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Water Security in a Challenging World
Water-Energy-Food Security Nexus in the Arab Region
Current Water for Food Situational Analysis in the Arab Region and Expected Changes
due to Dynamic Externalities
Rabi H. Mohtar1*, Amjad T. Assi2, Bassel T. Daher2
1 Biological and Agricultural Engineering Department and Zachry Department of Civil Engineering, Texas A&M
University, College Station, TX 77843-2117, USA, [email protected], +1 765 4090309. 2 Biological and Agricultural Engineering Department, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-2117,
USA.
Abstract
The chapter will provide a situational analysis of the major stresses on water-food securities in the
Arab Region, as impacted by externalities such as climate change, population growth, and
economic development. The chapter will further explore the uncertainties associated with
predicting the future of these external stresses and will identify management risks associated with
the lack of understanding of the soil water and associated spatial variability of the external stresses.
The chapter will conclude with a vision for an adaptive management approach for addressing the
external stresses on water-food security in the Arab Region. A major cornerstone in this vision is
increasing the socio-economic resilience of local communities through localizing water and food
securities.
1. Introduction
Arab countries face multiple internal and external challenges to manage, sustain, and secure the
three scarce and unevenly distributed natural resources: water, food, and energy (WEF). The
uneven distribution of these resources is a general characteristic of the region, and together
demographic, geographic, political and other, natural constraints, exert burdens on WEF security
plans there. The decision makers in these countries are under continuous pressure to seek possible
solutions to bridge the WEF supply-demand gap. Thus, proposed strategies, are most commonly
reactive rather than preventive, and are usually associated with the uncertainties regarding
sustainability and have various socio-economic, environmental, cultural, and political drawbacks.
According to the World Bank (2007), current management plans for facing the WEF security
challenges in Arab countries are questionable, given the complicated internal and external
dynamics of the region.
In Arab countries, water security is the most critical challenge. The renewable water resources are
the lowest in the world at 1,500 m3/capita/year (WRI 2005). The majority of the water running
through major rivers in the region originate outside of the region, thus exposing it to vulnerabilities
that lead to political unrest, which in turn shakes its fragile WEF security. The Southeast Anatolia
2
Development project, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Israeli diversion of the Jordan
River are examples of the vulnerability of WEF systems to externalities in Syria, Iraq, Egypt,
Sudan, Jordan and Palestine, respectively. Another external pressure affecting WEF security in the
Arab region is climate change, which is expected to hit this region the hardest, though with huge
variations among the different countries (Droogers et al., 2012). Climate change is associated with
other social, economic and political dynamics that will shape the future of water-energy-food
security in the region.
The general strategic plan for securing food supply in the Arab region is through food imports
(virtual water trade), predicted to constitute more than 60% of the food basket by 2030 (World
Bank, 2009). Grains form the bulk of this import, providing 30-40% of total caloric intake of an
average person in the region (Larson et al., 2013; Wright and Cafiero, 2011). The decision to rely
on food imports was made under pressure, and led to unintended consequences such as the
degradation of the quality of the primary natural resource, arable soil. The decision also had
significant socio-economic impact on farmers, who comprise a large segment of the Arab society.
It added vulnerability to global markets. Branes (2013) warned against the misuse of the "virtual
water" concept and its application in agricultural lands in Egypt, particularly if adopted without a
clear plan and mitigation measures.
A key solution for facing the variability in challenges is localizing water and food securities. In
this paper, we will shed light on one significant resource "green water", whose use can save water,
food, and energy for many countries in the area. We also want to encourage innovative thinking
through optimized use of natural resources, encourage the benefits to be gained from technological
advances, and stress the value of continuous inclusion of the farmer, the primary steward of this
resource.
2. Situational Analysis of the Internal and External Stresses on Arab Countries' Water-
Food Securities
The water-food security of the Arab world is constrained by several internal and external stresses.
