West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937)

7/31/2019 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937)

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Syllabus

SUPREMECOURTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES

300U.S.379WestCoastHotelCo.v.ParrishAPPEALFROMTHESUPREMECOURTOFWASHINGTONNo.293Argued:December16,17,1936---Decided:March29,1937

1.DeprivationoflibertytocontractisforbiddenbytheConstitutionifwithoutdueprocessoflaw,butrestraintorregulationofthisliberty,ifreasonableinrelationtoitssubjectandifadoptedfortheprotectionofthecommunityagainstevilsmenacingthehealth,safety,moralsandwelfareofthepeople,isdueprocess.P.391.

2.Indealingwiththerelationofemployerandemployed,thelegislaturehasnecessarilyawidefieldofdiscretioninorderthattheremaybesuitableprotectionofhealthandsafety,andthatpeaceandgoodordermaybepromotedthroughregulationsdesignedtoinsurewholesomeconditionsofworkandfreedomfromoppression.P.393.

3.TheStatehasaspecialinterestinprotectingwomenagainstemploymentcontractswhichthroughpoorworkingconditions,longhoursorscantwagesmayleavetheminadequatelysupportedandunderminetheirhealth;because:

(1)Thehealthofwomenispeculiarlyrelatedtothevigoroftherace;

(2)Womenareespeciallyliabletobeoverreachedandexploitedbyunscrupulousemployers;and

(3)Thisexploitationanddenialofalivingwageisnotonlydetrimentaltothehealthandwellbeingofthewomenaffected,butcastsadirectburdenfortheirsupportuponthecommunity.Pp.394,398,etseq.

4.Judicialnoticeistakenoftheunparalleleddemandsforreliefwhicharoseduringtherecentperiodofdepressionandstillcontinuetoanalarmingextentdespitethedegreeofeconomicrecoverywhichhasbeenachieved.P.399.

5.Astatelawforthesettingofminimumwagesforwomenisnotanarbitrarydiscriminationbecauseitdoesnotextendtomen.P.400.

6.AstatuteoftheStateofWashington(Laws,1913,c.174;Remington'sRev.Stats.,1932,7623etseq.)providingfortheestablishmentofminimumwagesforwomen,heldvalid.Adkinsv.Children'sHospital,261U.S.525,isoverruled;Moreheadv.NewYorkexrel.Tipaldo,298U.S.587,distinguished.P.400.[p380]

ThiswasanappealfromajudgmentformoneydirectedbytheSupremeCourtofWashington,reversingthetrialcourt,inanactionbyachambermaidagainstahotelcompanytorecoverthedifferencebetweentheamountofwagespaidortendere

dtoheraspercontractandalargeramountcomputedontheminimumwagefixedbyastateboardorcommission.[p386]

HUGHES,C.J.,OpinionoftheCourt


300U.S.379WestCoastHotelCo.v.ParrishAPPEALFROMTHESUPREMECOURTOFWASHINGTON


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No.293Argued:December16,17,1936---Decided:March29,1937

MR.CHIEFJUSTICEHUGHESdeliveredtheopinionoftheCourt.

ThiscasepresentsthequestionoftheconstitutionalvalidityoftheminimumwagelawoftheStateofWashington.

TheAct,entitled"MinimumWagesforWomen,"authorizesthefixingofminimumwagesforwomenandminors.Lawsof1913(Washington)chap.174;Remington'sRev.Stat.(1932),7623etseq.Itprovides:

SECTION1.ThewelfareoftheStateofWashingtondemandsthatwomenandminorsbeprotectedfromconditionsoflaborwhichhaveaperniciouseffectontheirhealthandmorals.TheStateofWashington,therefore,exercisinghereinitspoliceandsovereignpowerdeclaresthatinadequatewagesandunsanitaryconditionsoflaborexertsuchperniciouseffect.

SEC.2.ItshallbeunlawfultoemploywomenorminorsinanyindustryoroccupationwithintheStateofWashingtonunderconditionsoflabordetrimentaltotheirhealthormorals,anditshallbeunlawfultoemploy[p387]womenworkersinanyindustrywithintheStateofWashingtonatwageswhicharenotadequatefortheirmaintenance.

SEC.3.Thereisherebycreatedacommissiontobeknownasthe"IndustrialWelf

areCommission"fortheStateofWashington,toestablishsuchstandardsofwagesandconditionsoflaborforwomenandminorsemployedwithintheStateofWashingtonasshallbeheldhereundertobereasonableandnotdetrimentaltohealthandmorals,andwhichshallbesufficientforthedecentmaintenanceofwomen.

FurtherprovisionsrequiredtheCommissiontoascertainthewagesandconditionsoflaborofwomenandminorswithintheState.Publichearingsweretobeheld.If,afterinvestigation,theCommissionfoundthat,inanyoccupation,tradeorindustry,thewagespaidtowomenwere"inadequatetosupplythemnecessarycostoflivingandtomaintaintheworkersinhealth,"theCommissionwasempoweredtocallaconferenceofrepresentativesofemployersandemployeestogetherwithdisinterestedpersonsrepresentingthepublic.TheconferencewastorecommendtotheCommission,onitsrequest,anestimateofaminimumwageadequatefort

hepurposeabovestated,and,ontheapprovalofsucharecommendation,itbecamethedutyoftheCommissiontoissueanobligatoryorderfixingminimumwages.Anysuchordermightbereopened,andthequestionreconsideredwiththeaidoftheformerconferenceoranewone.Speciallicenseswereauthorizedfortheemploymentofwomenwhowere"physicallydefectiveorcrippledbyageorotherwise,"andalsoforapprentices,atlessthantheprescribedminimumwage.

ByalaterAct,theIndustrialWelfareCommissionwasabolished,anditsdutieswereassignedtotheIndustrialWelfareCommittee,consistingoftheDirectorofLaborandIndustries,theSupervisorofIndustrialInsurance,[p388]theSupervisorofIndustrialRelations,theIndustrialStatistician,andtheSupervisorofWomeninIndustry.Lawsof1921(Washington)c.7;Remington'sRev.Stat.(1932),10840,10893.

Theappellantconductsahotel.Theappellee,ElsieParrish,wasemployedasachambermaidand(withherhusband)broughtthissuittorecoverthedifferencebetweenthewagespaidherandtheminimumwagefixedpursuanttothestatelaw.Theminimumwagewas$14.50perweekof48hours.TheappellantchallengedtheactasrepugnanttothedueprocessclauseoftheFourteenthAmendmentoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.TheSupremeCourtoftheState,reversingthetrialcourt,sustainedthestatuteanddirectedjudgmentfortheplaintiffs.Parrishv.WestCoastHotelCo.,185Wash.581,55P.2d1083.Thecaseishereonappeal.


