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“Who are we?”:
A Study into the Conflict between Islamists & Secularists in
Developing the Identity of the Peoples of Bangladesh
Sanjan Mohammed Shahrear Haque
MA International Studies & Diplomacy
Word Count: 10,050
‘This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of MA International Studies & Diplomacy of the School of
Oriental & African Studies (University of London)’
September 2005
2
Declaration:
‘I have read and understood 17.9 (Regulations for Students of SOAS) concerning
plagiarism. I undertake that all material presented for examination is my own work
and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person(s). I also
undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work
of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for
examination.
I give permission for a copy of my dissertation to be held at the School’s discretion,
following final examination, to be made available for reference.’
3
Contents
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 5
Chapter 1 The ‘Polity’ and Levels of Religiosity in Bangladesh . 10
1.1 Understanding the Liberals and Religious Right in Bangladesh ............... 12 1.11 Liberals ............................................................................................................ 12
1.12 The ‘Religious Right’ ...................................................................................... 13
1.13 The Jamaat-i-Islami within East Pakistan/Bangladesh ............................... 15
1.2 Levels of Religiosity within Bangladesh ...................................................... 17
1.21 Empirical evidence on religiosity by U.A.B. Razia Akter Banu ................... 18
Chapter 2 Theoretical Interpretations of ‘Bengali Islamism’ ......... 21
2.1 Distinguishing between Radical and Fundamentalist Islam ....................... 22
2.11 Inheritance of Decolonised Principles & Elite-driven Ideology .................. 26
2.2 Islamism, a ‘nativist’ response? ................................................................... 28
Chapter 3 Non-State Actors versus Islamic Revivalism ................. 31
3.1 Islamic ‘Revivalism’ ........................................................................................ 32
3.2 Civil Society .................................................................................................... 35
3.21 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) & Grameen Bank .... 37
3.3 A New Frontier for Islamists and NGOs – ‘Women’s role in society’ .......... 39
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 43
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 46
Publications .............................................................................................................. 49 List of tables
Table 1.1 Rural distribution of religious beliefs ................................................... 18 Table 1.2 Urban distributions of religious beliefs ............................................... 19
4
Abstract
The aim of this paper was to highlight several themes which were pertinent to
the relationship between Islamists and secularists in developing the identity of the
peoples of Bangladesh. It specifically looked at the levels of religiosity amongst the
people of both the rural and urban centres and its possible repercussion upon the
development of identity. It also covered the distinctions between radical and
fundamental Islam in the development of the polity. The paper examined the
theoretical literature which examines the role of radicals and fundamentalists in
developing the identity of Islamists within the polity. Finally, it looked at the direct
conflicts between non-state actors and Islamists and its repercussion in developing
the identity of the peoples in rural centres, especially women.
The bulk of the information for this paper was produced by conducting
secondary research covering the main themes of the topic. This included historical
documents, both in Bengali and English, as well as covering the textual information
of the theoretical discourse relevant to the topic. The primary resources utilised all
referred to the current situation within Bangladesh as opposed to any historical
documentation. The result of the study showed that the expanding levels of Islamism
in Bangladesh and the Islamists permeation of the polity has bifurcated the traditional
syncretic Islamic identity between the puritanical orthodox and those ideologically
opposed to it.
5
Introduction
6
Introduction
Identity formation has been central to the creation of Bangladesh as a state
when it gained independence from a united Pakistan in 1971. The ‘Bengali’ identity
was the central plexus utilised by the urban elite to uphold the mass agitation
movements against the Pakistani State. However, one cannot completely discount
the role of Islam within the role of identity formation, as the subsequent years of
independence has revealed. Islam was vilified by the liberal elites in the years
following independence, however, a succession of dictatorships 1 allowed the
Islamists to re-emerge politically. And by 1991 the Islamic parties began to hold the
key to power due to their minor, however strategic, electoral successes. Islamic
parties began to grow after 1991, when democracy was re-instated, culminating in
coalition power after the 2001 general election2. In a period of exactly 30 years, the
role played by Islamic politics has been turned on its head; from a pariah of the State
to being elected to govern, albeit through a coalition government. The focus of this
paper is to look at the unique set of concepts, which has led to the rise of Islamic
politics within the polity and its role in shaping the interplay between secularists and
Islamists in defining the identity of the peoples of Bangladesh through regional
culture and religious doctrine. This paper does not attempt to look at identity
formation discourse or the theoretical debate behind this topic3. The premise behind
this paper is primarily to answer one question: which identity do Bengalis prioritise
above all else, the syncretic Islamic Bengali identity or a universal Islamic identity
1 Lieutenant General Zia-ul-Huq reigned over Bangladesh between 1975-81, and Lieutenant Colonel Hussein Mohammed Ershad 1982-90 2 For further information on the election results see Election Commission Secretariat, www.bd-ec.org/electoral, Bangladesh, Dhaka: 2003-04, as checked 05/09/05 3 For further information on the debate over identity see Anthony Smith, A National Identity (London 1991); Alexander Motyl, ‘Inventing Invention: The Limits of National Identity Formation’, in Ronald Suny and Michael Kennedy (eds.), Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999
7
based on a pan-Islamic Umma? This paper does not necessarily question the identity
of Bangladeshis, anyone born within the territory of Bangladesh, as there is a
significant non-Muslim community residing within Bangladesh; or looking at Bengalis
in India. However, this paper is attempting to look at the composition of religion within
the State in a Muslim majority country and the frictions this created between the
secularists and Islamists. In addition to the above question posed, several related
questions will be covered throughout the paper, which include: what has dictated the
formulation of the current set of identities which have bifurcated society and the state?
Has the role of women changed since independence, if so, what are its implications
on the greater radius of identity? Can the Islamic identity co-exist or even merge with
a traditional Bengali one, or will it diverge in the course of the twenty first century?
Chapter 1 looks at the nature of ‘The Polity and the Levels of Religiosity in
Bangladesh’. It looks in depth the battles between the secularists and Islamists: the
liberals’ hope of re-building the non-communal unified Bengali identity first
constructed prior to the war for independence, against the Islamists hope of,
eventually, creating an Islamic State. It is important to remember that Islamists
politics is not dominated by the over-throw of democracy, which exists at the moment,
but merely to manipulate the state into following a system which closely matches the
tenets of the Al-Koran. This includes both electoral politics as well as grass-roots
reform through teachings of the ‘correct’ version of Islam. This chapter also looks at
the distinctions between the radicalised Islamic parties and the ones’ which have
followed the democratic road, albeit to bring about a slow revolution. This is closely
followed with a close look at the largest (by membership), and one of the oldest,
Islamic party’s in Bangladesh, the Jamaat-i-Islami. This chapter also examines the
levels of religiosity within Bangladesh through the work of Razia Akter Banu’s
8
empirical research on the differing types of Islam which predominate both rural and
urban centres of Bangladesh. Banu’s work highlights the bifurcation of the Bengali
identity between the majority, but poorly educated, rural community, and the sparsely
populated, well-educated, urban elite.
Chapter 2 looks at some ‘Theoretical Interpretations of ‘Bengali Islamism’’ and
its implication on identity formulation. This section takes a close look at the
distinctions between radicalism and fundamentalism and its differing interpretations
of the identity discourse. The aim of this section is to highlight the distinguishing
features of Political Islam, which does not directly make a distinction between the
public and private spheres, when applying its tenets, hence the argument often
utilised by the Islamists of the supremacy of Islam over the liberal secular State. This
leads to a close look at the nature of the political regimes which emerged within post-
colonial states; and its application of religion within the polity. Although Bangladesh
was not directly a post-colonial state, it has some of the hallmarks of one, and the
course of action taken by its initial leaders help to understand the complications
behind identity formation today. This section also looks at the genealogy of the rise of
Islamism within the national consciousness as a factor of class conciseness. This led
to looking at the relationship between rapid economic growth and erosion of
traditional social bonds as a factor behind the rise of Islamism and thus the conflation
of the identity formed leading up to 1971 and thereafter.
