Background Paper

Is there a community-level adaptation deficit?

Maximillian Ashwill & Rasmus Heltberg The World Bank

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Is There a Community-Level Adaptation Deficit?

By Maximillian Ashwill and Rasmus Heltberg

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this chapter is to understand how communities in developing countries

can more successfully adapt to climate change. We find that poor communities do face an

adaptation deficit. More specifically, local communities engage more in coping measures

in response to climate change than they do adaptation measures. The reason seems to be

that the costs of adaptation are too high and the effectiveness of adaptation in building

resilience to severe weather events is often limited or not sufficient in addressing long-

term environmental trends. Further, when adaptation does occur, it frequently leads to

negative outcomes, or maladaptation. We find that maladaptation occurs when planning

does not sufficiently account for temporal and spatial factors, when policies contradict

one another and create perverse incentives, when governance systems fail, and when

communities lack the knowledge to adapt. By contrast, we find that community

leadership, organization and trust towards nonlocal adaptation planners are essential

local characteristics for building the social capital needed for collective action and

successful adaptation. Finally, we argue that in order to promote adaptation in

developing communities, the high costs and negative or ineffective outcomes of policies

associated with adaptation must be reduced. This chapter’s methodology uses original

primary source data from several World Bank-led case studies on the “social dimensions

of climate change” that took place from 2008-2012.

The purpose of this chapter is to understand how communities in developing countries

can more successfully adapt to climate change. Climate change is happening (IPCC,

2007a) and has been shown to interact with political, institutional, technical, economic,

social, physical and cultural conditions to create greater social vulnerability (ACF, 2011;

O’Brien, et al., 2008; McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008; Folke, 2006; Adger, 1999). The

world’s poorest people, who have the lowest capacity to adapt and are the most likely to

be engaged in livelihood strategies that rely on the natural environment, are especially at

risk (IPCC, 2007b). This chapter focuses on these people and the communities in which

they live.

We find that poor communities do face an adaptation deficit. More specifically, local

communities engage more in coping measures in response to climate change than they do

adaptation measures. The reason seems to be that the costs of adaptation are too high and

the effectiveness of adaptation in building resilience to severe weather events is often

limited or not sufficient in addressing long-term environmental trends. Further, when

adaptation does occur, it frequently leads to negative outcomes, or maladaptation. We

find that maladaptation occurs when planning does not sufficiently account for temporal

and spatial factors, when policies contradict one another and create perverse incentives,

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when governance systems fail, and when communities lack the knowledge to adapt. By

contrast, we find that community leadership, organization and trust towards nonlocal

adaptation planners are essential local characteristics for building the social capital

needed for collective action and successful adaptation. Finally, we argue that in order to

promote adaptation in developing communities, the high costs and negative or ineffective

outcomes of policies associated with adaptation must be reduced.

This chapter begins with a brief note on the methodology and sources of data. The next

three sections examine, first, why adaptation is not occurring at a rate commensurate with

community-level climate challenges and social vulnerability, second, why adaptation

measures sometimes fail, and third, what the conditions are for successful adaptation. We

conclude by examining how policymakers can promote collective action and achieve

successful adaptation.

Methodological Note

The objective of the research behind this chapter1 was to help answer three general

questions. These include: (1) what are the main community-based responses to

environmental change and shocks? (2) Why do these responses succeed or fail? (3) What

types of external interventions are the most effective? And how can these be supported?

The methodology uses original primary source data from several World Bank-led case

studies on the “social dimensions of climate change” that took place from 2008-2012.

These studies were carried out by different research teams with similar, but not identical,

methodologies and objectives. The data was collected from the major developing regions

of the world, including South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan), East Asia (Vietnam,

Mongolia), sub-Saharan Africa (Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, Ethiopia, Mali, Ghana,

Mozambique, Kenya), the Middle East and North Africa (Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen), and

Latin America and the Caribbean (Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru,

Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina). This primary source data comes mainly from the

household surveys, transcripts of focus group discussions and interviews from developing

communities, mostly rural, that took place as a part of each study. This amounted to

roughly 8,000 household surveys, 275 focus groups, 2,000 interviews, and 100 national

and regional workshops from 69 regions in 24 countries. This added up to several

thousand pages of data. In order to review this information, we used a three-step process.

