What if Al-Khalifa Fell?

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What if Al-Khalifa Fell? Repurcussions for the Saudi-U.S.-Iran Triangle

Kayvon Afshari

May 24, 2011



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he wave of uprisings in the Arab world has inspired millions, uprooted

fossilized dictatorships, and presented new paradigms and unique

challenges to the constituent states as well as external actors. In

particular, the ongoing instability in the tiny island Kingdom of Bahrain, nestled

between Saudi Arabia and Iran in terms of both geography and religion, is having

tremendous impacts on the foreign policies of the two neighboring states as well as

the United States. Given this dynamic and the high stakes involved, policy makers in

all three countries must be asking themselves: “What if al‐Khalifa fell?”

The prospect of a new Shia‐led Bahraini government will undoubtedly

benefit the soft power and leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran; it will greatly

harm the soft power and oil economy of Saudi Arabia, as well as increase Saudi

domestic instability; and it will present significant naval as well as democratization

challenges to the United States, which may calculate that a nuanced reorientation of

its Middle East foreign policy is necessary.

The fact that Saudi Arabia has sent 1,000 troops (along with 500 policemen

from the United Arab Emirates) and the United States has been inconsistently

circumspect in its Bahrain policy when compared to its Syria or Libya policies

indicates that the two states are hoping to avoid facing the “what if?” question. On

the other hand, Iran has attempted to deliver two humanitarian aid flotillas and has

held solidarity demonstrations in Tehran, indicating that hastening the new order is

in Iran’s interest. All three states would do well to prepare contingency plans

beforehand, rather than be caught off guard.

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Sources of Instability

The current rulers of Bahrain, the Sunni Al‐Khalifa family, have dealt with

sectarian instability between the country’s 70% majority Shias and minority Sunnis

for a long time. “Since Bahrain gained its independence in 1970, Shias have been

heavily involved in every coup attempt, street agitation, uprising, and reform

movement,” according to Iranian‐American professor and State Department advisor

Vali Nasr.1 The Bahraini Shia are essentially composed of three subgroups.

Al‐Baharnah are the original Arab Bahraini inhabitants who emigrated because of

religious and political persecution of the Abbasid and Umayyad rulership. There are

Bahraini Shia who immigrated to Bahrain in the nineteenth century from al‐Ihsa and

al‐Qatif to escape the rising Wahhabi movement. Finally, there are Bahraini Shia

known as ajam who came from Iran in several periods from Iran’s coastal areas.2

The Shia of Arabian origin make up about 95% of the Bahraini Shia.

The al‐Khalifa family, which has ruled Bahrain since 1783, exposed the Shia

to the “cruelest suppression” historically.3 The Shia wrote to the British political

resident in the Gulf region, “We beg to state to the possessor of great wisdom, the

chief of the Gulf, that the Shi'a community is in a state of great humiliation and

subject to public massacres. They have no refuge, the evidence of none of them is

1 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W. Norton &Company, 2006), 234.2 Falah al‐Mdaires, “Shi’ism and Political Protest in Bahrain,” Digest of Middle East Studies, Spring 2002, Vol. 11,Iss 1, pg, 21.3 Youssif al‐Hasan, Mawqfana Tigah al‐Haraka al‐Diniya fil‐Bahrain “Our Attitude Towards the ReligiousMovements in Bahrain,” An‐Nahj, No. 15, 1987, p.53



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accepted [in the courts], their properties are subject to plunder, and their selves

liable to maltreatment at any moment.”4

Decades later, the 1979 Islamic Revolution served as a watershed moment in

the history of Bahrain’s sectarian instability. Thousands of Bahraini Shia

demonstrated in support of Iran’s Islamic Revolution and Ayatollah Khomeinei,

raising slogans to overthrow the pro‐American conservative regimes in the region. 5

Soon enough, groups such as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB)

and others popped up, and Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq Rawhani, of the Islamic

Iranian Revolution in Bahrain, demanded an Islamic form of government and even

said that the previous withdrawal of Iran’s claim to Bahrain had been made by an

illegitimate regime and was therefore illegal.6 In 1981, the Bahraini government

revealed a coup attempt and accused the IFLB of being behind it, arresting 73

members. The IFLB denied any involvement and announced that the regime wanted

to use any reason to get rid of the religious movement. The group then transferred

its activities outside Bahrain to Beirut and Tehran.

While the government weathered the storm intact, the underlying forces of

instability remained. They popped up again following the Gulf War, when the

political arena saw a resurgence of opposition activity. In 1992, 300 prominent

figures demanded general elections for a National Council as well as other

4 al‐Mdaires , “ Shi’ism and Political Protest in Bahrain,” 22.5 Fred H. Lawson, Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy, (London: Westview Press, 1989), p. 124. JosephKostiner, Shi'a Unrest in the Gulf in: Martin Kramer, ed, Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution, (London: WestviewPress, 1987), p.178.6 Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’a Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism, (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1985), 273.