Chapter 3 looks at ‘Non-state Actors versus Islamic Revivalism’ in developing
the Bengali identity. The non-state-actors, namely Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs), have led the charge to counter the rise of Islamists within the public sphere.
This section looks at the support, often covertly, given to Islamists by the established
9
rural religious clergy to maintain hegemony on the prescription of morality and
pertinently, the formulation of not only Bengali identity but gender identity. This has
been slowly countered over the years by the growing civil society through its work in
developing networks of identity for rural women. This study highlights the conflictual
relationships which exist between large NGOs and local clergy when the established
patterns of interaction are challenged through empowerment programmes. This has
challenged the traditional identity of the rural women & poor, which has become a
platform for discord between the Islamists and liberals. NGOs have often been
criticised because of their undue pressure on democratically elected governments;
and Bangladesh is no exception. This has led to questioning how this has galvanised
the Islamists in there battle against non-state actors and the establishment of a
Bengali Muslim identity.
The sequence of the chapters was chosen to highlight the three areas which the
author felt was pertinent in highlighting the shift in both identity as well as the
constituents of the polity. The topics chosen to highlight the argument establishes a
genealogy of the root factors in the digression from the traditional norms of society to
the, relatively, newly constituted actors which have become protagonists in
developing identity as well as solidifying their position within the national
consciousness.
10
Chapter 1 The ‘Polity’ and Levels of Religiosity in Bangladesh
11
Chapter 1 The Polity and Levels of Religiosity in Bangladesh
The descent from the original constitution of secular-socialism, first espoused
by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman (a.k.a. Mujib), to the election of a centre-right party
coalition which emerged after the 2001 general election, has shown the
transformation of the polity. The shift from the ideals of the war of independence and
the Constitution of 1972, which had secularism as one of its central tenets, was
finally complete when Islam was installed as a State religion during the Ershad
regime. The regimes which have held power since the death of Mujib in 1975, have
all attempted to mould an identity for the peoples of Bengal which reflect both their
personal interests as well as the underlying influence of Islamism of the polity. This
reflected a constant conflict between the liberals and the religious right as the
emergence of an articulate lower-middle class religious right4 asserted itself within
the political process. Thus the religious-right held the leverage of bestowing
legitimacy to the leadership, whether it was democratic or authoritarian; their role can
be described as the ‘king-makers’ of Bangladeshi politics especially in the democratic
era. However, the liberals began to lose their way in the years following
independence, the lack of a strong ideological stance along with poor organisation
allowed the religious right to gain the upper hand within the public sphere and
therefore cement itself as a viable alternative to the status-quo. The bourgeoisie
ridden liberals failed to connect with the masses and only portrayed a version of the
polity which could be understood by the urban educated elites as opposed to the
masses which the Islamists appealed to. The patrimony5 based ‘battles’ between the
various political parties distorted the real conflict which shaped the course of
4 For further work on lower-middle class base of Jamaat, Pakistan see Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Boston: Houghton Miffin, 1967, pp. 218-9 5 I am attempting to shed light on the ‘personalist’ nature in which protagonists of the leading parties conduct party politics thus occupy the public sphere with issues which are often personal.
12
Bangladeshi politics until today, the role of religion within the public sphere and its
effect upon the polity. Although this has not always been an overt factor within party
politics, it has however, been an ever present undercurrent which has turned the tide
of political activism from secularism to one which is deeply influenced by Islamists.
1.1 Understanding the Liberals and Religious Right in Bangladesh
The primacy of Islamic traditions and sentiments, cast aside by the Bengalis to
fight the Pakistani crackdown in 1971, subsequently returned as the widely felt
phenomenon of “political Islam” and a broader quest for Muslim identity.
Consequently, Bangladesh is preoccupied with two swelling cultural tides driven by
contrasting dynamics stemming from different roots (Rashiduzzaman, 1994: 974).
1.11 Liberals
Liberals are secular nationalists who sought to unify the country through
linguistic & literary symbols as opposed to religion. Their cardinal reference points
include ardent nationalism based on the Bengali language and culture, independence
and sovereignty for Bangladesh, secularism, individual freedom and liberal
democratic institutions. They are fervently critical of Muslim radical groups that
allegedly opposed the Bangladesh independence movement in 1971. This group is
composed of professionals, artists, literary figures, academics, Bengali nationalists,
political activists, social workers, reformists & feminists. This reflects a composition of
the upper social stratum when their education, profession, income, orientations and
parental background is considered. The liberals perceive the resurgence of religious
beliefs during the last two decades as a challenge to their hegemony and Islam
representing an “enemy ideology” for many. The liberals have often looked towards
13
Kolkata (formerly Calcutta) as a source of linguistic, cultural and ethnic solidarity.
Tagore is often a symbol of their beliefs and ideological motives, due to his
contribution to Bengali culture and society both in India and Bangladesh; this is often
reviled by the religious-right. A great many of the liberal intellectuals in Bangladesh
express general distrust of businessmen and profit-making enterprises; the overt
Marxists leanings, influenced by West Bengal, of some liberal intellectuals have
permeated to the liberal discourse.
1.12 The ‘Religious Right’
The ‘Religious Right’ constitutes the hardcore elements, which are politically
motivated and represented on the major by Jammat-i-Islami, its cultural associations
and student cadre. There exists’ other fringe groups which include Islamic Oikya Jote
(IOJ), the Islamic Constitution Movement (ICM), Khilafat Majlish (KM), National
Musalli Committee, Ahl-e-hadith, Ulema Committee, Islamic Chatra Sena, Jamaitul
Modarassin (Madrasa Teacher’s Association), Neezami-i-Islam, and the Muslim
League (ML). However, a distinction needs to be made between the politically
motivated groups with an active political wing in the public sphere and the radicalised
groups with a religious/cultural motive who are motivated by revolution and are
actively seeking to shift the norms of society, currently occupied by solidarity towards
Bengali nationalism. The motivations of the radicalised groups was exemplified by an
alliance of thirteen pro-Islamic groups called the United Actions Council (UAC) who
observed Al-Koran Day on July 29, 1994, with a ‘Long March’ of 100,000 protestors
to press their demands (the Jamaat was formally excluded, underlining the UAC’s
more religious/cultural character). The demands included the detention and
14
punishment (using capital punishment) of Taslima Nasreen6 and other “atheists” or
murtads, as well as anti-Islamic writers. The UAC also wanted the Parliament to pass
blasphemy laws to prosecute all those who transgressed (in their eyes); they also
wanted NGOs to be refrained from their ‘anti-Islamic’ activities, the ‘Qadiani’ sect be
declared non-Muslim, no Indian, American, or other external interference be allowed
in internal and religious matters, and all anti-Islamic newspapers and publications to
be banned (Bichitra, 1994) 7. However, it must be understood that the Islamic parties
are not a united and coherent body with universal aims and demands. In the main
they believe in an Islamic state for Bangladesh however, the methods utilised to bring
about that change differs. This will be covered in section 2.1.