First, we read in detail each report and background paper (published and unpublished)

related to each study, second, we searches each document electronically for key words,

and third, we searched the raw data for quotes and specific numbers related to certain

indicators. This chapter represents a summary of some of the more important findings.

Why adaptation is not occurring

The case study review shows that poor communities are coping with climate impacts

more than they are adapting to climate changes. Coping tends to occur when communities

are not resilient enough to prevent the damage and losses that result from physical

1 This work was originally commissioned to serve as a background paper for the World Bank’s

forthcoming World Development Report for 2014 on managing risk for development.

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climate impacts and weather hazards. In the absence of adaptation, coping actions will be

more frequent. After an examination of the conceptual background to coping and

adaptation, this section will look at why adaptation is not happening and how this lack of

planning can lead to “erosive” coping.

Conceptual Background

In order to analyze the ways in which adaptation succeeds and fails it is important to

understand that “adaptation” is not the same as “coping.” The most commonly cited

definition of adaptation, which we will also use, is that offered by the IPCC (2007b), “An

adjustment in natural and human systems in response to actual or expected climate

stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.” The

process of building climate resilience and reducing vulnerability is a result of successful

adaptation. A common mistake is to conflate the act of adapting with that of coping.

CARE (2009) differentiates the two concepts, in part, by saying that coping is a short-

term, reactive, immediate, non-continuous act motivated by crisis and oriented towards

survival, whereas adapting is a continuous process that involves planning and is oriented

towards longer-term livelihood security. Birkmann (2011: 815) elaborates this difference

further, “adaptation might indicate a turning point leading to a different development

path. While this change might be gradual, it is, however, different from a more short-term

oriented response to hazard impacts (coping).”

Results

The case studies show that there is much more coping occurring at the local-level than

adapting. In all of the case studies where respondents were asked about local-level

responses to climate change (ACDCC, 2011; ACF, 2011; SAR, 2013/14; GenBo, 2011),

they nearly always cited coping strategies more frequently than adaptation strategies.

This frequency varied depending on how questions were asked and the local context in

which questions were asked.

In the five countries of the ACF (2011) studies, respondents were only asked about

“adaptive,” not coping, strategies, still over half of the types of actions that communities

described could be considered “coping.” For example, respondents would refer to the act

of cutting down forests to expand cultivable areas as “adaptation,” but this was more of a

reaction to declining productivity in other lands than a change in process. In the ABDCC

(2011) study, where respondents in agricultural communities were asked about “coping,”

“adaptive,” and “survival” strategies separately, actions people took to “cope” (e.g.

dietary modifications) and “survive” (e.g. eating fewer meals) were all forms of coping,

whereas actions taken to “adapt” were commonly a mix of adaptation (e.g. seeking

permanent employment not related to agriculture) and coping (e.g. prioritizing food crops

over cash crops) (ABDCC Niger, 2010). When communities were asked generally about

how they “responded” to hazards and climate change without specifying whether it was

coping or adapting, most answers were examples of coping strategies. For example, in the

16 villages in rural Senegal (ABDCC Senegal, 2010) where respondents were asked

about “responses,” they identified the following actions: distress sales of household assets

for food, dietary modifications (eating less and of lower quality), borrowing at

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prohibitory rates for short periods of time, temporary migration to find wage labor, petty

trades, modifications to agricultural practices (planting new areas, planting at different

times) and, to a lesser extent livelihood modifications (damn construction to avoid

saltwater intrusion and fish farming). In this case, with the exception of the more isolated

examples of livelihood modifications, these responses are overwhelmingly reactive

strategies (coping), and not changes to process (adaptation). In terms of planning, several

research teams observed that respondents were too busy with their day-to-day lives to

envision how to respond over the long-term (ACF 2011; GenBo, 2011; AgMENA, 2013).

