Whose Metaphysics of Presence - Heidegger's Interpretation of Energeia and Dunamis in Aristotle

The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2006) Vol. XLIV

Whose Metaphysics of Presence? Heidegger’s Interpretation of Energeia and Dunamis in Aristotle Francisco J. Gonzalez Skidmore College

Abstract

In t h e recently published 1924 course, Grundbegri f fe der aris totel ischen Phi losophie , Mart in Heidegger offers a detai led interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of kinesis in the Physics. This in te rpre ta t ion identifies entelecheia with what is finished and present-at-an-end and energeia with being-at-work toward this end. In arguing against this interpretation, the present paper attempts to show t h a t Aristotle interpreted being from the perspective of praxis r a t h e r t h a n poiesis and therefore did not identify i t wi th s ta t ic presence. The paper also challenges la ter variations of Heidegger’s interpretat ion, i n par t icular his account of d u n a m i s in t h e 1931 course on Metaphysics Theta, which insists tha t its mode of being is presence-at-hand. By arguing tha t this reading too is untenable, the paper concludes tha t Aristotle’s metaphysics is not a metaphysics of presence and t h a t h i s texts instead point toward a possibility of metaphysics ignored by t h e a t tempts of Heidegger and others to overcome it.

j e trouve chez Aristote ... de quoi reengendrer la metaphysique. Celle-ci ne me parai t donc pas close, je dirais plut8t qu’elle me parait inexploree.. . .

-Paul Ricoeur’

Central to Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greeks, and therefore to his account of the whole history of metaphysics, is the thesis that for the Greeks “being” meant “presence.” This interpretation has been extremely influential, provoking many and diverse attempts to overcome what has come to be called

Francisco J. Gonzalez i s associate professor a n d chair of t he Department of Philosophy a t Skidmore College. He i s the author of :Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (‘Northwestern University Press, 1998) and has recently completed a book entitled A Question o f Dialogue: Heidegger and Plato.

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Francisco J. Gonzalez

“the metaphysics of presence.” Yet I have elsewhere attempted to show that this thesis is untenable in the case of Plato,2 and my aim in the present paper is to show tha t i t is equally untenable in the case of Aristotle. The crucial text is Heidegger’s recently published SS 1924 course, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen P h i l o ~ o p h i e . ~ I t is here tha t Heidegger provides the most thorough argument and textual exegesis in support of his thesis that being in Aristotle means presence. This thesis then underlies, and is further defended in, Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in later texts, most notably in the 1931 course Aristoteles, Metaphysik 0 1-3: Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der K r ~ f t , ~ and in the essay, “Vom Wesen und Begriff der @>6ois,” written in 1939.5 A critical reading of these texts promises nothing less than the recovery of possibilities for metaphysics that the Heideggerian history of Being must ignore and exclude.6

1.

Heidegger often cites the ordinary, pre-philosophical meaning of the Greek word for being, oiroia, as an indication tha t the Greeks understood being as presence. Heidegger expresses this meaning in the 1924 course as follows: “means [Vermogenl, possessions and goods [Hub und G u t ] , the household [der Hausstand], the estate [das Anwesen]” (GA 18, 345). Heidegger emphasizes that the ordinary meaning thus not only intends a specific being as the genuine or exemplary being, that is, one’s own goods or possessions, but also expresses the how of this being’s being: i t s being available (uerfiigbar), usable (brauchbar), and in this way there for us. Therefore, if we take the ordinary meaning of oiroia as a clue to what “being” meant for the Greeks, as Heidegger suggests (24), then we can infer that the Greeks understood being as being-there, being-at-hand, being-present. Furthermore, if this ordinary meaning is preserved in the philosophical meaning, if the philosophical meaning only makes explicit and thematic what is “connoted” (mitgemeint) in the ordinary meaning (25-7, 3461, then we can conclude that Aristotle too in using the word oiroia understood thereby “presence.”

But can we legitimately read a philosophical conception of being into the ordinary use of the word oiroia? Can we assume that this ordinary meaning is retained in the otherwise very different, technical philosophical meaning? After all, when Aristotle analyzes the different meanings of oiroia in Metaphysics Z, “goods” or “possessions” is not among them. Though Heidegger in later texts sometimes invokes the pre- philosophical meaning of oiroia as if i t were some kind of evidence for his thesis concerning the conception of being in Greek philosophy, in 1924 he is much more careful. Thus in

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Whose Metaphysics of Presence?

Heidegger’s manuscript for the course we find the following important warning regarding the interpretation of oiroia: “The ordinary meaning as guideline. Beware! I t could have disappeared. Only when there is a comprehensive examination of these indications. Otherwise easily dilettante. Mere sem- blance of depth. Precisely here one must take into consideration the fate and historicity of every language” (GA 18, 345). Heidegger thus makes it very clear that the technical meaning of oiroia cannot be simply deduced from the ordinary meaning, that the latter can at most serve as a guideline Weitfaden) (345; see also 24 and 26). Heidegger therefore recognizes the need to demonstrate that moments of the ordinary meaning of oiroia, in particular the connotations of Hab and Anwesen, are still present in Aristotle’s technical use of the term (26).

One way in which Heidegger attempts to demonstrate this is by showing that the different forms of being (Seinscharaktere), or rather the different ways of being (Wie des Seins) Aristotle presents in Metaphysics A 8 all “signify, with greater or lesser transparency, a there of beings [Da des Seiendenl” (350; see 348-50 and 29-34). For the purpose of the present paper, however, I will focus on the sense of being I take to pose the greatest challenge to what Heidegger wishes to demonstrate: the sense of being that cuts through the senses discussed at Metaphysics A 8, a sense of being expressed in two words that Heidegger himself will come to consider the most fundamental words for being in Ari~tot le :~ CvTE)\&Eia and C v i p y E i a .

That Heidegger in the 1924 course translates 6vTEhEXEia when i t first makes i ts appearance as “Gegenwart, Gegenwartigsein eines Seienden als Ende” (296) should not surprise us, since this is precisely the translation he needs to maintain the identification of h T E ? d x E i a with presence. Yet the context is precisely the one best suited to show the untenability of this translation. This context is the account of motion ( K ~ V ~ O I S ) in the first three chapters of Physics r, an account to which Heidegger devotes the last part of the 1924 course. He turns t o this account because he believes tha t “ K ~ V T ) C S I S constitutes the genuine there-character o f being” (287). What this means will become apparent if we turn to Heidegger’s translatiodinterpretation of the definition of motion Aristotle offers in the first chapter of Physics r, 201a10-11: “fi TOG

adopting the translation of h T E h & E i a already mentioned, initially translates the whole sentence thus: “motion is the being-present [Gegenwart] of what is capable of being-there as such” (313; see also 315). An immediately apparent problem with this translation lies precisely in the word “Gegenwart.” A piece of wood can be present as something capable of being, for example, capable of being made into a table, without thereby being in motion. Yet Heidegger oddly insists that such presence

6VVapEI dVTO5 h T E h i X E I U , Ifi TOIOGTOV, KiVQOiS h T I V . ” Heidegger,

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is motion. “Insofar as it is there, the piece of wood is in motion. Insofar as it is genuinely there as capable-of-being-a-box, it is in motion” (313). Essential t o understanding this very strange claim is Heidegger’s identification of K ~ V ~ C J I S with “significance” or “Bedeutsamkeit.” This is made especially clear in Heidegger’s manuscript, where we read: “Kivqois is the There of the ‘from ... to ...’ as such” (ist das Da des ‘von ... zu ...’ als solchen, 376). The piece of wood is there as significant, that is, as something to be used for a house or as something from which a box can be made: this is its Bedeutsamkeit. But this is also the K ~ V ~ C J I S that Heidegger sees as constituting “the genuine being-there of being.” The piece of wood sitting there is in motion in the sense of referring beyond itself, signifying something, and this is the K ~ V ~ C J I S that Aristotle is making manifest in his definition.

