Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
What Triggers the Use of the ECI?
The Role of Benefits, Values and Efficacy
Anna Kandyla Department of Political and Social Sciences
European University Institute Florence [email protected]
Sergiu Gherghina
Department of Political Science Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Please do not cite!
Abstract The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) aspires to encourage cit izens to participate in European Union (EU) policy-making processes. Yet, only isolated studies have examined the factors that shape the likelihood of using the ECI from the perspective of the citizens. Literature on political participation indicates that both utilitarian and value-based considerations related to democratic norms drive political activity. This study discusses the applicability of these theories to the case of the ECI and additionally considers the role of external and internal political efficacy in motivating its use by citizens. The paper develops a model that identifies value-based considerations, personal benefits from EU membership and political efficacy as key determinants of the willingness to use the ECI. The model is tested with survey data from two Eurobarometer waves for all Member States. Results indicate a strong tendency of EU citizens to be driven by interests in using the ECI and confirm that perceptions of efficacy motivate participation.
Paper prepared for the 2016 ECPR General Conference
Prague, 7-11 September 2016
1
1. Introduction
The potential of instruments for direct citizen participation in European Union (EU) policy-
making processes lies at the core of debates on democratizing the Union (Beck & Grande,
2007; Conrad, 2011; Meny, 2003). One of the ideas put forward in this respect was to give
European citizens the right of legislative initiative. In 2009, with the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon, the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) was established, creating for the first
time an instrument for citizens of the Member States (MS) to request the European
Commission (EC) to introduce a legislative proposal on an issue on matters under the
competence of the EU.
The ECI is an agenda-setting instrument with no binding effect. From an institutional
perspective, however, it is important since it endorses officially a form of direct citizen
participation at the EU level beyond the representative channel. Originating in demands for
democratizing the EU through bottom-up citizen involvement (Kaufmann, 2012, pp. 229–
237), expectations that the ECI has the potential to motivate and enhance citizen
participation in policy-making have been voiced by politicians, commentators and academics
(Conrad, 2011; Knaut & Keller, 2012; Monaghan, 2012). Crucially, although scholarly interest
in the ECI is vivid, little is known about who is likely to use the ECI and why. This study
contributes to these debates by examining what motivates citizens to use the ECI.
The extant individual-level research on the ECI indicates that positive views of the
EU and its institutions are associated with the intention to use this instrument (Kentmen-Cin
2014). In this study, we extend these findings by examining the role played by evaluations of
the EU in terms of benefits and values in motivating participation. Earlier studies indicate
that evaluations of the costs and benefit of EU membership tend to encourage participation
in European Parliament (EP) elections. This study adds further evidence as to the importance
of such utilitarian considerations in driving participation in non-electoral EU-level political
processes such as the ECI. At the same time, value-based approaches contend that political
values matter for political participation and, crucially, also impact the way that citizens
engage politically. We, thus, compare the impact of utilitarian considerations to that of
assessments of the EU in terms of values on the likelihood of using the ECI. In addition to
these two determinants, we examine the influence of what scholarship has identified as a
key driver of engagement in political action: sense of political efficacy. To test these effects,
our analysis relies on survey data from all EU Member States from two relatively recent
Eurobarometer surveys (May 2012 and November 2013).
2
The paper is organized as follows. The following section discusses the ECI as a form
of citizen participation in EU politics and presents the arguments and hypotheses. Next we
present the variable operationalization and data sources. The results of bivariate analyses
and multivariate ordinal logistic regression models are presented in the fourth section,
whereas the final section summarizes the main findings and discusses the major implication
of this analysis.
2. Citizen participation in the ECI: the motivating role of benefits, values and efficacy
Political participation in EU-level political processes has been mainly associated with voting
in European Parliament (EP) elections. The ECI represents an additional to the EP elections
possibility for participation. It falls under the broader category of citizens’ initiatives, a
bottom-up type of direct democracy that presupposes an initiative coming from individuals,
interest groups, or organizations (Beramendi et al. 2008; Schiller and Setälä 2012) . Such
instruments entail the right to propose new laws or the modification of laws, allowing
citizens to get involved in the legislative process. ECIs supported by at least one million
signatures in at least one quarter of the Member States have the potential to place an issue
on the political agenda and culminate in legislation.
The opening of the political action repertoire of EU citizens brought about by the
introduction of the ECI crucially entails the question of the factors that motivate
participation. Participation can take the form of initiating a citizen initiative or supporting an
existing initiative. As to the latter, citizens can be, of course, expected to support an
initiative only if they favor the particular cause it pursues, and different issues may be of
interest to different groups of citizens. The character, nonetheless, of this instrument can
also be expected to determine its appeal. A non-electoral form of participation, with a
bottom up dimension, the ECI may be of interest to those who seek new forms to signal
political preferences to EU decision-makers or to express criticism against policies made at
the European level. In fact, analyses of the topics of ECI campaigns suggest that the ECI has
been used to both these ends (Bouza Garcia and Greenwood 2014).
