Welcoming the Huddled Masses:

Sanctuary Policies in American Cities

James Hedrick

March 7, 2011

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Abstract

Although immigration is typically thought of as a federal issue, states andmunicipalities have dominated policymaking in this area over the last sev-eral years. And, despite overwhelming media attention paid to restrictivepolicies enacted in places like Arizona and Hazelton, PA, many states andmunicipalities have actually expanded the rights of immigrants and increasedtheir access to services. The widespread adoption of pro-immigrant and evenpro-undocumented immigrant policies across the country creates a puzzle forpolitical scientists. Why would states and localities enact policies that bene-fit non-citizens who have little-to-no access to the political system, especiallywhen public opinion is almost universally opposed to immigrants and immi-gration?

This paper addresses this question by looking at the enactment of so-called“sanctuary policies” by American cites. These policies, though varied, typi-cally prevent local authorities from enforcing immigration law and are particu-larly beneficial to undocumented residents, who can interact with law enforce-ment with less fear of deportation. I argue that, under certain circumstances,elected officials can and will represent the interests of their non-citizens con-stituents, despite their lack of formal access to the political system. To testthis theory, I construct a dataset containing information on approximately 100large American cities from 1990-2008 and their adoption of sanctuary policies.These policy adoptions are then analyzed using duration models similar tothose employed in the diffusion literature with the results arguing that thesepolicies require a political explanation, rather than a bureaucratic or economicone.

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Introduction

This paper seeks to answer a seemingly simple question: why would states and

municipalities pass policies that benefit immigrants, particularly illegal immigrants?

While punitive immigration legislation in states like Arizona & Oklahoma has been

widely publicized, it is not representative of all the immigrant policy that has been

enacted at the subnational level. Many states have granted increased rights and

access to immigrants through policies like in-state tuition for undocumented children

or laws allowing immigrants access to social services. Even Arizona has passed

legislation protecting the rights of undocumented immigrants to be compensated by

employers in the event of injury (NCSL 2008, see Arizona SB 1125).

However, this rush of pro-immigrant legislation that has accompanied the well-

publicized restrictive subnational policy enactments is difficult to explain based on

the current political science literature. Immigrants, particularly undocumented ones,

are prevented in most instances from having even the most basic access to the po-

litical system. Nevertheless, this paper argues that undocumented immigrants, and

by extension other groups without political access like felons, can receive political

representation under certain circumstances. Using the logic of the policy diffusion

literature, this paper tests the impact of certain demographic characteristics on the

adoption of so-called “sanctuary laws” in large American cities.

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Literature Review

The study of immigration has a long if sparse history in American politics, partic-

ularly at the local level. Urban areas were typically the first and often only stop

for immigrants throughout American history and much of the research on political

machines, for example, has dealt with the incorporation of various ethnic groups into

urban politics (Erie 1988, Waldinger & Lee 2001). Increased immigration in recent

decades - both legal and illegal - has spawned a literature on their integration and

incorporation into the political process as well (Ellis 2001, Zhou & Lee 2007).

Political science research however has largely avoided addressing the impact of

recent immigration on policy outcomes, particularly at the subnational level. Most

of the recent academic research on the impact of immigrants on policy (and visa

versa) has come from legal analysis, particularly at the subnational level (Spiro

2001, Rodriguez 2008, Su 2008, Olivas 2007). To use a highly relevant example,

Pham describes the legal back and forth between the Justice Department, Congress,

and immigrants’ rights groups following the 9-11 attacks over whether cites and

states were required to enforce federal immigration law (2006). While the federal

agencies and Congress attempted to enlist the aid of cites and states in enforcing

immigration law, many municipalities passed laws explicitly limiting the ability of

their law enforcement agencies to cooperate with federal authorities. Some of these

sanctuary laws prohibited expending resources, other strictly prohibited asking about

immigration status, while still others resembled a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy

(Rodriguez 2008).

In brief, this legal literature argues, perhaps surprisingly to political scientists,

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that states typically do not engage in a “race to the bottom” with respect to benefits

policies addressing aliens (Spiro 2001). In fact, one author refers to states as “labo-

ratories of generosity” towards immigrants and their access to services (Chang 2002,

pg. 364). However, while illuminating, this research has been largely descriptive

and primarily focused on the tension between national and subnational law on im-

migration issues. Additionally, while it has outlined the existing legal complexity

and explored the possibilities for enforcement at the subnational level, it has not

systematically tested hypotheses about the causes of subnational immigration policy

enactment.