Key among them are high population and economic growth (socio-economic), arid and semi-arid
climate, dependency on external water resources and food supply, climate change, and political
unrest. There is a high variability and uneven distribution of the two main resources for food
production, namely arable land and water. There are generally great disparities in wealth, natural
resources, and economic systems; thus, adaptive strategies for maintaining a sustainable level of
water-food security must vary. This section provides a situational analysis of these internal and
external dynamic stresses and describes how these stresses impact water-food security in the Arab
world. To capture the variability of these stresses among the Arab countries, we categorize the
Arab world into four geographical units:
(1) Arabian Peninsula: Bahrain [BHR], Kuwait [KWT], Oman [OMN], Qatar [QAT], Saudi Arabia
[SAU], United Arab Emirates [UAE], and Yemen [YEM];
(2) Middle East: Iraq [IRQ], Jordan [JOR], Lebanon [LBN], State of Palestine [PSE], and Syria
[SYR];
(3) North-eastern Africa: Comoros [COM], Djibouti [DJI], Egypt [EGY], Somalia [SOM], Sudan
[SDN];
3
(4) Maghreb: Algeria [DZA], Libya [LBY], Mauritania [MRT], Morocco [MAR], and Tunisia
[TUN].
2.1. Population growth
In the past three decades, the population in the Arab world has more than doubled. Though fertility
rates have consistently declined, the population rate continues to be high when compared to the
rest of the world (UNDP, 2012). This rapid increase in population makes the Arab world one of
the youngest regions (Brown et al., 2009), a reality that presents a clear opportunity for the Arab
countries: if the right investments were made in human capital and training for the labor market.
Youth represents a major economic asset (Madsen et al., 2007), but it also presents serious
challenges: including the need for adequate infrastructure for education and health care, increased
unemployment, malnutrition, and slow economic growth (UNFPA, 2012). Further, it imposes an
overburdening strain on already limited water resources and arable soil with regard to meeting
growing water-food demands. The population in the Arabian Peninsula is two and a half times
more than it was in 1980 (Fig. 2.1). Projections show that the population in the Arab World as a
whole will reach 692 million by 2050 (Zyadin, 2013). It is projected that North East Afrcia will
maintain the highest population, while the highest percentage of population growth is expected to
take place in the Arabian Peninsula countries. Arab countries across different regions continue to
grow at highly variable rates due to different patterns of fertility and immigration.
Fig. 2.1: The population growth in the Arab world from 1980 to 2014 and the projected population in
2050. (ESA UN, 2012)
0
100
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300
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600
700
800
900
1,000
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Arabian…
BH
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Mid
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TUN
Pe
rce
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Inc
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%)
Po
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latio
n (
Tho
usa
nd
s)
Population in the Arab Word [1980, 2014, 2050]
1980 2014 2050 %increase 1980-2014
160%
107%
92%250%
4
2.2. Economic development
The landscape of economies in the Arab World is characterized by great variability across different
countries (Fig. 2.2). In 2013, Qatar recorded the highest GDP per capita in the world (USD
102,100) while Somalia bottomed the global list with USD 600 (CIA, 2014). Mainly catalyzed by
a combination of high oil and gas returns and low local population, the Arabian Peninsula enjoys
a higher GDP per capita compared to the other regions. The sectors that contribute to the GDP
across countries in the Arab World also highly vary: some have significant agricultural activity,
while others solely rely on industry and services. In 2012, for example, 14% of Egypt’s GDP came
from agriculture, while 40% and 46% came from industry and services respectively. The value
added to GDP from agriculture, industry, and services for the same year was 7%, 19%, 73% for
Lebanon, 1%, 60%, 39% for UAE. (World Bank, 2014). Economic growth continues to be slow
in the Arab world, and for different reasons in different locations. This variability mainly results
from the lack of a stable macroeconomic environment, inadequate human capital, and excessive
reliance on public investment (World Bank, 2004; Xavier et al., 2002). Youth unemployment is
nearly double that of the global rate and continues to grow due to the rigid labor market and its
inefficiencies (WEF 2013; WEF 2014). A different set of interventions are needed to curb existing
trends across different countries.