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democratic demands.7 The ruler refused, and instead arrested and exiled several

Shia leaders. These events coincided with 1994 protests of poor and politically

marginalized Bahraini Shias over a lack of jobs and rights.

Bahrain and Iran

Before turning to how Iran’s interests would be affected by a change in the

Bahraini government, one must understand the context of Iran‐Bahraini relations as

well as the quality and level of Shia connections between the two nation‐states.

Indeed, the extent to which Bahrain’s Shia population follows the Islamic Republic’s

guidance and leadership is a contentious issue open to debate. At one extreme,

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, likely motivated by a fear of a rising Iran,

referred to them in 2006 as an “Iranian fifth column.” On the other hand, Bahrain’s

Crown Prince responded by stating that they are not “willing agents and puppets of

a malevolent Shia regime in Iran,” again motivated by the same fear, but this time

clearly downplaying the sectarian links.

In fact, the population does look to the east for broad guidance and even

religious training, but does not wish for an Iranian intervention or occupation. The

religious links between Iran and Bahrain, which was previously the fourteenth

Iranian province, span centuries. When Iran’s Safavid Dynasty was founded in 1501,

they converted the majority of modern‐day Iran to Shi’ism. However, at this time

there were very few prominent native Iranian Twelver ulama.8 So, Iran’s rulers

brought Arab scholars from the two most significant centres of Shia learning in the

7 al‐Mdaires, “Shiism and Political Protest in Bahrain,” 348 Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, 108



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fifteenth century: from the Gulf coast including Bahrain, al‐Qatif, and al‐Ahsa as well

as from Jabal ‘Amil in south Lebanon.9 As new immigrants dependent on the

largesse of the state, they developed a symbiotic relationship with the temporal

rulers. Essentially, the state supported the ulama by enforcing Shi’ism on the

populace while the ulama supported the state and kept quiet about the

inconsistencies in the religious stance of the monarch.10

The Islamic Revolution also served to bring the two countries closer on

religious and doctrinal terms. From the seventeenth to nineteenth century, two

schools of Shi’ism, Akhbari and Usuli, competed for predominance.11 The Usulis

were the majority, and the Akhbaris were the minority and were found mostly in

Bahrain. According to Baha’i author and Islam expert Moojan Momen, “[In] essence,

the Akhbari movement was a rejection of the rationalist principles on which ijtihad

and the whole of Shi’i jurisprudence had come to be based.” Meanwhile, the majority

Usulis, through the use of ijtihad , can give a judgment on virtually any subject.12 It is

clear that the Usuli School ascribes greater power to the ulama, and therefore it is

not surprising that the Iranian Revolution, by politically empowering the ulama,

furthered the Usuli position, making it more popular in Bahrain in the 1980s among

previously Akhbari communities.13 Furthermore, during the years that Saddam

Hussein obstructed religious study in Najaf, many of Bahrain’s middle‐aged clerics

studied in Iran’s seminary city of Qom, creating greater religious links between the

9 Heinz Halm, Shi’ism, trans. Janet Watson and Marian Hill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 82.10 Momen, An Introduction To Shi’i Islam, 108‐109.11 Juan Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam (London: I.B. Tauris,2002), 58‐77.12 Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam 222.13 Nasr, The Shia Revival , 69.



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two countries religious establishments.14 Finally, Sheikh Issa Qassim, the country’s

most prominent Shia religious scholar and one who has occasionally endorsed the

concept of velayat e faqih , serves as the principal representative of Ayatollah

Khamenei in Bahrain.15

However, the ties that bind Iran and Bahrain are not limited to the religious

sphere. There are also strong transnational ethnic ties between the Persian ajami

population in Bahrain and their ethnic brethren across the Persian Gulf. As Dr.

Nelida Fuccaro of the School of Oriental and African Studies explains, “[the] islands

of Bahrain and the city of Manamah were the natural destinations of immigration

from Iran.” This economic immigrant population mostly came from the ports of

Bushehr, Bandar ‘Abbas and Lingah. In 1900 a new Persian customs administration

was established in the ports, and as a result many mercantile communities relocated

to avoid the new fiscal regime.16 These groups relocated to Manamah and its

expanding economy, which spawned after the end of the civil strife of the 1840s.17

Throughout the twentieth century, the Bahraini Sheikh struggled to bring this

Persian community under his jurisdiction. In 1937, the government issued the

Nationality and Property Laws, which “introduced modern notions of citizenship

and restricted the right of ownership of immovable property to Bahraini

14 “US embassy cables: Bahrain’s relations with Iran,” The Guardian, February 15, 2011,http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us‐embassy‐cables‐documents/164906 15 Katja Niethammer, “Votes in Parliament, Debates in Majalis, and Banners on Streets: Avenues of PoliticalParticipation in Bahrain, European University Institute Rober Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (2006): 10.16 Nelida Fuccaro “Mapping the Transnational Community: Persians and the space of the city in Bahrain, c.1869‐1937,” Transnational connections and the Arab Gulf (2005): 45.17 Ibid, 45.



