1

2

3

PrefaceSince June 2005, Dantewada District (formerly part of Bastar district), Chhattis-

garh, has been in the news for an alleged uprising of adivasis against the Commu-nist Party of India (Maoist). Most media and official reports described this move-ment, known as Salwa Judum, as a spontaneous and self-initiated reaction to ‘Mao-ist oppression’, and hailed it as a turning point in the fight against Naxalism. At thesame time, a few reports indicated that people had been displaced in large numbersand were living in miserable conditions in camps. While this was officially attribut-ed to Maoist threats and retaliation against those joining the Salwa Judum, straynews also came in about the forcible emptying out of villages as part of the govern-ment’s anti-Maoist policy, and of excesses committed by members of the Salwa Ju-dum and security forces.

A fourteen-member team from five organizations conducted an investigationbetween 28 November and 1 December 2005 in Bijapur and Bhairamgarh blocks ofDantewada district, focusing specifically on the violation of human rights and theimpact on people’s everyday lives. The organisations are: People’s Union for CivilLiberties (PUCL) Chhattisgarh, People’s Union For Civil Liberties (PUCL) Jhark-hand, People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) Delhi, Association for the Pro-tection of Democratic Rights (APDR) West Bengal, and Indian Association of Peo-ple’s Lawyers (IAPL).

The information in this report is based on: a) Discussions with government offi-cials and paramilitary forces; b) interviews with people in Bhairamgarh, Matwada,Meertur and Gangaloor camps; c) discussions with people we met in villages thatwe visited, d) interviews with leaders and members of the Salwa Judum; and e)discussions with fact-finding members of a CPI team. We have also relied on theCPI’s Open Letter to the Prime Minister dated 16 November 2005, detailing theirfindings, two CPI (Maoist) press releases dated 10 October 2005 and 20 November2005, and their Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee newsletter, Prabhat, datedJuly-December 2005, as well as press clippings from June 2005 till the present.

On the basis of the fact-finding, three facts stood out strongly, all of which rancounter to the government’s assertions: First, it is clear that the Salwa Judum is nota spontaneous people’s movement, but a state-organized anti-insurgency campaign.Second, it is misleading to describe the situation as simply one where ordinary vil-lagers are caught between the Maoists and the military. The Maoists have wide-spread support and as long as people continued to live in the villages, it was diffi-cult for the government to isolate the Maoists. Rather than questioning its own non-performance on basic development, the government has resorted to clearing villag-es on a large scale. Tens of thousands of people are now refugees in temporaryroadside camps or living with relatives with complete disruption of their daily lives.Prospects for their return are currently dim. Third, the entire operation, instead ofbeing a ‘peace mission’ as it is claimed, has escalated violence on all sides. Howev-er, only the murders by Maoists are recognized, and the Salwa Judum and paramil-itary operate with complete impunity. The rule of law has completely broken down.

4

Contents

Chapter 1. The Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51. Dantewada: Region and its People 52. Natural Resources and the Rhetoric of Development 73. Political Movements 9

a. The Maoist Movement 10b. Jan Jagran Abhiyan 11

Chapter II. Salwa Judum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141. The Emergence of the Salwa Judum 142. Mode of Operation of the Salwa Judum 183. Attacks by Salwa Judum 194. CPI (Maoist)’s Violence 225. Displacement and Life in Camps 246. Non-registration of FIRs and Atrocities by Security Forces 257. The Breakdown of Civil Administration 28

Chapter III. ‘Undeclared War’: The Militarization of Adivasi Society . . . . . . 29Chapter IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

List of boxes1. Deaths Due to Hunger and Malnutrition 72. Indian Reserve Battalions 93. Malik Makbuja Scam 104. Mahendra Karma’s Colourful Career 125. The Ban on Sale of Tendu patta 166. Case of Kamlesh Paikra: Threat to Independent Journalists 277. Excerpts from Home Ministry’s Annual Report 2004-05 308. Excerpts from District Collector’s Work Proposal for Salwa Judum 2005 32AnnexuresI. Killings by the Security Forces/ Salwa Judum 38II. Killings by Maoists during the Salwa Judum Operations 40

5

CHAPTER ONE The Background1. Dantewada: Region and Its People

Dantewada district, situated at the south-ern tip of Chhattisgarh, has borders with Ma-harashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, and waspart of Bastar kingdom till 1947. After indepen-dence, it was merged with Kanker kingdom toform Bastar, the largest district (39,114 sq km)in the state of Madhya Pradesh. In 1998, Bastarwas divided into three districts, Kanker, Bastarand Dantewada, and in 2001 all three districtsbecame part of the newly formed state of Chhat-tisgarh. Recently, Bijapur has been carved outas a new police district in Dantewada.

With a population of 7.91 lakh, Dantewadadistrict has the lowest population density in thestate at 40.8 persons per square kilometre (2001census). Topographically, the region is com-posed of an undulating plateau, with hill rang-es cut by a number of rivulets that flow into theIndravati river. These riverbeds provide thespace for most rural settlements. Godavari andMahanadi are two major rivers that arise fromthe Bastar uplands.

The district is divided into four tehsils: Bho-palpatnam, Bijapur, Dantewada and Konta. TheSalwa Judum and police operations originatedin Bijapur tehsil, but have now spread to Kon-ta. The people inhabiting the district are pre-dominantly tribal – mostly Maria Gonds andDorla – accounting for 82% of the rural popula-tion. Scheduled Castes account for about 3% ofthe population and the rest are OBC communi-ties like the Sundis, Kallars etc. A number ofimmigrants, mostly traders, but also lower lev-el officials, school teachers, health workers etc.,have settled in the small market towns like Bi-japur, Sukma, Konta and Dantewada. The Bail-adilla mines hardly employed any local adiva-sis, with the result that the mining town ofKirandul is a non-tribal enclave, with little con-nection to the surrounding countryside.

This picture of a large number of fairly smalltribal villages, and a few large villages, withnon-tribal households is supported by the cen-

sus data. Of the 1220 villages in the district, 455are wholly tribal and another 458 are more than90 per cent tribal, i.e. 75 per cent of the district’svillages are almost completely tribal. Only 76villages, or approximately 6 per cent of the to-tal, have less than 50% tribal population. Thelarger villages serve as local markets and it isthese that tend to have greater non-tribal pop-ulations.

About 38 per cent of the rural area in thedistrict is outside the village and part of ‘forest’land. The 2001 Census states these forests have202 villages, of which about 90 are inhabited.What is pertinent is that these villages have noland rights and are at the mercy of the forestdepartment. [Dantewada has one National Park(Indravati) and two wildlife sanctuaries (Bhair-amhgarh and Pamed)]. Other than these, the restof the villages occupy 62% of the district, butagain 46% of this is also designated as ‘forest’.Hence in total, about two-thirds of the districtbelongs to the Forest Department, at least onpaper. Some of these forest areas may have beenvillage lands earlier. For instance, in the areasunder the Bhopalpatnam and Kutru zamindaris,feudal oppression during colonial times forcedresidents to flee their villages. After 1947 andthe abolition of Zamindari, these residents cameback to find their lands notified as forests.

The villagers are heavily dependent on bothagriculture and forests. Of the total village land,barely 29% land is cultivated, and as said earli-er, nearly half is designated as forest and therest is either uncultivable or is culturable waste.The average landholding per household (2001Census) works out to 1.01 hectare, i.e., 2.5 acres.Irrigation being by and large absent (barely 2%have some sort of irrigation), only a single cropis possible. The shifting of villages due to eco-nomic reasons is therefore common. In the 2001Census, there are 30 such villages that have be-come uninhabited (this is in addition to 112uninhabited forest villages). Some of these vil-lages continue to practice shifting cultivation inforest areas, a practice that has been banned by

6

the government, except in the Abujhmarh ar-eas to the north of the Indravati.

The land actually under cultivation may besignificantly more than these figures suggest.Villagers have cleared significant areas desig-nated as forest land within the village for culti-vation. Most of the people own land, thus 84%of the main workers in rural Dantewada and55% of the marginal workers are cultivators. Yet,the paucity of land, and the low yields forces6% of the main workers and 39% of the margin-al workers to work as agricultural labour (in all,around 14% of the total working population).Such employment is provided on the lands ofthose who own larger and/or more fertile plots.They work either as naukar, i.e. free labour ob-taining a seasonal wage, or as kabadi, i.e. at-tached labour with a larger landowner, gettingfood in lieu of wages. Such sale and purchaseof labour is concentrated in some villages whilebeing wholly absent in most others. Of the dis-trict’s 1,220 villages, nearly 400 have no agri-cultural labourers and in all nearly 800 villageshave less than 10%, while 96 villages have morethan 50% agricultural labour. Labourers alsomigrate to neighbouring areas in AndhraPradesh and Maharashtra for work.

Given the rain-fed agriculture, the collec-tion and sale of non-timber forest produce atweekly haats (markets) or to agents is an impor-tant source of local income, a fact that under-lines the people’s dependence on the forest, andtheir forced interaction with Forest Departmentofficials and traders.

At the village level, authority and respectis commanded by the patel/pedda/mukhia (head-man) and the priest. In some cases, the sameperson performed both functions. The next rungin the structure is the pargan manjhi, the head ofa cluster of villages, a person of considerableclout. The headmen, in many instances, belongto households that are the oldest residents ofthe village, or those who initially set up the vil-lage. The process of the shifting of populationsled to later settlements within existing revenuevillages, with the newer settlers obtaining low-er amounts of land and less productive lands in

comparison to the earlier settlers. Thus, whilecultural practices ensure that economic differ-ences are not visible in dress and size of dwell-ing, the older practice of collective labour hasnow become a means of garnering the labour ofthe less well-off by those better-off.

Literacy levels are low in rural areas at 29%for men and 14% for women, with an overallrural literacy rate of 21%. Yet this presents apartial picture. In Bijapur tehsil for instance,there are only 52 villages in which more than25% of the population is literate, and 35 villag-es have no literates at all. This is related to theavailability and the quality of schools in the dis-trict: out of the 1220 villages, 214 do not haveeven a primary school and, of these, for 107 vil-lages the school is more than 5 kilometres away.The presence of a school building in the village,moreover, does not ensure that teachers areavailable. In some cases, teachers use the excuseof the presence of Maoist organisations in thevillage to remain absent. In any case, with theongoing Salwa Judum, schools have come un-der attack. Security forces have been usingschool buildings as temporary camps and Mao-ists have been blasting these buildings to pre-vent security forces from finding pucca sheltersin the villages.

The situation is distinctly worse regardinghealth facilities. Out of the 1220 villages, thereis no medical facility in 1161 villages. A prima-ry health centre exists only in 26 villages; a pri-vate registered medical practitioner in 17 vil-lages, a government subsidised one in 12 and acommunity health worker in 122 villages. A tell-ing comment on the inadequacy of the healthinfrastructure and the health and well being ofthe people is provided through the studies con-ducted by Chhattisgarh PUCL in earlier years.As early as 1987, an investigation into repeatedreports of blood dysentery in Bastar thatclaimed many lives each year revealed that peo-ple had very limited access to potable water. Amore recent study during 2004 revealed thatthings had not really improved very much inthe last 18 years(See Box 1: Deaths due to Hungerand Malnutrition).

7

2. Natural Resources and the Rhetoric ofDevelopmentWhile the people of Dantewada are ex-

tremely poor, their land is extremely rich, bothin terms of minerals and forests. When the gov-ernment talks of ‘development’, it appears tohave in mind the development of these resourc-es for private profit as against the developmentof its people. When organisations and move-ments have pointed out that the two are not

synonymous, and that the way mining and otherindustrial activity has been practiced in the pasthas resulted in the displacement and consequentpauperisation of tribals in this region, they arecalled ‘anti-development’.

The earliest commercial mining was for ironore deposits, which are among the best qualityin the world. Some of this iron ore is currentlymined at the Bailadilla mines at Kirandul/Bach-eli, wholly for export, located in the centre of

Box 1 Deaths Due to Hunger and MalnutritionA team from PUCL Chhattisgarh visited villages Burgum in Kuakopnda block and Hirpal in

Geedam block of Dantewada district following newspaper reports of hunger deaths in southBastar during March 2004.The following deaths due to hunger and malnutrition were documented.

Village Burgum Village Hirpal Village Burgum Village MutanpalBlock Kuakonda Block Geedam Block Bastanar Block BastanarDist. Dantewada Dist. Dantewada Dist. Bastar Dist. BastarBhima (7 years)Bidde (1.5 years) Sukki (60 years) Pintu (2 years) Sappe (50 years)Podiya (35 years) Pidde Bai (20 years) Mangay (40 years) Jagri (45 years)Sunil Sunita (9 months) Raju (40 years) Laxmi (60 years)Vinay Kumar Bachchi (12 days) Machi (2 years) Payke (70 years)Devmati Mangli (60 years) Gonchand (1 year)Lassi Dhaniram (7 years)Dewa Dole (60 years)Kosa Ayati (35 years)Esamti Diwar (2 years)BuddhuAnda (55 years)

The main findings of the team were:

i) In the villages visited there is no effective system of food security. There is no effectiveinfrastructure for agricultural production, and neither is there any other source of employment.So people lack the means to obtain the minimum food levels necessary for basic health.Consequently, a large proportion of the population is a victim of severe malnutrition.

ii) There is no access to safe and potable drinking water. Even the water from hand-pumps iscontaminated, and foul. Village people are forced to obtain water from small holes dug in riverbeds.Much illness is due to lack of access to safe water.

iii) Doctor and paramedical workers are deployed in the villages only on paper. They do not go tothe people. Their behavior is very unsympathetic, and often insulting. Their only concern is withtheir salaries. Some sources suggested that health personnel in the areas under Naxalite influenceare reluctant to go to villages because if they are residents of these areas, they are suspected bythe police of having sympathies for the Naxalites and consequently harassed.

8

Dantewada district. The only rail line in thisregion is from the port of Vishakapatnam toKirandul. The mines have provided no employ-ment locally, what they have given the regionis pollution of the rivers Sankini and Dankini.A considerable amount of iron ore from Bache-li is also illegally sold on the black market. Inthe 1970s, the widespread practice of non-trib-al men working in the mines keeping adivasiwomen and then abandoning them was high-lighted. Not much has changed since then. Thereare also substantial deposits of tin, corundum,granite, lapidolite (lithium ore), marble and sil-iminite. Tin is illegally mined and smelted, con-suming vast amounts of timber for charcoal inthe process. The business is run by the immi-grant settlers who pay bribes to the police inorder to conduct their trade.

These efforts at exploiting natural resourc-es have gained momentum since the formationof the state of Chhattisgarh in 2001. The newstate government has entered into agreementswith several industrial houses such as the Tatasand Essar to set up steel plants on land leasedfrom the state. Plans are afoot for intensifiedmining with the Essar group setting up a pipe-line to transport 8 million tonnes of iron ore slur-ry per annum to the Vishakhapatnam port. ANational Mining Development Corporation(NMDC) steel plant has already been initiatedat Nagarnar village in Bastar, despite local pro-tests.

