Whistleblowing in Organization

8/11/2019 Whistleblowing in Organization

1/22

Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions,Actions, and RetaliationAuthor(s): Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam ViswesvaranSource: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Dec., 2005), pp. 277-297Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25123666.

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2/22

Journal

of

Business

Ethics

(2005)

62: 277-297

?

Springer

2005

DOI 10.1007/sl0551-005-0849-l

Whistleblowing

in

Organizations:

An

Examination

of

Correlates

of

Whistleblowing

Intentions,

Actions,

and Retaliation

Jessica

R.

Mesmer-Magnus

Chockalingam

Viswesvaran

ABSTPJVCT.

Whistleblowing

on

organizational

wrongdoing

is

becoming

increasingly

prevalent.

What

aspects

of

the

person,

the

context,

and the

transgression

relate

to

whistleblowing

intentions

and

to

actual

whis

tleblowing

on

corporate

wrongdoing?

Which

aspects

relate

to

retaliation

against

whistleblowers?

Can

we

draw

conclusions

about the

whistleblowing

process

by

assess

ing whistleblowing

intentions?

Meta-analytic

examina

tion

of 193 correlations

obtained

from

26

samples

(N

=

18,781)

reveals

differences

in

the

correlates

of

whistleblowing

intentions and

actions.

Stronger

rela

tionships

were

found between

personal,

contextual,

and

wrongdoing

characteristics

and

whistleblowing

intent

than

with actual

whistleblowing.

Retaliation

might

best

be

predicted using

contextual variables.

Implications

for

research and

practice

are

discussed.

KEY

WORDS:

retaliation,

retaliatory

acts,

organiza

tional

wrongdoing,

organizational

justice,

whistleblow

ing,

whistleblower

characteristics,

whistleblowing

intentions

Incidents

of

organizational

wrongdoing

are

increasingly making

headlines

(e.g.,

fraud,

corrup

tion,

and

other

unethical

acts

in

organizations

like

Enron, WorldCom, Anderson, and Tyco). While

once

thought

to

be

rare,

broad

coverage

of

recent

corporate

wrongdoing

has led

to

a

widely-held

belief

that scandal

may

be

uncovered

in

virtuaUy

every

business

or

organization

(Anand

et

al.,

2004).

With

greater

frequency,

reports

of

wrongdoing

are

made

by

members

close

to

the

inner

workings

of the

organization (e.g.,

by employees,

board

members

or

internal

auditors),

rather

than

by

external

auditing

agencies.

These

individuals,

often

referred

to as

whistle-blowers,

risk retaliation both

by

their

orga

nization

(e.g.,

via

job loss, demotion,

decreased

quality

of

working

conditions)

and

by

the

public

(e.g.,

character

assassinations,

accusations of

being

merely

sour

grapes ,

spies,

or

squealers )

in

their

efforts

to

expose

perceived

immoral

or

iUegal

acts

(Jubb,

1999;

Near

and

Miceli,

1985).

In

this

manuscript,

we

examine

potential

pre

dictors

and correlates

of

whistleblowing

behavior

and

of

retaliation

against

whistleblowers.

Specifi

caUy,

we

employ meta-analytic

methodology

to

examine

the

personal

and

contextual correlates

of

Chockalingam

Viswesvaran

(Ph.D. University of Iowa)

is

a

Professor of Psychology

at

Florida International

University.

His research

interests include business

ethics,

personnel

selec

tion,

and

human

resource

management.

He

has

published

in

Journal

of

Applied

Psychology,

Organizational

Behavior and

Human Decision

Processes,

and

Psychological

BuUetin.

He

has served

on

5

editorial

boards

and

as

an

Associate Editor

of

the International

Journal

of

Selection

and Assessment.

He

is

an

elected

fellow

of

the

Society

or

Industrial and

Organizational

Psychology

as

well

as

Divisions 5

(Measurement)

and

14

(Industrial-Organi

zational

Psychology) of

the

American

Psychological

Association.

Jessica

Mesmer-Magnus

(Ph.D.

2005,

Florida

International

University)

is

an

Assistant

Professor

ofManagement

with the

Cameron

School

of

Business

at

the

University

of

North

Carolina

at

Wilmington.

Her

research

interests

include

work/

family

conflict/balance, organizational

training

program

de

sign, whistleblowing/counterproductive

behavior,

and business

ethics. She has

published

in

the

Journal

of

Vocational

Behavior,

Journal

of

Business

Ethics and

Journal

of

Labor

Research. She

is

certified

as

a

Senior

Professional

in

Human Resources and has worked

as a

Human Resources

Manager for

a

US-based

national

consulting firm.

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3/22

278

Jessica

R.

Mesmer-Magnus

and

Chockalingam

Viswesvaran

whistleblowing

intentions and

behaviors,

as

weU

as

the correlates

of retaliation

against

whistleblowers

in

an

effort

to

improve

our

understanding

of the

whistleblowing

process.

Our

main

purpose

in

conducting

this

study

is

to

guide

future

research

in

efforts

to

better

predict

and understand

whistle

blowing

and

retaliation,

and

to

inform

practice

as

to

the

aspects

of the work

environment that

may

foster

the

potential

for effective

whistleblowing.

In

the

foUowing

review,

we

wiU

(1)

provide

an

overview of the

whistleblowing

construct,

(2)

re

view

potential

correlates

of

whistleblowing

and

of

retaliation

against

whistleblowers,

and

(3)

draw

a

distinction

between

an

employee's

intent

to

blow

the

whistle and

actuaUy blowing

it.

We

hope

to

inform

research

as to

the

feasibility

of

drawing

conclusions about

whistleblowing

from

data

based

on

intentions rather than

actual

behaviors.

Whistleblowing

defined

Whistleblowing

is the

disclosure

by

organization

members

(former

or

current)

of

iUegal,

immoral,

or

iUegitimate

practices

under

the

control

of their

employers,

to

persons

or

organizations

that

may

be

able

to

effect action.

(Near

and

Miceli,

1985,

p.

4).

While

whistleblowers

typicaUy

have

both

internal

and

external

reporting

channels available

to

report

organizational

transgressions,

research

suggests

that

nearly

aU

whistleblowers

initiaUy

attempt

to

report

wrongdoing

via

internal channels

before

utilizing

(or

in

lieu

of)

external

channels

(Miceli

and

Near, 1992,

2002).

Even

though whistleblowing

via

internal

channels

is

less

threatening

to

an

organization

(as

compared

with external

reporting

which

threatens

public

scrutiny

or

legal

intervention;

Miceli

et

al.,

1991a),

whistleblowing

within

an

organization

is

not

often

welcomed.

Rather,

whistleblower

reports

of

wrongdoing

are

frequently

buried

or

ignored

(Miceli

et

al.,

1991b).

In

this

scenario,

the

whistleblower

is

unsuccessful

in

stopping organizational

wrongdoing,

and

worse,

is

placed

in

a

position

to

experience

negative

consequences

to

their action.