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nationals.”18 Finally, the government attempted to deal with its ‘Persian problem’ by

asking them to renounce their political allegiance to Iran in exchange for the

maintenance of their domestic assets. Among the community, many applied for

naturalization, others transferred property to their sons without adopting Bahraini

citizenship themselves, and the ones who maintained close contacts with Iran

simply auctioned their properties and went back to their homeland.19

Interestingly, most ajamis opted for Bahrain’s independence under its Arab

al‐Khalifa ruling family in 1971, and when Bahrain was released from British

control, Iran relinquished her historical claim to the island in exchange for

sovereignty over three other islands (Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb) it

claimed.20 The ajami independence decision suggests that despite the strong

kinship, ethnic, and sectarian ties to Iran, the Bahraini Persians by 1970 had no

desire to be a part of the Iranian government.

Persian Red Herring

While Iranian claims to Bahrain have officially ceased (despite occasional

ownership claims by Iran’s contrarians21), the Bahraini government as well as other

conservative Arab regimes have repeatedly employed the Iranian threat as a

red‐herring to fend off calls for political reform. This trend seems to have begun in

the 1990s, as Nasr writes that the “government of Bahrain repeatedly dismissed

18 Fuccaro, “Mapping the Transnational Community,” 53.19 Ibid, 53.20 Ibid, 39.21 “Iran and Bahrain,” VOA News, February 18, 2010. http://www.voanews.com/a‐41‐2007‐07‐23‐voa5‐84658192.html



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calls for political reform by labeling them as Shia plots.”22 Furthermore, this

scapegoat dynamic continues today, as Rand Corporation’s Middle East specialist

and former Vice‐Chair of the National Intelligence Council Graham Fuller writes, “It

is a quick and easy way to gain Washington’s sympathy… Invocation of the Iran

threat to trump long‐overdue political change is simply cynical.”23

Indeed, the question of whether Iran’s long hand directs Bahrain’s opposition

and works to subvert the government’s stability is an interesting one, subject to

much debate as well as speculation. However, thanks to a State Department cable

from 2008 leaked by WikiLeaks, we may have some indication behind‐the‐scenes

that the U.S. government believed at the time that the subversion claims were

overblown and politically‐motivated:

Bahraini government officials sometimes privately tell U.S. official visitorsthat some Shi'a oppositionists are backed by Iran. Each time this claim israised, we ask the GOB to share its evidence. To date, we have seen noconvincing evidence of Iranian weapons or government money here since at

least the mid‐1990s…In post's assessment, if the GOB [Government of Bahrain] had convincing evidence of more recent Iranian subversion, it would quickly share it with us.24

Furthermore, most of the available research and intelligence suggests that

the ongoing demonstrations are not being directed by Iran either. In an email to The

Gulf/2000 Project, Middle East expert William Beeman wrote that two U.S. Military

Intelligence agents (both fluent in Arabic and Persian, and former students of Ray

Motaheddeh and Juan Cole) flatly denied to him that Iran had any agents on the

ground in Bahrain, based on their own extensive investigations in February and

22 Nasr, The Shia Revival , 156.23 Graham Fuller, e‐mail message to Gulf/2000 Project, “Iran in Bahrain?” March 23, 2011.24 “US embassy cables: Bahrain's relations with Iran.”



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March.25 Finally, U.S. officials told the Wall Street Journal that they don’t see Iran as

the driving force behind the popular revolts, and caution that they have no concrete

evidence that Iran is providing or preparing large‐scale financial or military support

to opposition elements in Bahrain. “[Iranian] aspirations far outpace their ability to

project their influence into these places,” an administration official said.26

In fact, the Obama administration seems to be taking some steps to avoid

unleashing Iran’s potential soft power in the island kingdom. The administration

repeatedly pressed Saudi Arabia and Bahrain not to use force against largely Shia

protestors, fearing that this would provide Iran with an excuse to begin meddling

inside the country.27 Under Iran’s religious code, Iran has an obligation to protect

the rights of Shias around the world.

Despite all of this, it is also untrue that Iranian aspirations have not led to any

attempts at influencing Bahrain’s events on the ground. In particular, Tehran has

attempted twice to send a humanitarian aid flotilla (similar to the Turkish flotillas

sent to Israel) to Bahrain, only to be turned away before reaching the shore.

