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GOVERNANCE NOTES

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JUNE 2000

I N S T I T U T I O N S A N DI N S T I T U T I O N S A N DI N S T I T U T I O N S A N DI N S T I T U T I O N S A N DI N S T I T U T I O N S A N D

G O V E R N A N C EG O V E R N A N C EG O V E R N A N C EG O V E R N A N C EG O V E R N A N C E

P R O G R A MP R O G R A MP R O G R A MP R O G R A MP R O G R A M

WATERSHED GOVERNANCE: LIVELIHOODS AND RESOURCE

COMPETITION IN THE MOUNTAINS OF MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

BY BLAKE D. RATNER

INTRODUCTION

Recent years have brought new evidenceof a burgeoning water crisis in mainlandSoutheast Asia.1 Cycles of flash floodsand droughts emerged as the most seri-ous threat to Vietnam’s growing agricul-tural economy. The reservoirs feedingThailand’s irrigated rice basin, the ChaoPhraya, dropped to record lows and in-stigated unprecedented cuts in watersupply to Bangkok. In China, the historic1998 flooding of the Yangtze River servedas a potent reminder of the huge costs ofinadequate watershed management.

Many areas of the region also face a cri-sis in the welfare of upland communities.They are not only left behind in nationaldevelopment, but are also losing accessto local resources. The result for thesepeople, such as the residents of Vietnam’sdensely populated northern mountainsor those displaced by logging companiesin remote forests of Cambodia or damconstruction in Laos, is growing povertyand bleak future prospects.

Crises in water supply and local welfareare symptoms of an underlying trend—increased competition over the naturalresources essential to the livelihoods ofupland and lowland residents alike. If avillage is isolated from outside claims on

Figure 1 Mainland Southeast Asia: Major Watersheds

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the natural resources on which it dependsand if it is self-sufficient, then questionsof how to meet the needs of the residents,how to manage the resources, and howto plan for the future can all be dealt withlocally. But today such isolation is rare.The emerging reality in the uplands isone of interdependence and growingcompetition among users of forest, land,and water resources and also among al-ternative uses of the watershed system.Those poised to lose most in this compe-tition are the households and communi-ties whose livelihoods depend directly onthe resources. Since most of the majorriver basins in the region cross interna-tional boundaries (see Figure 1), the com-petition is expressed at an internationallevel as well. Changing human needs anddemands for the resource base are spur-ring on this competition, necessitatingparallel changes in governance to moreequitably allocate the benefits of scarcewatershed resources and achieve moresustainable resource use.

Economic Transition andExpanding MarketsLiberalization of economic policies in theregion is transforming who has access toupland resources and the ways those re-sources are used. In Thailand, marketforces have helped determine land usein the uplands over the past several de-cades. In Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, andChina, the government’s move towardcompetitive markets is more recent, caus-ing changes in regulations covering pri-vate firms, state enterprises, trade, landtenure, and foreign investment.

Although the transition from centralizedcontrol of the economy and state pro-duction to market-led development is far

from complete, the effects on theground are already extensive. This ismost apparent in new private sectorroles for resource extraction, such as log-ging and mining, and in such industriesas coffee, rubber, paper, and silk produc-tion that rely on extensive tree planta-tions. In Cambodia and Laos, the log-ging that accelerated deforestation overrecent years would not have been pos-sible had the government not openedthe sector to foreign firms. This helpsexplain why between 1990 and 1995,mainland Southeast Asia experiencedthe world’s highest annual rate of defor-estation (1.6 percent), according to theUnited Nations Food and AgricultureOrganization (FAO).2

Improvements in transport infrastruc-ture, particularly road networks, havealso aided the expansion of domestic andinternational markets.3 Moreover, roaddevelopment has led to spontaneous mi-gration, unplanned or illegal logging ofnewly accessible forests, and unplannedland clearing for agriculture, often infragile environments.4

Furthermore, as the benefits of eco-nomic growth translate into higher in-comes in the region, consumer demandincreases the incentive to harvest uplandresources. Harvesting of forest plant andwildlife products in the mountains ofLaos and Vietnam has reportedly surgedsince the opportunities for cross-bordertrade with China expanded several yearsago.5 Rising consumer demand in Chinaand a scarcity of nontimber forest prod-ucts highly valued for traditional medi-cine and other purposes ensure a highprice, while upland residents in Laos andVietnam find it increasingly necessary to

secure income to participate in the casheconomy. Rising incomes not only putnew pressure on upland forest resourcesdirectly but also increase demand forwater for agricultural production, hydro-electric power generation, and urban andindustrial uses.

Poverty, Population, andResource UseMany upland residents in the region arebenefiting from the new economic op-portunities created by expanding marketsand infrastructure. Increased farmer in-comes in northern Thailand have beenattributed to tenure security, good mar-ket access, government or private agro-industry assistance in establishing prof-itable crops, as well as off-farm employ-ment opportunities in lowland industry.6

In large areas of Vietnam’s northernhighlands, by contrast, prospects are ex-tremely bleak, with rapid populationgrowth, in-migration, and a resourcebase that is already severely depleted.7

With per capita income (in terms of rela-tive purchasing power) less than onesixth that of Thailand,8 there are feweropportunities for upland residents tofind employment elsewhere in theeconomy and greater reliance directly onupland forests and agriculture for sub-sistence production.

Those countries with rapid populationgrowth are also the poorest in the region,augmenting the challenge of upland de-velopment. The populations of Cambo-dia, Vietnam, and Burma are growing atmore than twice the rate of either Thai-land or China, while Laos is increasingthree times as fast. By 2025, Vietnam isexpected to add 32 million people to its

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Environment for Europe: Fora and Outcomes

fragile and steep-sloping areas,11 but theeffects of this trend are more complexthan commonly assumed. The mosaic ofagricultural, forest, and other land usesacross the landscape has cumulative ef-fects on watershed functions that are notapparent at the plot level.12

The high profile of watershed protectionefforts in the region reflects a partialshift of government policies for the up-lands—from an emphasis on the valueof individual resources to the value of

the services these resources provide ina broader ecosystem. In addition to regu-lation of water flows and water qualityfor human use, important ecosystem ser-vices associated with upper watershedlandscapes include maintenance of thehealth of downstream fisheries and wet-land ecosystems, and the contribution ofbiodiversity to agricultural productivityand local livelihoods.

Better understanding of the real impactsof alternative forms of upland resource

1998 population, an increase of morethan 40 percent, equivalent to abouttwice the current population of Laos andCambodia combined. In the same period,Cambodia’s population is expected tomark an increase of 58 percent, and Laosan increase of 88 percent.9

Yet, population trends are only one fac-tor in explaining the character of pov-erty and resource use in the uplands.Population density in much of Yunnanis high in relation to mountainous areasin other countries of the region. (SeeFigure 2.) In some remote areas of theprovince, residents have low cash in-come but still reasonable standards ofhealth, nutrition, and education; theirlivelihoods remain intact. Upland resi-dents elsewhere have higher incomesderived from unsustainable resourceextraction, temporary labor, or farmingon lands where they may be threatenedwith eviction. More important than netincome is security of livelihoods, and formost upland residents this depends onsecurity in accessing and using localnatural resources. Economic growthdoes not automatically translate intobetter welfare for upland residents. Thepattern of growth and the implicationsthis has for resource use are key.

An Ecosystems ViewMuch of the attention policy officials giveto upland land use stems from concernsover its assumed contribution to watershortages, flooding, and downstream silt-ation.10 Logging in upper watersheds,forest conversion to agro-industrial plan-tations, and upland farming systems haveall been blamed for these downstreamimpacts. Research indicates a generaltrend of cultivated land expanding into

Figure 2 Population Density


management on ecosystem services isneeded to identify policies that providethe broadest social benefit and reduceconflict among groups who depend onthose services.13 Yet, improving theknowledge base on these biophysical re-lationships and identifying improvedland-use options are only parts of thepuzzle. The most technically appealingoptions will not make it beyond the trialplot or the land-use-planning map if theunderlying social and economic trendsthat motivate current resource use arenot addressed.

WHY WATERSHED

GOVERNANCE MATTERS

Addressing the underlying causes of re-source competition requires changingthe fundamental ground rules that de-fine who is involved in making resourcemanagement decisions, what powersthese different actors exercise, and howthey are held accountable for their deci-sions. Such innovations in governance areimportant largely because they are sys-temic, altering the underlying systemsand relationships in which resource man-agement decisions are made. When suc-cessful, they create opportunities for co-operation that can span the divisionsamong government agencies and medi-ate the competing goals of different re-source users. They do not erase compe-tition, but they improve the chances thatit can be managed equitably.

