Werlin (2003) Poor Nations, Rich Nations_A theory of Governance.pdf

Poor Nations, Rich Nations: A Theory of Governance 329

Herbert H. WerlinIndependent Consultant

Poor Nations, Rich Nations:A Theory of Governance

This article argues that the difference between poor countries and rich countries has to do withgovernance rather than resources. In emphasizing the importance of public administration inexplaining economic success and failure, the author examines three general theories of gover-nance (organizational, cultural, and structural-functional) presented in Ferrel Heady’s textbook incomparative administration. Political elasticity theory is introduced as a way to reconcile andovercome the weaknesses of these theories and to explain a number of unresolved questions in theliterature having to do with decentralization, corruption, democracy, culture, and globalization,using comparative case studies (the Netherlands and Ghana, Singapore and Jamaica, and Japanand Nigeria). The implications of political elasticity theory for foreign aid are suggested at theconclusion, illustrated by a comparison of Spain and Mexico. What ties these case studies to-gether is the heretofore unnoticed and/or unexplained fact that as countries prosper, politicalpower takes on “rubber-band” and “balloon” characteristics.

Some years ago I taught an undergraduate class on po-litical development at Howard University in Washington,DC. My students generally argued, “The poor are poorbecause the rich are rich.” They had what I called an ICRC(international, capitalist, racist conspiracy) viewpoint, andnothing I said could shake their position. While many ofthe demonstrators at recent International Monetary Fund/World Bank annual meetings may not completely sharethis viewpoint, most seem to believe the difference betweenpoor countries and rich countries is primarily a lack of re-sources. If we somehow could transfer income from therich to the poor, the world would be better off. They appar-ently have in mind large grants without strings attached,forgiveness of all debt, and protection from the bad effectsof globalization.

I wish I could agree with such a simplistic analysis ofthe situation. After all, according to a recent World Devel-opment Report (World Bank 2000, 3), the “average incomein the richest 20 countries is 37 times the average in thepoorest 20—a gap that has doubled in the past 40 years.”This publication goes on to note that about one-fourth ofthe world’s population continues to live on an income ofless than $1 a day. This indicates that, despite a decade ofeconomic growth, the dismantling of socialist economies,

extensive globalization, large amounts of foreign aid, andmany donor-assisted projects, extreme poverty has not di-minished.

World Bank officials clearly are frustrated by their in-ability during the last half of the twentieth century to re-duce the gap between poor and rich countries, pointingout there “is no accepted theory of poverty that establishesa hierarchy of causes, nor is there any widely adoptedempirical model that might serve the same purpose” (Whiteand Killick 2001, 27). In this regard, three points need tobe underscored. First, the existence of extensive naturaland human resources does not make much difference.Countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congoand Angola are fabulously rich in resources but over-whelmed by poverty. Until about 1980, Das (2001, 92, 208)points out, Hong Kong (with fewer than 5 million people)

Herb Werlin retired from the University of Maryland–College Park in 1993,having taught in the Department of Urban Studies and the Department ofGovernment and Politics. For many years, he did research, writing, andediting for the World Bank, from which his 1998 book emerged. In additionto the University of Maryland, he has taught political science, urban studies,and public administration at the State University of New York–Stony Brook,Johns Hopkins SAIS, Hofstra, and Texas Tech. His first book (1974) on theNairobi City Council stemmed from a 1966 political science doctoral dis-sertation completed at the University of California–Berkeley. Email:[email protected].

330 Public Administration Review • May/June 2003, Vol. 63, No. 3

earned more from its exports and had more public tele-phones than the whole of India (with then about 700 mil-lion people, including many who were highly educated andtechnologically skilled). Second, foreign aid does not domuch good by itself. Egypt, for example, received $52 percapita per year from 1987 to 1996, more than twice that ofother large countries with similar income levels (OED 2000,6). Because of weak public administration, illiteracy ratesremain about twice the average of comparable countriesand infant mortality, about 30 percent worse. During the1970s, Tanzania received more foreign aid per capita thanany other country without escaping extreme poverty, andthis high level of foreign aid continued during the 1990s,including more than 2,000 development projects (Thirkild-sen 2000, 62). Third (perhaps the saddest point of all), be-cause of poor governance, far more money goes from poorto rich countries than the poor receive in foreign aid. Inundermining their own financial institutions, leaders of poorcountries encourage capital flight (including money laun-dering) amounting to more than $1 trillion a year, equiva-lent to 3 percent–5 percent of gross world product, accord-ing to an estimate in the Economist (April 14, 2001, 64).

Theories of GovernanceIn countering the argument that poor countries are sim-

ply impoverished by their lack of resources and the vic-tims of globalization, I sometime suggested to my studentsthat it is as difficult to help poor countries as it is the va-grants in American urban centers. Inasmuch as many va-grants suffer from various forms of mental illness or socialpathology, it is impossible to help them become self-sup-porting without getting deep into their psychological andsocial problems. So it is with the poorest countries of theworld, particularly those with average annual per capitaincomes of less than $1,000. Most of these countries suf-fer from what I call “political illness” (similar to mentalillnesses such as alcoholism or drug addiction), whichmanifests itself in improper policies, weak bureaucracies,inadequate supervision, the illegitimacy of laws and regu-lations, and the lack of independent spheres of power. Inother words, governance is far weaker in the poor coun-tries of the world than in the rich countries.

While it is obvious to me that the inadequacy of gover-nance rather than resources is the primary reason for thegap between poor countries and rich countries, I havestruggled to develop a unified theory of governance sincestudying administrative theory under Dwight Waldo at theUniversity of California–Berkeley during the early 1960s.In this regard, we owe a debt of gratitude to Ferrel Heady,who has been summarizing theories of comparative ad-ministration for more than 40 years, most recently in his2001 textbook. However, Professor Heady clearly recog-

nizes the literature suffers from the fact that the three gen-eral theories (organizational, cultural, and structural-func-tional) presented in his sixth edition are inadequate, con-fusing, and contradictory. The considerations that followindicate why.