Additionally, there has been some recent attention to the historical development

of immigration reform in the United States. Daniels starts with the infamous Chi-

nese Exclusion Act in 1882 and goes on to describe and identify several long-term

“waves” of immigration policy that flow from permissive to restrictive, and then

more restrictive (Daniels 2005). While exceptionally well-documented and detailed,

Daniels historical account is primarily descriptive and provides little insight into the

causal factors that have inspired recent pro-immigrant policies, like sanctuary laws.

In contrast, Tichenor’s historical institutionalist account argues that the swings be-

tween permissive and restrictive immigration policy, at least at the national level,

have been driven by ideologically cross-cutting coalitions of interest groups. Profes-

sional experience and international pressure have also affected the tenor of American

immigration policy (Tichenor 2002). Below, some of Tichenor’s concepts will be

adapted to help understand municipalities’ motivations to enact sanctuary policies.

While political science has not focused much on the causes and effects of subna-

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tional immigration policy, there has been some research on the determinants of public

opinion regarding immigration. Generally speaking, native citizens, at least in indus-

trialized countries, support reductions in the number of immigrants and restrictions

on their access to public services by wide margins (Cornelius & Rosenblum 2005).

This negative attitude toward immigrants and immigration policy can be accentu-

ated by poor economic conditions, particularly sociotropic perceptions of the national

economy (Citrin, Green, Muste & Wong 1997, Kessler & Freeman 2005), or reduced

based on the perceived characteristics of the immigrants themselves (Hainmueller

& Hiscox 2010). However, there is evidence that the opposition to immigration is

at least partially emotionally related to anxiety, particularly when the immigrants

are believed to be members of a different ethnic group than the respondent, so that

anti-immigrant sentiment may be particularly resistant to change (Brader, Valentino

& Suhay 2008). In short, while there are some nuances in the study of public opinion

concerning immigration, suffice to say that public opinion “throughout the industrial-

ized world [is characterized] by opposition to existing immigration levels and negative

feelings about the most recent cohort of immigrants” (Cornelius & Rosenblum 2005,

pg. 104).

There has been scattered attention in political science to behavior and policy

associated with immigration. Most of this literature borrows heavily from race and

politics research in political science, particularly the racial threat hypothesis, which

states that increasing numbers of minorities will drive the creation of restrictive poli-

cies by the dominant group to preserve political power (Key 1949, Blalock 1967).

Specifically with regards to immigration, Tolbert and Hero found significant racial

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effects at the county level on voting for Proposition 187 in California, a particu-

larly punitive immigration initiative, as well as increased effects in areas with higher

unemployment (1996). More recently, Hopkins has argued that sharp increases in

immigrant populations and national salience affect policy responses to immigrants

(2010). These cases focus specifically on anti-immigrant legislation and look specifi-

cally at how increasing immigrant populations drive punitive local policies. They do

not, however, address the phenomenon of pro-immigrant policy.

Finally, there has been a smattering of very recent research on pro-immigrant

policy outcomes in various cities and states. For example, a comparison of in-state

tuition proposals for undocumented children (colloquially known as “D.R.E.A.M.

Acts”) found that framing the recipients as blameless “proto-citizens” helped facil-

itate passage in Kansas, while a focus on jurisdictional authority killed a similar

program in Arkansas (Reich & Barth 2010). Other research on California cities

finds that immigrant incorporation, as measured by pro-immigrant law enforcement

policies, are likely to be initiated by professional bureaucrats, rather than through

legislative or executive means (Lewis & Ramakrishnan 2007). Research treating

policies like sanctuary programs and same-sex marriage as “acts of defiance” find

that they can have a significant impact on state-level policies. Finally, others have

found that partisanship is the driving force behind a localities decision to enact ei-

ther pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant policies in response to changes in the local

demographics (Ramakrishnan & Wong 2010).

In short, the available research on immigration and immigrant policy, partic-

ularly pro-immigrant policy, is sparse at best but offers a few important building

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blocks. First, the research on public opinion seems to indicate that the public, at

least overall, generally opposes increased immigration and expanding access for cur-

rent immigrants. However, evidence from legal scholars seems to indicate that states

and localities might be more welcoming to immigrants than a cursory reading of

the public opinion research would indicate. Additionally, scattered research on po-

litical behavior and immigration policy outcomes has indicated that saliency, sharp

increases in the immigrant population, and poor economic conditions can increase

negative behavior and policies towards immigrants. However, other research on sub-

ational immigration policy outcomes seems to indicate that framing, partisanship,

and bureaucratic expertise are important for enacting pro-immigrant policy.

