Weapons in Space: The Need to Protect Space Assets

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Weapons in Space: The Need to ProtectSpace AssetsAlan Steinberg aa University of Houston , Houston , TexasPublished online: 26 Nov 2012.

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Weapons in Space: The Needto Protect Space Assets

ALAN STEINBERGUniversity of Houston, Houston, Texas

Space assets represent the most critical undefended resource of theUnited States. Though the government has clearly been aware ofthis weakness for over a generation, little appears to have beendone about it. Every day these assets become more critical, andthe threats against them are growing in kind. The United Statesmust address these threats in order to prevent potential futureissues in regard to military command and control, as well as theAmerican way of life. This article not only outlines threats to spaceassets but proposes means by which U.S. space assets could beprotected. Such protection comes not only from technology, whichhas been capable for years of doing the job, but from policy choiceas well. In regard to policy, increasing research and developmentfor space-based weapons, reevaluating existing treaties, andincreasing interagency cooperation are all needed to better protectU.S. space assets.

The United States will pursue activities in space in support of its inherentright of self-defense . . .1

Reagan Administration, 1988

Our policy is to promote development of the full range of space-basedcapabilities in a manner that protects our vital interests.2

Clinton Administration, 1998

The United States reserves the right . . . to defend and protect its spacesystems with a wide range of options, from diplomatic to military.3

Bush Administration, 2008

Address correspondence to Alan Steinberg, Department of Political Science, University ofHouston, 447 Philip Guthrie Hoffman Hall, Houston, TX 77204-3011. E-mail: [email protected]

Astropolitics, 10:248–267, 2012Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1477-7622 print=1557-2943 onlineDOI: 10.1080/14777622.2012.733867

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Maintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by space is centralto our national security, but an evolving strategic environmentincreasingly challenges U.S. space advantages.4

Obama Administration, 2011

If current trends continue, U.S. strategy to protect space-based systems in2013 will be no better than they were a quarter of a century ago in 1988despite tough rhetoric. The United States has spent billions of dollars on itsspace assets and yet they remain some of the least protected but mostexpensive systems the U.S. military possess. In the post–Cold War era,‘‘military space systems are playing an increasingly critical role.’’5 But threatsto space assets are growing in tandem with the military’s dependence onthem. Today, ‘‘every technologically advanced land, sea, and air servicealready depends on space satellites’’ and ‘‘reliance continues to increase,because systems in space offer strategic and tactical advantages that are other-wise unavailable.’’6 Given this reliance, the United States should embrace theconcept of space-based weapons in order to defend access to its space assetsand to maintain space as a free domain for international use. This article willfocus on the importance of military space assets, current threats to thesesystems, and how the United States can effectively respond to the threats.

WHY SPACE ASSETS ARE IMPORTANT

General Lance Lord, former commander of Air Force Space Command hasstated, ‘‘At the end of the day Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines knowthey benefited from the ‘Magic’ of Space Command . . .but, they may notalways know how.’’7 Before it can be understood why assets need to beprotected, it is important to comprehend what these space assets do forthe United States, particularly the military. The military relies on its spaceassets so much that U.S. military leaders believe that ‘‘you can’t go to warand win without space.’’8

Currently, the military relies on space in a number of ways that are listedbelow9:

. Over two thirds of long-distance military communications are sent viacommunications satellites.

. Survivability of U.S. strategic assets is greatly enhanced by the earlywarning provided by ballistic missile defense surveillance satellites.

. Verification of U.S. arms control agreements and the ability to monitorongoing crisis situations are aided by photoreconnaissance and otherintelligence satellites.

. Military weather satellites provide a reliable source of weather informationin remote or denied areas of the globe.

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. Accurate and reliable position information in some areas of the globe canonly be provided by military navigation satellites.

. Remote sensing satellites generate data and information that can also beused to achieve a variety of military objectives from map making to nuclearexplosion detection.

Space systems enable information transfer, including information assuranceand information superiority, whether for a warfighter or for commercialpurposes. Space capabilities provide an opportunity to collect, process,and disseminate information, allowing for a continuous flow of informationto those who need it in a secure environment. In addition to the above listthere are a plethora of non-military space applications, centered on com-munication, navigation, and weather. Despite the benefits available fromspace assets, reliance on these systems has created new vulnerabilities thatneed to be addressed, and it is because of the importance and ever increasingreliance on space systems that the threats to these assets are multiplyingexponentially.

THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF SPACE

The potential threat of space was fully realized when a 200-pound metalbasketball-sized object began orbiting Earth on 4 October 1957. WithSputnik, the Soviet Union became the first nation to reach space. But, theUnited States was quick to follow and is now considered the winner of theU.S.–Soviet space race, being the first, and only, nation to put a man onthe Moon. Though the United States may have won the civil side of the spacerace, there is a new arms race regarding the protection of space assets.Multiple countries are developing and deploying anti-satellite (ASAT) tech-nologies that threaten the security of space as well as those described below.

Today, there are international actors in the system that can place systemsin space and even more who can disrupt those systems that are currently inorbit. From the first space launches until the mid-1960s, the United Statesand the Soviet Union were the only two countries sending objects into space.However, beginning in the early 1970s and continuing still today, the Eur-opean Space Agency (ESA), through its Ariane family of space-launch vehi-cles, has been continuously increasing its foothold in space and supportingthe international launch market.10 Now, there is also commercial competitionfrom Russia and expanding space launch capabilities in China, which recentlyentered into the manned space flight realm. Add to this the growing trendtoward private sector space launch systems being seen around the worldand the competition for space starts to grow astronomically.

In addition to members of the European Union (EU), India, Israel,Japan,11 Iran,12 and others are on track to develop space launch systems

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or at least military technology, including North Korea13 and Iraq prior to theU.S. invasion.14 Some reports suggest that Egypt and Saudi Arabia have alsoinvested ‘‘hundreds of millions of dollars’’ into their own space programs.15

This expansion of space capabilities could generate the potential foradditional threats. As more countries strive for access and control of space,and develop increasing numbers of space assets, space itself may becomea battlefield.

Hostile nations already have the capabilities to destroy U.S. space assets.Space expert James Oberg claimed, ‘‘Rudimentary space weaponry is withinthe grasp of almost any state and even some corporations and terroristgroups.’’16 Even more shocking is the statement by Defense IntelligenceAgency director Thomas Wilson, who said, ‘‘China and Russia haveacross-the-board programs under way, and other smaller states and non-stateentities are pursing more limited, though potentially effective approaches.’’17

George Tenet, while Central Intelligence Agency Director, argued:‘‘Operations to disrupt, degrade, or defeat U.S. space assets will be attractiveoptions for those seeking to counter U.S. strategic military superiority.’’18

Rather than take the military head on, efforts can be concentrated on disrupt-ing satellite-based command and control of military forces, ultimately leadingto a breakdown of combatant capabilities. This degradation could eliminatemuch of the technological superiority that U.S. military forces rely on to effectits operations and sustainment of those operations.

