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IMMANUEL KANT

Praaical philosophy

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

MARY J. GREGOR

GENERAL INTRODUCTION BY

ALLEN WOOD Yale Ullivmity

8 CAMBRIDGE '.:>' UNIVERSITY PRESS

Introduaion

In 1795 King Frederick William II of Prussia withdrew from the War of the First Coalition and, on April 5, concluded the separate Peace of Basel with the revolutionary government of France. In a letter of August 15 of the same year (12 : 35) Kant offered the Konigsberg publisher Nicolovius what may well be the most widely read of his informal works, Toward Perpetual Peace.

Projects for "perpetual peace," and criticisms of them, had been in the air since 17 13 , when the Abbe St. Pierre, a secretary at the congress preceding the Treaty of Utrecht, had published the first two volumes of his Projet pour rendre la paix perpetue//e en Europe. Among the more prominent of his defenders and critics were Leibniz, Voltaire, Frederick the Great, and Rousseau . As might be expected, Kant was aware of the debate. In a Reflection that Adickes dates from about 1755 Kant notes Bayle's view that, although "it is possible in abstracto to put the rules of Christianity into practice, this is not the case with regard to princes: it was impossible in connection with the Abbe St. Pierre's proposal" (6: 241; AK 16, #2116). As the present essay shows, Kant did not consider the idea of a league of nations impossible, but he did not rely for his evidence upon experience of how princes have behaved.

Two years later, in The Metaphysics ojMorals, Kant would set forth systematically the grounds on which "morally practical reason pronounces in us its irresistible veto: There is to be no war, neither between you and me in a state of nature nor between us as states," which in their relation to one another are still in a state of nature (6: 354). On these grounds he concludes that it is our duty to work toward perpetual peace, the "final end of the doctrine of right within the limits of reason alone," and so toward its condition, a league of nations. In order for us to do so, it is enough that the impossibility of a universal and lasting peace, "the highest political good," cannot be demonstrated. Since Kant's purpose in The Metaphysics oj Morals is limited to determining what our duties are, he need not discuss the subject further in that work. Thematically, Toward Perpetllal Peace takes up where The Doctrine ojRight ends.

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It may be left undecided whether this satirical inscription on a certain Dutch innkeeper's signboard picturing a graveyard! was to hold for hu­man beings in general, or for heads of state in particular, who can never get enough of war, or only for philosophers, who dream that sweet dream. The author of the present treatise, however, lays down the following condition: the practical politician takes the stance of looking down with great self-satisfaction on the theoretical politician as an academic who, with his ineffectual ideas, poses no danger to a state, which must proceed on principles derived from experience, and who can be allowed to fire off all his skittle balls at once, without the worldly-wise statesman needing to pay heed to it; hence the latter must also behave consistently in case of a conflict with the former, by not suspecting danger to the state behind the opinions ventured and expressed publicly by the theorist; by this clausula salvatoria· the author of this treatise wants expressly to protect himself, in proper form, against any malicious interpretation.

Section I,

which contains the preliminary articles for perpetual peace among states.

I. "No treaty of peace shall be held to be such if it is made with a secret reservation of material for a future war."

For in that case it would be a mere truce, a suspension of hostilities, not peace, which means the end of all hostilities and to which it is already a suspicious pleonasm to attach the adjective perpetual. Causes for a future war, extant even if as yet unrecognized by the contracting parties them­selves, are all annihilated by a peace treaty, no matter how acute and 8:344 skilled the sleuthing by which they may be picked out of documents in archives. A mental reservation (reservatio mentalis) regarding old claims to be worked out only in the future - which neither party may mention just now because both are too exhausted to continue the war - with the ill will to make use of the first favorable opportunity for this end belongs to

• The little saving clause

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jesuitical casuistry and is beneath the dignity of a ruler, just as readiness to engage in deductions of this sort is beneath the dignity of his minister, if the matter is appraised as it is in itself.

But if, according to enlightened concepts of political prudence, the true honor of a state is put in the continual increase of its power by whatever means, then that judgment will admittedly look academic and pedantic.

2. "No independently existing state (whether small or large) shall be acquired by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation."

For a state is not (like the land on which it resides) a belonging (patrimonium). It is a society of human beings that no one other than itself can command or dispose of. Like a trunk, it has its own roots; and to annex it to another state as a graft is to do away with its existence as a moral person and to make a moral person into a thing, and so to contradict the idea of the original contract, apart from which no right over a people can be thought.· Everyone knows into what danger the presumption that acquisition can take place in this way has brought Europe, the only part ofthe world in which it is known, in our times right up to the present: the presumption, namely, that states can marry each other, partly as a new kind of industry for making oneself predominant by family alliances even without expending one's forces, and partly as a way ofextending one's possession of land. The hiring out of troops ofone state to another against an enemy not common to both is also to be counted in this; for the subjects are thereby used and used up as things to be managed at one's discretion.

8:345 3. "Standing annies (miles perpetuus) shall in time be abolished alto­gether."

For they incessantly threaten other states with war by readiness to appear always prepared for war; they spur states on to outdo one another in the number of armed men, which knows no limit; and inasmuch as peace, by the costs related to it, finally becomes even more oppressive than a shorr war, a standing army is itself the cause of an offensive war, waged by a state in order to be relieved of this burden; in addition, being hired to kill or to be killed seems to involve a use of human beings as mere machines and tools in the hands of another (a state), and this cannot well be reconciled with the right of humanity in our own person. But it is quite different with military exercises undertaken voluntarily and periodically by the citizens of a state in order to secure themselves and their own country

·A hereditary kingdom is not a state that can be inherited by another state, but the right to govern it can be inherited by another physical person. In that case the state acquires a ruler, but the ruler as such (i .e. as one already possessing another kingdom) does not acquire the state.

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against attacks from without. It would turn out the same with accumula­tion of a treasure: regarded by other states as a threat of war, it would force them to undertake preventive attacks (for of the three powers/ the power ojannies, the power oJalliances and the power ojmoney, the last might well be the most reliable instrument of war), were it not for the difficulty of discovering the amount of it.

4. "No national debt shall be contracted with regard to the external affairs of a state."

This expedient of seeking help for the national economy from outside or within a state (for the improvement of roads, new settlements, establish­ing stores of food against years of crop failure, and so forth) incurs no suspicion. But as machinery by which powers oppose one another, a credit system of debts growing out of sight and yet always secured against pres­ent demand (since the demand is not made by all the creditors at once) ­the ingenious invention of a commercial people in this century' - is a dangerous power of money, namely a treasury for carrying on war that exceeds the treasuries of all other states taken together and that can only be exhausted by the deficit in taxes that is inevitable at some time (but that is postponed for a long time because trade is stimulated by the reaction [of such loans] on industry and earnings). This facility in making war, com­bined with the inclination of those in power to do so, which seems to be implanted in human nature, is therefore a great hindrance to perpetual peace, and there would have to be a preliminary article forbidding it - all the more so because the bankruptcy of such a state, finally unavoidable, 8:346 must entangle other states in the loss without their having deserved it, and this would be doing them a public wrong. Hence other states are at least justified in allying themselves against such a state and its pretensions.

5. "No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state."

For what can justifY it in doing so? Perhaps the scandal that one state gives to the subjects of another state? It can much rather serve as a warning to them, by the example of the great troubles a people has brought upon itself by its lawlessness; and, in general, the bad example that one free person gives another (as scandizlum acceptum) is no wrong to it. But it would be a different matter if a state, through internal discord, should split into two parts, each putting itself forward as a separate state and laying claim to the whole; in that case a foreign state could not be charged with interfering in the constitution of another state if it gave assistance to one of them (for this is anarchy). But as long as this internal conflict is not yet critical, such interference of foreign powers would be a

b Miich/en

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violation of the right of a people dependent upon no other and only struggling with its internal illness; thus it would itself be a scandal given and would make the autonomy of all states insecure.

6. "No state at war with another shall allow itself such acts of hostility as would have to make mutual trust impossible during a future peace; acts of this kind are employing assassins (percussores) or poison­ers (venefin), breach ofsu"ender, incitement to treason (perduellio) within the enemy state, and so forth."

These are dishonorable stratagems. For some trust in the enemy's way of thinking' must still remain even in the midst of war, since otherwise no peace could be concluded and the hostilities would tum into a war of extermination (bellum internecinum); war is, after all, only the regrettable expedient for asserting one's right by force in a state of nature (where there is no court that could judge with rightful force); in it neither of the two parties can be declared an unjust enemy (since that already presup­

8:347 poses a judicial decision), but instead the outcome of the war (as in a so­called judgment of God) decides on whose side the right is; but a punitive war (bellum punitivum) between states is not thinkable (since there is no relation of a superior to an inferior between them). From this it follows that a war of extermination, in which the simultaneous annihilation of both parties and with it of all right as well can occur, would let perpetual peace come about only in the vast graveyard of the human race. Hence a war of this kind, and so too the use of means that lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden. But that the means mentioned above unavoidably lead to it is clear from this: that those infernal arts, being mean in them­selves, would not, if they came into use, be confined for long \vithin the boundaries of war, as for example the use of spies (uti exploratoribus), in which use is made only of others' dishonesty (which can never be com­pletely eradicated); instead, they would also be carried over into a condi­

8:347 tion of peace, so that its purpose would be altogether destroyed.

Although the laws cited above are objectively, that is, in the intention of the ruler, d laws ofprohibition only (leges prohibitivae), nevertheless some of them are of the strict kind (leges strictae), holding without regard for differ­ing circumstances, that insist on his putting a stop to an abuse at once (such as numbers I, 5, 6), but others (such as numbers 2, 3, 4) are laws that, taking into consideration the circumstances in which they are to be applied, subjectively widen his authorization (leges /atae) and contain permis­sions, not to make exceptions to the rule of right, but to postpone putting

, Denkungsart d tier Machlhabenden

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these laws into effect, without however losing sight of the end; he may not postpone to a nonexistent date (ad calend~,s graecas, as Augustus used to promise) putting into effect the law, for example, to restore in accordance with number 2 the freedom of certain states deprived of it, and so not restore it; he is permitted only to delay doing so, lest implementing the law prematurely counteract its very purpose. For the prohibition here con­cerns only the way ofacquiring, which from now on shall not hold, but not the status ofpossession, ' which, though it does not have what is required in order to be called a right,! was nevertheless in its time (that of putative possession) taken to be legitimate according to the public opinion of every state at the time.;;

8:348 .. Whether, in addition to commands (leges praeceptivae) and prohibitions (leges prohibitivae), there could also be permissive laT1Js (leges permissivae) of pure reason has hitherto been doubted, and not without grounds. For laws as such involve a ground of objective practical necessity, whereas permissions involve a ground of the practical contingency of certain actions; thus a permissive 1aT1J would involve necessitation to an action such that one cannot be necessitated to do it, and, if the object of the law had the same meaning in both kinds of relation, this would be a contradiction. But in the pertnissive law here, the prohibition presupposed is directed only to the furure way of acquiring a right (e.g., by inheritance), whereas the exemption from this prohibition, i.e., the permission, is directed to the present starus of possession, which in the transition from the state of nature to the ci\~1 condition can continue as possession that, though not in confortnity with rights,' is still possession in good faith (possessio putativa) in accordance with a pertnissive law of narural right, although a putative possession, as soon as it has been cognized as such, is prohibited in a state of narure, just as a similar way of acquiring is prohibited in the subsequent civil condition (after the transition has been made), and this authorization to continue in possession would not occur if such an alleged acquisition were to take place in the civil condition; for then, as soon as its nonconfortnity with rights were discovered, it would have to cease, as a wrong.

