Origen’s “Beautiful Captive Woman,” Polyvalence, and the Meaning of the “Righteousness of God” in Romans 1:17

James B. De Young

Introduction

Origen of the third century read Deuteronomy 21:10-14 in a special, allegorical way. The text says that an Israelite man may take a beautiful non-Israelite woman captured in battle to his home as his wife under special conditions. She is to put aside her pagan identity and please her new captor.

From this historical text Origen found a special meaning. He believed that it was teaching that a Christian could capture from pagan or non-Christian literature truth that was thoroughly biblical in its meaning. In other words, pagan literature sometimes expresses true truth. Later users of this figure cited the Apostle Paul’s use of pagan writers (such texts as Acts 17:28 and Tit. 1:12-13) as precedent. After purifying it, Paul found a “beautiful captive woman” in the pagan literature of his time.1

This past year the Evangelical Theological Society, fall, 2010, gave special attention to argue the New Perspectives on Paul and the Law (NPP). Frank Thielman, of Beeson Divinity School, sought to contribute to the issue of the NPP by arguing at length in his presentation that the term dikaiosunh (“righteousness”) in the phrase, “the righteousness of God,” as occurring in Romans 1:17, was polyvalent—that it had three meanings.2 He summarized his interpretation of the “righteousness of God” as including (1) the saving activity of God, as saving his people in faithfulness to his commitment to the Abrahamic covenant; (2) God’s “gift of acquittal from sin on the basis of faith”; and (3) “most obviously” a reference “to a property of God’s character, that he is fair, even-handed, and equitable in the way he distributes salvation.” 3

In his paper Thielman traces the history of precedents to his third idea. He notes that prior to Luther the third idea for defining the “righteousness of God” was understood as pointing to God’s nature of “strict justice in punishing the guilty and rewarding the virtuous”;4 and it was the only definition given to the phrase. Luther, however, asserted that the “righteousness of God” is not a statement of God’s nature but a “gift [of righteousness] that God gives to the sinner who has faith.”5 This was the sole Protestant meaning given to the “righteousness of God” until the early twentieth century. Thielman cites several texts that support Luther’s newer understanding (Rom. 1:17—the quote of Hab. 2:4; Rom. 3:21-24; 3:26; 10:3; Phil. 3:9; 2 Cor. 5:21).

With the twentieth century came a return to the idea that the “righteousness of God” referred to an attribute of God, but this time it was defended as meaning the “saving power of God.”6 Thielman cites proponents of this understanding, including Ropes (1903), Dodd (1932), Kasemann (1961; 1973), and Fitzmyer (1993) who thought that the “gift” idea for the

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“righteousness of God” was not suitable anywhere in Romans. In recent years the debate over the phrase has been between the two options of a gift of God or his attribute as saving power, with some choosing both ideas (Thielman cites Moo here).7 People of both views appealed to the Old Testament and Jewish background for support for their interpretation of the phrase; they did not appeal to any Greek ideas for support. But Thielman believes that the Roman pagan culture of Paul’s day supports a third idea for the “righteousness of God” that should be read along with the other two at Romans 1:17, that it is the “most obvious meaning” intended by Paul for the phrase.8 It is that God is “fair, even-handed, and equitable” in how he distributes salvation. Thielman derives this meaning from the Roman culture of Paul’s day.

In light of Origen’s defense of pagan literature, I ask: Is Thielman’s definition of the “righteousness of God” an example of Origen’s “beautiful captive woman”—a meaning representing true truth found in pagan literature and culture?

Thielman’s Defense of His Interpretation

What Thielman proposes is a reconsideration of an idea for the attribute of God. But instead of the idea of God’s attribute of justice Thielman proposes the idea that God is equitable, an idea that apparently has been rejected before.9

Thielman argues for his interpretation in several ways. First, he argues that Paul’s Christian readers of Romans would have, by the time of the writing of Romans (about AD 57, from Corinth), a pagan or Gentile background, that they would be unacquainted with the Old Testament meaning of “righteousness.” Thus, Thielman observes, while “Paul was clearly indebted to the Old Testament for his concept of ‘the righteousness of God,’” it “seems improbable that when the apostle wrote to them he intended for them to exclude from their thinking specifically Greek and Roman notions of righteousness.”10 Thielman adds that “Paul is unlikely to have written a letter that he knew would be unintelligible to most of his audience.”11 Thielman cites the work of Peter Oakes in support of his statements.

I will return to critique these statements that Thielman makes. For now I proceed to discuss the additional arguments that Thielman makes for his interpretation.

Thielman next gives a very significant place to the work of Origen to support his interpretation that the “righteousness of God” refers to God’s attribute of fairness. Citing Origen’s fragmentary commentary on Romans (dated 246; the “earliest extant interpretation of the whole letter”), Thielman argues that whereas elsewhere Origen took the “righteousness of God” to mean his “distributive justice” this is not the case for Romans 1:17. Instead, Origen interprets the phrase here to mean “God’s impartiality in distributing salvation to everyone who has faith, whatever their ethnic origin or social standing.”12 This is Thielman’s interpretation of Origen. He supports this understanding by saying that Origen emphasizes God’s “fairness, equity, and impartiality” in Romans 1:14-16 in making the gospel available to all without social boundaries. Then Thielman quotes Origen on verse 17: “The righteousness of God is revealed in

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the gospel through the fact that with respect to salvation no one is excluded whether he should come as a Jew, Greek, or barbarian. For the Savior says equally to all, ‘Come to me, all you that labor and are burdened.’”13

From this quote Thielman concludes that the “righteousness of God” is “God’s fairness and impartiality, his unwillingness to exclude anyone from salvation on the basis of his or her social standing.”14 Thielman appeals to this quote from Origen several times, and finally again at the very end. Yet is this a proper interpretation of Origen? There are at least three concerns I find here, which I discuss below.

For his third support, Thielman cites the “ancient Greek lexicon” from Plato that defines dikaiosunh as “what is deserved,” “what appears to be just,” “a law abiding way of life,” “social equality,” and “the state of obedience to the laws.”15 To this writer it seems that of these five ideas only one comes close to the idea of fairness, and translates i`so,thj koinwnikh,.

Fourth, Thielman turns aside the objection that Origen may simply be citing the idea of fairness (ivso,thj) as one of the four cardinal virtues of Greek philosophy, as Wilckens writes.16 Thielman argues instead that Origen was using the everyday Greek idiom of the Roman empire. To support this claim about Origen Thielman cites the coins in popular use at the time. This support consumes the bulk of the remainder of his paper.

Thielman cites Reumann that the “goddess Dikaiosyne with scales appears on Alexandrian coins and on Roman coins as an attribute of Aequitas, “equality/fairness/justice personified.”17 Thielman admits that he cannot find evidence to support Reumann’s claim; but he does find evidence on coins to show that personified “righteousness” and “impartiality” are represented as the same goddess, that they seem “to be interchangeable concepts on these coins.”18

The connection of the coins with goddesses raises significant questions for Thielman’s proposal, I believe. I’ll return to this matter in the section of evaluation below.

Thielman further observes about these coins that various emperors used the coins to convince the common people that they were the embodiment of various virtues, such as piety, mercy, harmony, fortune, peace, providence, and victory; and that they wanted the people to trust them to administer the affairs of Rome for the people’s welfare.

The woman portrayed on the coins as personified aequitas holds a balance in her outstretched right hand. Since this coinage also has two other symbols on it—a cornucopia and a chair of state, Thielman concludes that the coin’s message was that the emperor conducted his office with “complete equity.”19 It was an entirely positive, not a negative, message. Thielman cites this as confirming his interpretation of Origen’s statement on Romans 1:17.20

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During Nero’s reign coins depicted Nero on one side, and the goddess with the balance on the other side, now with the superscription, DIKAIOSUNH. Thielman concludes that the term is allied with “equity.” And while he concedes that “this impartiality, or fairness, could no doubt be conceived negatively in terms of impartial distribution of punishment to law-breakers,” it could “certainly also be understood positively as the equal distribution of a blessing, such as food.”21 Yet he makes another concession, for such coins labeled dikaiosu,nh apparently were circulated only in Egypt (far from Paul’s Roman recipients). Nevertheless, he writes that “it seems likely” that Paul’s readers would have associated the “righteousness of God” with his impartiality and fairness, and that Origen correctly interpreted Romans 1:17 in this way.22

At this point Thielman correctly observes that what the Roman emperor and common people believed to be fair or equitable would not be what Paul believed to be such in God’s eyes. Nevertheless, Thielman appeals again to Origen as correctly representing Paul’s view, that Romans 1:17 is not arguing the equity of God in meting out justice but in “saving everyone who believes no matter what their social group.”23 Yet, below I will raise concerns about Origen’s interpretation of Romans 1:17.

Thielman states a result of his new interpretation of the “righteousness of God.” He believes that in light of his reading of Romans 1:17 it is correct to speak of the “social dimension of justification”; and that this was seen by one of the earliest voices of the New Perspective (Markus Barth, 1968), along with N.T. Wright (Paul in Fresh Perspective). I’m not sure of the significance of this.

At this point in his presentation Thielman ends his defense for his view. Yet he takes up another point (what I’m calling #5): its appropriateness. He asks whether the idea he has been defending invalidates the other interpretations (that the phrase means God’s gift of righteousness and God’s active, saving power). He concludes that all three meanings are embedded in this “dense reading.”

However, Theilman acknowledges that he must deal with two problems. (1) How can Paul in Romans 1:17 mean “fairness” for the noun “righteousness” but for the following adjective (v. 17b) mean “acquitted” or “in the right”?24 Thielman defends this quick “shift” of meaning by appealing to Romans 3:26 where in one verse Paul uses the noun (“righteousness”) and the adjective (“just”) to refer to the nature of God, but then uses the verb (“to justify”) to refer to an activity of God by which he gives righteousness to the believer.25 Yet are these parallel cases?

The (2) second problem is how there can be three meanings for “righteousness” in the one phrase, the “righteousness of God”? To justify the “dense, three-layered, reading of righteousness in Romans 1:17” Thielman appeals to the work of Downing (NTS, 56 (2010) 139-62) who asserts that in ancient writers words were not used in a “very precise way”; that words could have more than “one connotation”; and in discursive literature there were no “fine

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distinctions of meaning.”26 Thielman takes this information and makes a conclusion about Romans 1:17, which, because of its import, I quote in full.

If that is correct, and if 1:16-17 constitutes the thesis sentence of Romans, then we should not expect Paul to use the phrase dikaiosu,nh qeou/ with one precise meaning. Instead, the phrase has a richness that allows Paul to highlight one aspect in some contexts and another aspect in other contexts in order to contribute to the total idea that he is trying to communicate when he defines the gospel. The surrounding literary context, then, will define which aspect of the expressions’ total range of associations Paul wants to communicate.27

Thielman further defends this conclusion that there are three meanings for “righteousness” by appealing to the reasonableness of finding two meanings (a gift from God; and God’s saving power), which many interpreters support. Yet it is not clear how or why two meanings must validate the possibility of three meanings. Also, Thielman’s statement raises concerns regarding polyvalence which I address below.

Thielman next appeals to the wider context for support of his idea that God’s fairness should be read in Romans 1:17. Again he cites Origen’s discovery of this idea in 1:14-16. Then he appeals to Romans 1:18-3:5 and argues that “every use of righteousness language brings out the fairness of God in the sense of his impartiality.”28 Yet Thielman acknowledges that a theological problem arises as one continues on through Romans 3:21-26: “How can God who is fair and impartial justify those whose unrighteous actions clearly show them to be unrighteous?”29 In other words, how can God give salvation without partiality in 1:14-17, judge impartially unbelievers on the basis of their evil works (chap. 2), but then “turn a blind eye to the unrighteousness and ungodliness of a select group of believers” and save them (chap. 3)? The answer to this problem, Thielman believes, is the atoning nature of Christ’s death. Citing Schreiner (Paul, Apostle of God’s Glory in Christ: A Pauline Theology, Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2001; pp. 200-201) in support, Thielman notes that believers are not righteous in themselves but their sins have been removed by the atoning death of Christ. Thus God both saves and judges at the cross. God “remains just at the same time that he became the justifier of the one who has faith in Jesus (3:26).”30

It is on this point that Thielman concludes his paper—a point upon which all evangelicals can agree. His very last words restate the three meanings he finds in the “righteousness of God” in Romans 1:17 and his acknowledgement that the third meaning goes back to Origen—that “the righteousness of God is the fairness of God in bringing salvation to all kinds of people regardless of their social standing or ethnic origins.”31 Readers of this present paper will note that the words “bringing salvation” differ little from the words Thielman used above (“distributing salvation”) to interpret Origen. Yet it seems that neither terminology is what Origen used nor his meaning. More about this comes below.

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This, then, is the thrust of Thielman’s study. The word “righteousness” in the phrase, the “righteousness of God” in Romans 1:17, is polyvalent (a word he uses at least twice in his paper). It has three meanings: God’s saving activity; the gift of righteousness from God; and impartiality or fairness or equitableness. It is the last meaning that Thielman proposes and defends in three ways: it is the meaning that Origen assigned to the phrase; it is the meaning that the pagan culture of Paul’s day would take it to mean; and it is supported by the context of Romans 1-3 and other texts from Paul. It is important to note that Thielman asserts that Paul “intended” the term to be polyvalent.

Evaluation of the Proposal That God Is Impartial or Fair or Equitable in Romans 1:17

Thielman’s proposal raises several questions. How does one define “historical” in “grammatical-historical-contextual interpretation”? That is, what kind of influence on meaning does contemporary cultural/historical (using the terms interchangeably) meaning have on a term as used in the Bible, particularly in the New Testament? Second, what about polyvalence? Is it an option for communication, especially for the interpretation of the Bible? Finally, is Thielman’s proposal an illustration of Origen’s “beautiful captive woman”?32

Several attendant issues are raised. How does polyvalence relate to authorial intention? How does it relate to literal interpretation? How does polyvalence impact hermenteutics? In addition, Thielman’s proposal raises the whole matter of how to interpret Romans 1:17 and the phrase, the “righteousness of God.” His proposal provides an occasion to examine the exegesis of the text and the theology involved in the concept. Should the phrase be given a single meaning or plural meanings?

In the following pages this study uses Thielman’s presentation as an opportunity to think through the first two critical issues related to Biblical hermeneutics. In addition, this study will examine the plethora of other views (singular and polyvalent) on Romans 1:17 and seek to categorize the multitude of interpretations in an effort to come to a resolution of the meaning of the phrase. Henceforth, this study will refer to Thielman’s proposal as the “new proposal.”

Issues Raised within the Proposal Itself

There are several concerns that are raised within the proposal itself. In regards to the use of Origen it is clear that Origen does not use “equitable” or “fair” or “even-handed” in defining righteousness. Second, the adverb “equally” modifies the verb “says,” and is a clear reference to Matthew 11:28. It is not modifying the word, “righteousness.” Third, Origen’s actual wording (“with respect to salvation no one is excluded”) looks more like an assertion of universal salvation than the idea that equity or fairness is an attribute of God. Origen is often designated as the first universalist of the church, for which he was condemned in the sixth century (533).33 Further, several commentators find that Origen understood that the “righteousness of God” is God’s retributive justice (Lange, Shedd; see below). Finally, even by a more generous interpretation of Origen, it seems that it is more in keeping with Origen’s actual words to suggest

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that he is saying that no one is excluded from the offer of salvation or the opportunity of salvation than that he is speaking about the “bringing” or “distributing” of salvation to all kinds of people irrespective of their backgrounds, as the new proposal contends. Origen’s allusion to Matthew 11:28 supports this observation.