Burying

or

ignoring

reports

and

retaliation

against

whistle

blowers

are

more

likely

when

whistleblowing

is

perceived

by

top management

to

represent

a

questioning

of

or

chaUenge

to

the

organization's

authority

structure

(e.g.,

Miceli and

Near,

2002).

Whistleblowing

research

Reviews

of

whistleblowing

research

have

identified

two

relatively

robust foci of

examination,

in which

researchers

have

sought

to

identify

the

conditions

under which

whistleblowing

intentions

are

formed

and action

taken,

and

retaliation

occurs

(Ellis

and

Arieli, 1999;

Miceli and

Near,

2002).

Studies

of the

antecedents,

correlates,

and

consequences

of the

decision

to

blow

the whistle

on

corporate

wrongdo

ing,

as

well

as

those focused

on

modeling

its

process,

have

typically

drawn

conceptual

distinctions

between

those variables related

to

the

whistleblower

(i.e.,

whistleblower

characteristics),

the

context in

which

the

whistleblowing

occurs

(i.e.,

contextual

variables),

and

aspects

of

the

wrongdoing

and

wrong-doer (e.g.,

King.

1997;

Miceli

et

al.,

1991a;

Miceli and

Near,

1985,1988;

Miceli

et

al.,

1991b).

Research

exploring

the role

of

these

variables

in

the

whistleblowing

pro

cess

is

typically approached

in

one

of

two

ways:

(1)

conducting

surveys

of actual

whistleblowers,

or

(2)

using

scenarios, interviews,

or

survey-based

methods

to

ascertain

when

an

observer

of

organizational

wrongdoing

will

be

likely

to

blow the whistle

or

will

report

the intention

to

make

a

claim.

Specifically,

while

some

authors have been

successful

in

gaining

access

to

actual

whistleblowers,

others have

resorted

to

drawing

conclusions

about

the

whistleblowing

process

using

reports

of

whistleblowing

intentions.

In

the first

case,

actual

whistleblowers have

observed

a

transgression,

made

the decision

to

report

it,

and then

actually

followed

through

in

making

a

claim.

Likely

or

intended

whistleblowers,

on

the other

hand,

have been

given

information

about

a

wrongdoing

(whether

real

or

fictitious)

and have

reported

either

how

likely

they

would

be

to

blow

the

whistle

or

whether

they

intended blow

the whistle

at

some

fu

ture

time.

The

obvious difference

between

these

ap

proaches

is

that intended

whistleblowers

have

not

actually

followed

through

with

blowing

the

whistle.

Researchers

have

justified

using

data

gained

from

intended rather

than actual

whistleblowers

by

(1)

citing

the

difficulty

of

carrying

out

investigations

into unethical

conduct

in

actual

organizations

(e.g.,

Chiu,

2003), (2)

suggesting

that actual

whistle

blowers

censor

the

information

they

provide

to

investigators

due

to

the

perception

that

data

gath

ered

in

actual

organizations

precludes

their

confi

dentiality

or

anonymity

(e.g.,

Sims

and

Keenan,



4/22

Whistleblowing

and Retaliation

279

1998), (3)

iUuminating

the

difficulty

of

locating

actual whistleblowers for

questioning,

or

(4)

citing

the

inherently

flawed

nature

of

such

data

(e.g.,

self

reports

of

past

events).

While

we

believe these

concerns to

be

valid,

we

also

believe

that conclu

sions drawn based on testimonies of actual whis

tleblowers

wiU be different than those from

likely

whistleblowers.

The real

question,

however,

is how

different

wiU

these

conclusions

be.

SpecificaUy,

are

the correlates

of

actual

whistleblowing

similar

en

ough

to

those

of

likely/intended whistleblowing

to

warrant

firm

conclusions

about

the

whistleblowing

process?

Or,

given

the

nature

of

whistleblowing

as

a

behavior

(rather

than

an

attitude

or

intention),

is

the distance between

whistleblowing

intent and

actual

whistleblowing (e.g., deciding

to

blow

the

whistle, accessing the internal

or

external channel,

making

a

claim of

wrongdoing, supplying

the

necessary

evidence)

so

great

as

to

void direct

comparison?

Research

on

the

intention-behavior

relationship

suggests

only

a

weak

relationship

between

the

intention

to act

and the

actual

per

formance

of

a

behavior

(MiUer

and

Grush,

1988).

In

fact,

measures

of behavioral intentions have

ac

counted

for,

at

most,

10%

ofthe

variance

in

overt

behaviors

(e.g.,

MitcheU,

1974).

Further,

the

intention-behavior

relationship

is

thought

to

be

even

weaker

for

some

behaviors

(i.e.,

those

behaviors that

may

be

governed

more

heavily by

subjective

norms

and external

support,

like whis

tleblowing;

e.g.,

MiUer and

Grush,

1988; MitcheU,

1974).

According

to

Bagozzi's

(1992)

Volitional

Model

of

Goal

Directed

Behaviors,

behavioral

intention and

overt

action

are

separated by

extensive

psychological,

motivational,

and

imple

mentation

processes

(i.e.,

planning, monitoring

activities,

guidance

and

control,

psychological

commitment,

effort).

This

suggests

there

may

be

multiple phases

involved

in

moving

from

an

awareness

of

an

iUegitimate

practice,

to

the decision

to

blow the

whistle,

to

actuaUy

making

a

claim.

Correlates of

whistleblowing

Below

we

review

research

resulting

from

both

reports

of

whistleblowing

intent

and

whistleblowing

action.

Researchers

have

examined

the

same

sets

of

variables

in studies of intended and

actual whistleblowers

(i.e.,

relating

to

aspects

of the

whistleblower,

context,

and

wrongdoing potentially predictive

of

whistleblowing

intention/action).

A

qualitative

review

of

the whis

tleblowing

process

yields relatively

consistent

findings

resulting

from

each

approach.

However,

a

cursory

examination of their results suggests stronger rela

tionships

may

exist

between

key

variables and whis

tleblowing

intentions

than

whistleblowing

actions.

Given

that

whistleblowing

behavior

may

be

heavily

governed by subjective

norms

and

external

supports,

it

stands

to reason

that the

relationship

between inten

tion

and

action

may

be

even

lower

for

whistleblowing

than

other

actions.

Using

a

meta-analytic

approach,

we

examine

correlates

of

whistleblowing

intent and

actual

whisdeblowing separately

so as to

lend

a

greater

understanding

of

their

common

relation

to

predictors

and correlates. We hope to identify the relationship

between

whistleblowing

intent and

whistleblowing

action,

so

that

research

may

be

better informed

as to

the

applicability

of data

regarding

whistleblowing

inten

tions

to

conclusions about

whisdeblowing

actions.

Whistleblower characteristics

A

variety

of

personal

characteristics related

to

the

decision

to

engage

in

whistleblowing

have

been

examined: whistleblower demographics (i.e., age,

sex,

level

of

education,

level of

job

held,

etc.),

personality

variables

(i.e.,

locus of

control),

morality

(i.e.,

ethical

judgment),

and

other characteristics

(i.e.,

job performance, organizational

commitment,

role

responsibility, approval

of

whistleblowing;

e.g.,

Brief

and

Motowidlo,

1986;

Near

and

Miceli,

1996).