Organizational TheoryOrganizational theory cannot escape the influence of

Max Weber, who, according to Heady (2001, 76), linkedrationality to “a finely ordered system of superordinationand subordination in which higher offices supervise lowerones.” The trouble with Weberian theory (as with the laterscientific management theories) is that politics seems tohold little interest inasmuch as “obedience to commandsis expected to be prompt, automatic, and unquestioning”(Thompson 1961, 11). It fails to explain, first of all, thesuccess of non-Weberian models and, secondly, the desir-ability of flatter, less authoritarian, and more fluid and adap-tive forms of organization (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).

According to Kenney and Florida (1993), the Japanesemodel has been successful because of its non-Weberian char-acteristics: self-managing work teams, job rotation, over-lapping functions, flexible and limited job classificationsand specialization, close alignment between work and homelife, social control rather than control from above, use ofpersuasion rather than commands, white collar–blue collaroverlap, welfare corporatism, labor–management coopera-tion, quality circles, innovation from below, and continualtraining. A recent article in the Economist (March 31, 2001,48) points out that in Italy, the wait for a computerized scanusing the public health service is six months, but only twodays using the private sector. Why not, therefore, use theconcept of “entrepreneurial government” advocated byOsborne and Gaebler (1992): decentralized, problem solv-ing, innovative, responsive to consumer concerns, and bothcooperative and competitive with the private sector: “Ourpublic sector can learn to compete, or it can stagnate andshrink, until the only customers who use public servicesare those who cannot afford an alternative” (7).

Cultural TheoryHeady (2001, 16) considers Riggs’s theory of prismatic

society, presented in 1964, to be “the most notable singlecontribution in comparative public administration.” WhatRiggs recognized was that most countries operate “semi-feudalistic” systems of government. “Feudalistic” is sim-pler to understand than “prismatic,” if we use the term (assuggested by Braudel 1993, 314) to refer to a “social pyra-mid, with its obligations, its rules and its allegiances, mo-bilizing economic, political and military strength .…” Vari-ous descriptions of such systems can be found in manyparts of the world. In Mexico, Cornelius and Craig (1991)


describe these interwoven chains of patron–client relation-ships as “camarillas,” suggesting that meritocratic consid-erations are less important than the loyalty, deference, andservices that clients can provide to patrons. In their 1993book on Africa, Callaghy and Ravenhill provide examplesof “crony statism.” As it is described by Le Vine (1975) inGhana, Nkrumah relied on an elaborate patronage system—linking officials, with their tribes, friends, and extendedfamilies into webs of corruption—with favors (rather thanperformance) as the output in return for bribes and othergifts.

Those using cultural theory generally have been influ-enced by the work of Talcott Parsons (1951), who describesa “traditional way of life” as including ethnocentricity;primordial rather than functional associations; the sancti-fication of customs, beliefs, and practices; the discourage-ment of individualism; an emphasis on authority by birthrather than merit; customary rather than contractual rela-tions; supernaturalism; the unwillingness to accept personalresponsibility for development; and social rather than le-gal sanctions. Until people (particularly leaders) can es-cape a traditional way of life, they cannot substantiallyimprove governance and living conditions.

The weakness of cultural theory, as I see it, has to dowith its failure to incorporate politics. For example, usingthe classification developed by David Apter (1971; see alsoAndrain 1994), Ethiopia shifted during the final 30 yearsof the twentieth century from a traditional to a mobiliza-tion (revolutionary Marxist-Leninist) to a reconciliationpolitical system without fundamentally changing or im-proving its administration, thereby remaining extremelyimpoverished. Yet, it continued to operate a highly suc-cessful airline based on standard business administrationtextbook guidelines. While Malawi’s political culture un-der President Banda was no different from neighboringAfrican countries, it maintained a very efficient road re-pair system (Msalomba 1991). In other words, when lead-ers are determined to transform traditional values into thoserequired for effective administration, they are quite capableof doing so. The impact of politics on culture should beapparent from comparisons of East Germany and WestGermany, North Korea and South Korea, or China andTaiwan. (My comparative case studies presented here—Singapore and Jamaica, Spain and Mexico—are intendedto be relevant in this regard.)

Structural-Functional TheoryFunctionalism is associated with the writing of Gabriel

Almond and James S. Coleman (1960), though Heady(2001, 87–88) notes that it also goes back to the theory ofTalcott Parsons and other sociologists. According to thistheory, the success of political systems in maintaining po-litical support (that is, generating enough output to attract

adequate input) depends on political structures’ capacityto perform various functions, including interest articula-tion, interest aggregation, rule making, rule application,rule adjudication, and communication.

Heady suggests various criticisms of functionalism,particularly that “the primacy of emphasis on functionsshould be replaced in increasing attention to structures”(9–10). I would suggest instead that its usefulness is un-dermined by the failure of its proponents to differentiatepolitical hardware (characteristics of the structure) frompolitical software (the quality of social relationships es-sential for effective performance). For example, considertwo articles that appeared in April 2001: one (Sullivanand Jordan) having to do with the Mexican government’sfailure to collect more than 11 percent of gross domesticproduct (as against two to three times that amount in mostindustrialized countries), and the other (Johnston) notingthat the U.S. Internal Revenue Service had to write off$2.5 billion in 2000 because of inadequate enforcement.Regarding the IRS, I believe it is appropriate to examinethe structural weaknesses that Johnston mentions: lackof staff and resources, slowness to increase pay and pro-motion, and the need for new and better computers. InMexico’s case, however (as amplified in the conclusion),the weakness of political software is primarily at faultbecause corruption here “is less a sickly deviation fromWeberian health, than the cartilage and collagen whichholds a sprawling body politics together” (Knight 1996,231). Few Mexicans are upset by reports that businessesgenerally fail to pay local taxes when, as in Nuevo Laredo,three-quarters of the 1982 budget allegedly fell victim tocorruption or when (as indicated in my conclusion), pub-lic services are inadequate in amount or quality (Morris1991, 70).