The relative popularity of radical groups has often been as a result of the
support from moderate Muslims. This indicates a failure of secular parties to attract
these ‘floating’ groups who have favoured to support a radicalised agenda which
raises the question of whether secular politics failed to attract the moderates or if this
is a manifestation of “fraternal” support constitutive of pan-Islamic unity. The “rough”
treatment of Islam by the secular government of the early 70s, soon after
independence, had hurt the sentiments of Muslims regardless of class. Therefore,
over the next two decades the upper middle class began to assimilate Islamic values,
which often made liberals nervous. The social class make-up within the religious-right
discourse will be touched upon throughout the paper as this has been an underlying
factor of the ‘success’ of radical groups. The liberal discourse has been, to some
extent, quietened by the organised nature of the pro-Islamic element of civil society;
6 The author of Lajja, Kolkata: Ananda Publishers, 1993, the controversial book which incensed Islamists and led to the banning of the book in Bangladesh and the author to take refuge overseas due to a fatwa taken against her life. 7 A Bengali language weekly. For further information regarding the march see Islam O Rashtradrohita, Dhaka: Chalti Prakashani, 1994
15
the contradictory signals and indications of the liberals has allowed Islamists and pro-
Islamists to enter the public sphere with increased fluidity and coherence.
1.13 The Jamaat-i-Islami within East Pakistan/Bangladesh
The role of Jamaat throughout Pakistan after the partition of the Indian sub-
continent in 1947 was minor. The East Pakistan branch had a very low membership
base, and insignificant within the context of a united Pakistan8. It was manned by a
lone paid official and in the years following partition the leader, amir, of the East
Pakistan branch was sent from West Pakistan, Rafi Ahmed Indori. The support base
for the Jammat within East Pakistan was low due to two pertinent factors: firstly,
Jamaat’s version of puritanical Wahabbi9 Islam is not one which Bengal has too often
subscribed to. This version often contradicts the folk10 variant of spiritual or Sufi Islam
which has been the backbone of Islam within the rural regions, however, Jamaat
found support within urban educated who were still part of the ashraf11, albeit one
which was fast shrinking. Maulvi Abdur Rahim of Barisal was the only notable
presence of a Bengali in the Jamaat hierarchy and was duly appointed amir of East
Pakistan in 1951. Secondly, the Jamaat’s antipathy towards greater regional
autonomy for Bengal along with the growing support for Awami League, whose role
as an outlet for Bengali grievances against the state, contrived to marginalise
Jamaat’s support.
8 For further information on Jamaat and intelligentsia within Pakistan see L Binder, 1961, pp. 70-108; S A Maududi, The Political Theory of Islam (English translation from Urdu), Lahore: Markazi Maktaba Jamaat-i-Islmai, n.d. 9 This branch of Islam eminates from Saudi Arabia and follows an orthodox interpretation of Islam, which is known to be traditional in its value and customs. 10 For further information see R Eaton (New Delhi, 2001) pp. 26-51 11 Ibid, p.26. These are Muslims claiming descent from immigrants from beyond the Khyber, or at least from beyond Bengal, who cultivated a high Perso-Islamic civilisation and its associated literature in Arabic, Persian, and Urdu.
16
As a political organisation, Jamaat takes a fundamentalist position on Islam; it
wants to implement Islam in its spirit as well as in the letter. Syed Abdul Ala Maududi
– the ideologue and founder of Jamaat in 1941 stated its founding principle to be:
“The Jammat is neither simply a political party nor merely a religious
organisation. It has embraced Islam without any reservation and it
considers Islam to be a complete and balanced code of conduct. So the
Jamaat is both political and religious. It is political to the extent Islam is
political, it is neither more nor less political than what Islam wanted to be”
(Azam, 1968: 62-3).
The centrality of Islam within the political process therefore exemplifies the role that
Jamaat plays within the polity; the neutrality of religion within the polity is thus
expunged due to the existence of such a doctrine. Therefore, it is un-surprising that
secularity within the polity of Bangladesh has thus far been unsuccessful and any
future changes within the political process must take into account the role of Islam
within the decision-making process.
Jamaat interprets Islam’s political philosophy as an antithesis of secular
Western democracy. Islam provides ‘theo-democracy’; the Muslim community can
elect a legislature consisting of pious, God-fearing men who would enact new
legislation in the spirit of the Al-Koran and Sunnah only in the fields which are not
already covered by the Holy book and Prophet’s tradition. The party has a three point
programme to bring about Islamic revolution: firstly, Islam is preached as a
revolutionary ideology; secondly, those ready to accept revolutionary ideology are
organised and trained to the principle of the ideology; and finally the trained cadre
are utilised to replace the current ‘un-Islamic’ leadership by an Islamic one (Maududi,
1962). The Jamaat has often followed a scheme of providing necessary public
17
services, which the state failed to provide, in order to spread its message to potential
constituents. The most effective of the targeted groups have been poor rural women;
the cadre of female party activists have grown exponentially over the years when
compared to the other main parties, namely Bangladesh National Party (BNP) &
Awami League (AL) (Banu, 1994: 87). One of the central factors behind their success
has been the strong ideological ethos, which the other leading parties, in recent
years, have failed to convey to potential constituents and existing activists. In recent
years, the dominance of Islamic discourse in rural regions has been challenged by
the work of non-state actors (this will be covered in-depth in Chapter 3).
1.2 Levels of Religiosity within Bangladesh
After centuries of evolution, Islam within Bangladesh has three clear types of
religious beliefs – ‘modern’, ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘popular’. ‘Modernist’ Islam tries to give a
rational interpretation of the Al-Koran and Al-Hadith 12 . It attempts to create
distinctions between radicalised versions of Islam from the essentials and the
rejection of the accidentals of Islam. “’Modernist’ Islam envisages a narrowly personal
and specific role of religion in life, and stresses self-determination rather than divine
will in the affairs of man” (Banu, 1992: 54). ‘Orthodox’, ‘puritan’ & ‘literal’ Islam
enjoins total and literal acceptance of the Al-Koran and the Al-Hadith. It stands for the
rigid adherence to the canonical laws of Islam and strict observance of compulsory
religious injunctions. For an orthodox Muslim, Islam offers a complete code of life and
believes in determination of all events by God’s will. Both these discourses are united
in rejecting any compromise on the core ideals of Islam- monotheism. ‘Popular’, ‘folk’
or ‘syncretistic’ Islam has polytheistic and animistic dimensions. A ‘popular’ Muslim
12 Teachings of Muhammed (Peace Be Upon Him).
18
would formally subscribe to the Confessional Statement about unity of God and
finality of Mohammed’s Prophethood. But she/he would in practice acknowledge the
sharing of supernatural power of God, by the Pirs, sacred places, Hindu Gods, local
deities and spirits by observing rituals and practices meant for cajoling or gratifying
these near –Godly forces. The populist Muslims would resort to these idolatrous and
polytheistic rituals and practices to avoid danger and misfortune, to cure illness or to
increase the prospect of their success in mundane affairs, and the like. All these
branches of Islam have contrived to make itself the dominant discourse in forming
the identity of Bangladeshis.
1.21 Empirical evidence on religiosity by Razia Akter Banu13
The urban-rural divide within Bangladesh is a stark reminder of several things:
the divergent economic conditions, the bifurcation of traditional with modern Bengali
society, and more pertinently the type of and nature of Islam practiced. Banu has
conducted research looking at the levels of religiosity within the urban and rural
centres of Bangladesh. In her study, she specifically examined the notions of
mysticism, religious tolerance and pertinently the role of Islam within Bangladesh.