Under the Panchayat Extension to Sched-uled Areas Act 1996 (PESA), it is necessary toconsult the Gram Sabha before acquiring landin Fifth Schedule areas. To the contrary, in Na-garnar, the government used violence againstprotestors, and resolutions that were unfavour-able to the government were simply replacedby pro-plant resolutions in the books. A spongeiron plant has already come up nearby in Raikot,emitting thick black fumes into the air. Com-plaints by the panchayat about the pollutionhave been ignored. In 1992, when the Bharat JanAndolan protested against a proposed steelplant at Maolibahat village, its leader andformer Collector of Bastar, Dr. B.D. Sharma was

paraded through Jagdalpur with a garland ofshoes by BJP activists.

The government is also proposing to revivethe Bodhghat Hydroelectric project, which hadyears ago been stopped by the Indira Gandhigovernment following pressure from a localconservation group, BASCON. The Ministry ofEnvironment and Forests approved the diver-sion of 5,734 hectares of forestland for this inFebruary 2004 on the grounds that compensa-tory afforestation had already been carried out.The Polavaram dam in Andhra Pradesh willalso submerge some 2,335 families in Konta dis-trict. Other major changes planned for theBastar-Dantewada region include the Dalli-Ra-jhara-Raoghat- Jagdalpur railway line. TheMardum Defence Base and a Jungle WarfareTraining College near Kanker have entrencheda military presence in the region. The latter hasreportedly cut down a large number of trees inthe reserve forest.

But nearly six decades of official boast of‘development’ has little to show for it. In fact,while literacy and health indicators are misera-ble, the one indicator that is thriving is the ratioof police stations to population. A cursory lookat the infrastructure for development shows thatwhile Dantewada boasts of 37 police stationsacross the district for its 374 panchayats (with33 new police stations to come up), there areonly 26 primary health centers (PHCs), 26 High-er Secondary Schools, and four degree collegesin the district.

More money is being allocated for securityand anti-Naxal operations than for develop-ment. According to the Ministry of Home Af-fairs’ Annual Report 2004–05, Rs 150 crore willbe reimbursed to the nine naxal-affected states,Rs 296 crore was released during 2003–04 forthe modernisation of police forces in naxal-af-fected districts, Rs 475 crore has been set asidefor raising 19 Indian Reserve Battalions (IRBs)(the cost of raising one IRB is Rs 25 crore), (seeBox 2: Indian Reserve Battalions), Rs 825 crore hasbeen allocated for 55 severely naxal-affecteddistricts under the Planning Commission’sBackward Districts Initiative for filling in “crit-

9

ical gaps in physical and social infrastructure”for a period of just one year. For the construc-tion of rural roads, the Ministry of Rural Devel-opment is to provide Rs 37.5 crore per annumfor naxal-affected areas under the Prime Minis-ter’s Grameen Swarojgar Yojana (PMGSY).

Indeed, what passes for development inofficial parlance has a security imprint. Thephysical infrastructure to be built includes - oth-er than police stations - roads, bridges, etc.While roads, bridges and electrification will nodoubt benefit ordinary people, it is evident thattheir needs are hardly what is behind the bring-ing in of the Border Roads Organisation forbuilding roads in the region. An official WorkProposal from the Collector’s office states thatthe real rationale of road building and widen-ing is to flush the Maoists out from the junglesand make troop movement in the area easier(Collector’s Work Proposal). The BRO road fromJagdalpur to Dantewada, for instance, is not

being built through the panchayats, and thusdoes not even provide local employment.

To summarise, the adivasis and other localinhabitants of the region have little possibilityof actual development and are acutely awareof their marginal and exploited status. For theoverwhelming majority in the villages, agricul-ture is unviable since plots are small and thereis no investment in irrigation, there are severerestrictions on the use of forests partly due tothe creation of wildlife reserves, the prices offorest produce are deliberately kept low by trad-ers and the government, and the governmentmachinery treats them with apathy and con-tempt. On the other hand, there is a small mi-nority – mostly trading families, shopkeepers,members of the bureaucracy, lawyers and oth-ers living in the small towns, and some rich trib-al leaders who have gained through politics orcorruption involving illicit felling of trees (seeBox 3: Malik Makbuja Scam) who want large de-velopment projects.

In a situation where the state claims rightsto the land and the people who live on that landare treated as peripheral to the national econo-my, a mass base of the Maoists challenging thisstatus quo forms a threat to the state’s plans forheavy industry and profits in this region.

3. Political MovementsThe first political mobilisation in the former

Bastar district under the aegis of a political par-ty took place in the mid-1970s, by the Commu-nist Party of India (CPI). It created its organisa-tion in the Bailadilla mines, around issues ofcontrol over mineral resources and work oppor-tunities for locals. The struggle in the mines wasbrutally suppressed through state repression,including police firing on protesting workersduring 1976-77 that resulted in the death of sev-eral workers and members of their families. Themovement begun by the CPI spread throughlarge areas of Bastar and brought the party elec-toral success in two of the three legislative as-sembly seats. The other issues taken up by themcentred around the lack of amenities and accessto forests. The CPI had for long demanded an

Box 2India Reserve Battalions

The Government of India raises one ormore India Reserve Battalions [IRBs] in eachstate. The concept of IRBs was mooted bythe Ministry of Home Affairs “in thebackground of increasing problems of law andorder and emerging internal security scenarioin the country, which put considerablepressure on the Central Police Forces”. Asof 2004-05, there were 85 IRBs in the country,each having 1,007 personnel. Thesebattalions are trained by the CRPF and theBSF in fighting with modern weaponry. Theresponsibility for recruiting and maintainingthese battalions rests with the stategovernments, but the central governmentbears the expenses towards raising andtraining its personnel. However, the centralgovernment has the power to deploy the IRBsanywhere on payment to the concerned state.

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs 2004-05.

10

autonomous council for the Bastar area to en-sure a degree of independence in the formula-tion and implementation of development poli-cy.

Movements against the dominant develop-ment paradigm and rampant corruption in theadministration continued throughout the 1980sand 1990s. Many of these were local in charac-ter. These included the movement against pineforestation to feed the Ballarshah Paper Indus-tries, the movement of the women of Asna nearJagdalpur against forest enclosure and monoc-ulture forestry, and the resistance of the tribalsof Mawlibhata to a proposed steel plant on their

land. In recent times, the most serious challengeto the dominant model of development hascome from the CPI (Maoist) formations.

A. THE MAOIST MOVEMENT

The Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh,bordering Dantewada to the South, has a longhistory of peasant struggles dating back to the1940s. By the 1970s, the struggles of the peas-antry were led by a number of Marxist-Leninistparties, including CPI (ML) People’s War(PWG), a precursor to the CPI (Maoist). Around1980, PWG started an organization in the areaof present-day Dantewada district, called theDandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor San-

Box 3 Malik Makbuja ScamThe malik makbuja right refers to the right of peasants to cut trees on their own land. A widespreadscam in the 1990s led to the large scale illegal felling of trees in Bastar. It’s a classic instance of howforest and timber resources in the region have been cornered by non-adivasi and adivasi elites.

Ostensibly created to safeguard the interests of adivasis, the MP Protection of ScheduledTribes (Interest in Trees) Act 1956-57 requires the supervision of the sale of felled trees by theCollector, with the sale money being deposited in a joint account. However, agents soon took overthe process by offering to help adivasis with the complex paperwork involved, only to cheat them.Timber merchants bought land in order to fell the trees on it. Since land alienation laws restrict thepurchase of tribal land by non-tribals, timber merchants usually targeted the lands of poor non-tribals. However, rich tribal politicians such as Mahendra Karma were able to buy land from othertribals as well. Both revenue and forest staff facilitated this.

Despite questions raised in the assembly by CPI MLA Manish Kunjam and others, andcomplaints of the Collector against his own superior for collusion in the malik makbuja scam, the MPgovernment did nothing. Ekta Parishad and Samaj Parivartana Samudaya, two local organisations,took the matter to the Supreme Court (WP (Civil) No. 202 of 1995). In 1997, the Court banned allfelling in the then Bastar district of Madhya Pradesh. The Lokayukt held an independent enquiryand the matter was handed over to the CBI. A CBI FIR dated 8.12.1998 states:

“The facts contained in the writ petition, reports of Lok Ayukta and its connected papers, primafacie show that the above-named officials of Govt. of Madhya Pradesh and land owners namelyMahendra Karma, Rajaram Todem, Suresh Chand Surana, Srinivasan Awasthi, Brij Mohan Guptaand others were party of criminal conspiracy during 1992-96 to cause wrongful gain to the landowners in the matter of felling trees. It is alleged that the accused public servants bestowed unduefavours to the said land owners and others and illegally accorded permission to fell a large numberof valuable timber trees on the basis of forged and fabricated documents and in utter disregard ofthe provisions of the MP Protection of Aboriginal Tribes (Interest in Trees) Rule 1957 and MadhyaPradesh Land Revenue Code 1959.”

According to a CBI letter dated 14.10.1999, FIRs had been filed against ten people for offencesbetween 1992 and 1996 in 56 villages. However, no further action has been taken against MahendraKarma or any of the other accused.

11

gathan (DAKMS). The earliest issues taken upby these organisations revolved around oppres-sion and exploitation by ‘outsiders’, primarilythe forest and revenue departments, the police,and moneylenders. They mobilized against thepractice of forest officials levying fines and de-manding illegal payments in money and in kindfor collection of minor forest produce by locals,for use of village forest areas for cultivation, orfelling of trees for house-building. Revenue of-ficials also demanded similar payments for ex-tending cultivation. Crimes listed under theForest Act 1980 provided police officials as wellthe opportunity to extort poultry, meat, liquorand money. The sum total of the payments aswell as the recurrent need of food loans and seedloans led people to moneylenders. Another is-sue was the people’s lack of a patta (ownershippapers) on the forest lands brought under cul-tivation, and on all cultivated land in forest vil-lages. Mass organisations such as the AdivasiKisan Mazdoor Sangathan (AKMS) deployedmethods of chasing away forest and revenueofficials from villages and attacking forest posts.Many forest check-posts were abandoned.

The organisations spread quickly and cov-ered large parts of Konta, Bhopalpatnam andBijapur tehsils in less than a decade. By the late1980s, internal contradictions in adivasi societystarted being addressed. One of these was theinequality in land ownership. This inequalitywas more marked in parts of Konta tehsil in theGodavari river valley. Distribution of a part oflarger holdings controlled by a few families inthe village (often including those of the head-man and sarpanch) to those without land, andredistribution of the more fertile lands was car-ried out in some areas. Redistribution of grainwas carried out in a similar manner.

A second initiative was the creation of sang-hams in villages. These were intended to gradu-ally replace the traditional structures of author-ity at the village level, articulate issues of thevillage and settle disputes. Sanghams exist inmany villages of Dantewada today. These sang-hams are currently one of the major targets ofthe Salwa Judum as they challenge the tradi-

tional structures of local authority, and are iden-tified with the Maoists. Even the District Col-lector states that the “real strength [of Maoists]lies in sangam membership who are fromamong the villagers” and comprise none otherthan the “illiterate common man who like oth-ers takes care of his family through earning dailywages” (District Collector’s Workplan).

There were also initiatives at fixing pricesof forest produce collected and sold to traders.The most celebrated among these was the rais-ing of prices in tendu patta (beedi leaf) collec-tion. Struggles by peasant organizations man-aged to raise the rates from barely Rs 2 for 100bundles (of 100 leaves each) in the early 1980sto Rs 35 in 1989, to Rs 80 by the mid-1990s (seeBox 5: Ban on Sale of Tendu Patta).

The period from the second half of the 1990sonwards was marked by other initiatives: pre-vention of the appropriation and misuse of gov-ernment funds by Sarpanches/headmen, mo-bilisation of labour for the creation of irrigationfacilities, creation of seed banks to tide over thelack of access to seeds at harvest time, mainte-nance of land records for all cultivated lands tocounter governmental refusal to do so, effortsat rejuvenation of forests, etc. The same periodsaw the creation of similar organisations inneighbouring areas in the north: Abhujmarhand other areas in Bastar district and parts ofKanker district. By 2000, when the state ofChhattisgarh was created, the CPI-ML (PW) hadcreated substantial bases in the forest areas ofBastar, Kanker, and Dantewada.

Two decades later, the People’s War de-clared the entire tribal forest region that includesBastar and extends into Maharashtra andMadhya Pradesh as a guerrilla zone, i.e. a re-gion where the Peoples War would attempt toprevent the state officials and forces from main-taining their rule and create alternative institu-tions of what it termed ‘people’s rule’.

B. JAN JAGRAN ABHIYAN

The region has a history of political opposi-tion to the Maoists from the dominant sectionsof society (both tribal and non-tribal) in the form

12

Box 4 Mahendra Karma’s Colourful CareerMahendra Karma of the Congress (I) is one of the major tribal leaders of the Salwa Judum.

He is a known figure in the region, politically and otherwise. Originally from Pharasepal village,he belongs to the Kashyap clan. Pharasepal and its surrounding villages are known to haveseveral landed households (their wealth measured by the fact that they sell 3-4 truckloads ofrice), many of which are related to Karma. His father, Boodha Majhi, was a clan mukhia who alsoused to collect taxes for the raja.

Karma first began his political work with the All India Students Federation while he was inthe Law College at Jagdalpur. His active political career began around 1975. He went on tobecome a CPI MLA in 1978, but was denied a CPI ticket in 1981 on the grounds of his poorperformance. He joined the Congress upon this, of which his brother was already a member. Inthe 1981 elections, which he contested as a Congress candidate, he lost the Dantewada seat tothe CPI. Following turmoil in the Congress party, he joined the new party floated by MadhavraoScindia, and was one of the two Members of Parliament elected on this ticket. In the eighties, heis seen to have established close relations with business interests in Dantewada and emerged asan opponent of the CPI-led Swayatta Andolan Following the formation of Chhattisgarh state,Karma became a minister in Ajit Jogi’s cabinet. Karma is now the official ‘tribal leader’ of theCongress (I) in the state.

of the Jan Jagran Abhiyans. The acquiring oflands from large holdings and their redistribu-tion to landless households by peasant organi-zations led to the creation of a section unhappywith the Maoists. Additionally, the downsizingof the role of the headman and the priest due tothe creation of sanghams also contributed to thebacklash. Traders and contractors in tradingtowns and tehsil headquarters such as Bijapurand Bhairamgarh - who were mostly non-trib-als - added to this constituency against the Mao-ists.