With multiple actors able to reach space, the threat to U.S. space assets isgrowing. Even space assets without direct military implications couldbecome targets. A Chinese newspaper commented in July 2000: ‘‘Forcountries that could never win a war by using tanks and planes, attackingthe US space system may be an irresistible choice.’’19 Once space assetsare destroyed or disabled, there could be significant lag times to repair orreplace them.

During the 1980s, total Soviet space launches exceeded the UnitedStates by a factor of about five to one, averaging 100 launches a year. Inaddition, Soviet turnaround time could be measured in ‘‘hours or days,’’compared to U.S. turnaround, which takes weeks or months.20 One shouldexpect that China might match or even exceed the former Soviet Union’space of space launches in due course. China has had over 50 successfullaunches since 1996, and ‘‘they will be a very robust and potent competitorin the future.’’21 At present, China has invested billions of dollars into thespace program and has plans for both lunar missions and a space station.22

In addition, with the recent termination of the U.S. Space Shuttle, the UnitedStates will start to lag behind other countries in regard to manned spacelaunches.23

Threats to space assets can be found not only in space but on theground as well. Some countries have developed or are developing ground-or air-based ASAT capabilities. During a nuclear test in the South Pacific in


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1962, by which a 1.4-Mt device was detonated approximately 400 km aboveEarth, the resulting electromagnetic pulse unintentionally rendered three U.S.satellites useless and disrupted almost a dozen others.24 This first ASAT testspurred the growth of the field of ASAT technology. In fact, the Soviet Uniontested ASAT capabilities as early as 1968, with the first co-orbital ASAT test bythe Cosmos series satellites, and is believed to have had an operational ASATcapability since at least the mid-1980s if not before.25

Over the last 20 years, countries have been working to develop and per-fect ASAT capabilities. In January 2007, China intercepted one of its ownweather satellites in what was believed and later confirmed to be an ASATtest.26 The United States responded with an ASAT test of its own in 2008.27

Since then, it appears that Russia has revitalized its ASAT program28 and Indiais considering one of its own.29

ASAT is not an unconventional capability, because it can operate from amissile launched from a high-flying aircraft or a ballistic missile, both ofwhich are capabilities that have seen constant proliferation in the post–ColdWar era. An ASAT warhead can do more than just destroy a single satellite,because the debris from a detonated ASAT warhead will spew debris intolow Earth orbit (LEO), causing possible hindrance to other satellites and pol-luting space.30 In fact, China’s intentional destruction of its own Fengyun-1Cweather satellite in 2007 is viewed as ‘‘the most prolific and severe fragmen-tation in the course of five decades of space operations.’’31 Therefore, actionmust be taken to prevent such an attack before it is too late.

ASAT capabilities are not limited to physical destruction of the satellite.Additional threats include cyber warfare, including hacking a satellite inorder to gain control of it or prevent the owner from controlling it; jamming,sending spurious signals to overwhelm the satellite communications; anddazzling and blinding of optics and sensors, rather than destruction, by useof lasers.

In 2005, the U.S. Air Force deployed the 76th Space Control Squadron,who uses an ‘‘offensive counter-communications system’’ capable ofknocking out enemy satellite communications by utilizing special electronicjamming systems.32 This provides a means for protecting U.S. space assets by‘‘interrupting the signals sent from the ground to satellites that try to disruptU.S. military of civilian spacecraft.’’33 However, China’s and Russia’s develop-ment and testing of electronic signal jamming is cause for concern. Aground-based electronic assault on space assets could very well be the firsttype of attack from both sides in future military engagements.34

Other space systems may pose a threat to space assets. Speculation hasexisted for years about having hunter–killer-type satellites, but nothing hasyet been verified.35 Of course, guns have been deployed in space in the past.In 1974, the Soviet Union’s Salyut-3=Almaz manned military reconnaissancestation carried onboard a version of the high-speed aviation 23 mmNudelman cannon, modified to operate in a vacuum.36

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The future will likely see directed energy and kinetic energy weapons inspace, as well as other forms of attack.37 One such threat that might comefrom nuclear weapons’ states with little space infrastructure, such as Indiaor Pakistan, is the deterrent threat of a space detonation. Such an eventwould potentially be costly, because the act could lead to the destructionof non-hardened space objects. Military satellites are often hardened toprotect from such an attack; however, many commercial satellites that themilitary relies on are not.38 Others argue that there is also a threat from whatis known as parasite satellites, such as those being developed by the People’sRepublic of China (PRC).39 The technology for such small satellites (small-sats) comes in the form of orbiting limpet bombs that attach themselves tospace assets for detonation at a later date.40 Theoretically, there is also thethreat of a smallsat that could attach and then take over a space asset;however, this technology is not known to exist yet.

Finally, there is the threat of directed energy weapons. These weaponscan come in a variety of forms, as will be discussed later in this article, andcan include nuclear-based threats. Should an attack take place from a spacebased directed energy weapon, ‘‘tactical warning may be measured in milli-seconds.’’41 Unlike the 15–20 minutes it takes for a ballistic missile to hit itstarget, a directed energy weapon will strike its target virtually immediatelyafter being fired. In addition to the speed of an attack, space weapons couldbe masked to reduce strategic warning as well. One possibility includes theuse of ‘‘civilian ‘fronts’ for military space activities’’ whereby seeminglynon-military assets can in fact be used as offensive weapons.42

Though damaging or destroying space assets with lasers may seem likescience fiction to some, some of the signs for the potential are there. In 2006,it was suggested that China attempted to ‘‘blind’’ U.S. satellites with lasers,43

though more recently this has come into doubt.44 There is also at least onereport of Iran using laser technology against U.S. satellites, but the reportsare unconfirmed.45 However, with the possibility of instantaneous threatslooming in space, it would be irresponsible for the United States to sit idlyby and not take any action to prevent or counter such an attack.