Political Elasticity TheoryHeady (2001, 34) quotes Jorgen Rasmussen’s supplica-

tion, “O Lord, deliver us from further conceptualizationand lead us not into new approaches.” Although I am sym-pathetic, I am also convinced of the need to carry on untilwe can find a way out of the confusion associated with ourinability to know whether public administration is helpedor hurt by the dichotomies of centralization and decen-tralization; bureaucratization and debureaucratization;regulation and deregulation; more control and less con-trol; privatization and public management; downsizing andrightsizing; strict guidelines and flexible guidelines; moreexpertise and more public input. Political elasticity theory,which was introduced in Werlin (1998) and summarizedin Werlin (2000), attempts not only to reduce confusion inpublic administration, but also to link comparative admin-istration to comparative politics and development studies.I will briefly summarize its five propositions:


1. The more that governments or those in authority canintegrate and alternate soft forms of political power(linking incentives to persuasion) with hard forms ofpolitical power (including disincentives and coercion),the more effective they will be.

2. As leaders integrate and alternate soft and hard formsof power, their political power takes on “rubber-band”and “balloon” characteristics, allowing them to decen-tralize or delegate power by various methods withoutlosing control, and to expand their influence in waysthat predictably affect the behavior of wider circles ofcitizens, participants, and subordinates.

3. Political elasticity depends partly on the selection ofappropriate political hardware (including “objective”forms of organization, regulation, procedure, and tech-nology), but mostly on the development of politicalsoftware (that is, policies and practices that foster re-spectful relations between leaders and followers).

4. The effectiveness of political software is directly pro-portional to the government’s success in establishingacceptable goals, hiring qualified personnel, encourag-ing training, delegating responsibility, stimulating mo-tivation and competition, paying attention to morale,expanding two-way flows of communication, promot-ing legitimacy, maintaining supervision, cultivatingcontractors, protecting independent spheres of author-ity, and developing conflict resolution procedures. In-asmuch as a government fails to promote any of thesecommonsensical requirements (with appropriate varia-tions), its efforts to reform both micro and macro ad-ministration are going to be problematic. Yet, progresscan be measured on the basis of steps taken to improveany aspect of these requirements.

5. Enhancing political software requires a balance betweentwo forms of struggle—for competitive advantage andfor consensus—that are suggested in the meanings ofpolitics found in Wolin’s 1960 study of political thought.Within the framework of his overarching definition ofpolitics (the relationship of leadership to followershipfor the purpose of governance), measures taken to in-crease advantage may be considered “primary politics”(such as partisanship), and measures taken to build con-sensus may be considered “secondary politics” (suchas statesmanship).

Comparative Case StudiesThe justification for political elasticity theory is simply

that it is more enlightening than the other theories that Headypresents as to the most interesting questions in the literaturehaving to do with the poverty and wealth of nations:1. Why are rich countries both more centralized and more

decentralized than poor countries?

2. Why are rich countries more successful than poor coun-tries in permanently changing their culture?

3. Why is classical democracy more essential than liberaldemocracy for economic development?

4. Why is corruption devastating for poor countries but notfor rich countries?

5. Why does globalization benefit some countries far morethan others?The following countries—the Netherlands and Ghana,

Singapore and Jamaica, Japan and Nigeria, and Spain andMexico—have been selected for comparison because, us-ing political elasticity theory, they not only help us to dealwith the questions that have been raised, but also enable usto understand why governance rather than natural resourcesis the primary reason for the wealth and poverty of na-tions. In other words, I will show that Ghana, Jamaica,Nigeria, and Mexico have far more capacity for wealth thantheir counterparts, but they will remain far more impover-ished so long as they remain politically inelastic.

Decentralization: The Netherlandsand Ghana

The Netherlands is a remarkable country in many ways.It is one of the most densely populated countries of theworld, with 27 percent below sea level, protected by itsfamous dikes. Yet, it was judged by the 1996 U.N. HumanDevelopment Report to have the best living conditions—including the lowest unemployment rates—within the Eu-ropean Union (Hunt 2000).

For purposes of this short comparison with Ghana, Iwill concentrate on the fact that the Netherlands ranks thirdworldwide (after the United States and France) in agricul-tural export value—an achievement that clearly would beimpossible without a high quality of governance, includ-ing a merging of centralization and decentralization. Onthe one hand, the Netherlands appears to be highly cen-tralized inasmuch as the central government appoints may-ors, provides more than two-thirds of municipal revenuesfor specific purposes, and determines the policies andguidelines for provincial and local administration (Ande-weg and Irwin 1993). On the other hand, the Netherlandsis also a decentralized state where local governments haveconsiderable autonomy (Jones 1995; Toonen 1996). Withinthe limits set by central and provincial officials, each mu-nicipality prepares its own plans and regulations follow-ing extensive discussions, negotiations, and opportunitiesfor objection. According to Wintle (2000, 149), under theDutch model, “the state is highly centralized, big-spend-ing and all-powerful, but that does not and need not threatenin any way the integrity of the component units.”

“Elastic decentralization,” to use my terminology, is evi-dent in the complex links between the private sector and


the public sector (sometimes characterized as “corporat-ist”) that are responsible for agricultural and industrial de-velopment in the Netherlands. These links have been pro-moted since the 1930s by provincial institutes for economicdevelopment (van Zanden 1998, 141–43). Associated withthem is a tight infrastructure of agricultural research, edu-cation, rural banks, cooperatives, commercial firms, advi-sory councils, parastatal organizations, and extension ser-vices that encourage and facilitate new products, productiontechniques, and marketing opportunities. Although 80 per-cent of farmers are organized, they are divided among“pillarized” groups (Catholic, Protestant, socialist, liberal,etc.). What makes this fragmented system politically elas-tic is its respect for independent experts, for the judiciary(including various bodies of administrative justice and ap-peal), and for the existing system of formal and informalbipartite and tripartite consultations (Andeweg and Irwin1993). Above all, there is a devotion to the politics of ac-commodation, pragmatism, and consensus.

While Ghana has about the same population size as theNetherlands (15–20 million), it has far more potential foragricultural development, considering its extensive natu-ral resources and the foreign aid it receives. Unlike theNetherlands, where manufacturing accounts for 70 percentof merchandise export, Ghana depends on agriculture fornearly half of its gross domestic product and export earn-ings and 70 percent of employment (Chhibber et al. 1993,29). Agricultural output has risen in recent years at an av-erage rate of only 2 percent, compared to a populationgrowth rate of 3 percent per annum (Republic of Ghana1997). The growth of food crops, livestock, and fishingoutput has been particularly slow, not only causing a lossof export opportunities, but also increasing urban food in-security (Maxwell 1999).