Finally, there is the issue of substantiation. On occasion Thielman cites evidence that he later qualifies, or admits could go either way. For example, when discussing the meaning of the symbolism on Roman coins he asserts that impartiality is the meaning. Yet in a footnote (#34) he cites Lichocka (Iustitia, 52) as suggesting that the symbolism refers to “a balance of power between the princeps and the senate or the princeps and the army.”34

Addressing the Issue of “Historical” Interpretation in Hermeneutics

It is important to consider what hermeneutics involves in order to get meaning from a text. This is an important question because the new proposal surely seeks to engage grammatical-historical-cultural interpretation. In such a hermeneutic what is the meaning of “historical” in grammatical-historical-contextual hermeneutics?

Concerns Regarding Gentile Readers

According to the new proposal for Romans 1:17, Paul intended that the formerly pagan readers of Romans would interpret the phrase, the “righteousness of God,” in light of their own pagan culture and background. The proposal claims that Paul could not expect that they would know the Old Testament meaning for the word.

Yet this reasoning raises several concerns. It is the same problem that every interpreter of Paul faces when one interprets those portions heavy with Old Testament echoes and quotations: How can Paul assume that his Christian readers most of whom have a pagan, Gentile background understand what his allusions to and quotes of the Old Testament mean? This concerns especially Romans and Galatians, as well as other epistles by him (and indeed by other authors, such as Peter in 1 Peter, and John in the Revelation). Moreover, by the proposal’s line of reasoning, the entire New Testament would not communicate or have much meaning for the vast majority of readers since it was not long before almost all the readers would have a Gentile, pagan background.

Yet interpreters of Paul and the rest do not resort to the method of polyvalence to explain how such writing could have meaning for the readers. They usually resort to some observation such as that Paul and other writers believed that their readers had been taught some basic Old Testament truth; and that their readers would gradually become more and more educated about the Old Testament—even through the very epistle they were reading. Colossians 2:6 says: “As therefore you received [by instruction] Christ Jesus the Lord, so continue to walk in him”—the words in brackets being a common interpretation of the term paralamba,nw. Also Paul’s exhortation to the Colossians that there should be a reciprocal reading of his epistles to the

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Colossians and to the Laodiceans suggests that one of the purposes would be clarify what he wrote to each in particular. Even the Apostle Peter speaks of some things that are difficult to understand in all of Paul’s writings (2 Pet. 3:16). But the obtuseness of Paul’s writings didn’t keep Peter from recognizing them as Scripture (3:17).

Indeed, the entire New Testament assumes a world view derived from the Old Testament, and assumes that the readers, regardless of their background, affirm it to be true. I suspect that even the new proposal takes this approach when interpreting the rest of Romans.

Furthermore, a good example of what Christian authors assume of their readers can be demonstrated by one of the earliest (A.D. 95-97; or perhaps as early as 70) Apostolic Fathers, Clement. His work, the Epistle from the Romans to the Corinthians, is filled with quotations, mainly from the Old Testament, including the citation of entire chapters (Psa. 51; Isa. 53). He quotes the Bible more than any other Apostolic Father, and in this respect parallels the Book of Hebrews in many ways.35 Yet Clement never apologizes for his appeal to the Old Testament, nor does he ever seek to introduce his quotations with some kind of explanation. He assumes that his Gentile readers (now more Gentile than when Paul wrote to them) have adequate knowledge of the Old Testament to make communication possible. His assumption in this regard is greater than Paul’s.

Since the book of Romans cites the Old Testament prolifically it would seem that it should be to the Old Testament that interpreters should turn for understanding Romans 1:17, especially since Paul immediately cites Habakkuk 2:4 in the second half of the verse.

Now Porter presents a good corrective to the idea that the Jewish background of Paul was totally at odds with that of the Roman world. The situation was highly syncretistic. While Paul was an ethnic Jew he was also a citizen of the Greco-Roman world. Paul’s world was quite cosmopolitan; Judaism was a part of the “interconnectedness” of this world.36

To illustrate the syncretism of Paul’s world, Porter discusses the issue of Paul’s use of the Old Testament under two concerns: why Paul even uses the Old Testament when writing to predominantly Gentile churches; and what techniques Paul used in citing the Old Testament.37

Porter suggests first that interpreters should seek to understand Paul’s argument in terms of “how he wishes it to be constructed, rather than how it would have come across to his listeners.”38 Paul’s world view was shaped by the Old Testament and how Christ’s coming fulfilled it. So Paul arranged his argument around the Old Testament and cited it often, even though some may not have understood him initially. But those who did could instruct the others. Porter cites Paul’s writing the Corinthian correspondence in part to clarify what he wrote formerly. Also, Paul cites the Old Testament often (at least fifty-five times in Romans, the most of his epistles), probably because of the literary form of his writing. In deliberative rhetoric a writer cited other texts to show that he has authority behind him and so to persuade his listeners. He also may cite others to give philosophical foundation for his position; or to illustrate the terms

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involved. Thus Paul’s Jewish techniques of citing the Old Testament may have been influenced by Hellenistic rhetoric. So Paul’s exegesis needs to be characterized as reflecting the “larger context of the Greco-Roman interpretive tradition of venerated texts.” 39

So there is some basis for suggesting that Paul would reflect the Gentile world around him to illustrate the meaning of the term, “righteousness.” But Porter speaks of Paul’s citing texts (as in Acts 17; Tit. 1) to bolster his authority. There is none of this involved if he intends a meaning found on coins. It seems that the idolatry and polytheism found on the coins would detract from his authority, not bolster it. Would Paul want to have the authority of idolatry behind him, especially when the emperor was called “Savior” in the culture but this title is never given to men in the New Testament?

Thus another question arises. Is a Biblical author seeking to communicate with the non-Christians in the city or area to which he writes, or with the Christians living there? It seems that the clear answer to this question is the latter.

If the proposal’s primary concern is for how Paul would seek to communicate with a pagan audience that is ignorant of Old Testament truth, why not interpret him in accord with contemporary cultures? Why not propose secular readings from contemporary American culture, or from African, Latin, Asian, and South Pacific cultures? This raises the issue of reader response criticism discussed below.

Other questions follow. If the Roman coins that bear the word dikaiosu,nh (or, Aequitas) also bear an image of a false deity, would not this suggest idolatry to Christians and make them suspicious of and reticent about embracing the meaning of any superscriptions found on them? Indeed, would they not recoil at the idea of applying the same word or words to the true God or to his Son, the Lord Jesus Christ? Do not the words of our Savior in Matthew 22:21 implicitly mean that a Christian needs to use discernment in understanding what realm belongs to Caesar and what belongs to God, and how allegiance to each should be exercised? Would not Christians almost implicitly reject the pagan meaning of the word since it would be associated with the pagans’ claims about their deity, or something less, but associated with idolatry? The pagan context of the Gentile coin would tend to pollute the meaning of the word on the coin.

One realm of allegiance (discussed in Matt. 22) would be worship: whom should the readers worship as God? Virtually all the coins of the Roman empire bore images of the emperors of this time: Julius Caesar (49-44 BC); Caesar Augustus (31 BC-AD 14); Tiberius Caesar (14-37); Gaius (Caligula, 37-41); Claudius (41-54); Nero (54-68); and the others who followed. Julius began to receive acclaim as a deity and all the rest followed suit.40 Would not such claims further enhance the Christian’s abhorrence of viewing these coins in a favorable light—because of both the images and the inscriptions on them? Would they “trust” him (a word the new proposal uses, p. 11) when they as Christians “had trusted” Jesus Christ as their only “Savior” and “Lord” (terms that the emperors employed of themselves)? It does not seem that

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the proposal’s claim that the “communication” on the coins was “entirely positive” is supportable.

Concerns Regarding the Meaning of “Historical”

In his classic work, Bernard Ramm defines the hermeneutics, the interpretation, that should guide conservative Protestants as literal, cultural, and critical.41 In tracing the precedents to this approach to hermeneutics Ramm affirms that the Reformers, particularly Luther and Calvin, embraced the literal interpretation of Scripture as primary. In this approach they followed the tradition of the Syrian school of Antioch and the Victorines of the medieval period.42 By following the literal rather than the spiritual (allegorical, anagogical, and tropological or moral) sense Luther, according to Ramm, followed the historical and grammatical principle. Ramm expands the latter by saying that the interpreter must “give attention to grammar; to the times, circumstances, and conditions of the writer of the Biblical book; and to the context of the passage.43

When he comes to describing the “Protestant System of Hermeneutics,” Ramm discusses in turn the three terms of the literal, cultural, and critical.” Regarding the first term, Ramm says that interpreters must interpret words and sentences in their “normal, usual, customary, proper designation.”44 He notes that all secondary meanings, such as parables, types, allegories, symbols and figures of speech depend on the literal meaning.45

Regarding the term, “cultural,” Ramm defines it as referring to the “total ways, methods, manners, tools, and institutions” of a people, including their history.46 This category includes biblical history and the ancient history of the peoples mentioned in or recipients of biblical texts. Culture may be both material and social, the latter including political, legal, religious, and economic structures.47

Regarding the third term, “critical,” Ramm means that “any interpretation of Scripture must have adequate justification.”48 He elaborates that such justification may appeal to history, lexicons, grammar, theology, culture, geography, and other things. The purpose of such justification is to allow others to investigate whether an interpretation is true.

Now it is the last two matters that become the focus of this study—the cultural and critical elements of hermeneutics.49 For it seems that, in order to find the idea of “equitable” in the word dikaiosu,nh and to make the latter term polyvalent, the new proposal was using cultural-historical justification for interpreting Romans 1:17.50

Yet several questions arise. Whose history and culture should have preeminence? Should it be the history and culture of the readers of the Bible, in this case, the Romans; or, the author’s, in this case, Paul’s? Should a distinction be made between a pagan or Gentile history and culture and that of the Christians who infused the understanding of their background with biblical teaching so that they interpreted it differently from their unbelieving neighbors? In other words,

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the Christian now understands that his culture is filled with all kinds of idolatrous practices and ethical evil. He realizes that the history of his people must now reckon at least with God’s providence and sovereign control over history and nations (Acts 17:26) and the potential that his nation’s history has also been under the control of Satan, especially if it sought to destroy Israel in the past or present.51

Ramm anticipated some of the problems that can arise from an abuse of the cultural approach. He notes that it is a “basis of departure, not the dominating factor in interpretation.”52 It is a “controlling principle, and is therefore a flexible tool.”53 He warns of abuses of this principle as practiced by form criticism, by the approach of the sociology of religion, by those who would deny to Old Testament prophecy a sensus plenior, and by modern liberalism. The cultural principle should “serve as a guide to the proper understanding of Scripture” but not “rule out the prophetic and supernatural aspects of the text.”54

The Matter of the Source of Meaning

If context determines meaning, should not the context, in light of the above information, include the Christian’s larger context—that of the rest of the Bible, especially the Old Testament? Regarding the meaning of dikaiosu,nh it is clear, as virtually all commentators of the text agree, that the term has its background in the Old Testament, including the LXX, rather than in a secular background. So the question is: How does the interpreter decide whether to add to this also a meaning that comes from contemporary (to Paul) pagan culture?

Is the answer partially determined by the kind of term involved? That is, dikaiosu,nh is theologically weighty, as shown by the contexts of Romans and Galatians where Paul discusses the gospel, salvation, the revelation of God, the role of Christ, the role of faith, and Old Testament teaching (all in Rom. 1:16-17). If the word under discussion concerned Gentile culture and/or history, then seeking meaning in the cultural/historical background of the readers would be an obvious pursuit. But the weight of this term is central to what Christians believe about God, what he has done for them, and how they can be saved—none of which derives from the Gentile culture. The interpreter is driven back to Jesus himself and to the Bible of both Jesus and Paul to discover the meaning of the term. Does the pagan understanding add anything to this meaning? Or, does it potentially lead the reader astray and corrupt his understanding?

For support the new proposal appeals to the description of God in Romans 2 as impartial. But the context concerns God’s impartiality in judging. The phrase, the “righteousness of God,” never occurs in Romans 2. There it says nothing of God’s salvation being impartially distributed (a claim of the new proposal). It also seems that such a statement would tend to conflict with the theology of election. God’s saving people is anchored to his election, not his impartiality.

Salvation is proclaimed impartially, and offered impartially, and its refusal is treated impartially. But its distribution is partial.55

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Also note that Romans 1:17 is not talking about “distributing salvation impartially.” Verse 16 asserts that the gospel is the power of God to bring salvation to everyone who believes. The impartiality is reflected in the identification of those to whom the gospel is proclaimed—anyone (vv. 14-15)—and who may respond in faith—any one may (v. 16). But verse 17 simply asserts that in the gospel God has revealed (taking the passive of “is revealed” as a divine passive) his “righteousness.” In other words, an impartial or fair offering of salvation revealing God’s righteousness is the point. It seems that the idea of fairness or equity pertains to the offer, but has nothing to do with whether “righteousness of God” means fairness. The latter idea must be clearly asserted someplace, where the biblical author says that righteousness means fairness. But that does not occur here.

So when does the interpreter appeal to secular usage to interpret a biblical text? It should be done to confirm a biblical definition, or to explain a term that is a hapax legomenon (occurring only once in the literature), or when it adds meaning that the Bible would also support. For example, to substantiate a subsitutionary sense for u`pe,r to show that Christ’s death was a substitutionary atonement and not just one on people’s behalf, over eighty examples of this meaning occur in Classical Greek, in the LXX, and in the Koine Papyri. This information supports the idea of substitution for some places in the New Testament (John 11:50; 2 Cor. 5:21; Gal. 3:3; 1 Tim. 2:6). There are other examples of this appeal to secular usage.56

Do these examples provide justification for the new proposal that claims that “equity” is an idea to be captured from Paul’s Roman world and intended by him as one of three meanings for Romans 1:17? It does not seem likely. For the New Testament never uses ivso,thj to discuss God’s character as “fair” or “equitable” regarding salvation. In addition, in the cases where the author imports a secular meaning into the text, the author makes such meaning a part of his argument. Paul does not do this in Romans 1:17. Finally, none of these other examples (cited in the endnotes) has any connection with idolatry. They seem to be morally or theologically neutral.

Addressing Other Hermeneutical Issues

The Claim of Polyvalence

The new proposal says that Paul is purposely “polyvalent” in Romans 1:17, that “Paul intended its meaning to be dense, and probably did not think it would be fully understood on a first hearing.”57 These claims raise several issues: polyvalence, polysemy, authorial intent, ambiguity, and the meaning of “dense.”

First, there is the need to clarify definitions. Polyvalence means “multiple meanings” intended by an author at one and the same place. That is, the claim is that a given term at a particular place has many meanings. This is clearly what the new proposal means by the word, since it lists three meanings for the word “righteousness” in the phrase, “righteousness of God,” as used in Romans 1:17. Now this term is related to “polysemy.” This is the technical idea of the “capacity of a word to have two or more different meanings”; that is, a “particular form of a

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word can belong to different fields of meaning, only one of which need be its semantic contribution to a single sentence or context”58 or specific instance of usage. By this Black means that there is “no general or central meaning of a word that combines all the meanings for which the word is used.”59 Thus such words differ from those words that carry “a general or central meaning and a number of secondary or transferred meanings. The general meaning of a word may be defined as the most common meaning in terms of frequency of occurrence.”60

It seems that the word “righteousness” is an example of polysemy, that various meanings are correct in different contexts. Or, is it? Perhaps this issue is at the very heart of the debate over the meaning of righteousness. Is it an example of polysemy, or is there a common meaning pervading most of its occurrences? Polysemy prevents the fallacy of illegitimate totality transfer—the gathering of various meanings of a word in different contexts and “then presumed to be present in any single context.”61

It seems that Black has no place for polyvalence, or multiple meanings at one place where a term appears. The new proposal reads the term “righteousness” as polyvalent instead of polysemous.

The Matter of Ambiguity

The new proposal associates polyvalence with Paul’s intention to be “dense.” This could mean (1) that Paul is packing together several definitions, or (2) that he is being impenetrable or stupid, or (3) that he is being opaque (as in photography).62 It seems that the new proposal embraces the first definition. It also seems that it embraces something along the lines of ambiguity or lack of clarity or vagueness. But these terms have a more precise meaning and are not the same.

