SWAC/OECD, N°2, April - June 2009 > www.westafricaclub.org

Impact of the crisis: •a mixed pictureThe free movement of •persons, 30 years later Challenges for food security •and the cotton sectorThe army - a key political player, •The Constitution under pressure

West Africa Observer

West Africa Observer - SWAC/OECD, N°2 – April - june 2009

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The Sahel and West Africa Club

The OECD has considerably deepened its relationship with Africa. The

OECD’s policy dialogue is also developing at a regional level, in particular

through the work of the Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) which plays

a bridging role as an interface between West African actors and OECD

member countries. Administratively attached to the OECD, the SWAC is

led by a Secretariat based in Paris, which is supported by a network of

partners and experts from West Africa and OECD countries.

Its specificity lies in its approach, which combines direct field-involvement

with analyses of West African realities. Together with regional institutions,

governments, business and civil society organisations, the SWAC

promotes the regional dimension of development, supports the formulation

and implementation of joint or intergovernmental policies and thereby

contributes to mobilising and strengthening West African capacities.

Summary

Impact of the crisis: a mixed picture

Economic outlook 5•

Regional policy reponses 6•

International policy reponses 6•

The free movement of persons, 30 years later

The 1979 Protocol and its application 8•

Obstacles and administrative harassment 9•

Regional infrastructure projects 10•

Challenges for food security and the cotton sector

High food prices 11•

A Charter for food crises prevention and management 12•

No relief for the West African cotton sector 13 •

The army - a key political player ; the Constitution under pressure

Speedy election in Mauritania 14 •

Political violence and elections in Guinea-Bissau 14 •

A difficult transition in Guinea 15•

Niger’s Constitution under pressure 15•

Contents

West Africa Observer - SWAC/OECD, N°2 – April - june 2009

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Summary

Despite the crisis, the economic outlook for West Africa is better

than expected. Not surprisingly, the oil exporting countries are the

hardest hit. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

presents a highly contrasted assessment as to West Africa’s capacity to

co-ordinate its monetary policies and the Central Banks actions while the

private West African banking system is rapidly integrating. However, the

West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) was able to react

relatively successfully within its zone. The G20 pledged more resources

to the main financial institutions such as the African Development Bank

(AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank Group.

The Gleneagles commitments were also reconfirmed. An interim Economic

Partnership Agreement (EPA) between West Africa and the European

Union will likely be signed in October 2009. Only addressing areas of

consensus, it will focus on trade in goods and equitable development in

order to compensate for the imbalances linked to the opening up of the

market.

As it is the 30th anniversary of the freedom of movement within the

ECOWAS zone, the West Africa Observer is focusing on the application

of this founding principle. All ECOWAS member states have eliminated

visas and entry permits for community citizens, and many of the countries

now provide a travel certificate or a community passport. Yet there is still

much to be done to reduce administrative harassment, and the number of

control posts along cross-border corridors.

The food situation is still worrying throughout the region. Despite record

production (17% increase compared with 2007/2008 for the entire region;

30% in Sahel countries), food prices remain high. Price pressures are

exacerbated by poor rainfall previsions; national public security stocks

are not at optimal level. With regard to cotton, the global economic crisis

combined with another fall in the dollar versus the euro (thus the CFA F)

raises the bar. Some countries are taking short-term measures to save

their “white gold” (subsidising inputs, State settlement of debts, sale price

guarantees) and plan to undertake structural reforms over the long-term.

Finally, the political and social scene continues to be instable. The

political transition processes in Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea

progressed at a different pace. Political dialogue and mediation

accelerated preparations for elections in Mauritania at lightning speed.

Guinea-Bissau was finally able to hold elections without incident, after

a series of political assassinations. In Guinea, as electoral preparations

seem to be off track, tensions are rising between the military junta and the

“Forces vives”. The army in these three countries is a key political player.

In Niger, despite the Constitutional Court’s decision, President Mamadou

Tandja will hold a referendum on 4 August 2009 which could pave the

way to a third presidential term. ECOWAS played an important role by

dispatching a mission of five Army Chiefs-of-Staff to Guinea-Bissau and

a high-level delegation to Niger, led by the former Nigerian President

Abusalami Abubakar.