Fig. 1.2: The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDPPP)
in year 2013 for countries in the Arab World (World Bank, 2014)
2.4. Water Availability and External Water Resources Dependency
The Arab world is considered to be one of the most water-scarce regions in the world. This scarcity
has several dimensions.
(1) The physical "hydrological" scarcity due to the limited internal renewable water resources,
which seems to become more severe with the climate change.
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
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20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
Ara
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Mid
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IRQ
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LBN
PSE
SY
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fric
a
CO
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SO
M
SD
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Ma
gh
reb
DZA
LBY
MR
T
MA
R
TUN
GD
P 2
01
3 (
bill
ion
$)
GD
PP
P 2
01
3 (
USD
)
GDP and GDPPP 2013
GDPPP GDP 2013
5
(2) The high dependence on the external renewable water resources not only from both other
Arab countries and from non-Arab countries. Currently, the external renewable water
resources of Egypt, Sudan, Iraq from non-Arab countries are 97%, 89%, and 61% of their
total renewable water resources, respectively (see Fig. 2.3).
(3) The socio-economic dynamics represented by the sharp increase in population, shift in life
styles, and economic growth. For example, economic growth in Qatar and United Arab
Emirates caused a population growth of 9 times more than it was three decades ago,
imposing substantial strain on already scarce water resources. Such a socio-economic
situation has never been experienced in any region except in the Arabian Peninsula.
Moreover, this region is classified as an absolute water scarcity region (i.e. < 500
m3/capita/yr) according to the physical water stress classification of Falkenmark, et al.
(1989) (Fig 2.3).
(4) The depletion of the vulnerable water resources to bridge the growing supply-demand gap.
(5) The deterioration of water and land resource quality, due to exposure to low-quality
domestic and industrial wastewater and agricultural return flow.
Arab countries can be categorized into three groups based on the sources and availability of water
to meet the current demand: (1) renewable surface water-based (Egypt and Sudan); (2) renewable
surface and groundwater-based (Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, Comoros, Mauritania); (3)
renewable and non-renewable groundwater-based (Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Jordan, and Palestine); (4) mainly non-renewable groundwater-based (Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen).
The internal renewable water resource from rainfall, physical water scarcity, is the lowest in the
Arab world. Each of the Arabian Peninsula countries receives less than 500 m3/capita/yr, and,
except for Oman, each has already exceeded their renewable water resources. In the Middle East,
only Iraq and Lebanon have a better water quota (between 500-1000 m3/capita/yr), while Jordan,
Palestine and Syria are still categorized as absolute physical water scarcity countries. Except
Comoros, all the North East Africa countries are also classified as absolute physical water scarcity
countries. The same classification applies for all Maghreb countries except Morocco, still
considered to be a water-scarce country (Fig.2.3). One should keep in mind that food security is
not only a function of water availability but also of land fertility and climate conditions. The
considerable variability of land fertility and climate conditions among these countries is an
important characteristic of the entire region and must be considered in any water-food security
plans.
The Middle East region of the Arab World is characterized by political instability. Water security
and political instability are interconnected. All of the countries in the Middle East share trans-
boundary water bodies among themselves and with other, non-Arab countries. Most of the 60%
renewable water resources in Iraq and Syria originate in Turkey and flow through Euphrates-Tigris
basin. Given the Turkish water-food-energy security plans for the Southeast Anatolia
Development project, it is to be expected that the growing water demand in Iraq and Syria will not
be easily obtained through these rivers. Nor is the situation any better in other parts of this region.
More than 66% of the flowing water in the Jordan River is extracted by Israel, while only 18%,
12%, <1%, and 0% is utilized by Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, respectively. As for the
Nile River basin, around 97% of the total renewable water resources of Egypt and 89% of those in
6
Sudan, flow through the Nile River. Thus, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is of great
concerns to both countries. In this part of world, water policy plays a pivotal role in shaping the
future of water-food security.