I wanted only to draw the anention of teachers of narural right to the concept of a lex permissiva, which reason presents of itself in its systematic divisions, especially since in civil (starutory) law use is often made of the concept, but \vith the following difference: the prohibitive law stands all by itself and the permission is not included in that law as a limiting condition (as it should be) but is thrown in among exceptions to it. Then it is said that this or that is prohibited, except for number I, number 2, number 3, and so forth indefinitely, since pennissions are added to the law only contingently, not in accordance with a principle but by groping about among cases that come up; for otherwise the conditions would have had to be introduced illto the formula of the prohibitive laT1J, and in this way it would have become at the same time a pertnissive law. It is therefore regrenable that the ingenious but still unsolved competition problem of the wise and asrute Count von Windischgratz,J which insisted on precisely that, was so soon abandoned . For the possibility of such a fortnula (similar to a mathematical fortnula) is the sole genuine touchstone of legislation that remains consistent, \\~thout which the so-called ius certum will always remain a pious wish. In that case we shall have merely general laws (which hold on the T1Jhole); but we shall have no universal laws (which hold generally), as the concept of a law nevertheless seems to require. , Besitzstalld f den erforderlichen Rechtstitel , ul1rechtmaj1iger

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8:348 Section II,

which contains the definitive articles for perpetual peace among states.

A condition of peace among men living near one another is not a state of nature (status naturalis), which is much rather a condition of war, that is, it involves the constant threat of an outbreak of hostilities even if this does not always occur. A condition of peace must therefore be established; for

* suspension of hostilities is not yet assurance of peace, and unless such assurance is afforded one neighbor by another (as can happen only in a

8:349

lawful condition), the former, who has called upon the latter for it, can treat him as an enemy. ""

FIRST DEFINITIVE ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE

The~consti~!!sm in every ga~sh~lI be republican.

A constitution established, first on principles of the freedom of the mem­bers of a society (as individuals), second on principles of the dependence of

8:350 I all upon a single common legislation (as subjects), and third on the law of their equality (as citizens ofa state) - the sole constitution that issues from the idea of the original contract, on which all rightful legislation of a people must be based - is a republican constitution. t The republican con­

8:349 • It is usually assumed that one may not behave with hostility toward another unless he has actively wronged me; and that is also quite correct ifboth are in a condition of being under civil laws. For by having entered into such a condition one affords the other the requisite assurance (by means of a superior having power over both). - But a human being (or a nation) in a mere state of nature denies me this assurance and already wrongs me just by being near me in this condition, even if not actively (facto) yet by the lawlessness of his condition (statu iniusto), by which he constantly threatens me; and I can coerce him either to enter with me into a condition of being under civil laws or to leave my neighborhood. Hence the postulate on which all the follo\\~ng articles are based is that all men who can mutually affect one another must belong to some civil constitution.

But any rightful constitution is, with regard to the persons within it,

(I) one in accord with the right ofcitizens ofa slate, of individuals within a people (ius civilatis), (2) one in accord with the right ofnations, of states in relation to one another (ius gentium), (3) one in accord with the right of citizens of the world, insofar as individuals and states,

standing in the relation of externally affecting one another, are to be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind (ius cosmopoliticum). This division is not made at will h but is necessary with reference to the idea of perpetual peace. For ifonly one of these were in a relation of physically affecting another and were yet in a state of nature, the condition of war would be bound up with this, and the aim here is just to be freed from it.

8:350 fRightful (hence external) freedom cannot be defined, as it usually is, by the warrant to do whatever one wants provided one does no wrong to anyone. For what does warrant mean? The possibility of an action insofar as one thereby does no wrong to anyone. So the h willkiirlich

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stitution is thus, as far as right is concerned, in itself that which every kind of civil constitution has as its original basis; the question now is only whether it is also the sole constitution that can lead toward perpetual peace.

Now, in addition to the purity of its origin - its having arisen from the pure source of the concept of right - the republican constitution does offer the p~thuesulLwishedjQr, iwncly p~ftual eace· the ound or this is as follows. When the consent of the citizens of a state is required in drder to decide whether there s a e war or no an 1 cannot De other­wise in this constitution), nothing is more natural than that they will be very hesitant to begin such a bad game, since they would have to decide to take upon themselves all the hardships of war (such as themselves doing the fighting and paying the costs of the war from their own belongings, pain­fully making good the devastation it leaves behind, and finally - to make the cup of troubles overflow - a burden ofdebt that embitters peace itself, and

definition would go as follows: freedom is the possibility of actions whereby one does no wrong to anyone. One does no wrong to anyone (one may do what one wants) pro\~ded one does no wrong to anyone; hence it is an empty tautology. My external (rightful) freedom is, instead, to be defined as follows: it is the warrant to obey no other external laws than those to which I could have given my consent. Similarly, external (rightful) equality within a state is that relation of its citizens in which no one can rightfully bind another to something without also being subject to a law by which he in tum can be bound in the same way by the other. (There is no need to define the principle of rightfol dependence, since it is already present in the concept of a state constitution as such.) The validity of these innate and inalienable rights belonging necessarily to humanity is confirmed and enhanced by the principle of rightful relations of a human being even to higher beings (if he thinks of them) , inasmuch as he represents himself, in accord with the very same principles, as also a citizen of a state in a supersensible world. For, as regards my freedom, I have no obligation even with respect to

divine laws that I can cognize by reason alone except insofar as I could have given my consent to them (since it is by the law of freedom of my own reason that I first make for myself a concept of the divine will). As regards the principle of equality with respect to the most sublime being in the world, except for God, that I might happen to think of (a great Aetm): if I do my duty in my post as that Aeon does his duty in his, there is no basis for mere obedience to duty belonging to me and the right to command to him. That this principle of equality is not Oike the principle of freedom) also appropriate to our relation to God has its ground in this : that he is the only being to whom the concept of duty is inapplicable.

But as regards the right of equality of all citizens of a state as subjects , the answer to the question, whether a hereditary nobility is allowable, turns only on whether. the rank granted by 8:35 I a state (of one subject being above another) would have to precede merit, or whether the latter would have to precede the former. Now it is ob~ous that if rank is connected with birth, it is quite uncertain whether merit (skill and fidelity in one's office) will follow; hence it will be just as if rank (being in command) were granted to a favorite without any merit, and the general will of a people in the original contract (which is yet the principle of all rights) will never decide upon this. For a nobleman is not necessarily a noble man. As for nobility of office (as the rank of a higher magistracy could be called, which must be acquired for oneself by merit), there rank adheres to a post, not as property to a person, and equality is not violated by it; for, when he retires from his office, he also lays down his rank and goes back among the people.

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that can never be paid off because of new wars always impending); on the other hand, under a constitution in which subjects are not citizens of the state, which is therefore not republican, [deciding upon warJ is the easiest thing in the world; because the head ofstate is not a member of the state but its proprietor' and gives up nothing at all of his feasts, hunts, pleasure palaces, court festivals, and so forth, he can decide upon war, as upon a kind of pleasure party, for insignificant cause, and can with indifference leave the justification of the war, for the sake ofpropriety, to the diplomatic corps,

8:35 I which is always ready to provide it.

So that a republican constitution will not be confused with a democratic 8:352 co~.an (~sUa1ly h~pjm1s),tnefOnOw1ng must be noted. T he forms

of a state (civitas) can be divided either according to the different persons who have supreme-power within a state or according to the way a people is governed by its head of state, whoever this may be; the first is called, strictly speaking, the form of sovereignty (forma imperil), and only three such forms are possi~y,eiTher o nly one, or some in association, or all those together who constitute the civil society possess sovereign power (autoc­racy, aristocrac:)I, and democracy, the ower of a prince, the powe;or-a­n~ an e ower 0 a eo Ie). nesecond -is -the-tGrtrrof'gOvern­ment (forma regimillis) and has to do with the way a state, on the basis of its civil constitution (the act of the general will by which a multitude becomes a people), makes use of its plenary power; and with regard to this, the form of a state is either republicall or des otic. Republicanism is the political principle of separation 0 the execut;!ve poweU the govern~t rom e legiSlative power; despotlsm is that of the high-handed management of the state by laws the regent has himself given, Inasmuch as he handles the pub1ic--wm:asliis private will. Of the three forms of state, that-ohiemocracy iri the strict sense of the word isnecessarily a d{spotism b ecause it estab­lis~~oweYinwhich all decide for and, if need be, agaUiSt one (who th~s not agree), so that all, who are nevertheless not all, decide; and this is a confTaCfiCtiO n of the general will with itself and with freedom.

This is to say that any form of government which is not representative is, strictly Spea KIDg, without form, because the~legislator cannot bITnone and the same person also executor of its will (any more than the universal of the major premise in a syllogism can also be the subsumption of the particular under it in the minor premise); and even if the other two state constitutions are always defective insofar as they leave room for this kind of government, in their case it is at least possible for them to adopt a kind of government in conformity with the spirit of a representative system, as

i niclll Sla<Jlsgenofle, sondern SltUllseigenliimer

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Frederick II, for example, at least said that he was only the highest servant of the state," whereas a democratic constitution makes this impossible 8:353 because there everyone wants to be ruler. It can therefore be said that the smaller the number of persons exercising the power of a state (the number of rulers) and the greater their representation, so much the more does its constitution accord with the possibility of republicanism, and the constitu­tion can hope by gradual reforms finally to raise itself to this. On this basis it is already harder in an aristocracy than in a monarchy to achieve this sole constitution that is perfectly rightful, but in a democracy it is impossi­ble except by violent revolution. The kind of government,t however, is of incomparably greater concern to the people than is the form of state (though a good deal also depends on how adequate the latter is to the former's end). But if the kiod of government is to be in conformity with 'I the concept of right, it must have a representative system, in which alone a \ republican kind of government is possible and without which the govern­ment is despotic and violent (whatever the constitution may be). None of J the ancient republics, so called, knew this system, and because of this they simply had to disintegrate into despotism, which under the rule of a single individual is still the most bearable of all.