The West Africa Observer

This quarterly review analyses West African news on major

political, economic and social trends from a regional point

of view. It summarizes and puts into perspective important

events and developments. Topics are chosen according

to the concerns of those with whom the SWAC team works:

leaders of West African regional or government organisations,

development partners, NGOs, local actors and researchers,

civil society, etc. Our work draws on many existing information

sources. We believe: “The more information is available, the

more it needs to be synthesised”. The West Africa Observer is

intended to become a tool that provides easy and quick access

to key information on the region.

Please send your comments to: julia.wanjiru@oecd.org

About the West Africa Observer

Normand Lauzon, SWAC Director

Impact of the crisis: a mixed picture

Economic outlook

The African Development Bank (AfDB) Annual meetings, held in Dakar

on 13 and 14 May 2009, released new growth prospects for the

African continent. According to the “African Economic Outlook (2009)”,

economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to be 2.4% in 2009

and 4.7% in 2010. In West Africa, real GDP growth is expected to slow to

4.2% in 2009, from 5.4% in 2008, before partially rebounding to 4.6% in

2010. However, it is a mixed picture with some countries maintaining, or

even increasing their growth rate.

Among the hardest hit African economies are oil exporting countries

which have felt the effects of the crisis quicker and more acutely. In 2009,

Nigeria is set to lose two growth points and its Federal State budget as

well as its current account balance will be in deficit. Foreign exchange

reserves dropped from US$ 53 to 43 billion between December 2008 and

July 2009. The Central Bank of Nigeria declared a relaxing of its monetary

policy (again cutting its federal funds rate from 8% to 6%) to provide

increased liquidity while securing stability of the exchange rate. Volatile

oil prices hinder the planning and implementation of economic policies

over the medium-term.

Ghana is faring well due to the good performance of the cocoa sector

and, more generally, increases in agricultural production. In 2009, private

consumption should support growth which will be able to rely on first

oil exports as of 2010. After good performances in 2007 and 2008, the

economy of Cape Verde is expected to significantly slow in 2009 as a

result of a potential decrease in remittances and a drop in tourism. Post-

conflict recovery in Liberia and Sierra Leone is likely to continue.

The situation also varies in UEMOA countries. Burkina Faso and Mali are

benefitting from good harvests, and Mali from the high price of gold in

particular, while Niger is profiting from the high price of uranium. Senegal

has suffered a poor agricultural campaign and a fall in phosphate

and fertilizer production. The suspension of the Falémé mine project

(ArcelorMittal of US$ 2.2 billion) is casting a shadow over Senegal’s

medium- and long-term growth prospects. The improved political situation

in Côte d’Ivoire, the biggest economy in UEMOA, has helped maintain

growth prospects of 3.8% in 2009. This contributes also to the economic

performance of other UEMOA member countries, tightly linked to the Côte

d’Ivoire.

Learn more

African Economic Outlook (2009): • http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org

Measuring the Pulse of Africa in Times of Crisis, OECD Policy Brief, •May 2009Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, IMF, April 2009, •http://www.imf.org

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At the same time, the 9th Summit of the Heads of State of the West African

Monetary Zone (WAMZ) announced the postponement of the creation of

the common West African Central Bank from January 2010 to June 2014.

According to Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua who chaired the

session, “the global economic and financial crisis has put constraints on

member states’ ability to meet the convergence criteria individually and

collectively.” A new Action Plan was adopted in order to assist preparation

in the countries concerned (the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and

Sierra Leone) to agree on common convergence criteria and establish

the legal instruments of the WAMZ.

Impact of the crisis: a mixed picture

Regional policy responses

During a regional seminar held in Cotonou on 11 and

12 June 2009, the ECOWAS Commission and its Consultative

Committee presented a highly contrasted assessment of the regional

responses to the crisis: no co-ordinated response by central banks

and a lack of co-ordination regarding monetary policies, while

the private West African banking system is rapidly integrating. A

regional strategic monitoring committee will be responsible for

analysing the sectoral implications of the financial crisis and report

to the next Conference of ECOWAS Heads of State. However, it

was underscored during the seminar that UEMOA was able to react

relatively successfully within its zone.

In the first quarter, the situation of the UEMOA banking system was deemed

relatively good as the region’s foreign exchange reserves were sufficient

(West Africa Observer, No. 1, January – March 2009). The 21 March 2009

assessment by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) confirms

this analysis and notes the mitigation of inflationary pressure. However,

the UEMOA Council of Ministers meeting on 26 June 2009 called for

vigilance with regard to potential price increases of energy products as

well as uncertainties related to climate conditions during the 2009/2010

agricultural campaign. Ministers also approved the creation of national

committees responsible for implementing the recommendations of the

UEMOA’s financial sector assessment programme. A series of directives

were adopted with a view to harmonising the management of public

finances to facilitate multilateral monitoring.