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TheappellantreliesuponthedecisionofthisCourtinAdkinsv.Children'sHospital,261U.S.525,whichheldinvalidtheDistrictofColumbiaMinimumWageAct,whichwasattackedunderthedueprocessclauseoftheFifthAmendment.Ontheargumentatbar,counselfortheappelleesattemptedtodistinguishtheAdkinscaseuponthegroundthattheappelleewasemployedinahotel,andthatthebusinessofaninnkeeperwasaffectedwithapublicinterest.Thateffortatdistinctionisobviouslyfutile,asitappearsthat,inoneofthecasesruledbytheAdkinsopinion,theemployeewasawomanemployedasanelevatoroperatorinahotel.Adkinsv.Lyons,261U.S.525,atp.542.

TherecentcaseofMoreheadv.NewYorkexrel.Tipaldo,298U.S.587,camehereoncertioraritotheNewYorkcourt,whichhadheldtheNewYorkminimumwageactforwomentobeinvalid.AminorityofthisCourtthoughtthattheNewYorkstatutewasdistinguishableinamaterialfeaturefromthatinvolvedintheAdkinscase,and,thatforthatandotherreasons,theNew[p389]Yorkstatuteshouldbesustained.ButtheCourtofAppealsofNewYorkhadsaidthatitfoundnomaterialdifferencebetweenthetwostatutes,andthisCourtheldthatthe"meaningofthestatute"asfixedbythedecisionofthestatecourt"mustbeacceptedhereasifthemeaninghadbeenspecificallyexpressedintheenactment."Id.,p.609.ThatviewledtheaffirmancebythisCourtofthejudgmentintheMoreheadcase,astheCourtconsideredthattheonlyquestionbeforeitwaswhethertheAdkinscasewasdistinguishable,andthatreconsiderationofthatdecisionhadnotbeensought.Uponthatpoint,theCourtsaid:

Thepetitionforthewritsoughtreviewuponthegroundthatthiscase[Morehead]isdistinguishablefromthatone[Adkins].Noapplicationhasbeenmadeforreconsiderationoftheconstitutionalquestiontheredecided.Thevalidityoftheprinciplesuponwhichthatdecisionrestsisnotchallenged.Thiscourtconfinesitselftothegrounduponwhichthewritwasaskedorgranted....Here,thereviewgrantedwasnobroaderthanthatsoughtbythepetitioner....Heisnotentitled,anddoesnotask,tobehearduponthequestionwhethertheAdkinscaseshouldbeoverruled.Hemaintainsthatitmaybedistinguishedonthegroundthatthestatutesarevitallydissimilar.

Id.pp.604,605.

WethinkthatthequestionwhichwasnotdeemedtobeopenintheMoreheadcaseisopenandisnecessarilypresentedhere.TheSupremeCourtofWashingtonhasupheldtheminimumwagestatuteofthatState.IthasdecidedthatthestatuteisareasonableexerciseofthepolicepoweroftheState.Inreachingthatconclusion,thestatecourthasinvokedprincipleslongestablishedbythisCourtintheapplicationoftheFourteenthAmendment.ThestatecourthasrefusedtoregardthedecisionintheAdkinscaseasdeterminative,andhaspointedtoourdecisionsbothbeforeandsincethatcaseasjustifyingitsposition.Weareoftheopinionthatthisrulingof[p390]thestatecourtdemandsonourpartareexaminationoftheAdkinscase.Theimportanceofthequestion,inwhichmanyStateshavingsimilarlawsareconcerned,theclosedivisionbywhichthedecisionintheAdkinscasewasreached,andtheeconomicconditionswhichhavesupervened,andinthelightofwhichthereasonablenessoftheexerciseoftheprotectivepow

eroftheStatemustbeconsidered,makeitnotonlyappropriate,butwethinkimperative,that,indecidingthepresentcase,thesubjectshouldreceivefreshconsideration.

Thehistoryofthelitigationofthisquestionmaybebrieflystated.TheminimumwagestatuteofWashingtonwasenactedovertwenty-threeyearsago.Priortothedecisionintheinstantcase,ithadtwicebeenheldvalidbytheSupremeCourtoftheState.Larsenv.Rice,100Wash.642,171Pac.1037;SpokaneHotelCo.v.Younger,113Wash.359,194Pac.595.TheWashingtonstatuteisessentiallythesameasthatenactedinOregoninthesameyear.Lawsof1913(Oregon)chap.


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62.ThevalidityofthelatteractwassustainedbytheSupremeCourtofOregoninStettlerv.O'Hara,69Ore.519,139Pac.743,andSimpsonv.O'Hara,70Ore.261,141Pac.158.Thesecases,afterreargument,wereaffirmedherebyanequallydividedcourt,in1917.243U.S.629.ThelawofOregonthuscontinuedineffect.TheDistrictofColumbiaMinimumWageLaw(40Stat.960)wasenactedin1918.ThestatutewassustainedbytheSupremeCourtoftheDistrictintheAdkinscase.Uponappeal,theCourtofAppealsoftheDistrictfirstaffirmedthatruling,but,onrehearing,reversedit,andthecasecamebeforethisCourtin1923.ThejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealsholdingtheActinvalidwasaffirmed,butwithChiefJusticeTaft,Mr.JusticeHolmesandMr.JusticeSanforddissenting,andMr.JusticeBrandeistakingnopart.Thedissentingopinionstookthegroundthatthedecisionwasatvariancewiththe[p391]principleswhichthisCourthadfrequentlyannouncedandapplied.In1925and1927,thesimilarminimumwagestatutesofArizonaandArkansaswereheldinvalidupontheauthorityoftheAdkinscase.TheJusticeswhohaddissentedinthatcasebowedtotheruling,andMr.JusticeBrandeisdissented.Murphyv.Sardell,269U.S.530;Donhamv.West-NelsonCo.,273U.S.657.ThequestiondidnotcomebeforeusagainuntilthelasttermintheMoreheadcase,asalreadynoted.Inthatcase,briefssupportingtheNewYorkstatuteweresubmittedbytheStatesofOhio,Connecticut,Illinois,Massachusetts,NewHampshire,NewJerseyandRhodeIsland.298U.S.p.604,note.Throughoutthisentireperiod,theWashingtonstatutenowunderconsiderationhasbeeninforce.