Ghana’s most lucrative agricultural product remainscocoa; however, its share of the world market has droppedfrom 30 percent in 1970 to about 10 percent, without muchlikelihood of recovery. According to a 1993 study by theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(Alpine and Pickett, 69), Ghana has a clear competitiveadvantage in many crops (in addition to cocoa): coffee,rubber, rice, maize, sorghum, cotton, tobacco, pineapples,and oil palm. Yet, because only about half of Ghana’s ar-able land is being cultivated, agricultural export opportu-nities are being missed. For example, while Ghana couldbe exporting more and better pineapples than Costa Rica,it managed only $5 million worth in 1994, against $45million for Costa Rica that year. Horticultural exports cer-tainly could be expanded, considering that Kenya (whichhas a much longer flying time to Europe) successfully ex-ports horticultural products (consisting now of 70 percentof its produce), thereby reducing its reliance on coffee andtea (Economist, March 14, 2001, 56).

The inability of the Ghanaian government to get farm-ers to respond to export opportunities is the result of manyfactors. First, life in rural areas continues to be far worsethan in urban areas, characterized by “poor sanitation, in-accessible roads, polluted water, unhygienic markets, anddilapidated school buildings” (Ayee 1997, 51). With only20 percent of the rural population (compared to 70 percentof the urban population) having access to safe water, theinfant mortality rate is 30 percent higher in rural than ur-ban areas, and child mortality is 20 percent higher (Bahalet al. 1993, 25). In many parts of the country, one-fourth toone-third of the communities lack access to good roadsand public transport. Because an estimated 60 percent offeeder roads are in poor condition, farmers (many of whomare women) have to spend much of their time head loadingcommodities and fetching water (White and Killick 2001,xx). Moreover, inadequate storage and transportation sys-tems account for about 70 percent of the retail price ofagricultural produce (Republic of Ghana 1997, 106).

A second factor has to do with the weakness of localgovernment, despite the extensive effort made to promotedistrict assemblies that began in 1988. Under the Rawlingsregime, these assemblies were never given the authority toraise funds, formulate policies, and carry out programs(Herbst 1993, 90). At the same time, they were not sys-tematically tied to the central government in any signifi-cant way. On the one hand, the assemblies generally lackedqualified staff to perform financial planning, budgeting,revenue collection, expenditure control, and accounting.On the other hand, the staff sent by the central governmenttended to be inadequate in number, unqualified, poorly paid,unsupervised, and rotated every few years without regardto local needs and personal preferences. Consequently,programs such as the 1975 National Council on Womenand Development, intended to help women in agricultureand rural enterprises, inevitably failed (Chao 1999, 57).Other efforts to help the poor (such as Programme of Ac-tions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment), includ-ing mobilizing the self-help efforts of rural areas, had tobe abandoned despite the willingness of many wealthycountries to mitigate the social cost of Ghana’s financialreform (OED 1995, 99).

A third factor accounting for political inelasticity in ru-ral Ghana stems from the government’s inability to dealwith problems such as soil fertility loss, soil erosion, anddeforestation (estimated to cost 4 percent of gross domes-tic product per year). The research and extension systemsremain uncoordinated and ineffective. Much of their staffis untrained or without funds or vehicles to get to rural ar-eas. The government has not even helped to provide fuel-efficient cooking stoves, small carts, wheelbarrows, and bi-cycles, which could promote local artisans and small-scaleindustry. There is an inadequate availability of simple equip-


ment for the conditioning, processing, and preserving ofcrops, and few farmers have access to irrigation, credit, fer-tilizer, insecticides, and other inputs that are taken forgranted in the Netherlands. Because of the traditional ten-ure system (preventing individually owned land), there islittle incentive for land improvement and credit provision.

The factors accounting for low agricultural productiv-ity in Ghana cannot be separated from the general weak-ness of governance in Ghana. At the beginning of 2001,Ghana’s new head of state, John Kufuor, encountered 40percent inflation, 50 percent interest rates, and a foreigndebt of $5.8 billion—about two and a half times the valueof its 1999 export of goods and services (Economist, April28, 2001, 45). This is particularly sad because his prede-cessor, Jerry Rawlings, who ruled Ghana for 19 years, wasconsidered by the World Bank to be relatively effectiveand responsible. Yet, efforts during the 1990s to improvethe functioning of the civil service proved unsuccessful,with the management of financial resources continuing tobe weak in “monitoring actual expenditures, auditing, andclearly and consistently applying regulations” (Africa Re-gion 1999, 7–8). All of the institutions of government wereaffected by “pervasive clientelism and personalism”(thereby undermining political software) that “inevitablystoked the fires of corruption” (Sandbrook and Oelbaum1997, 619).

Democracy: Singapore and JamaicaA social scientist looking at these two island states in

the early 1960s (each with a population then of about 1.6million and a per capita gross domestic product of $400),when independence from Great Britain was looming,might have predicted a much brighter future for Jamaica,despite problems stemming from colonial rule, racial ten-sion, and the danger of hurricanes and earthquakes (Norris1962). In 1960, Jamaica was the world’s primary sourceof bauxite and alumina. Its Industrial Development Cor-poration was responsible for 30 factories and more than300 manufactured items. While its agricultural exportsconsisted largely of such plantation products as sugar,bananas, citrus, and coconuts, it was promoting variousexotic fruits and spices, suitable for smallholder produc-tion. The country’s beauty gave it tremendous potentialto attract tourists, particularly after the Cuban revolution.Jamaica’s potential for export-led growth was enhancedby its geographical proximity to North America and itsEnglish-speaking workforce. At the same time, Singaporehad no natural resources and was suffering from severeracial, religious, and political turmoil, intensified by its1965 separation from Malaysia (Yew 2000). It could bedescribed then as “a somnolent, swampy fishing village”(Neher 1999, 39).