Financing the real economy is also still a major concern. On 11 June 2009,

the BCEAO announced another cut to its federal funds rate (from 4.75%

to 4.25%) and the coefficient of obligatory reserves applicable to banks.

The aim is to increase the volume of loans and reduce their costs. The

BCEAO’s governor, Mr. Philippe-Henri Dacoury-Tabley, stressed the

need for banks within the region to reflect the Central Bank’s action to its

clients, notably with regard to interest rates. Investments in agriculture,

energy and infrastructure continue to be UEMOA priorities.

The 36th Conference of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government,

held in Abuja on 22 June 2009 underscored “the need to deepen the

regional integration process” in order to counter the impacts of “crises”

and provide increased opportunities for regional growth. In fact, the

ECOWAS Commission believes it is essential to address the financial, fuel

and food crisis (“three F’s”) simultaneously. Heads of State encouraged

the ECOWAS Commission “to continue with its efforts to establish a

regional strategy and pursue the reforms that have been undertaken to

put in place macroeconomic convergence instruments and speed up the

establishment of a single monetary zone within the ECOWAS area”.

Learn more

Press Release of the Ordinary Meeting of the Union Council of •Ministers, UEMOA, 26 June 2009Final Communiqué of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State •and Government, 22 June 2009Strategy for addressing the financial crisis in ECOWAS, by •the ECOWAS Commission and the Consultative Committee, June 2009

International policy responses

L At the G20 Summit, it was agreed to allocate more financing

to the main financial institutions [the African Development

Bank Group (AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the

World Bank Group]. The G8 leaders also reaffirmed the Gleneagles

commitments to increase Official Development Aid (ODA) to Africa

from US$ 42 billion in 2008 to US$ 66 billion in 2010.

Participants at the annual AfDB meetings endorsed a joint Action Plan to

support Africa’s financial systems and lending to the private sector (US$

15 billion over the next 2 or 3 years). An Emergency Liquidity Facility

(ELF) of US$ 1.5 billion is being set up. It will provide financial support

to eligible states and to non sovereign activities (businesses). The AfDB

is also launching a Trade Finance Initiative. The first phase, approved in

March 2009, introduces a US$ 500 million trade line of credit to support

trade financing by African Banks and US$ 500 million for the Global Trade

Liquidity Programme (GTLP) in the second phase.

The G20 and the International Monetary and Financial Committee decided

to triple the IMF’s concessional loans to low-income countries over

the next three years. Africa’s share based on current IMF quotas is

estimated at US$ 15.6 billion. Africa could also receive US$ 3 billion

of the US$ 6 billion additional concessional lending. IMF financing

should become more flexible, in particular with regard to the

concessional lending facilities.

Impact of the crisis: a mixed picture

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Learn more

The Crisis and Africa: Monitoring the Global Policy Response, •prepared by the Africa Partnership Forum (APF) Support Unit, OECD, 10 June 2009

http://www.africapartnershipforum.org African Development Bank Group Response to the Economic •Impact of the Financial Crisis, March 2009, http://www.afdb.org Update on the EPA negotiations, by Melissa Julian •

http://ictsd.net/news/eclairageInformation-sharing Gateway on ACP-EU trade •

http://www.acp-eu-trade.org

An interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) by October 2009

Following meetings in June in Cotonou and in Brussels, the

European Union and West Africa (ECOWAS plus Mauritania)

decided to sign a less ambitious EPA in October 2009. This

would be an interim agreement on areas of consensus, mainly

trade in goods (including the 5th tariff band of 35% to better

protect the regional market) and the “EPA Development

Programme” (EPADP or its French acronym PAPED). Among

others, the PAPED (about US$ 9.5 billion over 5 years) shall

help countries of the region compensate for imbalances linked

to the opening up of the market instituted by the EPA, notably

its net fiscal impact. The October agreement should also set

out the road map for negotiating a more comprehensive EPA.

These negotiations, due to begin in January 2010, will have no

deadline as was the case in the past. They will focus on services

as West Africa is wary to open up calls for tender to European

businesses (see also the SWAC interview with Mr. Mamadou

Cissokho, ROPPA).