By contrast, conventional policy re-sponses to a changing upland landscapefrequently fail to address the social andinstitutional dimensions of resource useand sometimes aggravate conflict. Gov-ernment efforts to control flooding and

improve water supply have suffered froman overly technical emphasis on engi-neering solutions: dams, flood controlstructures, and irrigation schemes thatconsistently perform below expectations.Reforestation campaigns have relied tooheavily on government agencies, and inthe generally marginal areas where theyhave involved local communities, theyhave been done more through exhorta-tion than incentive. Governments haveoften seen forest communities as sourcesof problems in resource managementrather than partners in finding solutions,sometimes denying them access to keyresources or even resettling them.

Throughout much of mainland SoutheastAsia, policies in such sectors as forestry,water resources, agriculture, transporta-tion, and industry send conflicting mes-sages to resource users, while agencieswork at cross-purposes. These difficul-ties are not exclusive to any political sys-tem; over the past three decades, Thai-land under a market economy, and Chinaand Vietnam in socialist systems havefaced many similar obstacles in their ef-forts to harness upland resources for na-tional economic development.

Pursuing sustainable upland develop-ment and watershed management re-quires balancing the diverse interests ofnational society: rural and urban, uplandand lowland, minority and majority. Insome cases win-win solutions are pos-sible, such as improved land-use manage-ment systems that increase local welfareand restore watershed functions. Buttrade-offs are frequently necessary in theshort term. As the result of a lowland biasin government decisionmaking, uplandresidents are too often expected to forego

local resource exploitation so that down-stream residents or more powerful stateand private enterprises may reap the ben-efits. This power imbalance leads to afundamental inequity in the flow of re-sources between the uplands and low-lands. Inequity in access to resources andthe distribution of benefits derived fromthem, in turn, contributes to unsustain-able use.

These inequities are difficult to reversefor many reasons. Upland communities,and especially ethnic minorities, are fre-quently marginalized from governmentplanning and national policy decisions.They are physically remote fromdecisionmaking centers and face linguis-tic and cultural barriers to participation.Mechanisms for upland minorities tohold government agencies, businesses,and private landholders accountable fortheir actions are often weak or absent.Finally, the domain of administrativebodies is usually not aligned with thegeography of conflict, frustrating effortsto implement a basinwide approach ei-ther within countries or—in the case oftransboundary basins—among countries.

The next three sections examine re-sponses to these obstacles in compara-tive perspective, organized along thenested categories of local, national, andregional challenges of watershed gover-nance. This analysis is informed by casestudies of watersheds in the region thatexemplify the challenges at these scalesas well as the variety of government andcivil society responses.14 (See Boxes 1-5.)


LOCAL LEVEL CHALLENGES

Making Government AgenciesMore Accountable to theInterests of Upland MinoritiesThe norm in policymaking is to plan for up-land minorities rather than with them. Thedifference is significant, because upland com-munities voice values and priorities distinctfrom those of government planners. TheChom Thong case signals the problem of low-land bias in policy formulation, as well as in-stitutional and cultural obstacles to the equi-table representation of ethnic minorities inresource management planning. (SeeBox 1.) The result of such biases is thatethnic minorities commonly have little in-fluence over government decisions thatdirectly affect them.15

The basic problem is that most govern-ment agencies working in the region’suplands are principally accountableupward to provincial or national authori-ties rather than downward to localcommunities. Throughout mainlandSoutheast Asia, efforts to stabilize shift-ing cultivation have historically been mo-tivated at least in part by an interest inestablishing government authority andcontrol over remote populations. In Viet-nam, the government has widely used re-settlement programs as a means both torelieve population pressure and promotenational integration. Governments oftenpromote lowland-based business inter-ests to the detriment of ethnic minori-ties in the uplands. Strengthening theaccountability of government agencies toupland minorities is important on equitygrounds, as well as to improve thechances that ecosystem-based manage-ment strategies can be designed appro-priately and implemented successfully.

How can upland minorities’roles in local planning belegitimized and the channelsimproved to communicate theirinterests?Research institutes—both within andoutside government—can play an impor-tant bridging role by documenting andreinforcing the legitimacy of indigenousknowledge in technical and institutionalaspects of upland resource management.Identifying the links between traditionalknowledge and environmentalsustainability can also help counterprejudices that prevent many govern-ment agencies from working effectivelyin the uplands.16

Other priorities for research and ex-perimentation concern how govern-ments can remove the legal and insti-tutional barriers that exclude ethnicminorities from participating in localplanning. In Thailand, citizenship forminority residents is a complex issue,because many have arrived in recentyears either seeking economic oppor-tunities or as refugees from fighting.Several hundred thousand minoritypeople in the uplands have been reg-istered as Thai citizens, while othershave been denied citizenship for years.Key questions include: To what extentdo individual rights of political partici-pation for legal residents bolster theirlegitimacy in dealings with govern-ment? Does official recognition of tra-ditional ethnic associations or net-works of upland villages, which oftenlink groups dispersed over large geo-graphic areas, improve the represen-tation of ethnic minorities in develop-ment planning?

How can capacity be built ingovernment agencies andcommunity institutions to workbetter together?For most government agencies operat-ing in the region’s uplands, facilitatinglocally driven development planning isa radical change in roles. A senior Min-istry of Agriculture official in Laos hasstated that the overriding obstacle to in-stituting community forestry is not de-signing appropriate legislation or strat-egy, but building the necessary capacityin local-level agencies.17 A variety of pro-grams in the region are pursuing thisgoal by implementing community-basedmanagement while building the re-quired capacity for needs assessmentand training into domestic institutions.The Nam Ngum case highlights theneed—and the progress made—in im-proving government’s understanding ofand responsiveness toward local institu-tions as part of the land allocation exer-cise. (See Box 2.)

Many of the most promising examples ofgovernment collaboration with local up-land communities have involved NGOsas supporters or intermediaries. In Thai-land, university researchers have alsocollaborated effectively with governmentagencies to introduce participatory land-use planning methodologies.18 This ap-proach provides a way for officials tounderstand and be more accountable toupland residents in their own terms,while also building upland residents’awareness of how their actions affectdownstream communities. Such a reori-entation in personal relations oftenproves an important addition to whateverformal mechanism is employed to orga-nize discussions and analyze alternatives.


Box 1 Chom Thong District, Thailand

Lying about 80 kilometers from Chiang Maicity in northern Thailand, Chom Thong Dis-trict is a microcosm of highland-lowlandcompetition for water resources. The con-flict, though involving a small number of vil-lages, has captured the nation’s attention; thenational press has dubbed the Chom Thongconflict the “water wars.”1

Starting in the mid 1980s, lowland farmersprotesting water shortages and pollution pe-titioned to have highland villagers removedfrom the upper watershed forest areas in theMae Soi and Mae Tia catchments in ChomThong District. In November 1989, the cabi-net agreed to relocate highland Hmong tolower areas to prevent deforestation and wa-ter pollution, but the resolution was later sus-pended.2 In April 1998, lowland villagers setup a road block on a route to Doi InthanonPark, angered by government agencies’ lackof response to their demands.3

“No one should live and farm in the upperwatershed forests,” says M.R. SmansnidSvasti, vice president of the DhammanaatFoundation for Conservation and Rural De-velopment. “Any disturbance of those for-ests, where the rivers begin, will inevitablydamage their functioning,” she says.4

Much of the debate around the Chom Thongconflict, however, has not focussed on thespecific dynamics of land use and its rela-tion to water flows, but on more fundamen-tal questions of rights and identity that di-vide lowland and highland groups.

“The issue has become whether the tribalpeople have roots in Thailand,” saysKingkorn Narintarakul Na Ayutthaya of theNorthern Development Foundation. Hergroup works with the Northern Farmers Net-work, a coalition of local watershed networks,NGOs, and academics that promotes water-

shed conservation sensitive to highlandpeople’s uses of watersheds and forests andthe need for cooperation among groupswithin the whole watershed.5

The Chom Thong experience signals boththe importance and the complexity of es-tablishing appropriate regulations govern-ing rights to occupancy and use of pro-tected forests. A draft community forestbill—the result of a decade of intense de-bate among community groups, highlanddevelopment and conservation NGOs, theRoyal Forest Department, and academ-ics—is based on the premise that commu-nities should be allowed to live in the for-est as long as they can prove themselvescapable of conserving it. The draft bill, ap-proved by the Cabinet in 1996 but not yetestablished in law, emphasizes the need todevelop mechanisms for monitoring theperformance of communities, and speci-fies that use rights can be revoked if theydo not comply.