At the same time, the ECI falls under the category of institutionalized forms of
participation (see Barnes and Kaase 1979) since it was formally established by the EU
political elite and it embedded in a legal institutional framework. The ECI’s institutionalized
character perhaps explains why, previous research on the public intentions to use this
instrument finds that people’s views of the EU’s political processes matter (Kentmen-Cin
2014). In the only - to our knowledge - published research on the subject, Kentmen-Cin
3
(2014) tested the political dissatisfaction thesis on the ECI. Contrary to the thesis’
predictions, her findings suggest that trust in the EU’s institutions and positive evaluations of
the EU’s political system in terms of democratic credentials prompt interest in using the ECI.
We extend this finding by considering the role that evaluations of the EU in terms of
utilitarian considerations and values play in motivating interest in using the ECI.
Utilitarian considerations
Utilitarian explanations that presume instrumental rationality occupy a central space in the
literature on political participation. Derived, explicitly or implicitly, from rational choice
models such explanations suggest that individuals participate in politics when they perceive
that the expected benefits exceed the costs involved. For the most part, the relevant
literature focuses on the question of the “paradox of participation” and seeks to identify the
factors that incentivize political activity and those that increase the costs of participation.
Research, for instance, finds that negative evaluations of the economy and personal
hardships increase the opportunity costs of participation and depress turnout (Rosenstone
1982; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brody and Sniderman 1997).
It is also recognized that utilitarian considerations matter for political participation
aimed at EU level political processes. With voting in EP elections being the principal form of
participation in this realm, research has associated perceptions of gains from the European
project with turnout. Studies, for instance, indicate that benefits from EU membership are
linked to aggregate level turnout (Stockemer 2012; Mattila 2003; Flickinger and Studlar
2007). Moreover, considering that economic growth within a common market is one of the
principal aims of the EU, scholars find that actual and perceived economic benefits of
integration drive participation (Mattila 2003; Studlar, Flickinger, and Bennett 2003). A similar
logic seems to explain why citizens from certain socio-demographic groups participate more
in EP elections. More specifically, studies show that participation tends to be signifi cantly
higher for groups that have on average benefited economically by being part of the
European integration project, such as the better educated and those in higher occupational
status (Wessels and Franklin 2009; Blondel, Sinnott, and Svensson 1997, 199–235). Overall,
although the EP may not have been, at least until fairly recently, a powe rful institution in
terms of policy making, it forms part of the EU’s institutional architecture. As such,
participation in EP elections is driven by the desire to lend support to European project so as
4
to continue to enjoy the benefits associated with it.1 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that
the extant research on demonstrations and protests targeted at EU level politics, finds that
these are mobilized by objection to and concerns over the socio-economic implications of
integration (Uba and Uggla 2011; Imig and Tarrow 2001).
Taking stock of the above, and taking into account the institutionalized nature of the
ECI elaborated earlier, we expect that similarly to participation in EP elections, participation
in the ECI is motivated by perceptions of actual gains from EU membership. Individual who
have personally benefited by opportunities created by European integration will be more
likely to participate in this formal instrument, thereby expressing their support to the
integration project to continue to enjoy the benefits provided. Individuals, who, on the other
hand, do not see any advantages from EU integration, would be more likely to have no
interest in using the ECI. Based on these considerations, we expect that:
H1: Individuals who have experienced benefits from EU integration are more likely to use the ECI.
Value-based assessments
We also argue that value-based assessments of the EU may have an impact on the intention
to use the ECI. The literature on Europeanization combined with that on value change in
advanced industrial societies (Inglehart 1977; 1981; 1997) provides the main theoretical
impetus for this investigation.
First, Europeanization refers to the diffusion of norms and values from the EU level
to national states. One way to explain the alignment with EU requirements has to do with a
process of social learning in which the actors involved are motivated by identities, values or
norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Börzel and Risse 2003; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003;
Vachudova 2005). In this sense, Europeanization is about the construction of identity at both
the elite (as decision-makers) and mass level. In recent decades, especially with the recent
enlargements, the normative content of Europeanization is based on human rights and
democracy. For example, it has been shown that in candidate countries the mechanism
worked as follows: elites had the task to implement the EU supervisory framework to
establish democratic institutions (and the rule of law) that protect human rights, while
citizens gradually acknowledged democracy as a European value. The broad acceptance of
democratic values in societies has been both at the core of the rule adoption in candidate
1 Anyhow, evidence, indicates that the association between actual or perceived economic benefits of
integration and general support for the EU is strong (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel and Whitten 1997).
5
countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) and the driver behind the acceptance of
new institutional changes (Gherghina 2010). Research indicates that the extent to which
citizens embrace the value of the rule of law increases the likelihood of accepting the
external (EU) promotion of institutional change and the EU as a political system that could
compensate for the flawed national institutions, in general (Gherghina 2010). When the EU
is associated with values related to democracy promotion and maintenance (e.g. rule of law,
equality), citizens may perceive it as a legitimate political system that functions according to
democratic rules and that can be improved by following democratic means (through political
participation).
Second, according to Inglehart’s theory, post-materialist values are directed to the
fulfillment of a person's intellectual needs, their need for independence and self -
actualization. They concern priorities related to individual improvement, personal freedom,
human rights and solidarity, among others. These were contrasted with material values
which prioritize economic needs, safety and “law and order”. Linked to concerns with
democracy, a desire for political change and for more opportunities to participate in politics,
post-material value orientations were expected to stimulate engagement in non-electoral
forms of action (Inglehart 1990, 321; Dalton 2014, 90–94). Indeed, evidence indicates that
there is an association between post-material values and participation in non-violent protest
activities within the domestic political context such as petition signing and joining in
boycotts at the individual level (Copeland 2014; Dalton 2014; Opp 1990).