Photo: Stopover on the Lake Volta (Ghana)

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

will triple its loans to provide US$ 100 billion over the next three

years frontloading International Development Association (IDA 15)

disbursements (US$ 42 billion over 3 years of which US$ 21 billion will

be allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa). The World Bank also recommends

developed countries pledge the equivalent of 0.7% of their stimulus

packages to a global vulnerability fund to help development countries

which cannot afford bailouts and deficits.

The free movement of persons, 30 years later

Intra-regional trade is greatly tied to human mobility

According to the general perception set out in the 2009 Report

of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD), there is relatively little trade between African countries

(approximately 9.5% in West Africa). But the report also emphasises

the rarely highlighted fact that taken individually, intra-continental

trade accounts for more than 25% of many countries’ exports. Trade

within the ECOWAS zone accounts for 57% of Togo’s exports, 37%

of Senegal’s exports, 31% of Burkina Faso, 25% of Cape Verde,

24% of Côte d’Ivoire and the Gambia, etc. The tremendous volume

of oil exports relegates Nigeria’s exports within West Africa to 5%.

However, West Africa’s demographic and economic giant also trades

massive volumes (although difficult to quantify) of manufactured

and agricultural products within the ECOWAS region. Official trade

statistics do not necessarily reflect real trade volumes as 90% of the

West African population is living off the informal sector (family farms

and the urban economy).

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Freedom of movement is one of the founding principles of the 1975

treaty establishing ECOWAS. The 1979 Protocol on Free Movement

of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment sets out its

implementation. Over time, several supplementary protocols, an ECOWAS

Code of Citizenship (1982), the creation of an ECOWAS travel certificate

(1985), a residence card (1990) and a community passport (2000) help

implement this founding principle. What progress has been made?

All ECOWAS member states have eliminated visas and entry permits

for community citizens. Only a national identity card or a passport is

needed to move about within the ECOWAS area. Six member countries

have already introduced the community passport and seven countries

use the travel certificate. This much less expensive certificate is easier

to obtain and thus more frequently used than a passport. West African

nationals simply need an identity card when crossing the border. “The

ECOWAS Protocol […] has implicitly conferred a particular status on West

African nationals […]. This “adjusted” application of legal provisions is a

response to the nature of migratory exchanges that are behind the history

of the region.”1 There is certainly a high level of intra-regional mobility.

Approximately 3% of West Africans live in a country in which they do not

have nationality. Within the EU, it is about 0.5%.

1 Nelly Robin: ECOWAS, an Area of Free Movement and First Border Post for the Schengen Area, “Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives”, West African Studies, OECD/SWAC, 2009

West Africa is making notable progress with regard to free movement,

in comparison with other African regions, as was confirmed in the

Follow-up Report on the Implementation of Recommendations from the

3rd Conferences of African Ministers in charge of Integration, published in

May by the African Union Commission. The Report’s conclusions indicate

that the member countries of the East African Community and ECOWAS

are much further ahead (with the community passport) than the Common

Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic

Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in which the free movement

protocols are only at the ratification stage; and even more so than the

Community of the Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Southern African

Development Community (SADC) and the InterGovernmental Authority on

Development (IGAD) in East Africa who are still seeking consensus on

this issue.

Learn more

Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence •and Establishment, adopted by ECOWAS on 28 May 1979 in DakarFollow-up Report on the Implementation from the •3rd Conferences of African Ministers in charge of Integration (COMAI III), African Union Commission, May 2009Economic Development in Africa: Strengthening Regional •Economic Integration for Africa’s Development, UNCTAD, 2009

The 1979 Protocol and its application

The free movement of persons, 30 years later

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Obstacles and administrative harassment

Nevertheless, the Observatory of Abnormal Practices – an initiative

of the West Africa Trade Hub and UEMOA, supported by USAID –

asserts that numerous control posts, administrative harassment and the

extortion of funds continue to hinder free movement within the ECOWAS

zone. Each quarter, the Observatory publishes a report on the three

corridors of Tema-Ouagadougou, Bamako-Ouagadougou and Lomé-

Ouagadougou. The 2009 first quarter assessment showed that the rate

of “harassment” had not decreased considerably. Illegal payments vary

from 1 667 CFA F in Togo to 7 784 CFA F in Mali over 100 km. The amount

of time lost can be 5 minutes for 100 km in Togo to 30 minutes in Mali.

