When Do We Teach the Basics?

West Point senior NCO speaks to cadets about NCO

role

By D O N A L D E . V A N D E R G R I F F

We have to develop leaders who understand that context matters. The complexity of

today's challenges and the uncertainties of tomorrow require a much broader approach

to leader development and a clear understanding of the operating environment.

—General Martin E. DempseyCommander, Army Training and Doctrine CommandOctober 2009'

For the first time since the found-ing of the Republic, there isno way to tell what the U.S.Army—for that matter, the entire

military—will be used for, and therefore whatit should be trained for. For that reason, tbelate Colonel John R. Boyd, USAF, tnay turnout to be the most influential strategist of the21" century. But Boyd's work reaches beyondstrategy. It is also influencing how the U.S.Army and Marine Corps are beginning todevelop leaders. Soldiers, and Marines, focus-ing on strength of character and adaptability.-While Marines are already familiar withBoyd, Soldiers are beginning to know him pri-marily through the Observe, Orient, Decide,and Act ("OODA loop") concept and from hisinfluence on maneuver warfare. As a result,the Army is taking on and evolving a newapproach to training and education calledOutcomes-based Training and Education(OBT&E) while developing a new teachingmethod under the umbrella of OBT&E calledthe Adaptive Leaders Methodology (ALM).'

The OODA Loopf undamental to applying Boyd's con-

cepts is the realization that the OODA loopisn't really a loop at all. Boyd, in fact, neverdrew it that way. Instead, the loop is moreappropriately considered as a way of thinkingabout conflict based on the concept of keepingour orientations better matched to realitythan our opponents can. Boyd demonstrated,by combining examples from both militaryhistory and modern science, that the side thatcan do that not only can respond to changes

more quickly, but also can shape the situationto its liking, and then exploit the advantagebefore the opponent can react. Another keyis to u.se training and experience to assemblean arsenal of potentially effective actions thatwill flow intuitively, smoothly, and quicklyfrom orientation. The end result is, as Boyddescribed it, to "operate inside an opponent'sOODA 'loop'" and thus produce rapid, jarringchanges that disorient and demoralize theopposition.''

Boyd demonstrated the power ofmaking sound and timely decisions in histheory of decisionmaking. He contended thathuman behavior follows a specific four-stepdecisionmaking cycle of observation, orienta-tion, decision, and action—what he called theOODA loop. The party that can execute thisdecisionmaking process more rapidly andeffectively will gain an advantage because theopponent will constantly be reacting to hisdecisions. These continued reactions eventuallyresult in poor enemy decisions followed byparalysis of the entire decisionmaking process.The common expression for this procedure isgetting inside the enemy's decision cycle.^

The OODA loop is also known as theBoyd Cycle. Boyd developed it based on hisobservations of jet fighter combat over Koreaand through years of intense study of whyhumans react the way they do and why theymake certain decisions in combat. The OODAloop uses the cognitive skills that quantifythe situational decisionmaking process intangible terms. It transitions decisionmakingtheory into a simplistic and useful approach toteach and improve decisionmaking.

The critical step in the OODA loop isorientation, where analysis and synthesis ofthe observations occur. This process consistsof taking many disparate nuggets of data andtranslating them into a mental picture thedecisionmaker can then use to make a choice.Boyd describes this as an "examining of theworld from a number of perspectives so thatwe can generate mental images or impressionsthat correspond to the world."

The loop gains its power from theleader's ability to form mental constructs.Timeliness and accuracy of decisions andactions relate directly to the decisionmaker'sability to orient and reorient to rapidly chang-ing and uncertain situations. Personal experi-ences, education, and training (also knownas knowledge) empower the leader to formthese mental constructs. Boyd'.s theory thusemphasizes the importance of the leader'sability to think.

By-the-book answers to .specific well-known situations are not good enough. Itis the ability to think that allows a leader totake the knowledge from personal experi-ences, education, and training and adapt itto the imperfect information of the presentsituation to arrive at a timely, sound, andworkable solution.

Applying the OODA loop faster thanthe opposition is the essence of situational,or intuitive, decisionmaking. It is themeans of quantifying a mental process into

Major Donald E. Vandergriff, USA (Ret.), is a

contractor in support of Army Capabilities

Integration Center Forward.