SECOND DEFINITIVE ARTICLE FOR 8:354 PERPETUAL PEACE

The right of nations shall be based on a federalism of free states.

Nations, as states, can be appraised as individuals, who in their natural condition (that is, in their independence from external laws) already

• The exalted epithets often bestowed on a ruler ("the divinely anointed," uthe administrator of the divine will on earth and its representative") have often been censured as gross and 8:353 dizzying flanery, but, it seems to me, without grounds. Far from making the ruler of a country arrogant, they would rather have to humble him in his soul if he is intelligent (as must be assumed) and make him reflect that he has taken on an office too great for a human being - namely the most sacred office that God has on earth, that of trustee of the right oJ human beings - and that he must always be concerned about ha\~ng in some way offended against this "apple of God's eye." t Mallet du Pan boasts,. in his pompous but hollow and empty language, of having at last, after many years of experience, become convinced of the truth of Pope's well-known saying: uFor forms of government let fools contest; whate'er is best administered is best." If this means that the best administered government is best administered, he has , as Swift ex­pressed it, cracked a nut that rewarded him with a worm; but if it means that the best administered government is also the best government, i.e ., the best constitution of a state, then it is quite false; for examples of good governments prove nothing about kinds of government. \Vilo governed bener than a Titus or a Marcus Aurelius, and yet one left a Domitian as his successor and the other a Commodus; and this could not have happened if the state had had a good constitution, since their unsuitability for this post was well known early enough and the ruler's power was also sufficient to exclude them.

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wrong one another by being near one another; and each of them, for the sake of its security, can and ought to require the others to enter with it into a constitution similar to a civil constitution, in which each can be assured of its right. This would be a league ojnations, which, however, need not be a state of nations. That would be a contradiction, inasmuch as every state involves the relation of a superior (legislating) to an inferior (obeying, namely the people); but a number of nations within one state would constitute only one nation, and this contradicts the presupposition (since here we have to consider the right of nations in relation to one another insofar as they comprise different states and are not to be fused into a single state).

Just as we now regard with profound contempt, as barbarous, crude, and brutishly degrading to humanity, the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom, by which they would rather struggle unceasingly than subject themselves to a lawful coercion to be instituted by themselves, thus prefer­ring a mad freedom to a rational freedom, so, one would think, civilized peoples (each united into a state) must hasten to leave such a depraved condition, the sooner the better; but instead each state puts its majesty (for the majesty of a people is an absurd expression) just in its not being subject to any external lawful coercion at all, and the splendor ofits chief consists in his being able, without even having to put himself in danger, to command many thousands to sacrifice themselves for a matter that is ofno concern to them;" and the difference between the European and the American savages consists mainly in this: that whereas many tribes of the latter have been eaten up by their enemies, the former know how to make better use of those

8:355 they have defeated than to make a meal of them, and would rather increase the number of their subjects, and so too the multitude of their instruments for even more extensive wars, by means of them.

In view of the malevolence of human nature, which can be seen uncon­cealed in the free relations of nations (whereas in a condition under civil laws it is greatly veiled by the government's constraint), it is surprising that the word right could still not be altogether banished as pedantic from the politics of war and that no state has yet been bold enough to declare itself publicly in favor of this view; for Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel,s and the like (only sorry comforters) - although their code, couched philosophically or diplomatically, has not the slightest lawJul force and cannot even have such force (since states as such are not subject to a common external constraint) - are always duly cited injustijication ofan offensive war, though there is no instance of a state ever having been moved to desist from its plan by arguments armed with the testimony of such important men. This hom­

.. Thus a Bulgarian prince gave the following reply to the Greek emperor's benign offer to senle their dispute by a duel: "A smith who has tongs will not lift the glowing iron from the coals with his own hands."

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age that every state pays the concept of right (at least verbally) nevertheless proves that there is to be found in the human being a still greater, though at present dormant, moral predisposition to eventually become master of the evil principle within him (which he cannot deny) and also to hope for this from others; for otherwise the word right would never be spoken by states wanting to attack one another, unless merely to make fun of it, as a certain Gallic prince defined right: "It is the prerogative nature has given the stronger over the weaker, that the latter should obey him."

The way in which states pursue their right can never be legal proceed­ings before an external court but can only be war; but right cannot be decided by war and its favorable outcome, victory; and by a peace pact a current war can be brought to an end but not a condition of war, of always finding pretexts for a new war (and this cannot straightaway be declared wrong, since in this condition each is judge in his own case); however, what holds in accordance with natural right for human beings in a lawless condition, "they ought to leave this condition," cannot hold for states in accordance with the right of nations (since, as states, they already have a rightful constitution internally and hence have outgrown the constraint of others to bring them under a more extended law-governed constitution in accordance with their concepts of right); yet reason, from the throne of 8:356 the highest morally legislative power, delivers an absolute condemnation of war as a procedure for determining rights and, on the contrary, makes a condition of peace, which cannot be instituted or assured without a pact of nations among themselves, a direct duty; so there must be a league of a special kind, which can be called a pacific league lfoedus pacificum), and what would distinguish it from a peace pact (pactum pads) is that the latter seeks to end only one war whereas the former seeks to end all war forever. This league does not look to acquiring any power of a state but only to preserving and securing the freedom of a state itself and of other states in league with it, but without there being any need for them to subject themselves to public laws and coercion under them (as people in a state of nature must do). The practicability (objective reality) of this idea of a foderalism that should gradually extend over all states and so lead to perpet­ual peace can be shown. For if good fortune should ordain that a powerful and enlightened people can form itself into a republic (which by its nature must be inclined to perpetual peace), this would provide a focal point of federative union for other states, to attach themselves to it and so to secure a condition of freedom of states conformably with the idea of the right of nations; and by further alliances of this kind, it would gradually extend further and further.

It is understandable for a people to say, "There shall be no war among us; for we want to form ourselves into a state, that is, to establish for ourselves a supreme legislative, executive, and judicial power, which set­tles our disputes peaceably." But if this state says, "There shall be no war

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between myself and other states, although I recognizei no supreme legisla­tive power which secures my right to me and to which I secure its right," it is not understandable on what I want to base my confidence in my right, unless it is the surrogate of the civil social union, namely the free federal­ism that reason must connect necessarily with the concept of the right of nations if this is to retain any meaning at all.

The concept of the right of nations as that of the right to go to war is, strictly speaking, unintelligible (since it is supposed to be a right to deter­

8:357 mine what is right not by universally valid external laws limiting the freedom of each but by unilateral maxims through force); one would have to mean by it that it is quite right if human beings so disposed destroy one another and thus find perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of violence along with their authors. In accordance with reason there is only one way that states in relation with one another can leave the lawless condition, which involves nothing but war; it is that, like individual human beings, they give up their savage (lawless) freedom, accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and so form an (always growing) state ofnations (civitas gentium) that would finally encompass all the nations of the earth. But, in accordance with their idea of the right of nations, they do not at all want this, thus rejecting in hypothesi what is correct in thesi; so (if all is not to be lost) in place of the positive idea ofa world republic only the negative surrogate of a league that averts war, endures, and always expands can hold back the stream of hostile inclination that shies away from right, though with constant danger of its breaking out. '*' (Furor impius intus - fremit horridus ore cruento. Virgil.)t

THIRD DEFINITIVE ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE

"Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. "

Here, as in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy but of nght, so that hospitality (hospitableness) means the right of a foreigner

.. At the end of a war, when peace is concluded, it would not be unfitting for a nation to proclaim, after the festival of thanksgiving, a day of atonement, calling upon heaven, in the name of the state, to forgive the great sin ofwhich the human race continues to be guilty, that of being unwilling to acquiesce in any lawful constitution in relation to other nations but, proud of its independence, preferring instead to use the barbarous means of war (even though what is sought by war, namely the right ofeach state, is not decided by it). Festivals of thanksgiving during a war for a victory won, hymns that (in the style of the Israelites) are sung to the Lord ofHosts, stand in no less marked contrast with the moral idea of the father of human beings; for, beyond indifference to the way nations seek their mutual rights (which is regrettable enough), they bring in joy at having annihilated a great many human beings or their happiness. j erkenne

, Within, impious rage - shall roar savagely with bloody mouth. Aeneid 1.294-6.

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not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of 8:358 another. The other can tum him away, if this can be done without destroy­ing him, but as long as he behaves peaceably where he is,' he cannot be treated with hostility. What he can claim is not the right to be a guest (for this a special beneficent pact would be required, making him a member of the household for a certain time), but the right to visit; this right, to present oneself for society, belongs to all human beings by virtue of the right of possession in common of the earth's surface on which, as a sphere, they cannot disperse infinitely but must finally put up with being near one another; but originally no one had more right than another to be on a place on the earth. Uninhabitable parts of the earth's surface, seas and deserts, divide this community, but in such a way that ships and camels (ships of the desert) make it possible to approach one another over these regions belonging to no one m and to make use of the right to the earth's surface, which belongs to the human race in common, for possible com­merce. The inhospitableness of the inhabitants of sea coasts (for example, the Barbary Coast) in robbing ships in adjacent seas or enslaving stranded seafarers, or that of the inhabitants of deserts (the Arabian Bedouins) in regarding approach to nomadic tribes as a right to plunder them, is there­fore contrary to natural right; but this right to hospitality - that is, the authorization of a foreign newcomer - does not extend beyond the condi­tions which make it possible to seek commerce with the old inhabitants. In this way distant parts of the world can enter peaceably into relations with one another, which can eventually become publicly lawful and so finally bring the human race ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution.

If one compares with this the inhospitable behavior of civilized, espe­cially commercial, states in our part of the world, the injustice they show in visiting foreign lands and peoples (which with them is tantamount to conquering them) goes to horrifying lengths. When America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, and so forth were discovered, they were, to them, countries belonging to no one, n since they counted the inhabitants as nothing. In the East Indies (Hindustan), they brought in foreign soldiers under the pretext of merely proposing to set up trading posts, but with them oppression of the inhabitants, incitement of the 8:359 various Indian states to widespread wars, famine, rebellions, treachery, and the whole litany of troubles that oppress the human race.