Resolving this problem is not easy, as it involves security issues (banditry

is recurrent in some sections of these corridors), social issues (purchasing

power and working conditions of ECOWAS member countries’ security

forces vary greatly) and economic issues (the least costly and quickest

transport routes are preferred by truck drivers).

Results for 1 January – 31 March 2009

Learn more

7th Report of the Observatory of Abnormal Practices on Inter-•state Corridors, Results for 1 January - 31 March 2009, West Africa Trade Hub, UEMOA and USAID

The Conference of ECOWAS Heads of State and government meeting

on 22 June again, “called on Member States to ensure the effective

application of the ECOWAS Protocols on the Free Movement of Persons

and Right of Residence and to put an end to all forms of harassment

along corridors and borders.” The ECOWAS Commission also relies on

the press to stimulate debate to raise awareness among civil society.

During a workshop bringing together some 100 journalists (Abidjan,

24 and 25 June), the Commission suggested creating a media network

to encourage integration and lower the barriers hindering free movement

within ECOWAS borders. The Director of the ECOWAS Commission’s

Free Movement of Persons Department, Mr. NFaly Sanoh, stressed the

lack of awareness of community laws. The first step to applying a law is

to inform the beneficiaries. Photo: Trucks at the Paga border check point (Burkina Faso-Ghana)

The free movement of persons, 30 years later

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Regional infrastructure projects

At their summit, ECOWAS Heads of State and government announced

the creation of a fund for the development and financing of the

transport and energy sectors. This fund (modalities are currently being

explored) shall be financed through revenue generated by the region’s

main export products.

A transport corridor between West and Central Africa

The US$ 455 million project focuses on the Lagos-Enugu-Abakiliki

(Nigeria) - Mamfé-Mutengene-Bamenda (Cameroon) corridor covering

450km. This project will entail the paving and maintenance of the road, the

building of two bridges and investment in socio-economic infrastructure.

Two-thirds of the financing will come from the AfDB as well as the World

Bank in Nigeria and the Japanese International Co-operation Agency

(JICA) in Cameroon. ECOWAS, the Economic and Monetary Community

of Central African States (CEMAC) and the two states concerned will also

provide assistance. This project was finalised at the beginning of April,

just after the official settlement of the border between the two countries

on the Bakassi peninsula.

The dry port of Dosso in Niger awaiting the Parakou railway

On 21 May 2009, Niger’s President Mamadou Tandja, alongside

his Beninois counterpart, Thomas Boni Yayi, broke ground on the

Dosso dry port with a view to extending the Cotonou-Parakou railway

(Benin-Niger Joint Railway and Transport Organisation - OCBN) up to

the Nigerien town. This long-planned project still lacks the technical and

financial means even though both countries are committed to contribute

regularly into a fund. Areva’s participation is still in discussion.

The Senegal River with 900 navigable kilometres

The Senegal River Basin Organisation (Organisation de mise en valeur

du fleuve Sénégal - OMVS) announced plans to begin sea-marking

a channel in August/September 2009 so as to facilitate navigation

for medium-sized boats along the 900km that separates Saint-Louis

(Senegal) and Amdibédi (close to Kayes, Mali). Ports will be built in both

towns as well as nine stopover ports along the route.

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Challenges for food security and the cotton sector

High food prices

Global food commodity prices have dropped sharply since the

beginning of 2008 after having reached an all-time high in 2007. Yet,

they are still far superior to price levels prior to the 2007 crisis (Figure 1).

Plunging prices have stabilised over the last few months. Record rice

production (666 million tonnes, an increase of 2.3%) has led to a 30%

drop in prices although still not at the 2007 price level. Cereals are all

following a similar trend (Figure 2).

West Africa is following the global trend. Continued high food

prices were confirmed at the meeting of the Regional Monitoring

Mechanism on Food and Nutritional Security held in Dakar in June,

despite record production (17% increase compared with 2007/2008 in

West Africa; 30% in Sahel countries).

The FEWS NET monthly newsletter asserts that between April and June,

the price of imported rice remained higher than the 2004/2008 average of

all the markets surveyed. The same goes for corn, which is a basic food

product in coastal countries and a substitution for millet and sorghum in

Sahel countries where it is also used in animal feed. The prices of sorghum

and millet, mainly consumed in the Sahelian and Sudano-Sahelian zones,

are also above average. In June 2009, the price of millet in Mali (Mopti),

Niger (Niamey) and Burkina Faso (Djibo) were respectively 11%, 14%

and 21% higher than in June 2008. On the other hand, the price of yams,

also a basic food product on the coast and a substitution in the Sahel, fell

below the 2004/2008 average (except on the Lagos market). Although

current market supply is relatively good, producer’s as well as national

public security stocks are not at optimum level.