One could of course object tha t what is “significant” in Heidegger’s sense, such as the piece of wood in his example, is a t res t , while what Aristotle is trying t o define is not res t (ipEDia), which he characterizes as the aKivqoia of what is capable of being moved (202a4-5), but rather the opposite of rest (229b23-26; 264a27-28): K ~ V ~ O I S in the sense of alteration, growth and decay, generation and destruction, and movement in place (201all-15). Furthermore, K ~ V ~ O I S in this sense is not simply the being-present of the capable as capable, but the actual exercise, ac t iva t ion , of the capable as capable; for example, it is not simply the presence of the wood as buildable, but the actual exercise of this potential in the activity of building. Heidegger acknowledges this possible objection (314) but dismisses i t as a n illusion (Tuuschung) by drawing our attention to the phenomenon of rest. When the carpenter goes to lunch and leaves what he is building uncompleted, the wood is at rest. But rest is something that can characterize only what is capable of being in motion: rest thus preserves, rather than eliminates, a thing’s motion as its way of being: “Rest is only a Zimit-case of motion” (314). The way in which this answers the objection Heidegger faces is apparently this: Bedeutsamkeit can indeed characterize something at rest, something not presently being put to work, but what is thus at rest still has motion as its way of being. Thus the identification of Bedeutsamkeit and K ~ V ~ C S I S is preserved by way of an identification of both with rest. Thus in Heidegger’s manuscript we read the following: “Rest as the way of being-there [Da-Weisel of what is in motion as an object of concern in the world [des Besorgten der Welt]. Only thus is significance [Bedeutsamkeitl fully determined” (379).8

One can now understand why Heidegger gives such importance to the discovery of the phenomenon of rest as the way of being of most of the beings we encounter and deal with in the world: “As far as I know, no one has ever brought into consideration this moment of rest” (314). But even if we admit the unity of motion and rest to which Heidegger draws our attention, is it

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not still important to explain the difference? While the explicit purpose of Aristotle’s definition of K ~ V ~ U I S is to explain this difference, Heidegger’s interpretation prevents it from doing so. Specifically-and this is what is crucial-in translating iv-rEhEXEia as Gegenwart and thereby making K ~ V ~ U I S a kind of being-present, Heidegger blocks access to the phenomenon of K ~ V ~ U I S as distinct from rest.

Heidegger’s interpretation is strikingly similar to that of the philosophers whom Aristotle describes as explaining K ~ V ~ U I S in terms of “otherness” ( i ~ ~ p 6 - r ~ ~ ) . Heidegger himself suggests the possibility t ha t these philosophers saw ~ T E P ~ T ~ S as a characteristic a being has in itself in the sense “that a being in itself has the possibility of being from ... t o ..., of being characterized with regard to a certain determination by the absence of this determination. Does not i - r ~ p 6 - r ~ ) ~ then in this case determine the being of being-in-motion?” (3 17). The problem, of course, is that Aristotle rejects this interpretation of K ~ V ~ U I S

because, in Heidegger’s own paraphrase, “Wood can be a box and is there as wood-determined in itself through ~ T E ~ ~ T Q S - and yet not determined as moving” (384). I t is as if Heidegger in proceeding through the text has suddenly encountered a resurrected Aristotle telling him his interpretation will not stand.

Heidegger nevertheless refuses to see defeat here and instead joins Aristotle in rejecting the explanation of motion as C T E P ~ T ~ S . However, he can do so only by suggesting tha t the problem with this explanation is i t s failure to include the moment of being-present (Gegenwartigsein) (318, 384). I t is not enough for something to be characterized by otherness or difference in order for it to be in motion: this otherness or difference must be present. Heidegger’s interpretation is thus saved because i t included presence along with Bedeutsamkeit as essential dimensions of K ~ V ~ U I S . Yet the distance here between Heidegger and Aristotle is made clear by the fact that Aristotle’s objection to the thesis that K ~ V ~ U I S is ~ T E P ~ T ~ S has nothing to do with its failure to take presence into account. Instead, his objections are that what is other is not necessarily moved and that movement occurs not from and to what is other, but rather between contraries (Physics 201b21-24). In other words, Aristotle appeals not to the phenomenon of presence, but to the phenomenon of motion itself. This again shows tha t i t is Heidegger who is reading “presence” into the text. Furthermore, Aristotle’s objection explicitly rejects as a characteristic of K ~ V ~ U I S precisely what Heidegger wants to identify it with: the structure of being f rodto what is other. In other words, what characterizes K ~ V ~ U I S

is the relation of contraries and not Bedeutsamkeit. A little later in the course Heidegger again appears to

undermine his own interpretation of K ~ V ~ U I S when he insists: “One should not simply say: Kivquis is simply the ivfpyEia of

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what is capable. What is capable is not as such moved” (320). Yet Heidegger now appears to move towards a different account of motion: “What is in possibility comes t o i ts proper end in being put to work [In-Arbeit-Sein], it is then genuinely what it is, namely, being-capable. In relation to the Epyov of noiqai~, however, it is not finished [nicht fertig]” (321). Why this shift now in Heidegger’s account from defining motion in terms of Gegenwart t o defining it in terms of In-Arbeit-Sein? The main reason is that Heidegger by this point in the course has come to Aristotle’s characterization of K ~ V ~ O I S as “incomplete” (aTiAq$). This is clearly a characteristic of K ~ V ~ O I S that Heidegger’s earlier interpretation cannot account for: what is at res t and gegenwurtig in its significance need not be ax-riAqs but, on the contrary, can be finished and complete. If we saw t h a t Heidegger’s earlier characterization of K ~ V ~ C S I S was unable t o capture what is distinctive of K ~ V ~ C J I S as opposed to rest, we can now say that this is incompleteness, the state of being neither fully potential nor fully actual: and this is precisely the difficult indeterminacy of K ~ V ~ O I S that Aristotle is trying to explain.

But how can Heidegger feel justified in now changing his interpretation, specifically, in replacing Gegenwart with In- Arbei t -Sein? The reason is tha t he thinks he finds such a distinction in Aristotle himself, a s he makes clear in the following remark: “Insofar as Being ultimately means Being-at- its-end, Holding-itself-in-its-end in a final sense, ivTEhiXEia, Aristotle, when he speaks with care, must characterize the being [Daseinl of being-in-motion as i v i p y ~ i a ” (321).9 What Heidegger is assuming here is a distinction between ivTE AiXEia as being-present-at-an-end and i v i p y E i a as being-at-work- towards-an-end. This distinction then allows him to grant that the definition of motion as ivTEAiXEia is not fully adequate, since motion is C X T E A ~ S , and that Aristotle would be more careful if he were to characterize motion as iv ipyEia in the sense of an incomplete being-at-work. But what grounds are there for this sharp distinction between 2vipyEia and iv-rEAiXEia?’O And is In- Arbeit-Sein an adequate translation of the ivipyEia that defines motion?”