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C O M M E N T A R Y | When Do We Teach the Basics? I

a mechanistic action that all Soldiers canunderstand and apply. Decisionmaking supe-riority is merely creating a tactical decision-making base in the operating environment.

While it is necessary to understandthe OODA loop, the theory should not beintroduced as a model or diagram by nameuntil later in the formal education phase ofthe adaptive leader's course. In fact, unlessa student makes a direct reference to theprocess during a discussion, or uses a theoryto demonstrate what he has just done, theories

in decisionmaking or leadership should not bepresented as part of experiential learning untilthe latter half of an adaptive leader's course.That way, the student can experience it beforenaming it.

The OODA loop serves as the cen-terpiece of how an adaptive leader makesdecisions. Unlike the Army's Military Deci-sionmaking Process—a linear and analyticaldecisionmaking approach—the OODA loopprovides a guide to how to think faster andmore effectively than the enemy. However, it

timeliness and accuracy of decisions and actions relate directlyto the decisionmaker's ability to orient and reorient to rapidly

changing and uncertain situations

is a guide and not a process. Students shouldfirst be guided through many scenarios todiscover the loop on their own. When finallyintroduced to the formal theory, students willsay, "Wow, that is what I was doing!"

A specific area of emphasis for instruc-tors is examining how students use theinformation at their disposal to make deci-sions. Can they di.stinguish between pertinentand irrelevant information? Can they do itquickly? Can they then translate why thatinformation is important and determine howto use it?

According to Major Chad Foster,Military Science 300 Course Director at theDepartment of Military Instruction (DMI) atthe United States Military Academy (USMA),West Point, where ALM is being applied aspartofOBT&E:

At the heart of ALM is the essence of the BoydCycle, a 4-step theory of decisionmaking thatwas first articulated by Col. John R. Boydfollowing his study of fighter pilots in combatduring the Korean War.... Commonlyknown as "OODA" (observation, orientation,decision, action), the Boyd Cycle is a usefulframework for the assessment of studentsthroughout the course. We focus on the criti-cal step of "orientation" because this is wherethe cadet attempted to make sense out ofthe information at hand. The decision thatthe cadet makes is important, but how theyarrived at that decision is just as important.*"

Educating and Training = DevelopmentThe reason for recommending Boyd

to those who must deal with the strange-ness of the 21" century is the equally strangefact that Boyd was not primarily concernedwith warfare. Although he is recognized as atather of maneuver warfare, nowhere in thepages he left did he use the term. He wouldcertainly have agreed with both Sun Tzuand Clausewitz that warfare must serve ahigher purpose or it is just brutal savagery. Sothroughout his work, he emphasized destruc-tion and creation, coercion and attraction,chaos and harmony, isolation and interaction.These principles apply to the rifle squad justas they do to national policy. That is actuallywhat General Dempsey's opening statementimplies: OBT&E is the evolving approachto developing leaders who have the strengthof character to make rapid decisions basedon their understanding of the commander'sintent beyond the traditional two levels up.'

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The Army acknowledges the need forchange. We have begun an evolution in theway we develop—train, educate, access,promote, and select—leaders and Soldiers.We are specifically concerned with how weevolve adaptability. To clarify the Army'straining doctrine, the recently publishedField Manual 7-0, Training for Full SpectrumOperations, states:

Traditional training and education may notmeet all the needs of an expeditionary Army;as appropriate, training and education mustadapt to the needs of a new operationalenvironment.. .. For example, Outcome-iiased Training and Education is supposed todevelop individuals and organizations thatcan think and operate in complex environ-ments. ... The focus is on the total outcomeof a task or event rather than on the execu-tion of a particular task to a standard undera given set of conditions. Given operationalexpectations, it is supposed to developtangible skills such as marksmanship andintangible attributes such as creativity andjudgment.*

The Competency Theory of learn-ing once dominated course curriculums,and signs of it remain in leader develop-ment today. The theory is a product of theindustrial age outlook that once necessarilygoverned the way our military prepared forwar. This assembly-line mentality made sensewhen we relied on a massed citizen armymade up of draftees, but the disadvantage wasthat it emphasized inputs (hours, resources,people trained, and so forth) more thanindividual quality of the product. Order andcontrol are central to Programs of Instruction(POls) that use the competency theory as itsfbundation.'