Theprinciplewhichmustcontrolourdecisionisnotindoubt.Theconstitutiona

lprovisioninvokedisthedueprocessclauseoftheFourteenthAmendment,governingtheStates,asthedueprocessclauseinvokedintheAdkinscasegovernedCongress.Ineachcase,theviolationallegedbythoseattackingminimumwageregulationforwomenisdeprivationoffreedomofcontract.Whatisthisfreedom?TheConstitutiondoesnotspeakoffreedomofcontract.Itspeaksoflibertyandprohibitsthedeprivationoflibertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.Inprohibitingthatdeprivation,theConstitutiondoesnotrecognizeanabsoluteanduncontrollableliberty.Libertyineachofitsphaseshasitshistoryandconnotation.Butthelibertysafeguardedislibertyinasocialorganizationwhichrequirestheprotectionoflawagainsttheevilswhichmenacethehealth,safety,moralsandwelfareofthepeople.LibertyundertheConstitutionisthusnecessarilysubjecttotherestraintsofdueprocess,andregulationwhichisreasonableinrelationtoitssubjectandisadoptedintheinterestsofthecommunityisdueproces

s.[p392]

Thisessentiallimitationoflibertyingeneralgovernsfreedomofcontractinparticular.Morethantwenty-fiveyearsago,wesetforththeapplicableprincipleinthesewords,afterreferringtothecaseswherethelibertyguaranteedbytheFourteenthAmendmenthadbeenbroadlydescribed:[n1]

Butitwasrecognizedinthecasescited,asinmanyothers,thatfreedomofcontractisaqualified,andnotanabsolute,right.Thereisnoabsolutefreedomtodoasonewillsortocontractasonechooses.Theguarantyoflibertydoesnotwithdrawfromlegislativesupervisionthatwidedepartmentofactivitywhichconsistsofthemakingofcontracts,ordenytogovernmentthepowertoproviderestrictivesafeguards.Libertyimpliestheabsenceofarbitraryrestraint,noti

mmunityfromreasonableregulationsandprohibitionsimposedintheinterestsofthecommunity.

Chicago,B.&Q.R.Co.v.McGuire,219U.S.549,567.

ThispowerundertheConstitutiontorestrictfreedomofcontracthashadmanyillustrations.[n2]Thatitmaybeexercisedinthepublicinterestwithrespecttocontracts[p393]betweenemployerandemployeeisundeniable.Thus,statuteshavebeensustainedlimitingemploymentinundergroundminesandsmelterstoeighthoursaday(Holdenv.Hardy,169U.S.366);inrequiringredemptionincash


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ofstoreordersorotherevidencesofindebtednessissuedinthepaymentofwages(KnoxvilleIronCo.v.Harbison,183U.S.13);inforbiddingthepaymentofseamen'swagesinadvance(Pattersonv.BarkEudora,190U.S.169);inmakingitunlawfultocontracttopayminersemployedatquantityratesuponthebasisofscreenedcoalinsteadoftheweightofthecoalasoriginallyproducedinthemine(McLeanv.Arkansas,211U.S.539);inprohibitingcontractslimitingliabilityforinjuriestoemployees(Chicago,B.&Q.R.Co.v.McGuire,supra);inlimitinghoursofworkofemployeesinmanufacturingestablishments(Buntingv.Oregon,243U.S.426),andinmaintainingworkmen'scompensationlaws(NewYorkCentralR.Co.v.White,243U.S.188;MountainTimberCo.v.Washington,243U.S.219).Indealingwiththerelationofemployerandemployed,thelegislaturehasnecessarilyawidefieldofdiscretioninorderthattheremaybesuitableprotectionofhealthandsafety,andthatpeaceandgoodordermaybepromotedthroughregulationsdesignedtoinsurewholesomeconditionsofworkandfreedomfromoppression.Chicago,B.&Q.R.Co.v.McGuire,supra,p.570.

ThepointthathasbeenstronglystressedthatadultemployeesshouldbedeemedcompetenttomaketheirowncontractswasdecisivelymetnearlyfortyyearsagoinHoldenv.Hardy,supra,wherewepointedouttheinequalityinthefootingoftheparties.Wesaid(Id.397):

Thelegislaturehasalsorecognizedthefact,whichtheexperienceoflegislatorsinmanyStateshascorroborated,thattheproprietorsoftheseestablishmentsandtheiroperativesdonotstanduponanequality,andthat[p394]theirintere

stsare,toacertainextent,conflicting.Theformernaturallydesiretoobtainasmuchlaboraspossiblefromtheiremployes,whilethelatterareofteninducedbythefearofdischargetoconformtoregulationswhichtheirjudgment,fairlyexercised,wouldpronouncetobedetrimentaltotheirhealthorstrength.Inotherwords,theproprietorslaydowntherulesandthelaborersarepracticallyconstrainedtoobeythem.Insuchcases,self-interestisoftenanunsafeguide,andthelegislaturemayproperlyinterposeitsauthority.

Andweaddedthatthefact

thatbothpartiesareoffullageandcompetenttocontractdoesnotnecessarilydeprivetheStateofthepowertointerferewherethepartiesdonotstanduponanequality,orwherethepublichealthdemandsthatonepartytothecontract

shallbeprotectedagainsthimself.

TheStatestillretainsaninterestinhiswelfare,howeverrecklesshemaybe.Thewholeisnogreaterthanthesumofalltheparts,andwhentheindividualhealth,safetyandwelfarearesacrificedorneglected,theStatemustsuffer.

Itismanifestthatthisestablishedprincipleispeculiarlyapplicableinrelationtotheemploymentofwomen,inwhoseprotectiontheStatehasaspecialinterest.ThatphaseofthesubjectreceivedelaborateconsiderationinMullerv.Oregon(1908),208U.S.412,wheretheconstitutionalauthorityoftheStatetolimittheworkinghoursofwomenwassustained.Weemphasizedtheconsiderationthat"woman'sphysicalstructureandtheperformanceofmaternalfunctionsplaceheratadisadvantageinthestruggleforsubsistence,"andthatherphysicalwel

lbeing"becomesanobjectofpublicinterestandcareinordertopreservethestrengthandvigoroftherace."Weemphasizedtheneedofprotectingwomenagainstoppressiondespiteherpossessionofcontractualrights.Wesaidthat,

thoughlimitationsuponpersonalandcontractualrightsmayberemovedbylegislation,thereisthatinher[p395]dispositionandhabitsoflifewhichwilloperateagainstafullassertionofthoserights.Shewillstillbewheresomelegislationtoprotectherseemsnecessarytosecurearealequalityofright.

Hence,shewas


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properlyplacedinaclassbyherself,andlegislationdesignedforherprotectionmaybesustainedevenwhenlikelegislationisnotnecessaryformenandcouldnotbesustained.

Weconcludedthatthelimitationswhichthestatutethereinquestion"placeduponhercontractualpowers,uponherrighttoagreewithheremployerastothetimesheshalllabor,"were"notimposedsolelyforherbenefit,butalsolargelyforthebenefitofall."Again,inQuongWingv.Kirkendall,223U.S.59,63,inreferringtoadifferentiationwithrespecttotheemploymentofwomen,wesaidthattheFourteenthAmendmentdidnotinterferewithstatepowerbycreatinga"fictitiousequality."Wereferredtorecognizedclassificationsonthebasisofsexwithregardtohoursofworkandinothermatters,andweobservedthattheparticularpointsatwhichthatdifferenceshallbeenforcedbylegislationwerelargelyinthepoweroftheState.Inlaterrulings,thisCourtsustainedtheregulationofhoursofworkofwomenemployeesinRileyv.Massachusetts,232U.S.671(factories),Millerv.Wilson,236U.S.373(hotels),andBosleyv.McLaughlin,236U.S.385(hospitals).