Fig. 2.2: The internal and external renewable water resources in the Arab world. (AQUASTAT-
FAO database).
2.5. Climate change
According to many global and local climate change models, the Arab world will receive less
precipitation and an associated increase in temperature. The spatial and temporal variations in
these two climate characteristics are high, not only among the countries, but also within a given
country. The uncertainties in the predicted values of various climate change models are very high.
A study by the World Bank, Immerzeel et al. (2011), assessed the future water supply-demand
under various climate change and socio-economic scenarios. It was found that climate change will
be responsible for 16% of the water shortage in the region by 2050. Whereas, Drooger et al. (2012)
found that 22% of the water shortage in the region will be due to climate change and 78% due to
the socio-economic dynamics by 2050.
In the study of Immerzeel et al. (2011), one can recognize the high variation in projected
precipitation and actual evapotranspiration based on the results of 9 different Global Climate
Models (GCMs). With regard to precipitation, the prediction intervals were [-21%, 35%] in the
Arabian Peninsula with a median value of 2.1%; [-19%, 7%] in the Middle East with a median
2
97100
03
0 0 0
57 61
27
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97
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Ara
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SA
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YEM
Mid
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IRQ
JO
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LBN
PSE
SY
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NE A
fric
a
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SO
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SD
N
Ma
gh
reb
DZA
LBY
MR
T
MA
R
TUN
Pe
rce
nta
ge
(%
)
m3/c
ap
ita
/yr
Internal and External Renewable Water Resources Per Capita [2014]
ERWR [2014] IRWR [2014]
Absolute Water Scarcity Water Scarcity
Water Stress Water Vulnerable
Percent of External RWR from Total RWR
7
value of -6.4%; [-11%, 22%] in Egypt and Djibouti of the North-east Africa region with a median
value of 1.5%; and finally [-19%, 7%] in Maghreb with a median value of -7.3%. Only 5 countries
are expected to have more precipitation by 2050, three of these are in the Arabian Peninsula: Oman,
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen (Fig. 2.4). Rainfall intensity brings another uncertainty in the
future of water-food security in the region. Changes in the climate are expected to accelerate the
hydrological cycle, thus increasing the probability of flooding and desertification: both of which
impose substantial strain on the water-food scarcity in the region.
The increase in temperature also increases water demand, mainly from the agricultural sector, by
increasing evapotranspiration. Evapotranspiration in the Arab World is expected to increase by
1% - 3.6% by 2050. The greatest will be in the Middle East, with a median value of 3.1% (Fig.
2.4).
Fig. 2.4. The median precipitation and reference evapotranspiration anomalies of 9 GCMs as a
percentage comparing the [2040-2050] scenarios with respect to current situation [2000-2009].
Climate change is considered to pose a major threat to water-food security in the region and is
expected to be responsible for around 20% of the supply-demand gap by 2050. The uncertainty in
the predicted values are very high and the temporal domain of the occurrence of such extreme
events is not clear. Severe droughts can hit at any time, and would aggravate socio-economic and
political instability in the region.
-15.0 -10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0
Arabian PeninsulaBHRKWT
OMNQATSAUUAEYEM
Middle EastIRQJORLBNPSESYR
NE AfricaDJI
EGYMaghreb
DZALBY
MARTUN
Percentage [%]
Median Precipitation and Reference Evapotranspiration Anomalies of the 9
GCMs as a percentage:[2040-2050] with respect to [2000-2009]
Median Precipitation Anomalies
Median Reference
Evapotranspiration Anomalies
8
2.6. Global food prices and their implications on Arab countries
The Arab world is well-known for dependence on cereals in its diet. About 30-40% of total calories
of an average person in the region comes from wheat. Thus, it is not surprising that more than 29%
of the global wheat export between 2008 and 2010 was to the region (Larson, 2013). Several Arab
countries attempted to achieve self-sufficiency, at least in wheat production. For example, in 1984
Saudi Arabia subsidized wheat production, becoming a net exporter of wheat in less than 10 years.