Table 1.1 Rural distributions of religious beliefs Category Frequency Percentage
Modern 41 1.2
Orthodox 1752 50.6
Popular 1668 48.2
Total 3461 100.0
Source: UAB RA Banu, Islam in Bangladesh, p.64
13 For a complete reference of this study see Islam in Bangladesh (New York 1992)
19
Table 1.2 Urban distributions of religious beliefs Category Frequency Percentage
Modern 251 12.0
Orthodox 1295 62.1
Popular 540 25.9
Total 2086 100.0
Source: UAB RA Banu, Islam in Bangladesh, p.64
The study confirms that rural regions of Bangladesh are greatly inclined towards
the ‘popular’, ‘folk’ or ‘syncretistic’ Islam when compared to the urban centres, where
‘orthodox’ Islam is dominant. And as notionally predicted, ‘modern’ Islam has very
little support from the rural centres of Bangladesh, whilst the urban centres show a
relatively higher proportion but distinctly fewer when compared to other groups. The
small group of followers in the rural centres maybe the few landed elites who were
educated in the urban centres of Bangladesh therefore imported this ideology when
returning home. The majority of the rural constituents’ surveyed purport to follow an
‘orthodox’ version of Islam; there are two reasons behind this: firstly, the proselytising
messages of Wahabbi Islam by the missionaries, supported by the Gulf States, have
succeeded in shifting the norms which have governed rural areas for hundreds of
years. Secondly, there is greater awareness through Madrasaa education from an
early age to guide in the ‘true’ path of Islam, discounting the traditional synergetic
relationship between Bengali traditions and Islam. The indication of mass support for
the ‘popular’ or ‘folk’ variant of Islam leads to the suggestion that the traditions of
Bengali culture has not totally lost its sway within rural Bangladesh. Much of this form
of the religion is kept alive through groups such as the ‘Baul’ singers; they are
20
inspired by the works of Lalon Shah14 and others. They infuse the spirit of Sufism and
some strands of traditional or ‘orthodox’ Islam with Hinduism and mysticism.
The dominance of ‘orthodox‘ Islam within the urban centres conjoins with the
growth of Islamism within the polity. There are two reasons behind this phenomenon:
the growing lower-middle class population migrated to the urban centres and became
economically and politically active as the study on the Jamaat in 1.13 indicated.
Secondly, the religious-right have always elicited support from the urban elites, as
the remnants of the ashraf, mentioned in 1.13, legitimised Islamism and indoctrinated
the present middle class into ‘orthodox’ Islam. The support for ‘popular’ Islam within
the urban centres emanates predominantly from the migrant workers from the
surrounding rural and semi-rural areas and do not indicate a seismic shift from one
brand of Islam to the other. However, the pivotal factor within this study is the
‘modern’ Islam practiced within the urban centres; this is often composed from the
liberal and educated elites, who are part of the opinion formers within the polity.
Banu’s work also found that when respondents were asked “what type of people
would you elect?” the majority of the respondents in both rural and urban samples
wanted to vest political power with English-educated-cum-religious-minded people,
rather than religious leaders. They seemed to prefer a separation of religion and
politics, which is contrary to the classical political theory and practice of Islam (Banu,
1992: 164-8). This last point raises the pertinent question: how does this affect
identity formation? The following chapter looks at the various facets of Islamism, its
syncretistic qualities within Bengali culture as well as some theoretical interpretations
of Bengali Islamism.
14 For further information see ZA Tofayell, 1968; Bangladesh Observer, 22 October 2003
21
Chapter 2 Theoretical Interpretations of ‘Bengali Islamism’
22
Chapter 2 Theoretical Interpretations of ‘Bengali Islamism’
The premise behind the war of liberation was clear and simple, the
emancipation of the subjugated Bengali speaking majority within the state of Pakistan.
The majority of the people of the region were united in their revulsion of the actions
and policies of the state and its constant juxtaposing of the Bengali identity with the
Pakistani one. The state had monopolised Islam as its identity, whilst demonising
regional cleavages as a threat to its integrity and a constant aversion for anything
which failed to conform to the ideals which it had created to reflect Islamic values.
Thus, Bengali nationalism, manifested through linguistic cleavages as opposed to
secessionist idiom, which was portrayed to be a threat to the unity of the state and a
fragmentary agent within the Islamic Umma. The Islamists15 had been the central
plexus within the state’s drive to degrade the Bengali identity to the supremacy of the
Islamic Pakistani one. The Islamists gave succour to the legitimacy which was
required for the sustainability of state policies, which included the imposition of Urdu
as the state language of Pakistan, the imposition of Arabic scripture within Bengali
and the de-legitimisation tactics utilised to underplay the importance of Bengali
culture within Bengali identity (Murshid, 1995: 312-318).
2.1 Distinguishing between Radical and Fundamentalist Islam
The Islamists politics within Bangladesh must be distinguished between those
who follow a fundamentalist agenda and those who advocate a radical doctrine. The
fundamentalists follow a political Islamic discourse which advocates the acceptance
of Islam as a tool of social change through Islamic political parties; they act as agents
15 “…an Islamist is someone who places her or his identity at the centre of her or his political practice. That is, Islamists are people who use the language of Islamic metaphors to think through their political destinies, those who see in Islam their political future.” (Sayyid, 2003: 17)
23
for proselytising their version of Islam. However, the radicals within Bangladesh
advocate the overthrow of the liberal democratic state and the imposition of an
Islamic state. Although the fundamentalists would also agree with the creation of an
Islamic state, it is the methods utilised by the two groups which differ, thus one is
accepted by the polity whilst the other is a pariah of the state. It must be understood
that one group is not exclusive of the other, it is often the case that members of
fundamentalist groups have their initial period of ‘schooling’ within radical groups and
in later life move to organisations seeking peaceful change. This maybe a reflection
of gaining wisdom with age!
Sayyid looks at ‘fundamentalism’ within a broader phenomenon, a movement
which includes political projects represented by organisation such as Gush Emunim
in Israel, Shiv Sena in India, or the Christian coalition in the US (2003). Sahgal &
Yuval-Davis define fundamentalism in three main features: it is a project to control
women’s bodies; it is a political practice which rejects pluralism; and it is a movement
that purposefully conflates religion & politics as a means of furthering its aims (1992:
3-5). This definition is appropriate in the context of Bangladeshi politics as it existed
in 1971 as well as today. However, a further distinction needs to be made between
the ideas of liberalism and dogma- the conflict which exists between secularists and
Islamists within Bangladesh is an example of radicalised elements with set views on
the make-up of the state structure, which is often juxtaposed with culture and
nationalism. Once this occurs, they are straying from the fundamentals of society
where both Bengali nationalism and culture has historically always sat side-by-side
with Islamic values.
24
Islam is inextricably linked to politics; the distinction must be made between
Western liberal democracies, where the fundamental spirit of Christianity as a way of
life has been abrogateed to where Christianity serves the state but can also be
detached from the state, to the Islamic society within Bengal where Islam serves as
an integral part of individual lives therefore can not be completely separated from the
state. Sayyid argues that the current definition of religion is the product of a particular
history, in which religion is a distinct sphere of life. This has two effects: firstly, it
suggests that religion should be separate from other types of social relations such as
politics; secondly, it makes it possible to think that religion is simply a self-contained
unit of social life, one which can be detached from that social order and considered to
be distinct from that social order (2003: 14). This form of thinking lacks the
imagination required for application within the orient as the separation of state and
religion, which has existed within the occident for hundreds of years and fails to
qualify in its definition the relationship between the fundamental of a religion, Islam in
this case, and the necessary structures of the state which requires its citizens to carry
out acts which may be in conflict with the tenets of the religion. This has often led to
difficulties in formulating an identity for the people, when the role of religion was yet
to be determined.
The idea of religion is heavily reliant on the use of Western Christianity as the
model of what a ‘religion’ is. The concept of fundamentalism relies not on its internal
coherence but rather on a ‘shared’ assumption regarding the role of politics, truth and
religion (Sayyid, 2003: 15). Therefore, the common assumption to label Islamists as
political religious fundamentalists is a definition which will not be utilised throughout
this work. This term is often misappropriated to define those that utilise Islamic
politics and violence to put forward their ideas and often fail to put forward their
25
ideological motives, which reflects their Machiavellian tactics to usurper religion to
gain influence within the polity.