China· and Japan (Nipon), which had given such guests a try, have

• In order to write this great empire with the name by which it caUs itself (namely Chi1UJ. not Sina or a name that sounds like it), one need only consult Georgii's Alphabetum Tibetanum. pp. 65 I -54, especially note b. According to the observation of Professor Fischer of Peters­burg, it really has no determinate name by which it calls itself; but the most common one is , aufseinem Platz m herrenlos • die keinem angehorlen

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therefore wisely [placed restrictions on them], the former allowing them access but not entry: the latter even allowing access to only a single European people, the Dutch, but excluding them, like prisoners, from community with the natives. The worst of this (or, considered from the standpoint of a moral judge, the best) is that the commercial statesP do not even profit from this violence; that all these trading companies are on the verge of collapse; that the Sugar Islands, that place of the cruelest and most calculated slavery, yield no true profit but serve only a mediate and indeed not very laudable purpose, namely, training sailors for warships and so, in turn, carrying on wars in Europe, and this for powers that make much ado of their piety and, while they drink wrongfulness like water, want to be known as the elect in orthodoxy.

8:360 Since the (narrower or wider) community of the nations of the earth has now gone so far that a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all, the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastic and exaggerated way of representing right; it is, instead, a supplement to the unwritten code of the right of a state and the right of nations necessary for the sake of any

still the word Kin, namely gold (which the Tibetans express by Ser), so that the emp"lur is called King of Cold (i.e., of the most magnificent country in the world); it may well be that the word sounds like Chin in the empire itself, though (because of the guttural letter) it is pronounced Kin by the Italian missionaries. From this it can then be seen that what the Romans called the Land oflhe Sm was China but that silk was brought from there to Europe via Crea.ter Tibet (presumably through Lesser Tibet and Bukhara, crossing Persia and so forth) . This led to numerous reflections on the antiquity of this astonishing state as compared with that of Hindustan, and on its connection with Tibet and through this \vith Japan, although the name Sina or Tschina, which neighboring countries are supposed to give it, leads nowhere. Perhaps the ancient community between Europe and Tibet, which has never been rightly acknowledged, can also be explained from what Hesychius has kept open for us about

8:360 it,namely from the hierophant's cry (Konx Ompax) in the Eleusinian Mysteries (cr. Journey of the Younger Anacharsis, Part Y, p. 447 ff.). For, according to Georgii'sAlphahetum Tibetanuln, the word COr/cioa means god, and it markedly resembles Konx, and Palt-cio (ibid. p. 520), which the Greeks might easily have pronounced pax, means promulgator legis, the divinity pervading the whole of nattlre (also called Cencresi, p. 177) . But Om, which La Croze translates as benedictus, blessed, can scarcely mean anything other than beatific, if applied to the deity (p . 507). Now since P. Francisco Orazio, who repeatedly asked the Tibetan lamas what they understood by god (Concioa.), always received the answer, "It is the gathen·ng ofall the holy ones" (i .e., of the blessed souls, at last rettlrned to divinity by being reborn as lamas after numerous migrations through al\ kinds of bodies, transformed into Burchane, i.e., beings worthy of adoration, p. 223), that mysterious name Konx Ompax could well designate that holy (Konx), blessed (Om) , and wise (Pax) supreme being who pervades the whole world (nature personified) and , used in the Greek mysteries, may well have signified monotheism to the epopts, as opposed to the polytheism of the uninitiated masses, although P. Orazio suspected a kind of atheism behind it (Ioc. cit.). But how that mysterious word reached the Greeks across Tibet can be explained in the above way, which can also make plausible the early commerce of Europe with China across Tibet (perhaps even earlier than with Hindustan).6 • dell Zugang. aber nichl den Eingang P dieser

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public rights of human beings and so for perpetual p~ace; only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are constantly approaching perpetual peace.

First supplement On the guarantee of perpetual peace

What affords this guarantee (surety) is nothing less than the great artist nature (natura daecutia rerum)q from whose mechanical course pur­posiveness shines forth visibly, letting concord arise by means of the discord between human beings even against their will; and for this rea­ 8:361 son nature, regarded as necessitation by a cause the laws of whose operation are unknown to us, is called fate, but if we consider its purposiveness in the course of the world as the profound wisdom of a higher cause directed to the objective final end of the human race and predetermining this course of the world, it is called providence, '" which 8:362

" In the mechanism of nature, to which the human being (as a sensible being) belongs, there is evident a form lying at the basis of its existence, which we can make comprehensible to ourselves only if we ascribe it to the end ofa creator of the world determining it in advance; we call its de termination in advance (divine) prrroidence in general; insofar as it is put in the begil1l1il1g of the world, we call itfoul1dil1g prO\~dence (pruvidmtia cOl1di/rix; semel iussit. semper parrot - Augustine);' but as put in the course of nature , to maintain this in accord with univer­sal laws of purposiveness, we call it rulil1gprrroidroce (prrroidentiagubematrix); as [directing na­ture] further to particular ends not to be foreseen by the human being but only conjectured from the outcome, we call it guidil1g providence (prrroidentia directrix); and finally, with respect to single events as divine ends, we no longer call it providence but dispetlsa/iol1 (directio extraor­dinaria), although (since this in fact alludes to miracles, though the events are not called such), it is a foolish presumption for the human being to want to cognize an event as a dispensation; for it is absurd to conclude from a single event to a particular principle of the efficient cause (to conclude that this event is an end and not merely an indirect result, by a natural mecha­nism, of another end quite unknown to us), and it is full of self-conceit, however pious and humble such talk may sound. 50 too the division of providence (regarded materialiter), as di­rected to objects in the world, into groeral and special providence is false and self-contradictory (that, e.g., it is indeed concerned to preserve species of creatures but leaves individuals to chance); for it is called general in its purpose just because no single thing is thought to be excepted from it. Presumably, what was meant here is the division of providence (regarded forma/iter) in terms of the way its purpose is carried out, namely into ordil1ary providence (e .g., the annual death and revival of nature with the changes of seasons) and extraordil1ary provi­dence (e.g., the transporting of wood by ocean currents to Arctic coasts where it cannot grow, thus providing for the native inhabitants, who could not Jive without it); in the laner case, although we can very well explain to ourselves the physico-mechanical cause of these appear­ances (e .g., by the wooded river banks in temperate countries, where trees fall into the rivers and are carried farther afield by currents such as the Gulf5tream), we must still not overlook the teleological cause as well, which intimates the foresight of a wisdom in command of nature. But as for the concept, current in the schools, of a divine jl1teroro(jol1 or collaboration q Nature the contriver of things. Lucretius De rerum l1atura 5.234 . , Providence the founder; once it has ordered, they always obey.

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we do not, strictly speaking, cognize in these artifices of nature or even so much as infer from them but instead (as in all relations of the form of things to ends in general) only can and must add it in thought, in order to make for ourselves a concept of their possibility by analogy with actions of human art; but the representation of their relation to and harmony with the end that reason prescribes immediately to us (the moral end) is an idea, which is indeed transcendent for theoretical purposes but for practical purposes (e.g., with respect to the concept of the duty ofperpet­ual peace and putting that mechanism of nature to use for it) is dogmatic and well founded as to its reality. Moreover, the use of the word nature when, as here, we have to do only with theory (not with religion) is more befitting the limitations of human reason (which must confine itself within the limits of possible experience with respect to the relation of effects to their causes) and more modest than is the expression of a providence cognizable for us, with which one presumptuously puts on the wings of Icarus in order to approach more closely the secret of its inscrutable purpose.

Now, before we determine more closely this affording of the guarantee, it will be necessary first to examine the condition u that nature has pre­

8:363 pared for the persons acting on its great stage, which finally makes its assurance of peace necessary; only then shall we examine the way it affords this guarantee.

Its preparatory arrangement consists in the following: that it I) has taken care that people should be able to live in all regions of the earth; 2) by war it has driven them everywhere, even into the most inhospitable

(concursus) toward an effect in the sensible world, this must be given up. For to want to pair what is disparate (gryphes iungere equis)' and to let what is itself the complete cause of

8:362 alterations in the world supplemi?1lt its own predetermining providence (which must therefore have been inadequate) during the course of the world is,first, self-contradictory. For exam­ple, to say that, next to God, the physician cured the illness, and was thus his assistant in it, is in the first place self-contradictory. For causa solilaria non iuval.' God is the author of the physician together with all his medicines and so the effect must be ascribed i?1Ilirely to him, if one wants to ascend all the way to that highest original ground, theoretically incomprehensi­ble to us . Or one can also ascribe it i?1Ilirely to the physician, insofar as we follow up this event as belonging to the order of narure and as explicable in tenns of the order of narure, within the chain of causes in the world. Second, such a way of thinking also does away \vith all detenninate principles for appraising an effect. But from a morally praaical point of view (which is thus directed entirely to the supersensible) , as, e.g., in the belief that God, by means incomprehensible to us, will make up for the lack of our own righteousness if only our disposition is genuine, so that we should never slacken in our striving toward the good, the concept of a divine concursus is quite appropriate and even necessary; but it is self-evident that no one must attempt to explain a good action (as an event in the world) by this concursus, which is a futile theoretical cognition of the supersensible and is therefore absurd. , To couple griffins with horses. Virgil Eclogues 8.27. , a single cause does not assist • Zusland

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regions, in order to populate these; 3) by war it has compelled them to

enter into more or less lawful relations. That moss grows even in the cold wastes around the Arctic Ocean, which the reindeer can scrape from under the snow in order to be the nourishment, or also the draft animal, for the Ostiaks or Samoyeds; or that the sandy wastes contain salt for the camel, which seems as if created for traveling in them, so as not to leave them unused, is already wonderful. But the end shines forth even more clearly when we see that on the shore of the Arctic Ocean there are, besides fur-bearing animals, also seals, walruses, and whales, whose flesh gives the inhabitants food and whose blubber gives them warmth. But nature's foresight arouses most wonder by the driftwood it brings to these barren regions (without anyone knowing exactly where it comes from), without which material they could make neither their boats and weapons nor their huts to live in; there they have enough to do warring against animals, so that they live peaceably among themselves. What dnrve them into those regions, however, was presumably nothing other than war. But the first instrument ojwar, among all the animals the human being learned to tame and domesticate at the time the earth was being populated, was the horse (for the elephant belongs to a later time, namely the time of the luxury of already established states); so too, the art of cultivating certain kinds of grasses, called grain, whose original characteristics we can no longer cognize, and of diversitying and improving certain types ojJruits by trans­planting and grafting (perhaps in Europe only two species, the crab apple and the wild pear), could arise only in the condition of already established states, where there was secured ownership of land, after human beings, previously in the lawless freedom of hunting,;; fishing, or pastoral life, had 8:364 been driven to agricultural life; then salt and iron were discovered, perhaps the first articles, everywhere in demand, of a trade among various peoples, by which they were first brought into a peaceable relation to each other and so into understanding, community, and peaceable relations with one an­other, even with the most distant.