Let us consider the second question first. This translation of i v ipyEia is of course suggested by the etymology of the term. Yet, as Heidegger well knows, etymology by itself can prove nothing. Furthermore, Heidegger’s etymological account is questionable on two main points. (1) He takes the word Epyov t o mean “work,” whether in the sense of “working,” as here, or in the sense of “the work, the finished product,” which, as we will see, is how Heidegger interprets the word in later texts (these two related meanings, for example, are the only ones recognized in the 1931 course [GA 33, 501). But are either or both of these interpretations fully adequate interpretations of Zpyov? To see that they are not, one need only recall the use of

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the word in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics: to say that the Epyov of man is “the soul’s i v ipye ia in accordance with reason [KaTa A6yovI” (1098a7) is not t o say tha t this is the “work” man does nor that it is something “produced” by man; this is why the translation of “function” is sometimes chosen. Note also how in this part of the Nicomachean Ethics the Epyov is argued to be an 6vdpyEia with no sense of redundancy. (2) Therefore, the other problem with Heidegger’s reading is that it tends to reduce ivdpyEia to Epyov: as being-at-work it is work; as “standing in the work produced,” it is the work produced.12

Heidegger’s translation has indeed more than etymology to recommend it: it is certainly better to characterize motion as a putting-to-work of a capability than i t is to characterize it as the mere being-present of this capability. Yet this translation confronts a serious philosophical problem: i t collapses the distinction between ivipyEia and Kivqois. Being-at-work towards an unachieved end is itself a motion, so that to define i v i p y a a thus is necessarily to turn it into a motion. Heidegger indeed characterizes i v i p y E i a , in distinction from ivTEAiXEia, as “ U n fe r t ig s e in ( 3 8 1 ) , “ d a s No c h - n i c h t - fe r t i g ” ( 3 8 2 ) , thereby identifying it with motion not only implicitly but at one point in the course explicitly: “iv ipyEia is KivqoiS, but not ivTEhiXEia” (296).13 Yet such an identification is untenable for two reasons. (1) Aristotle’s definition of motion would become viciously circular, since it would amount to saying: “motion is the putting-in-motion of what is capable qua capable.” Of course, as Heidegger would be quick to point out, in philosophy, circles are not always vicious. But while some circular reasoning can be illuminating, a definition of motion as the putting-into- motion of what is capable of motion illuminates o r reveals nothing at all.14 (2) The second problem is that, in a well-known text from the Metaphysics (0 6, 1048b18-35), Aristotle sharply distinguishes between i v i p y a a and K ~ V ~ O I S precisely because the latter is ~ I T E A I ~ S while the former is And it is important to emphasize that the definition of K ~ V ~ O I S as an 6vipyEia does not at all contradict their distinction. The iv ipyEia that defines motion is not itself an incomplete process towards some end but, rather, the ful l actuality and completion of what is capable insofar as it is capable. It is the qualification “insofar as it is capable” that explains the incompleteness of motion and not anything in i v i p y E i a itself, as Aristotle explicitly says: “‘K~VTJCJIS, though a kind of ivipyEia, is incomplete [ ~ T E A I ~ S ] . The ‘cause of i ts being incomplete is the capable [ ~ b 6 u v a ~ 6 v l of .which it is the ivipyEia” (Phys. 2, 201b31-33).16 This is why the definition is not circular: iv ipyEia in itself is not motion17 nor is “the capable qua capable” in itself motion: only the ivipyEia of the capable qua capable is motion. This is also why Aristotle a t one point can even, with no hint of paradox, characterize motion a s a n ivTEAiXEia ~ I T E A I j s (257b8-9), a

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characterization tha t of course defeats the whole point of Heidegger’s distinction between ivTEAiXEia and i v i p y a a .

We can now draw an important conclusion: the key term in the definition of K ~ V Q C J I T , whether it be ivTEAiXEia or iv ipyEia , can mean neither Gegenwartigsein nor an unfertiges im-Arbeit- Sein: the former interpretation eliminates the phenomenon of K ~ V Q O I S altogether by substituting for it the mere presence of a capability, while the latter interpretation leaves it completely unexplained by simply defining it as itself. But these inadequate interpretations of ivTEAiXEia or ivipyEia rest on the sharp distinction Heidegger makes between them. Only by being sharply distinguished from ivipyEia can ivTEAiXEia be rid of any connotation of “activity” and be identified with “Gegenwart, Gegenwartigsein eines Seienden als Ende” and “Fertigsein” (296); only by being sharply distinguished from ivTEAiXEia can i v i p y a a be characterized as an incomplete movement towards a T ~ A O S . It is therefore this distinction that fails to make sense of Aristotle’s account of motion, an account in which the terms ivTEAiXEia and ivipyEia are used interchangeably. What justification, then, does Heidegger provide for making such a distinction?

Before looking at this justification we need to reflect on why Heidegger needs a sharp distinction between ivTEAiXEia and ivipyeia . As already noted, one of Heidegger’s principle aims in this discussion is to demonstrate that for Aristotle, and for the Greeks in general, Being was understood as presence and, more specifically, as a static presence. To support this interpretation he must argue tha t Aristotle’s word for being in the fullest sense, that is, ivTEAiXEia, means being-present-once-and-for-all, being-at-an-end, being-finished. But the only way in which he can interpret ivTEAiXEia in this way is to sharply distinguish it from i v i p y a a and interpret the latter in a way that completely subordinates it t o the former: as movement towards being-at- an-end, being-finished. The conclusion tha t Heidegger thus wishes t o arrive a t is clearly stated in the following passage from his manuscript for the course:

The How of t h e There (Da) of something: how does “being-at- work” [“In-Arbeit-sein”] arrive at this ontological-hermeneutical precedence? Because being=being-produced [ Sein=Hergestelltsein] , There=being-present [Da=Anwesendsein], being-finished [Fertigsein], having-come-into t h e Now [Hersein in J e t z t ] , in to presence [Gegenwart] ; in being-present-before [Gegenwartigsein] , being-in- possession-of-the-there [Da-Habendsein], remaining-there with [Sichaufhalten bei]. . . . (381)

But what becomes of this conclusion if ivTEAiXEia and ivipyEia a re synonyms? I t simply collapses. If i v n A i X E i a means the same as i v i p y E i a , then as activity i t cannot mean “what is

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simply present” (schlechthin gegenwart ig) , what is f in ished , much less what is produced. If i v ipyEia means the same as iv-rEhiXEia, then as an end-in-itself i t cannot be a process nor therefore work or production. The synonymous pair iv-rEhiXEia/ iv ipyEia would then name a conception of Being that evades and transcends the conception to which Heidegger tr ies t o confine Aristotle and the Greeks.