Oliver Roy also distinguishes between Islamists and neo-fundamentalists; neo-
fundamentalists are those whose aim is to see the establishment of an Islamic order
in terms of privatisation16, in contrast to Islamists who see the establishment of an
Islamic order necessitating intervention in public affairs- the capture of the state
(1994: 24). The protagonists of Islamic politics within Bangladesh follow a radicalised
agenda, where the subject of identity plays an integral role in their growing influence
within the public sphere. The radicalised proponents of the discourse have
propagated an Islam which has Wahabi influences thus, returning to an Arab-centric
orthodox doctrine which contradicts the tradition of Islam within Bengal. ‘Bengali
Islam’ as is best described, has its roots, not in radical orthodox traditions but the
spiritualism espoused by the Sufis, which is syncretic to the traditions of Bengali
culture and values17. Orthodox Islam does not distinguish between public and private
spheres in its application of Islamic laws, values or ideals, thus its political discourse
is akin to other political discourses such as socialism or liberalism. It can range from
the assertion of a Muslim subjectivity to a full-blooded attempt to reconstruct society
on Islamic principles (Roy, 1994: 35-47).
16 This refers to distinguishing Islam between the public and private spheres. Islam should be practiced at an individual level without the need for state intervention; therefore the state is detached from any decisions which is based on religion, namely Islam. 17 For further information on the syncretism between Islam & Hinduism see T Blanchet, Meanings & Rituals of Birth in Rural Bangladesh, Dhaka: University Press Ltd, 1984; L M Fruzetti, ‘Ritual Status of Muslim Women in Rural India’, in J J Smith (ed.) Women in Contemporary Muslim Societies, London: Associated University Press
26
2.11 Inheritance of Decolonised Principles & Elite-driven Ideology
Mujib led the cry for independence after realising the failure of Pakistan as a
state for Bengalis. As expected he became President of independent Bangladesh
and initially followed a democratic pluralistic ideology in governance and application
of civil laws. However, soon after independence, Bangladesh followed a path
characteristic of many decolonised states. This entailed a short period of democratic
governance (which can be interpreted as remnants of euphoria from independence)
followed by a clamour for plurality for expression, culminating in the seizure of power
by the leading agents of control. Realising the failure of democratic governance due
to his personal inability to accept criticism as well as bad governance, Mujib turned
Bangladesh into a one-party state. Soon after Mujib’s assassination the clamour for
control meant the inevitability of the military procuring the leadership of the country.
The first military leader of independent Bangladesh was Lt. Gen. Zia-ur-Rahman. Zia
required support from a source above party politics, religion, notably Islam. Fischer
argues that Islamism is a reaction to the failure of the ‘naive liberalism’ of the 1930s
and the third world socialism in the 1960s and 70s (1982). Mujib maybe described as
one of those 3rd world elites who aligned themselves to modernity through ideology,
in this case socialism, and failed to realise the congruence of religion and culture18.
The emergence of Islamism is presented as a product of the inability of the secular
elites, which succeeded the European colonial regimes to meet the hopes and
aspirations of their people (Ajami, 1981: 15, 141-41, 171)19.
18 Due to their role within the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, the Islamic parties were generally despised by the majority of the population and any form of communal politics was banned under the 1972 constitution. 19 For further information on see Fischer, 1982: 101; Keddie, 1988:15
27
Gilesnan identifies three reasons for the authoritarianism of the post-colonial
regimes: the ‘personalist’ nature of the new regimes; the expansion of civilian &
military disciplinary techniques which came with independence, leading to the
‘systematic and unpredictable’ intrusion into peoples lives; the discrepancies
between the ideologies of nationalism and legitimacy on the one hand, and the
realities of social inequalities & foreign dependence on the other (1990: 261-3). This
resulted in the mosque as the only arena of public discourse that the state did not
fully monopolise. In Bangladesh, the Islamists re-grouped and formulated a course of
action to re-enter the public sphere without being tarnished with the label of being
members of the Rajakar & Al-Badr militia groups20 from the 1971 war of liberation.
However, it is quite important to look at the make-up of members of such groups as
this is essential to the spread of Islamism within the rural quarters of Bangladesh.
Keddie believes that Islamism is the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie; something
which Gilesnan concurs. They had come to dominate the post-colonial state through
their recruitment into the ranks of a greatly expanded administrative and coercive
state apparatus. Power eluded such a group due to the domination of ruling elites,
thus the gradual expansion of the role of the petty bourgeoisie, and the inherent
contradictions it implies, are responsible for Islamism (Keddie, 1988: 13-4). Although
Keddie’s argument takes into account the disenfranchisement of a certain group of
people from the state apparatus, its application into Bangladesh must be questioned.
The Islamists were supported by the ruling elites at the time of their re-emergence at
a national level, both Zia and Ershad pandered to Islamic doctrine, during their time
in power, and thus the fragmented Islamic political parties and groups for legitimacy.
The grass roots led revolt Keddie describes did not occur within Bangladesh, the
20 ‘Rajakar’ & ‘Al-Badr’ were militia groups made-up of Bengalis, majority of who were Islamists, recruited by the Pakistani army to root out the freedom fighters during the war of liberation.
28
Islamic parties were sparsely spread throughout the public sphere and it was not until
the late 80s and early 90s did the Islamists ideology materialize into the national
consciousness.
2.2 Islamism, a ‘nativist’ response?
Islamism is a ‘nativist’ response to the western-led global system (Keddie, 1988:
20). Fischer also argues that the religious conflicts of the 20th century resemble more
closely the well-known phenomenon of ‘nativism’. In many parts of the world, when a
established culture was beginning to erode, threatening some of the population,
people responded by reaffirming the traditional way of life with increasing and frantic
behaviour (Fischer, 1982: 101). Economic growth and developments erode traditional
social bonds and engender unrealizable aspirations in emergent social groups.
Islamism is a reaction to the consequences of rapid economic growth. Rapid
economic growth along with the shifts in the material well-being of a vast number of
the population has resulted in perceived shifts in social norms of interaction. The role
of external actors have played a crucial role in the shift in social norms; the work
conducted by NGOs 21 within alleviating rural poverty through empowerment
programs for women have been one of the deep-seated areas of grievances for local
patriarchs, which have permeated through to Islamist politics. The role of NGOs and
especially women will be covered in greater detail at a later point of this work
because it is pertinent to the question of identity formation posed at the beginning of
the paper.
21 This topic has been covered in greater depth in Chapter 3.3
29
Edward Said argues that the construction of fundamentalism as a key term to
analyse political conflicts is derived from the concerns of ‘intellectual factories in
metropolitan centres like Washington & London’. This allows the ‘abnormality and
extremism’ of fundamentalism to be contrasted with the moderation and
reasonableness of Western hegemony (1994: 375-6). This is relevant when
contrasted with the development of Islamism within the polity; one must distinguish
between ‘folk’ variant of Islam and orthodox Wahabi Islam as mentioned in 1.2. The
former is common within the rural part of Bangladesh, something which has been
labelled as ‘haram’22 by the Islamists, whilst the advocates of the latter have utilised
tactics which has radicalised the global notion of Islam and given succour to the
‘intellectual factories’ as described by Said. The reaction to foreign intervention has
been the ‘nativist’ approach postulated, above, by Keddie, although this is not a
favourable term as it describes the people of the Orient to be parochial and out of
sync with ‘modern’ living. However, it does echo a reaction to the occident-driven
modernity which manifests itself via a return to traditional values which Husserl refers
to as sedimentation: the realisation of the contingency of what we consider to be
‘natural’ (Kockelmans, 1994).
