The partition that dare not speak its name.

WHEN PEACE MEANS WARBy John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera

T he Dayton settlement on Bosnia is an tinfin-ished peace, hence a flawed peace. Major issuesretnain unsettled. The U.S. must send itspromised peacekeeping contingent to Bosnia,

but, tinless it also moves to repair the Dayton accord,these defects will lead to new war, this time with Ameri-can troops caught in the middle.

Two types of Bosnia peace-schemes—one infeasible,one workable—have long contended. One type offeredunitary federal solutions that wotild maintain Bosnia asa single state where Serbs, Croats and Muslims wotildlearn to live together. However, the triangle ot deephatreds ttnleashed since Yugoslavia's breakup has longmade this solution implausible. Another type of planproposed partitions dividing Bosnia into several states(usually three), each free to go its own way. The BosnianSerb state then could (and surely would) join Serbia; theBosnian Croat state cotild join Croatia; and a Muslim-majority rump state would remain independent.

Since before the war started in April 1992 the U.S.has favored a federal soltition and opposed partition.Now we have belatedly seen the light and produced apartition settlement. This is good news, althotigh iheClinton administration will not admit that its policy haschanged. Announcing the accord. President Clintonasserted Ihat "the peace plan agreed to wf)uld preserveBosnia as a single state." Secretary of State WarrenChristopher likewise maintained that "the agreement isa victory for all those who believe in a multiethnicdemocracy in Bosnia." Htimpty Dumptv', they sttggest,has been put back together again.

These are noble lies. The settlement is a veiled parti-tion but a partition nevertheless. It effectively dividesBosnia into two separate states: a Serb Republic{Republika Srpska) and a Muslim-Croat Federation.They coexist tmder an itiipotetit central governmentthat barely deserves the name. The reality of partition isstarkly evident in the settlement's military provisions.Both Republika Srpska and the Federation are allowedto maintain their own armies, and each army is forbid-den from entering the other's territory. This means, in

JOHN J. MKARSHKIMKR is professor of political science atthe University of Chicago. SI'KI'HKN VA\ EVKR.A. is associ-ate professor of political science at M.I.T.

effect, that each regional government can defy' the cen-tral government's wishes at will. Most important, eithercan at any time declare and enforce its velvet divorcefrom the other and its sitiiultaneous remarriage to aneighboring state. The Dayton accord even legitimatesthe first steps of this divorce-and-remarriage by allowingeach entity to establish a "special relationship" with aneighboring state.

Dayton is the fourth Bosnia peace plan producedsince 1992 and the cttlmination of a glacial process ofU.S. acclimation to partition. The first was a prewarscheme agreed to in European Community-sponsoredtalks at Lisbon (February-March 1992). Although theplan spoke of national cantons within a Bosnian state,the federal structure was so weak that the propos-al, enthusiastically endorsed by Radovan Kiiradzic,amounted to partition. Tragically, the Lisbon planfailed when Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegovic changedhis mitid and scuttled it. Althotigh Warren Zimmer-mann, the American representative at the talks, nowdenies it, most reliable reports sttggest that Izetbegovicacted with U.S. approval.

Next came the Vance-Owen plan (September 1992-May 1993). It proposed a unitary federal Bostiia dividedalong ethnic lines into ten semiatitonomous cantonsthat wotild remain subordinate to a capable central gov-ernment. The Bosnian Serbs predictably rejected it sinceit denied them their prime goal, national independence.

Vance-Owen was followed by a European proposal forveiled tripartite partition (July 1993-January 1994).Resemhiing the Lisbon plan, it envisioned three ethnicreptiblics coexisting in a loose confederation under apowerless central government that could not preventthe inevitable final breaktip. Still dreaming of a unitedBosnia ttnder their leadership, and again encouragedby the U.S., the Mtislims rejecled it in early 1994.