While results

seem

to

differ

slightly

across

studies,

whistleblowers

(as

compared

with

inactive

observ

ers)

tend

to

have

good

job

performance,

to

be

more

highly

educated,

to

hold

higher-level

or

supervisory

positions,

to

score

higher

on

tests

of

moral

reasoning,

and

to

value

whistleblowing

in

the face of unethical

behavior

(e.g.,

Brabeck, 1984;

Miceli

and

Near,

1984;

Near

and

Miceli,

1996;

Sims

and

Keenan,

1998).

Also,

it

appears

that

whistleblowers

are

more

likely

(than

inactive

observers)

to

report

a

role

related

responsibility

or

obligation

to

blow the whistle

(e.g.,

Near and

Miceli,

1996).

Age

and

organizational

tenure

as

predictors

of

whistleblowing

have

yielded

mixed results

(e.g.,

Near

and

Miceli,

1996;

Sims and

Keenan,

1998).



5/22

280

Jessica

R.

Mesmer-Magnus

and

Chockalingam

Viswesvaran

Empirical

findings

regarding

the

personal

corre

lates of

whistleblowing

intentions and actions

are

typicaUy

interpreted

through

the lens of

social?psychological

theories of

behavior

(cf.

Casal

and

Zalkind,

1995;

EUis and

Arieli,

1999;

Miceli and

Near, 1994;

2002;

Near

and

Miceli,

1995).

For

example,

HoUander's

(1958)

idiosyncrasy

model

suggests

that

those individuals

who

are

considered

to

be the

best contributors

to

group

and

organizational

objectives

(i.e.,

have

high job

performance)

wiU be

given

greater

leeway

to

deviate

from

group

or

organizational

norms.

SpecificaUy, employees

with

good job performance

wiU

be

more

likely

to

have

accumulated

idiosyncrasy

credits

(interpersonal

bonuses)

within the

organization,

thus

providing

some

latitude

to

report

wrongdoing

without suffer

ing

retaliation,

and

more

importantly,

to

effect

the

desired

change (e.g.,

Miceli

et

al.,

1991a).

Similarly,

Pheffer

and

Salancik's

(1978)

Resource

Dependence

Theory

posits

that when

one

party

possesses

resources

upon

which

another

is

dependent,

that

party

wiU be

more

powerful.

Within

the

whistleblowing

context,

an

individual with

more

experience,

tenure,

and

better

job

performance

is

more

valuable

to

an

orga

nization,

thus

giving

them

some

leverage

to

report

misdeeds

(e.g.,

Miceli

and

Near,

2002).

Perceived

leverage

may

increase

whistleblowing

potential

and

action. Theories of

power

relationships (e.g.,

French

and

Raven,

1959) suggest

that individuals

gain

(and

exercise)

various

bases of

power

by possessing

valued

and

not

easfly replaceable

characteristics

(e.g.,

desired

or

unique

skiUs,

good job performance,

tenure

or

position

status,

credibility).

Thus,

whistleblowers

with better

job performance

and

tenure

are more

likely

to

be

successful

in

persuading

organizational

actors

to

stop

the undesirable

acts,

also

increasing

the

potential

they

wiU

report (or

intend

to

report)

a

transgression (e.g.,

Miceli

and

Near,

1994).

Organizational

employees

have three

options

to

address

an

unsatisfactory

situation

faced

within

an

organization:

(1)

to

exit the

organization,

(2)

voice

discontent

(i.e.,

blow

the

whistle),

or

(3)

remain

silent.

Employees

with

greater

tenure

are

more

in

vested

in

the

organization

and

may

prefer

voice

to

exit. This

is

also

congruent

with

predictions

from

theories

of

power

in

organizations,

where

employees

with

greater

tenure

may

have

greater

power

to

effect

change,

and

therefore

may

prefer

voice

to

exit

or

silence

(e.g.,

French

and

Raven,

1959).

In

a

similar

vein,

individuals

demonstrating higher

organizational

commitment

are more

invested

in

staying

with

the

organization,

therefore

are more

likely

to

blow

the

whistle rather

than

exit the

organization

(particularly

when the

prospect

of continued

wrongdoing

is

uncomfortable

or

unacceptable).

Thus,

theoretical

explanations

based

on

available

idiosyncrasy

credits,

power

relations,

voice-exit

choices,

and

control

theory

are

congruent

with

empirical

findings

that

older,

high performing,

more

committed

and

more

experienced employees

are more

likely

to

report

wrongdoing

in

and

by

organizations.

Contextual

variables

Compared

with the

personal

characteristics

of

whistleblowers,

contextual

variables

seem to

explain

more

variance

in

an

individual's

decision

to

blow

the

whistle

(e.g.,

Miceli

et

al.,

1991b;

Miceli and

Near,

1984;

Near and

Miceli,

1996).

Such

contextual

variables

may

include

supervisor

and

coworker

support,

organizational

climate,

threat

of

retaliation,

and size

of

organization.

Research

suggests

that

perceptions

of

supervisor

or

top

management

sup

port

are

instrumental

in

the decision

to

blow

the

whistle,

and

in

the determination

of

which

reporting

channel

wiU

be

employed

(i.e.,

internal

vs.

external

to

the

organization;

e.g.,

Keenan,

2000;

Sims

and

Keenan,

1998).

For

instance,

predictions

from Social

Exchange

Theory

(Thibaut

and

Kelley,

1959)

would

suggest

that

when

there

is

a

high

level

of

supervisor

and co-worker

support,

norms

of

reciprocity

will

develop

that channel

an

individual

to

use

internal

means to

effect

behavior

change

(before

making

the

charges public).

Other

contextual variables

are

also

worth

pursu

ing.

For

example,

whistleblowing

seems

to

be

greater

in

organizations

that

value

whistleblowing

and

in those

in which the

whistleblower

perceives

a

high

congruence

between

personal

and

organiza

tional values

(Berry,

2004;

Near

and

Miceli,

1996).

This is in

accordance

with

Enz's

(1988)

theory

of

value

congruence.

Similarly, potential

whistleblow

ers

who

perceive

a

threat

of retaliation

(by

the

organization,

immediate

supervisors,

or

co-workers)

are

much less

likely

to

blow

the whistle

than

those

who do

not

perceive

a

retaliatory

climate

(Keenan,

1995;

King,

1999;

Near

and

Miceli,

1996).



6/22

Whistleblowing

and

Retaliation

281

Characteristics

of wrong-doing

Evidence

suggests

that characteristics of

the

wrong

doing

(i.e.,

perceived

severity

of

the

wrongdoing,

evidence

of

wrongdoing)

and/or characteristics

of

the wrong-doer (i.e., likeability of or closeness to the

wrongdoer)

may

have

significant

implications

in

the

decision

to

blow the whistle.