Worrying rainfall forecasts are exacerbating price pressures. Rainfall

is expected to be insufficient in some Sahelian zones (the Gambia,

southwest and central Mali, southwest of Mauritania, Senegal) leading

to an early start of transhumance in pastoral zones. There could even be

a lack of rain in high-rainfall areas such as Benin, north of Côte d’Ivoire,

Ghana, north and west Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Togo. Floods

could also occur in the southern part of the Gulf of Guinea countries.

Against this background, several West African countries are maintaining

their agricultural production support programmes.

Figure 1: Food product price index

(index 100 = 2002 – 2004 average)

Figure 2: Cereal price index

source: FAO

source: FAO

Challenges for food security and the cotton sector

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Learn more

Food Aid Charter (1990) •Draft revised Charter for Food Crises Prevention and Management •(June 2009), http://www.oecd.org/swac/ruralNew Contexts and Food Security Issues in the Sahel and West •Africa (French), SWAC/D(2008)3, February 2008West Africa, monthly bulletin of cereal prices, June 2009, •FEWS NET, USAID

A Charter for Food Crises Prevention and Management

In the 1980s, the “Club du Sahel” (renamed in 2001 the Sahel and

West Africa Club - SWAC) and the Permanent Inter-state Committee

for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) carried out an analysis and

consultation process which led to the establishment of the “Food Aid

Charter” (1990), adopted by CILSS member countries and the main

food aid donors. This code of good conduct aims to co-ordinate donors’

actions by delivering aid in a timely and an appropriate manner to the

“real” beneficiaries in Sahelian countries while avoiding the adverse

effects it may cause on local production and the market. As a precursor

to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), it also inspired the

Food Aid Convention (London, 1999).

Today, food crises are more intricate taking on more diverse forms than

in the past. The regional population has doubled since the beginning of

the 1980s becoming increasingly urbanised (from 25% to almost 50%).

Trade has created great interdependencies on the regional market. While

in the past, food security mainly relied on the ability to produce one’s

own food, access to food today is mostly determined by income. The

global market has a strong impact on local prices which can remain high

even if local production is plentiful. The institutional framework has also

changed. Decentralisation paved the way for local actors to make their

voices heard. Farmers are actively taking part in food aid programmes

and international negotiations, supported by their associations and

much more powerful NGOs. Regional organisations (CILSS, ECOWAS,

UEMOA, etc.) are major players. New actors (Brazil, China, India, etc.),

non-signatories of the Charter, are also joining this new food security

landscape.

The Food Aid Charter therefore needs to be revised. Since 2007, the

CILSS and the SWAC are leading another consultation process involving

all concerned food security actors to respond to this new situation. A

draft version of the revised Charter was produced and validated by an

international Steering Committee (June 2009). It goes beyond the original

text evolving from co-ordinated food aid management to a food crisis

prevention and management tool (mutual responsibility). It also opens

up to regional organisations and non-state actors, and expands its

geographic coverage from the Sahel to all of West Africa.

Challenges for food security and the cotton sector

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Learn more

The World Cotton Market: Main Challenges (• French), International Cotton Advisory Committee, July 2009 http://www.icac.org

Cotton, Market information in the commodity area• http://www.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/cotton/market.htm

Cotton news: between the financial crisis and protectionism, •what hope for the cotton sector ? Information note n° 82, IDEAS Centre Geneva, 12 March 2009 (French)

No relief for the West African cotton sector

Since the mid-1990s, structural problems have affected the West

African cotton industry with a drop in international prices punctuated

by a few soaring speculative hikes, an increase in the cost of inputs and

fluctuations in the CFA F/US$ exchange rate. The global economic crisis

(provoking a sharp decrease in demand) combined with another fall in

the dollar versus the euro (thus the CFA F) raises the bar. Burkina Faso

surpassed Mali as the first cotton-producing country of the region. On

6 May, the Burkinabe’s Council of Ministers announced a support plan for

the cotton sector. Seven billion CFA F (10.6 million euros) will be provided

to subsidise inputs and to support producers’ purchasing price. Four

billion CFA F (6.1 million euros) will help balance out producer groups’

debts. In the long term, the cotton sector as well as the Burkinabe textile

fibre company SOFITEX will undergo significant reforms. SOFITEX has

opted to reduce cotton grain production costs and increase yields by

introducing genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

Firmly opposed to the cultivation of GMOs, the Swiss NGO, Helvetas,

in partnership with local associations, is implementing an agreement

between Brittany (France) and cotton growers in Burkina Faso and Mali.