This contributed to the predominance of short-term coping.

The reason that more coping is occurring seems to be the result of a lack of resources

available for adaptation and the ineffectiveness of adaptation to prevent losses from

severe physical impacts. The primary purpose of adaptation is to reduce the vulnerability

and build the resilience of natural, economic and social systems to climate change. If a

community is not sufficiently resilient it will not be able to withstand climate changes or

severe weather events and, as a result, damage and loss will occur (Warner, et al., 2012).

When damage and loss occur, communities are forced to cope. In other words, coping

should be seen less as a local decision, than as a result of a lack of adaptation. Warner

and colleagues (2012) and, in part, Birkmann (2011) show that a lack of resources limits

people’s ability to adapt as does the severity of weather hazards, from which adaptation is

often unable to prevent losses and damage. The case studies corroborate this by showing

that the inability to prevent loss and the high costs of adaptation prevented its

implementation. This is examined below.

Inability to Prevent Loss

In areas where physical impacts from climate change and hazards were high, the ratio of

coping responses to adaptive strategies was even higher. In the Sundarbans region of

Bangladesh and West Bengal, India, a coastal area consistently threatened by cyclones,

respondents were asked about both the “most important” coping and adaptive strategies

they used. About 75 percent of responses described coping actions (SAR, 2012/13

forthcoming), despite the fact that important adaptation measures took place, especially

in Bangladesh. These measures included the creation, improvement and modernizing of

early warning systems, the construction of multi-purpose cyclone shelters, the creation of

coastal embankment systems that reduce the impact from storm surges, the regeneration

and conservation of coastal forests, and campaigns to raise community-level awareness

on the threat from cyclones. Despite these actions, which have dramatically reduced

storm related mortality, Bangladesh still sustained serious losses from Cyclone Aila in

2009 (Oxfam, 2012).

High Costs of Adaptation and Fewer Resources

Since nearly all of the case study communities reviewed for this chapter were poor (by

income), it would be expected that they would be less able to adapt and reduce climate

vulnerability, and as a result coping strategies would be more common. As mentioned

above this is exactly what we found. Warner and others (2012), show that the local costs

of adapting act as a barrier for community members to implement these strategies. Most

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of the literature agrees that a lack of financial resources, among other factors, is

correlated with a lack of adaptive capacity (e.g. Mearns and Norton, 2010; Verner, 2010;

WDR, 2010; IPCC, 2001; 2007b; etc.). The case study sites examined for this chapter

were all relatively poor (in terms of income), so we were unable to compare coping

versus adaptation rates between the poor and less poor.

External support sometimes reinforces the predominance of reactive, coping responses.

More resources are often made available through non-local donors or development and

relief agencies to cope than to adapt. For example, in the Dominican Republic, heavy

rains in May of 2010 led to the rapid swelling of the large inland lake, Lago Enriquillo. In

the wake of this event there was widespread media coverage that documented the threats

to the lake and to the communities that relied on it. As a result, the Ministry of

Environment made Lake Enriquillo a priority for relief and recovery efforts and

international development agencies, like USAID, sought to implement projects in the

region (ACF Dominican Republic, 2011). In addition, out of necessity there are generally

more external resources made available to cope with shocks then there are to prepare for

them (adapt), despite the cost effectiveness of the latter2. In Honduras, foreign aid

amounted to 6.3% of GDP in 1997. In November of 1998 hurricane Mitch hit and aid

rose to 15.2% in 1999, more than double the amount it was pre-shock, which would have

included preparedness measures (Mechler, 2003). By this logic it is conceivable that if

some of the post-hurricane assistance to Honduras had been spent on preparation,

damages from hurricane Mitch would have been far fewer and eventual costs would have

been reduced or avoided for the country and its development partners.