The situation now, of course, is very different, evidencedby the great disparity in per capita income: Singapore,nearly $30,000 (with 6.5 percent annual growth), and Ja-maica, less than $2,500 (with negative growth for most ofthe last 25 years). While Singapore’s government has man-aged to eliminate persistent poverty, unemployment, andcrime, Jamaica’s government has been unable to break thelink between high teenage pregnancy rates (40 percent),female-headed households (40 percent), school drop-outand failure rates (one-third of those from poor households),poverty (one-third of the population), and extremely highrates of ordinary and violent crime (Human and SocialDevelopment Group 1997). Whereas Singapore has beenable to undertake some of the world’s best programs inpublic housing, public transportation, urban planning, pub-lic health, and public education, Jamaica’s efforts havelargely failed. Between 1965 and 1995, the World Banklent Jamaica $1.3 billion for 62 projects, of which 52 wereevaluated as unsuccessful in regard to outcome, sustain-ability, and institutional improvement (Caribbean Coun-try Management Unit 2000, 19). Consequently, the Bankceased lending to Jamaica after 1995, causing net trans-fers to be a negative $73 million annually.

In his recent autobiography, Lee Kwan Yew (2000) isproud of the cultural engineering that occurred under hisrule from 1959 to 1990, transforming a population thatwas largely uneducated, illiterate in English, impoverished,and without professional or technical skills into one com-parable to the most advanced countries. By the end of the1990s, 40 percent of eligible youth (compared to 5 percentin 1970) were enrolled in higher education, facilitating theannual export of $60 billion worth of high-tech products—about one-third more than China exported (Economist,November 10, 2001, 11). Whereas at the beginning of LeeKwan Yew’s rule, there was widespread unemployment,drug addiction, crime, gambling, prostitution, large fami-lies, high birth rates, extensive squatter settlements, andsegregated ethnic communities, at the end, more than 80percent of the 2.7 million lived in racially integrated, gov-ernment-financed and subsidized apartments (which theyowned, using contributions to a government pension fund).These apartments were clustered into 17 attractive estates,including parks, shopping centers, and playgrounds, andwere linked by a rapid transit system and expressways toone another, to industrial areas, and to the central businessdistrict (Field and Ofari 1989).

Singapore’s cultural engineering has been achievedthrough information dissemination, indoctrination or per-suasion, incentives, sanctions, and coercion (Quah andQuah 1989; Tremewan 1994). “Probably nowhere else inthe world are state policies to organize a country’s peopleand to influence its values and attitudes so extensive andpervasive” (Fong, Huat, and May 1989, 129). Its impact


between 1970 and 1990 has been clearest in regard towomen, doubling the percentage of those aged 25–29 withsecondary or college education, increasing by 20 percentthose in wage-earning employment, and reducing the fer-tility rate by 70 percent (Cheung 1990; Leete 1994). Us-ing controversial (and even amusing) approaches, the gov-ernment has not been able to reverse the negative conse-quences of a low birth rate. However, it has been moresuccessful recently in quadrupling the percentage of Malaystudents undertaking higher education, so that a higherpercentage of Malays in Singapore hold administrative orprofessional positions than in Malaysia, thereby also re-ducing their hostility toward the Chinese majority (Yew2000, 209).

Singapore’s capacity to reform its culture has dependedon the government’s ability to effect “cultural change”within the bureaucracy: recruiting the “best and the bright-est,” improving salaries and working conditions, reducingstaffing, discouraging corruption, and changing the valuesof civil servants (Quah 1994). Not only is the bureaucracyconsidered “the most respected in Asia,” but so is the judi-cial system, resulting in a high degree of public respect forthe government (Huff 1999). The 2001 Transparency In-ternational Web site lists Singapore as among the world’sleast corrupt countries.

Yet, Singapore cannot be considered a liberal democ-racy inasmuch as the government has used a one-partysystem to suppress dissent, detain without trial, intimidate(employing the “bankrupting libel suit”) newspapers andradical trade unions, enact antidemocratic laws and admin-istrative regulations, and undertake pork-barrel politics todiscourage opposition. As explained by Mutalib (2000,317), “an illiberal, (soft) authoritarian form of governanceis certainly preferable to liberal democracy” because “eco-nomic growth demands much sacrifice from the people,”which they might not be willing to support if given thechance. The resulting ambivalence toward democracy canbe found in Lee Kwan Yew’s recent book (2000, 304, 646).Whereas in 1992, he proclaimed in the Philippines that“what a country needs is discipline more than democracy,”he pointed out to a Chinese delegation to Singapore thatyear, “that social control could not depend on disciplinealone,” adding, “People had to have a decent life with rea-sonable housing and social amenities if they were to leadmoral and upright lives. They had to accept the basic prin-ciples of our system of government.”

Political elasticity theory allows us to distinguish be-tween primary and secondary democracy (or liberal andclassical democracy) using Wolin’s two sides of politics:partisanship and statesmanship. Whereas primary democ-racy has to do with elections, multiparty systems, and ma-jority rule (that is, when there is a meaningful struggle forcompetitive advantage), secondary democracy refers to the

consensus building that is essential for successfully man-aging this competition. In the case of Singapore, I believethat, although primary democracy may be undermined,secondary democracy is evident in many ways.

In my case study of Singapore’s public housing pro-gram (Werlin 1998), I found that government officials wereremarkably responsive to changing needs and demands,and they were willing not only to listen to criticisms andsuggestions, but also to fund research on existing andemerging problems. In the Straits Times, one can find quitefrank criticisms, and there are other opportunities for policyinput (Leong 2000). While Mutilib (2000) strongly (andrightly) suggests that Singapore should move toward moreliberal democracy, he reports on the government’s will-ingness in 1998 to revise its economic policies, taking un-usual steps to swing public opinion in favor of radical re-form. During a recession in the mid-1980s, employees ofeven profitable firms agreed to a significant reduction insalaries as a result of a “tripartite” advisory council com-posed of representatives of government, employees, andlabor (Campos and Root 1996, 81). This was facilitated by“vocal and frank comment on all public policies” carriedout in the press, parliament, public forums, and grassrootsinstitutions (Chee 1986, 161).

Likewise, in response to the 1998 Asian financial crisis,the parliamentary designated Committee on Singapore’sCompetitiveness made a number of painful recommenda-tions, including reducing total wage costs up to 20 per-cent, which were acceptable only because of the existinghigh quality of political software (Teen and Phan 2001,379). In a book that is quite critical of authoritarian rule inSingapore, one of the authors (Neher 1999, 51) points outthat “Singapore does enjoy substantive democracy,” includ-ing due process of law, equality of opportunity, and “amodicum of civil liberties.”