This agreement provides, with UEMOA support, 740 000 euros over

three years (2008-2010) to launch organic cotton production. Currently

accounting for 0.2% of global production, organic cotton is sold at

350 CFA F, more than twice as much as regular cotton (160 CFA F).

On 11 April 2009, Brazil announced that it would provide US$ 7 billion in

non-reimbursable aid to the cotton sectors in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad

and Mali. In 2003, these four countries launched the C4 initiative to defend

the interests of African cotton producers in WTO negotiations.

West African cotton basins

Cotton production in West and Central Africa

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the army - a key political player ; the Constitution under pressure

Speedy election in Mauritania

Following lengthy negotiations, the Dakar agreement, facilitated by

the Senegalese government and the International Contact Group on

the situation in Mauritania (African Union, Arab League, European Union,

International Organisation of the Francophonie and the United Nations) was

signed on 4 June 2009 in Nouakchott. It sets the date of the presidential

election to 18 July (initially scheduled for 6 June), re-opens candidate

registration (officially closed in April), establishes an interim government

and transforms the High Council of State (HCS - the junta in power since

the military coup on 6 August 2008) into a Security and Defence Council

under the National Union transitional government’s authority. It also

foresees the symbolic resignation of the deposed president.

Implementing this agreement immediately encountered difficulties. In

particular, there was disagreement on the composition of the National

Union’s transitional government which was finally appointed on

27 June; the unseated President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi refused to

officially step down prior to the dissolution of the HCS. On 24 June, the

Constitutional Court nullified a HCS order precipitating the closing of

candidate registration. The Independent National Electoral Commission

(INEC) was only established on 1 July making it impossible to mobilise all

the international observers on such short notice.

On 18 July, General Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz was elected in the first

round with 52.47% of the votes. His election was confirmed a few days

later by the Constitutional Court before which the opposition had submitted

a petition to nullify elections.

Amnesty for rebels in the Niger Delta

On 24 June 2009, Nigeria’s President Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua

offered amnesty to all Niger Delta rebel organisations

and militants who lay down their arms by 6 October 2009.

Immediately responding to this announcement, the Movement

for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) attacked an oil

pipeline. Nevertheless, there is progress towards peace. Some

rebel groups seem to seek firmer guarantees as compensation

for laying down arms.

Political violence and elections in Guinea-Bissau

Following the assassinations of President Nino Vieira and the Army

Chief-of-Staff Tagme Na Waie last March, violence again erupted

on the political scene. On the night from 4 to 5 June, the military was

accused of its involvement in the assassinations of Baciro Dabo, Minister

of Territorial Administration and a presidential candidate, as well as

Hélder Proença, a deputy in the African Party for the Independence of

Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and former Minister of Defence. The

government accused these two political figures, close allies of Nino Vieira,

of attempting a coup d’état. The ECOWAS Commission and the African

Union are setting-up an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate

these assassinations.

Furthermore, in order to prevent resurging tensions, ECOWAS paid the army

three months of back salary and contributed to the budget and logistical

arrangements of the 28 June elections (see box below). Other measures

should be undertaken soon. The donor round table on the restructuring

and modernisation of the security and defence sector, organised in Praia

on 20 April, was a first step. Following elections, ECOWAS intends to

organise an international donor conference on Guinea-Bissau. The United

Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS)

will be replaced as of 1 January 2010 by the United Nations Integrated

Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (Resolution 1876/2009). This office

will provide support to the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), in particular

in capacity-building of national institutions (police, justice, etc.), as well as

in reconciliation and mediation activities.

According to the last United Nations report on the political developments

in Guinea-Bissau, “there was a high risk of a constitutional crisis”. The

constitution provides for a 60-day term of office of an interim President

before elections are held. As President Vieira was assassinated at the

beginning of March, elections should have been held at the beginning

of May at the latest. In order to prevent a constitutional crisis, interim

President Raimundo Pereira achieved consensus with parliamentarians,

political parties and members of civil society to set the length of his

mandate. UNOGBIS sees this as an encouraging sign to build a new

national consensus based on political dialogue which is needed to resolve

the critical challenges facing the country.