At tliis point the LI.S. had torpedoed two peace planswhile endorsing none. Exasperated, the Etiropeansdemanded that the U.S. propose and stipport soltitionsof its own. This led to the so-called Contact Croup planof April 1994, which reached frtiition at Dayton. Itstemmed from two developments between Februaryand April 1994. First, tbe Americans pushed the Croatsand Muslims, then engaged in a bloody war, to stopfighting and form a federation. Second, the United

16 THE NEW REPUBLIC DECEMBER IS, I995

States, Britain, France, Russia and Germany formed thefive-power C.ontact Group, which then proposed aveiled bipartite partition of Bosnia lietween the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serbs. It envisioned a 51-49territorial division ot Bosnia, with 51 percent allotted tothe Muslim-Croat Federation and 49 percent to Repul>lika Srpska. The Serhs would be allowed to remain out-side the Federation and to rttn their own republic. Atthe time, (Minton administration officials hinted thatthe U.S. might tolerate secession by the Bosnian Serbs.The basic outline of the bipartite partition agreed to inDayton was in place, although Serb acceptance had toawait the solieringimpact of battlefielddefeats in the stimmerof 1995.

The Dayton accordembodies America'sbelated embrace ofpartition, but it doesnot carry partition'slogic to its necessaryconclusion, and there-in lies its weakness.The Dayton agree-ment posits bipartitepartition, but thereare three competingparties in Bosnia. Aplan that denies thisreality suffers fromthe same comfortingdelusions that havepre\ en ted the Westfrom sectiring a Bos-nian peace for thepast three years.

The main problemis that the Croatian-Mtislim Federation isuntenable. Like theBosnian Serbs, theBosnian Croats wantotit of Bosnia. Theyaccepted the Muslim-Croat Federation as an expedient, but they chafe atmembership in it, and they will surely move to destroy itsomeday soon. The U.S. should have anticipated thisdevelopment by forging agreement on the partition oftlie Federation into Croat and Mtislim states at Dayton.Instead, their inevitable divorce may well occur by war.

All evidence points to fierce Bosnian Croat resistanceto political tinion with the Bosnian Muslims. 1 he mayorof a Bosnian Croat town near Mostar recently warnedthat "if there were a referendum, the people would votenot 90 percent but 99 percent, not to be part of theFederation." Simple demographics fuel this Croat hos-tility. Muslims outnumber the Bosnian Croats by morethan two to one and wotild, therefore, dominate Feder-ation politics. This the highly nationalistic Ooats will

The Dayton Agreement

BOSNIAN/CROATFEDERATION

never accept. Instead they will demand their own stateor insist on joining a Greater Croatia.

Croat-Muslim relations were badly damaged by thebrtual war they fought between April 1993 and Febru-ary 1994. The U.S.-brokored peace that ended it is littlemore than a truce. Relations between the two sidesremain venomous. Even as they strtiggled togetheragainst the Serbs, Muslim and Croat forces twice fell tofighting each other in sotitliwestern Bosnia last stim-tner. Croat-Muslim relations in Mostar tell the samestory. That city was devastated by the Croat-Muslim warand left divided, with the Croatians controlling the west-

ern half and the Mtis-lims ruling in the east.The European Com-mtmity then investedover $200 million torebtiild and reunifyMostar. Yet the cityremains divided, withno prospect of recon-ciliation in sight.

The Bosnian Croatscan destroy the Feder-ation at will. Theirpolitical organiza-tion, the Reptiblicof Her/.og-Bosna, al-ready boasts all thetrappings of a state. Ithas its own 50,000-man army. It deliversthe mail, runs theschools and collectstaxes. Most impor-tant, like the Repub-lika Srpska, it has apowerful ally nextdoor in the Republicof Croatia. It isalready closely linkedto its mother state:Bosnian Croats carryCroatian passports,use Croatian currency

and (joatian license plates, route their telephone callsthrotigh Croatia and vote in Croatian elections, asthey did in Croatia's October 29, 1995, parliamentaryelections.

Moreover, Croatia is a willing ally and partner in theFederation's destruction. (Croatia's strongman. Presi-dent Franjo Tudjman, has shown undisguised contemptfor the Bosnian Muslims. Even as he paraded withRichard Holbrooke in Dayton, he was promoting aCroatian general, Tihomir Blaskic, charged recently bythe international war crimes tribtma! with anti-Muslimcrimes against humanity. The tribtmal alleged that dur-ing the 1993-1994 Mtislim-Croat war Blaskic oversaw thesystematic killing or expulsion of "alriiost the entireMuslim civilian population in the Lasva valley" in cen-

Proposcd New Bt)und.irv

Currently Under Bosnian/Croat Control

Currently Under Serb Control

MAV HV |IM MOI.I.OWAV KOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

DECEMBER 18,1995 THE NEW REPUBLIC 17

tral Bosnia—deeds that Tudjman apparently felt weretio bar to advancement. Tudjman has also spokenopenly of seizing Croatia's share of Bosnia and even ofdividing it in two with Serbia.