Erosive Coping

As mentioned above, coping often lacks an element of planning; therefore the

consequences of these actions could potentially exacerbate social vulnerability to climate

change. When this occurs, it is called “erosive coping” (De Waal, 1989; Van der Geest

and Dietz, 2004; Warner, et al., 2012). This dynamic was commonly seen in the case

study communities (see ACF, 2011; ABDCC, 2011). For example, in Niger,

environmental changes, specifically climate change combined with unsustainable

agricultural practices (such as slash and burn), have substantially reduced the productivity

of existing agricultural lands (ABDCC Niger, 2010). As a result, farmers have begun

cutting down forests to plant on the rich soils beneath. Consequently, these communities

are altering their environments in a way that reduces the productivity of land and

increases the community’s overall sensitivity to climate change. It is difficult to change

these behaviors because their benefits are tangible, immediate (money in your hand) and

popular (everyone is doing them). Such a result does not seem to be surprising since these

coping actions took place without much planning, but as we will see next, even with

planning, responses to climate change can still have negative outcomes.

2 An analysis of flood control preparedness enacted in China over the past forty years found that US$3.15

billion spent had averted approximately US$12 billion in losses (Mechler, 2003).

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Why adaptation fails when it does occur

From the case studies, we examined instances where adaptation failed. As a result, we

were able to identify, five common characteristics of adaptation that contributed, or led

directly to, negative outcomes. These include: (1) temporal failures: “adaptation”

planning that does not take account of long-term trends; (2) spatial failures: policies or

projects that create benefits for certain areas or populations, but create costs for others;

(3) incentive failures: policies or projects that produce perverse incentives; (4)

governance failures: governance structures that lead to inefficiencies and the unequal

distribution of benefits; and (5) knowledge failures: where communities or their members

lack sufficient knowledge of climate change challenges and the technical capacity to

adapt. These factors can contribute to maladaptation in isolation or association, and after

a conceptual background, each will be examined in turn.

Conceptual background

Maladaptation is defined by Barnett and O’Neill (2010) as, “action taken ostensibly to

avoid or reduce vulnerability to climate change that impacts adversely on, or increases

the vulnerability of other systems, sectors or social groups.” They further identified five

negative outcomes of adaptation that can be classified as maladaptation. These outcomes

include: increased emissions of greenhouse gases; a disproportionate burden on the most

vulnerable populations; high opportunity costs; reduced incentives to adapt; and limited

choices available for future generations.

Results

Using these definitions as a guide, we looked at each of the 24 countries included in the

data review and they all showed at least one example of maladaptation. Granted the

definitions of maladaptation outcomes are broad, and there is no account of the scale of

the problem, but at the very least it shows that maladaptation is occurring, and

commonly. Of the 69 regions examined, there was evidence that maladaptation was

occurring in over half of them. Many of the regions did not report maladaptation

occurring since their study methodologies did not specifically ask about it, but that does

not mean that it wasn’t happening. By contrast, some of the evidence that suggested that

maladaptation was occurring was not conclusive or did not take into account positive

outcomes from the adaptation process. Also, evidence was based on what respondents

said—their perceptions—therefore is subject to bias. According to Adger and others

(2005), one adaptation outcome may be seen positively by one social group and

negatively by another. The data review certainly showed evidence of this as well. Yet,

despite the limitations inherent in the methodology, there is still substantial evidence that

even humans’ best efforts at adapting to climate change commonly have unintended

consequences.

Temporal Failures

The most common pathway towards maladaptation, as witnessed in the global case

studies, is a project or policy that is designed for a short-term outcome but applied to a

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long-term challenge. Adger and colleagues (2005) describe these as temporal

externalities. For example, in Mongolia, climate change has likely contributed to more

frequent and severe Dzuds, a winter disaster in which livestock forage is rendered

inaccessible because of heavy snowfall or severe cold and leads to high levels of

livestock mortality. In the Mongolian winter of the 1999-2000 season, a Dzud led to a

major decline in livestock. As a result, an initiative was put in place to provide in-kind

loans of livestock to pastoralists to restock the herds that were lost in the Dzud. This was

actually a quite innovative and forward-looking project that included a participatory

approach to identify and target eligible pastoralists. Selection criteria emphasized the skill

and experience levels of herders to ensure that only the pastoralists most capable of

repaying the loan were restocked. However, despite over a half dozen years passing since

the last Dzud, the next year (2000-2001) another Dzud struck, and the following year

(2001-2002) another. These led to further losses to livestock including that of the

pastoralists who had been restocked. As a result of this policy, not only did it fail to

permanently help pastoralists recover from the first Dzud, it actually put them further into

debt (Mearns, 2012). Understanding temporal failure, is especially important when

intense and frequent climate hazards are projected to become the long-term trend (IPCC,

2012). Other distinct examples of temporal failures leading to maladaptation were seen in

Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Jordan and Lebanon.