New roles and capacities are needed thatposition local administrations to bridge theinterests of highland villagers andlowlanders, rather than aggravate the con-flict. In Chom Thong and elsewhere, his-toric biases against the highland ethnicgroups have become institutionalized in lo-cal administration. Yet, in other watershedsof northern Thailand, such as the Sam Muncatchment in Mae Taeng, the governmenthas supported networks of highland andlowland groups to cooperate for improve-ments in conservation and local welfare.6

The Chom Thong case also demonstrateshow a dispute supposedly about watershedresources can link to broader conflicts ofsocial values and national politics. Theseaspects of the conflict will never be re-solved in Chom Thong alone, and it may

be that the national level debate is a nec-essary precondition to identifying sociallyacceptable policy changes. This under-scores the importance of such groups asthe Northern Farmers Network that assisthighland residents and ethnic minoritiesto make community interests known.

1. Sanitsuda Ekachai. “Finding Solutions toWar is Not Easy,” Bangkok Post, April 30,1998.

2. Tanet Charoenmuang. “The Governance ofWater Allocation Problems in Thailand:Four Case Studies from the Upper North-ern Region,” in Water Conflicts (Bangkok:Thailand Development Research Institute,1994).

3. Subin Kuenkaew and Onnucha Hutasingh.“Villagers Block Road to Force OutHilltribes,” Bankgok Post, April 28, 1998.

4. M.R. Smansnid Svasti. 1998. Interview inForum on “Conflict or Resolution? Peopleand Forests in Northern Thailand,” Water-shed 4(1): 10-13.

5. Kingkorn Narintarakul Na Ayutthaya. 1998.Interview in Forum on “Conflict or Reso-lution? People and Forests in NorthernThailand,” Watershed 4(1): 17-18.

6. Mingsarn Kaosa-ard. “Ecosystem Manage-ment in Northern Thailand,” Center forSustainable Development Studies, Facultyof Economics, Chiang Mai University, De-cember 1999. Forthcoming REPSI work-ing paper, World Resources Institute.


Box 2 Nam Ngum Watershed, Laos

As the site of the country’s first major hy-droelectric power facility, the Nam Ngumwatershed is important to governmentofficials as a source of foreign exchangeearnings and as a model for watershedmanagement and future dam develop-ment policies.1

The watershed spans an area of 8,460square kilometers over two provinces inLaos (Vientiane and Xieng Khouang) andone special administration zone(Xaisomboon), draining into the MekongRiver. Livelihoods in the Xieng Khouangplateau, one of three “rice bowls” forLaos, are centered around wet rice culti-vation, while shifting cultivation is themain activity of most other communitiesin the watershed. The lower Nam Ngumwatershed has absorbed a large numberof war-time domestic refugees, which hasbred conflict over access to land and for-est resources.2

Although outsiders often perceive ethnicdifferences as driving the conflict, localpeople tend to describe scarcity and deg-radation of land resources as the primaryconcerns.2 Lowland farmers in the vicin-ity of the Nam Ngum Dam had to relo-cate as the reservoir filled. These farmershave often needed to rely on upland fieldsto make up for lost flat land, diminishingforest areas they had traditionally de-pended on to supplement food and fuel.Despite government efforts to eliminateshifting cultivation,3 the area of forestland affected by shifting cultivation in theNam Ngum watershed increased from 850square kilometers in 1985 to 1,500 squarekilometers in 1995.4

Along with the policy to recognize custom-ary use, the government assigns district of-ficials the authority for land allocation aspart of a broader effort to devolve resourcemanagement decisions. There remains agap of intermediate regulation that trans-lates broad policy prescriptions into for-mulas that work in the field. The challengestems from the complexity and variety oftraditional resource management systemsalready in place and the added demandswhen new arrivals come into direct com-petition with the original residents for cul-tivation rights and access to dwindling for-est land. But more importantly, capacitiesof local agencies need strengthening sothat they can be effective intermediaries,adapting to local conditions while also pro-viding feedback to policymakers who aredevising general policies based on experi-ences in such watersheds as the NamNgum.

A pilot project of the Center for ProtectedAreas and Watershed Management hasyielded important lessons on the kinds ofcapacities required to make district au-thorities effective intermediaries underthe decentralization policy. Two of the pi-lot villages in Long San District wereNamon Village, a community that resettledto the reservoir’s edge after its original vil-lage was inundated, and neighboringHouai Nhang, a Hmong village establishedin the 1980s. These villages could not agreeon a dividing boundary and resisted theofficial demarcation. The solution theyreached instead was to share forest, land,and water resources, effectively integrat-ing the newer arrivals in a common prop-erty arrangement. This unanticipated re-

sult was made possible because the projecttrained village leaders and involved themin data collection, workshops, and studytours to other areas. By carefully assessingexisting resource use patterns and support-ing local dispute resolution mechanisms,district officials served as effective facili-tators of the process.

1. Center for Protected Areas and WatershedManagement and Asian Development Bank(CPAWM/ADB). Nam Ngum WatershedManagement Project Inception Report(Vientiane, Lao PDR: 1998).

2. Kaneungnit Tubtim, Khamla Phanvilay andP. Hirsch. “Decentralisation, Watershedsand Ethnicity in Laos” in Resources, Nationsand Indigenous Peoples: Case Studies fromAustralasia, Melanesia and Southeast Asia.R. Howitt, ed. (Melbourne, Australia: Ox-ford University Press, 1996).

3. Government of Lao PDR. Socio-economicDevelopment and Investment Require-ments 1997-2000 (Vientiane, 1997).

4. Center for Protected Areas and WatershedManagement and Asian Development Bank(CPAWM/ADB). Nam Ngum WatershedManagement Fund for Sustainable EconomicGrowth and Environmental Management.Unpublished presentation (Vientiane, LaoPDR: Nam Ngum Watershed ManagementProject Lao-ADB, undated).


How can decentralization ofresource management author-ity be made effective?Representative local government, whereit exists or can be created, may providean appropriate alternative to reliance oneither traditional local institutions orcentrally administered governmentagencies to set priorities for services.Whether authority is vested in local gov-ernment, quasi-governmental commit-tees, traditional village associations,farmer organizations, or other groups,the essential factor is that those exercis-ing this authority be accountable to vil-lagers, including the very poor, women,and all ethnic groups, in as equitable amanner as possible.

Because power disparities and social di-visions at the community level can beintense, approaches are needed to ensurethat the local elite do not simply directgovernment services to their own needsand capture the benefits—an outcomepotentially worse than when priorities areset at a higher level in government.Although it is too soon to draw generalconclusions on Thailand’s experiment todevolve significant authority for localplanning and revenue management tosubdistrict (tambon) administrative orga-nizations, anecdotal evidence suggeststhat some village leaders or influentialbusiness owners have taken advantage ofthe situation to increase their own wateraccess to the detriment of poorer villagers.19

The principle of subsidiarity—locatingmanagement authority at the lowest ap-propriate level—is widely recognized asa condition for implementing the ecosys-tems management approach effec-tively.20 The difficulty is determining

what is the “appropriate” level for locat-ing various powers, including whichshould remain centralized, and what sortsof responsibilities and accountabilitiesshould be contingent on them. Becausedecentralization of resource manage-ment authority does not guaranteeimprovements in equity or sustainablemanagement, research on alternative de-centralization models and experiences isa high priority.

Establishing and ProtectingEquitable Resource Rights forLocal PeopleA related set of local-level governancechallenges focuses on rights and respon-sibilities over resource use. The Da Riverwatershed case highlights the importanceof questioning common assumptionsabout the prevalence and characteristicsof traditional management systems. (SeeBox 3.) In the Nam Ngum watershed,traditional systems exist, but they havebeen strained in recent decades and needto be adapted to handle increased com-petition. The ambiguity of upland re-source tenure noted in the Chom Thongcase creates a situation in which poweris contested and flows in favor of thosebest positioned to take advantage of theambiguity. It also highlights a long-stand-ing national dialogue concerning what isthe correct balance of rights relating toforest lands, what obligations or respon-sibilities should be attendant on these,and who should allocate them. No spe-cific tenure arrangements can be legis-lated that will prove appropriate in alllocales, but there are parallels in thequestions which need to be addressed.

How can traditional tenure rights be re-inforced where appropriate and linked

to clear responsibilities for resource pro-tection?

Where traditional tenure and land-man-agement systems of upland minoritieshave shown to be equitable, legal recog-nition is important to foster land stew-ardship and protect livelihoods. Thisrequires government officials at policybureaus and implementing agencies todistinguish where community-based ten-ure and resource management institu-tions are functioning well and to avoiddisrupting them. In other areas, suchinstitutions may be absent or ineffectivebecause of population movements,disruption by war, intense resource com-petition, or other factors that erode ca-pacities for collective action. Or they maybe strong, but sufficiently inequitable intheir distribution of rights and benefitswithin the community that they shouldnot be granted legal support. An obstacleis that researchers and officials lack sys-tematic practical means for assessing lo-cal institutions and capacities.21 Devel-oping such assessment methodologies is,therefore, a research priority.