If the Bosnian Croats oppose the Federation, why didthey join it in the first place? In early 1994 the UnitedStates offered Tudjman blandishments that he couldnot refuse. In particular, the U.S. promised to help himregain the large chunks of C'roatian territory (aboutone-third of that cotmtry) then controlled by rebelCroatian Serbs. Toward that end, the United Stateshelped Croatia build a powerful army by turning ablind eye to weaponry flowing into (Croatia in clear vio-lation of the U.N. arms embargo. The United Statesalso sent a team of retired U.S. army generals to Croatiato teach tactics and strateg)' to Ooatia's new army.Other aid, still concealed, was probably sent as well.

The results of American assistance have been spec-tacular. In May of this year, the Croatian army recap-tured Western Slavonia in two days. In August theentire Krajina region, a Serb-populated Croatian ter-ritory that easily threw off Croat rule in 1991, wasreconquered in four days. And last month, faced withthis Croat military juggernaut, Serbia's President Slo-bodan Milosevic agreed to give up Eastern Slavoniawithout a fight and transfer it back to Croatia in one totwo years.

Thus the Muslim-Croat Federation paid handsomeshort-term dividends for the Croats. But Tudjman stillhas no long-term interest in making the Federationwork. In fact, his main inducement to cooperate willvanish with his recovery of Eastern Slavonia, which is thelast Ooatian area still in Serb hands. Tudjman tippedhis hand last May when he told a British parliamentarianthat he envisioned a Bosnia eventually divided and con-quered by Croatia and Serbia, a scheme he illustratedwith a now-notorious sketch on a menu. His remarksechoed earlier reports that he and Milosevic had agreedto carve up Bosnia between them in March 1991, thesame year in which the Croat leader told then U.S.Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann that"Bosnia has never had any real existence," and "shouldbe di\ided between Serbia and Croatia."

In short, the Muslini-Ooat Federation is a\irtual deadletter. W ien it collapses, there is bound to be renewedfighting between Croats and Muslims over disputed ter-ritory unless their divorce is carefully agreed to inadvance. Renewed Croat-Muslim fighting could in turncause a wider unraveling of the Dayton accord by trig-gering renewed Serl>Mtislini and SerI>Croat fighting.

The Bosnian Serbs remain especially bitter aboutthree aspects of the Dayton accorci: its award ofSarajevo and Corazde to the Federation andthe narrow width of the Posavina O»rridor, the

Serbs' territorial connector in northern Bosnia. TheBelgrade Serbs would also like to renege on theirpromise to return Eastern Slavonia to Croatia and toclaim it for Serbia Instead. Figliting between Croats andMuslims would create a golden opportunity for Serbs to

gain these goals by force while Muslim and Croat forcestie each other down. And if the Serbs jump through thiswindow of opportunity we will be back where we began,with a three-way war.

Alternately, renewed Croat-Muslim fighting couldalso end with a SerlvCroat conquest of Muslim landsand a two-way division of Bosnia between Belgrade andZagreb, following the lines of their rumored 1991agreement. Such an outcome would be quieter in theshort run but would surely lead to guerrilla war, massivenew flows of refugees and the cruel denial of Muslimnational freedom.

S ome 60,000 NATO and non-NATO troops are slatedfor deployment to implement the Dayton planshortly after its signing in Paris later this month.The United States will provide 20,000 soldiers

for the implementation force, or tFOR, as it is called.These forces are assigned to patrol the roughly 550-tiiile border between the Federation and the RepublikaSrpska, to separate the two sides' forces and to overseetheir deployment back to temporary barracks awayfrom the front lines.

U.S. forces will face two problems. First, there is nosecure peace in Bosnia for the tFOR peacekeepers to keep.Peacekeepers can bolster a stable peace accord, but theydo little good before such an accord is in place. Andbecause the Dayton agreement is incomplete, it may notprove stable. A worst-case scenario, and not an unlikelyone, is that the shooting will start while IFOR is stilldeployed in Bosnia, and Ainerican soldiers will be caughtin the crossfire, perhaps in the midst of a presidentialcampaign. The Clinton administration might then beforced to withdraw U.S. forces ignominiously, as it didafter casualties in Somalia sparked an outcry at home.Even if tFOR is able to keep a lid on thefighting whileit isdeployed in Bosnia, the American effort will neverthelessbe wasted if the fighting resumes later, as it almost cer-tainly will unless the Croat-Muslim conflict is resolved.