Ambiguity “involves two or more distinct meanings for one word, phrase, or sentence,” while vagueness “has to do with lack of specificity.”63 If by “dense” the new proposal means definition (1) above then this would align with ambiguity, especially since he finds three meanings in Romans 1:17 for one term. But Black warns that true ambiguity “is rare. When it does occur, it usually results from our ignorance of the original context rather than from the deliberate intention of the author.”64 Black goes on to say that since most words are polysemous the context makes clear which of the several possible meanings is intended in a particular occurrence. He adds: “Generally speaking, only one meaning of the word will be intended in any given passage. The context serves to eliminate multiple meanings.”65

Black acknowledges that some ambiguity may be intentional and he cites several instances; and this is what the new proposal asserts. But, as noted above, Black adds that such cases are rare and they are “almost invariably due to our failure to operate in the same context as the author.”66 Thus while ambiguity may be present, it is not to be expected. It seems that it should be a final position to come to, when all investigation of meanings has been made and the pursuit of a single meaning fails.

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So is Romans 1:17 an example of deliberate ambiguity? Most interpreters do not assert such, although their practices often witness to it. In the appendix below at least one commentator deliberately asserts ambiguity in Romans 1:17.

And of course, this is what the present paper is all about. Does Paul intend one (as the Reformers and those before them maintained), two (as many current interpreters assert), or three meanings (so the new proposal for Romans 1:17). In light of Black’s statements and those of others, we should eschew any meanings in addition to a single meaning unless there is clear support for additional meanings.

We certainly cannot go to the other extreme, that there is only a single meaning for any Greek term wherever it may occur.67 As Black observes, it is polysemy that “makes a strictly literal translation such a futile exercise” since it assumes that a single meaning is the precise equivalent of a word in the source language. Rather one should pursue all the potential meanings of a word, and then use “all available contextual clues to select the sense that best fits the context.”68

Consensus Regarding Multiple Meanings, Ambiguity, and Allusion?

What do evangelical scholars say about multiple meanings and related matters? In his work of 1981, Kaiser deals with all of these issues.69 Kaiser acknowledges that words may have special nuances intended by a biblical author but he strongly rejects polyvalence.70 He traces the history of the idea of single meaning and how this has been rejected by many scholars in the last century or so. Throughout his book he opposes multiple meanings. While many find additional meanings when interpreting prophecy, Kaiser points out that future fulfillment of a prophecy is “inherently one with the historical sense.”71 He rejects also the idea of sensus plenior, and the idea that authors wrote “better than they knew,” and all allegorizing.72 Kaiser rejects also the idea that one can distinguish the human author of Scripture from the divine Author. 73 Finally, Kaiser asserts that meaning is always “a single meaning as judged by the author’s truth-intentions.”74

In his comprehensive work on hermeneutics and exegesis, Osborne shows how in recent years the locus of meaning has shifted from the author to his text and then to the readers of the text (reader response criticism). At the heart of his text Osborne discusses meaning (or, semantics) and begins with various difficulties that bring about fallacies in interpretation. It seems that the new proposal is involved in some of these fallacies.

Fallacies in Interpreting Words

For example, under lexical fallacy, Osborne discusses the error of “illegitimate totality transfer” (to use James Barr’s terminology). He notes that the “overemphasis on words to the detriment of context” often leads an interpreter to find many meanings and uses for a word and it becomes hard for that person to select just one for a particular passage.75 The tendency is to read the totality of the meanings into the single passage. He writes: “Such is ‘illegitimate,’ for no one

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ever has in mind all or even several of the possible meanings for a term when using it in a particular context.”76

It seems that the new proposal as well as others have made this error at Romans 1:17 (as shown in the appendix below). As quoted above the new proposal finds that the phrase dikaiosu,nh qeou/ has no “one precise meaning. Instead, the phrase has a richness that allows Paul to highlight one aspect in some contexts and another aspect in other contexts in order to contribute to the total idea that he is trying to communicate when he defines the gospel.” The surrounding literary context indicates “which aspect of the expressions’ total range of associations” Paul wants to communicate.77

To prevent this error Osborne advocates the principle stated by Nida that the “correct meaning of a term is that which contributes least to the total context;” that is, “the narrowest possible meaning is usually correct in individual contexts.”78 So of the three or four possible meanings advocated for “righteousness,” which seems best in fitting this criterion? It does not appear to be fairness or its equivalents.

Another possible fallacy found in the new proposal is the misuse of parallels. Are the uses of “righteousness” on coins dated to the time of Paul really parallel to Paul’s thinking, in light of the pagan idolatry involved on all such coins? While the interpreter must “study extant Greek literature for other possible semantic parallels” (the fifth of Osborne’s five guidelines), his second is more determinative, namely that “Paul’s use in Romans is more important than his use elsewhere.”79 Now the use of “righteousness” on coins is not Paul’s use, but surely usage in the context of Scripture (elsewhere in Paul, in the New Testament, in the LXX and the Hebrew Old Testament) is more important than usage in secular literature. Its occurrence in the latter must be held up to scrutiny. The proposal of “equity” never occurs as a biblical concept to describe God.

Also, it seems that the Pauline context should be enlarged to include Galatians, Philippians, and others of his epistles. So there is both a literary context and a situational (historical and cultural) one.80 More will be said of this below.

The final fallacy that Osborne takes up is that of ignoring the context. As a result this fallacy fails to “put the message of the text together as a coherent whole.”81 Does the new proposal of “fairness,” etc., really help to make the text coherent? Is this idea a necessary part of the message of the book? The new proposal appeals to Romans 2 for a defense of God’s impartiality. But there Paul speaks of God’s judging fairly; he is not defining righteousness.

Polyvalence As Part of the Movement Toward an Autonomous Text

Osborne devotes considerable attention to the matter of polyvalence under his discussion of “poststructuralism.” He shows how the concern for how the text communicates meaning (so structuralism) did not satisfy what and why a text communicates.82 Thus, as more and more emphasis was placed on the text as autonomous and objective there came a reaction in order to

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stress the reader as the generator of meaning. Multiple meanings necessarily result as various faith communities dialogue with the text. With structuralism and poststructuralism scholars have moved “even further from the object/text to the subject/reader.”83 Osborne thinks that two issues are at stake: “can we know what another person meant in a written account, and is it important to know that original intended meaning? Both questions must be considered.”84

Thus Osborne links polyvalence with movements like poststructuralism. Similarly, Brown asserts that the autonomous text, separated from the author, “began the movement toward polyvalency (many potential meanings of a text).”85

Citing his own example in writing his text Osborne believes that it is possible to adequately assess an author’s meaning. There is more than simply a “possibility of understanding.”86 Thus Osborne links authorial intention to polyvalence, and opposes the latter.87

For Osborne two matters help to fix on the single intention of the author and prevent polyvalence. One is the matter of literary genre which “determines the extent to which we are to seek the author’s intention”; that is, “generic considerations determine the rules of the language game.”88 Thus different genres (epistolary, narrative, poetry, parable, etc.) reveal the author’s intention, including multiple layers (as in narrative or poetry).89 The other matter is the issue of probability. Using four criteria, one can proceed from many interpretations that are possible to that which is more probable. These criteria are internal—consistency (lack of contradiction) and coherence, and external—comprehensiveness (enveloping all experience) and congruity (the theory fits the evidence). The “interrelations between internal . . . and external . . . criticism” allow one to move beyond multiple meaning.90 While many interpretations may fit these criteria as possible not all are as probable.

In a further extensive discussion of polyvalence, Osborne appeals to the two aspects of the single act of interpretation, intended meaning and significance.91 In applying his approach to hermeneutics, Osborne draws attention to his basic solution as a trialogue. After asserting that the text must be studied both diachronically and synchronically, he writes:

The basic solution is a trialogue between the author, the text and the reader. The author has produced the text and given it certain meanings that are intended to be understood by the reader. The text then guides the reader by producing certain access points that point the reader to the proper language game for interpreting that particular illocutionary act. The reader thereby aligns him- or herself with the textual world and propositional content, thus coming to understand the intended meaning of the text. 92

In fleshing out how this approach works, Osborne affirms several features including the need for certain controls to work with presuppositions. These include being open to new possibilities. Thus interpreters need a “polyvalent attitude”—desiring “truth rather than confirmation of our preexisting ideas.”93 One must engage the “hermeneutical circle” in which the text has priority over the interpreter.94 Also, he affirms that “polyvalent interpretations per se

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are unnecessary, but a pluralistic or polyvalent attitude is crucial.” He goes on to identify the error of pure polyvalence: it lacks a rigorous dialogue with various communities of faith because “it tends to relativism, that every theory is as good as the next.”95 He adds: “Of course, we want to be open to the possibility that the polyvalent school is describing ‘the way it is’ . . . . However, I have attempted to demonstrate why I do not believe this is the case.”96

It seems that for Christians the most powerful argument against readers’ determination of meaning is how the New Testament submitted to the world view of the Old Testament, and submits to its meaning. The only qualification is that Jesus Christ instructed his followers to find him embedded throughout the older Testament, as being its truest meaning that was there all along (Luke 24). As Christians we should emulate our Apostolic models.

Sound Hermeneutical Principles

The practice of exegesis includes the need for good hermeneutical principles to shape interpretation. 97 Osborne asserts three principles that lead to a consideration of the (1) literary genre, the (2) structural development of the text, and (3) semantic research that is based in synchronic matters so that meaning is determined by the semantic field and context. Diachronic matters are valid only when there is a “deliberate allusion to a past use, as in the New Testament use of the Old Testament.”98 Note that this is at the heart of deciding on the probable meaning of righteousness in Romans 1:17. Does the Old Testament background of the word transcend the synchronic meaning of pagan Rome?

The next hermeneutical principle is (4) a judicious use of background information. Then (5) Osborne asserts that identifying the “implied author” with the real author and the implied reader and the real reader “provide an indispensable perspective for the intended meaning of a text.”99 (6) There must be verification of competing interpretive possibilities for all systems that involves induction, deduction, and a critical realism that governs an “ongoing dialogue between the paradigm or reading communities.”100

Osborne concludes his text by asserting that his goal has been to elucidate “principles for determining the intended meaning of . . . the Bible,” to show “the spiral from text to meaning.”101 The Bible must be “understood in terms of its original intended meaning.”102 And for Osborne, this goal means that there should be one meaning for the terms of Romans 1:17. Unfortunately, the Appendix shows that Osborne is not consistent at this point.

Ambiguity and Authorial Intent

Vanhoozer also makes profitable observations about authorial intent and ambiguity. In his chapter, “Resurrecting the Author: Meaning As Communicative Action,” Vanhoozer gets to the heart of discovering meaning in a text.103 He shows how the author’s intention matters for interpretation, that what an author intends is the meaning of a text.104 He takes up the issue of ambiguity, both intentional and unintentional, and argues that an author does not intend “more

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than that of which he or she is explicitly aware.” He shows from the three areas of ambiguity (allusion, irony, and the history/fiction distinction) that the author actually intends these in order for interpretation to take place.105 Brown adds that the author must give some sort of “linguistic or literary signal to the reader” that ambiguity is involved.106 Thus meaning including allusion is connected to the author’s intention. “Allusion without authorial intention is a logical contradiction.”107 An author must know about something in order to allude to it.

Of these three areas of ambiguity, the one that the new proposal could claim is the first—that Paul intends an allusion to the idea of fairness found in the cultural background—the coinage—of his Gentile readers. Yet this idea still runs against another concern that Vanhoozer raises: “Can an author intend two things at a time or do two things at once?”108 And would Paul intend ambiguity on such a crucial word at such a crucial juncture of his epistle? Almost all interpreters concur that Paul’s central purpose for writing Romans deals with defining the gospel, and that Romans 1:16-17 represents the theme of the epistle. This special position affects its meaning.109 Would Paul “intend” (the new proposal’s word) to be ambiguous here? It seems that he would surely desire just the opposite.

Vanhoozer does allow for sensus plenior, of the divine author intending a fuller meaning that goes beyond what the human authors intended, but this is “instantiated” only in the canon.110

Multifaceted Yet Determined Meaning

Even more to the question of multiple meanings, Vanhoozer distances himself from two different kinds of answers to this matter. He rejects the notion of “one single correct interpretation” that should be accepted universally (a naïve monism that too “quickly identifies one particular interpretation with the single correct interpretation”—a “metaphysical doctrine” ) and accepts the “epistemological doctrine that, when all is said and done, the text has a true, and thus unified interpretation.” It is a “critical and multifaceted unity.”111 Brown similarly rejects an understanding of meaning as “single” (a “simplistic construal of meaning”) and prefers to speak of meaning as multifaceted yet having boundaries, as “determinate.” It is a sphere, not a point; it is complex, rich, and yet bounded.112

The other extreme that Vanhoozer rejects is that of plurality of various kinds: a plurality of authorial intentions, a plurality of interpretations derived from the various stages of a text’s composition, a plurality based in the multiculturalism of the readers, and a plurality of reading methods that lead to different interpretations. Vanhoozer distinguishes plurality from pluralism, and rejects pluralism, the ideology that sees “mutually inconsistent interpretations as a good thing.”113 So Vanhoozer rejects “any plurality that assumes the meaning of a text changes at the behest of the reader, at the influence of an interpretive community, or as a result of the Spirit’s leading.” Instead, he affirms a “‘Pentecostal plurality,’ which maintains that the one true interpretation is best approximated by a diversity of particular methods and contexts of

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reading.”114 He goes on to say that the Word “remains the interpretive norm, but no one culture or interpretive scheme is sufficient to exhaust its meaning, much less its significance.”115

Brown defends meaning as complex, yet determined, by showing that authors may have both implications and perlocutionary intentions. These are not part of meaning per se, but are matters that sit at “the edge of an author’s awareness” but bound to meaning or communicative intention by their “continuity with the author’s broader purposes.”116 As implications Brown points to such matters as allusions and echoes of the Old Testament. By perlocutionary intentions Brown points to those intentions that the writer wants the reader to do in response. 117

How does the new proposal fit these matters? It may seem that the proposal of a third meaning intended for Romans 1:17 may meet Vanhoozer’s and Brown’s definition of a “unified” or “multifaceted” meaning. But Thielman’s proposal runs counter to what Vanhoozer and Brown said earlier, that there cannot be more than a single meaning intended by an author (and the new proposal claims that Paul intended three meanings). Also, it seems that the new proposal could not be part of a unified meaning, derived as it is from the Gentile world with its idolatry and polytheism rather than from the Old Testament. The former world view is distinctively different from the latter one.

Multiple Significances and Continuing Meaning

After discussing the interpretive virtues of justice, understanding, and vitality (the Spirit enlivens the text), Vanhoozer observes: vitality requires readers to search not only for meaning but for significance—for “one multilayered meaning and for an abundance of significance.”118 Significance is “recontextualized meaning.” It is what the Bible means for today in comparison to what it meant in the canon. Vanhoozer writes: “The meaning of Scripture is revelatory and fixed by the canonical context; the significance of the Word is relative and open to contemporary contexts.” Significance is “a perfection of the biblical text.”119 But while significance is an indispensable aspect of interpretation, it should not be confused with grasping the intended meaning. The latter is a “matter of historical and literary knowledge,” while significance concerns the appreciation of this knowledge.120

Brown seems to distinguish these matters a bit differently. She does not distinguish normative meaning from non-normative contextualization. She notes that the original meaning was itself contextualized and localized to a particular time and culture. Thus contemporary pursuit of meaning is a “recontextualization” not a “contextualization.” 121

Because she links sensus plenior to contemporary “fuller meaning” with its lack of controls, Brown prefers to speak about “continuing meaning.”122 She defends this as explaining how meaning is adapted to new contexts, but there must be an unbroken tie or continuity between the original meaning of Scripture and its future fulfillments. In contrast to Vanhoozer Brown seems to think of application as part of meaning itself by calling it “continuing meaning” and defends it as an author’s “transhistorical intentions”—an author’s “unforeseen intentions for

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future readers.”123 She adds that contextualization attends to the original Biblical context and to contemporary contexts, thus recognizing that the Bible is “both culturally located and powerfully relevant.”124

It is here perhaps that the new proposal may make its contribution. Paul’s meaning in Romans 1:17 is to be derived from the Old Testament, but in the multifaceted meaning there is a significance for his Gentile readers discovered on the coins carried in their pockets/purses. “Righteousness” for them would also signify fairness and equity. However, the new proposal asserts instead that Paul intends the meaning of “equity,” etc., not the significance of “equity.”