ThisarrayofprecedentsandtheprinciplestheyappliedwerethoughtbythedissentingJusticesintheAdkinscasetodemandthattheminimumwagestatutebesustained.ThevalidityofthedistinctionmadebytheCourtbetweenaminimumwageandamaximumofhoursinlimitinglibertyofcontractwasespeciallychallenged.261U.S.p.564.Thatchallengepersists,andiswithoutanysatisfactorya

nswer.AsChiefJusticeTaftobserved:

Inabsolutefreedomofcontract,theonetermisasimportantastheother,forbothenterequallyintotheconsiderationgivenandreceived,arestrictionasto[p396]theoneisnotgreater,inessence,thantheother,andisofthesamekind.Oneisthemultiplier,andtheotherthemultiplicand.

AndMr.JusticeHolmes,whilerecognizingthat"thedistinctionsofthelawaredistinctionsofdegree,"could

perceivenodifferenceinthekindordegreeofinterferencewithliberty,theonlymatterwithwhichwehaveanyconcern,betweentheonecaseandtheother.Thebargainisequallyaffectedwhicheverhalfyouregulate.

Id.,p.569.

OneofthepointswhichwaspressedbytheCourtinsupportingitsrulingintheAdkinscasewasthatthestandardsetupbytheDistrictofColumbiaActdidnottakeappropriateaccountofthevalueoftheservicesrendered.IntheMoreheadcase,theminoritythoughtthattheNewYorkstatutehadmetthatpointinitsdefinitionofa"fairwage,"andthatitaccordinglypresentedadistinguishablefeaturewhichtheCourtcouldrecognizewithinthelimitswhichtheMoreheadpetitionforcertiorariwasdeemedtopresent.TheCourt,however,didnottakethatview,andtheNewYorkActwasheldtobeessentiallythesameasthatfortheDistrictofColumbia.Thestatutenowbeforeusislikethelatter,butweareunabletoconcludethat,initsminimumwagerequirement,theStatehaspassed

beyondtheboundaryofitsbroadprotectivepower.

TheminimumwagetobepaidundertheWashingtonstatuteisfixedafterfullconsiderationbyrepresentativesofemployers,employeesandthepublic.Itmaybeassumedthattheminimumwageisfixedinconsiderationoftheservicesthatareperformedintheparticularoccupationsundernormalconditions.Provisionismadeforspeciallicensesatlesswagesinthecaseofwomenwhoareincapableoffullservice.ThestatementofMr.JusticeHolmesintheAdkinscaseispertinent:


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eofstatepower,howcanitbesaidthattherequirementofthepaymentofaminimumwagefairlyfixedinordertomeettheverynecessitiesofexistenceisnotanadmissiblemeanstothatend?ThelegislatureoftheStatewasclearlyentitledtoconsiderthesituationofwomeninemployment,thefactthattheyareintheclassreceivingtheleastpay,thattheirbargainingpowerisrelativelyweak,andthattheyarethereadyvictimsofthosewhowouldtakeadvantageoftheirnecessitouscircumstances.Thelegislaturewasentitledtoadoptmeasurestoreducetheevilsofthe"sweatingsystem,"[p399]theexploitingofworkersatwagessolowastobeinsufficienttomeetthebarecostofliving,thusmakingtheirveryhelplessnesstheoccasionofamostinjuriouscompetition.Thelegislaturehadtherighttoconsiderthatitsminimumwagerequirementswouldbeanimportantaidincarryingoutitspolicyofprotection.TheadoptionofsimilarrequirementsbymanyStatesevidencesadeep-seatedconvictionbothastothepresenceoftheevilandastothemeansadaptedtocheckit.Legislativeresponsetothatconvictioncannotberegardedasarbitraryorcapricious,andthatisallwehavetodecide.Evenifthewisdomofthepolicyberegardedasdebatableanditseffectsuncertain,stillthelegislatureisentitledtoitsjudgment.

Thereisanadditionalandcompellingconsiderationwhichrecenteconomicexperiencehasbroughtintoastronglight.Theexploitationofaclassofworkerswhoareinanunequalpositionwithrespecttobargainingpower,andarethusrelativelydefencelessagainstthedenialofalivingwage,isnotonlydetrimentaltotheirhealthandwellbeing,butcastsadirectburdenfortheirsupportuponthecommunity.Whattheseworkersloseinwages,thetaxpayersarecalleduponto

pay.Thebarecostoflivingmustbemet.Wemaytakejudicialnoticeoftheunparalleleddemandsforreliefwhicharoseduringtherecentperiodofdepressionandstillcontinuetoanalarmingextentdespitethedegreeofeconomicrecoverywhichhasbeenachieved.Itisunnecessarytociteofficialstatisticstoestablishwhatisofcommonknowledgethroughthelengthandbreadthoftheland.While,intheinstantcase,nofactualbriefhasbeenpresented,thereisnoreasontodoubtthattheStateofWashingtonhasencounteredthesamesocialproblemthatispresentelsewhere.Thecommunityisnotboundtoprovidewhatis,ineffect,asubsidyforunconscionableemployers.The[p*400]communitymaydirectitslawmakingpowertocorrecttheabusewhichspringsfromtheirselfishdisregardofthepublicinterest.Theargumentthatthelegislationinquestionconstitutesanarbitrarydiscrimination,becauseitdoesnotextendtomen,isunavailing.ThisCourthasfrequentlyheldthatthelegislativeauthority,actingwithin

itsproperfield,isnotboundtoextenditsregulationtoallcaseswhichitmightpossiblyreach.Thelegislature"isfreetorecognizedegreesofharmanditmayconfineitsrestrictionstothoseclassesofcaseswheretheneedisdeemedtobeclearest."If

thelawpresumablyhitstheevilwhereitismostfelt,itisnottobeoverthrownbecausethereareotherinstancestowhichitmighthavebeenapplied.

Thereisno"doctrinairerequirement"thatthelegislationshouldbecouchedinallembracingterms.Carrollv.GreenwichInsuranceCo.,199U.S.401,411;Patsonev.Pennsylvania,232U.S.138,144;KeokeeCokeCo.v.Taylor,234U.S.224,227;Sprolesv.Binford,286U.S.374,396;Semlerv.OregonBoard,294U.S.608,610,611.Thisfamiliarprinciplehasrepeatedlybeenappliedtolegislation

whichsinglesoutwomen,andparticularclassesofwomen,intheexerciseoftheState'sprotectivepower.Millerv.Wilson,supra,p.384;Bosleyv.McLaughlin,supra,pp.394,395;Radicev.NewYork,supra,pp.295-298.Theirrelativeneedinthepresenceoftheevil,nolessthantheexistenceoftheevilitself,isamatterforthelegislativejudgment.

OurconclusionisthatthecaseofAdkinsv.Children'sHospital,supra,shouldbe,anditis,overruled.ThejudgmentoftheSupremeCourtoftheStateofWashingtonis


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Affirmed.