Leader development for the full spec-trum of 21*'-century military operations mustat every grade level be based on quality, notquantity. The rule should be, "Soldiers deserveand require trained leaders." Schools andcourses employing OBT&E principles guidingan ALM-based curriculum constantly putstudents in difficuh, unexpected situations,and tben require them to decide and act undertime pressure. Schooling must take studentsout of their comfort zones. Stress—mentaland moral as well as physical—must be con-stant. Wargames, tactical decision games, mapexercises, and free-play field exercises mustconstitute the bulk of the curriculum.

But under OBT&E, the emphasis is ongrowing the decisionmaker by explainingthe why behind the task and teaching in thecontext of a problem-solving exercise. Highercommand levels overseeing officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) schools mustlook for courses adhering to a few principles,while allowing instructors to evolve theirlesson plans using innovative teaching tech-niques and tools in an ever-changing environ-ment. Leaders who successfully pass throughthe schools must continue to be developed bytheir commanders. Learning must not stop atthe schoolhouse door.

Boyd emphasized destructionand creation, coercion

and attraction, chaos andharmony isolation and

interaction

The Army is currently assessing OBT&Eas a training doctrine, which evolved out ofthe approach Colonel Casey Haskins and his198"' Infantry Brigade took at Fort Benningfrom 2006 to 2008 in developing new infan-try Soldiers.'" Put simply, OBT&E looks forresults; it puts the burden of professionalismmore on the shoulders of the student andlets the instructor decide how to get results,much like mission orders or mission tacticswhere the how to is left to those executing themission with little or no oversight from higherup. OBT&E is best described as "developmen-tal training"—development of the individualwithin the training of a military task. Studentsare held accountable for what they shouldalready know and bring to the next course."

OBT&E is the guiding philosophyfrom which ALM was developed as a way toteach and reach outcomes. In OBT&E, Armystandards remain the baseline for training;however, they are no longer the primaryor exclusive goal. ALM is used to apply theprinciples of OBT&E. It evolved from an effortto develop cadets to be better decisionmak-ers and leaders of character at GeorgetownUniversity Reserve Officers' Training Corpsbetween 1999 and 2005. ALM uses situationaiexercises in a tactical environment to developprofessionalism, decisionmaking skills, andultimately strength of character. The method-ology used by the instructor is similar.'^

At a U.S. Army Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC)-hosted workshop

in August 2006, Dr. Robert Bjork, Dean ofthe School of Psychology at the University ofCalifornia at Los Angeles, presented "HowWe Learn Versus How We Think We Learn:Implications for the Organization of ArmyTraining." He emphasized:

When instruction occurs under conditionsthat are constant and predictable, learningappears to get what we might call contextual-ized. Jt looks very good in that context, butdoesn't support retention later when tested inother contexts and the learning acquired inthe original context does not transfer well todifferent contexts. In contrast, varying condi-tions of practice, even just the place whereyou study, for example, can enhance recallon a later test. If when trying to learn severalthings, you intertwine the learning of thosethings in such a way as to cause interferenceamong them during learning, long-term per-formance on them will be enhanced. Massing(such as cramming for exams) supports short-term performance; whereas spacing (distrib-uting presentations, study attempts, trainingtrials, etc.) supports long-term retention.^^

Bjork's work, as it relates to the currenttask-centric or input approach to Army edu-cation, can be summed up in the followingtwo statements:

• conditions of instruction that make per-formance improve rapidly often fail to supportlong-term retention and transfer

whereas

m conditions of instruction that appear tocreate difficulties for the learner, slowing therate of apparent learning, often optimize long-term retention and transfer.