Post-material values have been associated with the EU. Inglehart (Inglehart 1977;
Inglehart 1971) argued that due to its cosmopolitan and supranational character, the EU is
aligned with post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1971). The expected positive
relationship between post-material value orientations and EU support at the individual level
does not, nonetheless, seem to hold when utilitarian considerations are controlled for
(Janssen 1991; Anderson and Reichert 1995; Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif 1991) . Over the last
decades, however, the EU has expanded its remit into a number of non-economic and “new
politics” policy areas, such as alternative life styles, social and political participation, minority
rights and social equality (Franklin and Wlezien 1997) that can be linked to post-material
value priorities. The preferences of EU citizens regarding European unification are
responsive to these issues (Ibid). It could be argued that the ECI is, in principle, a
manifestation of such post-material or self-expressive value priorities: an alternative to
established instruments of participation in the EU which is truly supranational and with a
bottom-up dimension. We expect that when citizens perceive that such post-material values
6
are reflected in the EU as a political system, they shall be more inclined to use the ECI.
Taking stock of the above, the hypothesis is that:
H2: Individuals who associate the EU with values are more likely to use the ECI
Political efficacy
In addition to these two potential antecedents, we also test for the impact of individual skills
and attitudes towards politics on the likelihood to use the ECI. Politicians and EU scholars
have spoken of the potential of the ECI to involve large numbers of citizens (Bouza Garcia
and Del Río Villar 2012). We evaluate the ECI’s participatory potential against a large body of
literature on non-electoral political participation which suggests that not all people are able
or willing to get involved. Sense of efficacy is argued to tap these two dimensions. Internal
efficacy refers to the perception that one is competent to engage in the political process;
external efficacy encompasses an individual’s perception of how responsive democratic
political institutions are to citizens’ demands (see Lane 1959; Balch 1974).
Although often connected, internal and external efficacy constitute distinct
dimensions (Hayes and Bean 1993). Internal efficacy is related to perceptions about one’s
skills and resources to understand and participate as a political actor (Miller 1974, 253). It is
not surprising, therefore, that this dimension of efficacy has been found to correlate strongly
with actual political knowledge (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991) and education (Jackson
1995) and linked to inequalities in political participation. Differences in operationalization
notwithstanding (see Morrell 2003, 591–595), research finds that higher levels of internal
efficacy are positively associated with electoral (Finkel 1985; Pattie and Johnston 1998;
Hadjar and Beck 2010) and non-electoral participation (Pollock 1983; Gabriel 2015).
External efficacy, on the other hand, is argued to tap a “fundamental principle in
democratic regimes, namely, that political institutions and public officials be responsive to
the preferences and needs of citizens” (Iyengar 1980, 250), indicating, therefore, support for
the political system. As such, research finds that external efficacy triggers participation in
elections (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Pattie and Johnston 1998; Becker 2004) and in
other activities closely connected with the political process (Verba and Nie 1972). The
explanation here may partly rest on a cost-benefit calculation: the more one believes that
elected representatives are attentive the more confident one feels that participation can
have the desired outcome and is incentivized to get involved.
In a study on factors that affect intention to use the ECI, Kentmen-Cin (2014)
showed that “cynical” citizens were significantly less likely to use this instrument. The study
7
used an index of “cynicism” which combined internal and external efficacy measures with
items tapping satisfaction with democracy in the EU and trust in EU institutions. We thereby
seek to advance knowledge about the distinct role played by political efficacy and its
dimensions. First, research has established that external efficacy with regard to the EU
triggers participation in EU political processes such as EP elections (Blondel, Sinnott, &
Svensson, 1997; Cox, 2003). Second, the ECI is an instrument of limited formal power,
dependent on institutional mediation in order to have an impact on policy (Cuesta-López
2012, 256). One could, therefore, expect that those who consider that overall EU policy
makers are responsive to citizens’ declared will may consider that participation can make a
difference and be incentivized to use the ECI. Those, on the other hand, who find that the EU
is not responsive may be more likely to disregard this instrument. Moreover, it has been the
ECI seems to require some basic understanding of the EU’s decision-making processes and
policy context (Boussaguet 2016). With this in mind, we also expect that individuals with
higher levels of internal efficacy would be more likely to embrace the opportunity to use the
ECI because they possess the skills necessary for understanding EU affairs. The hypotheses
are that:
H3: Individuals who understand how the EU works are likely to use the ECI.
H4: Individuals who feel that their opinion matters in the EU are likely to use the ECI.