Theory

Given the literature cited above, it is obvious that a simple story of public opinion

and representation is not a sufficient explanation for the widespread adoption of pro-

immigrant policy by state and local governments. Although many other studies have

found significant congruence between aggregate public opinion and policy outcomes

(Erikson, Wright & McIver 1993, Stimson, Mackuen & Erikson 1995), in this case

public opinion, at least of the population as a whole, seems to be universally opposed

to policy that expands the rights and access of aliens, especially illegal ones. Even

recent research on news coverage of the immigration issue finds that media atten-

tion tends to be negative toward immigrants and immigration, especially near the

U.S.-Mexico border (Branton & Dunaway 2009b, Branton & Dunaway 2009a). Nev-

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ertheless, these beneficial policies are widespread and explicit in their targets. From

the preceding literature review, I have identified three possible theories to explain the

phenomenon of pro-immigrant policy: activism, bureaucratic incorporation, and an

electoral connection. First, I’ll describe and dispense with the first two possibilities,

and then focus on the third which I argue best explains the adoption of sanctuary

policies by local governments.

First, the only article that specifically addresses the phenomenon of local sanc-

tuary policies explicitly argues for a bureaucratic incorporation theory (Lewis &

Ramakrishnan 2007). Lewis and Ramakrishnan argue that the adoption of sanctuary

policies is driven by bureaucratic expertise, specifically among police commissioners

and local law enforcement. These loosely controlled bureaucratic agents adopt poli-

cies that help them better carry out their duties, but that would not be approved

through a standard legislative or electoral process. However, the study looked only

at California. A closer examination of the sanctuary laws adopted across the country

as recorded by the National Immigration Law Center (NILC) shows that the vast

majority of them were adopted through legislative means, either through ordinance

or council resolution.

Figure 1 below shows distribution of sanctuary policies by their method of pas-

sage. Legislative indicates passage by a city council, executive indicates mayoral

order, and bureaucratic indicates adoption by the police department. Obviously,

the vast majority of sanctuary policies do not come from bureaucratic innovation.

Instead, they are largely the product of legislative resolutions and ordinances that

direct local law enforcement not to “inquire about the immigration status of crime

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victims, witnesses, or others who call approach or are interviewed.”1

In short, nationwide sanctuary laws seem to be a case of the principals, the

local legislatures, exerting direct control over the activities of their agents, the police

departments. This simple count does not argue that municipal bureaucrats, such

as police chiefs, are without influence in this are. As you can see, in 19 cities, they

independently adopted a sanctuary policy, and it seems a safe assumption that they

were consulted by the council members and mayors who enacted the remainder of

the policies. However, this figure does argue that there is a larger story than simply

the application of bureaucratic expertise to a law enforcement problem.

Figure 1: Sanctuary Policies by Type

1See Hartford, CT Ordinance, 07/08 available here: http://www.hartford.gov/government/Town&CityClerk/Proposed%20Ordinances/immigration%20status.htm.

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Which leads us to the second possible explanation for these ordinances, local gov-

ernment activism. Some researchers have argued that in a federal system, upper level

policy inaction or policy mismatch between levels of government can lead to local

governments adopting aggressive or defiant legislation (Riverstone-Newell 2010, God-

win & Schroedel 2000, Shipan & Volden 2006). A number of studies have shown that

local activism can spur state attention and policymaking on an issue (Riverstone-

Newell 2010, Shipan & Volden 2006). This literature is closely related to the dif-

fusion literature, arguing that there can be vertical movement of innovation as well

as horizontal movement. However, this literature tends to argue that upper-level

policymaking is the purpose and incentive for the passage of the aggressive policies

adopted by local governments.

In other words, local policy adoption is an agenda setting tool used by local policy

entrepreneurs to spur policy adoption at other levels in a federal system rather than

create a “durable local policy solution” for their own jurisdictions (Riverstone-Newell

2010). In some instances, this interpretation of sanctuary policies may be reasonable.

For example, the state of New Mexico adopted an executive order prohibiting state

law enforcement from inquiring about immigration status following the adoption of

similar provisions by its two largest cities: Albuquerque and Santa Fe. Likewise,

Montana and Oregon adopted legislative sanctuary policies after some cities had

adopted similar policies. However, states with the most activity from their cities in

this area, like California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota,

have not adopted similar policies. Even states that are generous to immigrants in

other areas such as Texas, California, and New York which have all adopted an in-

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state tuition policy that benefits the children of undocumented immigrants, have

not adopted similar sanctuary policies. This indicates that these policies may be

substantively important for the cities that adopt them, rather than symbolic acts.