However, this success was costly and resulted in depleting valuable groundwater resources and
affecting diversity of agricultural product in the kingdom (Sowers et al., 2010). Currently, the plans
are to cease wheat production in Saudi Arabia and to either import cereals or secure access to
arable land in other countries (mainly in Africa and Asia) sufficient to meet the increasing demand
for cereals.
Grain import (virtual water trade) seems to offer an easy solution to bridging the unmet water and
food demand in these countries. Due to the socio-economic, hydrological and climate change
constraints, the tendency is toward boosting food imports up to 64% by 2030 (World Bank, 2009).
Such a plan is associated with many risks: some large grain exporters are converting their product
into ethanol and it is expected that by 2050, 182 million tons of cereals will become bio-fuel,
compared to only 65 million tons in 2005 (Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012). This will impact
both global food prices, and the local markets in the Arab world, where the poor and vulnerable
spend 30-70% of their income on food. On average, local food markets showed 5-10% variation
as a response to the global market prices in the period 2006-2011. The highest variation was
observed in Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, and Palestine (Larson, 2013). The poor people, and the poor
countries are least resilient to changes in the food prices, and these represent a quarter of the
population in the region. It is not only the vulnerable people, but also the precious land that could
suffer from the side effects of the increased food imports. Barnes (2013) addressed the drawbacks
of the Egyptian policy to decrease the area of water-intensive rice cultivation and increase rice
imports, noting that it was the land and the farmer who received the shock.
3. Uncertainties Associated with the External Stresses
It is clear that socio-economics, politics and climate change will play an influential role in shaping
the future of food and water security in the Arab World. However, substantial uncertainties are
associated with these projections. The uncertainties increase the vulnerability of the regions’
inhabitants and reduce the resilience of water-food security adaptive strategies. In the last decade,
rapid population growth in Arab Peninsula resulted from the greatly increased demand in the labor
market; three wars in Iraq and Syria caused significant increase in the population of Jordan and
Lebanon in a very short time. It is challenging for any adaptive plan to accommodate such socio-
economic and political dynamics in such a short time frame. Given that the socio-economic factor
is anticipated to be responsible for about 80% of the unmet demand by 2050, it is critical that water
strategies, in the face of such dynamics, focus on local-scale water supply projects and technical
solutions. These would enforce the resilience of water-food security systems that require the
engagement of local societal factors. Moreover, global biofuel production is expected to double
by 2050 and result in a shortage of (or increased competition/demand for) cereals. There is no
guarantee about the future production of bio-fuel, cereals production for the food market, and their
9
prices. These uncertainties are alarming for Arab world countries that plan to increase food
imports, mainly of grains.
Several studies using different GCMs have been conducted to predict future climate changes. Two
common results can be concluded from these studies: (1) in average climatic scenarios, climate
change will be responsible for about 20% of the water supply-demand gap by 2050, and (2) there
is high variation among the different models. For example in the Immerzeel et al. (2011) study,
the precipitation anomalies, as a percentage in the Arab World, are predicted to be within the
interval [-18%, 18%] with a median value of -2.1%. The questions then become: when can we
expect the worst case scenario? Are we ready for it? Can our large-scale projects and plans cope
with it? All that we observe from recent drought and flood events tell us we are not ready yet. One
way for mitigating such risks is to develop reliable local climate predictions. Under these
uncertainties, water experts and decision makers should work on creating innovative solutions by
understanding the local environmental system, and engaging the societal actors.