Osborne, Vanhoozer, Brown and others provide guidance for evaluating the new proposal for polyvalence in Romans 1:17. The case for it appears to fall short. Both Kaiser and Osborne, as well as others, point out that the best argument for single meaning is one’s own writing. In order to communicate, as in this present paper, everyone assumes that there is basically one meaning to one’s words. All assume that there is adequate knowledge between authors and readers. It may not be comprehensive knowledge but it is adequate.125

Other Ways to Interpret Romans 1:17

In light of the issues discussed in this paper it seems appropriate to reexamine the various interpretations given to the “righteousness of God” in Romans 1:17. Thus the Appendix devotes a lengthy treatment to the suggested interpretations as I’ve uncovered them and organized them. Here is the summary of these findings.

Summary of Interpretations of the “Righteousness of God”

These are the following ways proposed to interpret the phrase, the “righteousness of God.” Each is amplified to show the variations more clearly. These occur in their fuller explanation in the Appendix.

Thus Paul intends to say that in the gospel, the power of God unto salvation (v. 16), is revealed [or, God is revealing] . . .

1) his gift of acquittal (justification); that is, an acquittal that God gives, a status (righteousness) that counts before God (so Luther), at his tribunal (so Calvin) (one idea) (objective genitive); so also Shedd, Gifford, Liddon, Cranfield, Mounce, Godet, Haldane, Meyer, Alford, Ryrie, Hendriksen, Johnson, Clarke, Nygren, Morris;

2) his gift of righteousness attributed to the believer; it is not forensic, but infused as an unending process of sanctification; so Spicq;

3) his divine attribute, or nature, describing who God is (one idea) (subjective or possessive genitive); so Lange, Lenski, Murray, Witherington, Robertson, Plumer, Barth;

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4) his divine attribute, or nature, describing both who God is and his activity that flows from his attribute (one idea) (subjective genitive or possessive genitive); so Fitzmyer, Kertelge, Parry;

5) his saving power; that is, the saving power that comes from God or that God exercises (one idea; subjective genitive); so Knox, Barrett, Seifrid, Jewett, Black, Newman and Nida, Dodd, Olshausen; Schrenk;

6) his faithfulness to the covenant (one idea); so Harrison, Achtemeier, Wright;

7) both his gift and what he approves (two ideas); so Hodge;

8) both his attribute and his gift (two ideas); so Sanday and Headlam, Bruce;

9) both his faithfulness to the covenant and his gift of righteousness (two ideas); so Dunn;

10) both his saving power and his gift of acquittal (two ideas; subjective genitive and objective genitive); so Kasemann, Moo, Schreiner, Westerholm, Stuhlmacher, Osborne, Byrne, Brown?

11) the three ideas of his saving power and his gift of acquittal and his equity or fairness; so Thielman;

12) the three ideas of divine righteousness, the gift of righteousness, and God’s judicial action; [so Denney? It is not clear that the author is asserting all three ideas].

Observations

None of the commentaries cited suggested the idea of “equitable” or “fair” as proposed by Thielman.

Virtually no commentator who takes a double or triple sense wrestles with the problem of double or polyvalent meaning, nor with the issue of authorial intention as connected with this matter. Most seem to make a leap from the matter of how meanings may be associated or related to “righteousness” to making them equal to definitions, to identifying something as “is.” Witherington is a recent exception to this observation.

Conclusion

The 2010 proposal is commendable in bringing a return to the consideration that the “righteousness of God” is an attribute of God. However, there seems to be significant hurdles for the proposal—that Paul intends three meanings for dikaiosu,vnh in Romans 1:17—to overcome.

1) Hermeneutical considerations argue that finding more than one sense intended by an author is improbable. To assert a double meaning, even a triple meaning, for dikaiosu,nh runs counter to good hermeneutics—that an author intends more than one meaning by his speech/writing at one place and time. While this may occur with

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prophecy Romans 1:17 is not a prophetic text. Thus it behooves interpreters of Romans 1:17 to reconsider the trend toward a double or multiple meaning for the “righteousness of God.”

2) To derive a meaning for dikaiosu,nh in Romans 1:17 from the surrounding idolatrous, pagan culture is problematic and unlikely.

3) The meaning of “righteousness” should come from the Old Testament, Paul’s usual source for defining significant theological terms, especially in light of the immediately following quote of Habakkuk 2:4. LEH define it as “virtue of righteousness, justice.”

a) All other proposals for the meaning find support in the Old Testament.

b) How does the pagan-derived idea of “equity” or “fairness” become joined by “as” (giving comparison or cause) to the idea of the following quote? In other words, how does the idea of “equity” find its comparison with or cause in the quote from Hababkkuk (“as it is written, the just shall live by faith”)? Could it be read, “as it is written, the fair one shall live by faith”? It does not seem likely that the idea of “fair” or “equity” is embedded in the context of Habakkuk 2.

4) In the entire Bible “equity” (ivso,thj) in never given as an attribute of God. The term does occur but not as a description of God (cf. LXX Job 36:29; Zech. 4:7; PSal. 17:41; 2 Cor. 8:13, 14; Col. 4:1). In the last reference Paul exhorts human masters to “grant” what is “fair and just” to slaves. The verb “grant” shows that these concepts pertain to what masters should do; they do not describe what masters are.

5) “Equitable” or “fair” raises serious concerns about making this an attribute of God. To say that God is “just” or “righteous” (Rom. 3:25-26) is a forensic idea describing the nature or character of God. “Fairness” has no connection to the root dik meaning “punishment” or “justice.” Thus “equity” is out of sync with the other definitions. Also it seems that “fairness” and “evenhandedness” are extensions or actions of God’s attribute of justice or uprightness, as wrath toward sin seems to be an extension of God’s holiness. God is just and righteous and acts with fairness and evenhandedness. The ideas of “fair” or “equitable” also seem to suggest a comparison; and the only true comparison one could make is with God himself (note Gen. 18:25).

6) The interpretation of Origen’s remarks about Romans 1:17 seem to be incorrect. Several sources (see the Appendix) assert that Origen found retributive justice in 1:17. And it seems that his words about the “righteousness of God” comprise an assertion of his belief in universal salvation.

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7) The weight of the church’s interpretation throughout its history lies behind the idea of the character of God as upright or just. There is no tradition behind “equitable.”

8) The “righteousness of God” is primarily a statement about who God is, a reference to his attribute or character. It is God’s uprightness. But this is known only by his activity, by God acting righteously.

a. All the other ideas suggested for the phrase are aspects (note Brown’s term) or associations or the application of God’s righteousness; but none is his righteousness per se.

b. The “righteousness of God” is not “saving activity” nor “transformation” nor a forensic gift but it does entail them in its manifestation. The righteousness of God is the basis for many things.

c. This is the simplest way to understand the phrase.

9) There is a serious difficulty with the idea advocated by many that Romans 1:17 means the “saving activity of God.” This view becomes totally redundant with 1:16. The resultant translation would be: “the gospel is the saving power of God (v. 16); for in it (the gospel) is revealed the saving power of God” (v. 17); or, more fully: “I am not ashamed of the gospel, for it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes . . . ; for in it (the gospel) is revealed the saving power of God from faith to faith.” Thus Paul would be defining both the gospel and the righteousness of God virtually the same way.

10) The kind of genitive involved is a crucial matter. A survey of some grammars shows that it is probably not a genitive (or, ablative) of separation (“righteousness from, out of, away from God”), with the “of God” indicating the point of departure,126 nor an objective genitive. It is best as a possessive genitive (“righteousness belonging to God”) or descriptive genitive (“divine righteousness”) or a subjective genitive (“righteousness that God gives”). This may be an instance of the possessive genitive “looked at from another angle.”127 This observation helps to explain the many translations that see the genitive as possessive and/or subjective.

11) In regards to the anarthrous construction (dikaiosu,nh qeou/) the word is definite: not “a righteousness of God” but “the righteousness of God.”128

12) One must ask whether the definitions involving a double or triple meaning are cases of illegitimate totality transfer, and whether the stated need to do “justice to the nuances” is a way to define a meaning. “Righteousness” may take different forms, but this is not the essence of righteousness. As Witherington notes, the Old Testament only associates God’s righteousness with his saving activity; it does not equate them.

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13) It seems that one must distinguish between the direct meaning and several indirect meanings. Any direct reference carries with it an indirect reference to other ideas (see Cranfield, 98-99, n. 1).

a. The various ideas are “integrally related and should not be excluded from the larger view of the issue” (Mounce, 73). But the “larger view” comes from other contexts.

b. The nature of God as righteous is only known by the declaration of Scripture and by inference drawn from his actions. “God is love” is known experientially by God’s deeds, that “God loves.”

c. The nature of God is who he is essentially and his deeds make him known existentially. The two are tied closely together and difficult to separate, but it is necessary to do so (contra. Islam regarding Allah).

14) All the other suggested definitions flow from God’s attribute: salvation, justification (the gift of acquittal) based on the death of Christ. They are implicit ideas in the “righteousness of God,” but not the explicit idea.

15) The study above has answered the question of how Paul can expect his Gentile readers to understand Old Testament concepts. This is not the only passage in Romans that is difficult to interpret. Paul must assume that instruction and understanding would be an ongoing process.

Issues of Context Involved in Deciding the Meaning of the “Righteousness of God”

Ultimately the various circles of context must decide how to interpret the “righteousness of God.”

1) The Old Testament usage is primarily determinative for Paul in Romans 1:17.

2) While many other aspects of “righteousness” appear in Romans, Galatians, and elsewhere (Phil. 3), the question is: what is the meaning in Romans 1:17?

3) Since Romans 1:17 is part of the theme of Romans (vv.16-17), it would not be unusual to discover that Paul’s meaning in 1:17 is basic and foundational to all the rest. As Dunn notes, Paul purposes to explain in the rest of the epistle what he means in Romans 1:17.

4) Verse 17b with the quote of Habakkuk 2:4 emphasizes faith as the vehicle to tap into God’s righteousness. It would be appropriate for Paul to say in effect that to understand who God is faith is the necessary means. The “revelation” of God’s righteousness occurs only in the realm of faith, as Kasemann (31) points out. The righteousness of God is apprehended only by faith.

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5) Note how the terms signifying God’s “righteous ordinance” (dikai,wma; 1:32) and “righteous judgment” (dikaiokrisi,aj; 2:5) occur in the context. These are the very next occurrences of “righteous” after 1:17.

6) Note how Paul cites several attributes of God immediately after 1:17: in 1:20 (“his eternal power and deity”), 1:23 (“the glory of the incorruptible God”; cf. 2:24, the “name of God”), 1:25 (“blessed forever”), 2:4 (“his kindness [2 times] and forbearance and patience”), 2:11 (“no partiality”). Even “his wrath” in 1:18 is an expression of God’s holiness.

Resolution for the Meaning of the “Righteousness of God”

So what is the “righteousness of God” in Romans 1:17? It seems best to define it as follows. In the gospel, proclaiming the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, God is revealing his nature as upright. He is upright or just because the gospel is God’s power to save everyone (v. 16) who believes it. Or, because the gospel (proclaiming the atoning, substitutionary death of Christ and his resurrection) is God’s power to save everyone (v. 16) who believes (v. 17b), God reveals that he himself is just or upright regarding the need to punish sin by what he has done right in the work of Christ at the cross and in the resurrection. He vindicates himself as just by what he did at the cross and by how he can accept the guilty.

Why is the gospel the power of God unto salvation? Because God is just, upright. So verse 17 is the basis for verse 16 (whether gar introduces the explanation or the cause for v. 16).

It isn’t God’s saving action (pace Kasemann and others including Moo, Schreiner, Osborne, etc.) since this is what the gospel is (v. 16). Such an idea for verse 17 is redundant (as pointed out above).

Since the meaning of God’s attribute of uprightness seems best for Romans 1:17, then the proposed idea of “equitable” or “fair handed” drawn from Roman coins and the pagan emperors of Paul’s day is unsupported. The new proposal is not an example of Origen’s “beautiful captive woman.”

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APPENDIX

This paper has brought various issues of hermeneutics to bear on the new proposal to evaluate its potential for interpreting the “righteousness of God” in Romans 1:17. This study has also summarized cryptically all the other proposals for the meaning of the phrase, and has argued for a particular interpretation—the nature or attribute of God as just or upright.

In light of this it is helpful to review here all the proposed interpretations given to this phrase. In light of the above discussion it seems especially pertinent that interpreters who have found a dual or triple meaning need to rethink the consequences of such a reading. The placing of interpreters into various categories is often a subjective decision.

A Survey of Various Interpretations of the “Righteousness of God”

The new proposal is commendable for returning to the idea of finding an attribute of God in the phrase, the “righteousness of God.” As most acknowledge, this was the approach throughout much of church history until the time of the Reformation. However, the meaning proposed during much of church history was that it refers to the attribute of justice or holiness in contrast to “equity” of the new proposal. A survey of commentators on Romans 1:17 since the Reformation shows how widely divergent the views are. It will be profitable to categorize all the various views of the “righteousness of God” according to whether interpreters find one, two, three or more meanings intended by the author, Paul. The square brackets [ ] enclose my subjective evaluations.

The Single Meaning Position

The Phrase Refers to the Gift of Righteousness

Martin Luther (1552; second printing, 1960) says that God’s righteousness is “that by which we become worthy of His great salvation, or through which alone we are (accounted) righteous before Him” (24-25). This view affirms that “of God” is an objective genitive. The righteousness is “not that according to which God Himself is righteous as God, but that by which we are justified by Him through faith in the Gospel” (25). It is “God’s righteousness” to distinguish it from man’s righteousness which comes from works (25). So Luther rejected the view that it is the attribute of God. Further clarification of Luther’s view occurs below (see Fitzmyer).

John Calvin (rep. 1979) takes Romans 1:17 to mean the righteousness of God “which is approved before his tribunal” (64). Calvin acknowledges that it may be the righteousness freely given to us by God, that the words “will bear this sense,” but affirms the former idea as “more suitable, though it is not what I make much of” (65). His editor, Henry Beveridge, suggests that this and several other meanings are true, including the righteousness provided by God, or contrived by God, or imputed by God. The meaning does not “materially differ” (64, n. 1).

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William G.T. Shedd (1879; rep. 1978) cites two views for “righteousness”: (1) an objective attribute of God: retributive justice ( he cites Origen); truth (Ambrose); benevolence (Semler); or (2) a subjective state or condition of man, in which he is “righteous” (3:21-22). He finds that the quotation of Habakkuk favors the second view (16-17). He takes the “of God” as a “genitive of source”: God is the “author” of this righteousness (17). [Thus it is an ablative/genitive of source or a subjective gen.].

E.H. Gifford (1886; rep. 1977): it has a “comprehensive” rather than a “restricted sense” because it occurs in a summary statement of the great theme of the Epistle. The form of the expression, the immediate context, and Paul’s previous usage point to a righteousness having God as the author, man as its recipient who by it becomes righteous; its effect is salvation; and its condition is faith; and it is embodied first in the person of Christ (61).