In taking care that people could live everywhere on the earth, nature at the same time despotically willed that they should live everywhere, even if against their inclination, and without this "should" even presupposing a concept of duty that would bind them to do so by means of a moral law;

.. Of all ways of life, that of the hllnter is undoubtedly most opposed to a civilized constitu­tion; for families, having to separate, soon become strangers to one another and subse­ 8:364 quently, being dispersed in extensive forests, also hostile since each needs a great deal of space for acquiring its food and clothing. The prohibiliOTI ofblood oddressed 10 Noah (Genesis 9:4-6) - which, often reiterated, was a condition later imposed by Jewish Christians upon the newly accepted Christians of heathen origin, though in a different connection (Acts 15,

20 and 21, 25) - seems to have been originally nothing other than a prohibition of the hllTller's way oflife; for in it cases must often come up in which raw flesh is eaten, and if the latter is forbidden so too is the former.

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instead it chose war to achieve this end it has. That is to say, we see peoples whose unity of language enables us to recognize the unity of their descent, such as the Samoyeds on the Arctic Ocean on the one hand and on the other a people of similar language two hundred [German] miles distant in the Altaian Mountains, between whom another, namely a Mon­golian people given to horsemanship and hence to war, has thrust itself and so driven the former part of the tribe far away from the latter, into the most inhospitable Arctic regions, where they would certainly not have spread of their own inclination;* in the same way the Finns in the north­ernmost regions of Europe, called Lapps, are now just as far separated

8:365 from the Hungarians, to whom they are related in language, by Gothic and Samartian peoples who thrust themselves in between them; and what can have driven the Eskimos (a race quite distinct from all American races and perhaps descended from European adventurers of ancient times) into the north of America, and the Pesherae into the south all the way to Tierra del Fuego, if not war, which nature makes use of as a means to populate the earth everywhere. War itself, however, needs no special motive but seems to be engrafted onto human nature and even to hold as something noble, to which the human being is impelled by the drive to honor without self-seeking incentives, so that military courage is judged (by the American savages as well as by the European savages in the age of chivalry) to be of immediately great worth, not only t[there is war (as would be reasonable) but also in order that there may be war, and war is often begun merely in order to display courage; hence an inner dignity is put in war itself, and even philosophers have eulogized it as a certain ennoblement of humanity, unmindful of the saying of a certain Greek, "War is bad in that it makes more evil people than it takes away." So much for what nature does for its own end with respect to the human race as a class of animals.

Now we come to the question concerning what is essential to the purpose of perpetual peace: what nature does for this purpose with refer­ence to the end that the human being's own reason makes a duty for him, hence to the favoring of his moral purpose, and how it affords the guarantee that what man ought to do in accordance with laws of freedom but does not do, it is assured he will do, without prejudice to this freedom, even by a constraint of nature, and this in terms of all three relations of public right: the nght ofa state, the right ofnations and cosmopolitan right. When I say of

* The question could be raised: if nature willed that these frozen shores not remain uninhab­ited, what will become of their inhabitants if (as we may expect) it some day ceases to bring them driftwood? For we may believe that, as culture progresses, the occupants of the temperate zones will make bener use of the wood growing on the banks of their rivers than to let it fall into them and be swept out to sea. I reply: those who live on the Ob, the Yenisi, the Lena, and so forth will bring it to them by trade and will barter it for the animal products so abundant in the sea around the Arctic coasts, once il (nature) has first exacted peace among them.

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nature, it wills that this or that happen, this does not mean, it lays upon us a duty to do it (for only practical reason, without coercion, can do that) but rather that nature itself does it, whether we will it or not (Jata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt). v

I. Even if a people were not forced by internal discord to submit to the constraint of public laws, war would still force them from without to do so, inasmuch as by the natural arrangement discussed above each people would find itself in the neighborhood of another people pressing upon it, against which it must form itself internally into a state in order to be armed 8:366 as a power against it. Now the republican constitution is the only one that is completely compatible with the right of human beings, but it is also the most difficult one to establish and even more to maintain, so much so that many assert it would have to be a state of angels because human beings, with their self-seeking inclinations, would not be capable of such a sub­lime form of constitution. But now nature comes to the aid of the general will grounded in reason, revered but impotent in practice, and does so precisely through those self-seeking inclinations, so that it is a matter only of a good organization of a state (which is certainly within the capacity of human beings), of arranging those forces of nature in opposition to one another in such a way that one checks the destructive effect of the other or cancels it, so that the result for reason turns out as if neither of them existed at all and the human being is constrained to become a good citizen even if not a morally good human being. The problem of establishing a state, no matter how hard it may sound, is soluble even for a nation of devils (if only they have understanding) and goes like this: "Given a multitude of rational beings all of whom need universal laws for their preservation but each ofwhom is inclined covertly to exempt himself from them, so to order this multitude and establish their constitution that, although in their private dispositions they strive against one another, these yet so check one another that in their public conduct the result is the same as if they had no such evil dispositions." Such a problem must be soluble. For the problem is not the moral improvement of human beings but only the mechanism of nature, and what the task requires one to know is how this can be put to use in human beings in order so to arrange the conflict of their unpeaceable dispositions within a people that they themselves have to constrain one another to submit to coercive law and so bring about a condition of peace in which laws have force. It can be seen even in actually existing states, still very imperfectly organized, that they are al­ready closely approaching in external conduct what the idea of right prescribes, though the cause of this is surely not inner morality'" (for it is not the case that a good state constitution is to be expected from inner

, The Fates lead the willing, drive Lhe unwilling. Seneca Episl. mor. [8+ w das Innere der Moralilal

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morality; on the contrary, the good moral education' of a people is to be expected from a good state constitution), and thus that reason can use the

8:367 mechanism of nature, through self-seeking inclinations that naturally counteract one another externally as well, as a means to make room for its own end, the rule of right,Y and in so doing also to promote and secure peace within as well as without, so far as a state itself can do so. Here it is therefore said that nature wills irresistibly that right should eventually gain supremacy. What we here neglect to do eventually comes about of its own accord, though with great inconvenience. "If one bends the reed too hard it breaks; and he who wills too much wills nothing." Bouterwek.7

2. The idea of the right of nations presupposes the separation of many neighboring states independent of one another; and though such a condi­tion is of itself a condition of war (unless a federative union of them prevents the outbreak of hostilities), this is nevertheless better, in accor­dance with the idea of reason, than the fusion of them by one power overgrowing the rest and passing into a universal monarchy, since as the range of government expands laws progressively lose their vigor, and a soulless despotism, after it has destroyed the seed of good, finally deterio­rates into anarchy. Yet the craving of every state (or of its head) is to attain a lasting condition of peace in this way, by ruling the whole world where possible. But nature wills it otherwise. It makes use of two means to prevent peoples from intermingling and to separate them: differences of language and of religion, * which do bring with them the propensity to mutual hatred and pretexts for war but yet, with increasing culture and the gradual approach of human beings to greater agreement in principles, leads to understanding in a peace that is produced and secured, not as in such a despotism (in the graveyard of freedom), by means of a weakening of all forces, but by means of their equilibrium in liveliest competition.

8:368 Just as nature wisely separates states that the will of each state, and even on grounds of the right of nations, would like to unite under itself by cunning or force, so on the other hand it also unites nations that the concept of cosmopolitan right would not have secured against violence and war, and does so by means of their mutual self-interest. It is the spirit ofcommerce, which cannot coexist with war and which sooner or later takes

.. Different religions: an odd expression! just as if one could also speak of different morals. There can indeed be historicaUy different creeds,' fro be found] not in religion but in the hisrory of means used to promote it, which is the province of scholarship, and just as many different religious books (the Zendavesta, the Vedas, the Koran, and so forth), but there can be onJy one single religion holding for all human beings and in all times. Those can therefore contain nothing more than the vehicle of religion, what is contingent and can differ accord­ing to differences of time and place. , Bildung y tier rechtlichen Vrmdtriji , Glaubesarten

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hold of every nation. In other words, since the power ojmoney may well be the most reliable of all the powers (means) subordinate to that of a state, states find themselves compelled (admittedly not through incentives of morality) to promote honorable peace and, whenever war threatens to break out anywhere in the world, to prevent it by mediation, just as if they were in a permanent league for this purpose; for, by the nature of things, great alliances for war can only rarely be formed and even more rarely succeed. In this way nature guarantees perpetual peace through the mechanism of human inclinations itself, with an assurance that is admit­tedly not adequate for predicting its future (theoretically) but that is still enough for practical purposes and makes it a duty to work toward this (not merely chimerical) end.

Second supplement Secret article for perpetual peace

A secret article in negotiations of public right is objectively, that is, consid­ered in terms of its content, a contradiction; but subjectively, appraised in terms of the quality of the person who dictates it, a secret can well be present in them, inasmuch as a person finds it prejudicial to his dignity to announce publicly that he is its author.

The sole article of this kind is contained in the following proposition: The maxims ojphilosophers about the conditions· under which public peace is possible shall be consulted by states armed for war.