According to the pro‐Bahraini government Gulf Daily newspaper, former member of

Bahrain’s parliament Nasser al‐Fadhala said, “Iran should stop interfering in our

country’s issues. By sending this aid flotilla to Bahrain they are highlighting

their propaganda to support those people, who failed to overthrow our regime.”28

25 William O. Beeman, e‐mail message to Gulf/200 Project, “Tehran Rising,” May 19, 201126 Adam Entous and Matthew Rosenberg, “US Says Iran Helps Crackdown in Syria,” The Wall Street Journal , April14, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704547804576261222747330438.html 27 Ibid.28 “IRAN: Tensions increase as second Iranian Flotilla to Bahrain is Blocked,” Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2011,http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/05/iran‐flotilla‐turned‐back‐as‐.html



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Additionally, the Iranian Foreign Ministry recently hosted Bahraini

dissident Saeed Alshabi for a seminar addressing the uprising in Bahrain, during

which he accused Western nations, Saudi and Jordanian monarchies of

collaborating to suppress pro‐democracy protests.29 Also, more than 1,000 Iranians

recently took part in an officially‐sanctioned protest against the ruling family and

its Western allies. The protestors in Tehran shouted, “Death to al‐Khalifa in

Bahrain” and “Death to America.”30 And in an attempt to further highlight the

situation, Iran’s English television news station Press TV aired a documentary

broadcasting footage of Bahrain’s desecrated Shia mosques and Hussainiyas, and

equated the Saudi intervention with the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian

Territories.31

Still, even if Iran’s hand in Bahrain is limited and if the ongoing protests are

popular, grass‐roots protest in nature, there are undeniably some political links

between the Islamic Republic and Bahrain’s opposition parties and leaders. In an

email from New America Foundation Research Fellow Barak Barfi, he writes that

the leaders of the Islamic Action Society [AMAL] have ties with both Iranian

officials and Iraq‐based clerics linked to Tehran’s mullahs. He also describes ties

between the al‐Wifaq party and Tehran:

29 “The Uprising in Bahrain is a Reforming Uprising,” Islamic Republic News Agency, May 16, 2011.30 “IRAN: Protestors slam Bahrain’s royal family, U.S. for crackdown on dissidents,” Los Angeles Times, March 18,2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/03/iran‐bahrain‐libya‐tehran‐protests‐islam‐religion.html 31 Derek Henry Flood, “The Island at the Center of the World: The Silencing of Bahrain's Crisis,” The JamestownFoundation, March 12, 2011,http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37921&cHash=0d79d119d921596caa9cde1f71d25177



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Even the mainstream opposition group al‐Wifaq has some relationship toIran. Ali Salman, who heads the bloc, studied in Qom in the early 1990s, asdid a number of other mid‐level clerics who turned to political activism.

Al‐Wifaq parliamentarians I know often travel to Iran and maintain cordialties with the clerical class there.32

Gregory Gause, a political science professor and Gulf specialist, also argues

that there is some ideological affinity between more extreme groups in the Shia

community and Iran, because they have raised the Hezbollah flag as well as pictures

of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at previous rallies.33 He also points out that the

Bahrain Freedom Movement of the 1990s had Iranian connections, and that some of

its leaders were in exile in Iran.

34

Finally, Gause writes that hypothetically “even if

none of the Shia opposition groups have any ties at all to Iran organizationally or

ideologically, they would undoubtedly look to Iran for support if they were to come

to power, just on pure balance of power logic.”35 Since Saudi Arabia would be their

enemy, they would naturally seek out Iranian support to balance the Saudis.

What if al Khalifa Fell?

For Iran, the prospect of a Shia‐led neighbor government in Bahrain is an

enticing one, and must be viewed in the context of Iran’s historic quest for regional

hegemony. Regional primacy has been the norm rather than the exception for Iran

in its 3,000‐year history.36 The Persian Empire stretched from Libya in the west to

Ethiopia in the south, Bulgaria in the north, and India in the East. Well aware of its

vast natural resources, unique geostrategic position, vibrant culture, and large

32 Barak Barfi, e‐mail message to Gulf/2000 Project, “Iran in Bahrain?” March 21, 2011.33 Gregory Gause, e‐mail message to Gulf/2000 Project, “Iran in Bahrain?” March 21, 201134 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 2007): 39.