Wrongdoing

type

and

perceived severity

has

been found

to

be

moderately

positively

related

to

whistleblowing

(Miceli

and

Near, 1985;

Near

and

Miceli,

1996).

There

is

also

a

tradition of research

in

whistleblowing

that addresses

whether

the

wrongdoing

is

sufficiently

costly

to

warrant

pursuit.

Thus,

it has been

suggested

that

potential

whistleblowers look for

materiality

(as

auditors

do)

before

embarking

on

any

actions.

Similarly, organization members seem to be more

likely

to

blow the

whistle

on

organization

wrong

doing

when

they

have

convincing

evidence of

the

wrongdoing,

and

when the

transgression

personaUy

affects them

(Miceli

and

Near,

1985).

The latter

finding parallels

the research

on

the

bystander

effect

in

explaining prosocial

behavior: due

to

a

diffusion of

responsibility,

individuals

are

less

likely

to

help

when

several others

are

present

(Latane

and

Darley,

1970).

On the

other

hand,

to

the

extent

strong

norms

of

reciprocity

develop

and

social

sup

port is high between organizational members,

wrongdoing

that

harms

the

organization

and/or

co-workers

is

more

likely

to

be

reported (especially

using

internal

channels).

Interestingly,

in

organiza

tions that

depend

upon

the

continuation of the

wrongdoing,

whistleblowers

are more

likely

to

select

external

reporting

channels rather than

attempt

to

make

an

internal claim

(Miceli

and

Near,

1985).

This

relationship

appears

to

be

especially

strong

when

the

whistleblower

is

fearful

of

retaliation

by

the

organization,

supervisors,

or

coworkers

(Miceli

and

Near, 1985).

Retaliation

against

whistleblowers

Once

an

organization

member has blown the whistle

on

an

organizational

wrongdoing,

management

may

make

two

types

of

decisions:

(1)

whether

to

disre

gard

the claim

or

take

appropriate

action,

and

(2)

whether

to

reward

or

retaliate

against

the

whistle

blower

(Near

and

Miceli,

1986).

It

is assumed

that

a

whistleblower's

experiences

(perceived

or

actual,

reward

or

retaliation)

foUowing

a

whistleblowing

event

wiU

have

strong

effects

on

others'

wiUingness

and likelihood

to

blow

the

whistle

in the

future

(Casal and Zalkind, 1995; Miceli and Near, 1992).

LogicaUy,

organizational

response

to

whistleblower

action

depends

in

part upon

whether

management

agrees

with

the merit of the

claim

and

with the

whistleblower's

obligation

to

take

action

(Parmer

lee

et

al.,

1982).

Under

circumstances where

an

organization

is

dependent

upon

the continuation of

the

wrongdoing

or

when

they

are

not

dependent

upon

the whistleblower

(e.g.,

Resource

Depen

dence

Theory;

Pheffer

and

Salancik,

1978),

the

organization

is

more

likely

to

retaliate

against

the

whistleblower and continue the wrongdoing (Near

and

Miceli,

1986).

Retaliation

may

take

many

forms,

ranging

from

attempted

coercion of

the

whistleblower

to

with

draw

accusations of

wrongdoing

to

the

outright

exclusion

of

the

whistleblower

from

the

organiza

tion

(e.g.,

Parmerlee

et

al.,

1982).

Other

retaliatory

acts

may

include

organizational

steps

taken

to

undermine the

complaint

process,

isolation of

the

whistleblower,

character

defamation,

imposition

of

hardship

or

disgrace

upon

the

whistleblower,

exclusion from meetings, elimination of perquisites,

and other forms

of discrimination

or

harassment

(e.g.,

Parmerlee

et

al.,

1982).

RetaUatory

acts

may

be

motivated

by

the

organization's

desire

to

(1)

sUence

the

whisdeblower

completely,

(2) prevent

a

full

pubUc

knowledge

ofthe

complaint,

(3)

discredit

the

whistleblower,

and/or

(4)

discourage

other

potential

whistleblowers

from

taking

action

(MiceU

and

Near,

1994;

Parmerlee

et

al.,

1982).

Retaliation is

not

always

initiated

by

organiza

tional

top

management.

Rather,

isolated

acts

of

retaliation may be initiated by the whistleblower's

supervisor

or

coworkers

with

or

without

(formal

or

informal)

sanctioning

by

top

management.

Super

visors

may

be motivated

to

retaliate

against

whis

tleblowers

for

a

variety

of

reasons,

but

they

frequently

do

so

out

of

fear

that

a

whistleblowing

claim

signals

their

inability

to

maintain

order and

compliance

within

their

departments,

or

the fear that

valid

complaints

wiU

result in

the restriction

or

cessation

of

their

own

operations

or

influence

(O'Day,

1972;

Parmerlee

et

al.,

1982).



7/22

282

Jessica

R.

Mesmer-Magnus

and

Chockalingam

Viswesvaran

Correlates of retaliation

against

whistleblowers

Predictors

or

correlates

of retaliation

against

whis

tleblowers

fall

into

one

of four broad

categories:

(1)

characteristics of the whistleblower, (2) actions taken

by

the

whistleblower

in

reporting

organizational

wrongdoing,

(3)

situational

or

environmental

vari

ables

related

to

the

organization,

and

(4)

character

istics

of

the

wrongdoing

or

wrongdoer.

Characteristics

of

the whistleblower

Characteristics of the

whistleblower examined

in

relation

to

retaliation include whistleblower

age,

education

level,

job

level,

role

responsibility,

and

value

congruence

with

the

organization.

While

demographic

characteristics

of

whistleblowers

are

thought

to

be less

predictive

of retaliation than

are

contextual

variables

(Miceli

and

Near,

2002),

research

suggests

that individuals who blow the whistle be

cause

it

is their

job

to

do

so

(e.g.,

audit

or

role

responsibility)

are

less

likely

to

be

retaliated

against

and

are more

likely

to

be

successful

in

stopping

the


Casal

and

Zalkind, 1995;

Miceli

and

Near,

2002).

Further,

Parmerlee

and

coUeagues

(1982)

found

preliminary

evidence that

older

whistleblowers

are more

likely

to

be retaliated

against

than

are

younger

whistleblowers.

Interestingly,

their

results also

suggest

that whistleblowers that

are

valuable

to

their

organization

(e.g.,

due

to

age,

experience,

education,

job

level)

are

more

likely

to

be

retaliated

against

as

compared

to

less valuable whistleblowers.

Perhaps,

for

older

individuals

and those

at

higher

job

levels and with

more

experience,

greater

organiza

tional

loyalty

is

expected.

When

such

individuals

blow the

whistle,

other

organizational

members

may

feel

a

greater

sense

of

betrayal,

thus

paving

the

way

for

more

retaliatory

behaviors.

This is

especially

true

when

external channels

are

employed

to

report

vio

lations.

Norms of

reciprocity

and

notions of

perceived

justice

violations

(however

misguided)

appear

to

predict

retaliation.

