November 1, 2008

Peak Oil

What’s Happening With Oil?

André AngelantoniPresident, PostPeakLiving.comPresident, Post Peak Advisors

Co-Founder, Post Carbon MarinSteering Committee, The 10,000 Garden Project

No Quick Fixes

‣ Occurring now or will soon

‣ Economic consequences will be extreme & long lasting

Why is peak oil important?

‣ Public panic

‣ Rush for supplies, instant shortages

‣ Major negative reaction on Wall Street

‣ Depression, unemployment, inflation, etc.

When peak oil becomes widely known, repeat of 1973 and 1979:

Source: Hirsch, Bezdak presentaton

This Presentation

‣ About peaking

‣ Timing

‣ Size of the problem and what won't work

‣ Impact

‣ Response

Oil Price

0

37.5

75.0

112.5

150.0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Pric

e (U

S $)

Source: EIA

Peak Oil: Supply Falls Short of Demand

OIL PRODUCTION normally matches oil

demand

World Oil Production

PRODUCTIONreaches a maximum

and declines(peaks)

SHORTAGESand

INCREASING PRICE

Source: Hirsch, Bezdak presentaton

U.S. Oil Historic and Future Production

Deepwater> 500mUS Lower 48

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0

Oil

in

Th

ou

sa

nd

s o

f B

arr

els

pe

r D

ay

1930 1950 1970 1990 2030 20502010

Alaska

LITTLE WARNING OF PEAK

AND RAPIDDECLINE

Source: EIA

Hubbert’s Peak (Globally)

Global Hubbert’s Peak

The Age of Oil

1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100 2200 2300 2400

We are hereC

umul

ativ

eO

il Pr

oduc

tion

The Growing GapSource: Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, Ireland

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This Presentation

‣ About peaking

‣ Timing

‣ Size of the problem and what won't work

‣ Impact

‣ Response

Historic and Future Oil Production

Source: BP Statistical Review; 4% decline rate

21201880 1920 2000 20401960

Oil Production

2080

Millio

ns o

f b

arr

els

per

day

100

80

60

40

20

0

Actual HistoricProduction

FutureProduction

Where we are nowSource: Mitigation of Maximum World Oil Production:

Shortage Scenarios, Hirsch, 2008

out of the IMF-defined range), and a roughly $60 perbarrel oil price, the $100 per barrel oil price increase(10 times the IMF $10 increase), we would calculate a 4%reduction in world GDP, which is in line with our unityratio approximation.

On the basis of the foregoing, we adopt the following:(1) when world oil supply declines on a sustained basis, theresulting shortages will cause world oil prices to escalateand world GDP to decline, and (2) a sustained percentagedecline in oil world supply will cause an approximatelyequal percentage decline in world GDP.

3. Possible world oil production patterns

Fig. 2 shows three simplified oil production patternsassociated with oil production from giant oil fields, largeregions, and various forecasts. In a sense, these patternsrepresent a continuum from sharp maximum to plateauedmaximum, followed by continuing declines.

When planning mitigation, particular attention must bepaid to longer-term decline rates. As recently noted byGAO (2007), ‘‘the rate of decline after a peak is animportant consideration because a decline that is moreabrupt will likely have more adverse economic conse-quences than a decline that is less abrupt.’’

The model used in analyzing future world oil productionis shown in Fig. 3. The model consists of the followingphases: A period of increasing production, which ischaracteristic of world oil production over the last decades;A rollover period, wherein production departs from itsprevious growth rate; A plateau period, where productionmay fluctuate; and finally, a period of relatively monotonicdecline.

Fig. 4 shows the limiting case without a plateau.A period of rollover and roll-down is of interest because

such a slowly changing period of oil production couldcorrelate with relatively moderate economic distress.

4. The characteristics of giant oil fields

Giant oil fields are responsible for over 60% of worldconventional oil production (Robelius, 2007), and theyprovide an important benchmark when considering long-term world oil decline rates. Most giant fields werediscovered decades ago, have long since passed theirmaximum oil production, and are in relatively monotonicdecline. Decline rates for a number of reasonably well-managed fields vary in the 8–16% range. The world isunlikely to be subjected to such high rates of decline,because the phasing of production from various oil fieldsin a large region usually moderates single, giant fieldbehavior.

ARTICLE IN PRESS

Rollover / Roll down

Time

Production

Production

Time

Sharp Break

Time

Production

Plateau

Fig. 2. Possible shapes of future world oil production.