Control variables
We acknowledge that the likelihood to use the ECI may well be influenced by other than the
hypothesized individual attitudes and skills. To avoid, hence, bias in the examination of the
hypothesized relationships we control for the influence of potential confounders without
formulating hypotheses about the direction of their effect. For reasons of parsimony, we
select factors identified as key antecedents of the intention to use the ECI, attitudes towards
the EU and participation in EP elections. First, as discussed above, satisfaction with the EU’s
democratic performance and institutions is associated with higher likelihood of using the ECI
(Kentmen-Cin 2014). Second, research indicates that identification with Europe also affects
the likelihood of using this instrument (Kentmen-Cin 2014) while support for the EU is
associated with participation in EP elections (Mattila 2003). We, therefore, include measures
to capture the potential impact of satisfaction with EU democracy, identification with
8
Europe and positive attitudes towards the direction in which the EU goes in our models.2 In
addition to these determinants, we control for the potential effect of cognitive skills. Formal
education and political knowledge are generally considered to be associated with a desire
for more opportunities to participate in politics (Verba and Nie 1972). Education, in
particular, is strongly linked to the likelihood of using the ECI (Kentmen-Cin 2014).
3. Data and methods
To empirically test the hypotheses formulated in the previous section we use individual level
data from two Eurobarometer surveys conducted in May 2012 (79.3) and November 2013
(80.1). The time interval of one year and a half between the two surveys allows us to
observe whether tendencies towards the use of the ECI are relatively stable and also
whether changes occur after people get used to the idea of this democratic tool (the first
survey was conducted when the ECI had just been introduced). The sample of respondents is
probabilistic and representative at national level. The analysis is conducte d for all EU
member states and the total number of respondents is slightly higher in the November 2013
survey because Croatia was included.
The dependent variable of this study is the intention of respondents to use the ECI.
It was measured as the answer to the question “How likely or not do you think you would
make use of this European Citizens’ initiative?”. Possible answers were coded on a four -
point ordinal scale ranging from not at all likely (1) to very likely (4).
To estimate the impact of utilitarian considerations on the intention to use the ECI
(H1), we use the following question “For each of the following achievements of the EU,
could you tell me whether you have benefited from it or not?”. Respondents were
presented with a list of achievements and each answer was coded dichotomously (0 if the
respondent answered that she had not benefited and 1 if she had benefited). We measure
perceptions of benefits from the EU (H1) by means of a cumulative index of five
achievements of the EU in economic, political and social areas3: border control, consumer
rights, cheaper phone calls, medical assistance, and living/working/studying abroad. The
2 We did not test for the impact of support for the EU on the intention to use the ECI because there is
a danger of reverse causality, especially for the 2013 survey. For the theoretical argument regarding
how the use of ECI can enhance support for the EU, see Gherghina and Groh (2016). 3 Although the questionnaire presents a broader range of benefits, we selected these five benefits for
several reasons: a) they correspond to different areas of l ife; b) these are the ones on which there is variation; and c) the ones missing correlate higher with some of the ones included. We lumped
together working, l iving and studying because they refer to the same benefit (freedom of movement) that people can use at different stages of their l ives (e.g. studying as a student and working /living if older or not studying).
9
final index is measured on a six-point scale with 0 corresponding to the situation when
respondents see none of these benefits and 5 when respondents see all five. We chose this
measurement because it reflects the individuals’ practical experiences in bene fiting from the
EU integration outcomes/policies and it does not include ideological or value-based
considerations.
The second independent variable, values of the EU (H2), is also coded as a
cumulative index of five values associated to the EU. Respondents were asked to mention
(coded as 1) or not (0) which values are best associated to the EU: “In the following list,
which values best represent the EU?”. We selected five different values connected with
political and social issues: rule of law, human rights, democracy, equality and solidarity
(support for others).4 The final index of values is measured on a six-point scale with the
lowest score corresponding to no value (0) and as no extreme values as 0 when respondents
associate none of these values with the EU and 5 when respondents mention all five values.
Both indexes for H1 and H2 have an equal weight for their constitutive items.
The third independent variable is the ability to understand EU politics, or else,
internal efficacy (H3). It is operationalized on a four-point scale reflecting the statement “To
what extent you understand how the EU works?” (Braun and Tausendpfund 2014). Possible
answers range between totally disagree (1) and totally agree (4). In line with previous
research (Mcevoy 2016), we rely on the question asking respondents whether they think
their voice counts in the EU as an indicator of external efficacy (H4). The variable is
measured in a similar way with a four-point scale (1 = totally disagree, 4 = totally agree).
As to the control variables, attachment to the EU is measured on a four-point scale
measuring the answer to the question “How attached do you feel to the EU?” (1= not
attached at all and 4= very attached). Satisfaction with democracy in the EU is measured in a
four-point scale as the answer to the question “How satisfied are you with democracy in the
EU?” (1= not at all satisfied and 4= very satisfied). To capture the assessment about the
direction in which the EU goes, we use the following question: “At the present time, would
you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in
the EU?”. The possible answers were: things are going in the wrong direction (coded as 1),
neither good nor bad (coded as 2) and things go in the right direction (coded as 3). For all
4 Again, the questionnaire includes a broader l ist of values. Our selection of values was based on
theoretical considerations (fit to the Europeanization and post-materialist theory) as well as on methodological concerns (existence of variation and correlation of some of the values that are not included).
10
variables (dependent plus independent) “do not know” answers were treated as missing
values. The mean and standard deviation of all variables are reported in Appendix 1.