In short, the activism argument works better for issue areas like same-sex mar-

riage or gun control, areas that are more tied to specific ideological positions or

parties. These areas would be more subject to policy mismatch in a federal system

than immigration, which has historically been dominated by cross-cutting coalitions

(Tichenor 2002). In addition, while the desire to spur upper-level policy action might

be partially responsible for the adoption of some sanctuary policies, arguing that lo-

calities adopt these policies to move specific issues to the larger political agenda

assumes that the policies are not electorally dangerous for the municipal leaders.

The public opinion research cited above seems to indicate that this is unlikely, espe-

cially for so many cites across the country.

To conclude, neither local activism or bureaucratic incorporation seems to be

a reasonable explanation for the spread of local sanctuary policies. Local activism

assumes that the ultimate motivation is to set the agenda for upper-level action and

that local elected officials face no threat for advocating for these policies. Addition-

ally, bureaucratic incorporation can only account for less than a quarter of the overall

adoptions, leaving the vast majority of sanctuary policies unexplained even before

more complex analysis is attempted. In short, explaining these sanctuary policies

requires thinking about how these policies fit with the reelection aspirations of ambi-

tious lawmakers. A theory connecting the reelection concerns of lawmakers with the

policy preferences of residents without access to the policy arena is described below.

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Electoral Connection

Given the description presented above, it might surprise many to learn that this is not

the first time in American history that subnational governments have taken the lead

on assimilating new residents. During the Antebellum Era, many state governments

and state party organizations actively naturalized and recruited recent (white male)

immigrants. So welcoming were the attitudes of many states and localities (or at least

so great was their need for immigrant electoral support) that many actually allowed

non-naturalized citizens to vote (Aylsworth 1931). Many state governments even

enlisted the aid of immigration agents in foreign countries to recruit migrants during

a time of labor scarcity, abundant territory, and widespread industrialization. These

policies were affirmed in at least one Supreme Court case (The Mayor, Alderman, and

Commonality of the City of New York, Plaintiffs v. George Miln 1837). While this

period was not without its nativists, who focused largely on anti-Catholic attacks,

nevertheless the national government was largely silent on immigration and the state

governments were given significant leeway over assimilation and naturalization policy

(Tichenor 2002).

Tichenor argues that much of this pro-immigrant policy was not necessarily the

product of egalitarian public opinion. Although modern public opinion polling was

unknown at the time, he points to numerous Founding Fathers, prominent politicians

(particularly Federalists and later Whigs), newspaper editors, and other opinion

leaders who warned against the influx of immigrants and their deleterious affect on

the Republic (Tichenor 2002). Instead, he traces the enactment of policies that

expanded the rights and access of immigrants to electoral concerns. To grossly

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oversimplify, the Democratic-Republican party organized around recent European

immigrants and fought for generous naturalization and assimilation policies to ensure

immigrant electoral support. Later in the pre-Civil War period, they were joined

by urban Federalists and their successors who needed laborers and were politically

threatened by the large immigrant populations in urban areas (2002). In short,

at one of the few other times in American history when states and localities had

such a broad influence over immigration policy, it was largely due to normal political

concerns, driven by the electoral considerations of strategically motivated politicians.

Therefore, explaining the generosity of modern state and local governments to-

ward immigrants requires a theory of representation that accounts for why immi-

grants might be electorally important to local lawmakers and why these officials

would pursue policies that benefit their non-citizen constituents. Obviously, the

easy assimilation and strong political machines of the 1800’s are no longer in effect.

However, there are other reasons to believe that lawmakers might respond to illegal

aliens, and this starts with assuming that any elected official’s primary goal is reelec-

tion (Mayhew 1974, Arnold 1990). The difficult question to answer is how a group

that cannot vote, is not organized, and consists of a large number of individuals that

are not even officially recognized by the national government can be important to

lawmakers’ chances at reelection.

First and foremost, it is important to note that we know, at least from the

Congressional literature, that individuals need ‘neither firm policy preferences’ nor

‘knowledge of what Congress [or state legislatures] are doing,’ to affect legislator

behavior. Instead, legislators’ “anticipation of future opinion can be a powerful

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constraint on their voting decisions” and presumably other political behavior as well

(Arnold 1990, pg. 10). Therefore this theory of non-citizen representation rests heav-

ily on the idea that subnational lawmakers are forward-looking, ambitious individu-

als, a contention that seems to be easily defensible from the literature (Maestas 2003).

This dovetails somewhat with the activism argument mentioned above, but here the

ultimate motivation for adopting/advocating for sanctuary policies is to maintain

office and secure future political offices, rather than the efficacy of the policy itself.