H.P. Liddon (1899; rep. 1977) takes Romans 1:17 as the “righteousness which God gives” (15) (thus a subjective genitive). But he says more. Applied to God it “describes His perfect correspondence with the necessary and eternal Laws of His moral nature.” He is the “true standard of Absolute Right to Himself.” The biblical sense is conformity to “Right which God enjoins and of which He is the standard.” In Matthew 6:33 and James 1:20 the “righteousness of God” contains a qualitative genitive; the phrase describes that “Righteousness of which God is the standard and which He expects at the hands of Christians” (cf. Eph. 4:24) (16). Liddon goes on to say that righteousness in the New Testament has two leading aspects, the standard or ideal of human conduct (several refs.), and a gift from God. Under the latter Liddon puts Romans 5:16, 17 and 1:17; 3:5, 21, 22, 25, 26; 10:3; (and 2 Cor. 5:21; Phil. 3:9). Under this category Liddon puts two elements: acquittal of the guilt of sin (justification); and the communication of a new moral life (Rom. 8:4). Righteousness has been won objectively by Christ for all humanity, and becomes subjective to each individual by faith (16-17). The righteousness one receives is not external only but internal, “not imputed only but imparted to the believer” (18). “Justification and sanctification . . . are coincident and inseparable” (18). So Liddon seems to understand the term, without a context, as being an attribute of God; but in 1:17 it is a gift from God to the believer.

C.E.B. Cranfield (1975; rep. 1985) makes a significant contribution to the understanding of Romans. On the issue at hand, Cranfield gives an extensive bibliography followed by an extensive survey of the use of “righteousness” in its various cognates in secular Greek, in the LXX (where the meaning of the terms was significantly altered), and in the New Testament (92-95). He observes that the meaning of the verb, “to justify,” cannot be explained by its use in secular Greek. [Would he say the same about the noun, contrary to the new proposal?]. He first decides that the verb cannot refer to both status (God’s acquittal) (so Protestants) and ethical character (making righteous in an ethical sense, moral regeneration (so Roman Catholicism), but only the former. But he notes that the two are not to be separated (95). He then argues the points that favor a subjective genitive and righteousness as an activity of God; and then argues the opposing idea that the genitive is origin and righteousness refers to a status of man resulting from

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God’s action, righteousness as a gift from God (96-98). He decides for the latter, citing as support several texts (Rom. 5:17; 10:3; Phil. 3:9; 1 Cor. 1:30), the phrase, “from faith to faith,” the use of Habakkuk 2:4, and the argument of the whole epistle. He acknowledges that the issue has not yet been “conclusively decided” either way (98). He thinks that righteousness as an attribute of God is unlikely though it has “sometimes been maintained” (96, n. 2). Cranfield makes an important point in a footnote (98-99, n. 1) when he objects to finding the solution to be both meanings, a double sense. Instead he writes that it is “surely more likely that Paul meant to focus attention either on the one or on the other, though it is of course true—and this needs to be emphasized—that a direct reference to either carries with it an indirect reference to the other.” [This last idea goes far to explain why there is such confusion over the meaning of the phrase].

Robert H. Mounce (NAC, 1995) may be placed here. He finds the “major emphasis” to be the status of the one declared to be righteous. Yet he believes that the other “two aspects” (the attribute of God and God’s activity of declaring one to be righteous, taking the genitive as subjective rather than possessive) are “integrally related and should not be excluded from the larger view of the issue” (73). He takes the next phrase in 1:17 to point to “faith as the origin of righteousness and the direction in which it leads” (73). So he seems to be suggesting that in Romans 1:17 one meaning occurs, but in other contexts other aspects occur.

There are many others who take it as meaning God’s gift of acquittal or justification: Godet (1883), 93; Haldane (1853), 56-57; Meyer (1889), 50; Henry Alford (1958) (who rejects the idea of an attribute of God; 2:319); Ryrie NIV Study Bible; Hendriksen (1980-1981), 62; Alan F. Johnson (1974), 31. Adam Clarke (n.d.) takes righteousness as having the basic idea of “acting according to the requisitions of justice or right” (41), with various “acceptations” or a variety of meaning in different contexts including “God’s method of saving sinners” in Romans 1:17 (41). He notes that the Hebrew qdc has the notion of a beam or scales in even balance (41).

Others who seem to belong here include Anders Nygren (1952), 74-75 (a righteousness from God offered people and accepted by faith). Leon Morris takes it primarily as the gift of a right standing from God rather than a “quality or attribute of God” (69).

The Phrase Refers to the Gift of Infused Righteousness

Ceslas Spicq (TLNT, 1:334-336) considers that righteousness may be a divine attribute (retributive justice; an attributive genitive), or a righteousness that comes from God (a genitive of author or source), but prefers as better the righteousness that God “attributes” to the believer “because God himself is righteousness” (335). It is a “gift received . . . a real justice/righteousness.” This “justice/righteousness by faith cannot be forensic” because the sinner is transformed within. The initial justification must “continue as an unending process” and “is identified with the Christians life . . . and with sanctification” (336).

The Phrase Refers to the Attribute, the Character or Nature of God

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J.P. Lange (rep. 1960) adds valuable insight to the discussion. As used among the Greeks the term denoted “an even relation between two or more parts where each has its due, or conformity to law and custom, a normal moral condition” (74). Used of God righteousness is one his “moral attributes, essentially identical with His holiness and goodness, as manifested in His dealings with His creatures, especially with them” (74). God is “absolutely perfect in Himself and in all His dealings with His creatures, and requires man to aim at this perfection (Matt. v.48)” (74). Lange notes the need to make careful distinctions. He says that the “righteousness of God” cannot be “righteousness before God” (an objective genitive; so Luther and others), for this righteousness presupposes justification. Nor can the word itself be the act of justification, even if it is connected with the result of justification, the righteousness of faith (a subjective genitive, or a genitive of origin or procession: the righteousness that proceeds from God, the right relation in which man is placed by a judicial act of God). For this justification presupposes the atonement, and the atonement is founded on the exercise of God’s righteousness (74). It is the righteousness that “comes from God” that is able to avail before God” (75). The impartial righteousness is revealed to believers as grace and to unbelievers as wrath (75). His editor rejects the ideas of “justifying righteousness” and “God’s method of justification”; it is “the very righteousness of God Himself, which is both imputed and imparted to men in Jesus Christ” (75). He cites Forbes as finding three ideas of righteousness when used of God: God’s retributive righteousness or justice; God’s justifying righteousness; and God’s sanctifying righteousness. Significantly (for this study) he identifies Origen’s view as “retributive justice” (75).

R.C.H. Lenski (1936) is particularly helpful. Finding that the words in question come as the climax of Paul’s paragraph, with “righteousness” emphasized, Lenski takes the “of God” as a “genitive of the origin and of the author” [hence both a gen/abl of source; he acknowledges that this is only formally different from a subjective gen.—God’s bestowing the status of righteousness upon the believer], and compares it to “God’s gospel,” “God’s power,” and “God’s wrath” (cf. Phil. 3:9) (78-79). He takes “righteousness” as the attribute of God, and argues that this is the basis of the righteousness revealed in the gospel. Every verdict of God will reveal his attribute of righteousness, especially the “verdict which pronounces the believer righteous” (79). He evaluates Luther’s idea that the phrase refers to God’s verdict of righteousness upon the believer with its forensic emphasis, and that the “of God” is an objective genitive yielding “the righteousness that avails with God” (79-80). But he faults Luther for not defining the genitive but the “resultant idea of the noun plus its genitive. A righteousness that God’s verdict establishes is one which beyond question is valid in his court, before his judgment seat” (80). Thus Lenski defines righteousness as God’s attribute. Incidentally, Lenski makes a strong case for the idea that the Gentiles of Rome knew the Old Testament well by reading in services, expounding and teaching (85-86). This concurs with what Clement of Rome thinks regarding the Corinthians’ knowledge of the Old Testament. Virtually no one else quotes or alludes to the older Testament more than Clement, not even Paul.

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John Murray (1968) surveys at least five possible meanings (30ff). He observes that the attribute of righteousness, God’s rectitude, occurs elsewhere (Rom. 3:5, 25, 26); but here and elsewhere (3:21, 22; 10:3; 2 Cor. 5:21; Phil. 3:9) it is righteousness related to “the power of God operative unto salvation” (30). God’s “mere attribute of justice” (which Christians must believe) cannot effect our salvation, nor is saving faith directed “at the mere rectitude of God” (30). Here at the introductory summary of the epistle righteousness is “unto our justification,” later called a free gift (5:17; cf. vv. 18-19). Murray then surveys the other ideas for the import of the “righteousness of God”: a righteousness that proceeds from God (idea of origin: an ablative or genitive of source; or author [hence a subjective genitive?]) (so Meyer); a righteousness which God approves (so Calvin); or a righteousness that avails with God and is “therefore effective to the end contemplated” (so Philippi) (30). Murray approves all of these ideas as true but faults them for not concentrating on the most important consideration—a much closer relationship of righteousness to God. He argues for a “righteousness of divine property and characterized by divine qualities. It is a ‘God-righteousness’” (30-31). It is righteousness “characterized by the perfection belonging to all that God is and does.” Thus Murray is supporting, uniquely it seems, a descriptive genitive: “divine righteousness.” This view makes clear distinctions.

K. Kertelge (EDNT, 1990) is placed here because he finds that Paul is chiefly concerned with the “question about God” (1:328). It is not the righteousness received from God (gen. of origin), nor that which is valid before God (obj. gen.). Instead it is a subjective genitive, the “claim of God upon the individual, which God demonstrates in his act upon the individual when he exercises justice” (328).

Joseph A. Fitzmyer (AB, 1992) has written comprehensively about Romans 1:17, and has influenced many, including Thielman. He points out that Paul’s terminology in 1:16-17 echoes Psalm 98:2 (“Yahweh has made known his salvation, in the sight of the nations he has revealed his uprightness”; similarly Isa. 46:13 puts in parallel “righteousness” and “salvation”; cf. 51:5, 6, 8; 56:1; 61:19; Ps. 40:9-10). His basic definition for the “righteousness of God” is God’s “uprightness,” taking it as a reference to an “attribute, property, or quality in God” on the basis of its being found in 3:5, 21, 22, 25, 26; 10:3, and the parallel use of the “power of God” (1:16) and the “wrath of God” (1:18). He thus understands “of God” as “a possessive or subjective gen., descriptive of God’s upright being and of his upright activity”; rather than a genitive of author or origin (= abl. of source). He suggests that the idea of an attribute or quality is not static but that it is an aspect of God’s power, from which comes God’s “acquitting and salvific activity in a forensic mode” (257). Fitzmyer points to a similar meaning for the phrase found in postexilic writings of the Old Testament, and concludes that it is “the quality whereby God actively acquits his sinful people, manifesting toward them his power and gracious activity in a just judgment” (257).

This suggestion of the meaning parallels what Seebass writes (NIDNTT, 3:353-355). Whereas in Classical Greek the term meant a standard of law, “conforming to the existing, static social order,” in the Old Testament it is behavior in keeping with the “two-way relationship

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between God and man,” including God’s redemption and salvation of man. Hill (3:357-358) sees the idea as a divine attribute in the Psalms, “occasionally personified.” Thus God performs righteous and just deeds, including deliverance, salvation, victory, vindication, righteous help, healing, and reward; and negatively, the punishment of the wicked. Hill adds that the noun in the LXX refers to God’s “character and actions” often in conformity to the covenant law (358). The forensic sense is “almost always present” when translating sedeq. In rabbinic Judaism righteousness was “completely identified with conformity to the law” (358).

The subsequent discussion by Fitzmyer lends significant credence to his view. He shows that due to the Latin Vulgate’s influence (using iustitia Dei) on English the phrase was rendered the “justice of God.” The latter has been understood as “God’s distributive or retributive justice and sometimes as a quality contrasted with God’s mercy” (258).

Fitzmyer traces how this terminology was used in Christian history. Augustine (in De Trinitate 14.12.15 and De Spiritu et littera 1.9. 15) used both the objective sense of iustitia Dei (“the justice which he gives to a human being”) and subjective sense (“that justice by which he himself is just”) (259). In the medieval period three understandings of the phrase prevailed. (1) It has the attribute, or subjective sense. Ambrosiaster wrote: “It is the justice of God, because he has given what he has promised.” Fidelity to his promise shows that God is just, and the one who believes becomes a witness to his justice. Often Ambrosiaster used the term in the sense of God’s mercy. (2) It has the attribute of distributive justice—God’s rewarding people “according to their just deserts,” as in Ps.-Jerome (259). (3) It has the idea of communicated justice—the objective sense (as in Ps.-Primasius, Thomas Aquinas, and others) (259). Each of these meanings was further modified and acquired various nuances in the later medieval period.

Luther initially understood the “righteousness of God” as “distributive justice” taking the genitive as subjective. Fitzmyer quotes and translates Luther as follows: “But justice is said to be the rendering to each one what is his. . . . Thus the Lord judges the world with equity (in that he is the same for all: He wants all to be saved) (cf. the new proposal here) and judges with justice in that he renders to each one his reward” (260). Then, as Fitzmyer relates it, Luther came to view the genitive as objective—the justice “that counts before God, i.e., the uprightness that a human being enjoys as a gift from God” (260). By meditating on Romans 1:16-17, Luther came to realize the role of faith: “the justice of God is that by which the just lives by a gift of God, namely by faith” (261). It is “the passive justice with which the merciful God justifies us by faith” (261). Here Luther felt that he was born again. Thus Luther, in the view of Fitzmyer, “rightly rejected” the punitive idea of iustitia but unfortunately he also rejected the idea of iustitia as a divine attribute, and following Augustine made it a gift that God gives to sinful people (261). And so Luther translated 1:17 as “the justice that counts before God.” Fitzmyer traces how the Augustinian sense was adopted at the Council of Trent and has continued into modern times (espoused by Bultmann, Nygren, Cranfield, Cornely, Lagrange, Michel, O’Neill, Ridderbos, and others). Ambrosiaster’s sense of God’s faithfulness to his promise also continues today.

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Cremer introduced the idea of relationship to the term, based on the Old Testament use of sedeq and the behavior of partners in a covenant. Thus interpreters began returning to the idea of a subjective or possessive genitive, as an attribute of God, “descriptive not so much of God’s being, but of his activity as Savior” (so Schlatter) (262).

Fitzmyer finds that Kasemann reads the phrase as having one idea throughout Romans, namely the “power character of God’s gift” or “his rectifying power” (even if such is not considered an attribute) (262). Fitzmyer thinks that this sense is more acceptable than the gift idea, which he deems as unsuitable anywhere in Romans (262). He finds different senses in Romans. In addition to the subjective genitive (or attribute sense) claimed for the references above (Rom. 1:17; 3:26; even 10:30) and supported by other attributes of God (3:3, 7), Fitzmyer takes it outside of Romans to be an objective genitive (or, a gen. of author or origin), meaning a “status of uprightness communicated to human beings by God’s gracious gift” (258), in several texts (2 Cor. 5:21—a unique use to Paul; Phil. 3:9 with the prep. ek; 1 Cor. 1:30; cf. Rom. 5:17, “gift of righteousness”). He opposes the idea of importing the objective sense from these texts into Romans.

Finally, Fitzmyer objects to the idea that Romans 1:17 can have two senses—both the relational concept of God’s activity (his attribute sense) and status (his gift sense) (as espoused by Moo, Althaus, Lietzmann—a “changeable double sense,” and others [see below]). He agrees with Oepke that a double sense “reveals the embarrassment of the interpreter” (263). [Fitzmyer slightly misinterprets Moo’s view here].

Overall, Fitzmyer’s comments are helpful, showing the history of the interpretation of the phrase, and how an attribute sense can still involve the idea of an activity of God.