But it seems to be humiliating for the legislative authority of a state, to which one must naturally ascribe the greatest wisdom, to seek from its subjects (philosophers) instructions about the principles of its conduct toward other states, and yet very advisable to do so. A state will therefore 8:369 invite their instruction tacitly (thus making a secret of it), and this is tanta­mount to saying that it will allow them to speak freely and publicly about universal maxims of waging war and establishing peace (for that they will do of their own accord, if only they are not forbidden to do so); and the agreement of states with one another on this point requires no special arrangement of states among themselves for this purpose but is already present in obligation by universal (morally legislative) human reason. This does not mean, however, that a state must give the principles of philoso­phers precedence over the findings of lawyers (representatives of the power of the state), but only that they be given a hearing. A lawyer who has made his symbol the scales of right along with the sword of justice does not usually make use of the latter merely to keep all extraneous influences

, Bedingullgen

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away from the former, but when one side of the scales refuses to sink he puts the sword into it (vae viais)/ and a lawyer who is not also a philoso­pher (at least in morality) is greatly tempted to do so, since his office is only to apply existing laws but not to investigate whether such laws them­selves need to be improved, and he counts this rank of his faculty, which is in fact lower, as higher because it is accompanied by power (as is also the case with the other two faculties) .8 Beneath this allied power the philo­sophical faculty stands on its very low step. So it is said of philosophy, for example, that she is the handmaiden of theology (and likewise of the other two faculties). But it is not clear whether "she bears the torch before her mistress or carries the train behind."

That kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings is not to be expected, but it is also not to be wished for, since possession of power unavoidably corrupts the free judgment of reason. But that kings or royal peoples (ruling themselves by laws of equality) should not let the class of philosophers disappear or be silent but should let it speak publicly is indispensable to both, so that light may be thrown on their business; and, because this class is by its nature incapable of forming seditious factions or clubs, it cannot be suspected of spreading propagantUi.

Appendix

8:370 I.

ON THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALS AND POLITICS WITH A VIEW TO

PERPETUAL PEACE

Morals is of itself practical in the objective sense, as the sum of laws commanding unconditionally, in accordance with which we ought to act, and it is patently absurd, having granted this concept of duty its authority, to want to say that one nevertheless cannot do it. For in that case this concept would of itself drop out of morals (ultra posse nemo obligatur);' hence there can be no conflict of politics, as doctrine of right put into practice, with morals, as theoretical doctrine of right (hence no conflict of practice with theory); for if there were, one would have to understand by the latter a general doctrine of prudence, that is, a theory of maxims for choosing the most suitable means to one's purposes aimed at advantage, that is, to deny that there is a [doctrine of] morals at all.

Politics says, "Be ye wise as serpents"; morals adds (as a limiting condi­tion) "and guileless as doves.»d Ifboth cannot coexist in one command, there

b woe to the vanquished .. no one is obligated beyond what he can do dMatthew 10:16

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is really a conflict of politics with morals; but if both ought nevertheless to be thoroughly united, then the concept of opposition is absurd, and the question of how that conflict is to be resolved cannot even be posed as a problem. Although the proposition honesty is the best politics contains a theory that is, unfortunately, very often contradicted by practice, the equally theoretical proposition honesty is better than all politics is raised infinitely above all objections and is indeed the indispensable condition of alJ politics. The tutelary god ' of morals does not yield to Jupiter (the god of power); for Jupiter is still subject to fate, that is, reason is not suffi­ciently enlightened to survey the series of predetermining causes that would allow it to predict confidently the happy or unhappy results of human actions in accordance with the mechanism of nature (though it is sufficiently enlightened to hope they will be in conformity with its wish). But it throws enough light everywhere for us to see what we have to do in order to remain on the path of duty (in accordance with rules of wisdom), and thereby do toward the final end.

But now the practical man (for whom morals is mere theory), bases his 8:371 despairing denial of our benign hope (even while granting ought and can) strictly on this: that he pretends to see in advance, from the nature of the human being, that he is never going to will what is required in order to realize that end leading toward perpetual peace. Admittedly, the volitions of all individuals to live in a lawful constitution in accordance with principles of freedom (the distributive unity of the will ojall) is not adequate to this end; but there is still required for it this solution of a difficult problem, that all together will this condition (the collective unity of the united will), so that a whole of civil society comes to be; and since, accordingly, a uniting cause must be added to this variety of the particular volitions of all, in order to produce from them a common \vill, which no one of the all is capable of, in the canying out of that idea (in practice) the only beginning of the rightful condition to be counted upon is that by power, on the coercion of which public right is afterward based; and (since we can scarcely allow for a moral disposition of the legislator such that, after the disorderly multitude has been united into a people, he will now leave the people to bring about a rightful constitution by its common will) it can be anticipated that in actual experience there will be great deviations from that idea (of theory).

It is then said that he who once has power in his hands will not let the people prescribe laws for him. A state that is once in possession [of the power] not to be subject to any extemallaws will not make itself depen­dent upon the tribunal of other states with respect to the way it is to pursue its right against them; and even a continent, if it feels itself supe­rior to another that does not otherwise stand in its way, will not leave unused the means of strengthening its power by plundering or even con­quering it; and so all the plans of theory for the right of a state, the right of

, Grenzgotl

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nations, and cosmopolitan right dissolve into ineffectual, impracticable ideals, whereas a practice that is based on empirical principles of human nature, one that does not consider it demeaning to draw instruction for its maxims from the way of the world, can alone hope to find a sure ground for its edifice of political prudence.

8:372 Admittedly, if there were no freedom and no moral law based upon it and everything that happens or can happen is instead the mere mecha­nism of nature, then politics (as the art of making use of this mechanism for governing human beings) would be the whole of practical wisdom, and the concept of right would be an empty thought. But if one finds it indispensably necessary to join the concept of right with politics, and even to raise it to the limiting condition of politics, it must be granted that the two can be united. I can indeed think of a moral politician, that is, one who takes the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can coexist with morals, but not of a political moralist, who frames a morals to suit the statesman's advantage.

A moral politician will make it his principle that, once defects that could not have been prevented are found within the constitution of a state or in the relations of states, it is a duty, especially for heads of state, to be concerned about how they can be improved as soon as possible and brought into conformity with natural right, which stands before us as a model in the idea of reason, even at the cost of sacrifices to their self­seeking [inclinations]. Since the severing of a bond of civil or cosmopoli­tan union even before a better constitution is ready to take its place is contrary to all political prudence, which agrees with morals in this, it would indeed be absurd to require that those defects be altered at once and violently; but it can be required of the one in power that he at least take to heart the maxim that such an alteration is necessary, in order to keep constantly approaching the end (of the best constitution in accor­dance with laws of right) . A state can already govern itself in a republican way even though, by its present constitution, it possesses a despotic ruling power,! until the people gradually becomes susceptible to the influence of the mere idea of the authority of law (just as if it possessed physical power) and thus is found fit to legislate for itself (such legislation being originally based on right). Even if a constitution more in conformity with law were attained illegitimately, by the violence of a revolution engendered by a bad constitution, it could then not be held permissible to lead the people back to the old one, although during the revolution anyone who

8:373 took part in it by violence or intrigue would be subject with right to the punishment of rebels. But as regards the external relations of states, it cannot be demanded of a state that it give up its constitution even though this is a despotic one (which is, for all that, the stronger kind in relation to

f Hemchennachl

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external enemies), so long as it runs the risk of being at once devoured by other states; hence, as for that resolution, it must also be permitted to postpone putting it into effect until a more favorable time.;;

Thus it may always be that despotizing8 moralists (erring in practice) offend in various ways against political prudence (by measures prema­turely adopted or recommended); yet when they offend against nature experience must gradually bring them onto a better course; but moralizing politicians, by glossing over political principles contrary to right on the pretext that human nature is not capable of what is good in accord with that idea, as reason prescribes it, make improvement impossible and perpetuate, as far as they can, violations of right.

Instead of the practice" of which these politically prudent men boast, they deal in machinations,; inasmuch as their only concern is to go along with the power now ruling (so as not to neglect their private advantage), and thereby to hand over the people and where possible the whole world, in the way of true lawyers (of the craft, not of legislation) when they go into politics. For since it is not their business to reason subtly about legislation itself but to carry out the present commands of the law of the land, to them whatever lawful constitution now exists must always be the best and, when this is altered from on high, the one following it, since everything is 8:374 then in its proper mechanical order. But if this sldll in turning their hand to everything gives them the illusion that they are also able to judge the principles of a state's constitution as such in accordance with concepts of right (hence a priori, not empirically); if they make much of their knowl­edge of human beings (which is admittedly to be expected, since they have to do with so many) but without knowing the human being and what can be made of him (for which a higher standpoint of anthropological observation is required), and equipped with these concepts approach the right of a state and the right of nations, as reason prescribes it, then they cannot make this transition except in the spirit of chicanery; for they follow their usual procedure (of a mechanism in accordance with despotically given coercive laws) even where concepts of reason admit only coercion through

• These are pennissive laws of reason that allow a situation of public right affiicted with injustice to continue until everything has either of itself become ripe for a complete over­throw or has been made almost ripe by peaceful means; for some rightfUl constitution or other, even if it is only to a small degree in confonnity with right, is better than none at all, which latter fate (anarchy) a premature refonn would meet with. Thus political wisdom, in the condition in which things are at present, will make refonns in keeping with the ideal of public right its duty; but it >;\~U use revolutions, where nature of itself has brought them about, not to gloss over an even greater oppression, but as a call of nature to bring about by fundamental refonns a lawful constitution based on principles of freedom, the only kind that endures. g despotisirende

• Praxis , Praktiketl

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laws in accordance with principles of freedom, by which a state constitu­tion that can continue valid} is first possible - a problem the supposedly practical man believes he can solve empirically, ignoring that idea, from experience of how the hitherto most lastingk constitutions were arranged, even though they were for the most part contrary to right. The maxims he makes use of for this (though he does not let them become known) amount, roughly, to the following sophistical maxims:

I. Fac et excusa. Seize any favorable opportunity for taking possession without any sanction to do so (whether of a right of a state over its people or of a right over a neighboring people); the justification can be presented much more easily and elegantly after theftct, and the violence glossed over (especially in the first case, where the supreme power within a state is also the legislative authority, which one must obey without reasoning subtly about it),9 than if one were willing to devise convincing arguments in advance and to wait for counterarguments about them. Such audacity itself gives a certain semblance of inner conviction about the legitimacy of the deed, and the god bonus eventus is the best defense attorney afterward.

2. Si feasti, nega. Whatever crime you have yourself committed, for example, so as to reduce your people to despair and hence to rebellion, deny that the guilt is yours; instead, maintain that your subjects' re­

8:375 calcitrance is to blame or, if you have seized a neighboring nation, human nature, since if a human being does not anticipate another in using force, the other can be surely counted upon to anticipate and seize him.

3. Divide et impera. That is, if there are certain privileged leaders in your nation who have chosen you to be merely their chief (primus inter pares),' set them at variance among themselves and at odds with the peo­ple; then come to the people's aid with the illusion of greater freedom, and all will be dependent upon your unconditional will. Or if you are dealing with external states, stirring up disagreement among them is a fairly sure means for you to subjugate them one after another by seeming to assist the weaker.