I argue that there might be several reasons that local and state lawmakers would

represent the policy interests of their non-citizen constituents and anticipate their

preferences. First, non-citizens do not always stay non-citizens. At different points

in American history the government has enacted legislation to legalize previously

non-citizen groups. For example, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 granted full

citizenship to all Native-Americans, who had previously been excluded from the

Fourteenth Amendment as they were not deemed to be ‘subject to the jurisdiction’

of the United States.

This ‘threat’ - for lack of a better term - of mass legalization has been even

more explicit since the mid-1980’s. The last major immigration reform passed in the

United States, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, provided for

the legalization of vast numbers of illegal immigrants, approximately 900,000 of which

had become fully naturalized, and voting elligible, citizens by 2001 (Rytina 2002).

Given that every serious piece of national immigration legislation proposed in the

last few years has included some sort of amnesty/earned legalization provision, the

emergence of a vast new constituency is a very real possibility for many lawmakers

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around the country.

Additionally, the United States recognizes jus soli or birthright citizenship under

the Naturalization Cluase of the Fourteenth Amendment. This clause reads, “All

persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside”

(Bickel 1973). While originally enacted to ensure citizenship to freed slaves, it has

subsequently been interpreted to grant U.S. citizenship to anyone born within U.S.

territory (United States v. Wong Kim Ark 1898). As a result, while most immigrants

cannot fully participate in the political system, their children can. In short, the

children of illegal immigrants represent a large and growing pool of potential new

voters with limited loyalty to either party (Pantoja, Ramirez & Segura 2001). And,

given what we know about political socialization - not to mention the developing area

of bio-politics - it is likely that the opinions of the parents will pass to the children

(Campbell et al. 1960, Fowler et al. 2008).

Finally, it’s important to note the large, if not practically complete, overlap be-

tween the immigrant community and Latino community. For all practical purposes,

at least at the national level, the public sees immigrants as overwhelmingly Latino

and the undocumented population at least is largely Latino, although it has been di-

versifying in recent years (Citrin et al. 1997, Passel & Cohn 2009). While the general

make-up of the immigrant community may vary from city to city, generally speaking

Latinos are strongly supportive of pro-immigrant policies in general. Even among

highly assimilated Latinos, over half support explicitly pro-immigrant policies, and

overall their support far exceeds that of the public at large (Branton 2007, see Ta-

16

ble 1). Additionally, since non-citizenship is the largest factor suppressing Latino

voter turnout, Latino groups should be particularly interested in advocating for the

rights of undocumented immigrants (Calvo & Rosenstone 1989, Fix & Passel 1994).

In short, immigrants (and their children) not only represent a potential group of

new voters, they specifically represent potential Latino voters, and illegal immigrant

issues are highly salient to Latino voters.

Given the arguments and literature presented above, subnational lawmakers should

support pro-immigrant policies through two paths. First, when Latino citizens rep-

resent a significant electoral presence in a jurisdiction, they are likely to exhibit a

strong, direct influence on lawmakers’ support for pro-imigrant policies. As long as

we can safely assume that officials recognize the connection between Latinos and

immigrants, Latinos support pro-immigrant policies by wide numbers (Tolbert &

Hero 1996, Branton 2007) and politicians are savvy enough to recognize the connec-

tion, then large Latino populations should be positively associated with the support

for and enactment of pro-immigrant policies.

Secondly, independent of a sizable Latino population, a large foreign-born pop-

ulation should also be positively associated with support for and passage of pro-

immigrant policies. As opposed to solely a ‘race to the bottom’ where cities and

states impose restrictive and punitive policies on non-citizen residents, large foreign-

born populations should also spur the adoption of pro-immigrant policies. Due to

combination of political ambition and immigrant impact on future public opinion,

large foreign-born populations should also be associated with the passage of pro-

immigrant policies at the subnational level. Therefore, we can state the following

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two hypotheses:

H1: Jurisdictions with higher percentages of Latino residents will be more likely

to adopt sanctuary policies earlier than cities with lower percentages of Latino

residents.

H2: Jurisdictions with higher percentages of undocumented or foreign-born res-

idents will adopt sanctuary policies earlier than cities with fewer immigrant

residents.

Data & Methods

Testing the theory and hypotheses above requires first defining an acceptable depen-

dent variable. The theory outlined above implicitly assumes that the causal factors

driving pro-immgrant policy and anti-immigrant policy are different. As a number

of other authors have shown, anti-immigrant political behavior can be explained

fairly well by a combination of racial animosity following a recent immigrant influx

(Hopkins 2010) and poor economic conditions (Tolbert & Hero 1996). However, the

presence of anti-immigrant sentiment and policies does not preclude the enactment

of pro-immigrant policies, as many of the most restrictive states also have large

amounts of pro-immgrant legislation (NCSL 2008, 2009, 2010).

