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Who benefits from Child Benefit?. Laura Blow Ian Walker Yu Zhu. Background. 1975, Barbara Castle, Secretary of State for Social Services, on the Child Benefit Bill: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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IFS
Who benefits from Child Benefit?
Laura Blow
Ian Walker
Yu Zhu
Background
• 1975, Barbara Castle, Secretary of State for Social Services, on the Child Benefit Bill:
– “… the nation's provision for family support is concentrated first and foremost where it is needed most on the poorest families; and that it goes to the person responsible for caring for the children and managing the budget for their food, clothing and other necessities.”
Background
• Gordon Brown, March 1998 Budget:– “Child Benefit remains the fairest, the most
efficient and the most cost-effective way of recognising the extra costs and responsibilities borne by all parents”.
• April 2005 Budget:– CB increased to £17.00 a week for the first child
(£17.55 for lone parents), and to £11.40 a week for subsequent children. “Since 1997, the value of Child Benefit for the first child has been increased by 25 per cent in real terms”.
Our aim
• To learn something about the effectiveness of transfers aimed at children in the UK.
• Previous literature suggests that such labelling can have an effect - Kooreman (2000) finds evidence that CB is spent disproportionately on child related goods in Netherlands.
Our aim
• To infer how CB is spent– i.e. is it spent on child related goods (more than
are other sources of income)?
– or is it spent on adult related goods?
– or is “a pound a pound”?
• So a direct approach to whether “money matters”.
Empirical approach
• CB is– universally paid– up rated (roughly) yearly – sometimes in line with prices,
sometimes more or less than this
• Therefore get monthly exogenous real variation from– inflationary erosion between up ratings– real increases/decreases when updated
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
18.00
20.00
22.00
Rea
l ch
ild b
enef
it (
£ p
er w
eek)
First Child (Couple) First Child (Lone Parent) Subsequent Children First Child (Lone Parent post 7/98)
Real CB 1979-2001 (£ per week in 2003 prices)
Empirical approach
• CB is– universally paid– up rated (roughly) yearly – sometimes in line with prices,
sometimes more or less than this
• Therefore get monthly exogenous real variation from– inflationary erosion between up ratings– real increases/decreases when updated
• Can think of our approach as treating CB variation as “natural experiment”.
Empirical approach
• Use UK FES data from 1980 to 2000 to estimate Engel curves for different goods– Child specific goods: children’s clothing– Adult specific goods: men and women’s clothing, alcohol, tobacco.
• Include CB and other expenditure (othexp) separately.
• Test whether MPC(CB)=MPC(othexp) for the different goods.
• Do this separately for different household types– since CB varies with number of children, if pool, worry that CB is just
picking up variations in spending patterns across household types.
Data & Methodology
* *othexp CB stuffh h h hi i i i ie a b c
• “stuff” includes year/month/region dummies, controls for children’s age, age of head of household, lone father dummy.
• Household types:– Couples, 1 child – Couples, 2 children – Lone parents, 1 child– Lone parents, 2 children
# obs CB as % of expenditure 9,811 4
14,663 7 2,920 10 2,239 15
Expenditure patterns
couples lone parents couples lone parentsTotal expenditure £ 392 184 414 205Children's clothing % 1.9 3.3 2.7 4.2Women’s clothing % 2.4 3.5 2.1 2.8Men’s clothing % 1.6 0.5 1.4 0.4Food % 16.7 19.3 18.5 21.5Alcohol % 3.6 2.1 3.3 1.7Tobacco % 2.0 3.3 1.7 3.0
1 child 2 children
Test: MPC(CB)=MPC(othexp) ?
Basic results
Child clothing
Women’s clothing
Men’s clothing
Food Alcohol Tobacco
Couples, N=8575 CB 0.015 0.156 0.213* 0.177 0.523** -0.015 Lone Parents, N=744 CB 0.118 0.663** 0.040 -0.047 0.188* -0.019
Test: MPC(CB)=MPC(othexp) ?
Basic results
Child clothing
Women’s clothing
Men’s clothing
Food Alcohol Tobacco
Couples, N=8575 CB 0.015 0.156 0.213* 0.177 0.523** -0.015 othexp 0.017** 0.039** 0.028** 0.075** 0.033** -0.000 Lone Parents, N=744 CB 0.118 0.663** 0.040 -0.047 0.188* -0.019 othexp 0.025** 0.064** 0.006** 0.065** 0.019** 0.000
Test: MPC(CB)=MPC(othexp) ?
Basic results
Child clothing
Women’s clothing
Men’s clothing
Food Alcohol Tobacco
Couples, N=8575 CB 0.015 0.156 0.213* 0.177 0.523** -0.015 othexp 0.017** 0.039** 0.028** 0.075** 0.033** -0.000 F(CB = othexp) 0.00 0.84 2.11 0.38 14.29** 0.04 Overall F, p F(6,8526) = 2.82 p = 0.01 Lone Parents, N=744 CB 0.118 0.663** 0.040 -0.047* 0.188 -0.019 othexp 0.025** 0.064** 0.006** 0.065** 0.019** 0.000 F(CB = othexp) 0.25 5.54** 0.11 0.28 2.43 0.05 Overall F, p F(6,694) = 1.41 p = 0.21
Test: MPC(CB)=MPC(othexp) ?
Basic results
Initial conclusions
• Results suggest CB is spent differently from other income– Spent disproportionately on adult-assignable
goods rather that child-assignable goods
• But this does not have to imply that parents favour themselves over their children.
• It could be that they place so much weight on the welfare of their children that they insure them against income variations.
Results robust to
• Quadratic specification (MPCs calculated at mean).
• Including households on welfare
• Accounting for purchase infrequency – instrumenting expenditure with income
• Tobit specification (zeroes)
• Splitting sample into smokers / non-smokers
• Splitting sample by time (1980s / 1990s)
Anticipated and unanticipated CB effects
• assume households form static expectations of real CB – i.e. will be indexed in line with inflation since the last increase
• decompose CB into anticipated / unanticipated parts
• allow the two components to enter separately in the Engel curves
• find that it is unanticipated CB variation that is reflected in adult assignable good expenditure
Conclusions
• Policy-induced unanticipated variation in CB is spent differently from other income – disproportionately on goods consumed
predominantly by adults
• Consistent with the view that parents place so much weight on the welfare of their children that they fully insure them against any unexpected policy changes.
• Suggests that families would gain from more certainty about their future benefit incomes.