Whether community or household-based, traditional or new, effective ten-ure arrangements tie rights for resourceaccess and exploitation to responsibili-ties for resource protection. Such provi-sions are necessary to prevent situationslike those in Lake Dianchi, where uplandcommunities may pay careful attentionto harboring the environmental serviceson which they directly depend, such assoil fertility for agricultural production,but disregard those impacts that do notaffect them directly, such as downstreampollution. Thailand’s draft communityforest bill is remarkable in this regard; it


Box 3 Da River Watershed, Vietnam

The Da River watershed is a case of spe-cial urgency in Vietnam’s dilemma of up-land development, forest management,and watershed protection. Mountain com-munities and the lowland population fardownstream have competing priorities foruse of the watershed, which spans Son Laand Lai Chau provinces, two of the poor-est in Vietnam. Although 86 percent of thewatershed is legally classified as forestland, only 10 percent is under good forestcover. In the next twenty years, populationdensity in the watershed is expected toreach 75 people per square kilometer, sixtimes the density in 1945.1 The populationtrend is already increasing pressure onpoorly productive and erosion-prone mar-ginal lands.

Downstream, the Da River, which origi-nates in China’s Yunnan Province, contrib-utes some 40 percent of flow to the RedRiver. The Red River Delta is home to over17 million people, making it one of themost densely populated rural areas in theworld. Massive flooding in 1971 left tensof thousands of people dead, and less se-vere flooding regularly inflicts major losseson rice production. Saline intrusion alsothreatens groundwater supplies as far in-land as Hanoi.2 Sedimentation from theDa River watershed is a major threat tothe Hoa Binh Dam, currently the largestdam in Southeast Asia and source of morethan a third of Vietnam’s electricity.

The government’s experience with the HoaBinh Dam shows how easy it is to under-estimate the extent of social dislocationlarge-scale interventions cause and to over-estimate the capacity of government agen-cies to deliver promised remediation. Mostof the 58,000 people displaced by the dam’sreservoir were forced to resettle in higherelevations where they depend on scarceforest resources and marginal lands andhave not received electricity, let alone ad-equate compensation. The legal frame-

work and institutions for resolving land dis-putes were inadequate, and many of thefunds provided for infrastructure, irriga-tion, and other projects to assist resettledfamilies yielded little benefit because ofpoor consultation.3

In 1998, the government announced plansto move forward with construction of a hy-droelectric power facility twice the size ofthe Hoa Binh Dam, upstream on the DaRiver in Son La Province. The official es-timate was that 103,000 people would haveto be resettled.4 Institutional mechanismsare needed to better balance local and na-tional interests in decisions on major in-frastructure projects, to incorporate localvoices, and to design remediation mea-sures when these projects do go forward.

Local conflict among Da River watershedresidents centers on access to and use offorest lands. Current government policyencourages commercialization of land useby allocating forest lands to households.According to research in some ethnic Thaicommunities in the watershed, the house-hold allocation policy is actually erodingtraditional resource management systemsfor assigning and protecting forest land,mobilizing community labor and re-sources, and mediating conflict over for-est use.5 This suggests that official land al-location and dispute resolution mecha-nisms that reinforce the authority of tra-ditional systems may be appropriate insome places.

Other research in Black Thai villages hasshown that government policy todecollectivize agricultural production ac-tually had little effect on village land ten-ure, as the shift to household productionpredated the policy reforms. A distinct eth-nic identity shared by villagers and localofficials, and the strength of village normshave muted the influence of state policy.Likewise, recent efforts at land allocation,

land-use planning, and forest protection inthese villages have had little influence.6

By contrast, the same research found thatfarmers’ responses to changes in technol-ogy and market opportunities have beenrapid, inducing agricultural intensification,large-scale terracing, and a shift fromswidden to wet-rice cultivation. Such in-fluence of market forces on land-use prac-tices in the watershed suggests that effortsto change incentives through market-based policy instruments may complementor ultimately be even more effective thandirect approaches to reorganize produc-tion through land allocation.

1. A.T. Rambo. “Perspectives on DefiningHighland Development Challenges in Viet-nam: New Frontier or Cul-de-Sac?” in TheChallenges of Highland Development in Viet-nam. A.T. Rambo, et al., eds. (Honolulu:East West Center, 1995).

2. World Bank, ADB, FAO, UNDP, NGOWater Resources Group in Cooperationwith the Institute of Water Resources Plan-ning. Vietnam Water Resources Sector Re-view (Washington, DC: World Bank, May1996).

3. G. Houghton. 1996. “Vietnam’s Hoa BinhDam: Counting the Costs.” Watershed 2(1):26-37.

4. Reuters news report. 1998. “Vietnam to re-locate 103,000 for huge dam project.” Sep-tember 21.

5. Vo Tri Chung, et al. “Community CaseStudies from Upland Vietnam,” in Stewardsof Vietnam’s Upland Forests. M.Poffenberger, ed. (Berkeley, California:Asia Forestry Network, January 1998).

6. Thomas Sikor, private communication,January 2000.

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stipulates that forest land rights dependon specific protection criteria that re-quire regular monitoring. Communityforestry is most often implemented to-day in marginal and degraded areas.22 Itwill only become common practice inpriority watersheds and higher-value for-ests if responsibilities for protection areclear and publicly acceptable.

How can governments makepartnerships with local com-munities to help strengthenforest law enforcement?Security of land and forest tenure is ulti-mately a question of protecting usersfrom competing claims on the same re-source. Although legal recognition of ten-ure rights is necessary, it is not sufficient.Protection depends practically on howrights are enforced, whether through for-mal administrative structures, traditionalinstitutions, or both. Many upland com-munities in the region face serious threatsto their livelihoods as the result of large-scale forest mismanagement beyondtheir control. The military and loggingcompanies who take control of the for-est often disregard traditional accessrights of ethnic minority communities, aparticular problem in Cambodia andBurma.23

If the laws governing forest rights areessentially unjust, or if there is collusionby the government in illegal logging, thenthere is no sense in promoting commu-nity roles in forest law enforcement. Butif an equitable tenure system is in placethat gives local communities sufficientbenefits and a high stake in good forestmanagement, and if those exercising thestate’s coercive power (such as the mili-tary or the forest department) are heldaccountable for their actions, then com-

munities can be effectively engaged aspartners in forest law enforcement. Inparticular, they can play a role in prevent-ing and detecting forest crimes, whileresponsibility for suppression is betterhandled by the state. Expanding thescope of groups involved in forest lawenforcement can multiply the capacitybrought to the task as well as improvethe fairness with which the law is ap-plied—particularly against large-scaleforest crimes.24

How can local capacities andlegal frameworks be strengthenedto manage intercommunityresource disputes?In some areas, traditional systems for al-locating resource access and managingconflicts among villages function effec-tively without outside support. But in-creased resource competition means thateven where the law recognizes traditionaltenure regimes, these must be comple-mented by mechanisms for mediation ata wider scale. The Nam Ngum case studyshows that officially recognizing custom-ary rights does not necessarily removecompetition for land among local resi-dents, particularly in areas of high mi-gration. In other cases, local communi-ties face much more powerful actors, asin the Da watershed, where communi-ties conflict with state forest enterprisesover forest access.

Because it is neither feasible nor appro-priate to address all such disputesthrough formal legal channels, there isa need for alternatives that are cultur-ally acceptable and equitable. Skilledmediators are required in communities,government, and nongovernmental or-ganizations (NGOs). Improved informa-tion on local resource conflicts and

monitoring is also essential to hold ac-tors fairly accountable for their resourceuse decisions.25

Comparative research in the region hasalso shown the need for a legal frame-work that protects parties who committo a dispute resolution process outsideof the court system. These protectivemeasures include the rights to fair accessto information, fair treatment under theprocedures of the dispute resolution pro-cess, and systems for procedural over-sight and appeals. For disputes involv-ing multiple stakeholders, additionalsupport may be required to allow all toparticipate on a reasonably equal foot-ing, including providing funds for trans-portation, assistance in assessment of thedispute, and information dissemination.26

NATIONAL LEVEL

CHALLENGES

Balancing Authority andStrengthening Incentives atthe Riverbasin ScaleMediating the interests of actors insubnational watersheds and riverbasinsholds another set of governance chal-lenges. The Dianchi Lake case (see Box4) exemplifies an area where changinginstitutional incentives have promotedrapid commercial growth, but where theresource conservation incentives areweak by comparison. Part of the dilemmaconcerns horizontal accountability—finding ways to assure that those bearingthe costs of pollution and sedimentationhave recourse across administrativeboundaries. The Dianchi Lake case raisesother issues as well: how to achieve co-ordination at the watershed scale, thetypes of powers appropriate to bodies

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Box 4 Dianchi Lake Watershed, Yunnan, China

Dianchi Lake is one of two main sourcesof water for the city of Kunming, the capi-tal of China’s Yunnan province. Becausethe needs of the Kunming municipal areaare the main force driving policymaking,concern for both the quality and quantityof available water top the list of prioritiesin the Dianchi catchment, an area of 2,920square kilometers. City officials are hardpressed to provide adequate infrastruc-ture and services for the growing popula-tion of 1.8 million registered residents andadditional unofficial migrants.1 Water de-mand in the catchment is expected toreach 1,000 million cubic meters per yearby 2020; current supply varies from 242-900 million cubic meters per year.1 The gapmust be met by either significantly aug-menting supply or improving efficiency inwater use and allocation if Kunming is tokeep up with its growth trajectory.