Knowledge about the EU is measured by a cumulative index (on a 0–3 scale) of the
answers provided to factual questions. The general question reads as follows: “For each of
the following sentences about the EU, could you please tell me whether you think it is true
or false?” These were: “The EU consists of (the correct number of)5 member states”, “The
Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of each Member
State” and “Switzerland is a member of the EU”. A knowledgeable respondent would answer
“true” to the first two questions and “false” to the third one. Each of these correct answers
received a score of 1, while any other answer (including the “do not know”) included a score
of 0 because that showed absence of knowledge. The index represents the sum of the
answers to these questions and ranges from 0 (no knowledge at all) to 3 (knowledge on all
three items). Education is measured on a three-point scale variable: up to 15 years of
education coded as 1, 16-19 years of education coded 2, 20 years of education or more
coded 3.6
The empirical analysis that follows is structured along bivariate and multivariate
statistical analysis. Since all variables are ordinal we use non-parametric correlations
(Spearman) and ordered logistic regressions. Moreover, as the distribution is skewed (see
Figure 1), the use of standard errors to compensate for that problem was considered
appropriate.
4. Findings
There is considerable variation in the intention of the European citizens to make use of the
ECI. Figure 1 presents the distribution of respondents in both surveys, each bar reflecting
percentages. These are fairly similar in the two surveys. Overall, there is a general reluctance
towards the use of this participatory tool in the EU with three out of four respondents saying
that it is not at all or not very likely to use it in the future. In the 2013 survey the percentage
of people who said that it is not at all likely to use the ECI is slightly higher than in 2012 (39%
vs. 36%). This stability of preferences may be an indicator of the poor visibility of the ECI or
of its limited potential of action. At the other extreme a constant percentage of only 5% of
the respondents are very likely to use the ECI.
5 27 in the May 2012 survey and 28 in the November 2013 survey.
6 It could be argued that respondent’s age cound make a difference on the intention to use the ECI.
We control led for its potential effect and the statistical test indicated a very low impact (considerably lower than the other controls included in the paper). We, therefore, exclude age from the models.
11
Figure 1: The intention of EU citizens to use the ECI
The variables associated with the intention to use the ECI and the direction and strength of
association are presented in Table 1. The correlation coefficients indicate that all
hypothesized effects go in the expected direction, statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
Among them, the perceptions of benefits brought by the EU correlate the highest with the
intention to use the ECI in a positive manner. This is followed by the two components of
efficacy with citizens who understand how the EU works and those considering that their
voice counts in the EU favouring the use of the ECI. The EU values (the more, the better) are
only weakly correlated to the use of ECI. The control variables also correlate positively with
the intention to use the ECI, all relationships being significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 1: Bivariate correlations between intention to use the ECI and other variables
Variables May 2012 November 2013
EU benefits 0.28** 0.25** EU values 0.12** 0.14** Understand how EU works 0.22** 0.23** Voice counts in EU 0.20** 0.19** EU attachment 0.24** 0.24** EU democratic satisfaction 0.13** 0.15** EU right direction 0.10** 0.11** Knowledge about the EU 0.12** 0.11** Education 0.16** 0.17** N 20,696-23,522 22,773-25,302
Notes: Reported coefficients are non-parametric (Spearman). N differs across questions due to missing values
** significant at p < 0.01; * significant at p < 0.05.
36
38
21
5
39
36
20
5
N O T A T A L L L I K E L Y N O T V E R Y L I K E L Y F A I R L Y L IK E L Y V E R Y L I K E L Y
2012 2013
12
The multivariate statistical models (Table 2) include the main effects (Model 1) and the
control variables (Model 2) for each survey. One general observation is that the inclusion of
the control variables does not improve the fit of the model, i.e. the value of the pseudo R2 is
fairly similar in the full model when compared to the one without controls. At the same
time, the effect size and direction of the main variables remains largely unchanged. A second
observation is that all hypothesized effects are statistically significant at the 0.01 level
(unlike many of the controls) and they are consistent with the findings of the bivariate
correlations. For example, effects appear to be stable when looking at the two different
surveys, and the variables that correlated highly with the intention to use the ECI have the
strongest impact in the multivariate models as well.
There is empirical support for all four hypothesized relationships in both statistical
models (with and without control variables). Hypothesis H1 predicted a positive association
between perceptions of benefits from the EU and the intention to use the ECI. In 2012 and
2013, individuals perceiving benefits from the EU were 1.23 and 1.20 times respectively
more likely to use the ECI compared to those who did not identify any advantages brought
by the EU, controlling for other antecedents. Hypothesis H2, predicting that people who
attach more values to the EU are more likely to use the ECI also received empirical support.
Note that the effect of values is slightly smaller to that of benefits. Among the hypothesized
motivational factors, internal efficacy (H3) has the strongest effect. In 2012, respondents
who reported a better understanding of how the EU functions were 1.25 times more likely
to use the ECI in comparison to those citizens who did not feel that way, controlling for all
other factors. The effect of efficacy is slightly higher in the 2013 survey. External efficacy, ie.
perceptions that one’s voice counts in the EU, is also positively associated with the intention
to use the ECI (H4).
Among the control variables, respondents with a strong attachment to the EU (OR =
1.35 in 2012; 1.32 in 2013) or those who are better educated (OR = 1.17 for both surveys)
are more likely to use the ECI. Both effects are significant at the 0.01 level. The other
controls show no consistent significant effect.