U.S. RESPONSE

The United States needs to take action now in order to protect its spaceassets. Without taking appropriate measures, the United States will continueto face a growing threat to space assets. The United States cannot rely oninternational treaties to protect its space assets, even if a treaty designed toprotect space assets existed. Too often such treaties have been broken orignored, and when they have been there has been no response or punish-ment. In fact, the United States does not depend on treaties alone for defensebecause it is the mission of Air Force Space Command to ‘‘defend the UnitedStates of America through the control and exploitation of space.’’46


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Space is often compared to the high seas, a medium that every coun-try has equal rights to use and the right of unimpeded access.47 In fact,many international treaties have been signed that reaffirm space rights.However, history has shown that international treaties guaranteeing peaceonly last for so long. Countries will attempt to bend the rules to suit theirinterests, pull out of the treaties when it suits them, or just ignore them alltogether. The United States must work to defend assets in space in thesame way it is currently policing the high seas and, arguably, the world.In 1990, the National Space Council wrote: ‘‘Space will become to thefuture what oceans have always been—highways to discovery and com-merce. But the sea lanes must be open to be usable, and as we knowfrom past conflicts, they are subject to disruption.’’48 In the same ways thatU.S. merchant shipping, and ocean-going craft in general, benefits fromthe backing of the U.S. Navy in times of crisis, space assets will requiresimilar protection, from an ‘‘on-call military capability to protect [U.S]space assets.’’49

A RAND study published in 1998 suggested three possible courses ofaction for the United States to take in regard to achieve its national securityobjectives for space: (1) the minimalist strategy option; (2) the enhancedstrategy option; and (3) the aerospace force strategy option.50 Each strategyinvolves a greater degree of involvement in space security, ranging frominternational cooperation to U.S. domination. The options vary in theamount of control that the Department of Defense (DOD) has over variousspace related functions. The minimalist strategy places a great deal ofreliance on international partnerships, which during a time of war could fallapart, and therefore do not provide sufficient security for U.S. space assetsor the United States itself. The aerospace force strategy option would beoptimal for security but perhaps out of reach for the time being due toeconomic constraints and international accords. Currently, it would appearthat the United States is not even at the enhanced strategy option stage butrather still involved with a minimalist policy due mostly to a lack of fundingfor space initiatives. These various strategies are highlighted in order topromote the understanding that currently the United States has decidedto take a very loose security policy toward space, even taking into accountthe rhetoric of the National Security Space Strategy, and that there is agood deal of room for strengthening the strategy regardless of internationaltreaties.

Though the 2011 National Security Space Strategy outlines broad stra-tegic policy, there are three things that the United States should do immedi-ately in order to secure its space assets: (1) increase research anddevelopment (R&D) for space-based weapons; (2) reevaluate existing treat-ies related to space weaponization and U.S. participation in them; and (3)enhance support for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA).

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INCREASE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FORSPACE-BASED WEAPONS

In January 2001, the first space war game was conducted by the U.S. AirForce. The game was set in 2018 and involved an enemy state attackingU.S. satellites supporting a military operation on the ground. It showed thattaking into account the current lack of preparedness, without more fundingfor space defense, the United States could face a ‘‘Pearl Harbor in orbit.’’51

This simulation led to the conclusion that anti-satellite lasers and other spaceweapons could serve as potential deterrents against an attack on spaceassets.52 It is now over 10 years later, and the level of protection for spaceassets remains more or less unchanged. In fact, the recent space war gameconducted in April 2012 noted that ‘‘As the number of space systems andcapabilities has multiplied so have the vulnerabilities.’’53

Weapons in space could provide the best defense for space assets. Justas soldiers with guns provide protection for U.S. territory, armed space-basedsystems can protect space assets. However, weapons in space may not be assimple as weapons here on Earth. Though destroying satellites may not bethat complex, because most have few if any defenses and they travel inpredictable paths, simple destructive devices leave space debris, which leadto problems later for all spacefaring states and their space objects.54

Therefore, such weapons would be better suited for targeting objects notin space, such as threats on the ground and kinetic weapons targeting U.S.space assets. At times, destruction of a satellite or other space-based systemmight be in the best interests of the United States to promote its own security,and the same technology that can be used to protect space assets can also beused to preemptively strike foreign space assets that pose a threat.

Weapons that can be based in space currently come in two forms:kinetic energy weapons, by which the energy from the transferred momen-tum of the object is used to destroy a target, sometimes in conjunction withan explosive device; and directed energy weapons, by which energy is har-nessed and directed at the target in order to cause its destruction. In additionto these destructive weapons, what is needed for the future are new forms ofspace weapons that can be used to terminate enemy space assets withoutcausing bothersome orbital debris. However, for the time being, any weaponin space to protect U.S. interests would be better than no weapon in space,because space-based weapons are needed to complement current systemsused to defend space assets.

Kinetic Energy Weapons

Hit-to-kill, or kinetic energy weapons destroy their targets by impacting withthem at high speeds, converting the kinetic energy of the object into shockwaves that damage the target. Ground-launched interceptors, which have


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been the mainstay of many ballistic missile defense systems, utilize hit-to-killtechnology. The idea behind this technology is equivalent to hitting a bulletwith a bullet. Though the concept has been around since the 1960s,55 nuclearwarheads were initially designated for use as a near enough to the targetsolution, until guidance and navigation systems were advanced enough toallow for the interceptors to actually strike incoming missiles.

Initial kinetic kill ASAT weapons developed by the United States includea small homing rocket fired from an F-15. During a 1985 orbital test, theweapons destroyed an old satellite but created 285 pieces of space debrislarge enough to track from Earth and many more pieces that were too smallto track.56 In the 1990s, the U.S. Army explored a program of anti-satelliteresearch that uses rockets based on land to fire kill vehicles toward spacetargets, destroying them using kinetic energy but ‘‘not so forcefully as to gen-erate clouds of whirling debris that might damage friendly spacecraft innearby orbit.’’57 Most recently the U.S. Navy has taken the roll of theanti-satellite mission with the success of destroying a defunct but dangerousU.S. satellite with a standard missile (SM)-3 launched from an Aegis warship.58

The future may also see new forms of kinetic energy weapons. For overtwo decades, there has been research and discussion on the idea of an elec-tromagnetic rail gun or mass driver. Rail guns can fire a variety of projectiles,including mass amounts of unguided ones or fewer, heavier projectilesequipped with guidance systems.59 Some experts believe that such a devicecould even be mounted on the Moon and ‘‘accurately launch lunar rocks atcity-sized targets on Earth’’ with force ranging from 500 tons to theoreticallymegatons.60 However, there is question regarding the usefulness of such asystem because the time to impact would take hours if not days and, there-fore, the target would have to be fixed in position, and such force would alsobe useful for targets that could not be destroyed by other methods. Inaddition, such a system would be an affront to the Outer Space Treaty.61

Though the technology continues to be investigated by some, it will likelyremain more in the realm of science fiction than science fact for the foresee-able future. At present, simple kinetic energy weapons seem to be the choicefor countries who want to destroy space assets.