Nevertheless, intensifying agriculturalproduction and rural industry continueto stake their claims on water resourcesupstream from Kunming. Agriculture isthe largest water user in the catchment,accounting for 60 percent of overall de-mand; runoff from agricultural pesticidesand fertilizers also contributes substan-tially to poor water quality in DianchiLake.1 In recent years, township and vil-lage enterprises (TVEs) have introduceda new phase of rural industrialization inYunnan that is far outpacing economicperformance of the larger and less flex-ible state enterprises. In general,Yunnan’s estimated 850,000 TVEs remainoutside of the larger planning processes,are poorly regulated, and contributeheavily to land degradation and pollution.

One of the government’s challenges is toadapt monitoring and enforcementmechanisms to the dynamic TVEs, so thatsmall enterprises can be made accountablefor their environmental impacts. Under thecurrent system, a provincial-level environ-mental planning office is accountable to the

provincial government, and only indirectlyto the national environmental protectionagency, curtailing its independent author-ity. Townships, moreover, are responsible forgenerating their own operating funds ratherthan relying on budget allocations fromabove. These factors have encouragedentrepreneurialism among township offi-cials, with the TVEs effectively under theirmanagement. The governing climate thathas made the TVEs so successful in eco-nomic terms also makes them difficult toregulate.2 Separating government’s role inregulating, supervising, and coordinatingthe economy from its responsibility for thedirect management of enterprises is a ma-jor feature of the administrative reform pro-gram announced by Premier Zhu Rongji inMarch 1998.3

Managing the watershed as an integratedsystem also requires cooperation acrossterritorial boundaries; however, the incen-tives to counties and townships reward lo-cal economic growth and provide few chan-nels for downstream territorial units tonegotiate pollution controls with theirneighbors. There are, nevertheless, prom-ising examples emerging in Yunnan oftowns that have reached agreements withsurrounding villages to compensate forland-use and forest-management measuresthat protect water flows in smallcatchments.4 Such local innovations meritcloser study to determine what conditionsmake agreement possible, how they arefunctioning, and whether similar arrange-ments would be viable at larger scales.

A related need is improved mechanismsfor water allocation within the lake catch-ment. Even if the authorities take the hugestep of making a proposed interbasin wa-ter transfer to meet the city’s needs, this isnot replicable as a general model for deal-ing with water scarcity. The crucial test iswhether agriculture and industry can findways to increase water use efficiency with-out sacrificing production.

In adopting the 1998 Water Law, Chinaelaborated a comprehensive policy frame-work that distinguishes regulatory andallocative functions of the state from userights and payment and maintenance re-sponsibilities of the users. The governmenthas begun issuing water drawing permits,but still lacks the institutional mechanismsto fully administer the system. When ithappens, China will be the first country inthe region to implement a fully legalizedsystem of water allocation.5 The effort de-serves close attention to determine how itwill affect overall efficiency as well as eq-uity among water users.

1. Montgomery Watson, in association withGHK International, Hunting Technical Ser-vices, Severn Trent Water International andEFTEC, Yunnan Environmental ProjectSummary Report. 1998.

2. K. Lieberthal. “China’s Governing Systemand its Impact on Environmental PolicyImplementation,” in China EnvironmentSeries (Washington, DC: Woodrow WilsonCenter), undated.

3. Changhua Wu, private communication,January 1999.

4. James Harkness, private communication,March 1998.

5. R.M. Saleth and A. Dinar. “Water Chal-lenge and Institutional Response: A Cross-Country Perspective” (Washington, DC:World Bank, Rural Development Depart-ment, unpublished draft report, April1998).


charged with this task, and the challengeof building incentive mechanisms to con-trol water allocation and water quality.In Chom Thong District, the legal frame-work to manage water allocation is lessdeveloped but the conflict relating high-land communities to water users down-stream is pronounced and raises the pros-pect of similar conflicts at broader scales.

What array of powers andcapacities are appropriate forriverbasin bodies to mediateamong competing stakeholderclaims and coordinate sectoralagencies?Motivated largely by the need to man-age better against floods, drought, andcompetition among water use sectors,China and Vietnam have recently intro-duced new water laws that call for wa-tershed management bodies to coordi-nate across existing administrative units.If they are to be effective, riverbasinbodies should have the explicit mandateto pursue equity in meeting the inter-ests of upstream residents and down-stream water users, and the authority toinduce a shift in the flow of benefits. Acoherent basinwide approach would linkefforts to manage water demand down-stream with investments in soil and wa-ter conservation and local livelihoodsupstream. Doing so requires thatriverbasin bodies coordinate not only thetechnical agencies with such responsi-bilities as water supply and forest man-agement, but also those with oversightfor industry and social services.

Establishing a watershed body does notensure coordination of relevant actors,as the Dianchi Lake case demonstrates.Existing sectoral agencies and local gov-ernments are typically protective of their

powers. This implies a need for strongsupport from central government to es-tablish the authority of watershed bod-ies. However, riverbasin bodies oftenconsolidate power and become bureau-cratic and unresponsive to local stake-holders.27 Therefore, these bodies mustalso have adequate capacities forintersectoral planning—commonly lack-ing at subnational levels—and should beprepared to mediate among competingstakeholders and involve nongovernmen-tal actors in decisionmaking. Withoutthese ingredients, they risk becoming ir-relevant to the most important decisionsthat affect watershed resources.

How can economic instrumentsboost the incentive to localgovernments and enterprisesfor basinwide ecosystem man-agement?By employing economic policy instru-ments, including subsidies, taxes, andpublic investment to promote economicmanagement goals, governments canwield a more systemic influence than ispossible through policing resource usealone. Modifying the rules by which lo-cal governments obtain and allocate rev-enue exemplifies this approach. Fiscalmeasures have so far proven effective inspurring local economic growth and ru-ral industrialization, but are not welltested in encouraging environmental pro-tection in the region. (See Box 4 . DianchiLake case.) One possibility for bolster-ing the stewardship incentive is to intro-duce standards for environmental perfor-mance by local governments, with goodperformers receiving rewards of addi-tional revenue, or reductions in requiredtransfers to central government. Particu-larly if neighboring jurisdictions have a

role in monitoring performance, such anapproach could strengthen horizontal ac-countability.

Accountability is most easily establishedwhen those providing the services of re-source protection are in direct contactwith those receiving the benefits andpaying the subsidy. This appears to bethe case with lowland-to-upland subsi-dies that local authorities in smallcatchments of Yunnan devised andimplemented on an experimental basis.28

For large scales areas where such ac-countability mechanisms are absent,adaptive research and extension com-bined with credit and marketing oppor-tunities may be more direct mechanismsto influence farmer behavior. Therefore,a priority item for research is to assesswhere economic policy instruments canbe usefully applied and the conditions fortheir effectiveness.

How can institutions for allo-cating and enforcing waterrights be developed that pro-vide equitable access and linkdownstream demand manage-ment to investment in upstreamprotection?Governments in the region—especiallyThailand, China, and Vietnam—have in-vested heavily in water supply and irriga-tion infrastructure with undeniable ben-efits to the welfare and productivity offarmers who receive this service. But thepublic subsidies for water supply also cre-ate huge inefficiencies in its use. Whencompeting with large-scale agriculture,urban, and industrial users for scarce wa-ter supplies, small farmers often lose out.29

Many resource economists advocate full-cost water pricing as a market-based so-


lution. The goal is to incorporate the fullcosts of delivering water as well as thecosts of protecting upstream supply intothe prices paid by users. In addition toencouraging water conservation withinagriculture, industry, and domestic sys-tems, water pricing can produce a real-location among these alternative uses.However, such a market-based realloca-tion would not necessarily reflect na-tional poverty reduction or food securityobjectives.

First, an essential precondition for imple-menting market mechanisms for water al-location is a legal and regulatory frame-work for assigning and enforcing waterrights. Nowhere in the region is such a sys-tem in place, although the Chinese gov-ernment has demonstrated the strongestcommitment and made the most progressin creating the necessary institutions. (SeeBox 4. Dianchi Lake case.) In the absenceof these institutions, the early introduc-tion of market mechanisms for water allo-cation may have negative results.29

Second, allocation systems must ensurethat basic human needs for safe domesticwater and irrigation for food productionare met so that the poorest users are notdenied water because they cannot pay forit. Addressing the equity aspect is ulti-mately necessary to ensure the politicalfeasibility of instituting or increasing wa-ter charges. This may require continuingto subsidize some portion of supply or in-troducing a price structure that requireslarger production units (in agriculture aswell as industry), and wealthier householdsto shoulder the main burden.