Theories of

power

also

suggest

that

whisdeblowers

at

higher job

levels,

who

are

expected

to

enforce the

power

structure,

upon

violating

this

mandate

are more

likely

to

suffer retaliation. On the

other

hand,

individuals

at

lower

levels of

the

organiza

tional

structure

may

have

lesser

power,

thus

being

easy

targets

for

retaliation.

FinaUy,

evidence

suggests

that

whistleblowers

whose values

regarding

right

and

wrong

are

not

congruent

with

those

of

the

organization,

are

more

likely

to

be retaliated

against

(Miceli

and

Near,

1994),

presumably

because

organization

top

man

agement does not deem the wrongdoing to be as

severe as

is

perceived

by

the

whistleblower,

thus

casting

doubt

on

the

merit

ofthe whistleblower's

complaint.

Actions

taken

by

the

whistleblower

Some

researchers have examined

whether

specific

actions

taken

by

a

whistleblower influence the de

gree

to

which

they

are

retaliated

against (e.g.,

whether

the whistleblower used

an

internal

or

external channel

to

report

wrongdoing,

whether the

whistleblower

attempted

to

remain

anonymous

during

the

whistleblowing

process,

how successful

the

whistleblower

was

in

ultimately curbing

the

organizational

wrongdoing,

and

even

whether

others

in

the

organization

ignored

wrongdoing).

Indeed,

research

suggests

that

when

whistleblowers

report

wrongdoing

via external

channels,

they

are

more

likely

to

receive

retaliation,

and such retalia

tion

is

likely

to

be

more severe

than when internal

channels

are

utilized

(Near

and

Miceli,

1986).

Starting

with Weber

(1947)

and Barnard

(1938),

organizations

have relied

on

the

concept

of

legiti

mate

authority.

Thus,

the

use

of external channels

is

more

likely

to

elicit

retaliatory

behaviors,

as

it

violates the

power

and

authority

structure

present

within

the

organization. Similarly,

whistleblowers

who

unsuccessfuUy attempted

to

remain

anonymous

during

the

whistleblowing

process

were more

likely

to

be

retaliated

against

(Miceli

and

Near,

1994).

Inconsistent results have

been

reported

regarding

the

effectiveness

of

the

whistleblower

in

curbing

wrongdoing

and

experience

of retaliation.

Specifi

caUy,

Miceli

and

Near

(2002)

report

that effective

whistleblowers

are

less

likely

to

experience

retaUation

unless the

supervisor

or

top management

simul

taneously

curbed

the

wrongdoing

and

retaliated

simply

for

blowing

the whistle. This

suggests

that

even

when the

transgression

is

agreed

to

be

harmful

and is

subsequently stopped,

some

organizations

are

particularly

sensitive

to

violations

of

the

authority

structure

via

whistleblowing.

This

seems

to

be



8/22

Whistleblowing

and

Retaliation

283

especiaUy likely

when

whistleblowers

have utilized

external channels.

Contextual variables

Context variables

examined

in

relation

to

retaliation

include

top management,

supervisor,

and coworker

support,

as

well

as

organizational

climate for whis

tleblowing.

While

lack

of

support

from

supervisors

and

top

management

is

likely

predictive

of

retalia

tion

against

whistleblowers,

coworker

support

does

not

appear

to

be related

to

perceived

or

experienced

retaliation

(Near

and

Miceli,

1986).

This

finding

is

likely

due

to

the low

occurrence

of

retaliation

ini

tiated

by

coworkers

(e.g.,

Miceli

and

Near,

1994).

However, this

finding

may be indicative of

organi

zational

norms

for

treatment

of whistleblowers.

SpecificaUy,

in

organizations

where

whistleblowing

is

not

sanctioned,

coworkers

are

likely

less

willing

to

offer

support

or

protection

from retaliation

to

a

whistleblower.

Characteristics

of

the

wrongdoing

Lastly,

in

addition

to

the

other

predictors

of retali

ation, researchers have examined

aspects

of the

wrongdoing

that

may

influence

retaliation

(e.g.,

frequency, severity,

and evidence of

wrongdoing).

Logic

suggests

that

when

wrongdoing

in

an

orga

nization is

widespread

or

when

the

organization

is

dependent

upon

the continuation of

wrongdoing,

the

organization's

top

management

would be

more

likely

to

lash

out

at

individuals who blow

the

whistle

(Casal

and

Zalkind,

1995).

However,

Near

and

Miceli

(1986)

found that

a

whistleblower's

report

of

(a)

multiple

incidents

of

wrongdoing,

(b)

multiple

individuals involved in the wrongdoing, or (c)

multiple

sources

of

evidence,

appear

unrelated

to

retaliation. This

could be

explained

in

terms

of

the

effort

needed

to

retaliate

against

a

whistleblower

with

strong

evidence of

wrongdoing,

particularly

when the

wrongdoing

is

widespread

and

impacts

multiple

individuals

(Parmerlee

et

al.,

1982).

In

sum,

our

first

purpose

in

conducting

this

re

search

was

to

investigate

the

antecedents

and

cor

relates of

whistleblowing,

and

to

determine

whether

these

were

different

for

whistleblowing

intent

versus

actual

behavior.

Our

second

purpose

in

conducting

the

present

study

was

to

examine

likely

antecedents

and

correlates

of

retaliation

against

whistleblowers,

and

to

determine

the

relative

importance

of each

variable

in

predicting

retaliation.

To

address these

questions,

meta-analytic

cumulation of the extant

literature

was

employed

to

summarize and

integrate

findings

from

individual studies.

Method

Database

One hundred and

ninety-three

correlations

from

26

samples

reported

in

21

articles

(total

N

=

18,781)

examining

whistleblowing (including

intent to blow

the

whistle,

likelihood of

blowing

the

whistle,

and

actual

whistleblowing,

both

via

internal and external

channels)

and

retaliation

against

whistleblowers

were

included

in

this

meta-analysis.

To

ensure a com

prehensive

search,

these studies

were

located

using

the

foUowing

strategies:

(1)

conducting

a

comput

erized

search

ofthe

Psyclnfo

(1887

to

present)

and

ABI

Inform

(1971

to

present)

databases,

using

appropriate

keywords

and

phrases

(e.g.,

whistleblow

ing,

blowing

the

whistle,

organizational

wrongdoing,

retaliation, dissent,

counterproductive

behavior,

corruption),

(2)

conducting

a

manual search

of

references cited

in

studies

included

in

this

meta-analysis

and cited

in

this

manuscript,

(3)

snowbaUing

references

cited

in

recently

published

reviews of

the

whistleblowing

literature

(e.g.,

Gundlach

et

al., 2003;

Miceli

et

al.,

1991b;

Near and

Miceli,

1995,

1996),

and

(4)

soliciting

relevant,

but

as

yet

unpublished,

research

from authors

at

the

2004 and 2005

meetings

of the

Society

of Industrial

Organizational

Psychology.

These

methods

yielded

an

initial

67

journal

articles, dissertations, and theses with the potential to

provide

usable

data.

An

attempt

was

made

to

obtain

aU

studies

identified.

