out, to every-one's detriment.

If we are to resolve this dilemma, itmust be by the judicious exploitation ofjust the same behavioral processes thatgave rise to it in the first place. We cannothope to solve society's problems by ig-noring the natural laws of behavior. (Yepoliticians, take heed.) The secret, saysSkinner, is to supplement the intrinsicconsequences that flow naturally from ouractions with extrinsic ones that societycontrives. When immediate conse-quences are at odds with long-term con-sequences, we must contrive to offset theshort-term consequences by others thatare consonant with the projected long-term outcome for the individual and thegroup.

Societies have traditionally done justthis in the moral training of the young,mostly by use of punishment and fear-"instilling a conscience," it is called. Tooffset any immediate advantage to a childfor lying or stealing, say, the child's moralteachers contrive punishments to offsetthe benefits of the misconduct. Theseserve to bring children into more pal-pable contact with the consequences oftheir misdeeds for others; lying or steal-ing harms others, so liars and thievesshould be made to feel a comparableharm. In time, the inclination to engagein punishable acts declines; the individ-ual has "learned self-restraint" or has"developed a conscience." Ofcourse, theultimate source ofthe restraint rests withsociety, which carried out the moraltraining and which enforces self-restraintby exacting penalties for infractions ofthe moral code.

Skinner's chiefinnovation would be toreplace a system of moral training andenforcement based on extrinsic punish-ment of antisocial acts with a systembased on extrinsic reinforcement of pro-social acts. The reinforcement for pro-social behavior would have to be gen-erous enough and judiciously enough

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applied to make up for any natural de-ficiencies in the short-term reinforce-ment of prosocial acts. Indeed, such actsmay have no short-term reinforcementfor the individual at all, but only costs;and acting prosocially means forgoing theshort-term reinforcers that are to begleaned by acting selfishly. In time, Skin-ner believes, a wisely planned and exe-cuted system of moral training based onreinforcement should be just as success-ful in instilling a personal conscience andself-control in the individual as the tra-ditional system based on punishment.7And, of course, it would have the advan-tages that all reinforcement systems haveover systems based on fear and force: Itwould not incite instant resentment, re-sistance, and rebellion; it would not leaveindividuals feeling that they had beencompelled to act, or to inhibit acting,against their will; it would stimulate cre-ativity and imagination instead of thesullen dullness that punishment breeds;and it would forestall or at least minimizethe anxiety neuroses that Freud (1930/1962), in Civilization and Its Discontents,argued were the unavoidable and tragicprice of civilized restraints on unbridledselfishness.

In Walden Two, Skinner offered sev-eral examples of his methods of moraltraining. Young children were given lol-lipops, but not allowed to eat them until

7Japanese child-rearing methods may teach us athing or two. For example, "American motherstended to prefer discipline via the assertion of ma-ternal authority and power, whereas Japanesemothers used such empathy-oriented approaches asdescribing how a child's misbehavior would hurtothers' feelings" (Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn,1984, p. 959)."When we children started to quarrel, my mother

used to say . . . 'to lose is to win.' By giving way, aperson demonstrates his or her tolerance, self-con-trol and flexibility. Giving way shows that the per-son is mature enough to control his or her ownassertive drives in order to protect the peace andharmony of the group. This gives the person cred-ibility so that he or she will be supported by eldersand peers in more important decision-making sit-uations in the future. Mother would also providean immediate reinforcement by showing a very sub-tle but clearly noticeable sign ofappreciation to thechild who yielded. The one who failed to yield wouldthus have a strange feeling of defeat even thoughapparently the victor" (Azuma, 1984, p. 970).

later; they were invited to put the lolli-pops away in the meantime. Once thelollipops were out of sight, the childrenforgot about them and did not suffer theirdeprivation. Thus, the children learnedto put temptation behind them. Whenthe children were older, they had to carrytheir lollipops on a string around theirnecks. The lollipops were coated withpowdered sugar, so teachers could easilydetect a surreptitious lick. At the ap-pointed time, if no licks were evident,the children could eat their lollipops; oth-erwise not. At this stage, the children hadto learn to "internalize" the earlier be-havior of putting temptation behindthem. They learned to busy themselveswith other things and so forget about thelollipops hanging from their necks, thussparing themselves the pangs of a plea-sure denied. The lesson Skinner teachesus here is important. Self-control is amatter oflearning to manipulate the con-ditions that control one's behavior. Wecan resist temptations by putting themliterally behind us, but we can also, andwith wider application, learn to ignorethem by busying ourselves with otherthings. This is the behaviorist's versionof an internalized conscience.Another famous (or infamous) exam-