Directed Energy Weapons

Directed energy weapons (DEWs) come in two forms, as either a high-powerlaser or a particle beam. The most mature laser technology is that of chemicallasers, which are powered from the reaction of two chemicals, such as hydro-gen and fluorine or deuterium and fluorine.62 Currently, the strongest suchweapon in the U.S. arsenal is the mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIR-ACL). With an output of 2.2 MW emitted at a wavelength of 3.8 mm, MIRACLwas the first megawatt-class, continuous-wave chemical laser built by theUnited States.63 The MIRACL was fired at a U.S. satellite in 1997 to collect data

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on the effects of laser beams on sensitive satellite equipment. Though littledata has been released, the test suggests that the MIRACL laser could be usedas an anti-satellite weapon.64 Chemical lasers, such as MIRACL, are the basisof the first generation of combat lasers, because both the tactical high-energylaser (THEL) and the airborne laser (ABL) rely on them.

Another technology that has more or less been abandoned for use as aspace weapon, despite the attention it received in the 1980s, is the X-raylaser. This device would have, in theory, harnessed the power of a low-yieldnuclear explosion to emit pulses of X-rays at its targets.65 Thus, an X-ray laseris only a single-shot, self-destructing weapon. However, development ofsuch technology has taken a turn for scientific use rather than as a weaponlikely due to advances in other technologies that would not require puttingnuclear weapons in space.

Solving the Debris Problem

The problem, as mentioned before, with both most directed energy andkinetic energy weapons is that when they target an enemy space asset, thedestruction of the asset leaves space debris that is problematic for U.S. spaceassets. In fact, such events could generate tens if not hundreds of thousands offragments, which are too small to track, traveling at hundreds to thousands ofkilometers per hour that could impact and damage, if not destroy, spacefaringassets.66 James Clay Moltz suggested that the dangers and damage posed bysuch debris are reason enough to keep weapons out of space. In his argu-ment, Moltz prefers to protect civilian use of space by preventing weaponsin space. He provided no solution for defending access to space capabilitiesin a conflict other than throwing up more satellites or finding air and groundbased substitutes.67 However, putting more defunct satellites in space to useas decoys is not a viable option because they in a sense add to the debrisproblem, though not to the same extent as smaller nontrackable debris.

Those opposed to placing or employing weapons in space are quick tosuggest that transmission between space assets and Earth could be jammed.Jamming, and rendering the satellite useless without destroying it, is the leastlethal method of preventing a satellite from being useful to an enemy.Jamming devices can be space or ground based, but currently jamming isgenerally done from the ground. However, to jam a satellite requires highenergy on multiple frequencies in order to disrupt the signal between a satelliteand its ground station. The United States is already looking into jamming withthe aforementioned deployment of the 76th Space Control Squadron. Thethreats associated with jamming a satellite’s transmission have been aroundfor quite some time and there are many techniques already in place to preventthem.68 Jamming would not be an effective method of terminating the threatfrom a hardened space asset or against point-to-point laser communicationsystems, which are more costly but relatively simple means of defense.


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Another ‘‘clean’’ solution, particle beam weapons, may be more effec-tive, because they are not as easily defended against. Particle beam weaponsdiffer from other directed energy weapons, such as thermal kill lasers,because they instantaneously penetrate target interiors, rather than usingheat to burn through the target. This means that a particle beam would behighly destructive to the electronic circuitry of a space asset and wouldrequire less delivered energy.69 These weapons can utilize either neutral orcharged particles. Neutral particle beams only work well in a vacuum, andcharged particle beams work well only in atmosphere. Particle beamweapons would be suited for space-based deployment against space-basedthreats or ground-based deployment for ground-based threats but will notwork well between the two mediums.70 Tests conducted in 1989 suggestedthat neutral particle beam lasers could be developed for ‘‘defensive, spacebased weapons systems.’’71 Despite the theoretical effectiveness of suchweapons, it appears that such programs have gone dormant.

At present, the focus appears to be in electromagnetic and high-energyradio-frequency weapons. These so-called microwave weapons are welldeveloped and the closest to being deployed in space. This technologywould disable the electronics of an enemy weapon72 and thus have thepotential to be used as either an anti-satellite weapon or even an anti-anti-sat-ellite defense weapon. Firing either a high-power microwave beam orultra-wideband beam, both types are designed to fry the circuitry or knockout the electronics on their targets.73 In doing so, the satellites or anti-satelliteweapon would be left inert and likely drift into the atmosphere and disinte-grate, rather than leaving debris scatted in the paths of other satellites. Ofcourse, countermeasures are already being developed against microwaveweapons, but the costs of protecting assets is high.74

Arguments against Space Weapons

Some experts fear the possible negative ramifications of increasing R&D ofspace weapons. These drawbacks come in the form of a possible arms race.Helen Caldicott and Craig Eisendrath argued in their book, War in Heaven,that moving along a path to space weapons will lead to an arms race in spaceas countries try to match or defeat U.S. efforts.75 Though there is no argumentthat development of space weapons by one country will lead to similar orcounterdevelopments for another, it is naı̈ve to think that if the United Statesdoes not build the capabilities that no one else will. The history of nuclearweapon development shows that regardless of U.S. efforts, other countrieswere already working toward the same technology, and just because aweapon is used once does not imply that it will be used again.

Keeping to this analogy of nuclear weapons, Michael Krepon andMichael Katz-Hyman argued that space weapons will lead to an increase innuclear weapons proliferation because states will likely be ‘‘feeling less

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secure as a result of space weapons.’’76 In their article, they pointed to China,Russia, North Korea, and Iran as countries that already possess or are work-ing on nuclear weapons capabilities regardless of U.S. space weapon efforts.The idea that space weapons may lead to reduced feelings of securitydemonstrates the importance of the next aspect of the three-phase approachaddressed in this article, the reevaluation of security treaties related to space.

As stated previously, many countries have clearly been working tofurther their counter-space abilities despite the fact that the United Stateshas not been actively pursuing space weapon capabilities. These capabilitiesare currently being considered for use against dual-use systems, such as com-munications or navigation satellites. Increasing R&D on means and methodsto help prevent or mitigate attacks on these assets is of critical importance toboth military capabilities and maintaining our current way of life. Of course,there are risks and costs to such an approach, but the risks are potentiallymitigated through treaties and the costs through working with national andinternational partners.