Said argued that orientalism provides accounts of Islam (and the orient) which
are organised around four main themes: there is an ‘absolute and systemic
difference between the West and the Orient; the representations of the orient are
based on textual exegesis rather than ‘modern Oriental realities’; the orient is
unchanging, uniform and incapable of describing itself; and the orient is to be feared
or to be mastered (1995: 300-1). Said’s contention is that Islamism is neither
homogenous nor monolithic in the way that it is represented by academic and
22 Something which is forbidden by the tenets of the Al-Koran.
30
popular mediums. Although Islamists within Bangladesh have attained a certain form
of homogeneity, although this does not represent a well-structured coherent
opposition to the current system. It has however, created friction within the make-up
of urban-rural identity as well as the national identity. The work of Razia Akhtar
Banu 23 , gives us an empirical understanding of the levels of religiosity within
Bangladesh both within urban and rural centres. This is crucial to the understanding
of Bengali identity both within Bangladesh but more pertinently within the
international system. The common understanding of Bangladesh as a moderate
Islamic nation is crucial to the hegemonic force of the international system. The
emergence of Islamic parties within the governing coalition at the end of the 2001
general election has led to a doubt over the state’s so-called moderate stance. One
must look in close detail at the changes within party politics since independence as
this will hold some of the answers as to why Islamic parties have emerged as the
lynch-pin to power.
23 See Chapter 1.21
31
Chapter 3 Non-State Actors versus Islamic Revivalism
32
Chapter 3 Non-State Actors versus Islamic Revivalism
Bill Richardson, then US Ambassador to the UN in 1998, described Bangladesh
as a “moderate Islamic country” and went to add that “its track record of democracy
breaks many of the conventional negative stereotypes about Muslim countries,
Bangladesh is dramatic evidence that Islamic countries can be strong democracies”24.
The reality of such a statement is infused with the genealogy of réal politk; one must
look at the role of such a ‘moderate state’ within the spectrum of regional and
international politics. The cordial relationship which exists between Bangladesh and
the US, as well as other donor states, requires the state to be ‘seen’ as a moderate
actor amongst the nation of Islamic states. This is often represented by succession of
‘free & fair’ elections and the acceptance of the status quo within the international
system. However, this discourse formulated by the Western liberals fails to
understand the complexities of the evolving nature of identity within Bangladesh. The
constant battles between the secularists and Islamists (as mentioned in chapter 1)
have polarised the various constituents of these two groups which has left
Bangladesh with a fractious democracy and weakened the state. Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) have taken advantage of this situation through propagating
their distinctive agendas which has conflicted with Islamic sensibilities, according to
Islamists.
3.1 Islamic ‘Revivalism’
Political activity and its fluidity leads to the marginalisation of Islamists, thus
within Bangladesh the political activity is feeble and democratic institutions weak
which has allowed Islamic rhetoric to take a high ground within the polity. Unlike the
24 Seminar on ‘Making Democracy work in the 21st Century’, Bangladesh International Institute for Strategic Studies (BIISS), Dhaka, 13 April 1998
33
Indian State machinery, which had been established for approximately two hundred
years prior to independence, Bangladesh had no such luxury upon secession from
Pakistan. The fractal nature of institutional development under the various
leaderships since independence stunted the ability of the state to regulate, when
required, the constituents of the public sphere. This resulted in insipid growth of
Islamism within the polity. The 1972 Constitution vowed to keep ‘secularism’ as one
of its firm tenets within governance. However, this failed under both Zia & Ershad as
mentioned earlier in the paper. Hence, during their period of governance two things
happened: the emergence of Islamism within the public sphere and eventually the
polity; and the building blocks for the development of non-state actors. The non-state
actors ideologically and financially funded by the Islamists fall into three categories:
‘madrassas’ (religious schools), mosques, and ‘tablig jamat’ (voluntary groups
preaching Islamic lifestyle). The secularists developed non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), often funded by overseas institutions with a similar ideology or
government bodies, and in later years Civil Society Organisation (CSOs)25, to shape
the future of the polity but more pertinently, society. It is the role of NGOs in the last
twenty years which have questioned the established patriarchal development of
society due to the clandestine support given by the Islamic clergy often headed by
the local Mulla or mufti. It is this support which Islamic political parties such as
Jammat garner during elections, which make them important factors within the
political process.
One must clearly distinguish between Islam, firstly, as a value system and
secondly, social force (Ahamed & Nazneen, 1990: 803-5). As mentioned previously,
25 NGOs provide services, which the state fails to provide; it is a formally recognised organisation outside the state, the family, and the market or for-profit sector. However, CSOs attempt to influence government, often a subtype of NGOs (Blair, 2000: 182).
34
the Islam traditionally practiced within Bengal distinguished between political Islam
and syncretic Islam; it is the latter which has predominantly shaped the value system
of the peoples of the rural regions, while the former has influenced the peoples of the
urban 26 . However, in recent years ‘Bengali Islam’ has been challenged by the
insertion of puritanical or orthodox brand of Islam, which has intermittently attempted
to denounce the practices of ‘Bengali Islam’27 as profane. It is the social forces which
these Mullas attempt to mould and shape according to their interpretation of the Al-
Koran. Therefore, Islam as a social force can be a rallying point within a free political
process, only if the political institutions and organisations are strong. However, when
these variables are closed and weak, Islam strengthens as a force of conservatism.
This has been the case within the rural regions of Bangladesh over the last twenty
years; the rise of Islamism was facilitated by the growth in Islamists under the Zia and
later Ershad regime. However, this has been countered by the steady rise of NGOs
and development organisations which has constantly challenged the rural patriarchal
authority. At this point some distinctions between Islam as a political entity and the
faith need to be made. Rodinson 28 uses the term “theologocentricism” as an
explanation of attributing all observable phenomena among Muslims to matters of
Islamic theology (Khalil, 2002: 19). This has marginalised, if not completely silenced,
the genealogy behind the actions taken by the proponents of a theocratic society, as
opposed to looking at it in political terms.
26 Refer to the work of UAB Razia Akter Banu to distinguish the levels of religiosity between rural & urban Muslims, Chap 1.21 27 Refer to Chapter 2.1 for further clarification 28 Originally in M Rodinson, ‘La Fascination de l’Islam', quoted by A Khalil, 2002
35
3.2 Civil Society
The resistance movements of the 1960s and the war of independence of 1971
politicised society in an unprecedented manner, such that the border between the
civil society and the state became blurred. The necessity for a civil society outside
the influence of, and at times in opposition to the state was yet to be understood, let
alone appreciated. The nationalistic discourse in Bangladesh, as in any other post-
colonial state was used by its leaders to secure space for autonomous actions, and
Mujib subordinated civil society to his own needs and desires. This set the
benchmark for future leaders, although the actions of the ‘father of the nation’ (Mujib)
were, at the time, deemed to be costly it allowed future leaders to undermine the role
of the civil society in the development of the polity. The strength of the civil society
began to grow with each passing year and really accelerated after 1979 (Riaz, 2004:
95). The cultural activists waged battles on two fronts: one was to advance
democracy whilst the second was the “antifundamentalist” agenda (Riaz, 2004: 95).
The middle class secularists, who made-up much of the civil society, failed to reach
out to the masses whilst the cultural activities remained confined to urban middle
class masses. The failure by the secularists allowed the Islamists to gain ground in
order to establish themselves as viable alternative to the established orthodoxy which
proved in late years to be vital in the secularist/Islamist discourse. The failure of the
civil society in the ‘80s was typified through a change in the constitution by Ershad,
which instituted Islam as a state religion. This was an opportunity for the factious
groups within the secular civil society to build a common platform in which to mount
concerted resistance to the Islamists who had gained significant ground since
independence. The urban uprising which led to the downfall of Ershad, according to
Riaz signalled the success of the secularists over the Islamists; this allowed “…a
vibrant secularist civil society [which] began to claim a certain space within the
36
political sphere…” (2004: 96). This does not correlate with the level of influence
which the Islamists gained in the period after Ershad’s downfall. The Islamists had
utilised the Ershad regime to gain the necessary legitimacy required to rehabilitate
itself within the public sphere. And subsequently aided in the downfall of the Ershad
regime and in the following general election, became an integral part of the polity
primarily through the work of its substantial grass-roots support. The strength of the
Islamists within the polity in the 90s was exemplified through three events: the trial of
Golam Azam, the fatwa against Taslima Nasreen in ’94 and finally the NGO activities
after the attacks in Brahmanbaria in 199829.