4. Toward Innovative Solutions for a Better Future of Water-Food Security in the
Arab Region
Agriculture is considered to be a main constituent of national security and social identity in many
countries. Agriculture not only depends heavily on water, but also on land: both of which are
threatened by climate change. Furthermore, considerable amounts of energy are embedded within
different stages of food production. The agricultural sector embeds within it vast resources and is
complex in terms of its attributes and its value to society. Agriculture consumes the most water in
a region classified as the most water-scarce in the world. The agricultural sector is also the main
source of income for the most vulnerable parts of the society in the Arab Region. An important
step towards identifying ways to encourage agricultural resilience within the Arab countries is to
investigate the potential of local resources and their ability to withstand the stresses facing these
resource systems.
Good management of this sector demands a holistic, yet localized, understanding of the inter-
linkages among different resources (water, energy, soil, land), externalities (economics, population
and demographics, politics, climate), and involved stakeholders (governments, farmers, investors,
civil society). No single water-food security strategy could be generalized over the entire region
due to the enormous variability in resource availability, external factors and range of involved
stakeholders. This variability is highly pronounced among different countries, and even among
different sub-regions in the same country. Therefore, localized adaptation strategies need to be
developed, based on these elements. Developing local-specific plans will contribute to reducing
the vulnerabilities of local societies to the stresses that face resource systems. It will also help
improve levels of resilience of natural and socio-economic systems as they face external stresses
such as climate change.
A 199m3/yr water shortage is expected by year 2050 (Droogers, 2012) in the MENA region. With
the increase in the water shortage, supplying domestic households from fresh water resources will
take priority over agriculture and will create a challenge for agriculture experts and decision
10
makers to meet market needs. This could lead to reduction in local agricultural production and to
bridging shortfalls in food demand through imports, while accepting associated risks and
vulnerabilities. Alternatively, localized adaptation scenarios could be developed to maintain a
certain level of local food production. Immerzeel et al. (2011) discusses 9 adaption scenarios to
manage the unmet water demand. The conclusion of the study favors improved agriculture
practices, such as heat and salt tolerant crop varieties. It also favors desalination as part of an
efficient adaptation strategy for water resources. This conclusion is in alignment with the need to
localize food production, farming systems, and adaption plans, in order to increase resilience of
the agricultural system as it faces a wide array of dynamic stresses. Moreover, Verner et al. (2013)
concluded that farmers and rural inhabitants are key players in increasing the resilience of the
agricultural sector’s response to climate change. They are at the front-line of efforts to protect their
source of income in a non-stationary world. The study highlighted the importance of regular, on-
farm agricultural experiments to identify, evaluate, and manage the changes in local production
systems rather than adopt ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions.
Arab countries currently meet a significant portion of their food market needs through import.
Amounts and types of food import vary from one place to another, depending on resource
availabilities and enabling conditions. Agricultural trade plays an important role in today’s global
economy, and will continue to be a major contributor in supplying markets worldwide.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that many potentials for improving levels of local food production
in the area are under tapped or yet to be developed. The Arabian Peninsula is rich with energy
resources (renewable "solar" as well as non-renewable “fossil”) yet, very poor in fresh water and
fertile soil. Technology is advancing rapidly, and it is only a matter of time before efficiency and
storage issues are overcome for solar energy. Such a clean, cheap, and renewable source of energy
can bring agricultural life to the area.
Nonetheless, unique localized farming systems need to be adopted where soil-water-atmosphere
can be monitored and controlled. Sahara Forest Project (http://saharaforestproject.com/) launched
as a pilot project in Qatar, and now under construction in Jordan, provides case studies for localized
farming systems in which technologies can be combined and used to alleviate the impact of severe
environmental externalities such as limited water resources, limited arable soil, and year round very
high temperatures.