When

a

manuscript

was

not

available

via

interlibrary

loan,

a

request

for

a

copy

was

sent

directly

to

the

study's primary

author.

Studies

were

included

only

if

they

reported

a

cor

relation

(or

an

effect

size

which

could

be converted

to

a

correlation

using

appropriate

conversion

for

mulas)

between

one

of

the

several

predictors

and

whistleblowing

(intent/likelihood

or

behavior)

or

instances of retaliation.

Studies

that

examined



9/22

284

fessica

R.

Mesmer-Magnus

and

Chockalingam

Viswesvaran

constructs

different

from

those

of interest

(e.g.,

perceptions

of

or

reactions

to

unethical

behaviors/

incidences other than those

of actual

or

intended

whistleblowing)

or

those that

reported

only

anec

dotal

data,

regression

coefficients,

or

other

effect

sizes not representative of a clean relationship

between

whistleblowing

intent/action

and

a

relevant

correlate,

were

not

code-able. When authors

reported

separate

correlations

for different

subgroups

(e.g.,

males and

females),

samples,

administrations

(as

in

a

longitudinal

study),

or measures

of the

same

construct,

those

correlations

were

examined

sepa

rately.

The studies included

in

this

meta-analysis

are

listed

in the references

prefixed

with

an

asterisk.

The

studies

included

in this

meta-analysis,

for the

most

part,

utilized

largely

male

samples

of

working

adults

(average ages between mid-1920's and late-1940's)

who

have

(or

could

have)

witnessed

and

reported

(or

considered

reporting)

organizational

wrongdoing

(i.e.,

internal

auditors,

military

and

government

employees,

accountants).

Experimental,

scenario

based,

and

survey-based

designs

were

utilized.

Coding procedure

The

first author

made

an

initial

independent

effort

to

code the 21 articles selected for inclusion in this

study.

A

random

subset

of

these

articles

was

coded

by

the

second author

in

an

effort

to

determine

coder

reliability.

Inter-coder

agreement

was

very

high,

likely

due

to

the

objective

nature

of the data coded.

In

reference

to

whistleblowing

intentions and

actions,

the

variables

coded included those related

to

(1)

the characteristics

of

a

whistleblower

(e.g.,

demographics,

like

age,

sex,

education,

tenure,

and

job

level,

and other

characteristics,

like ethical

judgment,

job

satisfaction,

job performance,

role

responsibility to blow the whistle, and approval of

whistleblowing),

(2)

the

context

in

which

whistle

blowing

takes

place

(e.g., organizational

climate for

whistleblowing,

fear

or

threat

of retaliation

against

whistleblowers,

organizational

size,

and

supervisor

and

co-worker

support),

and

(3)

the characteristics

of

the

wrongdoing

or

the

wrong-doer

(e.g.,

the

seri

ousness

of

the

wrongdoing,

the

amount

of evidence

of the

wrongdoing

possessed

by

the

whistleblower,

whether

the

whistleblower

was

effective

in

stopping

the

wrongdoing,

and the

degree

to

which

the

whistleblower works

near

or

closely

with

the

wrong-doer).

These correlates

were

coded

with

re

spect

to

whether

the

data

was

coUected

from in

tended

or

likely

whistleblowers

or

from

actual

whistleblowers.

Further,

the data

were

coded

with

respect to whether the whistleblower used (or in

tended

to

use)

an

internal

or

external

reporting

channel.

If

the

reporting

channel

was

not

specified

or was

mixed,

this

was

coded

separately.

Wrnle

we

had

hoped

to

be able

to

examine

correlations

be

tween

whistleblowing

correlates and

whistleblowing

intentions

and

behaviors

by

the

type

of

reporting

channel

employed

(intended),

there

was

an

insuffi

cient number of

studies

available

to

facilitate

this

specificity.

We chose instead

to

examine

the

rela

tionships

of

whistleblowing

correlates with

either

intentions or actions, regardless of reporting channel.

In

reference

to

correlates

of retaliation

against

whistleblowers,

the variables coded included those

related

to

the

(1)

characteristics of

a

whistleblower

(e.g.,

like

age,

education,

job

level,

role

responsi

bility

to

blow

the

whistle,

perceived

alternative

job

opportunities,

and

degree

to

which the whistle

blower

perceived

value

congruence

with the

orga

nization), (2)

actions taken

by

the whistleblower

in

reporting

an

organizational

wrongdoing

(e.g.,

utilizing

an

external

channel,

attempting

to

remain

anonymous during the whistleblowing process, and

success

in

stopping

the

wrongdoing),

(3)

contextual

variables

(e.g.,

supervisor

and co-worker

support),

and

(4)

characteristics

of

the


frequency

of

wrongdoing

in the

organization,

the

severity

of the

transgression,

and the

amount

of

evidence about the

wrongdoing possessed

by

the

whistleblower).

Analysis

The

meta-analytic

methods

outUned

by

Hunter

and

Schmidt

(2004)

were

employed

to

analyze

this data.

The

three

outcomes

investigated

are

(1)

intent

to

blow the

whistle,

(2)

whistle-blowing

behavior,

and

(3)

retaliation

experienced.

Each

set

of

bivariate

correlations

(between

a

predictor

and

outcome)

were

analyzed separately.

The

sample-size weighted

mean

observed

correlation and

the

sample-size

weighted

standard deviation

of

the

observed

corre

lations

were

computed.

These

two

estimated



10/22

Whistleblowing

and Retaliation

285

parameters

provide

a

distribution

of the observed

effect

sizes.

Unfortunately,

insufficient

information

was

available

to

correct

for

unreliability

in

the

measures.

This

concern

is

mitigated

to

some

extent

by

the

objective

nature

of

some

ofthe

predictors

included (e.g., gender, tenure). To the extent sta

tistical artifacts

like

unreliability

and

range

restriction

in the

measures

affect the

results,

our

reported

findings

underestimate

the

true

magnitude

ofthe

correlations and overestimate the true

variability

across

studies.

Note,

however,

that

our

analyses

are

conservative

in

that

true

correlations

wiU

actuaUy

be

higher

and

we are more

likely

to

consider

potential

moderators

(even

when their

effects

are

weak).

The

sampling

error

variance

associated with

the

mean

observed

correlation

was

computed

(Hunter

and Schmidt, 2004) and subtracted from the

observed

variance.

The

resulting

residual variance

was

used

to

compute

the confidence

intervals

around the observed

mean.

The

percent

of observed

variance

attributable

to

sampling

error

was

also

computed. UsuaUy,

if

60%

or more

of the observed

variance is

attributable

to

sampling

error,

one

can

assume

that

variance

across

studies

due

to

uncor

rected artifacts

like

unreliability

and

range

restriction

in

the

measures

correlated

can

explain

the

remaining

variability.

Such

a

finding

suggests

that the

rela

tionship generalizes

or

transports

across

contexts.

Thus,

our

analyses

could be construed

to

be

a

bare

bones

meta-analysis

(Hunter

and

Schmidt,

2004).