ALM under the guiding OBT&E prin-ciples exposes students to classical educa-tion in conjunction with existing leadershipprograms on campuses where they aretaught to find the answers, whereas "com-petency based" curriculum as describedearlier gives students the answers. Instead,if the students are exposed to an environ-ment in which they want to find the answersfor themselves, the lessons are emotionallymarked in time, which builds intuition—anecessary trait of "adaptive leaders." Thisapproach in ALM immerses students ineducation and training with innovativeteachers combining the terms education andtraining into development.

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According to Major Foster:

In my opinion, the implementation of keyelements of ALM has been the best thingto happen to our Military Science programduring my time here as an instructor. Afterseeing this new methodology of teachingapplied to our courses in tactical problem-solving and small unit tactics this semester, Iam even more convinced of its value. In justa few weeks, I felt that I was able to get mycadets to a level beyond that which I was ableto achieve over several months during previ-ous semesters.''*

From February 2008 through December2009, the demand for information on OBT&Eand ALM was intensified. Requests for theworkshop "Deciding under Pressure and Fast"that teaches ALM increased as well. SinceJanuary 2008, ALM and the workshop have

from September 2008 to September 2009,the Army Fires Center of Excellence at FortSill, on October 3,2009, made it a policy thatall training and education use OBT&E andALM.'' At the same time. Fort Knox hasimplemented OBT&E and ALM completelyin its Army Reconnaissance Course (ARC),gaining "buy-in" from students and cadreafter its first pilot course in March 2009."

Many other institutions within theArmy, including leader-centric courses suchas ones at the Noncommissioned OfficersAcademy (NCOA) at Fort Benning, arestarting to use ALM in their POI and lessonplans. As Command Sergeant Major ZoltanJames, Commandant of the NCOA at FortBenning, explains:

ALM has outlined and changed the way weteach at Ft. Benning's NCO Academy by givingus the ability to develop NCOs who think for

Adaptive Leaders Methodology uses situational exercisesin a tactical environment to develop professionalism,

decisionmaking skills, and ultimately strength of character

been presented in San Diego, California (atthe Joint Conference on Military Ethics); FortHuachuca, Arizona; Fort Benning and FortGordon, Ceorgia; Fort Monroe, Virginia; FortKnox, Kentucky; and USMA at West Point.Participating in the ALM workshop is thefirst step of incorporating the method into acourse or program.

The U.S. Army Asymmetric WarfareGroup (AWG) has been pushing OBT&Hthroughout the Army in its Combat Applica-tion Training Course (CATC), which usesrifle marksmanship as a vehicle to show Armyleaders how to teach OBT&E. AWG also usedALM in its incentives, and hosted its firstAdaptability Conference on June 3-4, 2008.Day 1 focused on ALM's workshop, whileday 2 focused on OBT&E. AWG followedup with a larger conference in March 2009that involved over 100 representatives fromthroughout the Army as well as U.S. militaryand government agencies. The TRADOCCapabilities Integration Center Forward con-tinues to host the ALM workshops, recently atFort Sill, Oklahoma; Fort Knox; Fort LeonardWood, Missouri; and Fort Benning.

After frequent workshops that devel-oped over 100 instructors, and having over400 instructors participate in the AWG CATC

themselves instead of current training outlinesthat provided them with a Task, Condition,and Standard. We have changed our trainingculture, adding the utilization of tactical deci-sion games with no additional resources orincreased Program of Instruction time. Thisnew training tool allows our students attendingNoncommissioned Office Education System(NCOES) [courses] to share their combat expe-riences with their peers and provides a trainingvehicle to develop and practice adaptability.Most importantly, they gain knowledge andunderstanding of how to deal effectively with acontinually changing environment."

The issue before TRADOC is institutinga metbodology tbat moves beyond tbe visionoutlined by FM 7-0 and General Dempseyto a tangible metbod to instruct our leadersin "how to think" versus "what to think."James continues, "Creating adaptability in ourleaders attending NCOA is a huge challengefor the current methods available of trainingby the standard training support packets pro-vided for NCOES classroom instructions bythe Institutional Army.""