Therefore, unlike some previous work, this article will not use a ratio of pro-

immigrant to anti-immigrant legislation as the dependent variable (Yoder 2009).

Instead, I analyze the enactment of a very specific type of pro-immigrant policy

at the local level, the enactment of so-called “sanctuary policies” by municipalities

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since the mid-1970’s. Sanctuary polices are a good way to study this issue for three

reasons. First, the data is readily available and reliable. The National Immigration

Law Center (NILC) has collected a detailed database on the type and date of passage

of sanctuary policies by American cities up to 2008. Secondly, sanctuary policies

offer a strong test of the theory. Generally, these policies restrict the ability of law

enforcement to ask anyone not charged with a felony about their immigration status.

The strongest sanctuary policies often forbid the use of any state or local resources to

enforcement federal immigration law. Third, reelection constraints are likely to have

a more powerful effect in the policy enactment stage of the policymaking process,

rather than agenda setting or customization, allowing us to use the available data to

test the theory (Karch 2007).

These policies unequivocally expand the rights and access of immigrants, making

it easier for them to interact with local law enforcement without fear of arrest or

deportation while also making it easier for law enforcement to investigate crimes in-

volving immigrants. Specifically, these policies are most beneficial to undocumented

immigrants, ensuring a robust test of the hypotheses, since illegal immigrants inar-

guably have even less access to the political system than legal aliens. In short, the

NILC database allows the creation of a dependent variable that measures when and

if particular a particular city adopts a specific type of pro-immigrant policy. We can

then test the impact of a variety of internal and external influences on the adoption

of these policies by using an event history analysis (EHA) framework similar to that

used in the diffusion literature.

To estimate the models above, it is necessary to construct an appropriate dataset.

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The dataset employed in this article consists of all American cities over 190,000 people

as off 2000, 99 cities total, measured from 1990 to 2008. This time period serves

two functions. First, it largely encompasses the universe of these sanctuary policy

adoptions, at least as recorded by the NILC. Secondly, it avoids a few sanctuary

policies adopted by cities in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s as a reaction to several

civil wars in Central America. These policies were more similar to the ‘activist’

policies mentioned above than I think more ‘modern’ sanctuary policies are. The

previous policies were a protest against what was seen as poor U.S. foreign policy,

while modern day sanctuary policies typically have a less activist bent. For the most

part, this dataset was constructed using 1990 and 2000 Census data, supplemented

with the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS) data. The ACS data used was the

three-year average from 2006-2008, which minimized measurement error from using

the one-year ACS data. EHA will be used to estimate the likelihood, conditional

on the independent variables, that a particular city in a particular year will adopt a

sanctuary policy.

As for the independent variables, the primary hypotheses above will be tested

by measuring the size of the Latino and foreign-born population from year to year.

This will included interpolating the size of the population based on Census and

American Community Survey (ACS) data for given years. Basically, the populations

are measured at ten-year intervals based on the decennial Census, and then the size

of the population in each intervening year estimated based on the average increase

over the decade. Or, in the case of the three-year ACS, the interpolation covers

2000-2008. In short, the Census provides base counts for 1990, 2000, and 208, while

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the year-to-year measures are estimated using simple linear interpolation.

Additionally, since rapid increases in the immigrant (or minority) populations

tend to increase support for restrictive policies (Hopkins 2010), the increase in the

foreign-born population as a percentage of the total municipal population has been

included in the models as well. This variable is estimated losing a linear interpolation

technique similar to that described for the Latino and foreign-born populations de-

scribed above. However, in this case, the variable describes the percent of the cities

total population that has immigrated from a foreign country within the last decade.

This seems to be a reasonable definition of “recent” and should measure how certain

“New Destination” cities differ from cities that have long been immigrant magnets

(Jones-Correa 2001).

Economic variables have also been seen to be important for support of restrictive

immigration policies. Therefore, the models include the percentage of the total pop-

ulation in poverty, which should reduce overall support for pro-immigrant policies.