The second problem is that U.S. forces will have twomissions in Bosnia that work at cross-purposes: peace-keeping and arming the Muslims. The impact of theU.N. arms embargo has fallen unevenly on the threebelligerents, hitting the Bosnian Muslims hardest.Today they are outgimned by both the Croats and theSerbs and cannot defend themselves. Thus, one reasonIFOR is needed is to protect the Muslims from the Croatsand the Serbs while the peace plan is implemented.The need to establish security for the Muslims will con-tinue even after the agreement is implemented. Other-wise the Muslims' weakness will be a standing invitationto both the Croats and Serbs to return to war once tFORleaves. Hence the U.S. will have to bolster the BosnianMuslim army before it can leave Bosnia. 1 he Muslimarmy should be strengthened to a point where it has afair chance of defending successfully against a Croat orSerb attack. If the U.S. leaves without creating such apower balance it will leave behind a powder keg.

Arming the Muslims, however, clashes with the neu-continued on page 21

18 THE NEW REPUBLIC DECEMBER la, 1995

Beirut to Bosnia

I f the U.S. contributes 20,000troops, as planned, to a 60,000-strong NATO peacekeeping force in

Bosnia, the rcsuitwill be the latestexample of what (he Pentagon knowsby the acronym CO nv: OperationsOther Than War. Its success maydepend on how well the Clintonadministration has learned the lessonsof previous attempts at OOTV\: peace-keeping, peace-making and nation-btiilding in Lebanon, Somalia andHaiti. In these three cases, the samepattern has been repeated: early suc-cess in achieving narrowly defmedgoals followed by catastrophe andwithdrawal when "mission creep" ledto ambitiotis attempts at reconstrtict-ing disordered states and societies.

The terrorist bombing of the U.S.Marine barracks in Lebanon on Octo-ber 23,1983, which killed 241 Ameri-can soldiers, has overshadowed thefact that the initial interventi(jn of theU.S. in Lebanon was a success. Thepurpose of that first mission—in whichthe U.S. joined France and Italy in amultinational forct—was to imposepeace among the warring factions inLebanon in the aftermath of Israel'sJune 1982 invasion long enough topermit the troops from the PalestineLiberation Organization (PLO) to beevacuated. By earK September 1982,this operation had been accom-plished. On September 16, however,six days after the U.S. Marines hadreturned to their ships, LebaneseChristian militiamen began a tliree-day slaughter of 800 Palestinianrefugees in the Sabra and Shatilarefugee camps.

President Reagan then sent 1,200marines back into Lebanon in lateSeptember 1982. Doing so was a disas-trous mistake. The first interventionhad followed a strict timetable (theadministration promised the Marineswould be withdrawn alter thirty days),and the U.S., along with its allies, hadnot taken sides with one or another ofthe warring parties. The new missionin Lebanon was hound by neither ofthese constraints. There was no datefor a pullout. Even worse, the Reaganadministration committed the U.S. tothe task of strengthening the govern-ment of President Aiiiin CJemayel—agovei niTient that existed more in the-ory than in reality. According to Rea-gan, on May 17, 1983, the U.S. wasnow in Lebanon "to help the new gov-

ernment of Lebanon maintain orderuntil it can organize its military andits poliee and asstmie control of itsborders and its own internal security."As a result of mission creep, the U.S.committed itself to supporting a fee-ble government and joining as a com-batant in the Lebanese ci\il war—ambitious tasks without the support ofthe American public, hi February1984, three months after the hombingof the Beirut Marine barracks, theU.S. began its ignominious pullout.

In December 1992, President Bushsetin motion another misadventure inOOTW, this time in Somalia. The Clin-ton administration expanded a rela-tively successful humanitarian reliefoperation into a more ambitiousnation-lniilding effort—the familiarpattern of initial success in a strictlydefined task followed by mission creepand disaster. In its attempt to helprebuild a Somali government, the Clin-ton administration abandoned neu-trality and took sides in the struggleamong rival Somali factions. After twodozen U.N. peacekeepers from Pak-istan were killed by supporters ofMohammed Farah Aidid, the U.S.launched a manhunt for GeneralAidid, now identified as an evil "war-lord. "In a firefight between U.S. forcesand Aidid's troops in October 1993,seventy-eight American soldiers werewounded and eighteen killed; the bodyof one was dragged triumphantlythrough the streets of Mogadishu, be-fore a world watching on CNN. Onceagain, the U.S. had failed to force thereassembly of a broken society at gun-point; once again, U.S. troops engagedin a htimiliating retreat.