Ben Witherington, III, (2004) supports a single meaning for “righteousness of God” in Romans 1:17 as the attribute of God. Witherington treats Romans as deliberate rhetoric and this explains, for him, why Romans 1:16-17 says what it does and what it means—capturing the essence of the entire book. Upfront Paul signals that his epistle is about honor (note “I am not ashamed”) and this means that the topics usually addressed include “right, justice, piety, equity, and mercy” (49). [Note the appearance here of “equity”]. When he surveys the use of “righteousness” in the Old Testament Witherington evaluates the positions of Moo and others. While God’s salvation and his righteousness are often juxtaposed and closely associated (Ps. 51:14; Isa. 46:13), it is not correct to say (as others do) that “God’s righteousness is God’s saving intent” (italic his) (52). Rather, God’s righteousness (his “fairness and faithfulness to his promises”) “prompts his saving activity” (52) Witherington also challenges the idea of righteousness as a gift in the LXX, as a transfer or a conveyance of a status, pointing out that righteousness in these places (Ps. 35:27-28; 37:5-7; 51:14; Mic. 7:9) is rather the basis of vindicating or motivation of saving his own (52). Witherington does find humans being made righteous or given righteousness so that they can act in a righteous manner (Ps. 71:1-2). He finds parallels of Romans 1:17-18 in Qumran. There are references to righteousness as a gift from God

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(Phil. 3:9). He also opposes the Roman Catholic idea of an infused, ethical righteousness, suggesting instead that the legal standing alone is meant, but this should have a subjective effect on the believer (53).

Witherington gives a list of conclusions for righteousness since it has a range of uses (54). (1) Never does it refer to an innate quality in a believer. (2) It is the righteousness/justice/holiness of God himself (so Rom. 1:17). (3) Paul’s main concern is not with abstractions but with God’s saving purposes, and so the effect of righteousness on people. (4) This effect comes about by the believer’s faith. (5) Righteousness is used in conjunction with Christ’s saving work. (5) The forensic idea of legal standing can be read into some places but not everywhere. Witherington adds that salvation is viewed as a gift at places by Paul; and that righteousness may be viewed as a relational term (54). Finally, in a footnote, Witherington adds that most of the Church Fathers clearly referred the phrase, the “righteousness of God,” “in the first instance to an attribute of God and secondly to a derived attribute of believers obtained through faith, and not to something like the concept of God’s covenant faithfulness” (54,n. 15). It is not “a cipher for the notion that God will be true to his promises to his people and so keep his Word, though that notion is not excluded” (ibid.). Sometimes the Fathers saw “this righteousness as the basis of a believer’s right-standing and so ‘justification’ as well (e.g., Ambrosiaster)” (ibid.).

It seems that Witherington has made some significant observations about the way righteousness relates to salvation and to a believer’s position. Righteousness is related to these but is not equal to them.

A.T. Robertson (Word Pictures in the New Testament; 1931) takes the phrase as a “God kind of righteousness” (which he identifies as a subjective genitive) “with two ideas in it (the righteousness that God has and that he bestows)” (4:327) (thus it may be both a possessive genitive and a subjective genitive, since he states elsewhere that they are closely connected (Grammar, 499)). It seems that he is primarily supporting the idea of the attribute of God. He cites Acts 28:4 where the people of Malta believed that the goddess di,kh was not going to allow Paul to outlive the snakebite.

Others take it as God’s attribute: Wm. F. Plumer (1870), 53 (an “attribute of his nature” provided for all mankind). Here also seems to belong Karl Barth (trans. 1933) who writes of God’s being consistent with himself (40). God affirms himself by “denying” us and the world, by revealing himself in Christ, as the Redeemer, as the meaning of all, as the Creator, by his mercy, by his judgment; he “justifies us by justifying Himself” (40-41). Another who seems to belong here is R. St John Parry (1921), 40 (righteousness belonging to the character of God and by his power all are able to reach).

The Phrase Refers to the Saving Activity of God

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John Knox (IB, 1954) turns from the intrinsic idea of God’s character (supported by v. 18 and 3:25), and specifically the active sense, “God’s vindicating his righteousness” (393). Rather he takes it as the act of God, appealing to Old Testament texts (Ps. 98:2; Isa. 46:13; 51:5) where, he claims, righteousness is “obviously a synonym for salvation,” meaning “God’s act of vindicating those whom he approves” (393). It is a saving, vindicating action (394) of those who are “really righteous, not to make them so”(when they in fact are not righteous in themselves). It is an issue of acquittal. Justification confers “not primarily a new character, but a new status” (394). In additional comments regarding the themes of the epistle embedded in verse 17 the gospel is identified as “an activity of God” which “proclaims a righteousness which comes from God, and is characteristic of God”; it is related to the salvation of men. There is available to men a “righteousness which is given by God” to be received by faith. God has disclosed the new righteousness (hence the passive “it is revealed”) (394-395). In actuality, Knox finds several ideas in the phrase.

C.K. Barrett (1957) writes that salvation is the “operation of his righteousness, which is not simply his property or attribute of being right, or righteous, but also his activity in doing right . . . thus his righteousness issues in his vindicating—those whom it is proper that he should vindicate” (29). He cites several texts (Isa. 45:21; 51:5; Ps. 24:5; 31:1; 98:2; 143:11) where righteousness is “almost a synonym of salvation” (30). He goes on: “God, the righteous judge, must do righteous judgement [sic] in his court; and, in this court, man must secure the verdict, Righteous” (30). Orthodox Jews considered that this verdict would occur only at the last judgment, but Paul says righteousness is presently being revealed. The judgment has been done through Jesus Christ sent to suffer death for sin and so to manifest God’s righteousness in “a way accessible to faith” (30). It seems that Barrett acknowledges the idea of the attribute of God but finds in Romans 1:17 that it is God’s activity (hence a subjective gen.).

Mark A. Seifrid (Christ, Our Righteousness; 2000) argues that the meaning in Romans 1:17 is not an attribute of God but an act of God, his “saving intervention.” He asserts that Paul has in view “God’s role as ‘ruler and judge,’ who will savingly bring about ‘justice and righteousness’ for the world which he has made” (46). He cites Luther’s view that it is not a “mere divine quality,” not the “active righteousness of God by which God punishes sinners” but a passive righteousness, a righteousness given to faith” (46, n. 41). Seifrid laid the foundation for this view from the Old Testament where he finds righteousness to be God’s saving act of judgment on Israel and the world (Ps. 98:1-3, 6), of God’s ruling and judging that is found before the time of Israel (hence it cannot be defined as God’s faithfulness to the covenant with Israel), of God establishing justice for himself and bringing retribution on his opponents (Isa. 1:10-26; 58:1-14; Amos 5:1-27). There is saving righteousness and retributive justice (Ps. 143:1-3; 51:14—David appeals to God against God) (39-42). Seifrid argues that God’s righteousness cannot be reduced to “salvation” since it always functions within a “context of a legal dispute or contention,” and “punitive and retributive” concepts are “associated” at times with righteousness (43). He notes that “saving righteousness and wrath parallel one another, since they are different

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aspects of the same event” (43). The “saving sense” of God’s righteousness is four times more frequent than the “forensic” or “juridical” sense to the phrase. Thus there is both “positive and negative outworkings” (43). He acts not only for his people but for his own sake. His ruling and judging “include his absolute right to be God” (45). Seifrid adds that it is only through wrath and judgment that deliverance and salvation come.

Thus Seifrid argues that the saving act of Romans 1:17 “suggests” that Paul refers to the resurrection of Christ (46). “God’s righteousness” is “his vindicating act of raising Christ from the dead for us” (47; italics his). Thus deliverance of the oppressed, vindication of the Servant, faithfulness to Israel, and salvation for the world are “implicitly present” (47). In the resurrection God has been vindicated and has defeated his enemies (47).

Seifrid adds new insight in seeing that several ideas are “implicitly present” but the act of God is apparently explicit, and it refers to the resurrection of Christ (he cites as support Rom. 1:1-4; 4:25). In 3:24 he finds it to be not an act but a gift (64). Later, he asserts that the “righteousness of God” includes both “God’s justifying verdict and its result” (he cites Rom. 1:17; 3:21-24), that “verdict” and “vindication” “belong together” (172). He says this to distance himself from those who want to combine gift and power in some sort of “meta-concept of justification” (172). [This position goes against those who find a double meaning in 1:17]. He also says that “there can be no justification of the sinner which is not simultaneously a justification of God in his wrath against the sinner” (and he cites 1:18, 29, 32; 2:5, 8, 13) (171). [This statement seems to suggest that the character of God is at stake in 1:17].

Seifrid also reminds all interpreters that there are both positive and negative sides to God’s righteousness in the Old Testament. This thought helps to undermine those who see in Romans 1:17 only the saving activity of God to “create welfare and salvation” in the creation, in Israel, and in the judgment (so Peter Stuhlmacher, Revisiting Paul’s Doctrine of Justification; 2001; 19). It seems that Seifrid should see both aspects in 1:17 as well, and these point to the attribute of God. Yet his initial statements assert that the phrase points to the saving activity of God.

Robert Jewett (Hermeneia, 2007) apparently belongs here. He first reviews the wide semantic range of “righteousness”: forensic dimensions and imputed righteousness; ethical “transformation shaped by righteousness”; relational ideas associated with covenantal loyalty; the gift of righteousness. He cites Old Testament texts to support God’s vindicating the righteous, the linking of righteousness with salvation. He concludes that Paul chooses one particular strand of the semantic tradition, namely “the act by which God brings people into right relationship with himself” (141-142). He emphasizes the new communal relationship that the gospel brings and the idea of restoring all of creation. From this he concludes that the genitive is subjective referring to “God’s activity in this process of global transformation,” rather than objective, referring to “the human righteousness bestowed by God” (142). He appeals to “God’s power” and “God’s wrath” as contextual support from similar subjective genitives (vv. 16, 18).

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He believes that those who see the phrase as both subjective and objective genitive (he cites Sanday and Headlam, Morris, Dunn, Byrne, Schreiner) as disregarding the contextual and grammatical evidence. It is the power of God “ushering in the time of salvation” for the whole world, a “nonimperialistic redemption of the world” (143).

Matthew Black (1973) takes it as the act of God, that is, the triumph of God over Satan, sin and death (37), rather than individual righteousness imparted or imputed on the basis of faith alone (36). Others who take it as God’s saving activity include H. Olshausen (1849), 77 (“a new way of salvation,” righteousness from God); C.H. Dodd (1932), 10-13 (God vindicates the right);.Schrenk (TDNT, 2:203) (it is not an attribute of God); Newman and Nida (1973), 20.

The Phrase Refers to God’s Faithfulness to the Covenant

Everett F. Harrison (1976) briefly cites Old Testament references as the source of Paul’s thought. He asserts that while God’s character is clearly “involved” in Romans 1:17, the expression goes beyond this to include God’s activity that is in keeping with his character. So while there is an “implied reference” to God’s character, this text “stresses divine provision” in offering salvation, “notably the way he acts in maintaining the covenant” (19; quoting Ziesler, 186). It seems that Harrison belongs here, if not under the category of the saving activity of God.

Paul J. Achtemeier (1985) takes it as God’s being true and faithful to his promises, to his covenant (37).

N.T. Wright (Justification: God’s Plan & Paul’s Vision; 2009) is probably the chief exponent of this position. He finds that the “righteousness of God” is “God’s own righteousness” which is nothing other than “his faithfulness to the covenant” (178) as shown by the record of the Old Testament with the unfolding plans that God had for Israel through whom God would bless the whole creation (178-180). He holds that Paul’s statements in 1:16-17 are “dense” and only clarified as the fuller arguments of the book unfold (178). Paul does not define what the gospel is in 1:16; rather he claims what it does—its effect (181). The words, “from faith to faith,” mean that when God unveils his “covenant faithfulness/justice” it is on the “basis of the faithfulness of Jesus the Messiah, on the one hand, and for the benefit of those who believe, on the other” (italics his; 181). This idea cannot be discovered from 1:17 itself but this is an example of Paul’s “advance summary statements” written “symphonically” and hinting “at themes yet to be stated in full” (181). Paul quotes Habakkuk 2:4 because the entire context concerns God’s faithfulness and the first part of the verse refers to God’s faithfulness (182).

The Double Meaning Position

The Phrase Means Both the Gift of God and What God Approves

Charles Hodge (1886; rep. 1968) clearly rejects the idea that righteousness is here an attribute of God (whether his rectitude, justice, goodness, or veracity) and appeals both to the

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fact that this righteousness is attained by faith and to various texts (Rom. 3:21; 5:17; 10:3; Phil. 3:9). He suggests that it means both the righteousness of which God is the author (what he gives; a subjective gen.), and which he approves (so Luther, Calvin, etc.), since these ideas are “not incompatible” (30). He cites most modern interpreters (of his day) as supporting this approach. He strongly finds here the idea of imputation. He also reviews the three views of this righteousness, namely the Pelagian (obedience to the law attains righteousness), the Romanists’ (inherent righteousness is the meaning), and the Protestant (righteousness is done for us and imputed to us) views (31).

The Phrase Means Both the Attribute of God and the Gift of God

William Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam (1895) write that the “righteousness of God” is a “great and comprehensive idea” that embraces both God and man (24). Thus it is first the righteousness of God himself for three reasons: the use in the Old Testament of the similar ideas as found in Psalm 98:2; as shown in Romans 3:5, 25, 26, while 3:21, 22, 10:3 are ambiguous; and the similar phrase, the “wrath of God,” in 1:18. Second, it is the gift of righteousness bestowed by God, as shown by three reasons: the righteousness is related to human faith in 1:17 (“revealed from faith to faith”) and in 3:22; it is confirmed by Habakkuk 2:4 quoted by Paul; and it is the idea of Philippians 3:9. These authors conclude that the two views are not “mutually exclusive” but “inclusive.” It is the righteousness of God himself and also that which proceeds from God. It is active and energizing, as it were the Divine will “enclosing and gathering into itself human wills” (25). God attributes righteousness to the believer because He is Himself righteous” (25). The whole scheme by which he gathers to himself a righteous people is the “direct and spontaneous expression of His own inherent righteousness: a necessity of His own Nature impels Him to make them like Himself. The story of how He has done so is the burden of the ‘Gospel’” (25). Having created a being with the “faculty of choice and capable of right and wrong action they could not rest until they had imparted to the Being something of themselves” (34). Sanday and Headlam cite many Old Testament texts that show that God’s righteousness is seen as “projected from the divine essence and realizing itself among men” (35). Paul understood this divine righteousness to take different forms: his fidelity to his promises; his punishment of sin; his resentment against sin at the cross; and the apprehension of his righteousness by faith on the part of all (35); and even that lived out in the life of the Christian (sanctification) (38-39). William M. Greathouse (1968) closely follows Sanday and Headlam (41-43).

F.F. Bruce (1963) finds both senses present, God’s personal righteousness and the righteousness “with which He justifies sinners on the ground of faith” (79). He finds a “remarkable anticipation of this twofold sense of the ‘righteousness of God’” in the Qumran literature (in the “Hymn of the Initiants”).

The Phrase Means Both Covenant Faithfulness and the Gift of Righteousness Bestowed

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James D.G. Dunn (1988) seems to favor double meaning within an overarching larger concept. He argues that in the Old Testament “righteousness” translates both qdc and dsx and is a relational term. Hence it means that God keeps his obligations to his covenant with Israel. “Righteousness” is “covenant faithfulness” and “righteousness and salvation become virtually synonymous” (as several references from the Psalms and Second Isaiah show) (41). Taking the meaning as “relationship” means that one does not have to choose in the debate between a subjective genitive (an attitude of God) and an objective genitive (an activity of God; a gift bestowed); it is not a question of either-or but both-and, “with the emphasis on the latter” (41). Relationship also allows that both ideas asserted for the verb (“to make righteous” or “to count righteous”) are true. Righteousness is a powerful gift which “enables and in fact achieves man’s righteousness” (42). Dunn further says that the meaning of the “righteousness of God” “would not necessarily be understood at once by all those listening to his letter” (47). Indeed, the purpose of the first few chapters is “precisely to explain” what Paul means by the phrase (47). When he discusses “from faith to faith” he appeals to Paul’s following Jewish exegesis to “extend [italic his] and broaden the meaning . . . to draw out as much meaning as possible from the text . . . the fuller meaning” (45). He further says that this later phrase is an example of Paul’s being deliberately ambiguous, that the “from faith” phrase from Habakkuk 2:4 can “embrace” both phrases in Paul (48): “from God’s faithfulness (to his covenant promises) to man’s response of faith” (48). Dunn further argues that Paul sets forth a “richness of meaning,” that he goes against the “convention” that “if a statement has one meaning it cannot simultaneously have a different meaning” (49). Paul embraces “a richer meaning” (49). [It is clear that issues of authorial intention, ambiguity, and polyvalence are involved in Dunn’s understanding of Romans 1:17].