But it is now time to look at the textual evidence Heidegger provides for the distinction on which his present reading of Aristotle’s ontology, and Greek ontology in general, depends. The evidence provided on p. 295 is Metaphysics 0 3 1047a30. Here Aristotle, according t o most editions of the text, refers to ‘‘4 i v ipyEia Toi jvopa” as ‘‘G n p o s T ~ V ivTEhiXEiav ouvTi8Evivq”: i v i p y E i a (as a name) is “set down in relation to, o r for, ivTEAiXEia.” However, this is not the text Heidegger reads: he follows Diels in substituting O U V T E I V O ~ ~ V ~ for ouv-riBEvivq so that he can interpret the text as meaning that ivipyEia “spannt sich aus zum Ende,” “stretches itself towards the end” (296). This of course is the interpretation Heidegger needs in order to distinguish between i v i p y a a as an unfinished movement towards an end and ivTEhiXEia as a being-finished-at-an-end. Unfortunately, W. D. Ross already showed in 1924 that the substitution of O U V T E I V O ~ ~ V ~ for mv-ri8Epivq is neither possible nor necessq.

But it is only in the active voice tha t Aristotle uses U W V T E ~ V E W in this sense. [In other words, there is no parallel for the middle voice U U V T E I V O ~ ~ V I ~ meaning what Heidegger takes it to mean here]. ouvTiOEpivq implies t h a t Aristotle was i n t h e habi t of connecting t h e words iv ipyEia a n d ivTEhiXEia together i n his lectures, and such phrases as EIS Tab-rbv Pauihia K a i Tbpavvov uwviOEpEv [we have “set down” the words PaaiAia and Tljpavvov as meaning the same] (Pl. Pol. 2763, cf. 259d) form a close enough parallel.18

In short, there is a more plausible reading of the text tha t makes it mean the exact opposite of what Heidegger needs it to mean: the word i v i p y E i a is “set down” in relation to iv-rEhiXEia in the sense tha t Aristotle normally uses the two together, and perhaps even-this is perfectly compatible with the text on this reading-interchangeably. And this of course is Aristotle’s practice. We have already seen that the two terms appear to be used interchangeably in the account of motion (see especially 201a27-2919 and 202a15-18) and there a re many more examples of this synonymy in Aristotle’s texts. Therefore, we can conclude t h a t both the most plausible reading of 1047a30 and Aristotle’s general practice rule out Heidegger’s interpretation.

However, Heidegger does offer a textual parallel for his substitution of O U V T E I V O ~ ~ V ~ for ouv-ri8Epivq at 1047a30. He

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cites Metaphysics 0 8, 1050a21-23 where Aristotle writes: “For the Epyov is T ~ A O S and i v i p y E i a is the Epyov; therefore, the name ivipyEia is also said according to the Epyov and “stretches towards” ( (SVVTE~VEI mpbs) iv-rEAiXEia.” So in this text Heidegger has the word he wants, ( S U V T E ~ V E I , in order to interpret the relation between i v ipyEia and iv-rEAiXEia as a movement from one to the other. But two objections can be made here. First, the present text does not support Heidegger’s reading of 1047a30 since the word ( S U V T E ~ V E I here is in the active voice, not the middle voice (Heidegger must attribute the same meaning to both voices, which is not plausible). Secondly, here as in the earlier text it is the word 6vipyEia that is the subject: it is not 6v ipyEia itself tha t “stretches towards” iv-rEAiXEia, but the word. What can i t mean to say tha t a word tends towards another word? What else besides tha t i t tends towards the meaning of the other word, tends to mean something similar or the same? And this is the interpretation clearly suggested by the context of the entire sentence. Here we do well to cite Ross again, this time on 1050a21-23: “Because the Epyov is the T ~ A o ~ (1. 21), the word iv ipyEia , which is derived from Epyov, tends to mean the same as iv-rEAiXEia” (264). In short, ra ther t han saying that i v fpyEia itself is a movement towards iv-rEAfXEia, what the sentence says is that the word iv ipyEia tends to have the meaning of ivTEAiXEia. This reading would bring the passage in line with the most plausible reading of the earlier passage a t 1047a30: Aristotle sets down the word i v i p y E i a together with 6vTEAiXEia. This reading would not only fail t o support but would even contradict Heidegger’s interpretation of the relation between the two terms.

Given i ts slim, or only apparent, textual basis and, more importantly, its inability to make sense of Aristotle’s account of motion, Heidegger’s distinction between iv-rEAiXEia and ivipyEia must be rejected. But to reject this distinction is, as I have already suggested, to reject Heidegger’s thesis that being for the Greeks meant being-present and being-produced. To think ivTEAixEia and i v ipyEia in their synonymy, as Aristotle’s text demands , is to recognize, on the one hand, that ivTEAiXEia is activity, being-active, and not some static presence, that it is in its T ~ A O S by being an activity with its aim in itself and not by being f in i shed o r a t a n e n d ; and, on the other hand, t ha t iv ipyEia is activity but not Arbeit, not something unfinished. In other words, i t is to recognize tha t the distinction between Fertigsein and Unfertigsein is completely incapable of capturing what is meant by either ivTEAiXEia or i v ipyEia . What emerges from such reflection as the central characteristic of Being is not presence and not being-produced, but rather act.

As is clear from the passage cited above, with its characterization of Being as Hergestelltsein, Heidegger insists on making m o i q a i ~ and T ~ X V ~ the guiding and determining perspective in

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Aristotle’s account of Being. What reflection on the synonymy of ivTEhiXEia and 6vipyEia shows, however, is that it is -rrp6<1~, as sharply distinguished from -rroiqois and T ~ x v ~ , ~ ~ that is Aristotle’s guideline in the interpretation of Being. In other words, what we find in Aristotle is not a n ontology of production, as Heidegger insists, but rather what Paul Ricaeur has called an “ontology of action.”22 Specifically, this means that it is from the perspective of i v i p y E i a understood as -rrp661s tha t Aristotle interprets K ~ V ~ O I S and -rroiqois and not vice uersa. Nothing demonstrates this better than Heidegger’s complete failure to explain Aristotle’s account of K ~ V ~ O I S from the perspective of a conception of Being derived from production (Being as full presence, being-finished, being-at-an-end). I t is only from the perspective of act, or being-in-act, that we can explain Kivqois as the being-in-act of what is capable qua being capable.

The understanding of iv-rEhiXEia and i v ipyEia together as “act” also has important consequences for the understanding of the relation between being and time. In sharply distinguishing between iv-rEhiXEia and iv ipyEia by characterizing the former as meaning being-fully-present-now and the latter as meaning on-the-way-to-being-fully-present-now, Heidegger is attributing to Aristotle a conception of Being as, in the words cited above, “Hersein in Jetzt , in eine Gegenwart” (381). Being is thus understood within the horizon of a naive conception of time as a series of nows. But this is precisely the conception of time and being that is shattered by an understanding of ivTEhiXEIa and i v i p y E i a as synonyms. As Aristotle explicitly argues, while K ~ V ~ C S I S is in time, ivipyEia is in an important sense not in time (1174a14ff.l This means tha t while K ~ V ~ U I S , having i ts T ~ ~ O S

outside itself, takes time, is stretched out in time so as to be countable with respect to before and after, i v ipyEia , being its own T ~ ~ O S , does not have a “before” and an “after” since it is T ~ ~ E I O V “in whatever time” ( i v b ~ ~ o i j v x p 6 v y , 1174135-6).