Time

Oil

Pro

du

ctio

n

Increase

Trendbreak

Decline

PlateauWidth

Plateau

Rollover

Fig. 3. The General Model with periods of production increase, rollover,fluctuating plateau, and extended decline.

Time

Oil

Pro

du

ctio

n

Increasingproduction

Trendbreak

DecliningProduction

Rolldownphase

Rolloverperiod

Roll-downperiod

Fig. 4. The limiting case without a plateau. A ‘‘roll-down’’ period isidentified because with the rollover period, it may represent a period ofrelatively moderate economic distress, compared with a long-term decline.

R.L. Hirsch / Energy Policy 36 (2008) 881–889 883

The Only Numbers That Matter Now

Year thousands barrels per day

2007 3,3032008 5,0472009 5,0562010 4,1062011 3,6902012 3,4792013 2,1432014 1,3902015 735

Data retrieved Oct 25, 2008

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_megaprojects

The Only Numbers That Matter Now

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_megaprojects

Data retrieved Aug 31, 2008

Act Now

‣ “By 2015, 37.5 mb/d new production will be

needed; only 25 mb/d worth of projects are on

the books leaving a gap of 12.5 mb/d that will

cause an “oil crunch” by 2012

‣ Unfortunately, there's a lot of talk, but very little

action. I really hope that consuming nations

will understand the gravity of the situation and

put in place radical and extremely tough

policies to curb oil demand growth.”

What is the Chief Economist, Fatih Birol, for the International

Energy Agency saying?

Act Now

‣ We sounded the alarm bells in Nov. 2007 and this Nov. with

World Energy Outlook 2008 the bells may well shrill much

louder...It is up to the governments, we have warned them. — Journal of the German Council on Foreign Relations,

April 2008

What is the Chief Economist, Fatih Birol, for the International

Energy Agency saying?

UK Peak Oil Group

Virgin, FirstGroup, Stagecoach (transportation); ARUP

(engineers), Foster and Partners (architects), Scottish and

Southern (energy giant), Yahoo, SolarCentury

Drilling in ANWR and OuterContinental Shelf

Figure 1 shows that the addition of the 42 billion barrels of new oil will result in a shoulder peak in the production curve around 2040. Model predictions for other production schedules show that the height of this shoulder peak will increase or decrease if the new oil is produced faster or more slowly that the rate assumed here. Producing the new oil faster, however, will shorten the duration of the new shoulder peak. Figure 1 also presents the actual production data from 1860 to 2006 to allow us to evaluate the ability of the model to accurately fit the historical production data. The plots of Figure 1 do not include increases in production from the Gulf of Mexico (e.g. Thunder Horse platform). The expected increases will add another small shoulder peak to the production curve without altering significantly its overall downward trend.

In summary, opening the now inaccessible moratoria areas to oil exploration and development will only add another shoulder peak to the production curve, but will not reverse the long-term inexorable decline of the US oil production. Is this sip of oil a good enough reason to start drilling in the moratoria areas that span 21 US states and large parts of our Outer Continental Shelf? Should we not look instead for other ways to quench our "big thirst" for transportation fuels?

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

1880 1920 1960 2000 2040 2080

Historical data

Model - New resources

Model - Base case

US

Oil

Pro

du

cti

on

Ra

te,

Gb

/ye

ar

Year

Figure 1: Historical data (red symbols) and model predictions for US oil production rates in billion barrels per year. - Dashed line: Base case with 231 billion barrels ultimate cumulative US oil production. - Solid line: Production curve with 42 billion barrels of new oil resources (273 billion barrels of ultimate cumulative production).

REFERENCES: 1. Jad Mouawad, "The Big Thirst", New York Times, April 20, 2008. 2. "Scientific Inventory of Onshore Federal Lands’ Oil and Gas Resources and the Extent and

Nature of Restrictions or Impediments to Their Development," Report by the US Departments of the Interior, Agriculture and Energy, 2006.

3. "Facing the Hard truths about Energy," National Petroleum Council, July 2007 4. F.M. Bass, Management Science, 15(5), 215-227 (1969). Dr. Kyriacos Zygourakis is a professor of chemical engineering at Rice University. The full-length version of this article is posted today on the ASPO-USA website www.aspousa.org .