REEVALUATING EXISTING TREATIES RELATEDTO SPACE WEAPONIZATION

In addition to increasing R&D of space-based weapons, the United Statesshould reevaluate the treaties that it has entered into regarding space weap-onization. International treaties have had many years of success in regard to awide range of security concerns from mitigating nuclear weapons prolifer-ation to creating formal alliance structures. However, one cannot assume thatjust because an international law exists that everyone will follow it. Currenttreaties seeking to prevent the militarization of space may reduce the possi-bilities of war in space on a theoretical level, but they are not currently work-ing to prevent an attack on space assets.77 During a time of war, certain rules,laws, and treaties are neglected, ignored, or discarded in accord withinternational law. Therefore, in addition to increasing R&D of space-basedweapons, the United States should reevaluate the treaties that it enters intoregarding space weaponization.

Through the treaties it has entered, the United States is pledged topreserve space for peaceful use and the benefit of all humanity. However,there are no current legal instruments that ban the weaponization of space.78

The only treaties that deal with the issue of weapons in space are the Treatyon Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use ofOuter Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer SpaceTreaty), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in itsresolution 2222 (XXI) in 1967, and the Agreement Governing the Activitiesof States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Moon Agreement),adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 34=68 in 1979.79


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Not only do these agreements not ban the stationing or use of weaponsin space, other than nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction, butthey received mixed support from the international community. The OuterSpace Treaty has been well received, with 127 signatories and 101 ratifica-tions, whereas the Moon Agreement has not, with 17 signatories and 13ratifications.80 In fact, the Moon Agreement, which does include a ban onusing the Moon or other celestial bodies for basing, testing, and militarymaneuvers, has not been ratified by any of the world’s space powers.

More defining treaties on the issue of space weapons and military usesof space have yet to be agreed upon. Some seek even more stringent controlsof outer space, such as with the Space Preservation Treaty, which wouldtotally ban space basing of weapons and the use of weapons to destroy ordamage objects in orbit.81 Such a treaty could be detrimental to the UnitedStates because it would be the modern-day equivalent of banning militaryships from sailing in international waters. At the same time, the UNConference on Disarmament has kept the topic of the ‘‘prevention of an armsrace in outer space’’ (PAROS) on its agenda for the past 30 years.82 ThoughUN resolutions for PAROS are widely supported, the United States has yetto agree to any resolution or treaty limiting activity in space, and perhapsrightfully so.83

The Outer Space Treaty calls for space to be available for use by anyonefor peaceful purposes. In order to ensure this, military assets must be set forthfor protection of space assets and to guarantee that space is not subject tooccupation by hostile forces. This is similar to how military ships in inter-national waters work to prevent pirating and other high-seas crimes. Thesesame principles can be extended to space basing of military systems. Thoughthe systems might have the ability to threaten numerous countries, due totheir control by the United States, this would be no more of an issue thana U.S. Navy vessel passing in the high seas, beyond the 12 nautical milesof territorial waters as established by the Law of the Seas, off the coast ofthose same countries. This strategy may in fact be currently in the mindsof U.S. decision makers who seek to avoid limiting U.S. options in spacein favor of transparency and confidence-building measures.

There have also been attempts for international treaties regarding ASATsystems specifically, but these treaties have had limited success. Talksbetween the United States and the Soviet Union were attempted in the late1970s and early 1980s, but they failed to produce any results.84 The UnitedStates appears to have lost interest in ASAT arms control until recently, andthe current objective seeks to rely on transparency, rather than treaties thatlimit actions in space. In 2008, Russia and China proposed a treaty to preventputting weapons in orbit, but the United States rejected the treaty, citing thatit would be difficult to enforce, and prefers ‘‘discussions aimed at promotingtransparency and confidence-building measures,’’ rather than treaties thatseek ‘‘to prohibit or limit access to or use of space.’’85 This line of thinking

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was followed up with the 2010 National Space Policy, which mentions thegoal of developing ‘‘transparency and confidence-building measures(TCBMs),’’ but so far no such measures have been enacted.86 TCBMs maybe the key regarding future international space treaties because they havebeen relatively effective for past arms control efforts.

Another possibility currently being discussed is the implementation of a‘‘Space Code of Conduct.’’87 The European Union (EU) drafted such a docu-ment in 2008.88 The concepts behind such a system are good in theory. Theyprovide for a set of rules and regulations that countries would agree to followin regard to space-based activities. Overall, the code calls for EU countries,and other states that wish to endorse or adopt the code, to participate on avoluntary basis by pledging to be good citizens in space, abide by existingtreaties, and be more transparent in space activities, for the good of all spaceusers. However, it is currently unclear how this would be any more effectivethan other international treaties that can be easily ignored. Attacking a spacesystem of a sovereign state would be tantamount to war, if not terrorism. Justas warfare has happened for years, despite treaties and international accords,space systems will eventually come under attack as they become increasinglyrelied upon both to support the warfighter and for everyday needs.Therefore, any effective space code of conduct would need to acknowledgerights of self-defense.89

Of course, some international treaties have seen success. The keybehind the success of those treaties seems to be based on the transparencygranted through the treaties and the ability to punish treaty violators. In orderfor the international system to decrease the threat to space assets and guaran-tee space access to all nations, stronger treaties that can respond to violationsare needed. Rather than a treaty aimed at preventing the weaponization ofspace, what should be promoted is a treaty that provides the openness calledfor through TCBMs and has strict punishments in place to act as a deterrentagainst rule breakers who attack space systems.

ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR NASA

In addition to a focus on weapons and treaties, there should be a focus onspace systems in general. The roots of the Space Age trace back to the late1930s, when a ‘‘peripatetic collaboration between the rocketeers and nationalmilitary establishments was inaugurated.’’90 The space program started as amilitary program. Even after the separation, and NASA’s takeover of thecivilian space sector, there have been dual-use projects. In addition to NASAprojects with known military implications, military personal are involvedwith NASA R&D and are often utilized as NASA test pilots and astronauts.

One program, the Manned Spaceflight Engineer (MSE) Program, specifi-cally involved Air Force military personnel who were assigned to specific


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military payloads on the Space Shuttle and were responsible for checking outand deploying them.91 These engineers also performed scientific studieson-board the Space Shuttle and it was hoped that they would gather infor-mation that could be useful to military manned space missions.92 Thoughthe MSE program was cancelled after the Space Shuttle Challenger accident,a similar program may indeed prove useful to both the military and civilianspace sectors in the future.