13
Table 2: Ordinal logistic regression with intention to use the ECI as dependent variable
Variables May 2012 November 2013 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
EU benefits 1.29** (0.01)
1.23** (0.01)
1.25** (0.01)
1.20** (0.01)
EU values 1.10** (0.02)
1.04* (0.02)
1.17** (0.02)
1.10** (0.02)
Understand how EU works 1.39** (0.03)
1.25** (0.03)
1.46** (0.03)
1.33** (0.03)
Voice counts in EU 1.25** (0.02)
1.13** (0.02)
1.20** (0.02)
1.10** (0.02)
EU attachment 1.35** (0.03)
1.32** (0.03)
EU democratic satisfaction 0.97 (0.02)
1.01 (0.02)
EU right direction 1.06** (0.02)
1.00 (0.02)
Knowledge about the EU 1.03 (0.02)
1.02 (0.02)
Education 1.17** (0.03)
1.17** (0.03)
N 19,534 15,488 21,729 17,473 Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 Wald Chi2 2096.89 1671.62 2266.51 1844.31
Notes: Reported coefficients are odds-ratios, robust standard errors in brackets. ** significant at p < 0.01; * significant at p < 0.05
To investigate further, we estimated the marginal effects of the two explanatory factors that
were found to have the strongest impact on the intention to use the ECI: perceptions of EU
benefits and internal efficacy. Figure 2 presents the results of the analysis. Τhese effects
calculated for both 2012 and 2013 indicate some very small differences between the surveys
in line with the findings of the multivariate analysis. More precisely, the marginal effect of
perceptions of benefits from the EU is slightly stronger in 2012, while that of internal
efficacy is somewhat stronger in 2013. Moreover, the marginal effect of EU benefits is
somewhat weaker than that of efficacy. There is a change in the probability of the intention
to use the ECI by roughly 0.15 when respondents report to have taken advantage of an
additional aspect of the EU. Intention to use the ECI increases at a higher rate (0.2) when
respondents display a higher level of external efficacy.
Figure 2: Marginal effects of benefits and efficacy on the intention to use the ECI
14
5. Discussion and conclusions
Citizen participation in EU politics beyond the representative channel offered by the EP is
getting prominence in academic and political debates as a tool for bringing the EU closer to
its citizens and addressing the democratic deficit. Against this background, expectations
abound as to the potential of the ECI to enable citizen involvement in the shaping of EU
politics. Very little is, nonetheless, known about why citizens may be interested in using this
instrument. Extending the scant research on the factors that impact the likelihood of using
the ECI and building on broader scholarship on political participation, this paper examined
the role that utilitarian and value-based considerations about the EU play in the intention to
use the ECI. It additionally tested for the motivating impact of political efficacy. As such, this
study offers new knowledge on why citizens may engage with this new instrument and
contributes to the broader debate about participation in non-electoral political processes
targeting the EU
1.8
22.2
2.4
2.6
EC
I 2
01
2
0 1 2 3 4 5
EU Benefits
1.6
1.8
22.2
2.4
EC
I 2
01
3
0 1 2 3 4 5
EU Benefits
1.6
1.8
22.2
2.4
EC
I 2
01
2
1 2 3 4
Understand how the EU works
1.6
1.8
22.2
2.4
EC
I 2
01
3
1 2 3 4
Understand how the EU works
15
The findings provided empirical support for the impact of benefit considerations,
value-based assessments and political efficacy on the intention to use the ECI. First,
empirical results – bivariate and regression analysis with controls - indicate that cost-benefit
evaluations are associated with the intention to use the ECI. According to rational-choice
inspired accounts, costs include the (time) resources invested to get informed about the
initiative and to sign it. Additional costs are represented by the low likelihood to achieve the
desired outcomes, i.e. reforms asked by the particular ECI . Similarly to what has been
demonstrated for participation in EP elections, the costs of participation seem to be
outweighed by perceptions of benefits stemming from the EU. Second, the analysis reveals
that the intention to use the ECI is not only interest-driven. Value-based assessments of the
EU have a positive effect on a person’s likelihood to use the ECI, controlling for the effect of
benefits and other antecedents. The motivating role of values that is investigated here has
foundations on Europeanization and post-materialism value theories. Associations of the EU
with key democratic values seem to act as a source of political legitimacy which in turn
triggers interest in participating in EU political processes such as the ECI. In addition, the
result further points to the relative significance of EU’s identification with post-materialist
values for engagement in new forms of political participation in the EU realm.
Overall, it appears that the intention to use ECI is driven by positive evaluations of
the EU - both as a benefit-provider and as a polity characterized by values - rather than by
negative ones. This is consistent with our theories and is, perhaps, related to the
institutionalized, character of the instrument vis-à-vis its weak policy impact. Indeed, the
potential policy impact of an ECI depends on support from the EU’s bodies. The major
implications of this finding is that the ECI is not likely to be to be tool for individuals and
groups who are excluded from enjoying the advances that the EU integration has to offer or
fail to associate the EU with democratic values. Hence, the ECI in essence the may be used
for signaling political preferences but is not likely to act as a vehicle for the expression of
profound discontent with what the EU has to offer and what it represents.