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population, Iran has consistently aspired to serve the role of primus inter pares in

regional politics.37

Today, Iran is the leading military force in the Persian Gulf. Despite the

apparent technological sophistication of the Gulf states’ militaries, they are “shells,”

while Iran’s is not.38 However, despite this military preponderance, Iran has learned

that hard power alone will not lead to regional leadership. Soft power is needed to

achieve that goal, and Iran’s revolutionaries sought to bridge the Sunni‐Shia and

Arab‐Persian divide through the ideology of political Islam.39 As such, Iran’s claim to

regional leadership was and is based on its ability to tap into the frustration of the

Arab street over perceived injustices such as the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict as well

as domestic political issues and frustration with governments such as the al‐Khalifa

ruling family.

With regard to soft power and regional standing, regime change in Bahrain

would be a win for Iran, as its articulation for the rights of Bahrain’s Shias will have

come to fruition. And as Gregory Gause pointed out, any Shia led government in

Bahrain would undoubtedly look to Iran for support. While it is very unlikely to

mimic the Islamic system of governance and install the concept of velayat‐e‐faqih, it

would nevertheless move closer to the Iranian sphere of influence. The message

37 R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1988), ch. 2.38 George Friedman, “Bahrain and the Battle Between Iran and Saudi Arabia,” Stratfor , March 8, 2011,http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110307‐bahrain‐and‐battle‐between‐iran‐and‐saudi‐arabia 39 Trita Parsi and Reza Marashi, “Special Report: The Geopolitical Battle for the Arab Street,” The Cairo Review of

Global Affairs, May 16, 2011, http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=56



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across the Arab street will be that the Riyadh‐Washington alliance is fading in the

face of a rising Iran, bolstered by the soft power of fighting injustice.

Also, in the context of the proverbial Shia Revival, outlined in Vali Nasr’s

2006 book, this would be a very significant win for Shias across the Middle East, of

whom Iran is the loudest spokesman. An event of this magnitude, coupled with the

fall of Saddam Hussein as well as the rise of the Shia majority in Iraq and Lebanon,

would further validate the premise of a Shia Revival and would inspire dispossessed

Shia across the Arab world.

In terms of Iran’s domestic politics, Bahraini regime change would likely be a

political win for Iran’s hardliners and powerful Revolutionary Guards, who believe

in the original foreign policy of the Islamic Revolution, namely to “export” the

Revolution. Whether the new Bahraini government is Islamic in nature or not, this

would still be interpreted as a win for the Revolution’s foreign policy, as a Shia

majority who were previously oppressed by a conservative American and

Saudi‐backed ruling family gained representation.

Despite the fact that most of the Iranian gains will be in the realm of soft

power, there are concrete hard power benefits as well. Most importantly, Manama

and Tehran have been in talks for several years about the expanded development of

the South Pars gas field. Iran’s former Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki

described the deal, saying, “According to agreements, Bahrain will invest in South

Pars phases and Iran will take part in Bahrain's refining and petrochemical



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industries, and finally Iran's gas will be exported to Bahrain.”40 Iran’s Deputy Oil

Minister Javed Oji told Iran’s semi‐official news agency “If [a South Pars deal is]

finalized, a new natural gas pipeline will be built under the Persian Gulf waters; the

pipeline is expected to transfer one billion cubic feet of Iran's gas to Bahrain.”41

However, since the initial agreement was signed in 2008, intermittent

ethno‐religious tension has gotten in the way of a long‐lasting agreement on the

South Pars gas field. According to the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington‐based

think tank that writes on issues of strategic importance to the United States, “[the]

potential of the massive deposits in South Pars could have massive mutual economic

benefits for both parties if they can put their sectarian differences aside long enough

to finalize an agreement.”42 Clearly then, a Shia‐led Bahraini government with

strong ethno‐sectarian ties to Iran would find a much more amenable environment

for negotiating a mutually‐beneficial energy agreement such as the ongoing one

regarding South Pars. Partially economically‐isolated by unilateral and multilateral

sanctions legislation, this would be a huge hard power win for the Islamic Republic

of Iran.

Beyond potential cooperative energy deals, Iran stands to gain from

increased trade with its neighbor. According to published Ministry of Finance

figures noted in a leaked US embassy cable, bilateral trade remained constant at

only $108 million in 2006 and 2007, accounting for less than 1% of Bahrain’s total

40 “Bahrain‐Iran gas deal ‘soon,’” Gulf Daily News, June 30, 2010 http://www.gulf‐daily‐news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=281299 41 “Minister: Iran, Bahrain to Finalize Gas Deal Soon,” Fars News Agency , September 5, 2010.42 Flood, “The Island at the Center of the World.”



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trade.43 In contrast, bilateral trade with the United States reached $1.2 billion in

2007, behind the European Union and Saudi Arabia. Because of Iran’s size as well as

the close proximity and shared body of water, it is very likely that a Shia‐led Bahrain

would have closer economic ties to Iran, likely at the expense of economic ties with

Saudi Arabia.