But is not an ivipyEia then still in time in the sense of being complete in the moment, in the “now”? Here we need to be very careful. Aristotle indeed, after claiming tha t the activity of pleasure (fi6Eo9ai), unlike being moved (KivEioeai), need not occur in time, adds the following explanation: “For it is a whole in the now” ( ~ b y a p i v T@ vijv ohov T I , 1174b9). But does this mean-and this is the crucial question-that an i v i p y E i a is whole and complete in the “now” in the sense that a house, a t the end of the process of building, is whole and complete in the now? Can we speak in both cases of something f in ished , completed, and therefore present now? Can we, in short, reduce ivipyEia to the conception of Being that Heidegger attributes to Aristotle, a conception determined by the perspective of the “now,” the “present”?23

To see that these questions must be answered negatively, we need only consider the striking way in which Aristotle illus-

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trates the temporal difference between iv ipyEia and Kivqois in Metaphysics 0 6, 1048b18-35:24 while in the case of a K ~ V ~ C T I S

such as building I cannot say simultaneously ( a p a , Met. 1048b23) that I have built the house and that I am building the house, in the case of an ivipyEia such as seeing, I can say simultaneously that I am seeing and that I have seen. In short, in a K ~ V ~ O I ~ , the present tense excludes the past perfect tense and vice versa:25 that something cannot be what it is becoming, this opposition between being and becoming, is precisely what it means to exist in time. But how then can ivEpyEia simultaneously admit both the past perfect and the present tense, how can i t overcome their opposition and thereby not exist in time?

Through careful reflection on what Aristotle says here we can avoid the mistake mentioned above: to see i v i p y E i a as differing from KivqaiS only in being finished, completed in the present moment would be t o identify i t with the past perfect tense, thus locating i t , like the house that has been built, in time (and, we could add, in mot ion, as the completion or finishing of motion). In this case, i v ipyEia would differ from K ~ V ~ O I ~ in that, while K ~ V T ~ I S can admit only the present active tense, i v i p y E i a would admit only the past perfect: i v i p y E i a would, like the house that has been built, exclude the present active tense.26 But this of course is not what Aristotle says. To claim, as he does, that ivipyEia admits simultaneously both the present and the past perfect tenses is to put i t completely outside the distinction between being-unfinished and being- finished, a distinction that, after all, has meaning only in time. If the same thing can simultaneously be seeing and have seen (aHa ~b a h 6 , 1048b33-44),27 this is because seeing is always complete without ever being f in ished . I can of course stop seeing, but this is not to finish seeing.28 To describe my seeing, or another iv ipyEia , as in itself finished or unfinished, makes no sense at all.

To say that seeing, and i v ipyEia as such, does not exist in time and transcends the opposition between the past perfect and the present tense is to say that it cannot be located in any present , not even in an eternal present. “I have seen and a m seeing” cannot be reduced t o “I am seeing, I am seeing, I am seeing, ad infinitum.” We have here neither a stat ic eternal repetition o f the same nor a process: we have a n activity, an ivipyEia, which as such is not in time in the sense that it exists neither in a series of moments nor in one moment of this series; if this iv ipyEia that simultaneously is and has been exists as a whole “in the now,” this “now” cannot be a point, but must rather be a n uncountable stretch, a time outside of time understood as the counting of motion. In short, iv ipyEia differs from K ~ V ~ O I S in being complete; but i v i p y E i a also differs from the product of K ~ V I - ~ I ~ (e.g., the built house) in never being finished; I have seen but am also s i m ~ l t a n e o u s l y ~ ~ still seeing. This is

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precisely the mystery of ivipyEia that puts it completely beyond the realm of K ~ V ~ O I ~ and I T O I ~ ~ I ~ : i t is active without being in motion; it is complete without being finished; it is now and not now, present and not present; temporal and yet outside of time.30

What is arguably the key example Aristotle uses in Meta- physics 0 6 is life itself.31 While it is not possible simultaneously to be moving and have moved, since these are different ( ~ T E ~ O V , 1048b32-33), i t is the same to be l iv ing and have lived (1048b27). Though life is complete, it is never completed; in its very completeness, in i t s very having lived, i t is always a present tense verb: living. Life of course can “cease” with death, but as Aristotle explicitly says, it can never come to a stop (TOTE TraLjEoOai, 1048b26-27). Also, a dead person cannot strictly be described as having lived (perfect tense), but only as someone who once lived (imperfect tense). Having lived is possible only in living and living is possible only in having lived. In this way life itself is not in time, that is, cannot be located anywhere on the continuum of counted time, neither in any present now nor in any sequence of present nows. As thus characterized, the iv-rE?dXEia of life can be identified neither with being-at-work, which implies working-towards-a-goal and thus not having yet l i ved , nor with being-at-an-end and being-at-hand, which implies no longer living. In other words, life that is at work has not yet lived, while life that is at hand is dead.

These brief reflections on Aristotle’s fundamental concepts of iv-rEhiXEia and ivipyEia should suffice to show that Heidegger’s interpretation of these concepts is not only wrong but disas- trously wrong.32 In being sharply distinguished from each other, both concepts are distorted beyond recognition. I t is at this cost that Heidegger reads into Aristotle a conception of Being as Being-present. I t is at this cost tha t he transforms into an ontology of Vorhandenheit what is an ontology of npLi€,is in which the highest and most genuine being is, despite being “unmoved,” or rather because “unmoved,” characterized as life (<mi) and pleasure CfiSopfi, Met. 10721316 and 26-30), thinking (vdqois) and nothing but thinking (v6qois v o j o ~ m s , Met . 1074b34-35). Though Heidegger does not discuss the unmoved mover in SS 1924, in an earlier course on Aristotle from SS 1922 he appears, according to the transcript of Helene WeilJ, to have recognized the problem that the unmoved mover posed for his interpretation: “But how can it be pure iv ipyEia despite its being ~ ~ K ~ V ~ T O V ? Must there then be an opposition [Gegensatz] between K ~ V ~ C J I S and ivipyEia? (GA 62, 321). His reply is simply to assert dogmatically that i v i p y a a is to be determined from the perspective of motion and is itself a type of motion: “1. The meaning of i v i p y E i a ” determines itself purely from the phenomenon of motion. 2. What it is, what type of motion: that too is a consequence of the meaning of pure movedness

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[Bewegtheitl” (321). In a course from SS 1926 a different, and even opposed, “solution” is suggested: “No a-rihqs, no ~ i v q o i s , but pure i v i p y E i a , pure energy [reine Energiel, that is, pure self- standing constant presence from out of itself [reine eigenstandige standige Anwesenheit uon i h m selbst her]” (GA 22, 178; see also 328). The above analysis and critique has shown tha t everything is lost in the move signaled by the seemingly innocent and inconspicuous “that is.” Just a little later in the same text iv ipyEia is characterized as the “highest form of being-at-hand (hochste Art des Vorhandenseins)” (180), which would make the unmoved mover something a t hand in the highest sense because eternally-at-hand. The being of the unmoved mover would thus not essentially differ from the being of an eternal, indestructible rock. In this reduction of the being of the first being to Vorhandenheit, the life and activity that are both the heart and head of Aristotle’s ontology are completely lost.33

2.