Third, revenue from water distributionshould be used as a mechanism to redi-

rect benefits to the uplands and, as ap-propriate, compensate upland residentsfor resource conservation and foregoneuses of water. Linking upland interestsin long-term use of forest resources withlowland interests in conserving waterflows is, therefore, an important meansto generate the necessary support.30 Ex-perimentation is required to identifywhich mechanisms are effective inachieving this link.

Broadening StakeholderRepresentation in PolicyReformA related set of governance challengesat the national level concerns the pro-cess of policy formulation. The Da Riverwatershed case highlights the need toinclude public deliberation when consid-ering major infrastructure investments,which are effectively national policy de-cisions even if their direct effects are lo-calized. Involving key stakeholders inassessing the desirability and feasibilityof alternative approaches increases thechance that policies will be politically fea-sible to implement, achieve the desiredgoals, and avert future social conflict.

How can information on up-land resources and ecosystemservices of watersheds, includ-ing competing uses and thepotential impacts of planneddevelopments, be improvedand made more accessible?Information alone does not produce bet-ter decisions, but lack of information of-ten aggravates conflicts or perpetuateserroneous assumptions in policy. Someof the most important gaps in informa-tion relate to the links between land useand watershed hydrology, as well as thevalues that watershed ecosystem services

provide to different stakeholders and thetypes of developments that are likely tomake a difference. Were this informationavailable and shared among the partiesin competition, for example in the wa-tershed of Lake Dianchi, they would beable to more accurately identify their in-terests and actions that might relieve thesituation at lower cost.

Far too often, government agencies arein the business of monopolizing informa-tion rather than making it accessible. Notonly is the public denied access, but otheragencies are left to barter for and buythe data they need or duplicate efforts.In Vietnam, although there are numer-ous agencies that acquire and analyzesatellite imagery of land cover, no com-mon standards exist to make their infor-mation compatible. In general, centralgovernments need to develop standardsfor data collection and analysis, consoli-date and strengthen efforts at monitor-ing, and commit to regular reporting ofenvironmental change.31 They also needto provide the public with full informa-tion on planned developments—by gov-ernment as well as private investors—sothat stakeholders have a chance to par-ticipate in their review before plans gointo effect. And they need to make surethe information is in a form that non-spe-cialists can understand.32

How can independent analysisof domestic policy alternativesbe strengthened?In determining general policy directions,the ruling parties in China, Laos, andVietnam maintain closed deliberations.Increasingly, each of these governmentsis turning to outside technical assistancein the design of specific measures and


implementing regulations. China andVietnam each have well established tech-nical and research institutes either withinor associated with various agencies,which provide information used in policydesign. But channels for domestic inputof a more independent nature in thesethree countries are still limited and usu-ally informal.

Independent analysis of policy alterna-tives can come from many sources. InThailand, several influential independentinstitutes with this focus are now wellestablished. University researchers havealso been important critics and advocatesof policy reform.

An independent analysis does not ex-clude government participation, but itshould be undertaken freely and with-out preconceived conclusions. Fosteringsuch analysis depends in part on effortsto strengthen research institutions’ ca-pacity. It also depends on the opennessof government policy agencies to makeuse of such analysis from multiplesources. Particularly promising is a col-laborative research approach, in whichindependent researchers and interestedgovernment officials work together tobring policy-relevant information andanalysis to bear on governmentdecisionmaking.

How can legal rights for do-mestic nongovernmental actorsand channels for their partici-pation in policy reform beensured?By constraining the range of voices thatcan legitimately contribute to policy re-form debates, governments narrow theiroptions or select policies that cannot beimplemented because the interests of

important stakeholders have been dis-regarded. Involving nongovernmental orcivil society organizations in the policyreform process has multiple benefits.These organizations can communicatethe findings of independent analyses tostakeholder groups and make sure theirinterests are represented in decision-making. Organizations that work at thegrassroots can help link marginalizedcommunities and policy officials. Theycan also provide essential support forimplementing policies and institutionalreforms.33

As the Chom Thong case demonstrates,popular mobilization by groups such asthe Northern Farmers Network by nomeans assures that all groups will be rep-resented equally. But in the absence ofNGO mobilization, politicallymarginalized upland minorities wouldhave considerably less influence. In Thai-land and Cambodia, domestic NGOshave independent status. A new law inVietnam has recognized nongovernmen-tal entities (“foundations”) for the firsttime.34 Vietnam and China each have agrowing number of quasi-NGOs, oftenassociated with universities, governmentresearch institutes, or professionalassociations, and the trend is towardgradually relaxing restrictions on theiroperations. In Laos, the prospects for adomestic NGO sector have dimmed withthe recently reported government sup-pression of groups critical of its policy.35

REGIONAL LEVEL

CHALLENGES

At the regional level, a parallel set of is-sues are important. Who is representedin decisionmaking over the management

and use of transboundary rivers? Howdoes this correlate with who is likely tobe affected by large-scale investmentson the horizon? Do regional institutionshave adequate accountability downwardto the primary stakeholders? Do nationalgovernments represent them ad-equately? Do major investment deci-sions (such as dams, water diversions,and industrial developments) requirereview by downstream parties? Are thedecisionmaking processes equitable?Such questions are highlighted in theMekong River Basin case (see Box 5), butare equally relevant to other major in-ternational rivers, such as the Salween,Red, and Irrawaddy.

How can intergovernmentalcooperation in the managementof major transboundary riverbasins be improved?The most obvious need is for strong re-gional institutions to create legally en-forceable international agreements andprovide mechanisms for dispute resolu-tion. The Mekong River Commission hasthis mandate, but so far lacks the capac-ity to fulfill it. (See Box 5.) BecauseChina, the upstream and most powerfulnation, is not a formal member, theCommission’s representation is incom-plete and its authority curtailed—short-comings common to many internationalriverbasin accords around the world.36

To create international bodies with ad-equate authority and full representationof countries sharing the basin, govern-ments must be convinced of the likeli-hood for mutual gain. Experience inother regions has shown that the possi-bility of mutual gain need not stem di-rectly from the terms of an agreement.


Box 5 The Mekong River Basin

Spanning six countries and home to some65 million people, the Mekong River Ba-sin harbors water resources vital to thewelfare and development prospects ofmainland Southeast Asia. Although theriver is relatively undeveloped for its size,current and proposed projects to harnessits flow are a source of dispute and a chal-lenge to international cooperation in theregion.

Located at the top of the river system,China is building a cascade of hydroelec-tric power dams on the upper Mekong(Lancang River) in Yunnan Province. Laoshas several new dams proposed on tribu-taries to the Mekong. Such projects re-quire that water be impounded and re-leased steadily, yet downstream ecosystemsdepend on the seasonal floods that main-tain agriculture and fisheries. Cambodianofficials are very concerned at how changesin peak flow could threaten aquaticbiodiversity in the Tonle Sap (Great Lake),a remarkably productive fishery central tothe country’s food security.1

A proposed diversion of water from theMekong mainstream to Thailand’s ChaoPhraya River system is especially conten-tious from Vietnam’s perspective. Protect-ing the Mekong Delta from dry season wa-ter shortages and sea water intrusion hasnational importance, because the delta ac-counts for almost half of Vietnam’s riceand fish production and a significant por-tion of its foreign exchange earnings.2 TheChao Phraya is the main source of waterfor Thailand’s urban, industrial, and agri-cultural heartland, an area that also suf-fers regular dry season water shortages.

Because the Chao Phraya Basin has lessthan one fifth the water availability perperson of the Mekong Basin, 3 calls for aninterbasin diversion are likely to recur.

The Mekong River Commission (MRC) isthe one regional institution with an explicitmandate to reach agreement and mediatedisputes over international allocation ofthe river’s water. But it is handicapped byincomplete representation, since neitherChina nor Burma are members. It has alsosuffered from an insular bureaucracy, vul-nerability to political interference by mem-ber governments, a bias toward large-scaleengineering schemes, and weak environ-mental assessment,4 all of which make itdifficult for the MRC to build credibilityas an effective mediator and provider ofindependent analysis of development al-ternatives.

Other regional institutions that could con-ceivably be used as fora to handletransboundary water allocation andbasinwide cooperation have also priori-tized economic development over environ-mental sustainability.The Greater MekongSubregion program is unique because allsix countries of the Mekong, includingChina, are members. But the program’sfocus on regionwide transportation infra-structure schemes reflects the historic biastoward economic growth of its coordina-tor, the Asian Development Bank. The As-sociation of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), which counts Vietnam, Laos,Burma, and Cambodia among its newestmembers, puts macroeconomic policy andpolitical stability at the top of its agenda,although it has also convened regional

working groups on such issues as water-shed management.