Compared to the debacles in Leb-anon and Somalia, the U.S. interven-tion in Haiti at first appeared to be asuccess. Faced with the prospect ofwar with the United States, the mili-tary dictatorship of General RaoulCeclias abdicated and Presidentjean-Bertiand Aiistide was restored topower in September 1994. The origi-nal all-U,S, contingent of 20,000peacekeeping troops has been re-placed by a U.N. peacekeeping forceof 6,900 troops, including 2,300 ,\mer-ican soldiers. Haiti appeared to be amodel of peacekeeping thai worked.

In the last month, however, theapparently successful settlement hasbegun to crumble. The United Statesannounced that it would withhold afraction of its aid to Haiti to punish the.Vistide government for not movingmore rapidly to privatize govennnent-

controlled companies. Then, onNovember 7,Jean-Hubert Feuille, acousin and close political ally of Aris-tide, was murdered by gunmen. AtFeuille's funeral on November 11,Aristide uttered a fiei y speech callingon supporters to disarm his enemies.The speech was followed hy acts ofarson, looting and murder of politicalopponents by some of Aristide's fol-lowers. Even worse, on Friday, Novem-ber 24, Aristide alarmed the U.S. byraising the possibility that he wouldstay in power for three more years (hehad promised to leave office on Febru-ary 7 after a free election on Decem-ber 17 in which he would not be a can-didate). Wiietber an orderly anddemocnitie transition will take place asplanned, permitting the exit of U.S.along with U.N. troops from Haiti,remains to be seen.

The lessons of these adventures inOOTW for the U.S. in Bosnia are clear.The U.S. and its allies might succeed,as long as success is defined in the nar-rowest possible terms—the separationof hostile forces by neutral peacekeep-ers. If the U.S. tries to provide themtiscle for a powerless central govern-ment with a complicated multiethnicconstitution and little legitimacyamong rival populations (as in Leb-anon) or to take sides with one grouprather than another in an attempt at"nation-building" by outsiders (as inSomalia), the NATO effort in Bosnia islikely to end in failure and humilia-tion. The U.S. must choose betweenenforcing a de facto partition of thedefunct Bosnian state and a moreambitious attempt to reconstruct afederal Bosnia under a new centralgovernment with a complex and prob-ably unworkable constitution.

Even a modest and successfulpeacekeeping effort in the Balkansmay be prolonged indefinitely. Thesituation in Cyprus offers anotherstriking parallel: just as BosnianCroats and Bosnian Serbs are likelyto seek annexation of their fragmentsof Bosnia by C roatia and Serbia,respectively, so Greek C-ypriots havesought to join Greece, while Turkeyhas occupied and governed the Turk-ish .section of tbe island. If the parallelholds in other respects, NATO forces, ifsent into Bosnia, will not be disen-gaged soon. The U.N. peacekeepingforce has been keeping Creek andTurkish Cypriots apart since March1964.

MrcHAEi, LiNn

20 THE NEW REPUBLIC DECEMBER I8 , 1995

tral stance that peacekeeping requires. PeacekeepersinN-ite attack unless they act as honest brokers, showingno favoritism toward any faction. If the Americans arcperceived as taking sides, which is sure to happen oncewe start arming and training the Muslim army, theSerbs and Croats are bound to consider the Americansas adversaries. U.S. peacekeepers patrolling the longFederation-Republika Srpska border will be in\iting andeasy targets for terrorist retribution.