Poverty is used as opposed to unemployment, because unemployment interacts un-

pleasantly with other economic variables that could increase support for sanctuary

policies. There is considerable evidence that many employers support immigration

on the basis of labor needs (Tichenor 2002). Since most undocumented immigrants

tend to be low-skilled workers, cities with economies driven by industries like agri-

culture, food processing, construction, etc. should be more likely to pass sanctuary

policies to encourage the stability of their labor force. As mentioned before, most

previous pro-immigrant policy was due to coalitions of interest groups that cut across

the typical left-right divide. Business groups should support, even if quietly, the en-

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actment of sanctuary policies if their industry depends on low-skilled labor. For the

purposes of this article, I have constructed a variable that measures the importance

of the service sector to the cities workforce. Where the service sector is a larger

proportion of the city’s overall economy, we should see more willingness to adopt

sanctuary policies. While not ideal, this variable should capture the importance of

particular industries to a city and their effect on immigration policy.2

In addition, a set of other control variables will be included to account for various

confounding factors. First, municipal governments with more resources and higher

levels of professionalism are expected to be more likely to enact sanctuary-style

policies. Therefore, the log of total population, per capita income, and a dummy

variable indicating Mayor-Council cities will be included as well. Total population

and per capita income should measure the resources that a city can bring to bear on

problems, and larger, richer cities are more likely to enact generous, pro-immigrant

policies. Alternatively, per capita government spending could be included as a more

direct measure the amount of resources a city commands if it were easily available.

Finally, Mayor-Council governments should be more politically responsive than other

governments, particularly to general public opinion. Therefore, results like those

from Ramakrishnana and Lewis (2007) might cause us to suspect that cities with

less political governments might be more likely to enact a sanctuary policy.

In short, the purpose is to test the impact of demographics on the adoption of

2Although the “service sector” as defined by the Census and ACS is not limited completely tolow-skilled labor, other versions of this variable which used a more detailed Census categorizationresulted in similar statistical estimates. Generally speaking, the size of the service sector, particu-larly overtime, should serve as a reasonable proxy for the importance of low-skilled workers to thelocal economy.

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pro-immigrant policies. According to the theory, large populations should increase

the likelihood of a city adopting a sanctuary policy, independent of the direct legal

access of the population. Additionally, the Latino population - as a measure of their

electoral strength - should also increase the likelihood of sanctuary policy adoption.

Finally, while direct measures of public opinion, municipal resources, and interest

group strength are difficult to come by at the city level, I have included proxies

as accurate as possible to control for confounding factors. These include the level

of poverty in the city overtime, as well as the total population and the per capita

income of residents to control for resources available. Finally, the structure of city

government has been included to control for the responsiveness of the city government

to external political influence.

Results

First, before showing the results of the statistical analysis, it is interesting to get

an idea of the overall policy situation overtime. Figure 2 above plots the smoothed

hazard function overtime for the adoption of sanctuary policies in large American

cities from 1990 to 2008. What is immediately obvious is that the likelihood of a city

adopting a policy has increased significantly since the early 1990’s and the adoption

of the first modern sanctuary policies. While this tendency has appeared to taper

off over the last few years, that is primarily an artifact of the smoothing equation

needed to extend the graph. Overall, the likelihood of a policy being adopted has

shown a rapid increase among large American cities, making the question that much

23

0.0

01.0

02.0

03.0

04Sm

ooth

ed h

azar

d fu

nctio

n

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005Time

Cox proportional hazards regression

Figure 2: Hazard Function for Sanctuary Policies

more intriguing and the need for an explanation that much more salient.

Unfortunately, that makes the failure of the model described and shown above to

support the hypotheses that much more disappointing. Neither hypothesis described

above is supported by the data. Neither the percentage of total population that

is foreign-born or Latino has an appreciable effect on the adoption of a sanctuary

policy. Oddly though, the size of the population is still strongly correlated with policy

adoption. However, this was included primarily as a control variable and there is

little theoretical foundation for the relationship. In fact, several different versions of

the model were estimated to ensure that the findings were robust. In each model,

the size of the population was significant every time, while neither the size of the

Latino or foreign-born population ever was. Neither were different variables that

attempted to capture the variability of the Latino ethnic group and the foreign-born

24

Table 1: Cox Proportional Hazards Model

Variable Hazard Ratio (Std. Err.)Population, logged 1.82∗∗ (.681)Percent Latino 0.277 (47.68)Percent Foreign Born 0.447 (3.425)Per Capita Income, logged 23.48∗∗ (35.08)Mayor-Council 1.877∗ (0.747)Percent Poverty 32.05∗ (12.98)Percent Service Economy 40.44∗ (20.72)Recent Immigration 1.15 (21.47)Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%

population. For example, the non-Anglo Latino population was similarly non-related

to the passage of sanctuary policies, at least statistically speaking.