Jamaica, in contrast, has maintained a vigorous two-party system since independence, with the People’s Na-tional Party and the opposition Jamaica Labor Party alter-nating in power about every 10 years. However, bothpolitical parties regularly employ criminal gangs (assistedto some extent by police and civil servants) to mobilizepolitical support, distribute favors, and intimidate oppo-nents. The civil service, the judicial system, and the policehave lost citizens’ respect as their effectiveness has beenundermined by inadequate pay, training, expertise, and evendrug money (Hudson and Seyer 1989).

The consequences of a democratic political system, inwhich partisanship is more apparent than statesmanship,were revealed once again July 2001, when riots broke outin the Tivoli Gardens neighborhood of West Kingston, caus-ing much destruction, personal injury, and the loss of morethan 25 lives (Gonzalez 2001). The violence came aboutwhen the police went into this community, led by Edward


Seaga, the former prime minister and leader of the opposi-tion Jamaica Labor Party, looking for illegal weapons.However, the origins of the violence goes back to the 1970s,when community leaders (known as “dons”) were armedby the parties, given control of patronage, and used as en-forcers in the turf wars that divided the country. In Jamaica’scase, political disorder clearly results from bad governance,rather than from such common causes of political instabil-ity as racial, religious, or ethnic differences.

Because primary or liberal democracy has taken a dys-functional form in Jamaica, it has intensified corruption,contrary to the conventional assumption. At the same time,there is not enough secondary democracy here to preventpersistent mismanagement of the economy, which mani-fests itself in slow growth, budgetary shortfalls, inflation,and unpayable debt. Parastatals (of which some 150 re-main) have been used by the government to undermine theeconomy because they are “monitored only in exceptionalcircumstances” (Harrigan 1998, 17). Moreover, banks,credit unions, and insurance companies continue to be un-dercapitalized, undersupervised, and underregulated, withthe public usually kept in the dark about this mismanage-ment (Dean 1998; Henke 1999). Public expenditure is hid-den, first of all, from the International Monetary Fund, and,second, from the legislature and the public, indicating thatthese methods “are linked to the workings of clientelistpolitics” (Harrigan 1998, 17). How the resulting politicalinelasticity has undermined business development is indi-cated in a recent World Bank report (Caribbean CountryManagement Unit 2000) showing a connection betweenthe “factionalized civil society” and the “parallel systemof government in inner cities” on the one hand and, on theother hand, the “low respect for law and order” and “lownational pride.” Until there is more evidence of classical(secondary) democracy, Jamaica certainly will be unableto escape its poverty, violence, and misery, even though,culturally, it may remain more exciting than puritanicaland authoritarian Singapore.

Corruption: Japan and NigeriaAlthough Japan and Nigeria are similar in population

size (125 million), their wealth disparity is immense—Ja-pan, nearly $33,000 gross national product per capita in1999, as opposed to $330 in Nigeria (World Bank 2000).Yet, Japan has practically no natural resources, whereasNigeria could be a wealthy country from the export of oiland natural gas alone, ignoring many other minerals foundin abundance and such agricultural products as palm oiland cocoa, in which it once led the world in export value.Much of Nigeria’s oil and gas reserves are found in theNiger River Delta, where oil production has led to envi-ronmental disaster, violence, and anarchy (Maier 2000).

According to a recent CIA report, there is here “an almosttotal absence of schools, good drinking water, electricity,and medical care” (Farah 2001). Despite a production oftwo million barrels of oil a day, motorists must wait inlong lines at gasoline stations, eventually paying four timesthe official price.

Corruption is seen as the primary cause of Nigeria’spoverty. In the early 1990s, it was estimated that abouttwo-thirds of the country’s income (largely from petroleumexports, amounting annually to several billion dollars) dis-appeared into extrabudgetary spending (World Bank 1994,22–23; Lewis 1994, 330). Yet, corruption has also adverselyaffected Japan, manifesting itself most recently in an esti-mated trillion dollars in bank loans to troubled companies(Tett 2001, 16). Other manifestations, according to Kerr(2001), include excessive government expenditures onconstruction investment (twice the share of gross domes-tic product as the United States) and on public works (8percent of gross domestic product, compared to 2 percentin the United States); inadequate urban planning; poor qual-ity of housing; environmental degradation; and high defi-cit spending. The reasons given for Japanese corruptionhave to do with “a pervasive and institutionalized systemof bid-rigging” in the construction industry (Woodall 1993,297); various forms of gift giving to politicians and bu-reaucrats in return for contracts and favors (van Wolferen1989, 134); “money politics,” with an estimated four timesmore per capita than any other country going to politiciansand political groups (Johnson 1995, 215); and theamakudari system, under which retired officials are allowedto take important positions in state-owned enterprises,banks, and corporations.

Whereas the impact of Nigerian corruption is economi-cally and socially paralyzing, the impact of Japanese cor-ruption is clearly not so, based on the fact that extremepoverty and homelessness in Japan are almost nonexistent(Economist, December 21, 1996, 46). For example, Kerr(2001, 374), who is otherwise highly critical of Japan, notesthat steel firms here “boast some of the world’s most effi-cient factories.” In Nigeria, on the other hand, a large num-ber of industrial projects, such as the Ajaokua Steel Com-pany, do not have the purpose of production, but ofenriching powerful people through kickback arrangementsand money laundering. In a comparative case study of solidwaste management in Tokyo and Lagos (Werlin 1998), Inote a high degree of political elasticity in Japan (facilitat-ing much more garbage recycling than in the United States)compared to political inelasticity in Nigeria, indicatingthere are offsetting factors regarding corruption in Japanbut not in Nigeria. These factors include the high qualityand integrity of the civil service; the emphasis on consen-sus and harmony; the role of whistle blowers, investiga-tive journalists, official auditors, and public prosecutors;


the active role of local governments and interest groups;and the public intolerance of dishonesty within the publicbureaucracy (Johnson 1995).