Whatever institutional forum they select,the countries of the Mekong need to findways to better account for the interests ofthose whose livelihoods depend on thewatershed resources. The benefits of ma-jor infrastructure development in the ba-sin—which generally accrue to nationalurban centers—must be weighed againstthe potential negative impacts on the farm-ers and fishermen who make up the ma-jority of the basin population.

1. M. van den Wansem. “Mekong River Ba-sin Research Survey.” Unpublished paper(prepared for Oxfam-America, 1998).

2. The World Bank, ADB, FAO, UNDP, NGOWater Resources Group in Cooperationwith the Institute of Water Resources Plan-ning. Vietnam Water Resources Sector Re-view (Washington, DC: The World Bank,May 1996).

3. C. Revenga, J. Brunner, N. Henninger, K.Kassem, and R. Payne. Pilot Analysis of Glo-bal Ecosystems: Freshwater Systems (Wash-ington, DC: World Resources Institute,2000).

4. Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI).Support to the Mekong River Commission:Background Report, prepared for UNDP inassociation with International Environmen-tal Management Co. Ltd. (Stockholm:1997).


Instead, it must be considered in thebroader context of international rela-tionships, including the political andeconomic benefits that improved coop-eration can generate.37 China has a sig-nificant stake in regional economic co-operation through improving rail androad transportation links to ports in Viet-nam, Burma, and Thailand that wouldprovide an outlet for goods produced inChina’s southwest. Tying such economicinterests to riverbasin cooperation maybe the most effective lever of influencefor downstream governments. Thirdparty mediation and access to fundingalso increase the incentives for coopera-tion—an area where multilateral insti-tutions have proven especially suited tocontribute.37

Networks of citizen groups and NGOsfrom inside and outside the region canbuild pressure for agreement and helpensure compliance through independentmonitoring. Given the slow pace ofprogress in the past and the reluctance ofgovernments in the region to raise theseissues, there is no reason to assume thatagreement will be reached before inter-national tensions rise or before the coststo local livelihoods become dramatic. En-suring representation of local stakehold-ers in transboundary resource manage-ment decisions is important enough thatit should not be left to official diplomacyby national governments alone.

Finally, localized transboundary man-agement efforts in small watersheds orparallel protected areas may provideexamples of cooperation and build con-fidence in tackling more contentious is-sues. For example, provincial govern-ments in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia

are undertaking complementary effortsat improving park management in bor-der areas, with support from the WorldWide Fund for Nature.38 Similar pro-tected area management efforts involvecooperation between local officials alongthe Chinese border with Vietnam andLaos.39 Such experiments need to besupported and used to draw lessons onhow to make the case for cooperationand how to build the necessary institu-tional relationships.

How can permanent channels fordirect engagement by subnationalstakeholders in regional basindevelopment be created?What mechanisms can sustain civil soci-ety roles in promoting dialogue and co-operation as complements to official mul-tilateral and bilateral channels? First,regional institutions should make com-mitments to full transparency in theirown decisionmaking and to publicly dis-seminating information on planned de-velopments and their potential impacts.

In addition to information access, it isnecessary to build channels so thatsubnational stakeholders—includinglower levels of government, local popu-lations of resource users, and specificinterest groups—can meaningfully influ-ence basin development planning.NGOs and civic groups can organize andadvocate to make their interests known,particularly to represent the interests ofpoor communities and forest residents,farmers and fishing folk who might oth-erwise be ignored. But regionalriverbasin bodies should also be requiredto ensure representation of competinginterests in establishing general plans,reviewing specific projects, and negoti-ating agreements.

What mechanisms can helphold governments, corpora-tions, and finance agenciesaccountable for crossborderimpacts?Many threats to environmental securityin the region stem from weak account-ability for resource exploitation or devel-opment impacts across national borders.National borders create special opportu-nities for abuse of power and resourcemismanagement. In the forestry sector,lack of effective cross-border coordina-tion and monitoring has provided oppor-tunities for private business, the military,and local governments to skirt nationallogging regulations. Hardwood lawn fur-niture manufactured in Vietnam is mar-keted in Europe as “eco-friendly,” eventhough it relies on logs illegally cut andtransported from Cambodian forests,according to Global Witness, a London-based monitoring group.40

Actions that might be prevented if theyoccurred under one nation’s jurisdictiongo unchecked when those affected andthose responsible are in different coun-tries. If it were clear that business, gov-ernments, and financing agencies wouldbe held accountable to affected groupsacross national borders, then theirdecisionmaking would change markedly.Even in the absence of proof that a givenplan would harm local livelihoods, thesepowerful actors would exercise muchgreater precaution.

Short of binding legal agreements, whatapproaches have worked to strengthenthe accountability of governments, fi-nance agencies, and corporations forcross-border impacts of upland resourceuse? How can these be expanded in theregion?


The Aarhus Convention, recently signedby many countries of Europe and theformer Soviet Union, breaks new groundin international policy by establishing justsuch a mechanism for cross-border ac-countability. In addition to requirementsfor making information publicly availableand allowing public participation in en-vironmental decisionmaking, it gives af-fected groups the right to access justiceeven if the development activities aretaking place in another country and evenif the responsible parties are from a thirdcountry.41

Even in the absence of official agree-ment, citizen groups could develop con-sensus around principles similar to thosein the Aarhus Convention and promotethem as a non-binding code of conduct.This would provide a standard to whichgovernments, corporations, and financeagencies could be held publicly account-able—if not through law, then by thepower of public attention, advocacy, andthe international media.

CONCLUSION

The pressures leading to resource com-petition in the uplands of mainlandSoutheast Asia and the actions neededto better manage this competition in-clude local, national, and regional do-mains. The three levels are presented inthis review side by side to emphasize thecomplementarity of efforts to improvegovernance at each level and the need toconsider all three.

Progress in responding to these chal-lenges depends on the willingness of gov-ernments to experiment with institu-tional innovations and their capacity toevaluate these experiments. It depends

on the ability of upland communities,NGOs, and other civil society actors todefend local livelihoods while consider-ing the needs of communities through-out the watershed. And it depends on theefforts of research institutions to improvethe underlying information that informspolicy decisions, compare experienceacross the region, assess alternative policyoptions, and address obstacles to imple-mentation. The search for ways to meetthe challenges of watershed governanceshould be a learning process that involveseach of these groups as both advocatesand analysts of change.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Colleagues who reviewed earlier draftsof the report with a critical eye and pro-vided comments include: Theresa Brad-ley, Jake Brunner, Mikkel Funder, NelsJohnson, Mingsarn Kaosa-ard, PhilipHirsch, Neil Jamieson, Anthony Janetos,Le Trong Cuc, Le Quy An, MartaMiranda, Tongroj Onchan, A. TerryRambo, Jesse Ribot, Jeff Romm, OscarSalemink, Frances Seymour, ThomasSikor, Uraivan Tan-Kim-Yong, DavidThomas, Magnus Torrell, Changhua Wu,and Xu Jianchu. Nathan Badenoch con-ducted significant background research.Others who helped bring the report fromconcept to print include: Hyacinth Bill-ings, Sandy Buffett, Kathy Doucette,Mairi Dupar, Carollyne Hutter, WattanaJaturasitha, Siobhan Murray, DanielNielsen, and Alicia Robbins. WRI greatlyappreciates the institutional partnershipwith the International Centre for Re-search in Agroforestry that has been es-sential to undertaking the ResourcesPolicy Support Initiative (REPSI), as wellas the generous financial support pro-

vided to the project by the Swedish In-ternational Development CooperationAgency, the Danish Ministry of ForeignAffairs, the Netherlands Ministry of For-eign Affairs, the United States Agency forInternational Development, and theFord Foundation.

NOTES

1. Mainland Southeast Asia is defined asthe region that spans Burma to Viet-nam, including Thailand, Cambodia,Laos, and the neighboring YunnanProvince of China. The same regionalgrouping is referred to by the AsianDevelopment Bank as the GreaterMekong Subregion (GMS).

2. FAO. 1999. State of the World’s For-ests. Online at: http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/forestry/publclst.htm

3. Road networks in Thailand and Yunnanare in the best condition and are themost extensive in the region. In Laosand Vietnam, road transport is improv-ing gradually and is a priority for over-seas development assistance, as it hadbeen in Cambodia before the recentpullback of international aid. Yet themost significant improvements in re-gional road links, which are a center-piece of the Asian Development Bank’sGreater Mekong Subregion program,have yet to be realized.