This Presentation

‣ About peaking

‣ Timing

‣ Size of the problem and what won't work

‣ Impact

‣ Response

The Size of the Problem

Fleet SizeMedian Lifetime(years)

Cost to Replace Half of Fleet

(2006 $)

Automobiles 140 million 17 $1.6 trillion

Light Trucks, SUVs, etc. 60 million 16 $1.3 trillion

Heavy Trucks, Busses 7.5 million 28 $1.7 trillion

Aircraft 8,500 22 $0.3 trillion

Source: Management Information Services

Fuel Share of WorldPrimary Energy Supply

Source: IEA, 2007

Oil34.3%

Nuclear6.5%

Coal25.1%

Renewables13%

Non-renew. waste 0.2%

Combustible renewables and

ren. waste 10.6%

Hydro 2.2%

Other0.5%

Gas 20.9%

Geothermal 0.414%

Wind 0.064%Solar 0.039%

Tide 0.0004%

Impact of Peak Oil

‣ Gasoline/diesel shortages start occurring soon

‣ Ground transportation will become more costly

‣ Air travel becomes a luxury again

‣ Things you need to buy, like food & batteries, will become

more expensive

‣ Worldwide depression and massive unemployment

‣ Food riots and increased crime

‣ Possible collapse of the monetary system

‣ More resource wars / globalization unwinds

This Presentation

‣ About peaking

‣ Timing

‣ Impact

‣ The size of the problem and what

won't work

‣ Response

The Huge U.S. Vehicle Fleet

Fleet SizeMedian Lifetime(years)

Cost to Replace Half of Fleet

(2006 $)

Automobiles 140 million 17 $1.6 trillion

Light Trucks, SUVs, etc. 60 million 16 $1.3 trillion

Heavy Trucks, Busses 7.5 million 28 $1.7 trillion

Aircraft 8,500 22 $0.3 trillion

Source: Management Information Services

Alternatives Energy SourcesAren’t Really Alternatives

Alternative Not a solution because... Barrels per Day

Nuclear

Provide electricitynot liquid fuel! 0

Wind

Solar

Tidal

Geothermal

Hydrogen Not economic and no infrastructure 0

Ethanol, Biodiesel Not economic and does not scale 848,000

Shale Oil Not commercial 0

Tar Sands Not scalable 1,550,000

Coal-to-Liquid Extremely expensive, long lead time <200,000

Source: Energy Information Agency, May 2008

No way to get to

86 million barrels in time

Source: Modified IEEE (2007) slide by InspiringGreenLeadership.com

Coal-fired plants

Wind turbines

Solar panels

Nuclear Power Plants

Three-Gorges Dams

We use one cubic mile of oil every year. To replace that, we would need to build...

...every year for 50 years.

What does this mean for climate change?

Is climate change no longer a problem?

13% 7% 6%

The Greenhouse Effect

56%

18%

Carbon Dioxide

Methane

CFCsOzone Nitrous

Oxide

The Carbon Cycle

How much carbon?

0

1,000

2,000

2000 2050 2100Cum

ulat

ive

Futu

re F

ossi

l-Fue

l .

CO

2 E

mis

sion

s, G

tC .

Producer-limited Profile

Cum

ulat

ive

Futu

re F

ossi

l-Fue

lC

O2

Emis

sion

s, G

tC

2000 2050 21000

1,000

2,000

Expected Temperature

0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

2000 2050 2100 2150 2200

From Burning Fossil Fuels Alone

Tem

pera

ture

(°C

)

Source: Modified from rutledge.caltech.edu

One TemperatureScenario

0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

2000 2050 2100 2150 2200

From Burning Fossil Fuels Alone With Feedback Loops

Tem

pera

ture

(°C

)

Source: Modified from rutledge.caltech.edu/IPCC 2007The red line is for illustration purposes only and is not

from Prof. Rutledge’s data.

The Bottom Line

Climate change makes moving off of oil

necessary; peak oil makes it inevitable.

— Richard Heinberg

This Presentation

‣ About peaking

‣ Timing

‣ Size of the problem and what won't work

‣ Impact

‣ Response

Scenario INo action until peaking occurs

Scenario IIMitigation Starts 10 years before peaking

Scenario IIIMitigation Starts 20 years before peaking

Extremely Bad

Serious Trouble

No Trouble?

Source: Hirsch presentaton

2005 Hirsch Mitigation Study

Scenario Results of CRASH PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION:

The Most Optimistic Case

Short of Time

“...as peaking is approached, liquid fuel prices and price volatility will increase dramatically, and, without timely mitigation, the economic, social, and political costs will be unprecedented. Viable mitigation options exist on both the supply and demand sides, but to have substantial impact, they must be initiated more than a decade in advance of peaking.”