1.Allgeyerv.Louisiana,165U.S.578;Lochnerv.NewYork,198U.S.45;Adairv.UnitedStates,208U.S.161.

2.Munnv.Illinois,94U.S.113;RailroadCommissionCases,116U.S.307;Willcoxv.ConsolidatedGasCo.,212U.S.19;Atkinv.Kansas,191U.S.207;Muglerv.Kansas,123U.S.623;Crowleyv.Christensen,137U.S.86;Gundlingv.Chicago,177U.S.183;Boothv.Illinois,184U.S.425;Schmidingerv.Chicago,226U.S.578;Armour&Co.v.NorthDakota,240U.S.510;NationalFireInsuranceCo.v.Wanberg,260U.S.71;Radicev.NewYork,264U.S.292;Yeiserv.Dysart,267U.S.540;LibertyWarehouseCo.v.BurleyTobaccoGrowers'Assn.,276U.S.71,97;Highlandv.RussellCarCo.,279U.S.253,261;O'Gorman&Youngv.HartfordInsuranceCo.,282U.S.249,251;HardwareDealersInsuranceCo.v.GliddenCo.,284U.S.151,157;PackerCorp.v.Utah,285U.S.95,111;Stephensonv.Binford,287U.S.251,274;HartfordAccidentCo.v.NelsonMfg.Co.,291U.S.352,360;PetersenBakingCo.v.Bryan,290U.S.570;Nebbiav.NewYork,291U.S.502,527-529.

SUTHERLAND,J.,DissentingOpinion


300U.S.379WestCoastHotelCo.v.ParrishAPPEALFROMTHESUPREMECOURTOFWASHINGTONNo.293Argued:December16,17,1936---Decided:March29,1937

MR.JUSTICESUTHERLAND,dissenting:

MR.JUSTICEVANDEVANTER,MR.JUSTICEMCREYNOLDS,MR.JUSTICEBUTLERandIthinkthejudgmentofthecourtbelowshouldbereversed.[p401]

TheprinciplesandauthoritiesreliedupontosustainthejudgmentwereconsideredinAdkinsv.Children'sHospital,261U.S.525,andMoreheadv.NewYorkexrel.Tipaldo,298U.S.587,andtheirlackofapplicationtocasesliketheonei

nhandwaspointedout.Asufficientanswertoallthatisnowsaidwillbefoundintheopinionsofthecourtinthosecases.Nevertheless,inthecircumstances,itseemswelltorestateourreasonsandconclusions.

Underourformofgovernment,wherethewrittenConstitution,byitsownterms,isthesupremelaw,someagency,ofnecessity,musthavethepowertosaythefinalwordastothevalidityofastatuteassailedasunconstitutional.TheConstitutionmakesitclearthatthepowerhasbeenintrustedtothiscourtwhenthequestionarisesinacontroversywithinitsjurisdiction,and,solongasthepowerremainsthere,itsexercisecannotbeavoidedwithoutbetrayalofthetrust.

Ithasbeenpointedoutmanytimes,asintheAdkinscase,thatthisjudicialdutyisoneofgravityanddelicacy,andthatrationaldoubtsmustberesolvedin

favoroftheconstitutionalityofthestatute.Butwhosedoubts,andbywhomresolved?Undoubtedlyitisthedutyofamemberofthecourt,intheprocessofreachingarightconclusion,togivedueweighttotheopposingviewsofhisassociates;but,intheend,thequestionwhichhemustanswerisnotwhethersuchviewsseemsoundtothosewhoentertainthem,butwhethertheyconvincehimthatthestatuteisconstitutionalorengenderinhismindarationaldoubtuponthatissue.Theoathwhichhetakesasajudgeisnotacompositeoath,butanindividualone.And,inpassinguponthevalidityofastatute,hedischargesadutyimposeduponhim,whichcannotbeconsummatedjustlybyanautomaticacceptanceoftheviewsofotherswhichhaveneitherconvinced,norcreatedareasonabledou


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btin,hismind.Ifuponaquestionso[p402]importanthethussurrenderhisdeliberatejudgment,hestandsforsworn.Hecannotsubordinatehisconvictionstothatextentandkeepfaithwithhisoathorretainhisjudicialandmoralindependence.

Thesuggestionthattheonlycheckupontheexerciseofthejudicialpower,whenproperlyinvokedtodeclareaconstitutionalrightsuperiortoanunconstitutionalstatute,isthejudge'sownfacultyofself-restraintisbothill-consideredandmischievous.Self-restraintbelongsinthedomainofwill,andnotofjudgment.Thecheckuponthejudgeisthatimposedbyhisoathofoffice,bytheConstitution,andbyhisownconscientiousandinformedconvictions,andsincehehasthedutytomakeuphisownmindandadjudgeaccordingly,itishardtoseehowtherecouldbeanyotherrestraint.Thiscourtactsasaunit.Itcannotactinanyotherway,andthemajority(whetherabaremajorityoramajorityofallbutoneofitsmembers)thereforeestablishesthecontrollingruleasthedecisionofthecourt,binding,solongasitremainsunchanged,equallyuponthosewhodisagreeanduponthosewhosubscribetoit.Otherwise,orderlyadministrationofjusticewouldcease.Butitistherightofthoseintheminoritytodisagree,andsometimes,inmattersofgraveimportance,theirimperativedutytovoicetheirdisagreementatsuchlengthastheoccasiondemands--always,ofcourse,intermswhich,howeverforceful,donotoffendtheproprietiesorimpugnthegoodfaithofthosewhothinkotherwise.

Itisurgedthatthequestioninvolvedshouldnowreceivefreshconsideration,a

mongotherreasons,becauseof"theeconomicconditionswhichhavesupervened";butthemeaningoftheConstitutiondoesnotchangewiththeebbandflowofeconomicevents.WefrequentlyaretoldinmoregeneralwordsthattheConstitutionmustbeconstruedinthelightofthepresent.IfbythatitismeantthattheConstitutionismadeupof[p403]livingwordsthatapplytoeverynewconditionwhichtheyinclude,thestatementisquitetrue.Buttosay,ifthatbeintended,thatthewordsoftheConstitutionmeantodaywhattheydidnotmeanwhenwritten--thatis,thattheydonotapplytoasituationnowtowhichtheywouldhaveappliedthen--istorobthatinstrumentoftheessentialelementwhichcontinuesitinforceasthepeoplehavemadeituntilthey,andnottheirofficialagents,havemadeitotherwise.

ThewordsofJudgeCampbellinTwitchellv.Blodgett,13Mich.127,139-140,app

lywithpeculiarforce."Butitmayeasilyhappen,"hesaid,

thatspecificprovisionsmay,inunforeseenemergencies,turnouttohavebeeninexpedient.Thisdoesnotmaketheseprovisionsanylessbinding.Constitutionscannotbechangedbyeventsalone.Theyremainbindingastheactsofthepeopleintheirsovereigncapacity,astheframersofGovernment,untiltheyareamendedorabrogatedbytheactionprescribedbytheauthoritywhichcreatedthem.ItisnotcompetentforanydepartmentoftheGovernmenttochangeaconstitution,ordeclareitchanged,simplybecauseitappearsill-adaptedtoanewstateofthings.