In July-August 1990, the residents of Bedrevillage near Kutru killed their headman. Largecontingents of police forces were stationed in thearea. The headman’s brother, along with policeforces, started organizing retaliatory attacksagainst Maoist sympathizers. Within no timesome political leaders, notable among them thepresent MLA Mahendra Karma (see Box 4: Ma-hendra Karma’s Colourful Career) took over theleadership of this operation which was calledJan Jagran Abhiyan. The method of the Abhiy-an was to threaten a village to hand over thosemost active with the organisation, or else facean attack. Such attacks involved looting and

sometimes the consumption of grain, poultryand animals, burning of houses and householdgoods, beating and rapes. Those associating ac-tively with the sanghams (village organisations)were arrested. In case of a surrender, before orafter the attack, the surrendered were made partof the Jan Jagran Abhiyan and were required toparticipate in attacks on other villages. This pro-cess lasted for over three months, starting fromclose to the Bhopalpatnam-Bijapur road in thewest and extending towards Konta in the southof the district. The BJP government in MadhyaPradesh at that time extended full support tothe Abhiyan and an-all party committee wasformed in its support, which included the Con-gress, BJP and the CPI. (The CPI has since heldit to be a mistake on their part to have support-ed the Abhiyan.) The Abhiyan was successfulin its objective to the extent that a small clusterof villages in Konta was all that was left of thetribal-peasant organisation.

The erstwhile People’s War then launcheda counter-offensive targeting state forces, whomthey felt were the mainstay of the Abhiyan. Theretaliation by the Maoists followed the samestrategy as the attacks by the Abhiyan: surren-

13

der or suffer attack. However, only those head-men and others who had closely associated withthe Abhiyan suffered attacks on their property.Within a short while the Abhiyan ended andMaoist organisations were re-established. Manyheadmen who ran away from their villages toescape Maoist retaliation were provided spacefor a hut by the government, behind the Bijapurpolice station.

During the 1990s, one significant new issuearound which people were mobilized was ofland ownership. This was more contentious incases where the villages were more economicallydifferentiated. In 1998, villages around Pharasa-pal, Mahendra Karma’s native village, saw thebirth of another Jan Jagran Abhiyan. These werevillages where some households produced sub-stantial surpluses of grain for the market. Ma-hendra Karma led this Abhiyan from its incep-tion. The pattern of mobilizing for and againstthe Abhiyan were similar to that in 1991. Thissecond Abhiyan, of 1998 was however localizedand short-lived.

Since 2000, an increasing number of policeand paramilitary forces have been deployed inDantewada. The first battalion of the CRPF per-manently stationed in 2001 was joined by two

more battalions. An India Reserve Battalion(IRB) from Nagaland was also stationed here.

Around May-June 2005, another mobiliza-tion against Maoist organisations using localelites, both adivasi and non-adivasi, and thestate forces began. Mahendra Karma, the Con-gress MLA, was again at its forefront very soon.This time round it was named Salwa Judum.Salwa is the Gondi word for the water that issprinkled on a patient to drive an illness out,while Judum is the word for collective hunts.Salwa Judum thus means the purification hunt,seemingly meant to cure tribal society of theMaoist ‘illness’. In official circles, this campaignis also referred to as Jan Jagran Abhiyan as wellas Salwa Judum, probably indicating both thecontinuities as well as differences from the JanJagran Abhiyans of the past.

The differences are crucial: For one, the Sal-wa Judum is over a wider area, involves muchmore intensive use of state power and is cen-trally part of the central and state governments’anti-Naxal policy. Two, the attacks and killingsare more frequent and far more brutal, and itsimpact on the daily life of the local people farmore devastating.

14

The picture conveyed by the administrationand dutifully picked up by the local media isthat the Salwa Judum is a ‘spontaneous’ and self-initiated movement of local tribals, having itsimmediate trigger in some of the Maoists’ re-cent policies such as the ban on collecting tenduleaves and on participating in state elections.However, none of the earlier reports treat thematter with the seriousness it deserves and someare even frivolous in nature. According to onereport, “From a handful in number to thousands.This is how the anti-Naxal movement is gain-ing ground in the main heartland of Naxalitesin Bastar...After keeping their mouths shut fordecades, the tribal people are getting united tobattle against the People’s War.” (Manjusainath,Hindu, 2005).

However, the picture these accounts pro-vide of the Salwa Judum is far from accurate.The fact is that the Salwa Judum is being led bysections of local elites, contractors and traders,that it is officially part of anti-naxal initiatives,and that it is being actively supported by stateagencies to an unprecedented degree. It’s farfrom being a “spontaneous” response to Maoist‘tyranny’ by the local populace at large, as thegovernment is making it out to be.

A lesser known truth is that, as a conse-quence of the Salwa Judum, the lives of thou-sands of people in the region are being torn apartin the course of what the Deputy Superinten-dent of Police, Dantewada, himself described as“aghoshit yudh”, an “undeclared war”. In just thelast few months, about 30,000 people have beendisplaced from their homes. Approximately15,000 people from 420 villages are living in tem-porary camps as refugees, as per official esti-mates. Perhaps an equal number are living withrelatives in other villages or in rented accom-modation. Some reports suggest that 96 peoplefrom about 34 villages have been killed till No-vember 2005.

The experiences of the fact-finding team inDantewada district itself conveys the sense in

which an undeclared war is gaining frighteningproportions. The following quote is from ournotes:

“In Dantewada district it is a common sightto see locals moving around with traditionalweaponry such as bows and arrows. But to ourteam’s surprise and concern, we found the sightof heavily armed local surveillance parties of notonly security personnel, but also local people ontheir bicycles, in groups of five (and often more),carrying three assault rifles, one 2 inch mortarlauncher and a sten-gun, to be just as common.

“Check points on the highway (NH 16) thatruns across the northern part of Dantewada dis-trict were often manned by armed locals whodemanded that they check our vehicles in casewe were harbouring arms or food for the Mao-ists, more popularly known in this area as ‘dadalog’. These armed, non-military locals weremembers of what has come to be known as theSalwa Judum.

“A part of the team, on their way to Gan-galoor via Bijapur, were not allowed by a SalwaJudum mob to proceed any further than Bijapur.This incident occurred in the presence of localgovernment representatives and security forc-es, who made no move to intervene. The teamalso witnessed a part of a village clearing oper-ation conducted by the Naga Indian ReserveBattalion forces on 30 November, where, amongother instances of looting by the forces, somesoldiers chopped off the head of a cow – oneamong the herds of cattle that they claimed theywere rescuing from the Maoists – in full view ofthe villagers and of the vehicles that were strand-ed on the road. There was also an ambulancefrom Geedum Hospital assisting in the opera-tion.”

1. The Emergence of the Salwa JudumThere is an ambiguity about the Salwa Ju-

dum’s origins. There are two somewhat conflict-ing explanations. The Salwa Judum is under-stood to have started either entirely as an anti-

CHAPTER TWO Salwa Judum

15

Maoist civilian initiative arising out of local so-cial contradictions or alternatively, as an opera-tion organized right from its inception as partof the adminstration’s long-term counterinsur-gency plans. Actually, the question about itsorigins is secondary. What’s more important isone, the social basis of the Salwa Judum; two,the extent of state patronage it is currently get-ting as part of the Indian state’s anti-Naxal agen-da; and three, the brutality people are facing asa consequence. In fact, the Salwa Judum couldnot have reached its present dimensions with-out the extent of state support it is getting.

According to the Collector of Dantewadadistrict, K.R. Pisda, the Salwa Judum, like theearlier Abhiyans, also started near Kutru. In May2005, he heard that in interior villages fallingunder Kutru tehsil mobilising was taking placeagainst the Maoists. The people there were ap-parently upset with the Maoists’ ban on collect-ing tendu leaves (see Box 5: Ban on Sale of TenduPatta ) and on laying roads in the area. Follow-ing this, the administration got letters from Be-dre (where the first Jan Jagran Abhiyan had be-gun in 1990) and some other villages asking forpolice protection against the Maoists. The Col-lector said he first encountered the Salwa Judumon 19 June 2005, when he saw a crowd of 5-6,000people in Matwada village, on their way to Ko-tarapal village, a Maoist stronghold. In a SalwaJudum meeting in Tadmendri village around thesame time, local sangham members were told tostop associating with the Maoists. There was astampede at this meeting, and some 80-90 peo-ple had not returned home by evening. Fearingthat Maoists were burning houses, crowds ofpeople took to the road. Some 15,000 people, heclaimed, gathered in different places and theadministration opened camps wherever therewere police stations – Matwada, Naimed, Bhair-amgarh, Kutru, etc. Soon after, a meeting washeld every alternate day in villages that wereknown to be pro-Naxalite.

All the leaders of the Salwa Judum whomwe met also referred to having organised local-ly. According to Lakshman Kashyap, a localleader of the Salwa Judum and a relative of

Mahendra Karma, meetings were fixed throughnotes passed between villages. Kashyap recalledthat the first such note he received was from ateacher, Deva Sodhi of Pharsegarh, invitingpeople to a meeting in Matwada.

A Maoist document (Prabhat, newsletter ofthe Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee ofCPI [Maoists]; July-December 2005) also pointsto some local mobilisation against them by vil-lage headmen. The first action by Salwa Judum,according to them, occurred after some land re-distribution was conducted in about 25 villagesbetween Kutru and the Indravati river. Peoplefrom these villages who had so far not been partof the Dandakaranya Area Kisan Mazdoor San-gathan (DAKMS) had now expressed a wish tojoin. On 5 June, mukhiyas from Aveli village,Gannu Patel and Masa Gaital of Bandeparra re-portedly invited local leaders of the DAKMS toUsikapatnam village to discuss problems facedby the local people. However, when the DAK-MS members visited Usikapatnam, they weredetained, beaten up and handed over to Kutrupolice station.

These accounts from the three differentsources suggest that the Salwa Judum began atthe local level over a variety of issues includingopposition to the sanghams, and redistributionof village land. The Salwa Judum leadershiprepresents those who consider themselves vic-tims of Maoist violence. These include those sec-tions of tribal and non-tribal society who havebeen adversely effected by the Maoists’ policieseg those in traditional positions of authoritywithin the village, those whose lands have beenredistributed, those traders whose profits havebeen hit by the struggles over tendu patta andforest produce etc. Lakshman Kashyap, a localSalwa Judum leader told us that the Salwa Ju-dum leadership primarily consists of (a) someheadmen, sarpanches, and panches along withtheir clans people, and (b) non tribal immigrants-both of whom (were) mobilized against theMaoists. Even official accounts do not deny thiscomposition of the leadership of the Salwa Ju-dum (Collector’s Work Proposal). At the grass rootslevel it is also apparent that contractors, trans-

16

Among the various explanations being provided today by the administration and sections ofthe media for the rise of the Salwa Judum, the ban on the sale of beedi leaf (tendu patta) byMaoists is often mentioned. The year 2005 witnessed a strike call by the peasant organisationDAKMS that led to a boycott of tendu patta collection, an important source of income for tribalhouseholds. In the Dantewada region, 2005 was also a year of drought. Some discontentmentover the boycott and the resultant loss in income among the adivasis is inevitable, but to say thatit led to the Salwa Judum is absurd. Such theories negate the wider context for the ban, particularlyof the long struggles fought by the adivasis and the Maoists to improve the rates of tendu patta,and the dubious role played by the state.

For the large majority of Bastar’s people, as also in the neighbouring tribal region of Gadchiroliin Maharashtra and Malkangiri in Orissa, incomes in cash result entirely from the sale of minorforest produce. Tendu patta, in particular, has a short season yet provides this income in the leansummer months and virtually every family engages in tendu patta collection. Tendu patta andbamboo also differ from other minor forest produce in that their collection and purchase is betterorganised, whether directly by the state or through contractors.

Till the early 1980s, the tendu patta trade was wholly controlled by private contractors, andcollection rates were extremely low, barely a couple of rupees for 100 bundles each of 100 leaves(i.e. for 10,000 leaves). By 1984, struggles taken up by adivasis and peasant organisationsmanaged to raise the piece rates to Rs 17 per 100 bundles of 70 leaves each, i.e. Rs. 24 for every10,000 leaves.

At varying times, state governments tried to abolish and replace private contractors. Howeverthese attempts failed as the governments prescribed rates much lower than those paid bycontractors. In Maharashtra, the state government issued such an order in 1985, but was forcedto withdraw it in 1989, following a boycott of tendu patta collection in the next three years. ForBastar, such a perverse order came in 1989; rates that had reached Rs 35 per 10,000 leaveswere reduced by the government to a paltry Rs 25. ‘Cooperative societies’ were formed to overseeits collection and purchase. This governmental policy resulted in a strike and led to a boycott oftendu patta collection for the next five years.

From 1995, people in Bastar again resumed collection. They presented certain basic demandsto the state government: a collection rate of Rs 100, establishment of a collection centre in eachvillage, prompt payments, and the employment of local people as munshi and watcher. Thesedemands were rejected. It led to varied protests ranging from mass petitions by villagers at forestrange offices, to road blockades and destruction of forest produce depots. Protests persisted,forcing the MP government in 1999 to set up a committee to examine the fall in tendu pattacollection. This committee recommended the re-introduction of the contractor system.

During this decade from 1989 to 1999, the MP government had raised rates from Rs 25 toRs 40 per 100 bundles. The reintroduction of the contractor system in Bastar witnessed a rise inrates from Rs 40 to Rs 80. Over the same period, rates by private contractors in Maharashtra hadbeen hiked from Rs 60 to Rs 136. This was achieved through villagers’ tendu patta strugglecommittees negotiating with contractors. Police attempted to prevent negotiations and villagerswere detained at many places. Contractors too were pressurized by the government not to agree

Box 5The Ban on Sale of Tendu Patta

continued on next page

17

with the demands. Despite this, rates inMaharashtra presently are Rs 180 but inneighbouring Bastar, the demand for a rateof Rs 100 has not been met, leading to aboycott of tendu patta collection.

The above description makes it clearthat the various state governments haveplayed a most dubious role. They haveviewed these struggles as increasingMaoists’ popularity and have tried to sabo-tage struggles. Despite this, increases incollection rates have occurred solely dueto pressure from peasant organisations,which have used boycott calls as a form ofstruggle in bargaining with contractors andpressurizing the government.

Hence, notwithstanding some discon-tent to which it may have given rise, to saythat the current ban led to mass support forthe Salwa Judum is far from the truth. Amore likely explanation of the relation be-tween the boycott and the Salwa Judum isthat the boycott further fostered the discon-tent of tendu patta traders and contractors,who had a grouse against the Maoists andwho therefore readily made common causewith the government in the shape of theSalwa Judum.

porters and traders from small towns ofDantewada district, who have much to gain fromindustrialization in the region, also play a prom-inent role in the Salwa Judum.

However, what’s important is that the statepromptly exploited the situation. It’s crucialnever to forget that the Salwa Judum could notbecome what it has without the extent of statesupport it is getting. For instance, the districtcollector told us that of the 150-200 Salwa Ju-dum meetings that had been held till December2005, he himself had attended 75 per cent. Oth-er sources also make it evident that the state hasplayed an active role in channelising and prop-agating the anti-Maoist opposition among sec-

tions of the population, thus fuelling the SalwaJudum as part of its all India anti-Naxal policy.