The Phrase Means Both the Saving Activity of God and the Gift of Status

Ernst Kasemann (trans. 1980) surveys the various interpretations of the “righteousness of God” (21-28), including the divine quality, the gift that God gives, an action of God (subjective genitive), the event of salvation, the saving activity of God (making righteousness an alternative term for mercy, kindness, and love), relationship within covenant faithfulness, and as a power. He argues for the dual idea of power and gift, and finds the same structure in Qumran where he thinks Paul found this concept as a fixed formula (29). The following phrase, “from faith to faith,” is only loosely connected to the preceding phrase, affirming that the revelation of God’s righteousness “takes place always only in the sphere of faith” (31).

Brown identifies Kasemann’s view as opposed to the idea that righteousness is a property of the divine nature (NIDNTT, 3:372), since it derives from Greek speculation and is in conflict with the Old Testament and Jewish tradition. For Kasemann it is both a “power and a gift,” a power which brings salvation to pass. He refrains from an “over-sharp distinction between the gift-like character of righteousness, its juridical application and its character as power” (3:372). With Stuhlmacher he sees the phrase as a technical one (3:372-373). Brown faults Kasemann for seeing it as a technical term but it may be such at Qumran. Brown affirms that the “righteousness of God” is God acting righteously, and doing so in power and as a free gift, and there is a

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forensic context (373). It also has a corporate aspect (the believer becomes part of a new humanity) and an ethical aspect (the Christian becomes a new kind of man).

Douglas J. Moo (1996) gives an extensive discussion of the “righteousness of God” in Romans 1:17. He argues that the phrase is crucial, occurring only eight times in Romans and once elsewhere (2 Cor. 5:21) and explicating the theme of the epistle. He cites the three main ideas given to the phrase in the history of the church (70ff.): (1) an attribute of God, either his justice or rectitude (“distributive justice”), and this is probable in 3:5, 25-26 (but probably not in 1:17), or his faithfulness (again the previous refs. could be cited in support); (2) a status given by God (either a gen./abl. of source: “righteousness from God”; or, with Luther, an objective gen., “righteousness that is valid before God”; he took it as purely forensic, a matter of judicial standing, not as “internal renewal or moral transformation” (71); (3) an activity of God (so a subjective gen.—a righteousness that God shows or gives), namely, on the basis of Psalms and Isaiah, so that righteousness “refers to” God’s saving intervention on behalf of his people, “his saving action” (71). Moo cites how various interpreters have combined two of these ideas or all three. Moo insists that the meaning must be based on three factors: the use in the Old Testament; the use of “righteousness” words generally in Romans; and the immediate context (72). He observes that the Old Testament most strongly supports the (3) meaning, that usage in Romans supports the (2) meaning, and the immediate context both (2) and (3). Thus he concludes that it is best not to make a choice between the idea of a status given and a divine activity to save, but that the phrase means both ideas. Thus he defines “righteousness of God” as “the act by which God brings people into right relationship with himself” (italics his) (74). He cites advantages of this “more comprehensive interpretation” (1) as being the most frequent meaning found in the Old Testament so that readers would have an “immediate starting point” for understanding Paul; (2) as doing justice to both “nuances” of divine activity and human receptivity, and (3) as allowing adequate place to the believer’s status (75). Clearly Moo rejects the idea of an attribute of God.

Thomas R. Schreiner (1998) gives a very thorough treatment of the “righteousness of God” (63-73). He first surveys the two main interpretations (he virtually ignores the third view, an attribute of God). (1) It “refers to the believer’s status before God” (63), a declaration of forensic righteousness as the standing of people “because of the gift of God’s righteousness,” as Luther defended it against the idea of an attribute of God (his distributive justice) and against the idea of the infusion of righteousness (thus gen. of source) (63). It is a divine gift of status. Schreiner cites Calvin, Bultmann, Cranfield, Klein, Moo, Mounce, and others, in support. (2) It is God’s saving power, both effective and forensic. Schreiner cites this view, begun by Schlatter and gaining most impetus from Kasemann, as growing in its support (63-64). Schreiner then gives the details of support for each of these two views. The first finds support from several texts in Romans (3:21-22; 4:3, 5, 6, 9; 10:3; etc.; plus Gal. 2:20-21; 3:6, 21-22, 5:5; 1 Cor. 1:30; Phil. 3:9) and asserts that the forensic sense is regular in the verbal cognates. The second finds support in the verb “is being revealed”; the parallel between Romans 1:17 and 1:18, the gospel as the

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“saving power of God” in verse 16, and the Old Testament background found in qdc. Schreiner concludes that it is best to take both the forensic and transformative views, and cautions that he is not saying that “both senses are present everywhere” (66). The forensic is basic to the transformative, but the latter cannot “be sundered” from the former.

In an interesting footnote (66, n. 11) Schreiner confesses that he has changed his mind on this issue several times, but has “slowly become convinced” that transformation is involved. In his Paul: Apostle of God’s Glory in Christ (2001) he argues for view (1) alone, even though he acknowledges that once he viewed God’s righteousness as both forensic and transformative (192, n. 2; 200; 205). As noted above, in his commentary, written earlier, he supported both the gift of acquittal or status before God, and God’s saving power.

[Yet if Romans 1:16 affirms that “the gospel is the saving power of God” (so Schreiner, 62), is it not redundant to have the “righteousness of God” in verse 17 mean that the “saving power of God” is revealed in the gospel (since most recent interpreters define the “activity of God” as his “saving activity”)?129 Paul ends up saying: “in the gospel as the saving power of God is revealed the saving power of God”; or, even more strange: “in the saving power of God is revealed the saving power of God.” Thus Paul would be defining both the gospel and the righteousness of God in the same way. Rather in verse 16 Paul defines the gospel as the saving power of God; in verse 17 he is not defining the righteousness of God as the saving power of God. Instead, in verse 17, he is saying that “in it (= the saving power of God, v. 16) God is revealing his righteousness.” Verse 16 defines the gospel; verse 17 defines God, it seems].

Schreiner adds that the possessives found in Romans 3:25-26 (“his righteousness”) parallel the “righteousness of God” in verses 21-22, and this argues that “of God” is a possessive genitive. He appeals to these verses as supporting “God’s righteousness” as both a gift and power, so that verses 21-22 (and 10:3) support God’s saving righteousness while verses 25-26 support God’s judging righteousness. [Yet don’t they better support the idea of God possessing something, namely justice and holiness, etc.?]

Schreiner takes up a third idea for the “righteousness of God,” namely that it means covenant faithfulness. He criticizes this idea by noting that God’s righteousness is only “linked” to covenant faithfulness; it should not be defined as such (69). God’s righteousness is not covenant faithfulness. It “involves” covenant faithfulness but should not be “defined” as such (69). In Paul: Apostle of God’s Glory in Christ (2001), Schreiner makes the same argument at length. In his comments on Psalm 98 he acknowledges that “God’s righteousness is often parallel to his faithfulness, his loyal love and salvation” (198) and that his righteousness “expresses” and “fulfills” his covenant, but this terminology doesn’t meant that righteousness is his covenant faithfulness, nor should we “define” it this way (199). [Yet it seems that Schreiner is doing something similar to those he criticizes. The “righteousness of God” is not “saving activity” nor “transformation” nor forensic but it does entail them in its manifestation. The righteousness of

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God is the basis for many things. God is something and this is revealed by what he does: he saves and he acquits].

Schreiner next extends the matter further by asking “why God saves his people” (69). His answer is for the glory of God, for the glory of his name. He cites several texts in support (Ps. 143:1, 11 [142:1, 11 LXX] ; 31:1 [30:2 LXX], 3 [30:4 LXX]; 79:9 [78:9 LXX]; Dan. 9:4-14, 15-18; Isa. 43:7; 49:3; Deut. 4:37; 7:7-8). Several of these put “your righteousness” parallel to the glory of his name (at Ps. 143:11; 31:1; Dan. 9:16). [It seems quite natural to find here that “your righteousness” refers to the nature of God, just as the glory of his name points to who he is, his person. It seems a stretch for Schreiner to say that the “saving righteousness of God [[note the assumed definition]] is rooted in his desire to glorify his name” (71), especially when righteousness precedes God’s glory (Ps. 143:1, 11; Ps. 31:1, 3)]. Schreiner dismisses the possibility that God’s name is “just parallel” to his “saving righteousness” [note the assumed definition] by asserting that God’s name and glory are “more fundamental” (71). [Yet the parallelism argues that they are both fundamental, and would be, if righteousness refers to an attribute of God]. In a footnote (69, n. 14) Schreiner criticizes Piper for saying that righteousness is “God’s unswerving commitment to preserve the honor of his name and display his glory.” He thinks that it is more “satisfying to say that the saving righteousness of God is rooted in (not defined as) a desire to bring glory to his name” (69). [But note that Schreiner has redefined righteousness as an activity of God, his “saving righteousness,” whereas Piper may have meant God’s attribute. Indeed, it seems that Schreiner has done what he criticizes Piper for doing: he is trying to say that righteousness is both God’s gift and his saving power rather than saying that God’s gift and power are rooted in God’s nature].

Someone who may take the “righteousness of God” as meaning multiple ideas is Westerholm (Perspectives Old and New on Paul; 2004): it’s a gift or God’s saving activity (32, 284), the status of righteousness that God confers on believers (206), God’s “endorsement of good and hostility to evil”; that is, God’s vindication of “what is right” and his “commitment to uphold the right” must be understood in 1:17 (285). Adding another thought he writes: Righteousness is “not simply God’s gift of acquittal” but it is “that salvific activity by which God’s commitment to uphold the right is vindicated at the same time as sinners . . . who believe the gospel become dikaios (285; italics his). He acknowledges that this “may seem overloaded, but each aspect of the clarification is amply attested in the chapters that follow” (286). Yet apparently he sees the meaning as embracing only two ideas for he thereafter writes (286) that “both” ideas, God’s gift of acquittal and the “salvific act by which God’s support of the moral order . . . are true to Paul’s thought; we need not here decide between them in ambiguous cases.” Thus Westerholm is placed in this position of a double meaning. He implicitly defends a double or multiple meaning by appealing to ambiguity (discussed above). He explicitly opposes taking “God’s righteousness” in 1:17 as meaning “covenant faithfulness” (292-293).

Similarly Peter Stuhlmacher (1994) sees it as God’s salvific activity and the gift of righteousness, and more, since it is for all creation (29-32).

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Grant R. Osborne (2004) surveys the three major views of “righteousness of God” (42): (1) an attribute of God (a possessive gen.), describing “his character, either his justice or his faithfulness, perhaps both”; (2) God’s activity “in making people righteous” (a subjective gen.), including God’s “saving power in bringing people to himself and transforming them”; and (3) a forensic or legal idea (gen. of source or origin), namely, “God’s judicial decision to ‘declare us righteous’” on the basis of Christ’s work on the cross. So God imparts a new status to believers. This is Luther’s view and that of many Protestants, Osborne adds. In coming to a decision which is the best view, Osborne asserts that the “balance of interpretation rests solidly on the side of the forensic approach” but he thinks it is not an either-or situation. Citing Moo and Schreiner he apparently decides that the (2) and (3) views are correct. He cites the Old Testament as referring to God’s act to bring people into relationship with himself, to God’s eschatological deliverance, and to God’s righteous character. He concludes: “the primary force of righteousness (italic his) in Paul and here centers on the legal act of God whereby the repentant sinner is declared right by God and brought into a right relationship with him, resulting in right living.” [It seems that Osborne is combining several ideas into his “primary force.” It seems disappointing to find one who champions a single authorial intention and meaning supporting a polyvalent idea].

Others holding to this double meaning include Brendan Byrne (1996): it is objective as a genitive of origin (from God), “God’s saving faithfulness to creation”), and subjective (“in Christ believers find a righteous status before God”) (60).

The Triple Meaning Position

It seems that the new proposal is the only interpretation of Romans 1:17 to adopt a polyvalent interpretation in which he affirms that Paul intends two regular meanings (the gift of God and the saving power of God), and a third, unique idea of the attribute of God (as equitable, fair, evenhanded, and impartial).

James Denney (EGT, 1967) seems to allow for three meanings. He disavows the idea of the divine attribute or the character of God. Although this is elsewhere true, here an “eternal and self-imparting righteousness of God” called for by the verse is “confusing” (2:591). Instead it is a righteousness valid before God, as Luther suggested, a “divine righteousness” (2:590). It is also the gift, a “Divine righteousness” of which God is the source or author (the historical Protestant interpretation) (2:590). Finally, God’s judicial action accomplishes salvation. “All these three views are Biblical, Pauline and true to experience . . .” (2:591).

Conclusion

It seems that it is better to affirm that Paul intends one meaning. Hence the approach of those before the Reformation, who read it as the attribute of justice, and those of the Reformation (Luther), who read it as God’s gift of righteousness to the believer, should be preferred. Of these

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single meanings it seems that the view that prevailed from the time of the earliest interpreters till the Reformation is best. While it seems that Luther was closer to the truth than moderns are, he may have been too much influenced by his opposition to both the legalism of Catholicism and the idea of retributive justice.

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1 See Henri de Lubac, S.J., Medieval Exegesis; vol. 1, The Four Senses of Scripture, trans. Mark Sebanc (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 211-224. Jerome cited the example of Paul. Other users of the figure include Augustine, Gregory, Rabanus Maurus, Rathier of Verona, Peter Damian, Thomas Aquinas, John Chrysostom, and others.2 “God’s Righteousness as God’s Fairness in Romans 1:17: An Ancient Perspective on a Significant Phrase.” Paper presented to the Evangelical Theological Society, November 19, 2010, Atlanta, GA.

3 Ibid., 2. I’m grateful to Frank Thielman for releasing a pre-publication form of his paper for my use in this paper.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Ibid., 4.7 Ibid., 5-68 Ibid., 19 Ibid. 10 Ibid., 6.11 Ibid., 7.12 Ibid., 8. The italics are Thielman’s. Also the words quoted are Thielman’s; he is not quoting Origen at this point.13 Ibid., 8-9. See Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5, trans. Thomas P. Scheck (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 2001), 87.14 Ibid., 9.15 Ibid.16 Ibid., 9-10.17 Ibid., 10.18 Ibid.19 Ibid., 12.20 Ibid.21 Ibid., 13.22 Ibid.23 Ibid., 14.24 It seems to me that the greater problem is how there can be three meanings in the first usage of “righteousness” in v. 17. Once this is granted then the problem that Thielman finds is virtually no problem at all.25 Thielman, “God’s Righteousness,” 16. Yet note that whereas all three terms in 3:26 are cognates drawn from dik- this is not the case for Thielman’s proposal (since isothj is not a cognate of dik- forms).26 Ibid., 17.27 Ibid.28 Ibid., 18.29 Ibid., 20.30 Ibid., 22.31 Ibid., 22-23.32 I’m not disparaging Origen’s use of Deut. I respect it and even carry it further than he. For in a real sense, every Christian (male and female) who comes from a pagan (non-Jewish) background is a “beautiful captive woman” in the sense that he or she has been captured by our Lord (2 Cor. 2:14) and joined as a bride to a new Bridegroom (Rev. 21:2).33 See Henri Crouzel, Origen: The Life and Thought of the First Great Theologian, trans. A.S. Worrall (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), 242ff.; and G.W. Butterworth, Origen On First Principles (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), xxxix-xl.34 Thielman, “God’s Righteousness,” 27. Indeed, one of the sources that Thielman cites as a source for the coinage of the day is by S. Skowronek titled, On the Problems of the Alexandrian Mint: Allusion to the Divinity of the Sovereign Appearing on the Coins of Egyptian Alexandria . . . . If the sovereign claimed that he was “righteous” meaning “impartial” or “fair” would Christians embrace this word since it was associated with a pagan emperor worshipped as deity?