— Peaking of World Oil Production: Impacts, Mitigation and Risk Management

Department of Energy, 2005

How Tied to Oil is the Economy?

2.5

Source: Mitigation of maximum world oil production: Shortage scenarios, Hirsch, 2008

2. The nexus of oil supply and GDP—a world economicimpact estimate

It is said that oil is the life-blood of our moderncivilization. Indeed, world oil production has increased intandem with world economic development for decades.This relationship is illustrated in Fig. 1, which shows ameasure of world GDP growth and world oil productiongrowth over the last 20 years (EIA, 2007a; IMF, 2007).

Our interest is in identifying an approximate relationshipbetween these two rates of change on the downside, i.e.,when world oil supply falls short of world demand.Precision is not possible in these considerations, becauseof multiple ambiguities and complex causal relationships.

2.1. Numerical relationships

Using world GDP figures similar to those in Fig. 1,Deutsche Bank (DB) estimated the relationship betweenGDP growth and oil demand growth for the period1995–2006 (Deutsche Bank, 2007):

% change in world GDP=% change in oil demand ! 2:5.

Simply stated, oil demand growth was positivelycorrelated with GDP growth, and an expanding worldeconomy demanded was generally well provided with agrowing supply of liquid hydrocarbon fuels and products.

History demonstrated that the opposite holds whenworld oil supplies are not sufficient to meet demand. Inthat circumstance, world oil shortages have acted as a dragon world GDP, as demonstrated in the Arab oil embargoof 1973 and the Iranian revolution of 1979. In bothinstances, oil shortages lead to recessions with significantlyincreased inflation, unemployment, and interest rates(Hirsch et al., 2005).

Estimates of the damage caused by past oil pricedisruptions vary, but impacts were significant. According

to EIA (2000) ‘‘the oil shock of 1973 caused the US GDPto go to about 3% negative in 1975. The oil shock of 1979caused roughly the same: "3% in GDP.’’ Elsewhere(EIA, Undated), EIA reported that the average grosssupply shortfall during the 1973–74 oil embargo was2.6MMbpd, or 4.4% on an annualized basis. The averagegross supply shortfall during the Iranian revolution was3.5MMbpd, or 5.4% on an annualized basis.It is important to recognize that drawing long-term

conclusions from this short-term data is chancy. Never-theless, the two oil supply interruptions of the 1970srepresent the only modern oil shortage experiences fromwhich guidance for the future can be gleaned. From theforegoing:For the Arab oil embargo:

% change in US GDP

% change in oil supply!

"3

"4:4#0:7.

For the Iranian revolution:

% change in US GDP

% change in oil supply!

"3

"5:4#0:6.

Thus, for these two episodes, a % GDP change/% oilchange ratio of 0.6–0.7 for the US was evident. Comparingthat range with the DB ratio of 2.5 for the world economicgrowth period of 1995–2006 and recognizing the approx-imate nature of these considerations, we conclude that aratio of 1:1 is a reasonable approximation for a futurecircumstance where world oil shortages act as a drag onworld GDP, i.e., numerical values ranging from 0.6 to 2.5are of order of unity. A ratio of one-tenth would seem toosmall and a ratio of 10 would be too large. While greateraccuracy would be desirable, this approximation is believedadequate for our analysis, since our final conclusions arenot highly sensitive to this assumption.One of the few recent studies of the potential economic

impacts of a severe, long-term decrease in world oilsupplies was the Oil Shockwave simulation, which involveda number of retired senior government executives, assistedby Sanford Bernstein & Co. LLC. (Gates et al., 2005). Thefocus of their effort was the potential impacts of a severeoil shortage caused by massive terrorist attacks on worldoil infrastructure, leading to significant, multi-year worldoil shortages.Among their conclusions was a forecast that a roughly

4% global shortfall in daily supply would result in an oilprice increase of nearly a factor of three and a severerecession.On the topic of the % GDP change/% oil change ratio,

the IEA estimated ‘‘a sustained $10 per barrel increase inoil prices from $25 to $35 would result in the OECD as awhole losing 0.4% of GDP in the first and second years ofhigher prices. Inflation would rise by half a percentagepoint and unemployment would also increase’’ (IEA,2004).If we assume the Oil Shockwave estimate of $160 per

barrel, IMF’s 0.4% GDP impact (recognizing that its use is

ARTICLE IN PRESS

1986 0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

Pe

rce

nt

World GDP growth

Oil production growth

5.0

1990 1998 2002 2006

6.0

1994

Fig. 1. World GDP growth and world oil production growth havegenerally tracked each other for nearly two decades, which is believed tobe a reasonable period for our purposes. 2006 was not included becauserecent data is often subject to change, and longer-term data usuallyoverwhelms short-term changes.