4. For a conceptual overview of the im-pacts of road development, see K.Talbott. Roads, People and Natural Re-sources: Toward A Regional PolicyFramework for Transport Infrastruc-ture in Montane Mainland SoutheastAsia. Paper presented at the sympo-sium on Montane Mainland SoutheastAsia in Transition, Chiang Mai Univer-sity, Chiang Mai, Thailand, November12-16, 1995.

5. D. Donovan. Policy Issues of theTransboundary Trade in Forest Prod-ucts in Northern Vietnam, Laos andYunnan, China. Report of workshopheld in Hanoi, September 1997. Un-published report available from WRI.


6. Tanet Charoenmuang. “The Gover-nance of Water Allocation Problems inThailand: Four Case Studies from theUpper Northern Region,” in WaterConflicts (Bangkok: Thailand Develop-ment Research Institute, 1994).

7. N. Jamieson, A.T. Rambo, and LeTrong Cuc. The Development Crisis inVietnam’s Mountains (Honolulu, Ha-waii: East-West Center Special Report,November 1998). Dao The Tuan. TheCrisis in Agriculture in the NorthernUplands. Paper presented at the Asso-ciation for Asian Studies Conference,Washington, DC, March, 1998.

8. United Nations Development Pro-gramme. Human Development Report(New York: Oxford University Pressand UNDP, 1999). Online at:http://www.undp.org/hdro

9. World Resources Report 1998-99(Washington, DC: World Resources In-stitute, 1998). Based on United NationsPopulation Division estimates.

10. Each government also has other moti-vations for policy intervention in theuplands, including such factors as na-tional integration, political stability,and combatting the cultivation andmarketing of illegal drugs, which arenot addressed directly in this paper.

11. E. Morrison, et al. Regional Study ofShifting Cultivation: Thailand, LaoPDR and Vietnam (London: Interna-tional Institute for Environment andDevelopment, 1995).

12. See forthcoming issue of Agriculture,Ecosystems and Environment. Find-ings from the Methodology Workshopon Environmental Services and LandUse Change: Bridging the Gap Be-tween Policy and Research in South-east Asia, convened by InternationalCentre for Research in Agroforestry(ICRAF), Chiang Mai, Thailand, May30–June 2 1999.

13. ICRAF coordinates research aimed atseparating science from myth in thisrealm. See ICRAF, Southeast Asia Re-gional Research Programme. Policy Re-search for Sustainable Upland Systems

in Southeast Asia. (Jakarta: October1998).

14. An expanded version of this paper, in-cluding additional discussion of gover-nance challenges and more detailedcase studies, is available online at: http://www.wri.org/repsi/rpswps.html

15. See for example, Anan Ganjanapan.“The Politics of Environment in North-ern Thailand: Ethnicity and HighlandDevelopment Programs,” in SeeingForests for Trees: Environment and De-velopment in Thailand. P. Hirsch, ed.(Chiang Mai, Thailand: SilkwormBooks, 1997). East West Center andCenter for Natural Resources and En-vironmental Studies. DevelopmentTrends in Vietnam’s Northern Moun-tain Region (Hanoi: National PoliticalPublishing House, 1997).

16. Hoang Xuan Ty. Indigenous Knowledgeand Mountain Rural Development inVietnam. Paper presented at Develop-ment Trends in Vietnam’s NorthernUplands Seminar, Washington, DC,March 26-29, 1998. The Research Cen-ter for Forest Ecology and Environ-ment (RCFEE), The Center for Natu-ral Resources and Environmental Stud-ies (CRES), of the Vietnam NationalUniversity, both based in Hanoi, andthe Center for Biodiversity and Indig-enous Knowledge (CBIK) in Kunmingareprominent examples of localresearch institutes active in promotingunderstanding of indigenous resourcemanagement systems.

17. Phouang Parisak Pravaongviengkham.Decentralization and Devolution ofForest Management in Lao PDR: A Na-tional Commitment to Viable PovertyAlleviation and Sustainable ResourceConservation. Paper presented at theRegional Symposium on StrengtheningCooperation for Forest Law Enforce-ment in the Mekong Basin Countries,Phnom Penh, June 14-16, 1999.

18. Uraivan Tan-Kim-Yong. “ParticipatoryLand Use Planning in Social Forestry,”in Local Organizations in CommunityForestry Extension in Asia. C. Veer andJ. Chamberlain, eds. (Bankgok: Foodand Agriculture Organization of theUnited Nations, 1992).

19. Mingsarn Kaosa-ard, private commu-nication, January 2000.

20. Most recently, this principle was as-serted as one of the key recommenda-tions from the Norway/UN Conferenceon the Ecosystem Approach for Sus-tainable Use of Biological Diversity,Trondheim, Norway, September 6-10,1999. BIODIV-CONV listserv fromBIONET Information Services, Sep-tember 23 1999.

21. A.T. Rambo and Le Trong Cuc. Pre-sentation at Regional Planning Meet-ing of the Resources Policy SupportInitiative, Hanoi, August 1999. M.Poffenberger, et al., eds. Linking Gov-ernment with Community ResourceManagement: What’s Working andWhat’s Not (Berkeley: Asia Forest Net-work, May 1997).

22. C. Veer, M. Victor and R.J. Fisher.“Overview and Introduction,” in Com-munity Forestry at a Crossroads: Re-flections and Future Directions in theDevelopment of Community Forestry.M. Victor, C. Lang and J. Bornemeier,eds. (Bangkok: Regional CommunityForestry Training Center(RECOFTC), 1997): vi-xiii.

23. S. Colm. 1997. “Land Rights: TheChallenge for Ratanakiri’s IndigenousCommunities,” Watershed 3(1).J. Brunner, K. Talbott, and C. Elkin.Resources and the Regime: LoggingBurma’s Frontier Forests (Washington,DC: World Resources Institute, 1998).

24. J. Brunner et al. Forest Problems andLaw Enforcement in Southeast Asia:The Role of Local Communities. Paperpresented at the Mekong Basin Sym-posium on Forest Law Enforcement,Phnom Penh, June 14-16, 1999.

25. For example, a research program inThailand’s Mae Chaem watershed co-ordinated by the International Centrefor Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF)is working to improve methodologiesto involve villagers directly in data col-lection and analysis that provides acommon reference in negotiations withgovernment agencies.


26. S.R. Tyler. “Policy Implications ofNatural Resource Conflict Manage-ment,” in Cultivating Peace. D. Buck-les, ed. (Ottawa/Washington, D.C.:IDRC Books/World Bank, 1999).

27. L. Milich and R.G. Varady. 1998.“Managing Transboundary Resources:Lessons from River-Basin Accords.”Environment 40.

28. J. Harkness, private communication,March 1998.

29. C.J. Perry, M. Rock and D. Seckler.Water as an Economic Good: A Solu-tion or a Problem? (Colombo, SriLanka: International Irrigation Man-agement Institute, 1997.)

30. Ford Foundation. Forestry for Sustain-able Rural Development: A Review ofFord Foundation-Supported Commu-nity Forestry Programs in Asia (NewYork: 1998).

31. A. Janetos and J. Brunner. RemoteSensing Policies and Practicalities: Les-sons from the Past, Opportunities forthe Future. Paper presented to theGTZ Regional Conference on GIS/GPS/RS Techniques in Practical For-est Management, October 18-20, 1999,Hanoi (Washington, DC: World Re-

sources Institute).

32. K. Miller, et al. Opportunities andChallenges for Managing Biological Re-sources Through Decentralization Poli-cies. Discussion Paper, mimeo, 1996.

33. This principle was recognized by gov-ernments around the world in Agenda21, the major statement of prioritiesemanating from the 1992 World Con-ference on Environment and Develop-ment

34. Tran Duc Vien, private communicationto Mairi Dupar, February 2000.

35. The Nation. “Anti-government StudentProtesters Detained in Vientiane” (No-vember 3, 1999). Reuters News Servicereport. “Laos Denies Anti-governmentProtest Report” (November 3, 1999).

36. L. Milich and R.G. Varady. 1998.“Managing Transboundary Resources:Lessons from River-Basin Accords.”Environment 40.

37. S. Barrett. “Conflict and Cooperationin Managing International Water Re-sources.” Policy Research Working Pa-per 1303 (Washington, DC: The WorldBank, 1994).

38. T.C. Dillon and E.D. Wikramanayake.A Forum for Transboundary Conser-vation in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam(Hanoi: World Wide Fund for Nature,December 1997).

39. Xu Jianchu, private communication,March 1999.

40. Global Witness. Made in Vietnam—Cut in Cambodia: How the GardenFurniture Trade is DestroyingRainforests. Briefing Document (Lon-don: Global Witness, April 1999).

41. E. Petkova, P. Veit. EnvironmentalAccountability Beyond the NationState: Implications of the Aarhus Con-vention. Environmental GovernanceNote (Washington, DC: WorldResources Institute, 2000).


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