Finally, because of the zero‐sum triangular game that has defined the rivalry

between the Riyadh‐Washington vertices and the Tehran vertex, losses for the

United States or Saudi Arabia must be viewed as relative gains for Iran, and visa

versa.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Although Saudi Arabia’s government continues to look relatively stable

compared to those of their brethren in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria,

behind the scenes the royal family is facing some stark prospects. They strongly

objected to the US support for the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts because they

feared that their American ally might “betray” them if they faced similar widespread

demonstrations. According to Trita Parsi and Reza Marashi, Iran experts at the

National Iranian American Council, “Saudi Arabia drew a line in the sand as the

winds of change swept through neighboring Bahrain.”44 The prospect of a Shia‐led

government or even a power sharing agreement in the island connected by the King

Fahd causeway was so threatening to the House of Saud that they flatly rejected

43 US embassy cables: Bahrain's relations with Iran, The Guardian. 44 Trita Parsi and Reza Marashi, “Special Reporter: The Geopolitical Battle for the Arab Street.”





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Islamic scholar who laid the core principals for Wahhabism, Shi’ism was an impure

form of Islam. According to him, good leadership began with the ascent to power

(showkat ), and because Shia imams were unable to win power, that made them ipso

facto unworthy of having it.46 Additionally, Wahhabism, which refers to Shia as

Rafida (a pejorative term meaning “rejectionists”), objects to any notion of a

mediating authority between man and God as being untrue to the original Islamic

essence. Therefore, they view the Shia as idolaters because of the extent to which

they revere Shia Imams like Imam Hussein. This hatred became so vitriolic that in

1802, Wahhabi armies stormed Karbala and desecrated the shrine of Imam Hussein.

This Wahhabi stream of vehemently anti‐Shia sentiment is hardly a remnant

of the past. In 2004, after 143 Shias were killed in Iraq while commemorating

Ashoura, a Kuwaiti Wahhabi cleric condemned the holy day as the “biggest display

of heathens and idolatry,” and accused the Shia of plotting to assassinate Sunni

leaders, foment strife across the region, grab the Gulf’s oil, and form an axis of evil

with Washington and Tel Aviv.47 Nor is the sentiment confined to rhetoric. In the

early 1990s, Abdullah bin Abd al‐Rahman al‐Jibrin, then a member of the Higher

Council of Ulama, condoned and even mandated the killing of Shia. As late as 2002, a

leading Saudi Arabia‐based charity circulated a pamphlet slandering the Shi’a as

apostates and called for efforts to “get rid of their evil.” 48

Despite anti‐Shi’ism in Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom still maintains a 10‐15%

Shia population, who mostly live in the oil‐rich Eastern Province, in al‐Hasa and

46 Nasr, The Shia Revival , 96.47 “The History of Shia Muslims: Why the aggravation?” The Economist , March 4, 2004,48 Toby Jones, “The Iraq Effect in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Report 237 (Winter 2005): 24.



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Qatif. Because the Saudis fear that Shia success in Bahrain will inspire its own Shia

citizens to rise up, they have a strong incentive to maintain stability in their island

neighbor, and avoid the “what if?” question at all costs. The stakes are particularly

high for Saudi Arabia because any Eastern Province Shia protests could disrupt the

production and supply of oil, the bedrock of their economy. 49 The Shias of Eastern

Province have protested against political and economic inequality in the past, and so

the Royal Family is cognizant of this threat to their domestic stability.

Beyond its own domestic stability, the issue of oil trade between the two

countries is of great importance to Saudi Arabia, according to Anthony J. Cordesman,

a strategy expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The tiny island nation is too close to the kingdom’s mainland, its key oilfacilities and tanker routes for Saudi Arabia‐‐and the United States‐‐toaccept Iranian influence or Shiite control in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia built theKing Fahd causeway between Bahrain and the Saudi mainland largely toensure the island’s security against internal upheavals or Iranian threats.50

He adds that, “[for] decades, Saudi Arabia has also supplied Bahrain’s

refinery with 85 percent of its oil. The two countries share output produced from

the offshore Abu Safa oil field. Bahrain gets most of the benefits, while Saudi

Arabia controls the field.51

Clearly, Saudi Arabia has determined that the stability of the al‐Khalifa

ruling family in Bahrain is in its vital interest. For the purposes of its Sunni

49 Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, “Challenges for Saudi Arabia amidst Protests in the Gulf,” March 25, 2011, Institutefor Defense Studies & Analyses,http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChallengesforSaudiArabiaamidstProtestsintheGulf_pkpradhan_250311 50 Anthony J. Cordesman, “Iranian and Saudi Competition in the Gulf,” United States Institute for Peace, April 27,2011, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/apr/27/iranian‐and‐saudi‐competition‐gulf .51 Cordesman, “Iranian and Saudi Competition in the Gulf.”