Spatial Failures

Adaptation that produces benefits in one area for one group of individuals may impose

costs in other areas for other groups. Adger and others (2005) refer to these as spatial

externalities. Several examples of this were witnessed in case study communities in

Paraguay (ACF Paraguay, 2011). In the Paraguayan Chaco, for example, respondents

said that market incentives compel owners of large cattle ranches to build dams to retain

water from seasonal river floods. They do this to help increase the water available for

livestock production. In the eastern Ñeembucú region, cattlemen and agriculturalists

build channels to drain wetlands in order to increase the amount of available land for

agriculture and pasture. In both cases, these activities, while helping short-term

profitability in the face of water abundance, are depriving other social groups, such as

small landholders and fisherpersons, of their water needs.

Incentive Failures

Policies that aim at achieving one goal may contradict others and lead to maladaptation.

Ashwill and others (2011), refer to these as perverse incentives. For example, in the

southern Argentine province of Rio Negro, traditional sheepherders have been confronted

by lower wool prices and drier conditions, which has reduced the availability of grazing

lands. As a result, nearly half of these pastoralists have permanently migrated from these

lands and the number of sheep in the region has declined by almost half (ACF Argentina,

2010). The Argentine government, in an effort to make more efficient use of this land,

enacted a law that can require pastoralists to sell their ancestral lands if they are no longer

using them for traditional grazing. As a result, sheepherders have been restocking their

sheep (often using state funds, which supplement this) to maintain tenure rights. This has

created a situation where people maintain sheep stocks (an unsustainable livelihood), not

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for their own financial well being, but rather to stay on their lands and take advantage of

state funds (ACF Argentina, 2010). Incentive failures were also shown to have led to

maladaptation in Bolivia, Peru, Lebanon, Jordan, Mali, Senegal, Vietnam and others.

Governance failures

Governance failures can also lead to maladaptation. Governance failures can come in the

form of corruption, a lack of leadership, inequity or conflict. These qualities were hard to

measure in the studies since people typically do not feel comfortable discussing them

with investigative teams. Still, enough evidence exists to suggest that not only are these

issues, but they are issues that undermine successful adaptation.3 In Paraguay, focus

groups uncovered a lot of discussion surrounding political clientelism and favoritism. In

such a situation, local leaders are in a position to hoard development or adaptation funds

for themselves or funnel them to their associates (ACF Paraguay, 2011). In Burkina Faso,

similar worries were voiced about how certain clans had greater access to resources to the

detriment of rivals or other unconnected individuals. These clans are inextricably linked

to certain tribes, families and socio-linguistic groups and it is these allies who benefit the

most from aid and development assistance (ABDCC Burkina Faso, 2010). According to

Adger (2003: 396), “social hierarchies and inequality in resources and entitlements are

rarely overturned in the course of adaptation, and external changes, such as extremes in

climate and other natural hazards, tend to reinforce these inequalities” (also see Adger, et

al, 2001). In a certain way, by external interventions utilizing these traditional structures

as conduits in the development process, they are unwittingly reinforcing an inequitable

social arrangement.