The feedback of instructors and studentsinvolved with ALM reflects the positiveimpact this cultural change will have on the

Army's future leaders. According to CaptainThomas Pike, Course Director for MilitaryIntelligence Basic Officer Leader Course(BOLC) III:

Adaptive Leader Methodology has had aparadigm shifting impact on the MilitaryIntelligence Basic Officer Leader Course(MIBOLC). ALM has not only improvedthe way in which material is presented tothe students; it has also changed the way inwhich instructors understand their material,dynamically changing MIBOLC's trainingenvironment. ALM is what is needed to trainjunior intelligence officers for the 21" century.

Of significant note is that this "change"has required no additional resources or alengthening in the total period of instruction.While the ALM takes advantage of combatveterans' insights and experiences, it requirestheir continued initiative and desire to growfuture leaders because it continues to buildon Army core principles and values. Thewarrior ethos underpins everything in theALM, while the methodology itself adaptsthe Army's leaders to the current and futureoperating environment.

ALM is a cultural change rather thana specific set list of exercises. Pike calls it "acompletely different mindset for the instruc-tor." ALM develops adaptability through theRapid Decision Making (RDM) process, usingthe experiential learning model and scenario-based learning. According to Captain CaseyGiese, BOLC II company commander, "ALMis a system that promotes .self-actualizedlearning via weakly structured situationalproblems." Captain Alec Barker, who appliesALM in his red teaming approach, says, "ALMespouses institutionalized inductive reasoningin order to prepare leaders for the complexwars of the future."" At a course using ALM,according to Major Paul Wilcox, formerBOLC II company commander:

Students are quickly thrown into problemsolving exercises that would be viewed in thepast as too complicated for them withoutflrst learning the basics [from a classroomlecture]. They then review the results of theiractions in an after action review (AAR) inwhich the instructors facilitate the students infinding their answers. The instructors avoidtelling the students how to do it, there are nobook solutions, but guide the students towardworkable solutions they already discovered

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in experimenting during the course of the

scenario.'^"

Preferably, the instructors use force-on-force, free-play exercises whenever possible.In lieu of these capstone exercises, they useTactical Decision Games, or as they are calledat USMA's DMI, Tactical Decision Exercises(TDEs), as a tool to facilitate learning beforeever introducing theory or doctrine. Theyniay also use symposium-based case studies.''According to Sergeant First Class Robert Elzy,BOLCII Tactical NCO, the approach calledfor in the ALM POI "is more difficult becausethe instructors must stand back and let thestudents learn through doing, but also knowwhen to step in to keep students on coursewithout wasting too much time, as somestudent leaders will flounder in trying to leadand solve the problem." Major Foster adds:

ALM works, but it takes the right kind ofinstructor. Gone are the days when youcould just "plug-in" any officer or NCO intoa teaching position. Teaching in a coursethat applies ALM requires a high level ofpassion and competence. It is tough for thosewho want to implement this methodology,but nothing worth having is ever easy. Afterseeing it first hand, J will apply the principlesof ALM in everything that I do as a leader,trainer, and mentor during the rest of myArmy career. J will also seek out subordinateleaders who understand this philosophy andcan put it into practice.

ALM teachers are concerned with whystudents do what they do—an action-learningapproach. The emphasis is on ensuring thatstudents gain and maintain a willingness toact. During numerous AARs and mentoringsessions—occurring during and after numer-ous scenarios with different conditions—theteacher will analyze why the students actedas they did and the effect their actions hadon the overall operation. As Captain Walton,instructor at Infantry BOLC III, put it:

/ was skeptical at first of its [ALM's] utilityfor a number of reasons. We had to reallybite our lips during the painful execution ofvery poor React to Contact Drills during the[exercises]. However, we noticed during theAAR we were no longer confronted with thestatement, "But that's the way SSG Melean-der told me to do it." I was now able to askleading questions during the AAR, i.e., "Why

did you assault back toward your [support-by-fire] position?" J found myself rather thanin a position of convincing the lieutenants ofa way to do it, and even of being confronta-tional at times in the AAR, the lieutenantsnow fully accepted and took ownership thatthey were not ready. J was now coaching,teaching, and mentoring on team, squad,and platoon leadership. The lieutenants thenwent back and conducted several hours ofrehearsals and then executed a second itera-tion of the [exercise]. They performed the bestset 0/[squad live-fire exercises] we've everconducted.^''