In short, this presents another conundrum. Neither the Latino population or the

foreign-born population is directly related to the likelihood of a sanctuary policy

being adopted, yet the overall size of the population is. Larger cities seem to be

more likely than smaller ones to pass these policies. This could indicate ambitious

politicians in these areas championing these policies as a symbolic means to gather the

support of immigrant and/or Latino communities state-wide perhaps. Or perhaps

these issues come up on the agenda more frequently in large cities that have the

capacity to address them, leading to an increase in passage. What is obvious is that

a more theoretically-driven concept of population is needed to unpack its effects.

Since population is more than simply size, it includes ideas like density and diversity

as well, future research should unpack the distinct aspects of population and measure

them more specifically (Taeuber & Taeuber 1976).

The other variables included in the model all seem to encourage the adoption

25

of sanctuary policies, although only per capita income and the size of the service

economy were expected to have a positive effect. Both the percent of the popula-

tion estimated to be impoverished and a Mayor-Council form of government both

increased the likelihood of a sanctuary policy being adopted, although both were ex-

pected to have a negative impact on policy enactment. The Mayor-Council finding

was also robust and of a similar magnitude across a multitude of different model

specifications. Finally, many of the additional controls have seemingly overly strong

effects on the hazard ratio, although with correspondingly high standard errors even

if they are “statistically significant.” This may indicate that the variables are in-

teracting somehow unexpectedly, although none of the standard robustness checks

significantly affected the results.

Overall, the quantitative analysis may have done more to hint than illuminate.

Neither major hypothesis was supported, but the size of the population seems to be

a strong predictor, both in the model reported in Table 1 as well as multiple ancillary

regressions not shown. The control variables had seemingly overly large effects in

many instances, although recoding and a variety of robustness checks failed to show

an obvious statistical problem. The impact of the Mayor-Council form of government

seems to be robust, although in the opposite of the expected direction. In short, the

statistical model built off the theoretical foundations explored earlier in the paper

failed to adequately explain the phenomenon at issue.

However, there are some glimpses of a way forward. Sanctuary policies, and by

extension other pro-immigrant policies, seem to be politically rather than bureau-

cratically motivate. Both the robustness of the Mayor-Council effect and the counts

26

seen in Figure 1 point to a political explanation for these policies. Some political

actor sees a benefit from promoting and introducing these polices, some constituency

is being represented, some group is agitating. This could be local economic elites

given the result for the service economy seen in Table 1. Although I mistrust the size

of the effect, it did hold up to a variety of non-reported specifications and seems to

indicate that a service-based, low-skilled economy is correlated with sanctuary policy

adoption. All told though, the, admittedly marginal evidence, seems to support a

political interpretation and story, although possibly not the one proposed above.

Future research will include more partisan, ideological variables. It is possible,

and has been suggested by other authors (Ramakrishnan & Wong 2010) that par-

tisanship may play a major role here. Including the two-party Presidential vote,

the partisanship of the local elections, or similar institutional and electoral variables

might also illuminate the issue more. Additionally, this manuscript explicitly ad-

dressed policy adoption without addressing two particular areas: agenda setting and

diffusion. It’s possible that local demographics and group strength have more impact

on the agenda stage and that policy adoption is governed by cross-state and cross-

city diffusive effects. Future research might address how and why this local policing

innovation spread so quickly. Is this a policy area in which policy “learning” is more

important or are things like economic competition more influential? Including in-

sights from the diffusion and agenda setting literature might shed more light on how

and why sanctuary policies spread and on pro-immigrant policies more generally.

27

Conclusion

To conclude, the extent literature on policymaking in subnational governments does

not well explain the widespread enactment of pro-immigrant policies. This paper uses

sanctuary policies, a dataset of large American municipalities, and the logic of event

history analysis to test whether there is a representational component to the passage

of pro-immigrant policies. According to the theory and literature outlined above, the

size of the Latino and foreign-born populations should be positively related to the

enactment of municipal sanctuary policies. However, the final results did not seem

to indicate a connection between the size or composition of the Latino and foreign-

born communities within a city and the passage of pro-immigrant sanctuary policies.

Further research that focuses on the political aspect of these policy adoptions and

that incorporates insights from the agenda setting and diffusion literature might offer

a way forward on studying these issues. In the end, states and localities have taken

the lead on immigration policy over the last decade and their policy solutions are

much more expansive than current theories might lead us to believe. This is an area

that deserves study and offers the possibility of expanding our understanding of how

policy is made and how fringe groups in society - immigrants, felons, the homeless -

might get their issues positively addressed by government agencies.

28

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