A majority of the NGOs within Bangladesh came to existence after
independence in 1971, primarily with the aid of foreign donors to repair the war-
ravaged economy and socio-political structure of the country. The numbers have
grown into a lattice of more than 13,000 NGOs in an integrated network, of which
1200 are funded by overseas institutions. Nearly 549 NGOs work with women as a
result of the women-in-development mandate of Western aid agencies (Lamia, 2004:
300) 30 . NGOs service close to 30 million people, nearly 80% of villages in
Bangladesh providing services such as: credit, education, reproductive healthcare,
child immunisation, potable water provisioning, diarrhoeal re-hydration programs,
prevention of environmental degradation, rural road construction, and voter education.
However, “NGOs are not mere service providers, they are also producers of social
meanings and identities for actors associated with them” (Lamia, 2004: 300). To
emphasise the importance of the above mentioned facts two NGOs have been
29 For detailed information of the G Azam trial & T Nasreen ‘saga’ see Riaz, 2004, pp 96-106 30 Originally from ‘NGO Affairs Bureau, Bangladesh’, 1998
37
selected to highlight the conflicts which have existed between civil society and
traditional norms of patriarchal Islamic rural society.
3.21 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) & Grameen Bank
BRAC was established in the early ‘70s to help rebuild a war ravaged country. It
is known to be the ‘world’s largest national private sector development endeavour’
(Hashmi, 2000: 152). In its rural development programme, through its own estimates,
by March 1996 it advanced more than 9 billion taka to 1.7 million BRAC members,
one from each household in over 35,000 villages (out of 68,000). The BRAC run
primary schools have enrolled over 34,000 children, 70% of students are girls and
96% of teachers are women. By early 1997, BRAC had employed about 50,000
regular and part-time workers to work in 50,000 villages in the country. It is estimated
that by the turn of the century 2 million families would be covered by the rural
development programme run by the organisation (Holiday, 1997).
The work conducted by BRAC have opposed the traditions defended by the
Mullas and village elders as they challenge the traditional hierarchies as well as the
prevalent theory of the inevitability of poverty. They boldly pointed out that due to the
lack of ethical teachings in sermons of Mullas, who glorify charity and the seclusion
of women or purdah, the average Bangladeshi fails to identify lack of morality in a
person unless that person is involved in an illicit sexual relationship (Hashmi, 2000:
153). The NGOs ‘educate’ rural women and men on their civil rights, which go on to
shape their ethos on what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’31. This has often contradicted the
traditional views held by the rural community, thus the challenge, initiated by NGOs,
to the hegemonic Islamised notion of piety have played into the hands of the 31 For further information on the work of BRAC and its successes see M Chen (Dhaka, 1993)
38
Islamists to highlight the disintegration of the traditional social norms. BRAC
established itself at the grassroots level to weed out all modes of exploitation and
corruption perpetuated by the rich and powerful32. It urged, through its workers to
construct ‘solid village institutions’ as opposed to the ‘evil institutions of the state’, as
well as the creation of village courts of justice, ‘free from the interference of outsiders’,
to settle their disputes, in the ‘sovereign’ and ‘self-sufficient’ villages33.
Grameen Bank (GB) was established in the 1970s but became fully fledged
bank in 1983 as it began to provide a credit to the rural poor owing 0.5 acres or less
cultivable land per family. The government owns fifteen percent of the shares while
the bank’s borrower-shareholders own the remaining 85%. Loans are issued without
collateral to poor villagers, both men and women. By late 1993, women constituted
94% of its members, holding up to 90% of its total cumulative disbursement of
US$768 million and accounted for 74% of all savings mobilised by the bank. The loan
recovery rate for men and women in 1992 was 89% and 97% respectively34. And by
early 1997, approximately 2 million women had borrowed by becoming GB members
throughout the country (Bornstein 1996, 19-61). The organisation’s profile was further
enhanced after its founder, Dr Yunus, was recently nominated for the Nobel Prize in
Economics35. The work carried out by GB has added to the bifurcation of traditional
social norms through its actions of empowerment for rural peoples but particularly
women. Along with BRAC, it has slowly shaken the foundations of patriarchal Islamic
rural society, it has also further aided in the reformulation of the identity of the rural
woman, from a primordialist into an instrumentalist one.
32 For further information on the ‘critique’ of Bengali society see BRAC Report (Dhaka, 1990), pp. 57-66 33 Ibid., 275-83, 290-7 34 For further information on loan recovery see Asia Week, 2 June 1995, p.58 35 For further information see English-language daily, Independent (Bangladesh), 19 July, 2005
39
3.3 A New Frontier for Islamists and NGOs – ‘Women’s role in society’
The relationship between Islamists and NGOs at best of times can be described
as adversarial and at worst vicious, especially those funded by Western institutions &
governments. It is the role of women in society which has created the greatest
amount of friction between the secularists and Islamists in the last 20 years; one
group advocates a retreat from the traditional image of the subjugated woman whilst
its opposition follows a set of doctrine which perpetuates a religious interpretation for
the role of women in society. The first serious religious confrontation with the NGOs
began in 1993 in Nandigram, a village of Bogra district, when Mufti Maulana Ibrahim
Kandker, a local pir, urged Muslims to refuse help from Christian missionary-
supported non-profit agencies and Bangladeshi NGOs such as BRAC and GB
(Rasiduzzaman, 1997: 240). Western NGOs are often accused of ‘disturbing’ the
traditional structures of social interaction between men and women, one which
predominantly disadvantages women. The patriarchal structures have constructed an
image of woman and determined her roles in Bangladesh. The docile, demure, weak
and submissive image of Bangladeshi women, their invisibility in the public sphere,
their portrayal as symbols of purity and fertility, and their persecution have more to do
with the customs of the country than with Sharia based Islamic laws. However, there
have been instances where the subjection of women have been ignored, sanctioned
and at times encouraged by the local religious clergy36.
In rural areas, this image has been perpetuated, reproduced, and legitimised in
the name of Islam as interpreted by the rural clergy. Islamists not only have found it
convenient but also have used the portrait of NGOs as agents of the West, as a tool
36 For further information on the attacks see Rasiduzzaman, 1997: 250-51; BRAC Report (1990), pp. 212-28
40
to advance their vision of Islam which domesticises women, excludes them from the
decision-making process, and denies them all kinds of resources (e.g. land, money,
and education). This is a political representation of Islam and should not be confused
with a faith based manifestation, which has links with the religious doctrine (refer to
Rodinson’s ‘theologocentricism’ in section 3.1). An anti-NGO alliance of the religious
groups and leaders called the Bengal Anti-Christian Organisation (BACO)37 became
active in some districts in 1994 (Rasiduzzaman, 1997: 241). Anti-BRAC protestors
allegedly destroyed 108,000 tut or mulberry trees which resulted in the
unemployment of thousands of women working for the tree plantation and silk
industries in the northern districts (Robbar, 1994). The identity of women within
Bangladeshi society has been dramatically challenged by the Islamists and NGOs;
the government remains powerless to regulate this and often taken the side of the
Islamists through in-action against perpetrators of violence (as was the case in
Brahmanbaria).
Orthodox Muslims also assumed a moral decline of those women working with
NGOs, as well as of the growing female workforce in industry, offices and business.
There is a nagging fear that Bangladeshi youth will fall under the spell of western
indifference and plummeting morality. However, many well-respected Islamic
scholars distanced themselves from cases such as the one described above, as well
as views about western ‘pollution’ of the social fabric of Islamic Bangladeshi society.