The essence of the ALM is not to arriveat the school solution, or even to teach thestudents to go down a prescribed checklistof steps. For an era where we cannot predict

Asymmetric Warfare Group senior NCO welcomesattendees to outcomes-based training andeducation integration workshop

what leaders will be doing—or even if itshould be called "war" at all—the checklistmentality is irrelevant at best. Instead, themethod requires instructors to put studentsinto increasingly complex and disorganizedscenarios. A good scenario employing TDEsgives students a tactical problem and thenputs them under stress—often a time con-straint, but there are other means limited onlyby the instructor's imagination. The studentsmust not only present their solutions, butalso explain why they did what they did. Theinstructor and the other students will critiquethe solution as well as the explanation and thetechnique for solving the problem. Did thestudents, for example, use an effective balanceof written and verbal instructions? Why didthey micromanage their NCOs? Did the localpopulation think better of the coalition as aresult, or did the "favorable" body count justhelp recruit more insurgents?

The impact of the training can bemagnified by combining TDEs with the studyof military history (the best TDEs are basedon historical examples) and intensive fieldwork that includes free-play exercises. Tb bemost effective, these teaching approachesmust take place under the cultural umhrellaof what is called a "learning organization."In contrast, today's approach to developingleaders is still focused on top-down memori-zation of process, which is not going to helpfuture leaders achieve mastery of Boyd-typeprinciples. As Command Sergeant MajorJames remarks, as a result of using ALM, "Wehave a better trained and developed NCOcorps [who have] become critical thinkersand can adapt to a changing operating envi-ronment to support senior leaders' missionrequirements.""

the issue before TRADOC isinstituting a tangible method

to instruct our leaders in "howto think" versus "what to

think"

Evolution Must ContinueSo how do we create strategic corporals,

strategic lieutenants, strategic majors, andstrategic colonels? The trick is to instill aculture like the one embodied in the Army'snew TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, The ArmyCapstone Concept Operational Adaptabil-ity—Operating Under Conditions of Uncer-tainty and Complexity in an Era of PersistentConflict. Boyd once called such a culture the"Principles of the Blitzkrieg," but droppedthat description in favor of "an operationalclimate for organizational success." Theessence of this approach is to ensure that welead through Auftragstaktik, a German termimplying that once everyone understandsthe commander's intent (two levels up), theyare free to, and indeed duty-bound to, usetheir creativity and initiative to accomplishtheir missions within the intent. In such anenvironment, teams will largely self-organizewithin the doctrinal framework to accomplishthe mission.-''

James concludes that "ALM hasenhanced all my NCO Academy instruc-tors' ability to plan and execute training atmy NCOES courses that encapsulates thestudent's ability to think for himself, givinghim another tool for training his Soldiers

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when they return to their units."" The culture

will become one that rewards leaders and

Soldiers who act, and penalizes those who

do not. Today's culture needs to evolve so the

greater burden rests on all superior officers,

who have to nurture—teach, trust, support,

and correct—the student, who because of his

training now enters the force with the ability

to adapt.

Although large-scale warfare among

developed states is increasingly unlikely,

conflict—the real subject of Boyd's investi-

gations—is eternal. The world population

approached seven billion by the end of the 20'''

century. Competition for increasingly scarce

resources will continue to make conflict,

for an era where we cannotpredict what leaders will bedoing—or even if it shouldbe called "war" at all—the

checklist mentality is irrelevant

including the use of large-scale armed force,

ever more likely in the developing world. As

Boyd insisted, resolving future conflicts so we

do not again become bogged down in multi-

year insurgencies will be a carrot-and-stick

affair, where the emphasis is not so much on

"unconditional surrender" or other 19"''- and

20"'-century notions as on persuading people

not to support dangerous groups. A compo-

nent of this approach may be discrediting

those who would use organized violence to

achieve their ends.