We

report

for each

meta-analysis,

the

number

of

correlations

included

(k),

the

total

sample

size

across

all

estimates

(N),

the


mean

observed

correlation

(r),

the


standard deviation

(SDr),

the

sampling

error

standard

deviation,

the residual standard

deviation

(resSD),

the

percent

of

observed

variance attributable

to

sampling

error,

and

the

95%

confidence interval

around the


mean

observed

correlation.

For

studies with

a

mean

observed

cor

relation

of

greater

than

0.05,

we

conducted

a

file

drawer

analysis

(Hunter

and

Schmidt,

2004),

and

provide

a

file

drawer

fe ,

which

represents

the

number

of

missing

studies

averaging

nuU

results

required

to

reduce

our

reported sample-size

weighted

mean

observed

correlation

to

0.05.

For

the

most

part,

we

conducted

meta-analyses

only

when

a

minimum

of three

studies

reporting

a

relationship

between

whistleblowing

intent/action

and

a

relevant

correlate

were

available.

However,

given

that

one

of the

purposes

of this

study

was

to

compare

conclusions drawn from

reports

of whis

tleblowing

intentions with those

drawn

from

reports

of

whistleblowing

actions,

in

cases

where fewer

than

three studies were available examining a compari

son

relationship

of

interest

(i.e.,

a

sufficient number

of

studies

were

available

to

meta-analyze

the rela

tionship

between

a

correlate

and

either whistle

blowing

intention

or

whistleblowing

action,

and

less

than three

were

available for the other

relevant

meta

analysis),

we

report

the results

of the other

relation

ship

for

purposes

of

description

and

comparison.

Results

The

results of

the

meta-analysis

of

correlations

between whistleblower

characteristics and whistle

blowing

intentions

(Intent

WB)

and

actions

(Actual

WB)

are

presented

in

Table

I.

Results indicate that

older

employees

are more

likely

to

intend

to

blow the

whistle

than

are

younger

employees

(r

=

0.19).

Unfortunately,

no

studies

examining

age

and actual

whistleblowing

were

located,

so we

cannot

be

sure

whether

this

relationship

translates

to

actual

whistle

blowers.

Sex and

tenure

appear

to

be related

to

actual

whistleblowing (r

=

0.13 and 0.10, respectively), but

not to

whistleblowing

intent.

Specifically,

females

and

more

tenured

employees

appear

to

be

slightly

more

likely

to

actually

blow the whistle.

Job

level

appears

to

have

a

similar

relationship

with whistle

blowing

intentions

(r

=

0.10)

as

with

actual

whistle

blowing.

These

results

support

the

contention

that

older

employees

with

greater

tenure

and

at

higher

levels

are

more

likely

to

have

the

commitment and

power

to

employ

voice rather than

exit

mechanisms.

More

interesting

than the

demographic

charac

teristics of whistleblowers

were

the results related

to

other

whistleblower

characteristics

and

intent

or

actual

whistleblowing.

Specifically,

ethical

judgment,

while

moderately

related

to

the

intent

to

blow the

whistle

(r

?

0.45),

is

not

related

to

actual whistle

blowing

(r

=

-0.08).

Similarly,

while role

responsi

bility,

approval

of

whistleblowing,

and

perceptions

that

blowing

the

whistle

would

be in one's

best

interests,

appear

to

be

predictive

of

the

intent

to

blow

the

whistle

(r

=

0.15, 0.44,

and

0.31,

respec

tively), they

do

not

appear

to

be related

to

actual



11/22

286

Jessica

R.

Mesmer-Magnus

and

Chockalingam

Viswesvaran

TABLE I

Correlations

between

Whistleblower Characteristics

and

Whistleblowing

Intentions and

Actions

Meta-analysis

k

N

r

SDr

SESD

resSD

%SEV

95%CI

File

drawer k

Whistleblower Action

demographics

Age

Intent WB 3 1279

0.19 0.1902 0.0457

0.1847

5.77 -0.17/0.55

9

Actual

WB

------

--

Sex

Intent

WB

2

1131

-0.05 0.0866

0.0414 0.0760

22.93

-0.20/0.09

-

Actual

WB 4

1707 0.13 0.0368 0.0460

0

100

0.13/0.13

7

Education

Intent WB

3

1667 0.02

0.0867

0.0418 0.0759

23.32 -0.13/0.17

-

Actual

WB 6 7851 0.02 0.0619

0.0275

0.0555

19.76 -0.09/0.12

-

Tenure

Intent WB

3

1563 0.02 0.0651

0.0436 0.0483

44.93

-0.07/0.12

-

Actual

WB

2

1383

0.10 0.0100 0.0376 0

100 0.10/0.10

2

Job

level

Intent WB

4

1938

0.10 0.1164 0.0439 0.1078 14.22

-0.11/0.31 4

Actual

WB

8

9200 0.08 0.0320

0.0293 0.0130 83.56 0.05/0.10 5

Other characteristics Action

Ethical

judgment

Intent WB 4 1147 0.45 0.0707

0.0472

0.0527

44.49

0.35/0.56

32

Actual

WB

2

320

-0.08 0.1669

0.0695 0.1518

17.32 -0.38/0.22

2

Job

satisfaction

Intent WB

2

838

-0.01 0.0503

0.0487

0.0128 93.58

-0.03/0.02

-

Actual

WB

2 1164 0.19 0.0300

0.0399

0

100

0.19/0.19

6

Organizational

Intent

WB 8

2170 0.03 0.0637

0.0603 0.0202 89.89

-0.01/0.07

-

commitment Actual

WB

------

__

_

Job performance

Intent WB

2

1315

0.05 0

0.0389

0

-

0.05/0.05

Actual

WB

2

1401

0.11 0.0156 0.0373

0 100 0.11/0.11

3

Role

responsibility

Intent

WB

4

1494

0.15

0.1556

0.0474 0.1482

9.28

-0.14/0.44

8

Actual

WB 6 7762

0.06 0.1048 0.0274 0.1011 6.85

-0.14/0.26

2

Approve

of

Intent WB 6 2143 0.44 0.1406 0.0394

0.1349 7.86 0.18/0.71

47

whistleblowing Actual WB 2 5514 0.06 0.0200 0.0190 0.0064 89.92 0.05/0.07 1

Notes: k

=

number of studies included

in

the

meta-analysis;

N

=

total number of

participants

across

studies included

in

the

meta-analysis;

r

=

sample-size

weighted

mean

observed

correlation;

SDr

=

tandard

deviation of


mean

observed

correlation;

SESD

=

standard

error

of

the

standard

deviation;

resSD

=

residual standard

deviation;

%SEV

=

percent

variance due

to

sampling

error;

95%

CI

=

95%

confidence interval

formed around the

sample-size

weighted

mean

observed correlation

(the

number

before the slash indicates the lower bound

and the number after

the

slash indicates the

upper bound);

File drawer

k

indicates the

number of

missing

studies

averaging

nuU results

required

to

reduce the

mean

observed correlation

to

0.05.