The evidence presented here about the role of political efficacy supports the
implication advanced about the limits of the ECI as a form of citizen involvement. The ECI is
more likely to be attractive to individuals who support and have confidence in the
responsiveness of the EU’s political system rather than those who feel alienated in EU
political processes. Confirming earlier research on the subject (Kentmen-Cin, 2014;
Gherghina and Groh, 2016), it seems quite unlikely that the ECI shall fulfill the purported role
of bringing citizens closer to the EU. Moreover, the effect for internal efficacy points to a
16
similar direction. We have argued and demonstrated that the likelihood of using the ECI
depends on the perceived capacity to understand how politics works in the EU. As the latter
hinges on the possession of certain attributes that make some citizens more competent to
deal with the requirements involved (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), the finding speaks
against expectations that the ECI can facilitate wider public involvement in EU-affairs.
Our study uses two surveys collected in the first 18 months after the
implementation of the ECI. This can be regarded as a weakness of the analysis since the
effects may need a longer period of time. Also, due to data availability constraints we focus
on the intention to use the ECI and not on actual use. Further studies can compensate for
these shortcomings by expanding the period of investigation and delving into the actual use
of the ECI. With respect to the latter one fruitful avenue for re search is to conduct
qualitative interviews with people who have launched or supported an ECI. This will allow
more in-depth understanding of the trends identified in this paper.
17
Appendix 1: Mean and standard deviation of variables included in analysis
Variables May 2012 November 2013 Mean Standard
deviation Mean Standard
deviation
Intention to use ECI 1.97 0.01 1.92 0.01 EU benefits 1.47 0.01 1.31 0.01 EU values 1.33 0.01 1.13 0.01 Understand how EU works 2.61 0.01 2.57 0.01 Voice counts in EU 2.15 0.01 2.11 0.01 EU attachment 2.40 0.01 2.40 0.01 EU democratic satisfaction 2.42 0.01 2.40 0.01 EU right direction 1.70 0.01 1.86 0.01 Knowledge about the EU 2.15 0.01 2.15 0.01 Education 2.17 0.01 2.19 0.01
18
References
Anderson, Christopher J., and M. Shawn Reichert. 1995. “Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in the E.U.: A Cross-National Analysis.” Journal of Public Policy 15 (3): 231. doi:10.1017/S0143814X00010035.
Barnes, Samuel H., and Max Kaase. 1979. Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies. Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications.
Becker, Rolf. 2004. “Political Efficacy and Voter Turnout in East and West Germany.” German Politics 13 (2): 317–40. doi:10.1080/0964400042000248223.
Beramendi, Virginia, Andrew Ellis, Bruno Kaufman, Miriam Kornblith, Larry LeDuc, Paddy McGuire, Theo Schiller, and Palle Svensson. 2008. “Direct Democracy: The International IDEA Handbook.” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. http://www.idea.int/publications/direct_democracy/index.cfm.
Blondel, Jean, Richard Sinnott, and Palle Svensson. 1997. “Representation and Voter Participation.” European Journal of Political Research 32 (2): 243–72. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00341.
Börzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. 2003. “Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe.” In The Politics of Europeanization, edited by Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, 57–82. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boussaguet, Laurie. 2016. “Participatory Mechanisms as Symbolic Policy Instruments?” Comparative European Politics 14 (1): 107–24. doi:10.1057/cep.2015.12.
Bouza Garcia, Luis, and Susana Del Río Villar. 2012. “The ECI as a Democratic Innovation: Analysing Its Ability to Promote Inclusion, Empowerment and Responsiveness in European Civil Society.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 13 (3): 312–24. doi:10.1080/15705854.2012.702575.
Bouza Garcia, Luis, and Justin Greenwood. 2014. “The European Citizens’ Initiative: A New Sphere of EU Politics?” Interest Groups & Advocacy 3 (3): 246–67. doi:10.1057/iga.2014.14.
Braun, Daniela, and Markus Tausendpfund. 2014. “The Impact of the Euro Crisis on Citizens’ Support for the European Union.” Journal of European Integration 36 (3): 231–45. doi:10.1080/07036337.2014.885751.
Brody, Richard, A., and Paul M. Sniderman. 1997. “From Life Space to Polling Place: The Relevance of Personal Concerns for Voting Behavior.” British Journal of Political Science 7: 337–60.
Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller. 1954. The Voter Decides. Evanston, IL: Row, Preston.
Carey, S. 2002. “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?” European Union Politics 3 (4): 387–413. doi:10.1177/1465116502003004001.
Copeland, Lauren. 2014. “Value Change and Political Action: Postmaterialism, Political Consumerism, and Political Participation.” American Politics Research 42 (2): 257– 282.
Dalton, Russell J. 2014. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Sixth edition. Los Angeles: SAGE, CQ Press.
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52 (4): 887–917.
Finkel, Steven, E. 1985. “Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 29 (4): 891–913.
Franklin, M. N., and C. Wlezien. 1997. “The Responsive Public: Issue Salience, Policy Change, and Preferences for European Unification.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 9 (3): 347–63. doi:10.1177/0951692897009003005.
19
Gabel, Matthew, and Guy D Whitten. 1997. “Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, and Public Support for European Integration.” Political Behavior 19 (1): 81–96.