They have been the exception, as there are numerous instances of Muslim leaders,
Mullas, undertaking direct actions against those they perceive to threaten the social
37 For further information see the Daily Janakantha & Jai Jai Din (Bengali language dailies) which published numerous reports in 1994 about Fatwa punishments inflicted by the Ulama.
41
fabric; this has often come in the form of fatwas38. In some areas the Mullas have
been spreading anti-NGO rumours, focusing on the religious consequences of
women’s participation in NGO activities. The women have been accused of being be-
purdah (without purdah), BRAC has been accused of spreading Christianity and
promiscuity in society as men and women fraternise within NGO projects. The work
of the NGOs has not only led to the loosening of traditional patronage, it has also led
to the integration of women within the international global production 39 . This
challenged the traditional role of men as the source of economic power and their
social control of women. Women who moved away from the control of rural authority
into a new sphere controlled by the NGO/capitalists forces were the actors actively
engaged in undermining of Muslim male authority. The poor women, as agents of
transformation in rural society and as vulnerable targets, thus became the symbol of
incitement to violence for the clergy (Lamia, 2004: 310).
There is growing class consciousness and alienation from the village elders and
elites who manipulate and rig elections and exploit the poor, there is also increased
levels of awareness, which can be attributed to their exposure to the BRAC
programmes40. The NGOs have also provided significant resources in educating
women in their legal rights; some NGOs provide legal advice for a nominal fee to
poor villagers. NGOs have also had a hand in ‘voters’ education program and ‘poll
monitoring’ throughout the country41. In the past, women have often been intimidated
into voting for a preferred candidate of the local clergy, as they were, often, unaware
38 The nonbinding religious interpretation or counsel that Muslims seek from the Mullas but that is usually enforced through village shalish (informal arbitration by elders) (Rashiduzzaman, 1994: 989). 39 This represents the increasing number of women working within the garments sector. Bangladesh is one of the leading exporters of garments in the world; the industry constitutes a large portion of annual earnings from exports. For further information see Taj I Hashmi (2000), pp 164-169 40 For further information see K Westergaard (April 1996), pp. 34, 38-40, 43 41 For further information see K Siddique (Feb 1998)
42
of the sovereignty of their vote. However, one must not perceive NGOs such as GB
and BRAC as the panacea to the developmental-ills of Bangladesh as there is a
counter-argument to the NGO contribution. The weak structure of the state allows
NGOs greater degree of autonomy, one which their counterparts in India are not so
fortunate to enjoy. Foreign donor organisations & institutions, in conjunction with their
local clients (NGOs), often dictate terms to the Bangladeshi government, publish
materials and take part in political activities which at times amount to inciting a
section of the population against others. The Canadian International Development
Agency and numerous NGOs, have for long-time urged Bangladeshi women to
‘overthrow male-domination to establish the rights of women’. The support for
Taslima Nasreen during the ‘93-94 controversy created animosity towards NGOs not
only from the amorphous groups of Islamic radicals but also liberals and leftists.
Some Western governments have even threatened to stop foreign aid to Bangladesh
unless NGOs are given free reign to run their affairs (Hashmi, 2000: 149-51).
Observers claim that large NGOs suffer from ‘oriental despotism’ and by thus have
‘emerged as one of the four bastards of civil society’. The other three are: the military,
civil bureaucracy, and political parties (Holiday, 1997). In one instance the
government had to withdraw the ‘cancellation order’ against fifty NGOs and the
Association for Development Agencies (ADAB), as well as remove the director-
general of the NGO Affairs Bureau (government body), all as a result of pressure
from the powerful NGO lobby and foreign donor agencies & governments42.
42 SM Hashmi, (Dec 1996); ‘ADAB is beyond Government Control: NGOs Defeating the Bureau’, Dhaka Courier, 28 Aug 1992
43
Conclusion
44
Conclusion
Based on the work carried out for this paper Bangladeshis remain loyal to the
syncretic Bengali Islamic identity over a universal identity based on a pan-Islamic
Umma. However, this is by no means permanent and should take into consideration
the shifts in international politics. The emergence of a ‘pan-Asian Islamic solidarity
movement’ based on Wahabbi brand of Islam during the nineties and the beginning
of the twenty-first century greatly affected the role of Bangladesh amongst the group
of Muslim states as well as the wider international system. The importance of
Bangladesh to remain a ‘moderate’ state is vital to the Western powers. Bangladesh
remains a key ally in their ‘war on terror’ and with a population close to 140 million
people, gives them a great source of legitimacy. However, looking back at the
formulation of identity, the syncretic Bengali Islam remains dominant within the rural
regions of Bangladesh, which make-up an overwhelming majority of the population,
as highlighted by the work of Banu in Chapter 1.21. The study also shows an almost
equal proportion of people supporting ‘orthodox’ Islam, which indicates a shift in the
traditional values of rural Bangladesh.
In recent years, it is the work carried out by NGOs which has been integral in
conflating the traditional identity of Bangladeshis, one, which was perpetuated by the
rural Islamic clergy. The NGOs role in attempting to transform the identity of women
in society resulted in juxtaposing not only gender roles against one another, but the
traditional discourse of religion in the public sphere against the compelling theocratic
idiom which has slowly emerged over the last twenty-five years. This is all a result of
the weak State, it has failed to regulate the role of non-state actors within the public
sphere, both development & religious Islamic NGOs. Therefore, the battles between
45
the secularists and the Islamists have been conducted outside the power of the State,
thus, proliferating the conflation identity.
The Islamic identity has coexisted, and some elements have merged, with the
Bengali identity for over 650 years. The folk variant of Islam is the cultural heritage of
the peoples of East Bengal/East Pakistan/Bangladesh, at its core, this will never
change. This manifests itself in all parts of Bengali society, regardless of class, caste
or gender. The rituals and customs which are followed by the peoples of both the
urban and rural regions are unique to Bangladesh. The problems over identity have
arisen as a result of abrogating the traditional form of Islam and adopting an
‘orthodox’ version which is not suited for Bangladesh. This topic has been a common
feature within Muslim majority states on the periphery of the Islamic world; if one
adopts the Middle East as the centre of the Islamic world, then countries such as
Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, and Bangladesh would fall on the periphery. However,
the periphery states have negotiated the role of religion within the state, albeit mostly
through authoritarian regimes who have suppressed extreme version of Islam from
the public sphere. Bangladesh failed to do so, due to successive military regimes
utilising Islam as a tool for legitimacy. Therefore, the State must strengthen its
identity by re-adopting the 1972 Constitution and making secularism a firm tenet
within the application of its laws. Traditional or folk Islam must be allowed to return to
the hearts and minds of Muslims within Bangladesh, any other version will simply be
reneging upon the principles, for which Bangladesh was founded, the secular
homeland of Bengalis.
46
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Publications
1. ‘5 Militants held with Bombs, Explosive, Suspected Training Camp Unearthed in Cnawabganj’, Daily Star, 12 March 2003
2. ‘ADAB is beyond Government Control: NGOs Defeating the Bureau’, Dhaka Courier, 28 Aug 1992
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8. ‘Three-day Lalon Festival concludes in Kushtia’, Bangladesh Observer, 22 October 2003
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11. Lintner B, ‘A Cocoon of Terror’, Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 165, No. 13, 4 April 2002
12. Robbar, Dhaka, 24 July 1994
13. S Rahman & A R Khan, ‘Emerging NGO Culture in Bangladesh’, Holiday, 10 Jan 1997
14. SM Hashmi, ‘State, Politics and Civil Society in the context of Donor Hegemony: Bangladesh at 25’, paper presented at Bangladesh 25 Conference, Columbia University, New York, 5-7 Dec 1996