...Restrictionshave,itistrue,beenfoundmorelikelythangrantstobeunsuitedtounforeseencircumstances...But,whereevilsarisefromtheapplica

tionofsuchregulations,theirforcecannotbedeniedorevaded,andtheremedyconsistsinrepealoramendment,andnotinfalseconstruction.

Theprincipleisreflectedinmanydecisionsofthiscourt.SeeSouthCarolinav.UnitedStates,199U.S.437,448-449;LakeCountyv.Rollins,130U.S.662,670;Knowltonv.Moore,178U.S.41,95;RhodeIslandv.Massachusetts,12Pet.657,723;Craigv.Missouri,4Pet.410,431-432;ExparteBain,121U.S.1,12;Maxwellv.Dow,176U.S.581,602;Jarroltv.Moberly,103U.S.580,586.[p404]

Thejudicialfunctionisthatofinterpretation;itdoesnotincludethepowero


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famendmentundertheguiseofinterpretation.Tomissthepointofdifferencebetweenthetwoistomissallthatthephrase"supremelawoftheland"standsfor,andtoconvertwhatwasintendedasinescapableandenduringmandatesintomeremoralreflections.

IftheConstitution,intelligentlyandreasonablyconstruedinthelightoftheseprinciples,standsinthewayofdesirablelegislation,theblamemustrestuponthatinstrument,andnotuponthecourtforenforcingitaccordingtoitsterms.Theremedyinthatsituation--andtheonlytrueremedy--istoamendtheConstitution.JudgeCooley,inthefirstvolumeofhisConstitutionalLimitations(8thed.),p.124,veryclearlypointedoutthatmuchofthebenefitexpectedfromwrittenconstitutionswouldbelostiftheirprovisionsweretobebenttocircumstancesormodifiedbypublicopinion.Hepointedoutthatthecommonlaw,unlikeaconstitution,wassubjecttomodificationbypublicsentimentandactionwhichthecourtsmightrecognize,butthat

acourtorlegislaturewhichshouldallowachangeinpublicsentimenttoinfluenceitingivingtoawrittenconstitutionaconstructionnotwarrantedbytheintentionofitsfounderswouldbejustlychargeablewithrecklessdisregardofofficialoathandpublicduty,andifitscoursecouldbecomeaprecedent,theseinstrumentswouldbeoflittleavail....Whatacourtistodo,therefore,istodeclarethelawaswritten,leavingittothepeoplethemselvestomakesuchchangesasnewcircumstancesmayrequire.Themeaningoftheconstitutionisfixedwhenitisadopted,anditisnotdifferentatanysubsequenttimewhenaco

urthasoccasiontopassuponit.

TheAdkinscasedealtwithanactofCongresswhichhadpassedthescrutinybothofthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesofthegovernment.Werecognizedthat[p405]therebythesedepartmentshadaffirmedthevalidityofthestatute,andproperlydeclaredthattheirdeterminationmustbegivengreatweight,butwethenconcluded,afterthoroughconsideration,thattheirviewcouldnotbesustained.Wethinkitnotinappropriatenowtoaddawordonthatsubjectbeforecomingtothequestionimmediatelyunderreview.

Thepeople,bytheirConstitution,createdthreeseparate,distinct,independentandcoequaldepartmentsofgovernment.Thegovernmentalstructurerests,andwasintendedtorest,notuponanyoneoruponanytwo,butuponallthreeofthes

efundamentalpillars.Itseemsunnecessarytorepeatwhatsooftenhasbeensaid,thatthepowersofthesedepartmentsaredifferent,andaretobeexercisedindependently.ThedifferencesclearlyanddefinitelyappearintheConstitution.Eachofthedepartmentsisanagentofitscreator,andonedepartmentisnotandcannotbetheagentofanother.Eachisanswerabletoitscreatorforwhatitdoes,andnottoanotheragent.Theview,therefore,oftheExecutiveandofCongressthatanactisconstitutionalispersuasiveinahighdegree;butitisnotcontrolling.

Coming,then,toaconsiderationoftheWashingtonstatute,itfirstistobeobservedthatitisineverysubstantialrespectidenticalwiththestatuteinvolvedintheAdkinscase.Suchvicesasexistedinthelatterarepresentintheformer.AndiftheAdkinscasewasproperlydecided,aswewhojoininthisopinio

nthinkitwas,itnecessarilyfollowsthattheWashingtonstatuteisinvalid.

Insupportofminimumwagelegislationithasbeenurged,ontheonehand,thatgreatbenefitswillresultinfavorofunderpaidlabor,and,ontheotherhand,thatthedangerofsuchlegislationisthattheminimumwilltendtobecomethemaximum,andthusbringdownthe[p406]earningsofthemoreefficienttowardthelevelofthelessefficientemployees.Butwiththesespeculationswehavenothingtodo.Weareconcernedonlywiththequestionofconstitutionality.

ThattheclauseoftheFourteenthAmendmentwhichforbidsastatetodepriveany


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personoflife,libertyorpropertywithoutdueprocessoflawincludesfreedomofcontractissowellsettledastobenolongeropentoquestion.Norreasonablycanitbedisputedthatcontractsofemploymentoflaborareincludedintherule.Adairv.UnitedStates,208U.S.161,174-175;Coppagev.Kansas,236U.S.1,10,14.Inthefirstofthesecases,Mr.JusticeHarlan,speakingforthecourt,said,

Therightofapersontosellhislaboruponsuchtermsashedeemsproperis,initsessence,thesameastherightofthepurchaseroflabortoprescribetheconditionsuponwhichhewillacceptsuchlaborfromthepersonofferingtosell....Inallsuchparticulars,theemployerandemployeehaveequalityofright,andanylegislationthatdisturbsthatequalityisanarbitraryinterferencewiththelibertyofcontractwhichnogovernmentcanlegallyjustifyinafreeland.

IntheAdkinscase,wereferredtothislanguage,andsaidthat,whiletherewasnosuchthingasabsolutefreedomofcontract,butthatitwassubjecttoagreatvarietyofrestraints,nevertheless,freedomofcontractwasthegeneralrule,andrestrainttheexception,andthatthepowertoabridgethatfreedomcouldonlybejustifiedbytheexistenceofexceptionalcircumstances.Thisstatementoftherulehasbeenmanytimesaffirmed,andwedonotunderstandthatitisquestionedbythepresentdecision.