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leadership, Wahhabi anti‐Shi’ism, its own domestic political stability, as well as its

oil stability and trade, Saudi Arabia concluded that sending in troops to crush the

opposition was necessary. The prospect of democracy, political reform, and Shia

power in its neighbor is simply too much for the House of Saud to stomach.

The United States of America

The United States also finds the Bahrain situation challenging, although not

nearly as insurmountable as Saudi Arabia. It is these unique challenges of Bahrain,

despite its small population and size, which have led American officials to be

relatively circumspect in their statements, when compared to statements on the

Libyan or Syrian uprisings. Indeed, part of this strategy is motivated by the strong

US‐Saudi relationship, and a desire to keep its oil partner happy after

disagreements regarding the American approach to the Tunisian and Egyptian

unrest. However, the United States also has its own unilateral interests in

maintaining Bahraini stability.

The most concrete American interest is maintaining the presence of the

U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, which brings with it several thousand onshore personnel

and dependents, about 30 warships, and roughly 30,000 sailors. As Associate

Professors Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon explain, the Fifth Fleet patrols

the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, the western part of the Indian Ocean, and the

Persian Gulf, ensuring that sea‐lanes remain open, protecting the flow of oil,

conducting anti‐piracy operations, and acting as a check against Iran's regional



20

influence.52 In addition to this, Bahrain hosts the United States’ Naval Forces

Central Command, and offers U.S. forces the Isa Air Base and space at Bahrain

International Airport. In exchange, the United States pays a $6.7 million annual

lease, and provides Bahrain with military aid ($18 million in 2010) as well as

security pledges.53 A Shia‐led Bahraini government that looks to Iran for support

would be less inclined to host such a large U.S. Navy presence charged with

checking Iranian regional power. In recent years, satellite television, blogs, and

social media have made it harder to keep the presence of U.S. bases around the

world quiet, and Bahraini regime change would certainly metastasize that trend.

“From Ecuador to Japan to Kyrgyzstan, U.S. military bases have quickly become

sources of contention when opposition leaders and activists politicize the U.S.

presence,” the authors write.54

Ronald E. Neumann, who served as U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain until 2004,

speculated in an email about the relocation options for the United States if a Fifth

Fleet exodus took place. “The costs in time, money and effectiveness to moving are

very high,” he wrote. He added that it is possible that Oman might let the United

States use Masirah Island, but that “we would be unlikely to enjoy the same

freedom of action we have in Bahrain.”55 He wrote that he would not be surprised

52 Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, “The Arab Spring and America’s Military Bases,” Foreign Affairs, April5, 2011. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid.55 Ronald E. Neumann, e‐mail message to Gulf/2000 Project, “Relocation Costs and Issues,” May 8, 2011.



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if the relocation costs ran into the billions of dollars, and added that building at

Bahrain took many years and that recreating would take a similar amount of time.

While the United States is most concerned about its base and the regional

hard power it ensures, it is also worried about spillover effects in nearby Iraq. In

particular, large‐scale solidarity protests among Iraq’s Shia majority, which has

close religious ties to Bahrain’s Shia, could complicate U.S. plans for withdrawing

troops from Iraq this year.56

The Obama administration also faces the interrelated challenges of a

repression implication as well as a democratization challenge. Even though

American officials maintain that they were informed of Riyadh’s intervention

decision but were not consulted about it, the perception of U.S. complicity in the

crackdown remains. Rumors are circulating that the United States condoned Saudi

intervention as a quid pro quo for Riyadh’s support of the no‐fly zone over Libya.57

In addition, if the Bahraini security forces used American military hardware and

equipment to violently crush protests, the repression implication will prove salient

to a new Shia‐led government. In March, the Daily Mail reported that the State

Department details recent sales of U.S. defense items to Bahrain at $88 million.

The United States authorized $18,000 in tear gas for Bahrain in 2008, but did not

license it in 2009, according to the figures.58 Washington has recently launched an

56 Entous and Rosenberg, “U.S. Says Iran Helps Crackdown in Syria.”57 Cooley and Nexon, “The Arab Spring and America’s Military Bases.”58 “Obama administration approved $40billion in private arms sales to countries including Libya and Egypt,” The

Daily Mail , March 12, 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article‐1365523/Obama‐administration‐approved‐40billion‐private‐arms‐sales‐countries‐including‐Libya‐Egypt.html



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investigation into the conduct of the Bahraini security services, the results of

which could further validate the perception of the American repression

implication on the Bahraini street.59 Either way, articles by Iran’s Press TV with

titles like “Quick Facts: US arms used against democracy” will remain.60

Finally, the broadest challenge for the United States in this time of turmoil,

and one that can only be navigated by frequently asking “what if al‐Khalifa fell,” is

the democratization dilemma. On the one hand, both the Bush and Obama

administrations have pushed a concerted democratization campaign in the Middle

East, arguing that it is a necessary step towards stability, Middle East peace, and

economic progress. However, the contradiction in this policy is that the

implementation of a democratic ideal such as representation in the case of Bahrain

will undoubtedly empower the Shia, which could work against U.S. interests and

in favor of Iranian interests for all of the reasons outlined above. Bahrain

represents the ideal case of the familiar task of weighing U.S. interests with values

in the Middle East.