We can turn now to a consideration of two important later texts on Aristotle already cited above: the 1931 course on Metaphysics 0 1-3 and the 1939 essay “Vom Wesen und Begriff der Q3ois.” While Heidegger in these texts builds on and further carries out his reading of ivTEAiXEia and i v i p y E i a , we will see tha t his interpretation undergoes no fundamental transformation. These la ter interpretations will instead make even clearer the limitations of Heidegger’s interpretative framework and thus the need to free Aristotle’s ontology from this framework. As the above reflections have already suggested, what is at issue here is not primarily the reliability of Heidegger as an interpreter of Greek texts nor even the “correct” reading of Aristotle; what is a t issue is i v i p y E i a itself, as the word for a possibility of thinking that is arguably still unexplored and that, while still alive in Aristotle’s texts, is suppressed by Heidegger’s reading of these texts.

The 1931 course is primarily devoted to Aristotle’s concept of 6 3 v a H I S . However, in Heidegger’s interpretation of chapter three of Metaphysics 0, the chapter in which Aristotle critiques the Megarian identification of 63vapiS with i v i p y E i a , the latter notion is necessarily at issue. Furthermore, a brief consideration of this par t of the course will show tha t Heidegger’s reading does as much violence to the notion of Grjvapis as it does t o the notion of i v i p y E i a , and again with the aim of identifying the Greek conception of being with presence-at- hand. That this is indeed Heidegger’s aim can be shown through a brief summary of his overall interpretation of 0 3. The central question at issue in this chapter, according to Heidegger, is how 60vapiS is at-hand (vorhanden). The thesis of the Megarians is that a 66vapis is present at-hand only when it

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is being exercised, that is, only in 6vipyEia. Heidegger insists repeatedly that this Megarian thesis is to be taken very seriously and is even a pinnacle of Greek thought. Its powerful justification is that only in 6vipyEia does a WvaviS show itself, offer a “look” (Anblick), announce its presence (GA 33, 179-80; see also 183). In other words, the Megarians claim that 66vavis is a t hand only in M p y E i a because it is only in the process of production, and especially in the final product, that a G6vaviS comes into full presence. But then the conception of being that comes to expression in the Megarian thesis is the Greek conception of being as Hergestelltheit and Anwesenheit. Thus the Megarian thesis, Heidegger asserts, is “conceived in a good Greek manner [gut griechisch gedachtl; indeed, not only that, but i t is-right up t o the new step Aristotle takes-the only possible interpretation of the being-at-hand of a capability” (180).

If the Megarians are only giving voice, with great consis- tency and insight, to the Greek conception of being, then isn’t Aristotle, through his critique of the Megarians, bringing this conception into question? As the passage just cited indicates, Heidegger grants Aristotle a modification of this conception of being as presence, but not a radical departure. Indeed, Heidegger asserts emphatically that Aristotle and the Megarians are in complete agreement (sich ganz daruber einig) in understanding being as presence (179). Thus Heidegger even suggests that the Megarian thesis might have been provoked by Aristotle’s failure to explain the being-at-hand of 60vaviS (169) or his dogmatic assumption that this question was already resolved (175). What Aristotle does achieve in chapter 3 is to show a way in which G6vavis can be present without being 6vipyEia: namely, by being had. The having of 66vayiS is still a certain kind of presence of 66vapis. Whether or not Heidegger thought Aristotle’s response to the Megarians was adequate-the Megarians could, after all, insist that the GrjvapiS is really had only in actual exercise, in WpyEia-is not clear since the course comes to an abrupt end before Heidegger’s reading of Metaphysics 0 3 is completed. We can presume, however, that he would not consider fully adequate any response that was still locked within a conception of being as presence, as Aristotle’s supposedly was. Heidegger can thus maintain that the Megarians, despite the injustice history has done them, were of an equal stature with Plato and Aristotle (“hatten ... den gleichen Rang,” 163); they were, after all, more consistently Greek!

It is not possible here to go into all the details of Heidegger’s reading of Metaphysics 0 3, a reading that without question offers some rich philosophical rewards. Instead, only one fundamental question will be posed to this reading: is it really “indisputable” (unbestreitbar, 170-711, as Heidegger asserts, that the question a t issue in 0 3 is how 6 6 v a v i s can be

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vorhanden and therefore, given the supposedly Greek conception of Being, how it can be present? First, it needs to be noted that Heidegger’s thesis that Aristotle and the Megarians shared the same conception of being as presence and therefore could disagree only about how 6 3 v a p i s is present is asserted categorically towards the beginning of the reading and is never demonstra ted . In other words, i t is a presupposit ion of the reading, not its result. However, Heidegger does a number of things to make the text fit this assumption. It is by showing the arbitrariness and untenability of these interpretative moves tha t I hope t o show tha t 0 3 has nothing t o do with the Vorhandenheit or Anwesenheit of Girvapis, and for the simple reason that for Aristotle a 63vapiS is not something “present” or “at hand.”

The view Aristotle attributes to the Megarians in the very first line of the chapter, and the view that he spends the rest of the chapter challenging, is: “o-rav h p y i j p6vov 6 3 v a d a i ” : “when something is active only then is i t capable.” I t seems from this tha t the Megarians are making a claim about the capability of capability: a capability is a capability only in i ts exercise; t o be capable is actively to be capable, that is, t o be acting. Yet consider Heidegger’s “translation” of the Greek: “When a power is at work, only then is the having-power-for at hand [vorhandenl” (167). With this translation the question becomes not how a capability is a capability, not how what is capable is capable, but how a capability is vorhanden. But there is in the Greek nothing corresponding to “vorhanden”! Heidegger takes care of this problem by adding to the text some new Greek, some Greek of his own making. After citing the Greek tha t is actually in the text, Heidegger adds: “ that is, 6 3 v a p i v \ jnapxEiv” (167). I t is now this added Greek tha t Heidegger can translate as “66vapis is vorhanden.”

But does this really make an important difference? Is not (‘the being-at-hand of capability” just a different way of saying “being-capable” ( 6 3 v a o e a i ) ? Most certainly not. To substitute “the being-at-hand of capability” for “being-capable” is t o subordinate and even reduce “being-capable” t o a different sense of being: “being vorhanden,” which is then later transformed, through the alchemy of Heidegger’s undefended thesis concerning the Greek conception of being, into “being present.” Heidegger would of course claim that the Greeks are the ones who reduce all senses of being, including being-capable, t o presence. But the irony is tha t Heidegger can maintain this thesis only by himself introducing “presence” and “being-at- hand” into the text. Neither a t the beginning of Metaphysics 0 3, nor anywhere in the course of 0 3, is the presence or being-at- hand of 63vapiS at issue, or even mentioned.