In a recent issue of Japan Quarterly, two articles (oneby Hiromitsu, the other by Takeshi) explore factors thatmay have increased police corruption: slush funds,amakadari considerations, protective or cover-up proce-dures, etc. Yet, the Japanese police continue to enjoy ahigh degree of public esteem. Reflecting the social tradi-tion of respect for the police, “police officers see theirwork not only as a career, but as a way of life that goesbeyond income or even family” (Takeshi 2000, 47). Whilethis professional pride is clearly not enough to preventpolice corruption, it does suggest a difference betweenpolice corruption in Japan and in Nigeria. Whereas theJapanese police are under various types of control, theNigerian police are clearly not, so that in Japan, policemisbehavior is considered scandalous, while in Nigeria,it is standard operating procedure—so much so the po-lice are nicknamed “Kill and Go” (Kerr 2001, 199). Thismeans that, instead of the soft forms of political power(persuasion and incentives) commonly and effectivelyused in Japan, force remains both “a prevalent method ofgovernance” in Nigeria and, at the same time, largely in-effective (Agbese 1990, 244).

This difference between Japanese and Nigerian corrup-tion takes us back to the two subdivisions of politics usedfor political elasticity theory (the struggle for competitiveadvantage or primary politics and the struggle for consen-sus or secondary politics). Whereas primary corruption(which exists in Japan) indicates excessive partisanship orgreed, secondary corruption (prevalent in Nigeria) reflectsthe government’s inability to control or mitigate this situa-tion. As an analogy, we might think of basketball foulingunder two situations: one in which there is normal referee-ing, so that fouling is meaningful, punishable, and toler-able, and the other in which refereeing is corrupt, causingfouling to be pervasive, essential, and destigmatized. Thisconcept of corruption suggests a balance between greedand governance. The weaker the governance, the moredangerous and dysfunctional the manifestations of greed.Because secondary corruption undermines an already weakgovernmental system, it requires fundamental political re-form before punitive measures can be effective.

Conclusion: The Implications forForeign Aid

Because poor countries suffer from inadequate gover-nance rather than inadequate resources, foreign aid agen-cies tend to be too soft rather than too hard in their assis-tance programs. At the World Bank (with which I havehad the most experience), staff continue to be under great

pressure to get loans out and projects going, regardless oftheir merit or likelihood of success. Strings are certainlyattached (particularly for structural adjustment lending),but they are usually ineffective.

There is a saying that the more impoverished a country(or individual) is, the more tightly closed is the door toreform, with the lock having to be opened from the inside.While I believe that a heavy-handed approach would becounterproductive, the following approaches (Werlin 1998)might be experimented with: (1) requiring prior reform—making sure, for example, that a country has the capacityto repair old roads before new roads are financed; (2) in-tensifying pressure—terminating ineffective projects fol-lowing the dissemination of explanatory reports and theholding of public hearings; and (3) promoting competi-tion—getting countries at similar levels of per capita in-come to compete for project support based on their qualityof governance. As William Easterly (2001, 118), a seniorWorld Bank official, courageously advocates, aid shouldincrease with policy performance, “so that governmentshave an incentive to pursue good policies.”

I also have in mind making debt relief contingent on acompetitive process after the amounts available to eacheligible country are announced. Each country would beexpected to determine its quantifiable goals, strategies forachieving them, and timetables for doing so. Taking intoaccount the governmental improvements of this countryin comparison to those of other highly indebted or impov-erished countries, evaluators (led perhaps by TransparencyInternational, the world’s leading anticorruption organiza-tion) would periodically announce how much countrieswould receive, together with justifications. Less success-ful countries would be invited to keep trying for completedebt elimination. The objective would be to make debt re-lief or forgiveness a prize to be worked for, rather than agift to be waited for. Otherwise, it (along with other formsof foreign aid) is likely to be wasted, if not counterproduc-tive, as my final comparative case study indicates.

Globalization: Spain and MexicoSpain emerged from its civil war and World War II prob-

ably even more impoverished than Mexico (Salmon 1995,2–3). Its per capita income was only $443 in 1963, whichwas less than Mexico at $450 (in 1985 dollars) in 1800(Landes 1999, 292). Manufacturing was limited, trade wasdiscouraged, and the balance of trade was in deficit. Cur-rency was overvalued, inflation was high, and the infra-structure, poor. Moreover, unlike Mexico, with extensiveoil reserves and minerals, Spain lacked enough financialresources to purchase needed sources of energy and rawmaterials.

While the governments of both Spain and Mexico gradu-ally abandoned economic autarchy after 1960—including


membership in the World Bank, International MonetaryFund, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment—they fully embraced globalization duringand after the 1980s. Spain’s entry into the European Com-munity in 1986 was seen, not merely as ending its isola-tion and restoring it to its rightful place in Europe, but also“as part of an overall process of economic modernizationthat would induce Spain to adjust its economy to the com-petitive economies of the Community” (Carr 1987, 10). Inaddition to other economic reforms, Mexico drasticallyreduced tariffs and rigid controls on foreign investment,joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),entered into the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA), and signed trade agreements with many LatinAmerican countries. During the 1990s, with the expansionof the maquilas (“industries,” also called maquiladoras orfactories, begun during the 1960s in the border areas) intoa national manufacturing arrangement, Mexico had thehighest rate of export growth in the world, making it theworld’s eighth-largest exporter (Levy and Bruhn 2001, 11).In 1998–99, it sold about $35 billion in high-tech prod-ucts—nearly as much as China, which has more than 10times Mexico’s population (Economist, November 10,2001, 12).

Unfortunately, Mexico has not benefited nearly as muchas Spain from globalization: Its gross domestic productper capita is currently about 25 percent of Spain’s, and itspurchasing power parity with the United States, half thatof Spain (Economist 2001, 164, 202). In 1995, 42.5 per-cent of the Mexican population lived on less than $2 a day,whereas there was no reported percentage then below thepoverty line in Spain (World Bank 2000, 281). While Spainhas experienced high levels of unemployment, reaching13.4 percent in early 2001, it does not have Mexico’s hugeinformal sector, amounting to an estimated 60 percent ofthe economically active population, largely lacking thesocial safety provisions found in Europe (Peters 2000, 163).