When conflict with enemies becomes

necessary, Boyd's timeless concept of "operat-

ing inside their OODA loops" provides the

mechanism for achieving resolution rapidly

and with the minimum damage to our

coalition and to friendly and uncommitted

populations. Most importantly, as Major

Foster concludes, "ALM creates leaders and

Soldiers who can truly 'think on their feet'

because they are forced to do so in every

aspect of the course. I don't think there is any

other method or theory that could be better

for developing leaders, especially those in the

military."-' JFQ

' Remarks by General Martin E. Dempsey,Commanding General, U.S. Army Training andDoctrine Command (TRADOC), at the Associa-tion of the United States Army's Chapter Presidents'Dinner, Washington, DC, October 4,2009.

^ Several of the principles as well as methodol-ogy are being put to practice at the U.S. MarineCorps Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) atQuantico, VA. EWS is a captains' course attendedby all Services as well as allies.

' Discussions with Command Sergeant MajorWilliam "Morgan" Darwin, USA (Ret.), contributedto this article.

^ Boyd's magnum opus. Patterns of Conflict,

ends not with the OODA loop and sowing decep-tion, ambiguity, and chaos, but with the "Themefor Vitality and Growth." In other words, our focusshould always be on attracting people around theworld to engage peacefully with us and our way oflife, while we, in partnership with our allies, retainthe capability to deal quickly and elegantly withthose who would use force to gain their objectives.Available at <www.d-n-i.net/dni/>. Also based ondiscussions with Col Chet Richards, USAER, andFranklin C. Spinney.

^ I was fortunate to be mentored by many aco-lytes of John Boyd, particularly Franklin "Chuck"Spinney and Chet Richards. Also see <www.d-n-i.net/dni/> for a thorough examination of Boyd'stheories.

' Chad Foster, "No Approved Solutions inAsymmetric Warfare: Nurturing Leaders in anOutcomes Based Training Environment," Assembly

(August 2009), 14.

Based on discussions with Dr. Chester Rich-ards, November 2008.

" U.S. Army Field Manual 7-0, Training for

Full Spectrum Operations (Eort Leavenworth, KS:Combined Arms Center, December 12,2008), para.3-7.

' Donald E. Vandergriff, "Review of ArmyTraining," unpublished paper (Arlington, VA: U.S.Army Training and Doctrine Command, Septem-ber 2006), 4-5.

'" The Army made a smart move; COL Haskinsis now Director of the United States Military Acad-emy's Department of Military Instruction taskedwith developing all cadets in military science.

" CSM Morgan Darwin, USA (Ret.), providedthis definition of OBT&E.

'•' Quotation provided by CSM Patrick Laidlaw,October 30,2008.

" Dr. Robert Bjork, presentation at TRADOC-hosted workshop in August 2006, "How We LearnVersus How We Think We Learn: Implications forthe Organization of Army Training," 5.

" Quote provided by MAJ Chad Foster,October 25,2008.

" U.S. Army Accessions Command, "BasicOfficer Leaders Course (BOLC) Policy and Guid-ance," unpublished memorandum (Fort Monroe,VA: TRADOC, April 24,2008), 4. Also see Head-quarters U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence,"The Way Ahead for Outcome Based Training andEducation and the Adaptive Leaders Methodologyat Fires Center of Excellence (Fort Sill, OK: U.S.Army Fires Center of Excellence, October 3, 2009).

"• MAI Robert Perry, USA, and LTC KevinMcEnery, USA (Ret.), "Army ReconnaissanceCourse: Defining the Aim Point for Reconnais-sance Leader Training," Armor (August 2009), 14.

'• Quote provided by CSM Zoltan James,October 31,2008.

•« Ibid.

" Alec Barker, "Review of Raising the Bar,"

unpublished book review (Reston, VA: April 2008).

-° Based on discussions with MAJ Paul Wilcox,USA, September 16,2007.

" Donald E. Vandergriff, "Swift to Swiss: Tacti-cal Decision Games and Their Place in MilitaryEducation," Improved Performance Society Journal

(February 2006).

" Quote provided by CPT Andrew Watson,TAC Infantry BOLC III, with knowledge of LTCLance "Duke" Davis, commander of 2/11 Infantry,Fort Benning, GA, October 25,2008.

" James.

" LTG Walter Ulmer, USA, "Creating andAssessing Productive Organizational Climates,"course handout (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army WarCollege, 2002), 1.

'^ James.

'̂ Foster.

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