Wefurtherpointedoutfourdistinctclassesofcasesinwhichthiscourtfromt

imetotimehadupheldstatutoryinterferenceswiththelibertyofcontract.Theywere,inbrief,(1)statutesfixingratesandchargestobe[p407]exactedbybusinessesimpressedwithapublicinterest;(2)statutesrelatingtocontractsfortheperformanceofpublicwork;(3)statutesprescribingthecharacter,methodsandtimeforpaymentofwages,and(4)statutesfixinghoursoflabor.Itisthelastclassthathasbeenmostrelieduponasaffordingsupportforminimumwagelegislation,andmuchoftheopinionintheAdkinscase(261U.S.547-553)isdevotedtopointingouttheessentialdistinctionbetweenfixinghoursoflaborandfixingwages.Whatistheresaidneednotberepeated.Itisenoughforpresentpurposestosaythatstatutesoftheformerclassdealwithanincidentoftheemploymenthavingnonecessaryeffectuponwages.Thepartiesareleftfreetocontractaboutwages,andtherebyequalizesuchadditionalburdensasmaybeimposedupontheemployerasaresultoftherestrictionsastohoursbyanad

justmentinrespectoftheamountofwages.Thiscourt,whereverthequestionisadvertedto,hasbeencarefultodisclaimanypurposetoupholdsuchlegislationasfixingwages,andhasrecognizedanessentialdifferencebetweenthetwo.E.g.,Buntingv.Oregon,243U.S.426;Wilsonv.New,243U.S.332,345-346,353-354,andseeFreund,PolicePower,318.

Wethenpointedoutthatminimumwagelegislationsuchasthathereinvolveddoesnotdealwithanybusinesschargedwithapublicinterest,orwithpublicwork,orwithatemporaryemergency,orwiththecharacter,methodsorperiodsofwagepayments,orwithhoursoflabor,orwiththeprotectionofpersonsunderlegaldisability,orwiththepreventionoffraud.Itis,simplyandexclusively,alawfixingwagesforadultwomenwhoarelegallyascapableofcontractingforthemselvesasmen,andcannotbesustainedunlessuponprinciplesapartfromtho

seinvolvedincasesalreadydecidedbythecourt.

TwocaseswereinvolvedintheAdkinsdecision.Inoneofthem,itappearedthatawoman21yearsofage,[p408]whobroughtthesuit,wasemployedasanelevatoroperatoratafixedsalary.Herservicesweresatisfactory,andshewasanxioustoretainherposition,andheremployer,whilewillingtoretainher,wasobligedtodispensewithherservicesonaccountofthepenaltiesprescribedbytheact.Thewagesreceivedbyherwerethebestshewasabletoobtainforanyworkshewascapableofperforming,andtheenforcementoftheorderdeprivedher,asshealleged,notonlyofthatemployment,butleftherunabletosecureany


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positionatwhichshecouldmakealivingwithasgoodphysicalandmoralsurroundingsandasgoodwagesasshewasreceivingandwaswillingtotake.TheWashingtonstatute,ofcourse,admitsofthesamesituationandresult,and,foraughtthatappearstothecontrary,thesituationinthepresentcasemayhavebeenthesameasthatjustdescribed.Certainly,totheextentthatthestatuteappliestosuchcases,itcannotbejustifiedasareasonablerestraintuponthefreedomofcontract.Onthecontrary,itisessentiallyarbitrary.

NeitherthestatuteinvolvedintheAdkinscasenortheWashingtonstatute,sofarasitisinvolvedhere,hastheslightestrelationtothecapacityorearningpoweroftheemployee,tothenumberofhourswhichconstitutetheday'swork,thecharacteroftheplacewheretheworkistobedone,orthecircumstancesorsurroundingsof,heemployment.Thesolebasisuponwhichthequestionofvalidityrestsistheassumptionthattheemployeeisentitledtoreceiveasumofmoneysufficienttoprovidealivingforher,keepherinhealth,andpreservehermorals.And,aswepointedoutatsomelengthinthatcase(pp.555-557),thequestionthuspresentedforthedeterminationoftheboardcannotbesolvedbyanygeneralformulaprescribedbyastatutorybureau,sinceitisnotacomposite,butanindividual,questiontobeansweredforeachindividual,consideredbyherself.[p409]Whatwesaidfurtherinthatcase(pp.557-559),isequallyapplicablehere:

Thelawtakesaccountofthenecessitiesofonlyonepartytothecontract.Itignoresthenecessitiesoftheemployerbycompellinghimtopaynotlessthana

certainsumnotonlywhethertheemployeeiscapableofearningit,butirrespectiveoftheabilityofhisbusinesstosustaintheburden,generouslyleavinghim,ofcourse,theprivilegeofabandoninghisbusinessasanalternativeforgoingonataloss.Withinthelimitsoftheminimumsum,heisprecluded,underpenaltyoffineandimprisonment,fromadjustingcompensationtothedifferingmeritsofhisemployees.Itcompelshimtopayatleastthesumfixedinanyevent,becausetheemployeeneedsit,butrequiresnoserviceofequivalentvaluefromtheemployee.Itthereforeundertakestosolvebutone-halfoftheproblem.Theotherhalfistheestablishmentofacorrespondingstandardofefficiency,andthisformsnopartofthepolicyofthelegislation,althoughinpracticetheformerhalfwithoutthelattermustleadtoultimatefailure,inaccordancewiththeinexorablelawthatnoonecancontinueindefinitelytotakeoutmorethanheputsinwithoutultimatelyexhaustingthesupply.Thelawisnotconfinedtoth

egreatandpowerfulemployers,butembracesthosewhosebargainingpowermaybeasweakasthatoftheemployee.Ittakesnoaccountofperiodsofstressandbusinessdepression,ofcripplinglosseswhichmayleavetheemployerhimselfwithoutadequatemeansoflivelihood.Totheextentthatthesumfixedexceedsthefairvalueoftheservicesrendered,itamountstoacompulsoryexactionfromtheemployerforthesupportofapartiallyindigentperson,forwhoseconditionthererestsuponhimnopeculiarresponsibility,andtherefore,ineffect,arbitrarilyshiftstohisshouldersaburdenwhich,ifitbelongstoanybody,belongstosocietyasawhole.

Thefeatureofthisstatutewhich,perhapsmorethananyother,putsuponitthestampofinvalidityisthatit[p410]exactsfromtheemployeranarbitrarypaymentforapurposeanduponabasishavingnocausalconnectionwithhisbusines

s,orthecontract,ortheworktheemployeeengagestodo.Thedeclaredbasis,asalreadypointedout,isnotthevalueoftheservicerendered,buttheextraneouscircumstancethattheemployeeneedstogetaprescribedsumofmoneytoinsurehersubsistence,healthandmorals.Theethicalrightofeveryworker,manorwoman,toalivingwagemaybeconceded.Oneofthedeclaredandimportantpurposesoftradeorganizationsistosecureit.Andwiththatprincipleandwitheverylegitimateefforttorealizeit,infact,noonecanquarrel;butthefallacyoftheproposedmethodofattainingitisthatitassumesthateveryemployerisboundatalleventstofurnishit.Themoralrequirementimplicitineverycontractofemployment,viz.,thattheamounttobepaidandtheservicetober