According to a video (apparently made at amedia training organisation, Jan Darshan, at thegovernment’s request) the Salwa Judum start-ed on 1st June 2005 in Kutru, where people wereupset with the Maoist’s ban on collecting tenduleaves, the frequent closure of haats due to theirbandh calls, and the alleged siphoning of devel-opment funds from the area. However, it alsorevealingly states that ‘Operation Salwa Judum’was preceded by months of ‘overt and covertoperations’ by the police (from January 2005onwards) in which the police tried in a “subtlemanner” to convince people of the ills of Mao-ism. The video shots of Salwa Judum meetingsclearly show the Chief Minister, the Collectorand politicians like Mahendra Karma address-ing these, and security personnel accompany-ing Salwa Judum processions. The video men-tions the government concept of ‘carpet securi-ty’, by which military camps are stationed acrossthe district, village defence samitis (organiza-tions) created, and roadside settlements set upfor those who can’t return to their villages, forfear of Maoist attacks. Our fact-finding foundthat the ‘carpet security’ plan was well in place.

Also pointing to the administration’s closeand prompt links with the Salwa Judum is anaudio CD released by the Maoists to the Chhat-tisgarh press in August 2005, in which the Su-perintendent of Police, Bijapur district, is heardstating that Rs 2 lakhs would be given to everyvillage that joins the Salwa Judum. He is alsoheard announcing rewards for killing Maoists,and incentives for people with knowledge ofweapons and land mines.

It is instructive to learn that fostering localresistance is part of the government’s all-Indiapolicy to fight the Maoists. Annual reports ofthe Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for 2003-04 and 2004-05 refer specifically to the “creation”(pp 6), “raising” (pp 46), encouraging, promot-ing, etc., of “local resistance groups” and theneed to harness the “anti-naxal feeling among asection of the villagers” to “counter atrocitiescommitted by naxalite outfits”. This supports

continued from last page

18

our view that the Salwa Judum has become partof conscious state policy. Without the state func-tionaries’ presence at meetings conducted by theJudum, and the state’s role in conducting train-ing for local Special Police Officers (SPOs) fromamong members of the Salwa Judum, fortifyingpolice stations, building roads, maintainingcamps, posting the Naga IRB in this region, etc.,the Salwa Judum would not have become aspowerful as it has. To understand the Salwa Ju-dum, it is essential to look at the administration’sfinancial and other kinds of support for it andthe government’s long-term anti-Naxal plans(See Chapter 3: “Undeclared War”).

2. Mode of Operation of the SalwaJudum“This is what happened in Bangapal, sir. On 3rd

August we held a meeting in Munder village. Vil-lagers from Munder ran away to the hills. The NagaBatallion went to the hills, caught them and broughtthem back, and made them join the Salwa Judum.Those who were unwilling to join were arrested. Idon’t know everything – I don’t know how manypeople have been made to join and how many arrest-ed.”

– Lakshman KashyapLocal leader of Salwa Judum, in an interview

No clearer account of what happens duringa Salwa Judum operation is available. Those whodon’t join the Salwa Judum are forcibly broughtin by the Salwa Judum members, the police andthe Naga IRB. Both our fact-finding and an ear-lier fact-finding report (November 2005) by theCommunist Party of India (CPI), point to a con-sistent pattern. First, Salwa Judum meetings areorganized in villages that are known to supportthe Maoists. The audience for these meetings aretransported by buses hired or procured by theadministration. Money for this comes from thecentral government. Often, various politiciansaddress these meetings. Processions, called‘padyatras’, go from the larger villages wherecamps are located and are accompanied by thesecurity forces and sometimes, by the Collectoror the SP. In the course of these meetings, thehouses of sangham members or ordinary villag-

ers are burnt and their cattle, pigs, poultry andother household goods looted. Since the housesin these villages are scattered, villagers are of-ten unable to collectively resist these attacks.However, some villages do resist attacks, aidedby their own sangham members and other Mao-ists. Sometimes people are killed, but no FIR isever registered for those killed by the securityforces. Maoist killings are however, recordedand the family compensated in many cases (SeeAppendix II: Killings by Maoists). People fromdefeated villages are then forced to come andlive in the camps, of which the administrationitself claims to have set up seventeen. They areunable to continue with their agricultural activ-ities and their normal existence, and are expect-ed to go on Salwa Judum processions and meet-ings in other villages and be part of other at-tacking parties. Additionally, they are expectedto keep an eye on people known to be associat-ed with the Maoists.

The daily lives of thousands of ordinarypeople in this area have been affected and theirlivelihoods hit by the Salwa Judum. In someplaces, such as Mankeli, in order to force thepeople to join, the Salwa Judum activists haveprevented villagers from visiting weekly haatsto purchase edible oil and salt.

Individual families are sometimes split be-tween the Salwa Judum and those who wish toremain in their villages or align with the Mao-ists. For instance, one of the men arrested fromvillage Satwas, Barsu Sudru, has a youngerbrother who is with the Salwa Judum. The per-ma (priest) of Markapal is still in the village –the team was not able to visit the village –, buthis wife has come to live in the Bhairamgarhcamp. We came across instances (e.g., in Man-keli village) where the Salwa Judum took awayyoung people from their village and their fami-lies were unaware of their whereabouts. Sincepeople who live in camps are forced to work asinformers against members of their own andneighbouring villages, and participate in attacksagainst them, villages are becoming increasing-ly divided. Such divisions are of no small sig-

19

nificance as either side is continuously engagedin violent attacks and killings.

Sangham members who are arrested arekept in camps next to police stations or chowk-is. According to the Collector, there are 1,500surrendered sangham members in the camps.In February 2006, Mahendra Karma claimed thatmore than 3,000 sangham members had surren-dered (The Hindu; February 6, 2006). The gov-ernment has announced that it will give reha-bilitation grants to these surrendered Maoists.The men whom we met in camps openly statedthat those who surrendered or were living in thecamps had to keep informing the administra-tion about the activities of the Maoists.

Those who are reluctant to surrender remainin custody. Sukhmati of Taaki Lode village,north of the Indravati river was staying in Bhair-amgarh camp because her husband had beenlocked up in the Bhairamgarh police station, lo-cated just behind the camp. This was when oth-er men who lived in the camp were undergoingSPO training. The SHO of the Bhairamgarh po-lice station, however, denied that there were anypeople locked up in the police station.

3. Attacks by Salwa JudumUnlike the Jan Jagrans of 1990 and 1998,

when some mukhiyas were mobilised againstthe Maoists, now the attacks by the Salwa Ju-dum on villages are being carried out with theassistance of the CRPF and the Naga IRB, ac-companied by a small contingent of civilians.The Naga IRB, feared by the locals, are in factknown to prefer to conduct their raids by them-selves.

While we do not have any independent con-firmation of this, there are serious allegations ofrapes by security forces and Salwa Judum ac-tivists. Maoists have listed 31 cases of rape, ofwhom six women were also murdered since theSalwa Judum began in June 2005 (Prabhat, July-December 2005).

There also are reports that children and oldpeople are being beaten. Villages are forciblycleared of people and their cattle. In most vil-lages that had been attacked, we found that en-

tire villages were completely empty, except forthe occassional old person and women in somecases. We also chanced upon villages wherepeople had finally decided to ‘surrender’ follow-ing repeated attacks by the Salwa Judum andthe security forces.

The following are accounts of some attackson villages by the Salwa Judum.

KOTARAPAL VILLAGE

Kotarapal is a large village divided intoJoona Kotarapal and Navin Kotarapal, whichwas a stronghold of the Maoists. Kotarapal wasattacked four times by the Salwa Judum. Thefirst was on 18 June 2005, following a Salwa Ju-dum meeting at Matwada ( a large village wherethe weekly market is held) in which about 3,000people participated. The meeting was ad-dressed, among others, by Mahendra KarmaMajhi, mukhiya Korsa Sukulu and Lekam Jila-ram. People from villages close to the Indravatisuch as Sattuva, Bail and Dharma also partici-pated. From the meeting, about a thousand peo-ple marched to Kotarapal village, a few kilome-ters away. Forewarned villagers had alreadysent the aged and the children out of the village;young men and women stayed back. When theSalwa Judum procession neared the village, itwas attacked by the villagers and sanghammembers. In the melee that ensued, 2 people(Micha Dashru of Bandeparre and Mohan Singhof Naimed) died. Sangham members detained12 people, of whom 11 were later released. Bhu-vneshwar Thakur of Jangla remained in theircustody and he was killed on 26 June.

Following the 18 June incident, a Salwa Ju-dum meeting took place in Bijapur, called byMahendra Karma, Prabhari mantri (Minister in-charge of Dantewada district) Kedar Kashyapand Rajendra Pambhoi, MLA. It was here thatthe Jan Jagran Abhiyan became ‘Salwa Judum’.On 1 July, Kotarapal was attacked, for the sec-ond time, by a combined force of the DistrictArmed Force and the CRPF, which was led bythe Inspector-General, Bastar region, the S.P.Bijapur, as well as Mahendra Karma. Since mostof the villagers and sangham members had es-caped to the jungle, the attackers looted and

20

burnt their houses and killed their cattle andlivestock. Two elderly peasants, Uikay Sannuand Vanjam Mangu, were killed and an oldwoman was fatally injured.

The third attack took place on 11 August, inwhich Lekam Budhram (35) and Aatam Bodhi(30), both sangham members, were killed byNaga IRB soldiers. It appears that in this attack,as well as a fourth attack that followed on 12September, Naga IRB soldiers took a large num-ber of people to Matwada camp. According tothe CPI fact-finding report, 48 youths who wereallegedly sangham members were picked upfrom Kotarapal and made to surrender beforeMahendra Karma on 13 October. Since then theyhave been detained in Bhairamgarh police sta-tion. According to some people from the village,whose families had refused to live in the camps,their mukhiya had been pressurizing them toleave the village. Many people had already runaway into the forests. The last two families fromthis village were attacked by the Naga IRB andthe men taken away to nearby Jangla and tor-tured. The village now lies completely empty.

MUNDER VILLAGE

Munder village, another known Maoiststronghold, was almost entirely empty when wereached there. Road construction activity, whichwas on in full swing stopped about half a kilo-metre before Munder. In the village, we met onevery old man who told us that everyone was outworking on their fields. We found, strangely,that field after field was being harvested onlyby women. One woman told us that all men ofworking age from the village had been takenaway by the Salwa Judum to Bangapal, whichhas a large SPO training camp, and had not re-turned home.

Munder is eight kilometers from Pharasa-pal, Mahendra Karma’s village. Munder villagehad been attacked five times. Munder was firstlooted on 22 July. Pigs, goats and chicken wereslaughtered and made a feast of and ten houseswere burnt. There were no casualties becausethe villagers, many of whom are sangham mem-bers, were expecting an attack and had escapedto the nearby forest. Three days later, the vil-

lage was again attacked. Three more attacks tookplace. In the first of these, on 28 August, Bog-gam Sannu (18 years) was killed. Then a meet-ing was called on 3 September in Munder bythe Salwa Judum. Once again the villagers es-caped to the forest. According to LakshmanKashyap, who was the local organizer of thisattack, 10 girls and 11 boys escaped to the for-est. This time, the Naga soldiers entered the for-est, killed Kadli Kummal (a DAKMS member)and captured the rest, who were asked to jointhe Salwa Judum. Twelve people who refusedwere detained without being charged. On 10September, in yet another attack, Kadli Kamlu(DAKMS member) was killed by Naga soldierswhile they were on a patrol in the now-desert-ed village.

MANKELI VILLAGE

Mankeli is a large forest village, with sever-al smaller hamlets off the road between Bijapurand Gangaloor. This village too has been repeat-edly attacked. Out of approximately 112 housesin six hamlets, about 60 houses have been burntby the Salwa Judum and several have been loot-ed.

The Murias of this village originally camefrom the Pinkonda area. Of all these households,only about 25 households had pattas given bythe forest department. The rest cultivated en-croached land. The Maoists redistributed landwithin the village for instance, 5 acres of oneman’s holding of 25 acres was taken for collec-tive cultivation. The seeds from this farm weregiven to those who didn’t have any seeds forcultivation the following year. The Forest De-partment officials have not visited this area fortwo years. People here, like in many other plac-es, complained about the ban on tendu leaves.In fact they said they were warned that theirhands would be cut off if they sold tendu leaves,but all in all, they came across as being neitherwith the Maoists, nor with the Salwa Judum.

The first time the Salwa Judum came, on 15September, the CRPF set fire to people’s homes,including their pigsties. The Salwa Judum tookaway people’s goats, pigs, poultry, and themahua, tora and grain they had stored. They set

21

fire to the anganwadi building after looting themahua, imli and other things that had beenstored in it. They also killed 20-year oldModiyam Bhadru (DAKMS member). The vil-lagers buried his body and after this incident,no one wanted to join the Salwa Judum. Expect-edly, the village was attacked again. This time,on 25 September, the Naga IRB soldiers cameon their own and killed Korsa Suklu and Pun-em Kanda, both sangham members. The Nagaforces also took away some 5-6 boys and onegirl, who were forced to work as informers. Thevillage headman was also taken away. The thirdtime, on 3rd October, the Naga soldiers camewith two of the boys they had taken away earli-er, who identified two sangham members KosaAitu and Emla Kova. They were killed whileworking in their fields.

The villagers were also told by the SalwaJudum, in turn, that since they gave shelter tothe Maoists, they would not be allowed to pur-chase anything from the haats (markets). As aresult, they could no longer buy even basic ne-cessities like salt from Bijapur. Villagers also saidthat all the sangham members from Naya para(hamlet) had been captured while those in oth-er paras of the village were in hiding. In Tongpara, everyone, not just sangham members hadfled. The Maoists broke down a school in thisvillage in which Naga soldiers had spent a night.The villagers said that the Maoists had warnedthe sangham members that if they joined theSalwa Judum, they would be killed.

The villagers had been sent a letter to jointhe Salwa Judum in September, and had alreadydisplayed some readiness to join the Salwa Ju-dum by attending Salwa Judum meetings atDhanar (1 October) and Korrepal village (4 Oc-tober). These two villages had been spared be-cause they had indicated a readiness to join in.When we met the villagers, three attacks by theSalwa Judum on the village had already takenplace. They were extremely tense and were de-liberating on whether and how to surrender tothe police in Bijapur. Three paras/ hamlets hadresolved to do this and thought that the otherswould join them. They were hoping that once

they had officially surrendered they would beallowed to live normally. Even as we were inMankeli, we heard gunshots, whose source wehad no way of confirming. In front of us, threeterrified men ran for their lives.