T he U.S. never should have signed the Daytonagreement. It should, rather, have forged a tri-partite partition of Bosnia, in expectation thatthe Croatian and Serbian republics would join a

Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia, respectively. In analternative—and better—agreement, the Muslim statewould be given a viable national territory. Its borderswould not be unduly long, would not include Muslimenclaves isolated in Serb or Croat territory, would be mil-itarily defensible and would provide access to the sea.The Muslims would be promptly armed so that theycould defend themselves without having to rely on Amer-ican or NAio ground forces but nol given enough offen-sive capability to lead them to try to take lost territory.While this arming went on, the Muslim state would besecured by a NATO promise to use massive NATO (largelyU.S.) air power to assist Muslim forces if the need were toarise. Under such a scenario, the European NATO statesand the U.S. would pursue a division of labor: Europewould assume all peacekeeping dulies while the U.S.concentrated on arming and training the Muslim forcesand on maintaining a ready sword in the air. No U.S.peacekeepers would go to Bosnia. Finally, a transfer ofpopulations caught behind new national borders wouldbe organized and subsidized by the major powers.

hnportant elements of this ideal strategy are nolongtrr possible because the Clinton administration hascommitted the U.S. to the Dayton program—with itsincomplete partition, its cross-purposes and its lack ofprovisions for population transfer. But the U.S. cannotnow abandon Dayton without cutting an absurd appear-ance. So Dayton must go forward.

To have any chance of success, however, the Daytonplan must at least be repaired. In the first place, thepartition of the Muslim-Croat Federation should bepromptly arranged. The U.S. should oversee its detailsand apply whatever coercion the parties require. TheU.S. now seems ready to manage the Serbian exit fromBosnia but remains strangely unaware that the Muslimsand the Croats will inevitably part ways as well. Instead,the U.S. should develop a plan for managing thebreakup of the doomed Muslim-Croat Federation with amininuim of bloodshed.

The U.S. should also accept the need to organizesome further transfer of populations. The Dayton accordincludes surreal language referring to the return ofrefugees to their homes, implying that Bosnia now mightsomehow return to the stauis quo ante. This wouldsurely be desirable from a humanitarian and moral per-spective. However, save for a handful of special cases, it is

not going to happen. Bosnia has witnessed mass murderand other unthinkable horrors. Rivers of blood haveflowed. All three parties are uncontrite and deeply bitter.There can be no restoration of integrated life until a pro-found reconciliation takes place. This is decades away.Hence, most of the ethnic cleansing that occurred in thiswar is going to stand for now. In fact, even more transfersare needed. For example, many of Sarajevo's Serbs willwant to leave once that city comes under full Muslimcontrol. Most Serbs will also llee Eastern Slavonia if Milo-sevic turns it over to the Croats. The U.S. should acceptthese sad facts and develop plans to ease the hardshipthat these migrations inflict on the displaced.

Finally, tiio United States should press forward witharming the Bosnian Muslims. The Serbs and Croatsshould be urged to publicly accept this arming pro-gram, to give U.S. peacekeepers exposed in Bosnia ameasure of political cover. The U.S. goal should be togive the Muslims a strong self-defense capability, ade-quate to deter new Croat or Serb aggression. Even ifSerb and Croat leaders publicly accepted U.S. militaryaid to Bosnia, however, this part of the accord couldcompromise U.S. neutrality, making peacekeepingefforts much harder.

If, however, the Dayton agreement falls apart—because, for instance, Bosnian Serbs sabotage it—theU.S. will not be sent back to square one, because theC-linton administration will have finally begun to dowhat it should have done long ago: arm the BosnianMuslims. If the NATO force is not, in the end, sent, or issoon withdrawn, the U.S. would not face the presentcontradiction between neutral peacekeeping andarmed support for one side. It could then try, withoutDayton s restrictions, to build up a Bosnian state capa-ble of defending itself. Furthermore, with the deal hav-ing fallen through, European opposition to arming theBosnian Muslims would be weakened. Even if Daytontails, therefore, good may come of it.

Peacemaking in Bosnia has been slow and diffi-cult because the U.S. shrank from partition. Itshrank from partition because partition is ugly.But in Bosnia, sadly, it is also the only feasible

scheme for peace. This error reflects a general Ameri-can tendency to underestimate the power and in-tractability of nationalism; it reflects, too, a dogmaticAmerican faith that other multiethnic societies can har-monize themselves, that ethnic groups elsewhere canlearn to live together as America's immigrants have.This faith finds expression in reflexive U.S. efforts tokeep together all states that face communal civil wars,lately including Iraq, the LSSR and Yugoslavia.

But U.S. policymakers must be willing at times todecide that some states cannot be sustained and shouldinstead be disassembled. Only if we accept this realityhonestly and promptly will we have a reasonable chanceof managing their disassembly and keeping it relativelypeaceful. Partition should remain a last resort, but,regrettably, we still live in a world where it is sometimesnecessary. •

DECEMBER 18,1995 THE NEW REPUBLIC 21