Furthermore, the dispute between the Megarians and Aristotle can be naturally interpreted with no reference t o

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Vorhandenheit or Anwesenhei t . What the Megarians and Aristotle do agree on is that GhapiS is not mere possibility, but a positive capability, a power (Kraft in Heidegger’s defensible translation). The Megarian objection is that power is power only in being exercised and tha t therefore 66vapiS and i v i p y E i a cannot be distinguished. That this is a sensible objection-the Megarians, as Heidegger insists, were no fools-is shown by the fact that Aristotle himself in De Anima characterizes knowledge that is possessed without being exercised both as an 6vTEAiXEia (412a21-27) and as a GhapiS (417a26-28): it is an 6v-rEhiXEia in contrast to the mere potential for acquiring knowledge possessed by a certain genus or matter; i t is a GhapiS in contrast t o the actual exercise of knowledge. Thus, even for Aristotle, G6vapiS in the strongest sense of the word, that is, when understood not as a mere potent ial (as in a human embryo having the potential to learn mathematics) but as a positive capability, is i v i p y ~ i a . ~ ~ However, what he must argue in 0 3 is that despite this unity of GrjvapiS and ivipyEia, their distinctness must be preserved if what only their distinctness can explain is to be preserved: namely, not only motion, but even the independence of the external world in its relation to us (since this requires a distinction between what is perceived and what is perceivable). The argument, thus plausibly interpreted, has nothing to do with the being-at-hand or presence of GitvapiS; what is at issue is only GhapiS as 6 3 v a p i ~ . ~ ~

As already noted, Heidegger argues that Aristotle explains the presence-at-hand of 60vapiS by interpreting the being of 63vapiS as being-had. “Aristotle sees the presence of 63vapis as such in EXEIV; what is had, is in possession and as possessed usable, at hand” (183). One sees clearly in this sentence why Heidegger is insisting that Aristotle understood the being of GdvapiS as being-had: i t is in this way that Aristotle can be made to conform to the supposedly Greek conception of being as what is produced and thus present for use, a t hand. But what is the evidence that Aristotle understood the being of 66vapis in this way? Heidegger can appeal only to Aristotle’s habit, in this text and elsewhere, of using the phrase G h a p i v EXEIV as a synonym for the verb GhaoBai . But does Aristotle’s use of the common Greek idiom of “having a G h a p i ~ ” really show that he located the being of 66vapiS in h ~ v i n g ? ~ ~ T o believe this one must a t least already be convinced tha t in 0 3 Aristotle is seeking to explain how GhapiS is present and at hand-how else than a s had?-and even then one should pause before reading so much into one word. In any case, we have seen that there is no reason to believe this is Aristotle’s goal in the text.

We also need t o note how philosophically questionable Heidegger’s method of proceeding here is. He is reducing GirvaoBai to Girvapiv EXEIV and then reading out of the verb EXEIV, instead of the verb GhaoBai, the meaning of being that is

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operative here. Aristotle, who knows better, insists that being- capable and having are two fundamentally distinct senses of being: the latter is one of the categories (Cat . lb27, 2a3), while the former is distinct from all being in the sense of the categories (Met. E 2 1026a33-b2; Met. 0 1 1045b27-35).37 And Aristotle in the present text has been seen to be faithful to his principle: he discusses being-capable in terms of being-capable and not in terms of any other sense of being. 61jvapiv E X E W must be interpreted as another and looser way of saying 81jvaoOa1, not vice versa.38

If Heidegger’s reading can so far be said to have “forced” the text, this is nothing compared to what he does to the sentence a t 1047a20-24. Here Aristotle, defending the distinctness of b 1 j v a ~ t S and i v i p y E i a , says what anyone except Heidegger would translate as follows: “So it can happen that something is capable of being something (61jvaT6v T I Eivai) without being i t , and capable of not being something (bvva-rbv pi Eivai) while being i t . . . .” This is how Heidegger translates: “So it can happen tha t something a s capable of something indeed really i s [wirklich istl and a t the same time is yet not really tha t of which this real capability as such is capable, and i t can also happen tha t something capable as a capability is not really [nicht wirklich ist] and yet precisely is really that of which it is capable” (215). Why the tortuous and even painful circum- locution? What Heidegger is trying to do is transform the “capability of being” at issue in the text into the “being of capability”; even more bizarrely, he is “paraphrasing” the “capability of not being” as the “not-being of a capability as a capability.” Here refutation seems superfluous, for why point out what any beginning student of Greek knows: tha t “63vaT6v TI Eivai” means “capable of being something” and not “something capable really is”; that “bvva-rov p i Eivai” means “capable of not being” and not “something capable is not really”? The important question is why Heidegger, who certainly knows his Greek well enough t o see that , would willfully so distort the text. The answer is simple: only through such a distortion can Heidegger force through his thesis that what is at issue in the text is the Vorhandenheit and Anwesenheit of capability. Aristotle speaks of being-capable, but Heidegger needs him t o speak of the being-present o r being-at-hand of capability. The violence tha t this requires is especially evident in Heidegger’s translation of Aristotle’s example: “Being capable of walking and not walking” (bvva-rbv PaGiSEiv o v p i PabiSEiv) becomes “what is capable-of-walking is really a being (at-hand) and yet does not walk in reality” (215)! That Heidegger must resort here to such impossible readings of the Greek only confirms what has been clear from the beginning: there is in Metaphysics 0 3 no ta lk of the being-present or being-at-hand of a capability, but only of being-capable (of being x) where this is not

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reduced, and cannot be reduced, to any kind of being-present or being-at-hand.

Yet Heidegger tries again when he turns to the definition or characterization of being-capable Aristotle provides at 1047a24- 26. The meaning of this sentence is unclear and disputed, but the Greek itself is not especially difficult and can be translated thus: “Something is capable [EOTI 86 8uvaTbv TOGTO] if, when the iv ipyEia of which it is said to have the GGvaviS occurs in it, there will be nothing incapable [obOiv EoTai aGirva~ov1 .” The problem this sentence poses for interpretation is its apparent circularity: it appears to be saying that something is capable when it is not incapable. One common expedient for remedying this problem is t o give the defining phrase “not aG\jvaTov” a completely different meaning from that of the word GuvaTbv tha t is being defined: “GuvaTbv” is taken to mean “capable,” while “not aG\jva-rov” is taken to mean “not logically impossible.” The sense would then be that something is capable when there is no logical impossibility in its having the corresponding i v i p y ~ i a . ~ ~ Yet this expedient, which involves giving two occur- rences of the same word in the same sentence two radically different meanings, is highly questionable and Heidegger is right to reject it.

Furthermore, the expedient is not necessary since sense can be made of the sentence without it, especially when i t is not seen as representing a strict definition. Given the context, the task of the sentence can be taken to be this: to show the insep- arability of G h a p i c from iv ipyEia , and thus acknowledge what t ruth there is in the Megarian objection, while nevertheless showing their distinctness and preserving the autonomy and irreducibility of being-capable. We can identify something as capable only when in exercise o r activity i t proves not incapable. For example, someone cannot be said to be capable of playing chess unless an actual chess game finds him not incapable of playing chess. This means that a Girvavis indeed cannot be identified o r defined without the corresponding i v i p y E i a . So far the Megarians have a point. But Aristotle’s statement also maintains the distinctness of 6 3 v a p i S and i v i p y E i a . I t does not say simply tha t something is GuvaTov when it is in ivipyEia, but rather when in ivipyEia it proves not aGirva-rov. i v i p y E i a is not G h a v i S , but rather the site where 6 6 v a p i 5 shows itself as GirvapiS. Here being-capable still remains distinct from that in which i t shows itself not incapable. Whatever circularity there is in Aristotle’s statement is intentional and unavoidable: being-capable can ultimately be explained only in terms of being-capable (or not being incapable) because it cannot be reduced to any other kind of being: neither being in ivipyEia nor, much less, being in any other sense.