What’s happened in Mankeli illustrates themanner in which villages with a Maoist massbase are, through coercive means, being annexedto the Salwa Judum campaign. A news reportquotes a Dantewada DSP as saying, “Rebelshave been fast losing base in their stronghold inDantewada district. Around 35 senior sanghammembers surrendered at a function in Mankelivillage, 412 km south from state capital. Over5,000 local people attended the function from22 villages” (IANS, 28 December 2005), com-pletely hiding the brutal process by which thishas been achieved.

Several such accounts such as Mankeli orMunder could be given, but we were unable tovisit many villages because of the difficulty wefaced in travelling freely in this region. Much ofthe information we have may be incomplete,simply because the administration keeps no ac-count of the people killed or displaced by thesecurity forces and the Salwa Judum. Neverthe-less, we met people from different villages incamps who spoke about their displacement. Forinstance, in Bhairamgarh camp, we were toldby the people of Halur village that they had beenbrought there by the Naga soldiers. Maoist doc-uments claim that many attacks of the SalwaJudum and the security forces have gone unre-corded. For instance, village Ariyal, a forest vil-lage which is a Maoist stronghold, where ten-sions had been brewing for long, was attackedon 2 September. The mukhiya of Ariyal, DorruMangu, who had joined the Salwa Judum ledthe attack in which ten sangham members, in-cluding a 12-year old bal sangham member weredetained, made to stand in a row and shot dead.Amongst those who were killed, were relativesof the mukhiya himself (Prabhat, July-December2005).

A CPI fact-finding team had visited severalvillages, where they were told of the Salwa Ju-dum’s looting, burning and killing. In village

22

Mundbedi, the CRPF had come accompanied by50 Salwa Judum members. They took 40 kg ricefrom the house of Nandu, along with chickens,pigs, goat and whatever they could lay theirhands on. The Salwa Judum burnt four of Ka-vad village’s 36 houses, and cooked within thevillage some of the things they looted 20 kg ofrice, 20 chickens and one pig. The villagers hidin the forests. While leaving, the Salwa Judumburnt 2 quintals of kosra and 40 kg of rice. Afteremerging from Kavad village, the Salwa Judumattacked villages Pidiya and Andri. Thirty hous-es were burnt in village Pidiya, and Santu, sonof Aitu, was shot dead by the CRPF. In villageBurji, the Salwa Judum forces came on 30 Sep-tember and killed and ate 6 pigs and 6 chickens.They also took away 10 goats, 30 vessels, mahua,and grain. Lemon and sulphi trees were cut andone cycle was broken. People from 60-70 hous-es ran away and the Salwa Judum looted Rs10,000 from their houses. In village Mallur, athousand-strong Salwa Judum procession camein October along with the CRPF. They beat up17 youths badly and took them away, forcingthem to join the Salwa Judum. Mallur, Palnarand Tamodi villages also suffered burning andlooting. In Palnar, 30 people were forcibly tak-en away, of whom Sukhram, son of Godi, waskilled. In the first week of August, in Manjhi-mendari village, a combined force of Salwa Ju-dum and the police burnt all the houses as wellas pigsties and chicken coops. All the pigs, goatsand chickens were killed and eaten. The villagewas empty because when the attack began, thevillagers ran away to the forests to escape theattack but didn’t have time to take all their be-longings. Our team also met some villagers fromthese villages such as Burji, Pusnar, Palnar andMallur in Gangaloor camp. Half the villages hadcome to live in camps while the other half washiding in the jungles. Once in the camp, theyare unable to do other work or return to culti-vate their fields. They were also expected to turnup for Salwa Judum processions whenever theywere called in other words, they were captive.

4. CPI (Maoist)’s ViolenceThe Salwa Judum has led to an increasing

spiral of violence, in which both sides are nowfighting an almost full-fledged war. This is incontrast to two people who are listed as killedin 2004, according to official documents.

During our fact-finding, we heard that insome cases, the Maoists had killed people sim-ply for attending Salwa Judum meetings. Oneman from Palnar told us at Gangaloor camp thatafter a Salwa Judum meeting on 24 August inGangaloor, the Maoists called a meeting in Pal-nar the next day and told people not to join theSalwa Judum, and noted the names of ten peo-ple, including him, who were taking others tojoin the Salwa Judum. He explained to the Mao-ists that he had taken people to avoid havingthe village burnt down. He was however threat-ened by people present from Saonar village forjoining the Salwa Judum and as a result, hadleft the village out of fear. On 4 September, someMaoists came to Palnar and told people they hadto leave their houses and camp in the hills toescape attacks by the Salwa Judum. (Sureenough, some days later on 21 September theSalwa Judum and forces went to attack Palnarand found the whole village empty.) At 8 pmthat night of 4 September, the sarpanch, the vil-lage patel and 7 SC boys were asked about theirrelationship with the Gangaloor Majhi and toldthat if they joined the Salwa Judum, they wouldnot be allowed to come back and live in the vil-lage. The sarpanch, patel and two others werekilled, while the remaining SC boys escaped toGangaloor.

Later, some of the people from Palnar whohad camped in the hills came to Gangaloor. Ofthe 350 households in Palnar, about 50 went toGangloor (250 households here, according to theman from Palnar we spoke to, are with the Mao-ists). They had left the Maoist camp on the pre-text that they wanted to come back to the vil-lage to restock grain. Following this, their hous-es were raided and the school and hospital inPalnar destroyed by the Maoists.

In Gongla, the 70-year old former sarpanchGaita Budu took people from the village to a

23

Salwa Judum meeting in Gangaloor on 21 Sep-tember. The following night, Maoists came tohis house and killed him. After this incident, thewhole village (110 households, 600 people) wentto Gangaloor. In Kotarapal village on 18 June,Bhuvneshwar Thakur of Jangla was first de-tained for being a Salwa Judum organiser andthen killed by sangham members while he wasalready in their custody (See Kotarapal account,earlier).

We talked to people in Bhairamgarh camp,where there were about 2,000 people fromaround 25 villages. Some ordinary people whoattended Salwa Judum meetings from curiosityor a desire to avoid having their villages attackedby Salwa Judum have also come into camps ei-ther out of fear of Maoists or specifically afterbeing threatened by them. Individual familiesand villages are sometimes split between thosejoining the Salwa Judum and those who wish toremain in their villages or align with the Mao-ists. For instance, while half the residents ofMarkapal village chose to stay on in the village,the other half had fled to the camp after sang-ham members threatened the men for attend-ing a Salwa Judum meeting in Bhairamgarh.Those who had come to the camp had sold theirmahua and left with whatever they had.

Several people in Bhairamgarh camp andelsewhere told us of instances of threats andbeatings when people chose not to ally with theMaoists. Pramod Kumar and Lakmibai fromMaramatta village told us that the Maoists tookaway 30 quintals of their last crop along with Rs15,000. He also said that his entire village wasthreatened. Those who did not become sanghammembers or those who were sympathetic to thegovernment’s policies were driven away. Villag-ers from Dharma village said they had heardthat the Maoists would beat those who had cometo camps, and were therefore scared of return-ing. The Maoists have since put out notices ask-ing people in the camps to come back to theirvillages, assuring them that they will not beharmed

Besides fear of Maoist violence, some issuesof coercion came up during our interviews.

Some people from Gongla village complainedthat they were forced to give contributions tothe Maoists in the form of one day’s tendu leafcollection and one day’s pruning wages, as wellas rice contributions. Phulmati, whom we metin Jagdalpur Hospital (see Phulmati’s accountbelow in the section Non-registration of FIRs)told us that she was forcibly taken away byMaoists to harvest grain elsewhere and her agedfather who protested was beaten.

People from Gongla said that no panchayatwork was allowed in their area. The educatedyouth are unhappy with the Maoist oppositionto government programmes. They want gov-ernment programmes to be implemented asthese are a source of employment. Not being ableto participate in elections is also an issue forsome people.

There has been an intensification of the con-flict – by both sides – in recent weeks. CPI (Mao-ist) squads have begun attacking and killing se-curity forces stationed in Dantewada and ele-ments that they perceive are in alliance withthese forces. On 28 February, at least 26 personswere killed when Maoists used a landmine toblow up a truck near Konta, which was carry-ing people returning from a Salwa Judum meet-ing. In yet another landmine blast, 14 peoplewere killed in Kanker district on 24 March 2006when Maoists attacked a jeep in which a groupof tribals and local tradesmen were returninghome from the local market. The Maoists tar-geted the private vehicle, mistaking it to be apolice jeep. In the second incident the Maoistshave apologized for the landmine blasts.

The actual scale of Maoist violence tends tobe exaggerated by the administration, helped byan ideologically bent and largely pliant media,to suggest the illegitimacy of the movement. Apoint repeated to us by everyone, includingmany Salwa Judum activists, was that the Mao-ist movement had a mass base among the poorfor whom some very real victories have beenwon, especially against a corrupt officialdom. Itis however a fact that the escalation in violencehas had certain unfortunate fall outs. In an areawhere medical and health facilities are already

24

lacking, schools and hospitals are either ren-dered dysfunctional by their use as bases by thesecurity forces, or are consequently destroyedby the Maoists. In the prevailing warlike situa-tion the Maoists have used coercion and fear forpurposes of intimidation, and shown a generalintolerance of dissent. More disturbingly, theescalation in violence has resulted in a numberof killings by the Maoists when the victims werein their custody and hence isolated and un-armed. The maintenance of democratic practic-es by people’s movements are particularly im-portant in furthering a progressively democrat-ic society.

5. Displacement and Life in CampsThe government has set up several camps

in Dantewada for all those villagers who havehad to vacate their homes, as a consequence ofthe Salwa Judum campaign. We found that thesecamps house five groups of people: those sar-panches, their families and allies who have astake in working with the administration andwho had decided to live in the camps becauseof Maoist threats; ordinary villagers who havebeen forced by the Salwa Judum to leave theirvillages and live in the camps; those who hadfled their homes because of real incidents of orrumours about Maoist retaliatory violence; theSPOs and in some cases, their families; and last-ly, surrendered sangham members and theirfamilies.

All these camps have been set up near po-lice stations. According to the Collector,Dantewada, there are 17 such camps, with ap-proximately 15,000 people living in them inBhairamgarh and Bijapur tehsils alone. In onecamp in Bhairamgarh alone that we visited,there were 2,000 people from around 25 villag-es in the camp. Some of these consisted of entirevillages such as Belnar, Bangoli, Sattuwa, whilein other cases a few families from a village hadcome in.

It is difficult to overstate the extent to whichthe daily lives of thousands of people have beenturned upside down and their livelihoods de-stroyed due to the ongoing evacuation of vil-

lages. In many cases people were made to leavetheir villages soon after sowing and crops nowlie rotting and uncut in the fields. People livingin camps that were relatively close to their vil-lages trekked all the way everyday to work ontheir fields.

Those who are under SPO training, howev-er, spend their days being trained in the camp.They had been promised a monthly allowanceof Rs 1,500. When people already are at the mar-gins of poverty and then have their livelihoodshit, this becomes a despicable way the govern-ment is inducing people to take up arms in itsoffensive against the Maoists. However, recentreports indicate payments to SPo’s have not beenregular leading to some dissatisfaction.

Many others have started working on earth-works under the Food for Work programme ofthe central government. According to womenfrom Markapal village we spoke to, the men gotRs 50 for doing coolie work; other reports sug-gest that people are getting Rs 55–60 a day forBlock level or PWD work and Rs 60 for forestwork. The roads that locals are working on leadto police stations off the highway. Locals are notemployed in the construction of the nationalhighway NH 16, as the work was given to theBorder Roads Organisation (BRO), which pre-fers to bring in workers from outside.

Most people the team met said that theywere surviving on whatever they brought withthem initially or on meagre government rations.At Meertur, one of the largest camps, we weretold by the Meertur mukhiya that food for thecamp’s population was provided for free by thegovernment. People living in other camps toldus that the government had provided free ra-tions only up to August or September. By thetime we visited these camps, only old people stillgot some rice a month, dal, potatoes and onionsfree.

Living conditions in the camps are abysmal.We saw blanket distribution ceremonies in Gan-galoor and Meertur camps, but little else to sug-gest that the government was interested in thewelfare of the people staying in them. There isno proper shelter. People live in tents erected

25

by the administration, or in little shacks madeof plastic sheets and sticks that they have putup themselves. The tents were bare as peoplehave few or no possessions. Sanitation andhealth conditions in the camps are very poor.Though we did see two health workers in Bhair-amgarh camp, reports of Medicin Sans Frontierssuggest that health conditions in the camps areat crises levels.

Some of the details of the Bhairamgarh camphighlighted by the CPI’s open letter to the PrimeMinister underline this situation: The camp islocated close to the police station and the Bhair-amgarh block headuarters. As many as 107 peo-ple from Sattuva village had been staying in a5x16 metre space (less than 900 sq. feet) for threemonths. The administration gave no help in set-ting up the tents and people had to get sticksfrom the forest to build their tents. All the reliefwork was being done under the supervision ofthe administration and not through the localpanchayat. People from camps were every nowand then forced by the police to attend SalwaJudum rallies.

One thing that bound people across campswas their anxiety as to whether they would everbe able to return home. Many people in campswould alternate between fear of Salwa Judumattacks and fear of Maoists while telling us abouttheir reasons for being there. Many are therebecause of Salwa Judum attacks. There also pre-vails, among others, a vague fear of Maoist re-taliation against those who join the Salwa Ju-dum, willingly or under pressure, and then re-turn to their villages. This fear is fuelled by theadministration and Salwa Judum members, thusmaintaining the pressure on people to keep liv-ing in camps, so much so that all outsiders notin uniform, like the fact-finding team, are viewedwith suspicion.

This is not all. The administration plans tomake some of these camps permanent. (Whenwe posed this question to the home secretary ofChhattisgarh he felt that while some may be ableto return to their villages many may not be ableto until such time as Maoists are not wiped outfrom the area.) About 200 people have been al-

lotted land for houses along the highway inKutru. This is part of the government’s plan tocreate roadside villages, attached to police sta-tions. While some of these villages may housepeople unable to return to their homes becauseof fear of Maoist retaliation the plan seems to bemuch wider in scope. Clearly, the government’sagenda seems to be to empty out the villages,attack the Maoist mass base, and deny Maoiststhe food, shelter and other material support thatenables the movement to function and grow.Salwa Judum leader Lakshman Kashyap admit-ted to having no idea about how people in theseroadside villages would survive.

6. Non-registration of FIRs and Atrocitiesby the Security ForcesCombing operations and attacks on villag-

es by the Naga IRB, CRPF and the Salwa Judumleave many people dead and injured ( see Ap-pendix I: People Killed in Attacks by Salwa Judum/Security Forces). Almost all these killings areunrecorded. Apart from killings, the adminis-tration is arresting a number of people suspect-ed of being Maoists or Maoist sympathisers.Most of these detentions are completely illegaland unrecorded. This is not to mention the illtreatment meted out to locals by the securityforces stationed there. Whether it was a Nagasoldier we spoke to or a CRPF officer, the senseof their superiority over the people they weremeant to protect was overwhelming and shame-ful. The people at the end of such treatment arethose with absolutely no access to, and perhapsno knowledge of, legal aid.