35 See my paper, “1 Clement: A Model for Christian Hermeneutics and Eschatology?” Paper presented to the Evangelical Theological Society, Danvers, MA, November 17, 1999. 36 See Stanley E. Porter, “Exegesis of the Pauline Letters, Including the Deutero-Pauline Letters,” A Handbook to Exegesis of the New Testament, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Boston: Brill, 2002), 506-508.37 Ibid., 509.38 Ibid., 510.39 Ibid., 511; see 509-511. Porter affirms that many points of Paul’s hermeneutics parallel those of Jewish exegesis, and it is clear that many Jewish techniques were derived from the Greeks. Just the fact that Paul wrote in Greek sets him apart from the Qumran community where Semitic languages were used. Hellenistic rhetoric arose in the 4th century BC and during Paul’s era Cicero and Quintilian had formulated rhetorical principles. Thus it is probably unwise to bifurcate greatly between Jewish and Greco-Roman influence on Paul. By his allegorization Philo illustrates how much a Jewish

writer could be influenced by the literary tradition of the Greeks.Porter later cautions about applying ancient rhetorical categories to Paul’s letters in light of the fact that studies have shown that letters weren’t analyzed on this basis until the fourth century CE (542).

40 See William H. Stephens, The New Testament World in Pictures (Nashville: Broadman, 1987), 9-33, who shows and describes several coins of these deified emperors. After Nero came those of the civil wars (Galba, 68-69; Otho, 69; Vitellius, 69), the Flavians (Vespasian, 69-79; Titus, 79-81; Domitian, 81-96), and the Adoptive (Nerva, 96-98; Trajan, 117-138).41 Bernard Ramm, Protestant Biblical Interpretation: A Textbook of Hermeneutics for Conservative Protestants (Boston: W.A. Wilde Company, 1956), 89. See the equally helpful book by Bruce Corley, et. al., Biblical Hermeneutics: A Comprehensive Introduction to Interpreting Scripture, second ed. (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2002).42 Ibid., 48-51.43 Ibid., 55. Italics his. Thus the “literal principle” has three “sub-principles”: Luther rejected allegory; he accepted the primacy of the original languages; and he embraced the historical and grammatical principle (54-55). Ramm cites five other principles, besides the literal, that were part of Luther’s hermeneutics (53-57). Calvin exemplified the new Protestant hermeneutics with “his touch of genius” (57). See chapters 6 and 7 in Corley, Hermeneutics, 90-115.

44 Ibid., 91.45 Ibid., 93-94.46 Ibid., 96.47 Ibid., 99.48 Ibid., 101.49 I assume that all evangelicals would subscribe to the hermeneutical principles just defined.50 One can appreciate Thielman’s defense of the coherence of theology and history, that they are not antithetical. In attempting to find a meaning from the past text for the contemporary church Osborne cites Thielman as supportive of this idea in his Theology of the New Testament: a Canonical and Synthetic Approach (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2005), 33-34. It is possible to find “a theologically charged history mingled with a historically charged theology” (Grant R.Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation ([Grove, ILL: second ed., 2006,] 364). Osborne cites (p. 364) P. F. Esler, New Testament Theology: Community and Community (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005), 36-37, in support of historians and theologians drawing together the past text and the present church. No doubt this conviction about the compatibility of theology and history lies at the base of Thielman’s appeal to the Roman culture in interpreting Romans 1:17.51 For example, Daniel 10 reveals that the “princes” of Persia and Greece sought to restrain the messenger who “looked like a man” and came to reveal the future of Israel to Daniel. Michael the archangel intervened and helped him overcome the opposition. Also, Revelation tells us that Satan, the devil, the serpent, “deceives the whole world” and their rulers (Rev. 12:9; 20:3, 7-10), and inspires the beast to exercise authority over all peoples on earth (13:7).”52 Ramm, Interpretation, 100. Italics are his.53 Ibid. Italics are his.54 Ibid., 100.55 That salvation should be distributed impartially seems to reflect the debate of Romans 9:10-24. This passage emphasizes God’s sovereignty in salvation. There the concern over how God distributes salvation, how people experience his mercy, is determined by his sovereign choice; the issue is not fairness or equity. This is Paul’s response to those who claim that God is unjust. He does not assert here that God is fair or equitable. Also, from the aspect of human responsibility to believe (Rom. 10:1-13), it is not a matter of impartiality but of choice. People must choose to believe (people of all backgrounds are invited to believe). Thus the distribution of salvation involves both divine sovereignty (not impartiality) and human responsibility.

56 See Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 383-389, where his extensive discussion includes the earlier work of A.T. Robertson and Bruce K. Waltke (see also 365-368). Another instance occurs when interpreting Hebrews 9:16-17 where the author appeals to a meaning for diaqh,kh not found in the Old Testament world and usage, where it meant “covenant” or “agreement” between two living people. But in the Roman world it also meant a “last will and testament” which didn’t go into effect until the testator died (as in the modern West). But on the occasion of Christ’s sacrifice of himself for the sins of people, he fulfilled not only the idea of the Old Testament, fulfilling an agreement between God and people (inaugurating the new covenant), but by dying gave the agreement the idea of “last will and testament”—something that could not go into effect till the testator died.

Another example is that of adoption—how a Christian is considered as adopted into the family of God (Rom. 8:15; Gal. 4:5). Adoption was unknown in the Old Testament. So Paul picks up a cultural feature of his Roman times

and uses it to enlarge the concept of Christians becoming God’s children/sons. This case and the instance of Hebrews 8:16 would be true examples of Origen’s “beautiful captive woman.”

57 Ibid., 1.58 David Alan Black, Linguistics for Students of New Testament Greek: A Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988), 124. 59 Ibid.60 Ibid.61 Ibid., 125.62 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass: G.&C. Merriam Co., 1960), 221.63 Black, Linguistics, 129. Osborne, Spiral, 107-108, very similarly discusses vagueness and ambiguity.64 Ibid.65 Ibid.66 Ibid. Osborne, Spiral, 108, allows for some examples of deliberate ambiguity under the idea of “double meaning.”

67 Such as advocated by Richard C. Averitt, Singular-Meaning Lexicon of the New Testament (East Point, Georgia: Scripture Semantics, 1988), iii-iv; and others. See also the negative judgment in Osborne, Spiral.68 Black, Linguistics, 125.69 Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., Toward an Exegetical Theology: Biblical Exegesis for Preaching and Teaching (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981).70 Ibid., 108.71 Ibid., 58.72 Ibid., 109, 111, 112. 73 Ibid., 204.74 Ibid., 246.75 Osborne, Spiral, 84. He seemingly rejects multiple meanings at any given place (84, 107).76 Ibid.77 Thielman, “God’s Righteousness,” 17.78 Osborne, Spiral, 84. He restates this later as “the best meaning is the least meaning”; it “causes the least change in the context” (107).79 Ibid., 91.80 Ibid., 97-98. 81 Ibid., 93. Osborne takes up the issue of multiple “senses,” from the standpoint of translation procedures, but this pertains to three levels of word meaning (102). He cites (91, 100, 102) Beekman and Callow as advocating a primary level (a common thread or meaning without a context), a secondary level (specific meanings sharing an aspect of the primary sense but occur only in some contexts); and a figurative meaning. But Osborne exhorts caution about such categories. Apparently this is not to be confused with multiple meanings. Osborne cites two determiners of meaning: the semantic field (determined by synchronic study) and the context (91).82 Ibid., 474ff.83 Ibid., 476.84 Ibid., 477. Osborne also critiques the idea of canon criticism and faults it for assuming a dichotomy between authorial intention and the theological understanding of the text in the church (492ff.).85 Jeannine K. Brown, Scripture As Communication: Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), 65, n. 22. In this footnote Brown continues: “Affirmation of polyvalence continues with reader perspectives. Yet reader approaches reacted against an autonomous, impersonal text. Instead, in reader-centered viewpoints, readers bring all that they are to the text to create meaning.” Later, Brown cites a frequently used analogy to summarize the movement from the author to the reader. The search for authorial intention (as defined in the 19th century) is compared to coming to the text as a window for understanding the author. Textual autonomy considers the text to be a picture, to be appreciated in its own right rather than what the author intends. Putting the emphasis on the reader (reader response ideas) views the text as a mirror—the reader finds one’s own reflection in the text (69).

She defines meaning, which she calls “textual communication,” as “the complex pattern of what an author intends to communicate with his or her audience for purposes of engagement, which is inscribed in the text and conveyed through use of both shareable language parameters and background-contextual assumptions” (80). It is clear that she doesn’t countenance that an author may intend multiple meanings.86 Osborne, Spiral, 478.87 Ibid., 477.88 Ibid., 510.89 Ibid.90 Ibid., 511. See also Corley, Hermeneutics, 30, for defense of a single meaning.91 Ibid., 513-521. The italic is mine.92 Ibid., 516.93 Ibid., 517.

94 Ibid.95 Ibid., 518.96 Ibid.97 Ibid. Critical-historical exegesis will consider biblical backgrounds (the historical dimensions), grammatico-historical exegesis brings the focus to the original or intended meaning (the semantic dimension), and literary criticism makes the text central (the literary dimension).

98 Ibid.99 Ibid., 519.100 Ibid.101 Ibid., 520-521.102 Ibid, 521. Quoting R.T. France, Osborne asserts that the priority in biblical interpretation must be “‘the first horizon,’i.e., of understanding biblical language within its own context before we start exploring its relevance to our own concerns, and of keeping the essential biblical context in view as a control on the way we apply biblical language to current issues.”

103 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There Meaning in This Text? The Bible, The Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998), 201ff.104 Ibid., 253.105 Ibid, 256-259.106 Brown, Scripture, 92. She goes on to show that ambiguity, whether intentional or unintentional, is caused by the linguistic, cultural, and worldview gaps between authors and readers (93-97). Later, she seems to be at odds with Vanhoozer when she says that implications, echoes, evocations, and allusions may be unattended by an author but still be part of meaning. Authors may not be aware of allusions, though they will be in continuity with their broader purposes and so be part of meaning (108). These may be “unconscious” “and “unintended” or part of the “subconsciousness” of an author (109-110). She cites the idea that authors, by citing or alluding to a particular Old Testament text, may be “evoking the entire context, message, or story of that other text” (110). This is one of the keys for understanding the use of the Old Testament in the New.107 Vanhoozer, Meaning, 257.108 Ibid., 256.109 Brown, Scripture, 86, says that “the placement of a particular passage affects its meaning,” and illustrates this by the additional implications that Matthew 28:17-20 has at the end of the Gospel of Matthew.110 Vanhoozer, Meaning, 265. The canon as a whole becomes the communicative act providing access to the divine intention. The fuller meaning focuses “on the (divine) author’s intended meaning at the level of the canonical act” (265). The divine intention supervenes on the intention of the human authors; it does not contravene the intention of the human authors. Vanhoozer seems to be limiting fuller meaning to what is later revealed in the canon compared to what someone earlier wrote. Yet even this fuller meaning attributed to the divine author is in fact the “fuller literal sense” (313). This sense is not a spiritualizing of the text but specifying the reference to Jesus Christ (314).

111 Vanhoozer, Meaning, 417. Elsewhere (First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics [Downer’s Grove: InterVarsity, 2002], 178, Vanhoozer says that “authors may intend to communicate complex, multilayered intentions.” [I presume he means that a single author may intend a single, multilayered intention (rather than plural intentions)]. 112 Brown, Scripture, 84-85. She elaborates on what she means by pointing out that a text has various aspects, such as a main point, subpoints, a particular placement in the whole, volitional and emotive/relational goals along side the cognitive ones, etc. (85-87). Thus there are different ways to describe a text and differing interpretations can be describing “faithfully communicative intention or meaning,” as long as the interpretations are not directly conflicting nor mutually exclusive (87). “Determinacy means that interpretations can be weighed on the basis of their alignment and coherence with an author’s communicative intention,” yet “determinacy does not mean that we will be able to exhaust the meaning of a text . . . in interpretive practice” (87; italics hers). Thus we can never finish reading the text (88) because meaning is imperfectly accessed by readers (88) because God created us as subjective, finite creatures and because all of our faculties have been impacted by the fall, by sin (89-90). Yet we should strive to arrive at meaning. Since God has communicated in Scripture (cf. Heb. 1:1-2) we must believe that he has given us the capacity to understand him, even if imperfectly (90).113 Vanhoozer, Meaning, 418.114 Ibid., 419. Italics are his.115 Ibid.116 Brown, Scripture, 108.117 Ibid., 111. Perlocution intention is not perlocution per se, that is, the actual response of the reader since the latter is not part of the author’s meaning. Perlocution intention is an extension of meaning. It is important to think of perlocution intention since Biblical authors want their readers not only to understand what they write but to respond to it (111-114).

Revelation 1:3 pronounces a blessing on those who not only hear but also keep the things in the book. John emphasizes this intention by a syntactical construction that uses one article to join two participles in the same case connected by “and.”

As Brown notes, “speech-act theory distinguishes a saying (locution) from the force of that saying or what it does (illocution) and the response of a hearer (perlocution) to the locution and its illocution” (111).118 Vanhoozer, Meaning, 421.119 Ibid., 423. 120 Ibid. By championing the idea of a single meaning in the text but multiple significances Vanhoozer may be thought of as a fundamentalist with regard to meaning and a liberal with regard to significance (424). Yet he rejects being a fundamentalist since he believes that fundamentalists attend to the Word and relegate the Spirit to “the theological and hermeneutical margins” (426).121 Brown, Scripture, 118-119. Thus Scripture’s meaning, with all its complexity, is “normatively addressed to its particular context yet normatively addresses other contexts as well. The text is able to speak into different cultural contexts without losing its normativity” (118-119). She affirms that while meaning and its contextualization in new contexts are distinct they are “intimately connected” (119). As shown above, Vanhoozer speaks similarly of significance as a “recontextualized meaning.” (143).

122 Ibid., 115.123 Ibid., 116. Brown is borrowing the terminology of Hirsch. Yet Brown and Vanhoozer are not that far apart for he calls the author’s intention the “intended meaning” and the application the author’s “extended meaning” (262). In Beyond the Obvious: Discover the Deeper Meaning of Scripture (James B. De Young and Sarah L. Hurty; Gresham, Oregon: Vision House, 1995), my co-author and I wrote that the process by which New Testament authors discovered deeper meaning in the Old Testament is a process that the Christian can emulate in interpreting Scripture for contextualizing it today. Yet the contextualization for today must be intimately connected to the author’s intended meaning.124 Ibid., 94-97.125 Osborne, Spiral, 478; Kaiser, Exegetical Theology, 47, 113.126 Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 109. He considers that a genitive of separation might fit Romans 1:17 “though this is debatable.”127 A.T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research (Nashville: Broadman, 1934), 499. He specifically cites the genitive of Romans 1:17 as an instance where the “subjective genitive can indeed be applied to the merely possessive genitive.” So he combines both in the translation, “the righteousness which God has and wishes to bestow on us.” This is helpful to resolving the translation. Like Wallace, he thinks it is “possible (though not probably correct)” to take it as an ablative, that God would be the source of righteousness (514).128 Ibid., 781. Regarding Romans 1:17 Robertson believes that it is indefinite, but adds that only the context can decide whether the noun is definite. He notes that the same phrase is later both anarthrous (3:21) and articular (10:3). He writes: “Sometimes the matter is wholly doubtful.” It seems that the following genitive (“of God”) argues that the noun is definite.129 Schreiner makes a point of saying that he does not distinguish “so sharply between ‘righteousness’ and ‘salvation’” (68, n. 12).