Gabriel, Oscar W. 2015. “When Representation Fails: Behavioural Reactions to Perceived Failure of Political Representation in France and Germany.” In Citizenship and Democracy in an Era of Crisis: Essays in Honour of Jan W. van Deth , edited by Thomas Poguntke and Jan W. van Deth. Routledge Research in Comparative Politics 64. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
Gherghina, Sergiu. 2010. “Unraveling Romance: An Assessment of Candidate Countries’ Support for the EU.” Comparative European Politics 8 (4): 444–467.
Gherghina, Sergiu and Adriana Groh. 2016. “A Poor Sales Pitch? The European Citizens’ Initiative and Attitudes toward the EU in Germany and the UK.” European Politics and Society 17(3): 373–387.
Hadjar, Andreas, and Michael Beck. 2010. “Who Does Not Participate in Elections in Europe and Why Is This?: A Multilevel Analysis of Social Mechanisms behind Non-Voting.” European Societies 12 (4): 521–42. doi:10.1080/14616696.2010.483007.
Hayes, Bernadette C., and Clive S. Bean. 1993. “Political Efficacy: A Comparative Study of the United States, West Germany, Great Britain and Australia.” European Journal of Political Research 23 (3): 261–80. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1993.tb00359.x.
Imig, Douglas R., and Sidney G. Tarrow, eds. 2001. Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Emerging Polity. Governance in Europe. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. “Changing Value Priorities and European Integration.” Journal of Common Market Studies 10: 1–36.
———. 1977. “The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post‐Industrial Society.” American Political Science Review 65: 991–1017.
———. 1981. “Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity.” American Political Science Review 75: 880–900.
———. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
———. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald, Jacques-René Rabier, and Karlheinz Reif. 1991. “The Evolution of Public Attitudes towards European Integration 1970-86.” In Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion: Essays in Honour of Jacques-René Rabier, edited by Jacques-René Rabier, Karlheinz Reif, and Ronald Inglehart. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.
Iyengar, Shanto. 1980. “Subjective Political Efficacy as a Measure of Diffuse Support.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 44 (2): 249–56.
Jackson, Robert A. 1995. “Clarifying the Relationship Between Education and Turnout.” American Politics Quarterly 23 (3): 279–99. doi:10.1177/1532673X9502300302.
Janssen, Joseph I. H. 1991. “Post-Materialism, Cognitive Mobilization and Public Support for European Integration.” British Journal of Political Science 21: 443–68.
Kentmen-Cin, Cigdem. 2014. “Explaining Willingness to Use the European Citizens’ Initiative: Political Cynicism, Anti-EU Attitudes and Voting Weight of Member States.” Comparative European Politics 12 (3): 301–318.
Mattila, Mikko. 2003. “Why Bother? Determinants of Turnout in the European Elections.” Electoral Studies 22: 449–468.
Mcevoy, Caroline. 2016. “The Role of Political Efficacy on Public Opinion in the European Union: The Role of Political Efficacy in the EU.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, n/a-n/a. doi:10.1111/jcms.12357.
20
Miller, Arthur H. 1974. “Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970.” American Political Science Review 68 (3): 951–72. doi:10.2307/1959140.
Morrell, Michael, E. 2003. “Survey and Experimental Evidence for a Reliable and Valid Measure of Internal Political Efficacy.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 67 (4): 589–602.
Niemi, Richard, G., Stephen Craig C., and Franco Mattei. 1991. “Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study.” The American Political Science Review 85 (4): 1407–13.
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1990. “Postmaterialism, Collective Action, and Political Protest.” American Journal of Political Science 34 (1): 212–35.
Pattie, Charles, and Ron Johnston. 1998. “Voter Turnout at the British General Election of 1992: Rational Choice, Social Standing or Political Efficacy?” European Journal of Political Research 33 (2): 263–83. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00383.
Pollock, Philip H. 1983. “The Participatory Consequences of Internal and External Political Efficacy: A ResearchNote.” The Western Political Quarterly 36 (3): 400–409.
Rosenstone, Stephen, J. 1982. “Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout.” American Journal of Political Science 26 (1): 25–46.
Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. New Topics in Politics. New York: Macmillan Pub. Co : Maxwell Macmillan Canada : Maxwell Macmillan International.
Schiller, Theo, and Maija Setälä. 2012. “Introduction.” In Citizens’ Initiatives in Europe: Procedures and Consequences of Agenda-Setting by Citizens, edited by Maija Setälä and Theo Schiller, 1–14. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2005. The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Cornell University Press.
Schimmelfennig, Frank, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel. 2003. “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (3): 495–518.
Studlar, Donley, Richard S. Flickinger, and Stephen Bennett. 2003. “Turnout in European Parliament Elections: Towards a European‐centred Model.” British Elections & Parties Review 13 (1): 195–209. doi:10.1080/13689880308413094.
Uba, Katrin, and Fredrik Uggla. 2011. “Protest Actions against the European Union, 1992–2007.” West European Politics 34 (2): 384–93. doi:10.1080/01402382.2011.546581.
Vachudova, Milada A. 2005. Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Verba, Sidney, and Norman Nie H. 1972. Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper & Row.
Wessels, Bernhard, and Mark N. Franklin. 2009. “Turning Out or Turning Off: Do Mobilization and Attitudes Account for Turnout Differences between New and Established Member States at the 2004 EP Elections?” Journal of European Integration 31 (5): 609–26. doi:10.1080/07036330903145880.