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enderedshallbeartoeachothersomerelationofjustequivalence,iscompletelyignored.Thenecessitiesoftheemployeearealoneconsidered,andtheseariseoutsideoftheemployment,arethesamewhenthereisnoemployment,andasgreatinoneoccupationasinanother.Certainlytheemployer,bypayingafairequivalentfortheservicerendered,thoughnotsufficienttosupporttheemployee,hasneithercausednorcontributedtoherpoverty.Onthecontrary,totheextentofwhathepays,hehasrelievedit.Inprinciple,therecanbenodifferencebetweenthecaseofsellinglaborandthecaseofsellinggoods.Ifonegoestothebutcher,thebakerorgrocertobuyfood,heismorallyentitledtoobtaintheworthofhismoney,butheisnotentitledtomore.Ifwhathegetsisworthwhathepays,heisnotjustifiedindemandingmoresimplybecauseheneedsmore,andtheshopkeeper,havingdealtfairlyandhonestlyinthattransaction,isnotconcernedinanypeculiarsensewiththequestionofhiscustomer'snecessities.Shouldastatuteundertaketovestinacommission[p411]powertodeterminethequantityoffoodnecessaryforindividualsupportandrequiretheshopkeeper,ifheselltotheindividualatall,tofurnishthatquantityatnotmorethanafixedmaximum,itwouldundoubtedlyfallbeforetheconstitutionaltest.Thefallacyofanyargumentinsupportofthevalidityofsuchastatutewouldbequicklyexposed.Theargumentinsupportofthatnowbeingconsideredisequallyfallacious,thoughtheweaknessofitmaynotbesoplain.Astatuterequiringanemployertopayinmoney,topayatprescribedandregularintervals,topaythevalueoftheservicesrendered,eventopaywithfairrelationtotheextentofthebenefitobtainedfromtheservice,wouldbeunderstandable.Butastatutewhichprescribespaymentwithoutregardtoanyofthesethings,andsolelywit

hrelationtocircumstancesapartfromthecontractofemployment,thebusinessaffectedbyitandtheworkdoneunderit,issoclearlytheproductofanaked,arbitraryexerciseofpowerthatitcannotbeallowedtostandundertheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.

Whetherthiswouldbeequallyoratalltrueinrespectofthestatutesofsomeofthestateswearenotcalledupontosay.Theyarenotnowbeforeus,anditisenoughthatitappliesineveryparticulartotheWashingtonstatutenowunderconsideration.

TheWashingtonstatute,liketheonefortheDistrictofColumbia,fixesminimumwagesforadultwomen.Adultmenandtheiremployersareleftfreetobargainastheyplease,anditisasignificantandanimportantfactthatallstatestat

utestowhichourattentionhasbeencalledareoflikecharacter.Thecommonlawrulesrestrictingthepowerofwomentomakecontractshave,underoursystem,longsincepracticallydisappeared.Womentodaystanduponalegalandpoliticalequalitywithmen.Thereisnolongeranyreasonwhytheyshouldbeputindifferentclassesinrespectoftheirlegal[p412]righttomakecontracts;norshouldtheybedenied,ineffect,therighttocompetewithmenforworkpayinglowerwageswhichmenmaybewillingtoaccept.Anditisanarbitraryexerciseofthelegislativepowertodoso.IntheTipaldocase,298U.S.587,615,itappearedthattheNewYorklegislaturehadpassedtwominimumwagemeasures--onedealingwithwomenalone,theotherwithbothmenandwomen.Theactwhichincludedmenwasvetoedbythegovernor.Theother,applyingtowomenalone,wasapproved.The"factualbackground"inrespectofbothmeasureswassubstantiallythesame.Inpointingoutthearbitrarydiscriminationwhichresulted(pp.615-617)w

esaid:

Theselegislativedeclarations,informoffindingsorrecitalsoffact,servewelltoillustratewhyanymeasurethatdeprivesemployersandadultwomenoffreedomtoagreeuponwages,leavingemployersandmenemployeesfreesotodo,isnecessarilyarbitrary.Much,ifnotall,thatinthemissaidinjustificationoftheregulationsthattheActimposesinrespectofwomen'swagesapplieswithequalforceinsupportofthesameregulationofmen'swages.Whilemenareleftfreetofixtheirwagesbyagreementwithemployers,itwouldbefancifultosupposethattheregulationofwomen'swageswouldbeusefultopreventorlessen


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theevilslistedinthefirstsectionoftheAct.Meninneedofworkareaslikelyaswomentoacceptthelowwagesofferedbyunscrupulousemployers.Meningreaternumberthanwomensupportthemselvesanddependents,and,becauseofneed,willworkforwhateverwagestheycanget,andthatwithoutregardtothevalueoftheservice,andeventhoughthepayislessthanminimaprescribedinaccordancewiththisAct.Itisplainthat,undercircumstancessuchasthoseportrayedinthe"Factualbackground,"prescribingofminimumwagesforwomenalonewouldunreasonablyrestrainthem[p413]incompetitionwithmenandtendarbitrarilytodeprivethemofemploymentandafairchancetofindwork.

Anappealtotheprinciplethatthelegislatureisfreetorecognizedegreesofharm,andconfineitsrestrictionsaccordingly,isbuttobegthequestion,whichis,sincethecontractualrightsofmenandwomenarethesame,doesthelegislationhereinvolved,byrestrictingonlytherightsofwomentomakecontractsastowages,createanarbitrarydiscrimination?Wethinkitdoes.Differenceofsexaffordsnoreasonablegroundformakingarestrictionapplicabletothewagecontractsofallworkingwomenfromwhichlikecontractsofallworkingmenareleftfree.Certainlyasuggestionthatthebargainingabilityoftheaveragewomanisnotequaltothatoftheaveragemanwouldlacksubstance.Theabilitytomakeafairbargain,aseveryoneknows,doesnotdependuponsex.

If,inthelightofthefacts,thestatelegislation,withoutreasonorforreasonsofmereexpediency,excludedmenfromtheprovisionsofthelegislation,thepowerwasexercisedarbitrarily.Ontheotherhand,ifsuchlegislationinresp

ectofmenwasproperlyomittedonthegroundthatitwouldbeunconstitutional,thesameconclusionofunconstitutionalityisinescapableinrespectofsimilarlegislativerestraintinthecaseofwomen,261U.S.553.

Finally,itmaybesaidthatastatuteabsolutelyfixingwagesinthevariousindustriesatdefinitesumsandforbiddingemployersandemployeesfromcontractingforanyotherthanthosedesignatedwouldprobablynotbethoughttobeconstitutional.Itishardtoseewhythepowertofixminimumwagesdoesnotconnotealikepowerinrespectofmaximumwages.Andyet,ifbothpowersbeexercisedinsuchawaythattheminimumandthemaximumsonearlyapproacheachotherasto[p414]becomesubstantiallythesame,therighttomakeanycontractinrespectofwageswillhavebeencompletelyabrogated.

Documents

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