ple ofWalden Two's moral training con-cerned soup. A troop of hungry childrencame in from a hike to find hot bowls ofsoup on the table, but rather than sittingright down to them, they had to stand forfive minutes, after which every other childwas allowed to start eating, while the reststood for another five minutes. Those whohad to wait passed the time telling jokesor singing. Again, they were learning toput up with a minor frustration by oc-cupying themselves with other activities;and they were learning to do so withoutenvy or rancor.Readers sometimes express outrage at

the cruelty of denying food to little chil-dren. Skinner's reply is that life is full ofunavoidable frustrations, and the soonerwe learn to deal with them with equa-nimity, the better. The children were well-nourished and well-loved, and it was anact of love to insert, in an otherwisepleasant day, a small lesson in how tocope with adversity. Further, the lessons

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in frustration tolerance were carefullygraded, so that by the time the childrenreached the soup lesson they were alreadywell versed in how to shrug off frustra-tion.

Skinner placed great emphasis in Wal-den Two on emotional training, a sub-class of moral training. He argued thatanger, resentment, envy, and the othernegative emotions are not only harmfulto the group as a whole, but they are alsopainful and useless for the individual suf-fering the emotion. Why not teach peopleto cope with life's problems without an-ger and without resentment, in ways thatare constructive for themselves and theirsocial groups, while sparing them the an-guish ofthese negative emotions? He sug-gested that the greatness of Jesus' teach-ing to "love thine enemies" lay not onlyin the disarming effect that love has onone's enemies, but also on the beneficialeffect on the person wronged, who isspared the pain of hating.A final example of Walden Two's

training in moral equity: At a certain age,the children were taken on trips to theBig City. They were shown the dismalslums as well as the lush enclaves of therich, and challenged to find the economicconnection between the two. This wasSkinner's answer to the question, "Howyou gonna keep 'em down on the farm,after they've seen Paree?" He thought thechildren's first-hand observation of themoral inequity of selfish individualismand commercialism would keep themfrom growing discontent with WaldenTwo's communitarian way of life andpining after the dark pleasures of theworld.

CAN WE GET THEREFROM HERE?

I have been assigning Walden Two tomy classes since 1960, and I have watchedmy students' and my own views of thebook change over the years. Student re-actions swing pro and con with shifts inthe political and economic climate. Thereare years when the predominant view isthat Walden Two is a totalitarian night-mare-a response that saddens me-andother years when the view is that Walden

Two is the only way to save humanity-a response that alarms me.

I am sad that Skinner's critics do notdiscern the difference between totalitar-ian systems based on privilege, inequity,force, and terror, and a proposal to en-gineer an equitable, communitarian, an-archic society through the methods ofpositive reinforcement. I am alarmed thatWalden Two's adherents are too ready topledge their allegiance to any new socialmovement that promises the world's sal-vation, and gloss over the political andeconomic obstacles and a certain hopefulnaivete in Skinner's proposals. WaldenTwo is just a dream,8 but as the yearshave gone by, I have found it a more andmore appealing dream. If Walden Twoin all its fullness, all its richness of cul-ture, all its humane caring for one anotherexisted, I would join up, gladly commit-ting all my worldly goods to the endeav-or. I would not worry about the threat tohuman freedom that Walden Two is saidto pose, for as a behavioral scientist Iknow that absolute freedom does not ex-ist. What does exist is a choice betweensocial systems that motivate behaviorthrough fear and those that motivatethrough positive consequences. Whatdoes exist is a choice between seeking the

8 The mature community ofa thousand membersthat Skinner depicted has no counterpart in reality.However, novice communities on a much smallerscale are thinly scattered over North America. TheFederation ofEgalitarian Communities (Box FB2,Tecumseh, MO 65760, 417/679-4682) lists: Dan-delion (RR1 (F), Enterprise, Ontario KOK ZO, 613/358-2304); East Wind (Same address as the Fed-eration); and Twin Oaks (Route 4, Box 169F, Louisa,VA 23093, 703/894-5126). Walden Two Interna-tional Association (% Linda Armendariz, ApartadoPostal 372, Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico 83000) isthe corresponding arm ofLos Horcones, a Mexicanaddition to the list of Walden Two-inspired com-munities in North America. Fernando Armendariz(1985) and McGregor (1985) provided up-to-dateprogress reports on Los Horcones and Twin Oaks,respectively, at a recent APA symposium.Crowe (1969) sees the communitarian movement

as a return to "tribal experience": "[W]e might wellassume that the departure from the tribal experi-ence is a short-run deviant experiment that failed.As we stand 'on the eve of destruction,' it may wellbe that the return to the face-to-face life in the smallcommunity unmediated by the electronic media isa very functional response in terms of the perpe-tuation of the species" (Crowe, 1969, p. 1106).