Faced with this looming inconsistency, Obama administration officials have

spoken more about establishing universal red lines, such as non‐violence, and

helping all parties in their attempts to master the democratic process. Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton said she rejects the accusation of inconsistency. “We live in

the real world, and there are lots of countries that we deal with because we have

59 Cooley and Nexon, “The Arab Spring and America’s Military Bases.”60“Quick Facts: US arms used against democracy,” Press TV , March 13, 2011,http://www.presstv.ir/usdetail/169760.html



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interests in common,” she said. “We do business with a lot of countries whose

economic systems or political systems are not ones we would design or choose to

live under. We encourage consistently, both publicly and privately, reform and the

protection of human rights.”61

Nonetheless, whether or not the al‐Khalifa government falls will be out of

the hands of the United States. It will depend on a maelstrom of factors from how

strongly the dispossessed masses assert their rights to how long the Bahraini and

Saudi troops are willing to react violently. However, the ‘antebellum’ American

approach will have significant repercussions for future relations with Bahrain,

whether it is al‐Khalifa led or otherwise. Essentially, if the United States plays the

stability over democracy card, then a potentially Shia‐led state would resent the

Americans even more for standing up for injustice against the tide of history. On

the other hand, if the Obama administration emphasizes democracy over stability

and the ruling family weathers the storm, then both Bahraini and Saudi officials

would be furious at the United States for “abandoning” Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain

under pressure.

At the moment, the administration seems to be, perhaps adroitly, playing a

hedging strategy. However, it would be wise to continually ask itself “what if

al‐Khalifa fell?” and to have contingency strategies in place should the situation on

the ground swing one way or the other.

61 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Danger: Falling Tyrants,” The Atlantic Monthly , June 2011.



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Conclusion

The significance of the Bahrain situation should not be dismissed. Despite

the tiny island’s small population and feeble leadership at the regional level,

Bahrain serves as a table where the Saudi, American, and Iranian players are forced

to show their cards. The decisions of the United States and Saudi Arabia have

clearly revealed themselves as regional status quo powers, while Iran’s moves have

been those of a revisionist state. Yet, while Saudi Arabia is heavily invested in the

status quo, the United States’ regional strategy is capable of fundamental shifts to

withstand the impact of Bahraini regime change.

Essentially, the greatest step toward a forward‐thinking regional strategy for

the both sides is to liberate themselves from the zero‐sum nature that has defined

US‐Iran relations. This step underscores the benefits of the “grand bargain,” Iran’s

2003 proposal to resolve all outstanding issues. Essentially, the prospect of

Bahrain’s “what if” question, like the nuclear issue, demonstrates that the costs of

non‐normalization as well as the benefits of normalization are gradually becoming

greater and more pronounced.62

While on the surface and on the ground, the interests of United States of

America and the Islamic Republic of Iran seem to be inherently irreconcilable, the

broader trends can actually move the two governments toward a tipping point of

normalization. For the United States, the increased benefits of rapprochement

62 See the author’s article in the 2011 Journal of Political Inquiry, entitled “Nuclear Normalization:Rapprochement with an Atomic Iran,” http://jpi‐nyu.org/wp‐content/uploads/2011/02/Nuclear‐Normalization‐Rapprochement‐with‐a‐Nuclear‐Iran.pdf



would include the ensured presence of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, less instability in Iraq,

the reigning in of Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as the diminished possibilities of

Iran creating a nuclear weapon in breach of its Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty

obligations. For Iran’s government, normal relations with the United States would

lessen fears of regime change, secure Iran’s right to produce nuclear power

including uranium enrichment, as well as gradually remove economically‐choking

unilateral and multilateral sanctions legislation.

Undoubtedly, diplomacy after thirty years of institutionalized enmity will

make this process extremely difficult. Yet both states have an increasingly great

deal to gain from successful negotiations, and an increasingly great deal to lose

from continued hostility. With the stakes rising in Bahrain and in other arenas, the

strategic calculus of both sides will shift toward normalization. While leaders in

both countries are certainly asking themselves “what if al‐Khalifa fell,” perhaps the

grand statesmen should ask themselves “what if we had a rapprochement?”

Documents

What if Al-Khalifa Fell?