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, is a site that has been used forboth military and civilian rocketry due to its ability to launch spacecraft intopolar orbits.93 Additionally, systems often find a dual use. For example, theSpace Shuttle was designed to meet both civilian and military needs as pub-lic policy directed all national security and civil flights to fly on the system.The Air Force worked with NASA on the Space Shuttle project, includingthe development of specialized technologies with military applications,such as support for launching satellites.94 In fact, DOD participation in aworking group of the Senior Interagency Group on Space determined thatdespite the objections of some within the agency, ‘‘DOD will be primarilydependent on the shuttle after the mid-1980s.’’95

Currently, all military applications for space systems involve unmannedplatforms, despite the fact that the DOD has had a ‘‘long-term interest inmanned spaceflight.’’96 Previous manned systems such as the Dyna-Soar,or X-20, and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) were cancelled dueto their limited capabilities and, arguably, the competition for Apollo projectfunds.97 Rather than developing separate systems, it would be in the bestinterest for DOD to work with NASA in order to improve dual-use mannedand unmanned missions in space. By combing funding on joint initiatives,as well as expertise, the DOD will gain information and experience that willhelp the DOD to better prepare for the day when manned military space-flights are a common occurrence.

The future of space warfare is likely to include both unmanned andmanned platforms. Though the near future is likely to see defensiveweaponry based in space to protect space assets, the distant future couldinvolve manned space combat. When this time comes, the experience andinformation gathered from civilian manned space flights will be invaluable.By working with NASA, the premier space agency in the world, the DOD willstrengthen its base of knowledge and expertise for space systems.

A NASA partnership would obviously work in tandem with increasingR&D on space-based weapons, and such a partnership could also influenceinternational treaties. NASA has been insurmountable with negotiatingspace-related treaties with other countries, arguably even better than theUN. Though the UN has passed a few resolutions calling for peaceful useof space and being respectful of space systems and their operators, NASAwas able to arrange the first international meeting in space. This meeting,known as the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, involved U.S. astronauts and Soviet

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cosmonauts linking up and shaking hands in space, during the height of theCold War between the United States and the Soviet Union down on Earth.

Space cooperation with programs like the International Space Stationhave allowed for joint functioning and knowledge sharing. A partnershipbetween the DOD and NASA involving the military space conglomerates ofother countries, especially allies, such as the British or the Australians, couldlead to a stronger space defense in a way similar to defense pacts on Earth.

In the past, NASA has had a mixed history in dealing with the military, attimes bending to their will and other times failing to prioritize military pro-grams due to seeing itself as a civil-space organization. However, with fund-ing cuts looming on the horizon for both agencies and the need to tightenbudgets, more cooperation between the two organizations may allow foradvances that neither organization alone could achieve.

CONCLUSIONS

Unilateral control of space provides a vantage point from which an actorcould overpower every opponent; therefore, U.S. military space forces needmeans to ‘‘forestall strategic surprise’’ and ‘‘respond successfully.’’98 TheUnited States does not want another Sputnik-style surprise in space,especially not one that is armed, ready to destroy U.S. space assets, and atthe hands of an enemy nation seeking to dominate space.

It is argued that if the United States starts putting weapons in space,another arms race will begin.99 However, the arms race in space may beunavoidable because a perception that the race has already begun currentlyexists. In China, military experts are suggesting that the United States isattempting to militarize space and that China must respond in kind.100 Thishas led India to take action, and who knows which other countries will jumpon the bandwagon next.101 It would appear that a new type of arms race willbe inevitable, and therefore the United States should act before we getbehind. ASAT capabilities are the leading factor in this race, but reports of‘‘Rods from God’’ and ‘‘Death Stars’’ are fueling the fire for countries todevelop more offensive weapons.102

It should be kept in mind that R&D of space weapons does not neces-sarily mean deployment and operations and that is the rationale for consider-ing treaties and engaging the civilian space sector as well as focusing onmilitary resources. It is more important for the United States to have capabili-ties to respond to a threat than to initiate an arms race. Space is just anothermedium, which has aspects that make it unique, but similar to the unique-ness found when air was added to the mediums of warfare and battles werenot just limited to land and sea.103 Due to the fact that military and commer-cial interests exist in space, it is only a matter of time before there is struggleover those resources.


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The United States has pledged to preserve space, and because no inter-national treaty is currently working to prevent ill-intentioned countries fromstarting trouble, the United States must act to keep the peace in space, even ifthat means by the use of force to defend space systems. In order to do so effec-tively, continued work on all fronts relating to the current and future use ofspace assets is required. If this arms race has indeed already begun, the UnitedStates does not want to fall behind. By increasing R&D for space-based weap-ons, reevaluating existing treaties, and working with NASA, the country willbe better prepared to protect space assets when and if it becomes necessary.

NOTES

1. The White House, ‘‘Presidential Directive on National Space Policy,’’ Fact Sheet, 11 February 1988.

2. The White House, ‘‘A National Security Strategy for a New Century,’’ October 1998.

3. Secretary of State, Request to Allies for New Demarche to China Regarding China’s January 2007

Anti-Satellite Test. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/china-wikileaks/8299317/REQUEST-TO-

ALLIES-FOR-NEW-DEMARCHE-TO-CHINA-REGARDING-CHINAS-JANUARY-2007-ANTI-SATELLITE-

TEST.html (accessed September 2012).

4. Department of Defense, ‘‘National Security Space Strategy,’’ January 2011.

5. Dana J. Johnson et al., Space: Emerging Options for National Power (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,

1998), 12. Also see Gen. Lance W. Lord, ‘‘Our Goals and Priorities for 2005’’ (speech given at the Space

Foundation’s 2005 Board of Directors Dinner, Orlando, Fla., January 2005).

6. John M. Collins, ‘‘Space Warfare May Become Necessary,’’ in Charles P. Cozic, ed., Space

Exploration: Opposing Viewpoints (San Diego, Calif.: Greenhaven Press, 1992), 158.

7. Gen. Lance W. Lord, ‘‘Space Supremacy’’ (speech given at the Air Force Association’s National Air

and Space Conference, Washington, D.C., September 2004).

8. Bill Gertz, ‘‘U.S. Deploys Warfare Unit to Jam Enemy Satellites,’’ Washington Times, 22

September 2005, 3. Also see Lord, ‘‘Space Supremacy’’ (note 7).

9. Charles W. Cook, ‘‘National Security,’’ in Theodore R. Simpson Ed., The Space Station: An Idea

Whose Time Has Come (New York: IEEE Press, 1985), 180. Collins, ‘‘Space Warfare’’ (note 6), 158.

10. Johnson et al. (note 5), 22. Also see Jeffrey Mason, Space: Battleground of Frontier of the 21st

Century. http://www.cdi.org/issues/bmd/21stcent.html (accessed September 2012).

11. Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘‘The U.S. Needs Space Weapons to Counter Global Military Threats,’’ in

Charles P. Cozic, ed., Space Exploration: Opposing Viewpoints (San Diego, Calif.: Greenhaven Press, 1992), 142.

12. Iran News Agency, ‘‘Satellite-Iran-Space,’’ retrieved from Lexis-Nexis (26 September 2005). Iran

put a satellite in space in late 2005 using a Cosmos-3 Russian booster. Also see Arye Egozi, ‘‘Looking at

Israel,’’ Yedi’ot Aharonot [newspaper]. Translation available as ‘‘Israelli Expert Comments on Iran’s Immi-

nent Launch of Spy Satellites,’’ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 14 September 2005.

13. Jeffery Kluger, Kim’s Rocket Fails, but North Korea’s Space Threat Is Scarier Than You Think.

http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2111703,00.html (accessed September 2012).

14. Mahnken (note 11), 144–145.

15. Egozi, ‘‘Looking at Israel’’ (note 12).

16. James Oberg, Are We Setting Ourselves Up for a Space Pearl Harbor?, para. 5. http://www.

jamesoberg.com/06122001pearlharbor_pol.html (accessed September 2012).

17. Ibid., para. 18.

18. George J. Tenent, Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate

Select Committee on Intelligence on the ‘‘Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World’’ (as

prepared for delivery), para. 32. https://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2001/UNCLASWWT_

02072001.html (accessed September 2012).

19. As quoted from Al Santoli, ed. ‘‘Beijing Describes How to Defeat U.S. in High-Tech War; Russia–

China Military Technology Agreement Detailed,’’ China Reform Monitor 12 September 2000, 331. http://

www.afpc.org/crm/crm331.htm (accessed September 2012).

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20. John M. Collins, Military Space Forces: The Next 50 Years (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon–

Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1989), 137.

21. Gertz, ‘‘U.S. Deploys Warfare Unit’’ (note 8), 3.

22. Jonathan Amos, China Launches Space Mission with First Woman Astronaut, http://

www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-18458544 (accessed September 2012).

23. Miles O’Brian et al., NASA Grounds Shuttle Fleet. http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/space/07/

27/space.shuttle (accessed September 2012).

24. Christopher A. Davis, Executive Summary: The Militarization of Space—Spurring or Deterring

Future Conflict? http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/1989/DCA/htm (accessed November

2011).

25. Mason, ‘‘Space’’ (note 10); Daniel Gonzales, The Changing Role of the U.S. Military in Space

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 27–28. David Hobbs, An Illustrated Guide to Space Warfare: ‘‘Star Wars’’

Technology Diagrammed and Explained (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1986), 12. Also see L. B.

Taylor, Jr., Space: Battleground of the Future? (New York: Franklin Watts, 1988), 104–117; and Mark Wade,

‘‘IS-A,’’ in Encyclopedia Astronautica. http://www.astronautix.com/craft/isa.htm (accessed November

2011).

26. The Guardian, ‘‘China Confirms Anti-Satellite Missile Test,’’ 22 January 2007. http://www.

guardian.co.uk/science/2007/jan/23/spaceexploration.china (accessed September 2012). BBC News,

Concern over China’s Missile Test. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6276543.stm (accessed

September 2012).

27. Jamie McIntyre et al., Navy Missile Hits Dying Spy Satellite, Says Pentagon. http://edition.cnn.

com/2008/TECH/space/02/20/satellite.shootdown/ (accessed October 2012).

28. RIA Novosti, Russian Officer Says Developing New Weapon for Space Defense. http://en.rian.ru/

russia/20100515/159029349.html (accessed September 2012).

29. Sandeep Unnithan, ‘‘India Has All the Building Blocks for an Anti-Satellite Capability,’’ India

Today, 27 April 2012. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/agni-v-drdo-chief-dr-vijay-kumar-saraswat-

interview/1/186248.html (accessed September 2012).

30. Gonzales, The Changing Role of the U.S. Military (note 25), 32 and 37.

31. Leonard David, ‘‘China’s Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud Circles Earth,’’ para. 3.

http://www.space.com/3415-china-anti-satellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.html (accessed

September 2012).

32. Gertz, ‘‘U.S. Deploys Warfare Unit’’ (note 8), 3.

33. Ibid., 3.

34. ‘‘Some say this kind of attack has already happened. A British military communications satellite

was reportedly kidnapped and driven off courser by hackers, though officials denied it.’’ James Oberg,

‘‘The Heavens at War,’’ New Scientist, 2 June 2001, para. 6. http://www.jamesoberg.com/heavens.html

(accessed September 2012).

35. See G. E. Perry, ‘‘Russian Hunter–Killer Satellite Experiments,’’ The Royal Air Forces Quarterly 1

(November 1977), 328–335; ‘‘The Nation: Targeting a Hunter–Killer,’’ Time Magazine, 17 October 1977;

and Bernard Weinraub, ‘‘Brown Says Soviets Can Fell Satellites,’’ New York Times, 5 October 1977, A1.

36. ‘‘The gun was pointed to the target by revolving the whole station. This weapon proved to work

in space environment. In one of flights, just before the braking impulse to the station, flying automatically,

the gun ammo was shot out. The cannon fired accurately, and all the constructions appeared reliable and

rigid.’’ Igor Marinin and Sergej Shamsutdinov, ‘‘Almazs,’’ Air Fleet Herald for the Proletariat Dictatorship

(in Russian) 5=6 (1995): 89–91. As quoted from Seven Grahn, Almaz Space Station Program. http://

www.svengrahn.pp.se/histind/Almprog/almprog.htm (accessed July 2010). Also see Oberg, ‘‘Are We

Setting Ourselves Up for a Space Pearl Harbor?’’ (note 16).

37. Cesar Jaramillo, ed. Space Security 2011 (Kitchener, Ontario, Canada: Pandora Press, 2011).

38. Oberg, ‘‘Are We Setting Ourselves Up for a Space Pearl Harbor?’’ (note 16).

39. The existence of these parasite satellites is highly debated and little evidence on either side of the

argument exists.

40. Oberg, ‘‘The Heavens at War’’ (note 34).

41. Collins, Military Space Forces (note 20), 51.

42. Ibid., 60.

43. Vago Muradian, ‘‘China Attempted to Blind U.S. Satellites with Laser,’’ Defense News,

28 September 2006. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2121111&C=america (accessed

May 2008).


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44. Yousaf Butt, ‘‘Effects of Chinese Laser Ranging Systems on Imaging Satellites,’’ Science and

Global Security 17 (2009): 20–35.