Certainly, no one is now taken in by these political maxims, for all of them are already generally known; nor is it the case that [politicians] are ashamed of them, as if their injustice were all too obvious. For, since great powers are never shamed before the judgment of the masses but only before one another, and, with regard to those principles, only their failure and not their becoming public can make those powers ashamed (since with respect to the morality of maxims they are all agreed among them­selves), there is still left to them political honor, which they can count upon

}eine ZII Rec/I1 bcsla,Jdige SllUJlsver/assung • am bcslen beslantietJe I first among equals

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with confidence, namely the honor of augmenting their power, in whatever way they may acquire it.'"

From all these twistings and turnings by which an immoral m doctrine of prudence tries to bring a condition of peace among human beings out of the warlike condition of a state of nature, at least this much is clear: 8:376 people can no more get away from the concept of right in their private relations than in their public relations, and they dare not openly base politics merely on the machinations of prudence and so disown all alle­giance" to the concept of a public right (this is especially noticeable in the concept of the right of nations); instead they give it all the honor due it, even if they should think up a hundred pretexts and subterfuges to evade it in practice, and attribute to cunning force the authority of being the source and the bond of all right. In order to put an end to this sophistry (if not to the injustice glossed over by it) and to bring the false representatives of the powerful on earth to confess that they speak not on behalf of right but of force - the tone of which they adopt, as if it were for them to give orders ­ it will be well to expose the illusion with which they dupe them­selves and others, to find the supreme principle from which the aim of perpetual peace issues, and to show that all the evil standing in its way arises from the fact that the political moralist begins where the moral politician correctly leaves off and, in thus subordinating principles to the end (i .e., putting the cart before the horse), frustrates his own purpose of bringing politics into agreement with morals.

• Even if it might be doubted whe!.her !.here is, in human beings who live toge!.her wi!.hin a state, a certain mal.evolence rooted in human nature, and instead of it !.he deficiency of a culture !.hat has not yet progressed far enough (barbarism) might wi!.h some plausibility be cited as !.he cause of !.he unlawful appearances of !.heir way of !.hinking, !.his malevolence is quite undisguisedly and irrefutably obvious in !.he external relation of states to one ano!.her. Wi!.hin each state it is veiled by !.he coercion of civil laws, for !.he citizens' inclination to violence against one ano!.her is powerfully counteracted by a greater force, namely !.hat of !.he government, and so not only does !.his give !.he whole a moral veneer (causae nan causae) but also, by its checking !.he outbreak of unlawful inclinations, !.he development of !.he moral 8:376 predisposition to immediate respect for right is actually greatly facilitated. For each now believes !.hat he himself would indeed hold !.he concept of right sacred and follow it fai!.h­fully, if only he could expect every o!.her to do likewise, and !.he government in part assures him of !.his; !.hereby a great step is taken toward morality (!.hough it is not yet a moral step), toward being anached to this concept of duty even for its own sake, without regard for any return. But since each, with his good opinion of himself, still presupposes the evil disposition in all others, the judgment they mutualLy pronounce on one another is that they are all infact of little worth (why this is so, since the nature of the human being as a free being cannot be blamed, need not be discussed). Since, however, respect for the concept of right, which the human being simply cannot renounce, most solemnly sanctions the theory of his capacity to become adequate to it, each sees that he; for his own part, must act in conformity with it, no maner how others may behave. m unmoralischen " allen Ge}umam allftukiindigen

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In order to make practical philosophy consistent with itself, it is neces­sary first to decide the question, whether in problems of practical reason

8:377 one must begin from its material principle, the end (as object of choice), or from its formal principle, that is, the principle (resting onJy on freedom in external relations) in accordance with which it is said: So act that you can will that your maxim should become a universal law (whatever the end may be).

The latter principle must undoubtedly take precedence; for, as a princi­ple of right, it has unconditional necessity, whereas the fonner necessi­tates only if the empirical conditions of the proposed end, namely of its being realized, are presupposed; and even if this end (e.g., perpetual peace) were also a duty, it would still have to be derived from the fonnal principle of maxims for acting externally. Now the first principle, that of the political moralist (the problem of the right of a state, the right of nations, and cosmopolitan right), is a mere technical problem (problema technicum), whereas the second, as the principle of the moral politician, for whom it is a moral problem (problema morale), is far removed from the other in its procedure for leading to perpetual peace, which is now wished for not only as a natural good but also as a condition' arising from acknowledg­ment of duty.

For the solution of the first problem, namely that of political prudence, much knowledge of nature is required in order to make use of its mecha­nism for the end proposed, and yet all this is uncertain with respect to its result concerning perpetual peace, whichever of the three divisions of public right one takes. Whether a people can better be kept obedient and also prosperous for a long period of time by severity or by the bait of vanity, whether by the supreme power of one individual or by several leaders united, perhaps even by an aristocracy of merit only or by the power of the people within it, is uncertain. History provides examples of the opposite [resulting] from all kinds of government (with the single exception of the truly republican one, which, however, can occur only to a moral politician). Still more uncertain is a right of nations supposedly established on statutes according to ministerial plans, which right is in fact onJy an empty word and rests on pacts that contain in the very act of their being concluded the secret reservation that they may be violated. On the

8:378 other hand, the solution of the second problem, namely that of political wisdom, urges itself upon us of its own accord, so to speak, is clear to everyone, and puts all artifices to shame; moreover, it leads straight to the end, but with the reminder of prudence not to draw toward it precipitately by force but to approach it steadily as favorable circumstances arise.

It can therefore be said, "Seek ye first the kingdom ofpure practical rea­son and its justice, and your end (the blessing ofperpetual peace) will come

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to you of itself." For morals has in it the peculiarity - and indeed with re­spect to its principles of public right (hence with reference to a politics cognizable a priori) - that the less it makes conduct dependent upon the proposed end, the intended advantage whether natural or moral, so much the more does it harmonize with it on the whole; and this happens because it is just the general will given a priori (within a nation or in the relation of various nations to one another) that alone determines what is laid down as right among human beings; but this union of the will of all, ifonly it is acted upon consistently in practice, can also, in accordance with the mechanism ofnature, be the cause bringing about the effect aimed at and providing the concept of right with efficacy. Thus it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a people is to unite itselfinto a state in accordance with freedom and equality as the sole concepts of right, and this principle is not based upon prudence but upon duty. On the other hand political moralists, how­ever subtly they reason about how the natural mechanism of a multitude of human beings entering into society would invalidate those principles and thwart their purpose, and also try to prove their contention against them by examples of badly organized constitutions of ancient and modern times (e.g., of democracies without a representative system), do not deserve a hearing, especially since such a pernicious theory itself produces the trou­ble it predicts, throwing human beings into one class with other living ma­chines, which need only be aware that they are not free in order to become, in their own judgment, the most miserable of all beings in the world.

The proposition that has become proverbial,jial iuslilia, pereal mundus,P or in German, "let justice reign even if all the rogues in the world perish because of it," sounds rather boastful but it is true; it is a sturdy principle of 8:379 right, which bars all the devious paths marked out by cunning or force, provided it is not misinterpreted and taken, as it might be, as permission to make use of one's own right with utmost rigor (which would conflict with ethical duty) but is taken instead as the obligation of those in power not to deny anyone his right or to encroach upon it out ofdisfavor or sympathy for others; and for this there is required, above all, a constitution organized in accordance with pure principles of right within a state, and then too the union of this state with other neighboring or even distant states for a lawful settlement oftheir disputes (by analogy with a universal state). This proposi­tion means nothing other than that political maxims must not issue from the welfare and happiness of each state that is to be expected from following them, and so not from the end that each of them makes its object - (from "I will,,)q as the supreme (though empirical) principle of political wisdom ­but must issue from the pure concept of duty of right (from "I ought," r the

P do justice though the world perish q vom Wollen r VImI Sol/en

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principle of which is given a priori by pure reason), whatever the natural consequences may be. The world will by no means perish by there coming to be fewer evil people. What is morally evil has the property, inseparable from its nature, of being at odds with itself in its aims and destructive of them (especially in relation to others similarly disposed), so that it clears the way for the (moral) principle of the good, even if progress is slow.

Thus there is objectively (in theory) no conflict at all between morals and politics. But subjectively (in the self-seeking propensity of human beings, which, however, because it is not based on maxims of reason, must still not be called practice), such conflict will remain; and it may always remain because it serves as the whetstone of virtue, whose true courage (according to the principle tu ne cede malis, sed contra audientior ito)' in the present case consists, not so much in resolutely standing up to the trou­bles and sacrifices one must thereby take upon oneself, but in looking straight in the face what is far more dangerous, the deceitful and treacher­ous but yet subtly reasoning principle in ourselves which pretends that the weakness of human nature justifies any transgression, and in overcoming its craftiness.

8:380 In fact the political moralist can say that regent and people or nation and nation do each other no wrong when they attack each other by force or fraud, though they do wrong generally in that they deny all respect to the concept of right, 10 which alone could found peace in perpetuity. For since one of them transgresses his duty toward the other, who is just as wrong­fully disposed toward him, when the two destroy themselves it happens to both of them quite rightly, though in such a way that there is always enough of this race left to keep this game going to the most distant times, so that posterity may some day take a warning example from them. Provi­dence is thus justified in the course of the world; for the moral principle in the human being never dies out, and reason, which is capable pragmati­cally of carrying out rightful ideas in accordance with that principle, grows steadily with advancing culture, but so too does the guilt for those trans­gressions. It seems that creation alone, namely that such a race of corrupt beings should have been put on earth at all, cannot be justified by any theodicy (if we assume that the human race never will be or can be better off);" but this standpoint for appraising matters is much too high for us, as if we could support for theoretical purposes our concepts (of the wis­dom) of the supreme power inscrutable to us. To such desperate conclu­sions we are unavoidably driven if we do not assume that pure principles of right have objective reality, that is, that they can be carried out; and people within a state as well as states in their relations with one another must act in accordance with those principles, regardless of what objec­

, Do not yield to troubles, but press on more boldly. Virgil Aeneid 6.95.

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tions empirical politics may bring against them. True politics can there­fore not take a step without having already paid homage to morals, and although politics by itself is a difficult art, its union with morals is no art at all; for as soon as the two conflict with each other, morals cuts the knot that politics cannot untie. The right of human beings must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice this may cost the ruling power. One cannot compromise here and devise something intermediate, a pragmatically con­ditioned right (a cross between right and expediency); instead, all politics must bend its knee before right, but in return it can hope to reach, though slowly, the level where it will shine unfailingly.