Knowledge Failures

Across the case studies, respondents often demonstrated a lack of knowledge concerning

the sources of negative environmental changes (i.e. climate change and social

vulnerabilities) and how to respond successfully. By contrast they usually demonstrated

an acute knowledge of what these changes were and how they affected communities and

households. For example, in the Peruvian Amazon over 90% of respondents from a

Machiguenga community observed some form of climate change occurring. These

observations included: changing precipitation patterns, increasing cold spells, and

changing seasons. Community members commented that fish population levels, crop

yields, and the availability of animal species for hunting were lower than anytime they

can remember. Despite these impacts, not a single community member identified

“climate change” or many aspects of their own vulnerability as sources of these

problems, instead they blamed pollution caused by a series of spills from a nearby natural

gas pipeline and angry spirits. A local representative of the Machiguenga Council of the

Urubamba River4 (COMARU) summed up well the Machiguenga people’s belief when

he said, “The Machiguenga Amazon Indians of the Upper and Lower Urubamba,

3 This was further supported in the literature, for example see: Arrow (2000), Woolcock (1998) and Portes

(1998). 4 Consejo Machiguenga del Rio Urubamba (COMARU) the largest indigenous Machiguenga organization

representing 30 native communities. They have become well known for their persistent resistance of the

Comisea natural gas extraction project.

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acknowledge that it may be true that Choris (white people) are causing damage to the

planet. But they believe that the root cause of this breakdown of nature is their own

failure to observe rules and principles of behavior as outlined by Tasorintsi (God).

Society is not nature, and it is nature that guides the indigenous interpretation of climate

change” (ACF Peru, 2011). When only the impacts from climate change and social

vulnerability are observed (e.g. floods, crop failure, disease, etc.), responses will continue

to be reactive. However, in order for communities to adapt and change processes, they

must understand and tackle the sources of these impacts and vulnerabilities (e.g.

damaging land-use practices, unsustainable livelihoods, etc.). Some form of knowledge

failure was observed in most of the 24 countries examined.

How successful adaptation occurs

To achieve successful, collective adaptation, communities must share three common

characteristics: trust, leadership and organization. After a conceptual background to

successful adaptation, collective action and social capital, we will examine specific

examples of how a lack of trust, leadership and organization can undermine adaptation.

Conceptual background

We define successful adaptation as Adger and others (2005) do, as actions that generate

outcomes that are effective, efficient, equitable, and legitimate. Of course, such outcomes

are contested, context specific, and based on competing values (Adger, et al., 2003).

Defining successful adaptation is therefore difficult because, as we have seen earlier,

while certain outcomes may be deemed a success at certain spatial and temporal scales,

they may be deemed a failure at others (Adger, et al., 2005). Effectiveness is judged by

how well adaptation strategies meet their stated objectives. Efficiency refers to the

relative benefits compared to costs. Equity is determined by who decides what action is

taken and who benefits (or more importantly who does not), which is important since

equitable outcomes increases the potential to reduce future vulnerability (Boyce, 2002).

Legitimacy is the extent to which affected people accept the adaptation decisions and

outcomes. A lack of legitimacy undermines the capacity of adaptive actions to achieve

full implementation (Adger, et al., 2005).

Few and others (2004) argue that collective action, particularly collective participation in

decision-making, will lead to successful adaptation. This is especially true for natural-

resource dependent livelihoods, where these resources, “frequently exist under multiple

property-rights regimes” and where “the implementation of investment and planned

adaptation is best brought about by the comanagement of resources” (Adger, 2003: 389

and 396). Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 226), contend that social capital is “the norms

and networks that enable people to act collectively.”5 Other studies have shown that the

ability of community members to develop and maintain security over their livelihoods in

resource-dependant societies is dependant on their social capital.6 By extension, in order

5 Other literature has shown this as well, including: Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000); Putnam (2000); and

Coleman (2000). 6 These studies include: Berkes (2002); Pretty and Ward (2001); Brown and Rosendo (2000); and

Bebbington (1999).

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to promote collective action and adapt successfully, social capital must be strengthened.

The two components of social capital include: bonding social capital – the strengthening

of internal organization and the capacity to take collective action – and bridging (or

networking) social capital – the linkages between local groups and external partners and

resources.7 Adger (2003: 389) contends that, “collective action requires networks and

flows of information between individuals and groups to oil the wheels of decision-

making.” Strong bridging and bonding social capital maintain these networks and flows.