R.L. Hirsch / Energy Policy 36 (2008) 881–889882

% change in US GDP % change in oil supply =

-3-4.4

Arab Oil Embargo

% change in US GDP % change in oil supply =

-3-5.4

Iranian Revolution

~ 0.7

~ 0.6

Leaked IEA Draft Report

‣ Output from the world’s oilfields is declining faster than previously

thought, the first authoritative public study of the biggest fields

shows.

‣ Existing fields (or at least those which are at, or past, peak) are

now averaging a depletion decline of 9.1% per annum. Even with

existing planned investment, depletion is 6.3%

‣ Conventional oil production is projected to grow from barrels 70.4

mb/d in 2007 to only 75.2mb/d in 2030.

‣ Total production by 2030 is projected to be 106.4 mb/d by 2030,

well below the 130 mb/d previously forecast by CERA

Notional Relationship Between Oil and the Economy

Four Possible Responses

Fossil Fuels Allow Higher World Population

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000

Data: Population and Energy, Graham Zabel Graph: PostPeakLiving.com

Pop

ulat

ion

in B

illio

ns

Biomass Population

Coal Population

Oil Population

Natural Gas Population

The Bottom Line

“The budget should be balanced, the treasury should

be refilled, public debt should be reduced, the

arrogance of officialdom should be tempered and

controlled, and the assistance to foreign lands should

be curtailed lest Rome become bankrupt. People

must again learn to work, instead of living on public

assistance.” — Cicero , 55 B.C.

Non-Obvious Impacts

‣ Net Exports Fall Faster Than Gross Production

‣ Deep Recession May Mask Peak Oil (for a while)

‣ Complex Civilization Is Temporary

‣ Can’t Run Complex Civilization on Alternatives

The Conventional Business Wisdom

« Saudi Aramco's proved reserves alone could keep the

world supplied for several decades. But it is only exploiting

ten of its 80 or so fields, so will be able to pump at the

present rate for about 70 years even if it never discovers

another drop of oil ».

— Economist Magazine, August 10, 2006

Saudi Arabia: Constant Production at 11 mb/d and Consumption

Increasing at +5.7%/year

Top Five Exporters: Saudi Arabia, Russia, Norway, Iran,

United Arab Emirates

Actual Forecast

BP 2007 (23.1 mbpd)

-6.2 ± 4%/year

Fossil Fuels Allow Higher World Population

The Olduvai Theory: Energy, Population, and

Industrial Civilization

‣ By 2025, net exports will be down by at least half

‣ 30% less arable land

‣ 8.5 billion people on the planet (maybe)

Source:Duncan, The Olduvai Theory: Energy, Population, and Industrial Civilization

This Presentation

‣ About peaking

‣ Timing

‣ Size of the problem and what won't work

‣ Impact

‣ Response

Economic Outlook

‣Waiting for the Magic Elixir

‣ Powerdown

‣ Building Lifeboats

‣ Last Man Standing

Our Next Step

‣Become community-sufficient

What should we do?

Which role will you play?

‣ Victim

‣ Complains that the world isn’t fair and there isn’t

enough time to prepare

‣ Bystander

‣ Que será será, fate, stuff happens!

‣ Participant

‣ actually is playing the game to win

How Will You Play This Game?

How Will You Play This Game?

Which role will you play?

‣ Leader

‣ See this as an opportunity to make a difference

‣ Create a future that wasn’t going to happen anyway

Urban Farming

‣ Kinsale, Ireland

‣ San Francisco, CA

‣ Bloomington, IN

‣ Sebastopol, CA

‣ Denver, CO

‣ Oakland, CA

‣ Plymouth, NH

‣ Portland, OR

‣ Tompkins County, NY

‣Willits, CA

Communities Taking Action

‣ www.theoildrum.com

‣ www.relocalize.net

‣ www.transitiontowns.org

‣ www.OilDepletionProtocol.org

Who Will You Need To Be?

Be courageous.

Acknowledgments:Richard Heinberg, Dr. Robert Hirsch, Colin Campbell, the

contributors at TheOilDrum.com

Learn How to Prepare

www.postpeakliving.com (citizens)www.postpeakadvisors.com (businesses &

governments)