II.

ON THE AGREEMENT OF POLITICS WITH MORALS IN ACCORD WITH THE

TRANSCENDENTAL CONCEPT OF PUBLIC RIGHT

If I abstract from all the matter of public right as teachers of right usually think of it (from the various empirically given relations of individuals within a state or also of states to one another), I am still left with theform of publicity, the possibility of which is involved in every claim to a right, since without it there would be no justice (which can be thought only as publicly known) and so too no right, which is conferred only by justice.

Every claim to a right must have this capacity for publicity, and since one can very easily appraise whether it is present in a case at hand - that is, whether or not publicity is consistent with an agent's principles - it can yield a criterion to be found a priori in reason that is very easy to use; in case they are inconsistent we can cognize at once, as if by an experiment of pure reason, the falsity (illegitimacy) of the claim in question (praetensio iuris).

After abstracting in this way from everything empirical that the concept of the right of a state or the right of nations contains (such as the malevo­lence of human nature, which makes coercion necessary), one can call the following proposition the transcendental formula of public right.

"All actions relating to the rights of others are wrong if their maxim is incompatible with publicity."

This principle is not to be regarded as ethical only (belonging to the doctrine of virtue) but also as jun·dical (bearing upon the right of human beings). For a maxim that I cannot divulge without thereby defeating my own purpose, one that absolutely must be kept secret if it is to succeed and that I cannot publicly acknowledge without unavoidably arousing everyone's opposition to my project, can derive this necessary and universal, hence a priori foreseeable, resistance of everyone to me only from the injustice with which it threatens everyone. This principle is, moreover, only nega­tive, that is, it serves only for cognizing by means of it what is not right 8:382

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toward others. It is, like an axiom, indemonstrably certain and is, besides, easy to apply, as can be seen from the following examples of public right.

I. With regard to the right oja state (ius civitatis), namely right within a state, a question arises here that many consider difficult to answer and that the transcendental principle of publicity quite easily resolves: "Is rebellion a legitimate means for a people to throw off the oppressive power of a so-called tyrant (non titulo, sed exercitio talis)?'" The rights of the people are injured, and no wrong is done to him (the tyrant) by his dethronement; there is no doubt about this. For all that, it is still in the highest degree wrong of the subjects to seek their right in this way, and they can not in the least complain about injustice if, having failed in this conflict, they have to suffer the most severe punishment.

A good deal of subtle reasoning can be done on both sides of this issue if one wants to settle it by a dogmatic deduction of grounds of right; but the transcendental principle of the publicity of public right can spare itself this prolixity. In accordance with it a people asks itself, before the estab­lishment of the civil contract, whether it dares to make publicly known the maxim of its intention to rebel upon occasion. It is easily seen that if one wanted to make it a condition, in establishing a constitution for a state, that in certain cases force would be exercised against its head, the people would have to arrogate to itself a legitimate power over him. But in that case he would not be the head, or, if both were made conditions of establishing a state, no state at all would be possible, though the people's aim was to establish one. The wrongfulness of rebellion is therefore clear from this: that the maxim of rebellion, if one publicly acknowledged it as one's maxim, would make one's own purpose impossible. One would therefore have to keep it secret. But this would not be necessary on the part of the head of state. He can freely declare that he will punish any rebellion with the death of the ringleaders, even if they believe that he was the first to transgress the fundamental law; for if the head of state is aware of possessing irresistible supreme power (and this must be assumed to be

8:383 the case in any civil constitution, since he who does not have enough power to protect each one among the people against the others does not have the right to command the people either), he need not be concerned that he will thwart his own purpose by acknowledging his maxim; but it is also quite consistent with this that, if the people's rebellion should suc­ceed, that head of state would return to the status of a subject and must not start a rebellion for his restoration but also need not fear being called to account for his previous administration of the state.

2. With regard to the right oJnations. Only under the presupposition of SOl1}e kind of rightful condition (i.e., of that external condition in which a right can actually be assigned to human beings can we speak of a right of

, not the title, but the practices [of a tyrant]

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nations; for, as a public right, it contains in its very concept the publication of a general will determining for each what is its own, and this status iuridicus must proceed from some kind ofpact, which need not (like that from which a state arises) be based on coercive laws but may, ifnecessary, be a condition of continuing free association, like that of the federalism of various states discussed above. For apart from some kind of rightful condition that actually binds together various (natural or moral) persons, and so in a state of nature, the only kind of right there can be is private right. Here again there arises a conflict of politics with morals (the latter regarded as doctrine of right), where that criterion of publicity of maxims can likewise be easily applied, though only if the pact binds the states solely for the purpose of maintaining themselves in peace, among themselves and collectively to­ward other states, but certainly not for the sake of making acquisitions. Here the following cases of the antinomy between politics and morals arise, [which are presented] along with their resolution.

a) "If one of these states has promised another something, whether it be assistance or cession of certain territories or subsidies and the like, it may be asked whether, in a case where the welfare" of this state is at stake, it can release itself from keeping its word by regarding itself as a twofold person : first as a s(JVereign, accountable to no one within its state, but then in tum merely as the supreme official of the state, which must give an account to the state; from this would follow the conclusion that what it has bound itself to do in the first capacity it is released from in the second." But if a state (or its head) divulged this maxim of his, then every other 8:384 would naturally either shun him or unite with others in order to oppose his pretensions, and this proves that politics, with all its cunning, would have to frustrate its own end on this footing (of openness), so that that maxim would have to be wrong.

b) "If a neighboring power that has grown to a formidable size (potentia tremenda)" arouses anxiety, may one assume that because it can oppress it is also going to will to do so, and does this give the less powerful a right to (united) attack upon it, even without first having been injured by it?" A state that was willing to make known its affirmative maxim about this would only bring on the trouble still more certainly and quickly. For the greater power would anticipate the smaller ones, and as for their uniting, that is only a feeble reed against someone who knows how to make use of divide et impera. This maxim of political prudence, declared publicly, thus neces­sarily thwarts its own purpose and is therefore unjust. 12

c) "If a smaller state, by its location, separates the territory of a larger one, which needs this [continuous] territory for its preservation, is the latter not justified in subjugating the former and incorporating it?" It is

• Hril • awesome power

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easily seen that the larger state must not divulge such a maxim in advance; for, either smaller states would unite in good time or other powerful ones would do so in order to contest this booty, so that this maxim makes itself impracticable by its openness; this is a sign that it is unjust and can be so in a very high degree; for that an object of injustice is small does not prevent the injustice done to it from being very great.

3. With regard to cosmapolitan right, I pass over it in silence here; for, because of its analogy with the right of nations, its maxims are easy to state and to evaluate.

In the principle of the incompatibility of such maxims of the right of nations with publicity we have a good indication of the disagreement of politics with morals (as doctrine of right) . But now we need to learn what the condition" is under which its maxims agree with the right of nations.

8:385 For it cannot be concluded, conversely, that maxims compatible with publicity are on that account also just, since one who has decisively supe­rior power has no need to conceal its maxims. The condition under which a right of nations as such is possible is that a rightful conditionX already exists. For without this there is no public right, and any right that one may think of outside it (in a state of nature) is instead merely private right. Now we have seen above that a federative condition of states having as its only purpose the avoidance ofwar is the sole rightful condition compatible with the freedom of states. Thus the harmony of politics with morals is possible only within a federative union (which is therefore given a priori and is necessary by principles of right), and all political prudence has for its rightful basis the establishment of such a union in its greatest possible extent, without which end all its subtilizing is unwisdom and veiled injus­tice. Such a spurious politics has its casuistry to match the best Jesuit school - the reservatio mentalis, formulating public pacts in expressions that, as occasions alise, can be interpreted to one's advantage as one wants (e.g., the distinction of the status quo de foit and de droit); the probabilismus, subtly detecting evil intentions in others, or even making the likelihood of their possible superior power a rightful ground for undermining other, peaceful states; finally the peccatum philosophicum (peccatillum, bagatelle), taking the devouring of a small state to be an easily pardonable trifle if a much larger state gains by it, to the supposedly greater good of the world. *

• Precedents' for such maxims can be found in Counsellor Gan'e's treatise "Uber die Verbindung der Moral mit der Politik," 1788.'3 This worthy scholar acknowledges at the very beginning that he is unable to give a satisfactory answer to this question . But to approve of their union while yet acknowledging that one cannot fully remove the objections that can be raised against it seems to grant a greater indulgence than might be advisable to those who are very much inclined to abuse it. ~ Beding/llig x Zus/and Y Belege

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The duplicity of politics with respect to morals, in making use of one or the other branch of it for its purposes, abets this . Both philanthropy and respect for the rights of the human being are duties: but the former is only conditional duty whereas the latter is unconditional duty, commanding abso­lutely, and whoever wants to give himself up to the sweet feeling of beneficence must first be completely assured that he has not transgressed this unconditional duty. Politics readily agrees with morals in the first 8:386 sense (as ethics), in order to surrender the rights of human beings to their superiors; but with morals in the second meaning (as doctrine of right), before which it would have to bend its knee, it finds it advisable not to get involved in any pact at all, preferring to deny it any reality and to construe all duties as benevolence only; but this ruse of a furtive politics would still be easily thwarted by philosophy, publicizing those maxims it uses, if only politics would venture to let philosophers publicize their own maxims.

With this in view I propose another transcendental, and affinnative, principle of public right, the formula of which would be as follows:

"All maxims which need publicity (in order not to fail in their end) hannonize with right and politics combined."

For if they can attain their end only through publicity, they must con­fonn with the universal end of the public (happiness), and to be in accord with this (to make the public satisfied with its condition) is the proper task of politics. But if this end is to be attainable only through publicity, that is, by the removal of all distrust toward the maxims of politics, such maxims must also be in accord with the right of the public, since only in this is the union of the ends of all possible. I must leave the further elaboration and discussion of this principle to another occasion; but that it is a transcen­dental formula can be seen from its exclusion of all empirical conditions (of the doctrine of happiness), as the matter of the law, and its having regard only for the form of universal lawfulness.

If it is a duty to realize the condition of public right, even if only in approximation by unending progress, and if there is also a well-founded hope of this, then the perpetual peace that follows upon what have till now been falsely called peace treaties (strictly speaking, truces) is no empty idea but a task that, gradually solved, comes steadily closer to its goal (since the times during which equal progress takes place will, we hope, become always shorter) .

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