Watkins_-_The_Principle_of_Methodological_Individualism.pdf

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The Principle of Methodological Individualism

Author(s): J. W. N. Watkins

Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3, No. 10, (Aug., 1952), pp.

186-189

Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of

Science

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/685556

Accessed: 16/05/2008 08:23

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2/5


3/5

METHODOLOGICAL

INDIVIDUALISM

I

no

longer

believe that

methodological

ndividualism

s

entailed

either

by

the truism hat

social

objects

recreated

y personal

ttitudes

or

by

the

invisibility

of social tructures

(though

believe hat hese

two

considerations

upport ethodologicalndividualism).

And

I

now

believe

that under

extremely

unlikely

circumstances

would

hold

methodological

ndividualismn

abeyance,demoting

t

from

a

rule

to an

aspiration.

The

investigator

f

a

system

of

interacting

omponents

would

have

abandoned

methodological

ndividualism

f he did not believe

that

the

system s

verall

behaviour ould be deduced rom

(a)

principles

governing he behaviour f its components, nd (b)descriptionsf

their

ituations;

r,

to

put

t

positively,

f

he

believed hat

he

behaviour

of its

components

ould

be deduced rom

(a)

macroscopic

awswhich

aresui

generis

nd

which

apply

o the

system

as an

organic

whole,

and

(b)

descriptions

f the

positions (or

functions)

of

the

components

within

the

whole. This

belief

constitutes

methodological

olism.

(I)

It

is

now clear o me that he

mere

act

hat

prices,

or

example,

are

charged

nd

paid by people,

that

they

are

human

creations,

oes

not,by itself,

entail hatthe

whole

price-systemmay

not be

governed

by

an

overall

law which

is

underivable

rom

propositions

bout

individual

ehaviour.

(2)

It

is

alsoclear

o

me

thatthe

invisibility

argument

does not

entail

methodological

ndividualism.

For a

holist who

denied hat the

English

State,

or

example,

s a

logical

constructionut

of

individual

people,

and

who assertedhat

it

is an

organism

which

develops,

and

responds

o

challenges, ccording

o

holistic

aws,

might

also

admit that

only

its

individual

components

were

visibleand that

any

operational

efinition f the

laws

it

obeyed

would be in termsof individualbehaviour. (Thushe mightclaim

that

The

English

State aims

at

self-preservation

s

literally

true

and

not a

shorthand

tatement

bout

English

people,

while

admitting

that

t could

only

be

tested

by

observing

heir

behaviour.)

(3)

I

now

believe

hat

methodological

ndividualismn the

social ciences

might

conceivably

ave o be

put

nto

abeyance.

For

t does

apparently

ave

to

give

way,

provisionally

t

least,

to

methodological

olism n

the

caseof

certain

non-human

ocial

systems.

Consider three differentsystemsof interactingcomponents:

(a)

the solar

system

as

conceived

by

classical

mechanics;

(b)

the

economic

system

as

conceived

by

Adam

Smith;

(c)

a

beehive.

1

A.

J.

Ayer,

Language,

Truthand

Logic,

2nd.

ed., London,

I948,

p.

63

187


4/5

J.

W. N. WATKINS

(a)

Here,

methodological

individualism

s

altogether

valid.

The

behaviourof the

whole

system

can be

explained

by applying

the inverse

square

aw and the law of inertia to the

system s

components,

if their

relative

positions,

masses

and momenta areknown.

Indeed,

methodo-

logical

individualism n the social sciences s

analogous

to

the

method

of

resolution

and

re-composition

which

characterises

Galilean

and

Newtonian

physics:

the

method,

namely,

of

analysing

a

complex

situation

into

its atomic constituents

and into

the

simplest

principles

which

they obey,

and of

deductively

reconstructing

he

whole

situation

from these.

(b)

Adam Smith stated

that

the individual

generally,

ndeed,

neither

ntends

o

promote

the

public

nterest,

nor

knows

how much

he is

promoting

t

.

.

.

;

by

directing

his]

ndustry

in such

a manner

s its

produce

may

be

of

the

greatest

alue,

he

intends

only

his

own

gain,

and

he

is

in

this,

as in

many

other

cases,

ed

by

an

invisible

hand o

promote

an end which

was

no

part

of

his

intention.

(The

Wealth

f

Nations,

Bk.

4,

Ch.

2.)

But the invisible hand is,

strictly,

gratuitous

and

misleading;

for

what

Smith

actually

showed

was

that

individuals

in

competitive

economic

situations

are led

by

nothing

but

their

personal

dispositions

to

promote,

unintentionally,

he

public

nterest.

Here

again,

methodo-

logical

individualism

s

altogether

adequate.

(c)

Mr

E. S.

Russell,

basing

himself

on

experiments

by

Risch,

has

reported

the

following

strange

fact

(strange,

that

is,

to

the

methodological

individualist).

If

young

worker-bees

(whose

normal

functionis to feed the larvaefrom theirsalivaryglands)aresegregated

into

one

half

of a hive

sealed

off

from

the other

half,

into which

have

been

segregated

the older

worker-bees

(whose

salivary

glands

have

atrophied

and

whose

normal

function

is

to

produce

wax

from

their

newly

developed

wax-glands,

and

later

to

forage),

then the

following

will

occur:

after

two

days

dislocation

and near-starvation

ome

of

the

young

workers

will

start

foraging

and

their

salivary

glands

will

atrophy

prematurely;

while

the

atrophied

salivary

glands

of some

of

the

older workers

will

revive

and

continue

functioning

long

after

the

normal

period,

enabling

them

to

feed

the larvaein their half of the

hive.