WALDEN TWO 159

satisfaction of one's human needs incommunity, and seeking it in selfish in-dividualism. We have few examples ofthe humane communitarian option, butevidence all around us of the chaos towhich both selfish competition and to-talitarian terror have brought us. The fi-nal decades of the twentieth century findhumanity besieged on all sides.

Alfred Meyer (1983), in a review ofThe Human Cycle by the anthropologistColin Turnbull, summed up Turnbull'sviews this way:We are, by [Turnbull's] reckoning, in deep emo-tional, social and spiritual trouble.... We fosterindividualism, which leads to competiveness andconflict rather than to cooperation and harmony.Part of the result is that we require laws to enforcesocial compliance, which comes voluntarily and au-tomatically in the small, tight-knit societies. In short,argues Turnbull, we have lost touch-political, eco-nomic, social, and religious touch-with the ulti-mate value, the joy of human community and itseffect, societal continuity. (p. 95)9

The anonymous author ofa New York-er "Talk ofthe Town" column a few yearsback discussed the mutual economic de-pendence among nations that the currentsystem of international banking and fi-nance has brought about. Bankers in theindustrial nations keep refinancing thehuge debts of the near-bankrupt devel-oping nations for they dare not let themdefault; one default could bring down thewhole world financial and monetarystructure.

9 More behavioral wisdom from the Japanese:The following passage describes how the Japaneseachieve consensus in business decisions through asystem called ringi. "[Ringi] involves five invariantsteps ... (a) a proposal, written up by the middlemanagement group, (b) cautious 'horizontal' con-sideration of the proposal by those at about themiddle management level, (c) cautious 'vertical'consideration of the proposal by those above andbelow the middle level, (d) formal affixment ofsealsto the ringisho document containing the proposal,and (e) final, deliberate ambiguity regarding au-thority and responsibility for the proposal. The fivesteps permit all participants tofeel that the group towhich they belong has shaped thefinal product, butthat no individual has. ... Each individual forgoespersonal, primary control over the final decision,but each gains control in the form of certainty asto how the decision will be reached and certaintythat it will be accepted" (Weisz, Rothbaum, &Blackburn, 1984, p. 963, emphasis added).

The world economy is thus held hostage by its in-dividual members-individual banks as well as in-dividual countries-whose separate interests maydiverge sharply from the interests of the whole. Inthe absence of any duly constituted internationalauthority, the international community is forced toresort to ad-hoc, semi-secret conclaves of financialpeople and others, convened on the spur of themoment to deal with emergencies as they arise....(p. 29)The "Talk of the Town" author went onto note a parallel between the world'seconomic predicament and the nuclearpredicament:In both our economic predicament and our nuclearpredicament, the sole path even to individual sur-vival lies in our acknowledgement of the commonglobal interest and in action in common, yet in bothpredicaments we enshrine individual interest andlet the common interest fend for itself, staking thefate of all on the voluntary self-restraint of eachparty involved. What appears to be at the root ofthis peculiar situation is not so much a failure ofresolve as a failure of observation. In times past,some "idealistic" people dreamed of establishing"one world" to replace the system of separate na-tion-states, and other "realistic" people dismissedsuch a notion as impractical. But while the idealistsand the realists were arguing, the world-realityitself-quietly changed. For reasons that had noth-ing to do with anyone's ideals-or, for that matter,with anyone's less creditable impulses-economic,technical, and political links tying the people of theearth together like so many mountain climbers ona slope were forged, and the one world came intobeing. This one world, in which we all now live,whether we like it or not, is no dream but an ir-revocable fact, which awaits our recognition andresponse. (p. 29)10

It is time to topple selfish individual-ism from its shrine, and have a care forthe common interest. Although not a sin-gle fully-developed Walden Two exists,much less a world network of matureWalden Twos, there are lessons to belearned from Skinner's dream of com-munity based on equity, self-expression,

'° Robert Axelrod asked contestants in a com-puter tournament to create a program to play Pris-oner's Dilemma, the nonzero-sum game beloved ofsocial psychologists. If, on a particular move, bothof two competing programs generated the com-mand to cooperate, each received three points. Ifboth programs generated a command to defect, eachreceived one point. But if one program cooperatedwhile the other defected, the defecting program gotfive points and the cooperating program none."The winner was the shortest program in the con-

test-a four-line program submitted by AnatolRapoport ... called TIT FOR TAT. TIT FORTAT's strategy is simple: Its first move is to co-operate, then it does whatever its partner did on

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respect for the carrying capacity of theenvironment, and contriving to rewardmoral behavior. Perhaps it is not too lateto learn them.

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