In a Jagdalpur hospital, we met two younggirls - referred to as ‘Naxalites’ by the nurses -recovering from serious bullet injuries. One ofthem, Sambatti from Wanger village, refused tospeak to us as she was either too scared or intoo much pain to speak. The other, Phulmati, aresident of Belnar village, told us she had notbeen in touch with her family since she was ar-rested. She said she had been forcibly taken bysome Maoists to harvest abandoned fields inKarkawada, near Nelasnar on the main highwayjust before Bhairamgarh. There were twenty of

26

them - including some members of a Maoistsquad - working on the fields when police foundthem and opened fire at them. The Maoists re-turned fire. This led to the deaths of three boys,including two from Kodenar village, who diedof police bullets. We found no record of the threeboys’ deaths anywhere. We heard these boyshave been buried in the grounds of Geedumpolice station. Whether this is true or not, thisshows that the police are expected to committhe worst excesses.

Sonia, an anganwadi worker in village Ka-maloor was beaten, stripped and dragged by herhair and detained by some Naga IRB soldierson 9 March. She is among the very few who havespoken up against the security forces. We couldnot meet her, but the mainstream media has cov-ered her story.

In Mankeli village, villagers said that theydared not go to the police station to file FIRsagainst the security forces for the five deaths thatoccurred there (see Mankeli account above),fearing that they would be forced to live incamps and because they felt that the police hadno interest in filing FIRs against their owncrimes! There was no post mortem of thosekilled, the bodies were left in the village by thepolice and the last rites were performed by thevillagers. This was reported to us in Kotarapalas well. The police only recorded crimes com-mitted by the Maoists, and the district adminis-tration only maintained records of compensa-tion paid to the victims of Maoist violence. Asenior correspondent in Raipur told us that thereis a government directive to keep silent over anykilling by the Naga IRB. We could not confirmthis, but the facts on the ground do indicate thatnon-registration of crimes by Salwa Judum andthe security forces across Dantewada is so rou-tine that this amounts to giving them carteblanche. Such selective recording of crimes alsomakes it appear that the only killings and vio-lence are those committed by Maoists. This en-ables the government to fuel ill-feeling againstthem and create an opinion in favor of a crack-down.

In addition, such non-registration of FIRs incases of killings by security forces denies com-pensation to the families of those killed. In anaudio CD released by the Maoists to the Chhat-tisgarh press in August 2005, the SP Bijapur isheard complaining that the Jangla police stationhad foolishly allowed the deaths of two of the 9‘Maoists’ killed by the police in Kotarapal vil-lage to be incorrectly registered as killings byMaoists. This, he said, would allow the deadpeople’s relatives to claim compensation, whichin turn would be used to post bail for Naxalitesympathisers in jail.

On the night of 30 November, while return-ing to Dantewada, we saw five people beingloaded onto a truck. Villagers told us that theMaoist Abujhmarh secretary had been arrested.We followed them to the Geedam police stationwhere we met the detainees, which included twoold and infirm people, a one-eyed man, and ayoung girl. They all said that they happened tobe in Sattuva village, from where most peoplehad already fled to camps. The river was inflood, one said, and they had been left behindbecause no more boats were available (boats hadbeen stopped by the security forces for two days,as we discovered when we tried to cross the In-dravati to reach Markapal village). He had anold mother, wife and three small children whomhe had to take across. The girl said she had beengrazing cattle when she was picked up. Anoth-er old man, a resident of Jhadka village, said hehad come to stay with his brother in Sattuva andcultivate his fields there. They said they had beensitting in a house discussing how to go acrossthe river when they were detained.

The police claimed that these five had beenarrested while possessing tiffin bombs the ear-lier evening (29 November). There was no FIRshowing the charges against them, let alone anyarrest warrant. When we again visited Geedumpolice station on 1 December, the detainees com-plained that they had been beaten in custody.When we asked the station-in-charge whetheran FIR had been filed, he said that the ‘opera-tion’ was still on, and they were waiting for it toconclude to register the FIR. This appears to be

27

Box 6Case of Kamlesh Paikra: Threat to Independent Journalists

Kamlesh Paikra, 27, is a local journalist from Cherpal village, who till recently was workingas Bijapur correspondent of Hindsatt (a daily published from Jagdalpur), when he fell foul of theadministration. Since he had been regularly reporting about the naxals in Dantewada, the SPBijapur began to pressurize him about his naxal connections, and in April 2005, proposed that hereveal his sources to the police in complete violation of accepted journalistic practice the worldover. When Kamlesh refused, the SP warned him of dire consequences.

In September 2005, Salwa Judum gangs burnt down approximately 50 houses in Mankelivillage, near Bijapur. There were unconfirmed reports of several deaths. Following Kamlesh’sreporting of the incident (Hindsatt , 8 September), a CPI team visited Mankeli. After this, Kamlesh’sharassment by the administration and Salwa Judum took a serious turn.

In addition to being a journalist, Kamlesh ran a fair price shop in Bijapur. He used to buy ricefrom the Food Corporation of India at the BPL rate of Rs 5.70 a kilo and sell it at the ‘saptahikbazaar’ for Rs. 6.15. For this, he had to renew a permit every week. After his 8 Sept news report,first his quota of rice for the weekly bazaar was refused him. Then his permit was cancelled. Noreason was given. Despite approaching the Food Inspector, the Assistant Collector, and thepolice, the permit was not renewed. His movement around Bijapur was also restricted. He wasnot allowed to visit the villages affected by Salwa Judum and the camps where displaced peopleare living.

A PUCL team visited Dantewada between 26- 29 November. They asked Kamlesh toaccompany them; in spite of their presence, he was prevented from visiting the effected villagesand camps. He was directly blamed for inviting both the CPI and the PUCL teams. Then theybegan to target his family. His elder brother Tarkeshwar Singh was a ‘prabhari’ in Cherpal HighSchool. The police claimed that naxal literature and uniforms were recovered from Tarkeshwar’shouse and jailed him on 1 Dec 2005. He was later charged in a bomb explosion case that happenedin Padera village in which 1 jawan was injured. Tarkeshwar was released on bail two weeks later,but the case is still on.

After further harassment, and fearing for his life, Kamlesh moved to Dantewada town in thethird week of December with his wife and parents. He does not have a job nor his fair priceshop..This seems to be the price for being a honest journalist. Kamlesh Paikra is a member of theChhattisgarh Shramjivi Patrakar Sangh. They submitted an application on his behalf to the ChiefMinister of Chhattisgarh, the Governor and the leader of the opposition. Nothing came of it. He isstill afraid for his life.

Kamlesh is not the only one. Another journalist, Lakshman Singh Kusram, also from Bijapur,reported on the molestation of some adivasi women by the CRPF jawans in Kutru. Now thepolice has reached his house, and have been threatening him.

Shockingly, this violation of journalistic freedom is explicitly part of the administration’s policy.The workplan of the Dantewada Collector maintains that there is need to institute restrictions onthe media. This document argues that “media coverage of Naxalite attacks makes it look as ifthey are gaining the upper hand. By reporting what the Naxalites are doing as against reportinghow ordinary people [read salwa Judum] are responding, the media indirectly gives the Naxalitesa voice.” It advocates controls on the media, beginning with a meeting between the administrationand all news publishers/media channels reminding them of their accountability to the people.

28

the norm being followed in Dantewada. The DSPDantewada also told us that FIRs showing ar-rests are recorded only when an operation con-cluded. When he was reminded that such de-lays in registering FIRs amounted to flouting thebinding directive of the Supreme Court (in theD.K. Basu judgment) to record arrest within 24hours of detention, he claimed, shockingly, thatin the midst of an ‘undeclared war’ such delaysare not unusual.

7. The Breakdown of Civil AdministrationThe civil administration is expected to be the

interface between the people and the govern-ment. It is supposed to, apart from enforcing thepolicies and programmes of the government, actas a grievance redressal mechanism for ordinarypeople. It has not done that nor provided any-thing that can be seen as development for ordi-nary people.

And due to the intensified conflict in recenttimes between the Maoists and the Salwa Judum,the police, which in theory is meant to be thecivil institution for the prevention and detectionof crime and the maintenance of rule of law, hasbecome part of the war-like operations here, aeuphemism for para-military formations. Thesituation we found in Dantewada has seriousand frightening consequences for the formalfunctioning of democracy because the civil ad-ministration now operates on the whims of theSalwa Judum activists and the security forces,against common people.

Although the District Collector assured usthat our team members were free to move any-where, it was apparent that on the highway (NH16) the situation was different. While the CRPFor the Naga Battalion or the District Armed Po-lice manned some checkpoints, it was even moredisconcerting to note that Salwa Judum activ-ists were manning their own checkpoints in fullview of the government forces. They carried outsearches of our vehicle and demanded to knowthe purpose of our visit. Salwa Judum membersman checkpoints on roads, search people’s be-longings and control the flow of transport. Weheard reports of how they had earlier been ha-rassing bus drivers and had looted shops in Bi-

japur. The police simply look on at the check-points where Salwa Judum activists operate.While we were in Bijapur, Salwa Judum leaderskept walking into the SDM’s house and shout-ing at him for letting us visit the villages. TheSalwa Judum made every effort to see that wedid not go to Mankeli village. They also did notlet us take local journalist Kamlesh Paikra withus (see Box 6: The Case of Kamlesh Paikra).

Also, the civilian population is being pro-vided arms and training by the government, analarming militarization of civil society. At all thecamps we visited between Geedam and Bijapur,namely Matwada, Bhairamgarh, Meertur, Nela-snar, Bijapur and Gangaloor, young men wereundergoing training to become special policeofficers (SPOs). The SPOs, according to the Dis-trict Collector and the station-in-charges atBhairamgarh and at Meertur, comprised eitherformer sangham members or young adivasi menrelated to the Salwa Judum activists. It is notclear whether these SPOs will be provided gunsor not (the District Collector is clearly opposedto it), but their training involves learning to han-dle a gun. The District Collector told us that vil-lage defence committees (VDCs) are being setup and that some of these young men will be-come SPOs attached to VDCs.

As mentioned, SPOs under training havebeen promised Rs 1,500 per month, a honorari-um set by central government for the SPOs aspart of its counter-insurgency operations. Weobserved that some SPOs have been armed withguns, while bows and arrows have been distrib-uted on a large scale to villages that join the Sal-wa Judum. The administration claims that theseare the people’s traditional weapons, but theCollector’s work plan makes it clear that distrib-uting bows and arrow is part of the administra-tion’s plans (Collector’s Work Plan). All this callsinto question the very notion of a civil adminis-tration; an administration that has failed to beaccountable to the people is covering up its fail-ures by co-opting common people.

The local civil authority in Dantewada isunable to assert itself before the Salwa Judumactivists. The government has consciously al-

29

lowed the local civilian authority to be weak-ened at the hands of the Salwa Judum leader-ship. When the SDM of Bijapur did not asserthis authority despite appearing visibly uncom-fortable by the unruly behaviour of the SalwaJudum activists who entered his house at will,we realized that he exercised little control overthem. In contrast, at Meertur, the local thana-in-charge sent a word to the village mukhia (aSalwa Judum member) to collect people so thatwe could talk to them! Clearly, police and offi-cial state forces work closely with the Salwa Ju-dum forces. That the police officers brazenlyexplain that whatever is taking place is becauseof the state of “undeclared war” not only con-tributes to the breakdown of civil administra-tion but is also conducive to creating a climateof impunity.

CHAPTER THREE Undeclared WarThe Militarisation of Adivasi Society

It is as though a new chain of command ex-ists on the ground in Dantewada. This is basedon a policy that considers groups such as theSalwa Judum of critical importance to fight theMaoists, and in which the security forces call theshots. There is evidence to show that the degreeof lawlessness that operates in Dantewada dis-trict is a direct result of an all-India policy tofight “Naxalism”. Annual reports of the Minis-try of Home Affairs provide some insights intowhat passes for official policy. Read togetherwith a work proposal prepared by the districtcollector of Dantewada the logic of the prevail-ing lawlessness becomes evident.

In chapter 1, we had briefly narrated someattempts in the past to promote a ‘Jan JagranAbhiyans’. Some of the dramatis personae re-main much the same, such as Mahendra Kar-ma. What is new is the overt involvement of thedistrict administration this time. The presence

of the district collector in most Salwa Judummeetings, the fact that Salwa Judum camps areset up next to police stations, that the trainingof SPOs takes place in close proximity to thecamps their family members live in these camps,and food and work is offered to them undervarious government schemes makes this an un-equal but symbiotic relationship between theadministration and the Salwa Judum. In keep-ing with this, the administration is even turninga blind eye to the criminal pasts of some of theSalwa Judum leadership, such as MahendraKarma, Ajay Singh, Vikram Mandavi etc, whohave been implicated in corruption and evenmurder. In an interview given to us, LakshmanKashyap in fact confirmed the rampant corrup-tion among the local leadership. However, theyform part of the section which is “anti-naxal”and hence their chequered past is of little conse-quence for the administration.

30

Box 7

Excerpts from Home Ministry’s Annual Report 2004-05

“3.122 Keeping in view the overall dimension of naxalism in nine States, a high levelcoordination Centre headed by the Union Home Secretary with Chief Secretaries and DsGPof naxalite affected States meets regularly and reviews and coordinates steps taken by theStates to check naxal activities (p. 45)..

“3.123 The important decisions taken by the Coordinate Centre include … long-term deploymentof Central Police Forces, inclusion of more districts and items under the Security RelatedExpenditure (SRE) Scheme, modernisation and upgradation of State Police forces andfortification of Police Stations for anti naxalite operations, … effective implementation of variousdevelopmental schemes in the affected areas and creation of Local Resistance Groups (p.45).

“3.129 Nineteen IRBns. [Indian Reserve Battalions] have so far been sanctioned to the statesaffected by naxalism (Andhra Pradesh,-5, Bihar-2, Orissa-2,Chhattisgarh-2,Maharashtra-2,West Bengal-2, Jharkhand-2 and Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh-1 each). The stategovernments are being advised to expedite raising of IR Bns. (p. 47).

“3.134 To enable the States to undertake more effective anti-naxalite action, the Ministry ofHome Affairs [MHA] has a scheme since April1 1996 namely, Security Related Expenditure(SRE) Scheme. … Presently, 76 districts in nine states are covered and the Ministry reimburses75-100% of the expenditure incurred on security related items, such as ex-gratia grant paid tofamilies of the victims of naxal violence, providing logistics and camp facilities to the CPFs,amount spent on special training given to State Police personnel, provision of insurance forState Police personnel involved in anti-naxalite operations, a lump sum grant to Village DefenceCommittees (VDCs)/ Nagarik Suraksha Samitis (NSSs) for security related expenditure,honorarium to the Special Police Officers (SPOs), lump sum amount per naxalite surrenderee,expenditure incurred on publicity material, and hiring of vehicles including helicopters, weaponsor communications equipment etc. Up to February 2005, a sum of Rs 125.56 cr under theSRE scheme has been reimbursed to the affected State Governments (pp. 47-48).