Another under-appreciated asset in the region is green water, defined by Wikipedia as 'rainwater
stored in the soil as soil moisture’. This water needs to be better quantified and managed. It
maintains, determines, and even improves the productivity and functionality of the soil-water-
atmosphere continuum. Once quantified and managed, it can reduce soil erosion, maintain soil
fertility, and most importantly, maintain the equilibrium between the soil-water-plant system and
its surrounding climate. Such a function will be essential to face the stresses associated with
climate change. Fig. 4.1 shows the amounts of available blue and green water in Maghreb countries
(Schuol et al., 2008). The data shows that blue water comprises only 4% of the renewable water
resources, while green water constitutes the remaining 96%. A great deal of research, human
capacity, and management must be channeled into developing technical solutions to better utilize
the 4% (blue water), but the 96% remains under studied: 91% of green water flow,
evapotranspiration, and 5% of green water is stored in the soil profile. Fig. 4.2 shows the portion
of precipitation counted as ‘internal renewable water resources’ across countries in the Arab world.
Only 8 of the 22 countries show that precipitation contributes to more than 10% of blue water.
11
Currently, the simplified representation of the soil-water medium limits proper accounting and
management of this precious but under-appreciated water. Braudeau and Mohtar (2014) present a
new paradigm that has the capability to quantify green water as it exists in the organized soil-water
system, with thermodynamic equilibrium and its surrounding climate (temperature, humidity, and
pressure). Once quantified, it can be better managed. Better accounting and utilization of green
water offers a promising leap toward better adaptation to climate change challenges facing food
supply chains.
Fig. 4.1. The green and blue water portions from the total precipitation (Schuol et al., 2008)
Algeria Libya Morocco Tunisia Mauritania
Precipitation 198.6 76.6 113.6 44.7 89.9
Green Water Flow 182.1 73.1 100.3 38.5 83.0
Greenwater Storage 11.3 3.1 7.5 3.3 1.5
Blue Water 5.2 0.4 5.7 2.9 5.4
0
50
100
150
200
km
3/y
r
Blue and Green Water in the Maghreb Countries (km3/yr)
12
Fig. 4.2. The amount of rainwater accounted as Internal Renewable Water Resources.
(AQUASTAT-FAO database).
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
The Arab World faces water and food security challenges with a set of non-stationary internal and
external pressures. Arid and semi-arid climates, recurring water stresses, high population growth
rates, frequent political unrest, and climate change are characteristic of the challenges that face the
region. The high level of variability in those challenges, whether among different geographic
groups (Arabian Peninsula, Middle East, North-east Africa, and Maghreb), different countries
within a group, or among different areas within a single country, is another characteristic of the
challenges in the region. This makes it difficult to adopt one-size-fits-all adaptive strategies.
Uncertainty of future projections for those challenges adds to the complexity of prescribing proper
strategies that could respond to possible scenarios.
Under predictions of high uncertainty and variability of future stresses, large-scale technical
solutions cannot provide high levels of resilience, and would threaten the livelihood of
communities across the region. Alternatively, localizing adaptive strategies, with pivotal
participation of local communities, increases the resilience of water-food security in the face of
uncertain stresses. Moreover, lessons learned at the farm level, would contribute to increasing the
ability of framers and farming systems to maintain a sustainable level of food security. Innovative
thinking is needed to understand the potential of available and under tapped resources, and to better
utilize them at the local scale, and better bridge the water-food supply-demand gap. This does not
eliminate the role of food imports, rain water harvesting systems, and existing hydraulic structures
in contributing to bridge the gap, but would come with higher risks and lower levels of resilience.
Localizing the farming system, once adopted as a strategy moving forward, would increase the
overall resilience of the water-food systems. Such a strategy should be inclusive and must account
26
04
72 2 2
30
37
7
70
32
15
2
60
64 3
1
85
1 0
19
12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
Ara
bia
n P
en
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la
BH
R
KW
T
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T
SA
U
UA
E
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Mid
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Ma
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How Much Rainwater Accounted as Internal Renewable Water Resources
IRWR [2015] Precipitation[Long term average] Percent of IRW from Precipitation
13
for the natural, social, economic, and technical environments after which local solutions are
prescribed and geared toward optimizing, rather than maximizing, the use of water, soil, plant and
atmosphere. The proposed approach is a socio-techno-environmental approach as opposed to a
solely technical one.
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