Because nearly three-fourths of all Mexican householdsin 1996 were considered at least somewhat impoverished,the expectation that NAFTA membership would reduceillegal migration to the United States (where wages are 10times higher) proved illusory. Moreover, globalization hasincreased income inequality in Mexico, where the top 20percent of households expanded their share of total incomefrom 49.5 percent in 1984 to 58.2 percent (compared to40.3 percent for their Spanish counterparts), leaving Mexicowith one of the most unequal distributions in the world(Peters 2000, 183). It also has intensified “territorial po-larization,” in which the states south of Mexico City arelargely excluded from export activities.

On the Human Development Index (which combinesper capita income, health, and adult literacy statistics),Spain scores 89.4, and Mexico, 78.6 (Economist 2001, 26).

However, one can point to indications of a greater dispar-ity in living conditions (OECD 2001). Mexico’s illiteracyrate remains at about 13 percent, compared to about 3 per-cent in Spain. Whereas only half of Mexican children makeit through primary school, more than 80 percent do so inSpain. At the primary and secondary levels, Mexico’s an-nual expenditure per student is about one-third that ofSpain. While almost all Spaniards now have access to ad-equate water sources and sanitation, the comparative sharesfor Mexico are 83 percent and 66 percent. Mexico’s infantmortality rate (per 1,000 live births) is six times higher (30compared to 5).

Transparency International’s 2001 Corruption Percep-tion Index is one indication of the greater weakness ofgovernance in Mexico than Spain, putting Mexico at 3.7(slightly higher than Egypt) and Spain at 7.0 (slightly be-low Japan). The other available comparison comes fromtwo OECD reports having to do with regulatory reform(with 1999 covering Mexico and 2000, Spain). The 1999report notes that “the enforcement of regulations is prob-lematic in Mexico” (151–52), adding, “Complex and un-clear regulation, and difficulties at the judicial level withinterpretation and enforcement, have meant that Mexi-can regulation has long been the source of considerableuncertainty and confusion to the citizen.” While empha-sizing existing weaknesses, the 2000 report concludes(104), “Over 20 years, Spain has experienced a processof social, political, and economic change of a magnitudeseen in few other OECD countries,” bringing Spain “con-siderably closer to the mainstream of regulatory practicesin the OECD.”

In his study of a number of ministries, Heywood (1998,114) finds that highly paid and qualified functionaries andeconomists “have been at the heart of Spain’s economicmodernization.” In contrast, the OECD (1998, 113) re-ported that “Mexico does not have a true civil service asthat term is understood in other OECD countries, with theexception of a few Ministries,” and that management andtraining are very inadequate. Because about a third of offi-cials are affected by the sexenio system (the change in gov-ernment every six years), those who gain power considerit their right “to partake of the system’s spoils” (Morris1991, 73).

Insofar as “there are few evaluations, either inside oroutside government, of how well it performs,” contractstend to be mismanaged or handled corruptly (Economist,May 12, 2001, 42). This may partly account for the factthat in 1997, about 60 percent of Mexican roads were un-paved, compared to only about 10 percent in Spain (WorldFact Book 2001, http://www.bartleby.com/151/). Moreover,inasmuch as the handling of contracts for construction workin the health care sector are given out by the central au-thorities for patronage purposes and, as such, are seldom


monitored, dams and major networks have been neglected,causing leaks, a loss of water for consumption and irriga-tion, and inadequate cost recovery (OECD 1998, 50, 53).

Professor Robert A. Pastor (2001) of Emory University,a leading expert on the North American Community, hasadvocated providing a level of assistance to Mexico simi-lar to what the European Union offers to its poorest mem-bers (2 percent–4 percent of their gross domestic product).I would support such assistance, from which Spain hasgreatly benefited, if it were carefully linked on a step-by-step basis (with publicly available annual progress reports)to improvements in governance, particularly those neededfor political software development.

Mexico’s experience with World Bank–supported for-eign aid so far has not been very good, based on studies ofthe World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department. WhenWorld Bank staff pointed out during the 1970s and early1980s that the Bank was lending more to Mexico than wasconsistent with its absorptive capacity, they found them-selves “undercut by management tendency to over-rulethem on appeal by the Mexicans” (OED 1994, xxxviii).While evaluations of the World Bank’s projects in Mexicoduring the 1990s, according to its 2001 OED report, wererelatively positive, they had mixed or unsatisfactory re-sults in water supply and sanitation, agriculture, and envi-ronmental issues. Above all, this report emphasized thefact that insufficient attention has been paid to “areas suchas civil service reform, legal and judicial reform, tax ad-ministration, financial management and accountability, oranti-corruption” (18).

Vincente Fox, who came to power in July 2000 as thehead of an opposition party, seems sincerely anxious toreduce corruption (Economist, May 12, 2001, 42). Becausehe faces great internal opposition in doing so, he probablywould welcome the sort of outside pressure advocated hereas political leverage. In this regard, Transparency Interna-tional is already monitoring the comptroller’s office andscrutinizing the handling of large contracts. The experi-ence of the Peruvian Sunat project (improving tax collect-ing) during the 1990s suggests the importance of requir-ing the country to show a real willingness to reform beforeproviding assistance: identifying needed positions, requir-ing staff to take examinations to compete for these posi-tions, and giving salaries comparable to those in the pri-vate sector (Werlin 1998, 327).

However, for foreign aid to be useful in reforming Mexi-can public administration, it must be strongly supportedby the public. I cannot predict what the response will be.Instead, I am simply saying that, in order for political powerto become elastic (with rubber-band and balloon charac-teristics), there must be a higher quality of political soft-ware (as is apparent in Spain, but not yet in Mexico).

A Final NoteWhile I have put less emphasis on geography, history,

and culture in explaining the wealth and poverty of na-tions (as indicated in my comparative case studies) thandoes David Landes (1999), I ultimately agree with himthat the lesson of history is “that the most successful curesfor poverty come from within” (523), adding, “no empow-erment is so effective as self-empowerment.” In suggest-ing that this can happen rather quickly (as it has inSingapore and Spain), I introduce an optimistic note intothe political development literature to reduce the pessimismencountered among those critical of globalization and struc-tural adjustment lending (de Rivero 2001).


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Yew, Lee Kwan 2000. From Third World To First: The SingaporeStory, 1965–2000. New York: HarperCollins.

Documents

Werlin (2003) Poor Nations, Rich Nations_A theory of Governance.pdf