Intent WB indicates

participants

indicated

they

intended

or were

likely

to

blow

the

whistle

on

a

wrongdoing;

Actual

WB indicates

participants actuaUy

blew the

whistle

on a

wrongdoing.

whistleblowing behavior (r

=

0.06, 0.06, and 0.04).

Conversely,

while

job

satisfaction and

job perfor

mance

relate

to

actual

whistleblowing

(r

?

0.19

and

0.11,

respectively),

they

are

unrelated

to

whistle

blowing

intentions

(r

=

?0.01 and

0.05,

respec

tively).

Finally, organizational

commitment

does

not

appear

to

be

related

to

either

whistleblowing

inten

tions

or

actual

whistleblowing.

It

should be

noted,

that

while

our

analysis

suggests

that

role

responsibility

is

unrelated

to

actual

whistleblowing

behavior,

it

is

possible

that

this

relationship

may

be

moderated

by

the whistleblowing channel used. Specifically,

the

data

included

in

our

analysis

suggest

a

small,

but

positive

correlation

may

exist between role

respon

sibility

and

the

use

of

an

internal

reporting

channel,

while

no

(or

a

negative) relationship

may

exist

with

the

use

of

an

external

channel.

The

results

of the

meta-analytic

examination

of

correlations

between contextual

aspects

of the

whistleblowing

situation and

whistleblowing

inten

tions

(Intent WB)

and

actions

(Actual

WB)

are

presented

in

Table

II.

Organizational

climate for



12/22

Whistleblowing

and

Retaliation 287

TABLE II

Correlations between contextual variables

and

whistleblowing

intentions

and

actions

Meta-analysis

k

N

r

SDr

SESD

resSD

%SEV

95%CI

File drawer

k

Contextual

variables

Action

Organizational

climate

Intent

WB

8

2947

0.28 0.1738 0.0457

0.1677 6.92 -0.05/0.61 37

for

whistleblowing

Actual WB

5 6960

0.10

0.0375

0.0263 0.0266

49.45

0.05/0.15

5

Threat

of

retaliation

Intent WB 7

2849

-0.27 0.1292

0.0459

0.1208 12.61

-0.51/-0.03

31

Actual

WB

8

11974 0.04 0.0907 0.0251 0.0872

7.65 -0.13/0.21

Supervisor

support

Intent WB 4 1443 0.28 0.0530 0.0484 0.0216 83.41

0.23/0.32

19

Actual WB

2

789 -0.12

0.0088

0.0495 0 100 -0.12/-0.12 3

Organizational

size Intent

WB

1

725

-0.10

-

- -

- -

1

Actual

WB 5

5803

0.09

0.0783 0.0286 0.0729

13.34

-0.05/0.23

4

See

Note

to

Table

I.

TABLE

III

Correlations

between characteristics of the

wrongdoing/wrongdoer

and

whistleblowing

intentions

and

actions

Meta-analysis

k

N

r

SDr

SESD

resSD

%SEV 95% CI File drawer k

Wrongdoing/wrongdoer

Action

Seriousness of

Intent WB 7

3207

0.16

0.2642

0.0413 0.2609

2.44 -0.35/0.67 16

wrongdoing

Actual

WB 6 6460

0.13

0.0348

0.0299 0.0180

73.41 0.10/0.17 10

Evidence

of Intent WB

1

636 -0.06

- -

1

wrongdoing

Actual

WB 3 4759 0.06

0.0079

0.0250

0 100

0.06/0.06

1

Closeness

to

Intent WB 4

965

0.45

0.1768 0.0527 0.1687 8.88 0.12/0.78 32

wrongdoer

Actual WB

------ -- -

Effective

in

stopping

Intent

WB

------

-- -

wrongdoing

Actual

WB

3 1714 -0.07 0.0741 0.0410 0.0617 30.65

-0.19/0.05

2

See Note

to

Table

I.

whistleblowing

is

more

strongly

related

to

whistle

blowing

intentions

than

actual

whistleblowing,

but

the

direction of

the

relationship

is

consistent

(r

=

0.28 and

0.10,

respectively).

Of

greater

interest

is

that threat of

retaliation is

negatively

related

to

the

intent

to

blow the

whistle,

but

appears

to

be

unre

lated

to

actual

whistleblowing

behaviors

(r

=

?0.27

and

0.04,

respectively).

Also

intriguing

is

the

finding

that

supervisor

support

is

positively

related

to

whistleblowing

intent

(r

=

0.28),

but

negatively

related

to

actual

whistleblowing

(r

?

?0.12),

sug

gesting

that

supervisor

support

may

facilitate

one's

decision

to

blow the

whistle,

but

work

to

inhibit

behaviors

required

to

actuaUy

blow

it.

The

results of

the

meta-analysis

of correlations

between

characteristics

of

the

wrongdoing

and of

the

wrong-doer

and

whistleblowing

intentions

(Intent WB)

and

actions

(Actual

WB)

are

presented

in

Table III.

We

found

similar smaU

relationships

between

seriousness of

the

wrongdoing

and whis

tleblowing

intentions

and

actions

(r

=

0.16 and

0.13,

respectively). Importantly,

the

observed correlations

used

to

compute

the

relationship

between

severity

of

the

transgression

and

whistleblowing

intent

varied

widely

in

magnitude, potentially signaling

the

pres

ence

of

a

moderator.

Of

interest

is the

moderate

effect size found for the

relationship

between

closeness

to

the

wrong-doer

and

intent

to

blow

the

whistle

(r

=

0.45);

this

finding

suggests

that the

closer the

potential

whistle-blower

is

to

the

wrong

doer

(whether

interpersonally

or

with

respect

to

organizational

structure),

the

greater

their

intention

to

blow

the whistle

on

the

transgression.

Unfortu

nately,

similar

data

was

not

available

for actual



13/22

288

Jessica

R.

Mesmer-Magnus

and

Chockalingam

Viswesvaran

whistleblowing,

so we

do

not

know

if

this rela

tionship

wiU

generalize.

Also

noteworthy

is

the

smaU

negative

correlation

found

between actual

whistle

blowing

and

the

whistleblower's

success

in

stopping

the

wrongdoing

(r

=

?0.07).

This

finding

suggests

that whistleblowers are not frequently successful in

their efforts

to

curb

organizational

wrongdoing.

It

is

worth

noting,

however,

that

aU

correlations included

in

this

computation

reflect the

success

of

whistle

blowers

who

utilized

an

external

reporting

channel.

Lastly,

displayed

in Table

IV

are

the results of the

meta-analysis

of

correlates of

retaliation

against

whistleblowers. Information

is

arranged

according

to

the four

types

of

correlates

examined

(1)

character

istics of the

whistleblower,

(2)

actions

taken

by

the

whistleblower,

(3)

contextual

variables,

and

(4)

characteristics of the wrongdoing. Education, job

level,

and the

role-prescribed responsibility

to

blow

the whistle

appear

to

be

relatively

unrelated

to

retaliation

against

whistleblowers

(r

=

0.04, ?0.07,

and

?0.07,

respectively).

While

smaU

relationships,

it

is

import

Documents

Whistleblowing in Organization