“3.137 The MHA took special initiative in getting the badly naxal affected districts (55) includedunder the Backward Districts Initiative component of the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana schemeof Planning Commission which provides Rs 15 crore per year per district for a period of 3years to fill in the critical gaps in physical and social infrastsructure. This works out to Rs2,475 crore, which will help accelerate the pace of development in the naxal affected districts.While 35 districts were covered in 2003-04, the remaining 20 are being taken up in the currentfiscal year” (p. 49).

“3.138 [Additionally], for construction of roads in naxal-affected areas, the Ministry of RuralDevelopment has given a special allocation of Rs 37.50 crore per annum for naxal -affectedStates under the PMGSY” (p. 49).

Note: Paragraph numbers and page numbers refer to the original document.

31

Moreover, when this patronage is read to-gether with the central government’s advocacyof:

(a) “creation”, “promotion”, “encourage-ment” of “local resistance groups”; (b) its fund-ing between 75-100% of the expenditure in-curred by states fighting this war against thenaxalites, and (c) the formation of VDCs, recruit-ing of SPOs etc, it becomes evident that this ispart of an all-India policy to fight the so-called“menace” of “naxalism” militarily, financed andcoordinated by the central government. So muchso that even posters and pamphlets put up alongthe highway between Geedam to Bijapur arefunded by the central government under re-im-bursement of “expenditure incurred on public-ity material” (See Box 7: Ministry of Home Af-faris [MHA], Annual Report 2004-05).

The Dantewada district collector’s work pro-posal (see Box 8: Excerpts from the Collector’s WorkProposal) also reveals the symbiotic relationshipbetween the administration and the Salwa Ju-dum. According to the proposal, Dantewada isan “entirely naxalite affected district”, and peo-ple from “200 villages” (the number of villageshad gone up to 400 by the time he spoke to us inend-November 2005) have started “a people’sawareness campaign against them”. But theCollector also says “it is imperative that the cam-paign receive administrative support” and iden-tifies three areas, namely “a common leader”;“adequate security”; and provision for “trans-port” as well as “food and a place to stay”. Itappears that this is being undertaken in so faras Mahendra Karma is projected as the leader,and the district administration is providingtransportation, food and camps to put up peo-ple. While this can be glossed over by the offi-cials as relief and rehabilitation of displacedpeople what cannot be ignored is the other as-pect of this policy. This concerns the formationof Village Defence Committees (VDCs) andtraining of Special Police Officers (SPOs).

VDCs and SPOs have been a part of thecounter-insurgency policy followed by the In-dian government for many years. These havebeen tried out and fine-tuned over the years in

various places as far apart as the North-East,Jammu & Kashmir, and Jharkhand (where theyare called Nagarik Suraksha Samitis). These arefunded through lump sum grants provided bythe MHA every year. In Chhattisgarh these arecoming up now and forms part of the govern-ment’s answer to the sanghams, the basic unitsof the Maoists at the village level. The Collec-tor’s work proposal states that the “real strength[of Maoists] lies in sangham membership whoare from among the villagers….who help in op-erations of the naxalites” . And insists that “it isnot enough to kill naxalites but more importantto crush and destroy their system”. Constitut-ing VDCs comprising “village head person,panch, sarpanch as well as young men” ( in op-position to the sanghams) is considered vital tothe success and consolidation of the war againstthe Maoists. Not only is physical annihilation ofnaxalites considered necessary, it is “only whenpeople see naxalites fleeing or getting killed”will they side with the administration.

The manner in which VDCs are constitutedshows their counter-insurgency roots. Informa-tion about a village’s population, the number offamilies, and distance from the police station isfirst collected. Then the entire area is dividedinto sectors of 8-10 villages. Security forces aredeployed in these, with each sector having aVDC as well. Each VDC in a cluster will havebetween 40-50 members. The VDCs’ composi-tion overlaps with that of the Salwa Judum inso far as the VDCs comprise “village headper-son, panch, sarpanch as well as young men”.Surrendered sangham members and young menand women from villages get trained to becomeSPOs. These SPOs are vital to this plan becausethey will be located in the villages and “usedfor regular searches”. In other words, the offi-cial policy seeks to build up the fighting capa-bility of the administration by creating a networkof informants and combatants from the village-level upwards. Salwa Judum is an intrinsic partof this because this enables the administrationto: (a) establish its authority in Maoist strong-holds, in villages to which entry was hithertodifficult; (b) identify whom to enlist/recruit in

32

“Dantewada district is an entirely naxalite-affected district. The district has 11 developmentblocks. Currently, in two out of 11 blocks, namely Bhairamgarh and Bijapur people from 200villages falling within Kutru, Farsegarh, Bedre, Jangla, Bijapur, Bhairamgarh and Nelsnar policestations, fed up with naxalite excesses, have started a people’s awareness campaign againstthem. This campaign has now spread to 60 villages from Bade Tumnar and Barsur area ofGeedam block and people from these areas too are present at meetings. In the coming days thiscampaign will spread to three other development blocs namely Usur, Bhopalpatnam and Konta”(p.2).

“Naxalites prohibited all their (villagers) activities and tyrannise them on a daily basis. Theydemand that villagers hand over young boys and girls to join their dalam. Refusal carries threatto their lives. Those working hard are left with ten sacks of paddy and rest is forcibly taken away.They do not let any development work take place, oppose all administrative work thus progressof villages is halted, and basic amenities cannot reach villages, people do not get jobs, all thishas resulted in the problem of starvation”(p. 3).

“So far, the campaign has held meetings in thirty places and in six places rallies have beenheld. In the meetings people from 30-35 villages meet on an agreed date at a designated place”(p.4).

“Considering the village by village conditions operating it is imperative that the campaignreceive administrative support. … Firstly, the campaign needs a common leader who can directthe campaign in a planned way. Secondly, adequate security must be provided to the participantsso that they can overcome pressure from the naxalites. And thirdly, during the campaign, villagersmust be provided transport as and when needed, as well as food and a place to stay at governmentexpense”(p. 5).

“(C)ollecting information about village population, number of families, distance from policestation to the village”; “of constituting village defense committees which should comprise villageheadperson, panch, sarpanch as well as young men…”(p. 9).

“It is proposed that young men and women from the villages be made Special Police Officers.Depending upon the size of the village 5-10 SPOs would be needed. These SPOs will receiveRs 1,500 per month as honorarium”(pp. 9-10).

“Apart from imparting training to the villagers, providing them with traditional weapons suchas bow and arrow, farsa, axe, stick, ballam, etc is extremely important. Although such weaponsare with most villagers but to encourage them people should either be given arrows or iron toprepare arrows. While villagers are asking for guns or license to use them, this is not advisable.Even if licensed guns are provided they can be looted by naxalites or the licensee could be killedto get his gun … Besides, an armed person can later on join a naxalite organization which willenhance the strength of the naxalites. Therefore, the villagers’ request [for guns] is not worthaccepting and they should only be provided traditional weapons”(pp. 10-11).

Box 8Excerpts from the District Collector’s

Work Proposal for Salwa Judum, 2005“Common Man’s Awareness Raising Campaign against Naxalites, 2005.

Work Plan to Make the Campaign Successful; District South Bastar, Dantewada (Chhattisgarh)”

continued on next page

33

“If we look minutely at police work in naxalite affected areas, it is more defensive and lessaggressive. Now the time has come when the police … have to become more aggressive.Although sometimes because of reasons beyond one’s control some excesses do take placeand some innocents do get affected. But keeping in mind the overall context of major operations,it is important that the higher-ups remain silent” (pp. 13). … Only when people see naxalitesfleeing or getting killed will they side with the administration. Therefore, this policy must bepursued strictly. And for this police officers should be given a target”(pp. 14). …

(A)ppointing, temporarily, a DIG for Bijapur police district who can oversee the progress ofthe campaign on a daily basis…”(pp 16).

The work plan argues for widening the definition of “naxalite” for the purpose of rehabilitationof surrendered naxalites, to include “sangam members”. The current definition restricts it tothose in uniform, carrying arms or a member of a dalam. The “real strength [of Maoists] lies insangam membership who are from among the villagers. … Villagers are common people whoside with whoever is powerful and follow whatever is demanded of them. Sangam membes arethe actual workers of the naxalites who help in operations of the naxalites. … To end the problemof naxalites, it is not enough to kill naxalites but more important to crush and destroy theirsystem operating at the village level”(pp. 15–16).

The work plan proposes to divide the area into sectors comprising 8-10 villages (pp17).These clusters of villages will have deployment of security forces. It suggests a company foreach cluster. And each cluster will contain village defence committees and the newly enlistedSPOs would be used for regular searches (pp 18).

The collector also argues that “media coverage of Naxalite attacks makes it look as if theyare gaining the upper hand. By reporting what Naxalites are doing as against reporting howordinary people (read Salwa Judum) are responding, the media indirectly gives the Naxalites avoice”. He advocates controls on the media, beginning with a meeting between the administrationand all news publishers/media channels reminding them of their accountability to the people (p.25).

Note: Page numbers refer to the original document

continued from last page

their war against the Maoists and finally (c) togather information vital for fighting the ‘war’.

Besides, with 400 villages already “combed”(by November) according to the Commandantof the IRB in Dantewada, the administrationproposes to recruit 5-10 SPOs for each village(totalling 2,000-4,000 SPOs for the district). Fur-ther, each sector of 8-10 villages will have a de-ployment of a company of roughly 100 policepersonnel. Each VDC in a sector will have SPOsattached to them. The total known strength ofparamilitary forces provided by the central gov-ernment (and other states) as of now is 7,000 andis likely to increase as there is a demand to de-ploy more troops. Thus a total force strength of

roughly 13-16,000 is currently deployed to fightnaxalism in a district with a total population ofmerely 7.2 lakhs (2001 census); in other words,a forces to people ratio of 1:45! And this is notjust any police, but armed police. (In compari-sion, the total police to people ratio for an al-ready highly policed Delhi is 1:179. That too, 2/3rd of this police force in Delhi are civil police.)

Alongside this, other developments are tak-ing pace in Dantewada. The District Armed Po-lice Force is being upgraded. Existing police sta-tions are being reinforced, and new camps andpolice stations being set up all across the dis-trict. While Dantewada and Bijapur police dis-tricts have 37 police stations, 33 new police sta-

34

tions are being set up. According to the MHAannual report 2004-05, apart from the DistrictForce (DF), two India Reserve Battalions havebeen sanctioned for Chhattisgarh. There are cur-rently already five battalions of CRPF, one NagaIRB and at least one battalion of the GujaratArmed Police. If Lakshman Kashyap is to be-lieved, then the Salwa Judum has been request-ing a few more batallions of the Naga IRB. TheHome Minister of Chhattisgarh had informedthe state assembly on 16 May 2005 that his gov-ernment had sought five battalions of armedpolice from Gujarat and Punjab. The Chhattis-garh Home Secretary too has stated that the ad-ministration has requested a few more battal-ions of the Naga armed police. (See ‘Naxalwatch’weblog, 23 January 2006).

Even this by no means completes the pic-ture. Chhattisgarh now boasts of a new JungleWarfare Training School at Kanker, headed byan army Brigadier. The GOC-in-C of the army’sSouthern Command is now involved in regularmeetings with the administration in Chhattis-garh, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh to mon-itor the progress of anti-naxal operations. Heli-copters and aerial surveillance have been men-tioned in official statements. There is talk of de-ploying helicopter gun ships and/or using themfor ferrying combat troops.

Just to give an idea of the extent of deploy-ment of troops in Dantewada, the 23 kms of roadfrom Bijapur to Gangaloor has three CRPFcamps and two of the Naga IRBs. Each campcomprises between 20-50 jawans. Squads of five

CRPF jawans, armed with three assault rifles,one 2-inch mortar launcher and a stengun, cy-cle up and down the road between their camps.At Meertur, the police station appeared to be afortified area with barbed wire fences and awatch tower, and with security force personnelcarrying light machine guns, posessing mortarlaunchers etc.. This conforms to providing “car-pet security” cover in this area.

Even road building has a security anglemore than anything else. Work on the highway(NH 16) between Jagdalpur and Nizamabad (viaBhopalpatnam) is being carried out by the Bor-der Roads Organization (BRO), the road con-struction wing of the Army. As the name sug-gests, it’s meant to build and maintain roads inborder areas of the country. Its involvement in“difficult and militancy prone areas of Maha-rashtra and Chhattisgarh” (www.bro.nic.in) re-veals the mindset of the administration whichperceives the situation in Bastar – a region withno international border – to be one which re-quires the services of the army’s road construc-tion agency.

To advocate the physical annihiliation ofMaoists and giving police officers a “target” tofulfil and/ or to seek to destroy “their systemoperating at the village level” is to pursue andpromote blood-letting. The militarization of so-ciety through the formation of VDCs and SPOsand arming them indicates that what is goingon in Bastar is not remotely a “peace campaign”but the government is waging a war on its ownpeople.

35

CHAPTER FOUR ConclusionThe team’s observations on the fact- find-

ing can be briefly summed up as follows:

1. Several villages are virtually deserted. Thefew we came across said they come to the vil-lages during the day to harvest the paddy cropand return to their camps as evening falls. Thosewho are now kept in camps some distance fromtheir homes can’t even do this. Many people areaccommodated in houses built close to the high-way and not too far from a police station. Whilesome are being offered jobs on daily wages forconstruction work/schemes of the governmentand others are being trained to become SPOs,nothing is said about their land and fields leftbehind in their villages.

2. There is a pattern in evicting people fromtheir villages. Sometimes the entire village isevacuated; in other instances, only a few fami-lies are moved out. A meeting is announced tobe held in a targeted village. On that date, a Sal-wa Judum crowd accompanied by security forc-es descends on the village and asks people tocome to the camp and sangham members to sur-render. If villagers show reluctance, they areattacked, belongings looted, houses burnt andsome people either lynched or killed by soldiers.Thus if ‘guerillas’ are like fish in the water thenevacuation/forced migration of some or all fam-ilies seems to be to drain the water or to forcepeople out from precisely those villages wherenaxalites enjoyed support, in order to deny themsustenance.

3. Across Dantewada and Bijapur police dis-tricts and especially all along the national high-way, security forces and Salwa Judum membersman checkpoints. The Salwa Judum activistsquestion people, check their belongings andeven enjoy the power to stop a person from trav-eling in this area.

