18
Chapter 16 What Should Central Banks Do? Monetary Policy Goals, Strategy, and Tactics

What Should Central Banks Do? Monetary Policy Goals ...syeda/ec3313/Ch16.pdf · Chapter 16 What Should Central Banks Do? Monetary Policy Goals, Strategy, and Tactics

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Chapter 16

What Should Central Banks Do? Monetary PolicyGoals, Strategy, and Tactics

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-2

The Price Stability Goal

• Low and stable inflation• Inflation

Creates uncertainty and difficulty inplanning for futureLowers economic growthStrains social fabric

• Nominal anchor• Time-inconsistency problem

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-3

Other Goals of Monetary Policy

• High employment

• Economic growth

• Stability of financial markets

• Interest-rate stability

• Foreign exchange market stability

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-4

Should Price Stability be thePrimary Goal?

• In the long run there is no conflict between the goals

• In the short run it can conflict withthe goals of high employment and interest-rate stability

• Hierarchical mandate

• Dual mandate

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-5

Monetary Targeting

• Flexible, transparent, accountable

• AdvantagesAlmost immediate signals help fix inflation expectations and produce less inflationAlmost immediate accountability

• DisadvantagesMust be a strong and reliable relationshipbetween the goal variable and the targeted monetary aggregate

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-6

Inflation Targeting I

• Public announcement of medium-term numerical target for inflation

• Institutional commitment to price stability as the primary, long-run goal of monetary policy and a commitment to achieve the inflation goal

• Information-inclusive approach in which many variables are used in making decisions

• Increased transparency of the strategy• Increased accountability of the central bank

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-7

Inflation Targeting II

• AdvantagesDoes not rely on one variable to achieve targetEasily understoodReduces potential of falling intime-inconsistency trapStresses transparency and accountability

• DisadvantagesDelayed signalingToo much rigidityPotential for increased output fluctuationsLow economic growth during disinflation

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-8

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-9

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-10

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-11

Implicit Nominal Anchor

• Forward looking and preemptive• Advantages

Uses many sources of informationAvoids time-inconsistency problemDemonstrated success

• DisadvantagesLack of transparency and accountabilityStrong dependence on the preferences, skills, and trustworthiness of individuals in chargeInconsistent with democratic principles

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-12

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-13

Tactics: Choosing the Policy Instrument

• ToolsOpen market operationReserve requirementsDiscount rate

• Policy instrument (operating instrument)Reserve aggregatesInterest ratesMay be linked to an intermediate target

• Interest-rate and aggregate targets are incompatible

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-14

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-15

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-16

Criteria for Choosing the Policy Instrument

• Observability and Measurability• Controllability• Predictable effect on Goals

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-17

The Taylor Rule, NAIRU, and the Phillips Curve

Federal funds rate target =inflation rate+ equilibrium real fed funds rate

+1/2 (inflation gap)+1/2 (output gap)

• An inflation gap and an output gapStabilizing real output is an important concernOutput gap is an indicator of future inflation as shown by Phillips curve

• NAIRURate of unemployment at which there is no tendency for inflation to change

Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 16-18