Social capital, and its ability to promote collective action, is especially important when

dealing with unforeseen climate changes or hazards (Burton, et al., 1993; Adger, 2003).8

Trust

Trust is defined as the “assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of

someone or something.” Within the context of climate change adaptation, it means that

in order for external interventions to be successful, their target communities must trust

the implementing agencies. Such trust allows for the “buy-in” by locals of non-local

initiatives and is crucial for building broad-based support and, more importantly,

collective participation from the community in project activities (Ostrom, 2000). Building

trust is related to building legitimacy (Adger, et al., 2005) and strengthening bridging

social capital. Adger (2003: 388) argues that successful adaptation is contingent on the

“social acceptability of options for adaptation.” There were no examples of successful

interventions from the case studies without a certain level of community trust towards the

implementing agencies. By contrast there are several examples where a lack of trust (or

lack of project legitimacy) decreased collective participation and led to failed

interventions.

Distrust inhibits collective action

In Salta in northern Argentina, local civil society respondents voiced a serious distrust of

the federal government. They claimed this distrust was the result of the government’s role

in displacing poor and indigenous people from their traditional lands and livelihoods in

the interest of major natural gas and soy businesses. The investigation team was

perceived by locals in Salta to be working on the government’s behalf, and as a result the

team’s access to communities was constrained and follow-up visits were not allowed.

Consequently, the study’s (ACF Argentina, 2010) goal of mobilizing collective action to

adapt to climate change was not successful. In fact, not a single coalition was ever

established in Salta. The research team applied this lesson in the future by working

exclusively in communities where they were accepted and where distrust was not as

prevalent.

7 For additional information on these definitions and a background on social capital refer to: Sabatier and

Jenkins-Smith (1993) and Narayan (1999). 8 In addition, some studies have argues that social capital and collective action do not necessarily lead to

successful adaptation. For examples refer to Dasgupta (2003) or Portes (1998).

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Leadership

Leadership is an important component in making external interventions successful

(Ostrom, 2000; Varughese, 1999; Frohlich, et al., 1971). A leader is a person that

maintains the networking social capital from the community-level. More specifically it is

important that there are individuals that can drive adaptation measures locally, compel

people and institutions to organize and mobilize around project objectives. It is also

important that these leaders are trusted locally, which can help legitimize the merits of

external interventions. Such individuals can act as the conduit between the local and

nonlocal and they can drive the development process from within (Verner, 2012).

Individual leaders have the capacity to promote networks of trust, reciprocity and

organization (Adger, 2003).

A lack of leadership inhibits collective action

In several Bolivian highland communities, a deficiency in community leaders limited the

process of building collective action (GenBo, 2011). The reason for this lack of

leadership was not because the community had no leaders; it was just that these leaders

no longer lived in the communities. Most moved to the lucrative gold mines nearby for

weeks and months at a time and as a consequence neglected their roles as leaders in their

communities. With the leaders away, it was difficult for investigation teams to organize

the remaining community members for meetings and workshops, let alone for collective

action. What made matters more complicated was that mine workers, a relatively resilient

livelihood, voiced much less concern for the climate vulnerabilities encountered in their

old communities than they did other issues.

Organization

Organization can be defined as, “A structure through which individuals cooperate

systematically to conduct business” (Dictionary.com, 2012) and is a functional

component of collective action. Organization, often manifested in the form of local

institutions, provides the social infrastructure that interventions require to mobilize

participation in project activities and apply these activities broadly without being limited

to individuals or individual households. An organization also represents an entity that has

experience in executing projects or activities that are complex in nature and hard to

understand: climate change fits this bill precisely. Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 234)

argue that the effectiveness of strategies for adapting to climate change and “the very

capacity of social groups to act in their collective interest depends on the quality of the

formal institutions under which they reside” (also see Adger, 2003; Evans, 1996; Ostrom,

1996). Internal organization is the key to strong bonding social capital, and promoting

equitable decision-making and outcomes.