45. Scott Peterson, ‘‘Iran Hijacked U.S. Drone, Says Iranian Engineer,’’ Christian Science Monitor, 15

December 2011. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-US-

drone-says-Iranian-engineer-Video (accessed September 2012).

46. Air Force Space Command, Almanac 2004–2005, 7.

47. Johnson et al. (note 5), 40.

48. National Space Council, ‘‘Ensuring America’s Technological Superiority Should Be the Main

Goal,’’ in Charles P. Cozic, ed., Space Exploration: Opposing Viewpoints (San Diego, Calif.: Greenhaven

Press, 1992), 50.

49. Edward L. Rowny, ‘‘Space is Part of Our Security: Some Defense Functions Can only be Conduc-

ted from Above,’’ Los Angeles Times, 18 July 1989, as quoted in Collins, ‘‘Space Warfare’’ (note 6), 158.

50. Johnson et al. (note 5), 48–65. A table summarizing the differences between the options can be

found on page 56.

51. Oberg, ‘‘The Heavens at War’’ (note 34); and Oberg, ‘‘Are We Setting Ourselves Up for a Space

Pearl Harbor?’’ (note 16).

52. Thomas E. Ricks, ‘‘Space Is Playing Field for Newest War Game,’’ Washington Post, 29 January

2001, A01.

53. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Schriever Wargame 2012 International HQ SACT Report.

http://www.act.nato.int/mainpages/schriever-wargame-2012-international (accessed September 2012).

54. Gonzales, The Changing Role of the U.S. Military (note 25), 37.

55. In 1964 President Johnson announced that the United States had two operational ASAT systems,

Thor and Nike Zeus. Lyn Dutton et al., ‘‘Military Space,’’ in Brassey’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems

and Technology Series, Vol. 10 (London: Brassey’s, 1990).

56. Today, Space Surveillance Network radars can detect space objects in LEO with a diameter of

10 cm or larger. Gonzales, The Changing Role of the U.S. Military (note 25), 49. For more on F-15 ASAT

capabilities see Dutton et al., ‘‘Military Space’’ (note 56), 158–159.

57. William J. Broad, ‘‘In Era of Satellites, Army Plots Ways to Destroy Them,’’ New York Times, 4

March 1997, C1.

58. Department of Defense, Navy Succeeds in Intercepting Non-Functioning Satellite. http://

www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=35114 (accessed September 2012).

59. ‘‘This works by passing a powerful electrical current—up to several megaamps—though two

parallel rails. A projectile fits between the rails, making electrical contact across them, and as the current

flows Lorentz forces act to propel it along the rails.’’ Hobbs, An Illustrated Guide (note 25), 120. Also see

Dutton et al., ‘‘Military Space’’ (note 55), 164.


61. Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law. http://

www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/treaties.html (accessed September 2012).

62. Hobbs, An Illustrated Guide (note 25), 108.

63. Ibid., 110. Also see Federation of American Scientists, Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser.

http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/miracl.htm (accessed September 2012).

64. Chris Plante, Pentagon Beams over Military Laser Test. http://web.archive.org/web/

20071230052044/http:==www.cnn.com/US/9710/20/pentagon.laser (accessed September 2012).


66. Mason, ‘‘Space’’ (note 10).

67. James Clay Moltz, ‘‘Reining in the Space Cowboys,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 59 (January=

February 2003): 61–66.

68. Dutton et al., ‘‘Military Space’’ (note 55), 70–71.

69. Ibid., 171.


71. G. J. Nunz, Beam Experiments aboard a Rocket (BEAR) Project Final Report Vol. 1; Project

Summary, 4. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a338597.pdf (accessed August 2012).

72. ‘‘Electromagnetic Weapons, Frying Tonight,’’ The Economist, 15–21 October 2011, 89.

73. Oberg, ‘‘The Heavens at War’’ (note 34).

74. ‘‘Electromagnetic Weapons, Frying Tonight’’ (note 72), 89.

75. Helen Caldicott and Craig Eisendrath, War in Heaven: The Arms Race in Outer Space (New York:

New Press, 2007).

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76. Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman, ‘‘Space Weapons and Proliferation,’’ Nonproliferation

Review 12:2 (July 2005): 323–341.

77. Sean J. Coleman, ‘‘Space-based Weapons are Wrong,’’ in Proceedings of the United States Naval

Institute 128:2 (February 2002): 96.

78. Ted McKenna, ‘‘Is Space Weaponization Inevitable?’’ The Journal of Electronic Defense 28, no. 7

(July 2005): 20.

79. Office for Outer Space Affairs, ‘‘United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law’’ (note 61).

80. The difference in signatories and ratifications is representative of those countries who have

signed the agreements but are yet to have ratified them in their own country. See United Nations Office

for Outer Space Affairs, Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space. http://

www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html (accessed September 2012); and see United

Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law. http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/treaties.html


81. Institute for Cooperation in Space, Space Preservation Treaty. http://www.peaceinspace.com/

sp_treaty.shtml (accessed August 2012).

82. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Safeguarding Space Security: Prevention of

an Arms Race in Outer Space. http://unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-179-3-en.pdf (accessed

September 2012).

83. Paul Meyer, ‘‘PAROS in Peril: Prospects for Renewed Outer Space Security Diplomacy’’ (paper

presented at Moving Ahead on Space Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington,

DC, December 2010). http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/

documents/nwgs/renewed-outer-space-security-diplomacy-pmeyer.pdf (accessed September 2012).

84. Matthew Mowthorpe, ‘‘The United States Requirements for an Antisatellite (ASAT) Capability,’’

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85. Nick Cumming-Bruce, ‘‘U.N. Weighs a Ban on Weapons in Space, but U.S. Still Objects,’’ New

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92. Cook, ‘‘National Security’’ (note 9), 183.


94. Taylor, Space (note 25), 51–59, 83–90.

95. Cook, ‘‘National Security’’ (note 9), 185.

96. Ibid., 181.

97. Ibid., 182.

98. Collins, ‘‘Space Warfare’’ (note 6), 163.

99. Steven Lambakis, ‘‘SpaceWeapons: Refuting theCritics,’’Policy Review (February&March 2001): 41–51.

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102. Michael Katz-Hyman, ‘‘Outer-Space Threats,’’ USA Today, 20 June 2005, 14A.

103. For a more complete analysis of morality and ethics in relation to space warfare, see John Hyten

and Robert Uy, ‘‘Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare,’’ Air & Space Power Journal,

XVIII:2 (Summer 2004): 51–60.


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Documents

Weapons in Space: The Need to Protect Space Assets