The bees

functions

will

be

increasingly

differentiated

ntil

the

division

of labour

in

both

halves

approaches

hat

of a whole

hive.

1

In this

Journal,

I950,

I,

113-114.

i88


5/5

MECHANICAL

CHESS-PLAYER

Here,

t

really

s as

f

individual

ees

were

led

by

an

nvisible

hand,

not

merely

to

promote

he interests f the

whole

half-hive,

but

to

adaptdrasticallyheirbiological tructuren order o do so. It seems

extremely

difficult o

believe that the

emergence

f

these

two

new

systems

f

specialised

unctions

ouldbe

explainedndividualistically,

in terms

of

the situations nd

principles

f

behaviour

f each

bee,

because

ll

the

bees n

eitherhalf

of the hive

were

of

approximately

the

same

type

and

n

approximately

he same

situation,

et

only

the

requisite

number

adapted

hemselves

o new functions.

Thus the

bee-hive

appears

o

be

an

organism

n the sensethat its

pattern

f

behaviours determinedy teleological rinciples hichapply o the

hive

as

a whole and

which cannot

be

derived

rom a

knowledge

of

individual ees.

The

principle

whose statusI

have been

trying

to

elucidate s a

methodological

ule

which

presupposes

he factual assertion hat

human

societies

are

not

organisms

n

the

above

sense.

There

s no

evidence o

suggest

hat

this

presupposition

s false. But

it

is at

any

rate

conceivablehatsuch

evidence

will

be found. If this

happened

should

not

wholly

abandon

he

principle

f

methodological

ndividual-

ism;

for

if

holistic

sociological

aws were discovered should

hope

that

they

were

not sui

generis,

ut

were

themselves

explicable

n

in-

dividualistic

erms

(just

as

I

hope

that

he

re-emergence

f

specialisation

in

the

bifurcated

ee-hive

will

eventually

be

explained

ndividual-

istically).

However,

the rule of

methodological

ndividualism

would

have to

be

partially uspended

n the

improbable

vent

of a

sociological

iscovery

which undermined

he rule s actualbasis.

J.

W.

N.

WATKINS

The Mechanical

Chess-Player

ASHBY S

discussion of

the mechanical

chess-player

to some

extent

anticipatespaper

f

my

own2

now

in

the

press.

May

I

be

permitted

to

quote

a

few

of

my

results,

and

raise

a

question

of

terminology

The

quantity

measured

n

bits is

negative

entropy.

This can

be used

as

a

measure

f

information, ontrol,

design (Ashby),

peci-

fication, complication (von Neumann3), or diathesis (Kapp

4).

1

W.

R.

Ashby,

this

Journal, I952, 3,

44

2J. B.

S.

Haldane,

Sankhya

in

press)

3J.

von

Neumann,

CerebralMechanisms

n

Behaviour,

London,

1951

4

R.

O.

Kapp,

Mind,

Life

and

Body,

London,

I95I

N

I89

MECHANICAL

CHESS-PLAYER

Here,

t

really

s as

f

individual

ees

were

led

by

an

nvisible

hand,

not

merely

to

promote

he interests f the

whole

half-hive,

but

to

adaptdrasticallyheirbiological tructuren order o do so. It seems

extremely

difficult o

believe that the

emergence

f

these

two

new

systems

f

specialised

unctions

ouldbe

explainedndividualistically,

in terms

of

the situations nd

principles

f

behaviour

f each

bee,

because

ll

the

bees n

eitherhalf

of the hive

were

of

approximately

the

same

type

and

n

approximately

he same

situation,

et

only

the

requisite

number

adapted

hemselves

o new functions.

Thus the

bee-hive

appears

o

be

an

organism

n the sensethat its

pattern

f

behaviours determinedy teleological rinciples hichapply o the

hive

as

a whole and

which cannot

be

derived

rom a

knowledge

of

individual ees.

The

principle

whose statusI

have been

trying

to

elucidate s a

methodological

ule

which

presupposes

he factual assertion hat

human

societies

are

not

organisms

n

the

above

sense.

There

s no

evidence o

suggest

hat

this

presupposition

s false. But

it

is at

any

rate

conceivablehatsuch

evidence

will

be found. If this

happened

should

not

wholly

abandon

he

principle

f

methodological

ndividual-

ism;

for

if

holistic

sociological

aws were discovered should

hope

that

they

were

not sui

generis,

ut

were

themselves

explicable

n

in-

dividualistic

erms

(just

as

I

hope

that

he

re-emergence

f

specialisation

in

the

bifurcated

ee-hive

will

eventually

be

explained

ndividual-

istically).

However,

the rule of

methodological

ndividualism

would

have to

be

partially uspended

n the

improbable

vent

of a

sociological

iscovery

which undermined

he rule s actualbasis.

J.

W.

N.

WATKINS

The Mechanical

Chess-Player

ASHBY S

discussion of

the mechanical

chess-player

to some

extent

anticipatespaper

f

my

own2

now

in

the

press.

May

I

be

permitted

to

quote

a

few

of

my

results,

and

raise

a

question

of

terminology

The

quantity

measured

n

bits is

negative

entropy.

This can

be used

as

a

measure

f

information, ontrol,

design (Ashby),

peci-

fication, complication (von Neumann3), or diathesis (Kapp

4).

1

W.

R.

Ashby,

this

Journal, I952, 3,

44

2J. B.

S.

Haldane,

Sankhya

in

press)

3J.

von

Neumann,

CerebralMechanisms

n

Behaviour,

London,

1951

4

R.

O.

Kapp,

Mind,

Life

and

Body,

London,

I95I

N

I89

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Watkins_-_The_Principle_of_Methodological_Individualism.pdf