A lack of organization inhibits collective action

The ACF study (2011) found that the process of promoting collective adaptation was

most effective in communities that had a history of organization. In cases that spanned

each of the five countries, it was the communities, which already knew how to organize

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or already had existing and functional institutions that were able to act collectively. In the

Paraguayan Chaco, where families are widely dispersed and often work alone (low

internal organization), there were major delays as the investigation team tried to organize

workshops and other activities on their own (ACF Paraguay, 2011). As a result, the

process of building coalitions took longer in Paraguay than in any other country and,

despite the additional time dedicated to organizing, the sustainability of these groups was

still by no means guaranteed.

Conclusions on how policymakers can promote successful adaptation

Before providing some general conclusions, we look at some practical ways, identified in

a case study from Mongolia, to catalyze collective action.

Comparative examples of collective action

The Mongolia case study, (Dzud, 2012) provides a valuable comparative analysis of three

different initiatives that aimed to induce collective action in response and preparation for

Dzuds. This analysis delivers insights into why certain types of interventions are more

successful than others. These three initiatives took three distinct approaches to promoting

collective action. The first was the creation of territorially-based pasture user groups,

which sought to involve all herders within a given territorial range to cooperatively

manage pastures. The second initiative supported project-specific, herder-proposed

initiatives. By putting the onus on herders to organize and propose projects, it was those

that were most active and organized that tended to receive support. As a result, other

groups perceived the process as unfair and non-transparent. The third initiative created

smaller kinship- or neighborhood-based groups with the aim of collectively managing

pastures and improving livelihoods. This program was the most successful of the three in

catalyzing collective action among herders, building herder-government cooperation and

contributing to measurable improvements in herder resilience (Dzud, 2012).

Lessons learned

This comparison teaches several lessons in how to catalyze collective action. First, it is

more difficult to induce collective action from large groups than it is from smaller ones

based on closely related social networks. In larger groups, people simply do not know

one another that well and are not as comfortable working with strangers. It is much more

realistic to expect people to maintain collective cooperation over the long-term if these

groups are comprised of families and people they know, trust and have worked with

before. Baland and Platteau (1996) have demonstrated that self-organized groups tend to

fall apart quickly in areas where new settlement (strangers moving into the community)

occurs. Second, these smaller, close-knit groups are more likely to be accused of unfairly

benefitting from assistance than large inclusive groups. Efforts can be made to improve

transparency, but this may just be an unavoidable problem when relying on existing

social structures rather than creating new ones. Third, it seems that an influx of resources

is the most likely impetus to catalyze collective action. If there is a financial incentive to

organize and cooperate, people will. Of course, this also would suggest that once

resources disappear, so will the collective action (Ostrom, 2000). Fourth, collective

13

action may be sustainable even in the absence of direct financial incentives if there is a

strong enough perceived need to act. When a group of individuals view a problem as real

and too large to deal with alone, they will often act collectively to find a solution

(Ostrom, 2000). This would suggest that opportunity exists in crisis.

These lessons apply to community-level efforts at collective adaptation only, which raise

additional questions. At what scale can these lessons be applied? Can they be applied

within larger political boundaries? How about to shared resource systems, like

watersheds that cross national borders? At the end of the day, climate change is a shared

challenge and the level of collective action needed to reduce emissions needs to happen at

the global level. How can the potential for this scale of collective action be improved?

These questions extend beyond the scope of this chapter, but further research in this area

is warranted.

General conclusions

To answer the question posed in the title of this chapter: yes, there is a community-level

adaptation deficit. This deficit is represented as the lack, or ineffectiveness, of adaptation

measures to reduce social vulnerability to climate change. In order for policymakers to

reduce this vulnerability and build climate resilience, it is necessary to make adaptation

more appealing to local communities by reducing its costs and its potential for negative

outcomes. We have seen that temporal, spatial, incentive, governance and knowledge

failures often lead to maladaptation. To reduce this risk, these potential failures have to

be taken into account and safeguarded against during adaptation planning and project

implementation. Finally, policymakers must increase the prospects for successful

adaptation by increasing the potential for collective action through measures to build

local leadership, trust and organization.

14

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