A peaceful first round of presidential elections

On 28 June, none of the eleven candidates on the list

obtained majority. Leading candidates were Malam

Bacai Sanha of the PAIGC (39.6% of the votes) and Kumba

Yala of the Party for Social Renovation (29.4%). The second

round of voting on 26 July should decide between the two.

Learn more

Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-•Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country, 10 June 2009

15

A difficult transition in Guinea

During the second quarter, relations between Captain Moussa Dadis

Camara’s National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD)

and the “Forces Vives” began to chill around the scheduled timetable

of the presidential election. While the head of the ruling junta stressed

the need to pursue his fight against corruption and drug-trafficking, the

spokesperson of the “Forces Vives”, Mr. Jean-Marie Doré, expressed his

concerns over the delay in electoral preparations and the lack of financing

to set up an Independent National Electoral Commission.

ECOWAS Heads of State and government were concerned by the lack of

progress in the implementation of the agreed chronogram for the restoration

of constitutional order (see ECOWAS Press Release No. 066/2009). With

the junta banning several political meetings, ECOWAS requested the

CNDD to respect its commitments, authorise all political party activity and

organise legislative and presidential elections in 2009. The International

Contact Group on Guinea (OCG) will open in Conakry in July to facilitate

dialogue between the CNDD and other stakeholders to assure elections

at the end of 2009.

The social climate is still tense. Guinean Unions are protesting against the

30% rise in fuel prices and are calling for salary increases, notably for civil

servants in the national education system. In mid-June, violence erupted

in Conakry and in several large towns between protesting youth and

military/policy forces, following a well-supported general strike. Following

these clashes baccalaureate exams were cancelled by the junta.

Niger’s constitution under pressure On 5 May, Niger’s President Mamadou Tandja announced his intention to

submit a referendum modifying the constitution to abolish the presidential

term limitation. The President thus intends to try to serve a third term in

order to “finish the large-scale projects underway”. On 8 May, twenty-

three deputies referred the matter to the Constitutional Court which then

ruled against it on 25 May. The next day, President Tandja dissolved the

National Assembly. One month later, on 25 June, the Constitutional Court

rendered a negative decision for the second time and one of the major

presidential parties (the Democratic and Social Convention) withdrew

its eight government ministers from the presidential administration. On

29 June, the President dismissed the seven judges of the Constitutional

Court and suspended the Court’s powers of arbitration concerning politics

and elections. The same day, he enforced Article 53 of the Constitution,

authorising the president to exert special powers and govern by decree.

The final Press Release of the Conference of ECOWAS Heads of State and

government of 22 June stressed their concerns and noted the Nigerien

Prime Minister’s reassurances that “all political stakeholders will continue

to operate with the ambit of respect for the constitutional legality”. The

ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance,

ratified by Niger, prohibits any non-consensual change to the constitution

within six months prior to elections.

Niger is expected to hold three elections in 2009 under very tense political

circumstances that include the constitutional referendum of 4 August,

legislative elections set for 20 August and presidential elections to be

held by the end of December. President Tandja’s term officially ends at

the end of this year.

A drop in drug trafficking

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

(UNODC) Report on “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule

of Law in West Africa: a Threat Assessment”, drug-trafficking , in

particular cocaine, is decreasing for the first time in five years. In

addition to Europe’s decline in demand, Mr. Antonio Mazzitelli,

UNODC’s West Africa Director, explains this drop by the

changes in political regimes (along with different strategies to

combat drug-trafficking) in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau as well

as measures undertaken by Ghana.

Learn more

“Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: •A Threat Assessment”, UNODC, 7 July 2009

A constitutional reform to establish the vice presidency in Senegal

On Senegal’s 49th anniversary of independence

(4 April 2009), President Abdoulaye Wade announced his

intention to establish the post of vice-president. Unlike Niger,

the Supreme Court declared itself incompetent to decide on the

opposition’s appeal. Following a majority vote by the National

Assembly, the Senate approved the constitutional change on

19 May. The vice president is named by the president for a term

not exceeding the president’s mandate in consultations with the

president of the Senate and the National Assembly.

the army - a key political player ; the Constitution under pressure

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West Africa Observer - Contact: julia.wanjiru@oecd.org