4. Police stations do not maintain records ofor investigate crimes committed by the DF, NagaIRB, CRPF and Salwa Judum members, foster-ing a situation of complete impunity..

5. While ‘development’ is said to be the flipside of the security approach towards naxalites,‘development’ in this area is nothing more thanan appendage of security. Road building inDantewada, both on the highway and in interi-or areas, repairing culverts and small bridges,etc is geared towards easy accessibility for se-curity forces into forest areas.

6. The administration is undertaking a sys-tematic militarization of Dantewada through thearming of the village population, setting up ofVDCs, training SPOs, and financing such oper-ations as part of the central government’s anti-Naxal policy, of which the Salwa Judum is anintegral part.

This kind of militarization of sections of vil-lage society in the form of the Salwa Judum onthe one hand, and the brutal attacks on Maoiststrongholds on the other, make for an incendi-ary situation. The atmosphere reeks of coercion.In such a climate anyone who does not acceptthe official point of view is automatically sus-pect and is regarded as being pro-naxal, andtherefore, an enemy who brooks no respect as afellow citizen. The District Collector does notdeny that Maoists have been successful in orga-nising local villagers, and yet people’s politicalchoices are being completely negated. Sang-hams, states the Collector’s document, have tobe “crushed and destroyed” as they form thestrength of the Maoists at the village level.

There is the conspicuous absence of any at-tempt by the government to understand the con-text of what are the genuine problems of thepeople of the region, and why and how Maoiststook roots here. The reference in the district col-lector’s work proposal to the pathetic conditionsof the tribals who are “uneducated”, “extreme-ly poor”, “lack basic facilities”, amounts to anindictment of successive governments, that havewilfully remained oblivious of this for six de-cades! It is only when the Maoists entered thisarea and began to organize the tribals that theadministration awoke from its stupor. The little

36

development work by the government has beenprompted by or caused by umpteen struggles:against forest officials, strikes for better price forplucking tendu leaf, wages under governmentschemes, etc.

A confrontation under the prevailing con-ditions is to exploit the resulting divide withintribal society in such a way that the already priv-ileged sections of the tribal and settler commu-nities are arrayed against fellow tribals who aresympathetic towards Maoists. By promotingthrough Salwa Judum precisely that section oftribal and non-tribal society which benefitedfrom the debilitating conditions imposed on thetribals, the ordinary villagers are once againbeing pushed back into a situation of being ma-nipulated and exploited. By arming one sectionof society against another, all the government isdoing is legitimising the need for resorting toviolence as a means of resolving political differ-ences.

We have referred in the report to the factthat, unlike in the past, the Salwa Judum is partof a war-making exercise of which officials inDantewada openly speak. Why is the war tak-ing place now? Besides the political motivationof defeating the Maoists, there appears to beanother increasingly pressing reason. Bastarcomprises some of the largest untapped miner-al resources in the country and recent monthsand years has witnessed an intense opening outof mineral resources to domestic and foreigncapital in Chhattisgarh, MP and Orissa. The In-dustrial Policy (2004-09) announced by the Chhat-tisgarh government also seeks to invite invest-ments to exploit the mineral and other resourc-es of Bastar as part of its development strategy.It has signed a number of MOUs with large pri-vate companies, a number of which are locatedin Dantewada district. With Orissa and Jhark-hand opening up its tribal areas to attract hugeprivate investments there is additional pressure

to open up Bastar. Targeting the Maoiststhrough the Salwa Judum is also targeting someof the potential resistance to this pattern offorced ‘development’, of which most poor lo-cals have always been only the victims.

In this sense, the conflict in Dantewada getspushed to a higher plane where the war againstthe Maoists also ties in with the struggle overownership and control over land, water, forestsand mineral wealth. The vagueness of an-all In-dia policy hiding behind “security” and “devel-opment” reveals itself as nothing but a crudestruggle for occupying tribal land. Chhattisgarhhas been the scene in the past of several impor-tant struggles of the tribals against projects thatsought to usurp control over their land, forestand mineral wealth unmindful of their interests.Under these circumstances, we fear that whatthe central and state governments are prepar-ing to prosecute in Bastar is a bloody, brutal anda long war.

The maintenance of democratic practices bypeople’s movements is particularly important infurthering a progressively democratic society.However, the Maoist movement, with signifi-cant numbers of people backing it in this region,cannot be dealt with as a law-and-order situa-tion through what is essentially a counter-insur-gency approach. To resolve this civil war-likesituation, the issues of the life and livelihoodsof the ordinary public need to be addressed se-riously, not undermined even further as the gov-ernment is doing now. The government oughtto create a situation in which progressive demil-itarization can be sought and conflict replacedby political dialogue. The importance of dia-logue – which ought to incorporate a way toaddress people’s root problems – cannot be over-stressed in this situation in which people’s lives,social, economic and political structures, theircultures, and indeed their very survival is atstake.

37

WE DEMAND

1. That the government stop using people as a shield and creating armedVillage Defence Committees as part of its anti-naxal operations;

2. That paramilitary forces be withdrawn from the area and the civil ad-ministration be restored;

3. That all killings by the state, the Salwa Judum and the Maoists bestopped.

4. That sincere dialogue with the Maoists be initiated, and a political res-olution to the situation be found;

5. That FIRs be registered for all crimes committed by the Salwa Judumand security forces and the culprits be prosecuted;

6. That the government and the CPI (Maoist) ensure that people returnto their homes in peace and security;

7. That people be assisted in regaining their livelihoods in their villagesand camps be dismantled.

38

Annexure I: Killings by the Salwa Judum / Security forcesVillage Date Killed Detail*Hiril 01.09.05 Karam Pandu (45) Killed by Naga IRB after(* also told to CPI) burning housesDumri Paralnar 11.08.05 Aatam Boda DAKMS

1-2.9.05 Tamo / Lamo Sukhram (20) DAKMSMaadvi Kopaal (35)Budhu (35)Unknown (30)

Paralnaar 01.10.05 Markam Channu Sangham member11.10.05 Baarse Somu ABS President

Aakwa 01.09.05 Name Unknown (12)Pullum / Pulladi 1.09.05 Kadli Payyaal (45)

Emla Rekaal (50)Aalvoor 31.08.05 Madkaam Kummaal (40) Sangham memberHindri 1.09.05 Tellam Bugru (55)

3.09.05 Madvi Messa (35) Sangham memberPottem / Polem 05.09.05 Lekham Lakhmu (50) Sangham member

Madvi Somu / Somara (35) Sangham memberAalam Mahadev (30) Sangham memberModium Boddaal Sangham member

Karremarka 16.08.05 Lamo/Tamo Rama (35) Committee presidentJangla 27.08.05 Lekham Lakku (35) Baal Sangham member

Maadvi Paaklu (35) Sangham secretaryname unknown (18) Sangham memberFour unnamed

12.09.05 Two unnamedGongla 02.09.05 Poddaam Sonu

20.09.05 Sandeev Gullu DAKMS secretaryKotarapal 01.07.05 Uike Sannu (50)

12.09.05 Vanjam Mangu/Manda (55)11.08.05 (?) Lekam Budhram (35) Sangham member

Aatam Bodi (30)Three unnamed

Munder 28.08.05 Boggam Sannu (18) Sangham member03.09.05 Kadli Kummal DAKMS10.09.05 Kadli Kamlu DAKMS15.09.05 Kalmu Badru DAKMS

Ariyaal / Iriyaal 02.09.05 Kadli Chinna (40) Sangham memberKadli Sannu (35) Sangham memberKadli Kamlu (35) Sangham memberKadli Aaylu (40) Sangham memberKadli Raamaal (45) Sangham memberKadli Kummaal (12) Baal SanghamUji Masaram (40) Sangham memberUji Jayraam (40) Sangham memberEmla Shukku (40) Sangham memberKadli Badru (35) Sangham member

39

Dorum 01.09.05 Tamo Kotlal (40)His wife (36)

Dokham 01.09.05 Bogmi Kislal (40)Bogmi Sobari (36)

Mankeli 15.09.05 Modium Badhru (20) DAKMS25.09.05 SJ meeting held here. 30-40

houses burnt 5 women and2 children taken by police

Korsa Shuklu Sangham memberPunem Kanda

03.10.05 Emla Kova GPC secretaryKosa Aaytu (45-50) Sangam member

Pulgatta 02.09.05 SantoKorsa Salo (20) KMS Committee

Mookavelli 05.10.05 Vedinje Nangi The two wives of Vedinje ChinnalVedinje Malli shot while tending to field. One

year child also shot at. Onewoman was pregnant. She waskilled after removing her foetus.

08.10.05 10 houses burnt. Village looted.Belnar June 05 Bokkaal

GulaabPooslakka July 05 SomaruMarkapaal July 05 MankuKiringed BudhramKarkawada BuggurPallewaya 22.09.05 Madvi LaxmanDimdi 01.09.05 Mellam Dagur Father of Dalam memberPusnaar 12.09.05 Poddaam Charri Sangham memberKondam 03.09.05 Vesa Joga Committee memberPedda Korma 01.10.05 Mudiami Shukko KAMS pres. on RPC

Kursaam Lekhten KAMS CSKilled by Nagas (also told to CPI)

Etepaar 05.10.05 Madkam Channi Sangham memberPabeda 13.09.05 Aapka Seenu MilitiaGornaam 15.09.05 Sodi Kosa MilitiaPunwaar 01.09.05 Punem Budhu MilitiaPaamra 02.09.05 Paaklu (Aasa Channu)Mosla 09.10.05 Emla Lakshu Range Committee

Dugga Guruji (Teacher)Bomra Keshlulul 11.07.05 Madvi ReejaRajug 1-7.10.05 Five women and one man SJ and police raped and killed the 5

women.Kutru Salwa Judum getting people to this camp, where they are tortured and

killed.Dead bodies thrown nearby or in Indravati.river. Four headless bodieshave been thus found.

(Source: Press Statements of CPI [Maoist] Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee, issued on 10October, and 20 November, 2005.)

40

Annexure-IIKillings by Maoists during the Salwa Judum Operation

This is the list given to us by the Collector, Dantewada; According to the Collector, each of thesedeceased’s families have been compensated with a sum of Rs 1 lakh.

Name of Deceased Village Tehsil Date of IncidentMiccha Dishru Bandeparre Bhopalpatnam 19/6/05Mohan Singh Naimed Bijapur 19/6/05Bhuvneshwar Thakur Jangla Bijapur 26/6/05Kotadu Rekhavaya Bijapur 28/6/05Potti Dunga Bijapur 29/6/05Murami Nendur Bijapur 29/6/05Sodi Barre Chintagupha Konta 5/7/05Vijay Giri Bijapur Bijapur 7/7/05Kohrama Kanglu Kotarapal Bijapur 11/7/05Evda Vacham Karkeli Bijapur 15/7/05Vacham Gunda Karkeli Bijapur 15/7/05Arki Gangaram Uskapatnam Bijapur 16/7/05Telam Pijja Uskapatnam Bijapur 16/7/05Todsam Ganpat Ambeli Bijapur 16/7/05Kishore Enka Ambeli Bijapur 16/7/05Budhram Ambeli Bijapur 16/7/05Badrinath Aalnaar Dantewada 18/7/05Vacham Chaitu Jaramarka Bijapur 19/7/05Satish Tumla Bijapur 21/7/05Sai Pondum Bijapur 23/7/05Betti Lalu Karremarka Bijapur 27/7/05Kohrami Ramsingh Karremarka Bijapur 27/7/05Hemla Lakhu Bodlui Bijapur 28/7/05Poonam Lakhu Kothrapara Bijapur 28/7/05Kadti Aaytu Pharasmundal Bijapur 28/7/05Poonem Mangalram Pinconda Bijapur 28/7/05Kadti Mangu Pharasmundal Bijapur 28/7/05Kadti Koya Kodli Bijapur 28/7/05Barsa Nehru Pondum Bijapur 28/7/05Karam Kanhaiya Arjunli Bhopalpatnam 5/8/05Podiyami Dhandhu Bodenar Bijapur 6/8/05Sukku Karma Pharaspal Dantewada 9/8/05Sukhram Pharaspal Dantewada 9/8/05

41

Pandru Jangla Bijapur 14/8/05Ramu Jangla Bijapur 14/8/05Jaggu Kadiyam Chidrapal Bijapur 23/8/05Rajendra Manjhiguda Bijapur 3/9/05Shrinath Pusnar Bijapur 22/9/05Potam Budhu Gongla Bijapur 22/9/05Suryapal Gongla Bijapur 22/9/05Mahadev Manjhi Padiharpara Bijapur 29/9/05Madvi Jagra Padiharpara Bijapur 29/9/05Anthas Kispota Padiharpara Bijapur 29/9/05Darshils Minjh Padiharpara Bijapur 29/9/05Hemla Pandu Gangaloor Bijapur 29/9/05Anil Kodoli Bijapur 29/9/05Mudiyam Budhram Saagwahi Bijapur 1/10/05Paspul Linga Cherpal Bijapur 3/10/05Poyami Budhu Ambeli Bijapur 14/10/05Mehtar Chihka Bijapur 16/10/05Hapka Mangu Ghumra Bijapur 22/10/05Hemla Sannu Gangaloor Bijapur 23/10/05Hemla Dashrath Bhogamguda Bijapur 23/10/05Jumdi Lakshmaiyya Cherpal Bijapur 28/10/05Kodiyam Lakhmu Koyaeetpal Bijapur 3/11/05Pujari Budhram Gongla Bijapur 3/11/05Hapka Aaytu Hallur Bijapur 5/11/05Munnaram Vetti Gumalnaar Dantewada 6/11/05Beko Chaitu Badepotenaar Bijapur 6/11/05Kumar Ella Padeda Bijapur 6/11/05Samlu Padeda Bijapur 10/10/05Hemla Budhram Gangaloor Bijapur 10/10/05Purushum Mangu Pedapal Bijapur 17/11/05Fagnu Ketulnaar Bijapur 22/11/05

42

1From the People proceeds the power of the State.–But where does it proceed to?Yes, where is it proceeding to?There’s some place it’s proceeding to.The policeman proceeds through the station gate.–But where does he proceed to?etc.

2Look, there’s the whole lot on the march.–But where are they marching to?Yes, where are they marching to?There’s some place they are marching to.They wheel through the gate and under the arch.–But where are they heeling to?etc.

3The power of the State turns right about.Something is in the air.–What can be in the air?There’s something in the air.The power of the state gives a piercing shoutAnd yells: Get moving there!–But moving why and where?It yells: Get moving there!

4There’s something standing in a crowdSomething which queries that.Why should it query that?What cheek to query that!The State just shoots-for that’s allowed-And something falls down flat.What was it fell down flat?What made it fall like that?

5The power of the State sees something spill.Something lies in the shit.What’s lying in the shit?Something’s lying in the shit.There’s something lying deadly still–The People, why, that’s it!Can that really be it?Yes, that is really it.

-Bertolt Brecht