What has been sketched out here is of course not Heidegger’s reading. This is because, in order to make the sentence fit his

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interpretation of 0 3, he must insist that it is not about being- capable, but rather about the being-present or being-at-hand of capability. To push through this reading, Heidegger must again read the Greek in his own inimitable manner. The word EOTI in the opening phrase “ Z O T I 86 8 u v a - h TOGTO ...” does not mean, Heidegger insists, “being-capable” “Vermogendsein” (220). He insists on this because he needs the EOTI to mean “is present at hand.” Thus, on his reading, “ZOTI 86 8uvaTov TOGTO ...” means not “this is capable,” but rather: “this capable is present at hand.” Heidegger actually expresses surprise that his reading “is in all interpretations and translations-as far as I know- completely missed,” and continues tha t as a result “every prospect of understanding the definition is from the very beginning pushed aside” (220). The phrase “EOTI 8i 8uvaTbv” must be understood as “the capable is present at hand” because the task of the entire chapter is “to determine in what the being of the capable, its reality-the Eivai of the immediately preceding sentence-consists” (220). That this is the task of the chapter, however, has been seen to be Heidegger’s own invention and one sustained only at the cost of the kind of rewriting and mis- reading of the text which we see again here and saw at its most outlandish in the reading of Eivai at 1047a20-24 to which Heidegger now refers.

I t is perhaps precisely in order t o preempt such criticism that Heidegger states the following a little earlier in the course.

When we in the process go beyond what Aristotle says, this is not in order to make what is said there better and the like, but a t first only in order to understand it a t all; here, the manner and form of expression in which Aristotle on his side may have carried out the considerations tha t a re necessary here is a mat ter of complete indifference [ganzlich gleichgiiltig] . (192)

One can certainly agree tha t an interpretation needs to go beyond what is said while yet strongly objecting to the suggestion that Aristotle’s own manner and form of expression are a matter of complete indifference! The la t ter a re especially important when what is at issue is Aristotle’s implicit understanding of being. What has been seen again and again is that while Aristotle speaks only of being-capable in terms of being- capable, Heidegger repeatedly ignores, changes, o r distorts Aristotle’s form of expression in order to make him speak of being-present and being-at-hand.

The last part of the 1931 course that needs to be considered in the present context is Heidegger’s return, immediately before the course abruptly ends, to 1047a30-32, and thus to the question of the relation between iv ipyEia and ivTEhiXEia. One departure from the reading in 1924 is that Heidegger now does not emend the text but reads auv-riBEpivq, perhaps because he

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had by this point consulted Ross’s ~ o m m e n t a r y . ~ ~ However, his view concerning the distinction between i v i p y a a and ivTEhiXEia does not appear to change. He translates even the unemended text as follows: “Being-at-work [Am-Werke-seinl , a meaning that is in itself directed at [ausgerichtet is t aufl ivTEAiXEia.” Furthermore, Heidegger’s comments explain the meaning of ivTEhiXEia thus: “the end, possessing perfection as something carried out, holding itself in it-most precisely: being-produced [Hergestelltseinl” (224). What remains the same here is therefore the interpretation of i v ipye ia and ivTEhiXEia from the perspective of Herstellen, and therefore from the perspective of ~roiqois ra ther than ~rpac is , with the result tha t the one becomes “being-at-work” ( A m - W e r l ~ e - S e i n ) ~ ~ and the other becomes “being-produced” (Hergestelltheit). What has already been shown to be the main problem with such an interpretation is made clear when Heidegger in this course, after making the perhaps acceptable claim that Girvapis and iv ipyEia are essentially related to ~ i v q o i ~ , goes further and claims that they are “ways of being-in-motion” (“Weisen des In-Bewegung-seins,” 216). This is the fundamental mistake: as argued above, Gfivapis and i v i p y E i a are not ways of being in motion42 and therefore a fortiori certainly cannot be interpreted in terms of producing and being-produced.

Aristotle himself makes this clear when at the very beginning of Metaphysics 0 he tells us that, while he will begin with the most common sense of 6irvavis, which is 6fivapiS in relation to motion, this sense is not what he needs for his present aim (oir piv xpqo ipq y ’ i o ~ i mpbs 6 pouh6pEBa v h , 1045b36-1046a1). Why? Because Gfivavis and i v i p y E i a go beyond, o r are more than ( h i ~ l h i o v ) , the GirvapiS and i v i p y E i a said according to motion ( K a T a ~ i v q o i v , 1046a1-2). Predictably, Heidegger’s reading of this passage does everything possible to reinstate motion as the essential and unsurpassable guiding perspective, despite what Aristotle says. Thus Heidegger asserts: “When accordingly in our treatise the theme of investigation should become 6irvapis and i v i p y e i a h i mhiov this does not rule out that ~ i v q o i s nevertheless remains in view; on the contrary: i t must remain in view, but not K a T a ~ i v q o i v (54). Therefore Heidegger resorts to the extraordinary expedient, grounded on nothing in the text, of characterizing 6irvapiS and iv ipyEia i d I T ~ ~ O V as KaTa K I V ~ ~ E O S , that is, he simply changes the accusa- tive to the genitive and thus retains motion as the determining perspective for even 6irvapis and iv ipyEia h i ~ r h i o v (53). This opens the door to characterizing later in the course the 66vapiS ,and iv ipyEia that “go beyond” what is said according to motion .as nevertheless ways of motion and moments of production, in flagrant contradiction to what Aristotle himself claims to U ~ a n t . ” 4 3 In short, what we see in the 1931 course is a n un- warranted and violent reduction not only of i v i p y E i a and

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iv-rEhiXEia, but now also of Girvapis, to a conception of being as presence and being-produced which, judging from all the evidence, is not Aristotle’s, but Heidegger’~.~~

3.

The interpretation of ivipyEia and ivTEhiXEia in the 1939 essay, “Vom Wesen und Begriff der Q)iro~s,” departs from the earlier interpretations of 1924 and 1931 in no longer making a sharp distinction between the two concepts. Is this because Heidegger is now closer to understanding them both together as a kind of activity or act distinct both from motion and from what is produced, at-an-end, completed? That this is not the case is evident from the fact that his characterization of iv-rEAiXEia has not changed: i t is still “Sich-im-Ende-Haben” (354). What has happened is only that iv ipyEia has now been brought into line with this interpretation, being no longer interpreted as being- at-work (In-Arbei t -Sein or Am- Werke-Sein) but rather as standing-in-the-work: “Im-Werk-Stehen; das Werk als das, was voll im ‘Ende’ steht”, where “das Werk is also understood “in the sense of what is to be produced and is produced [im Sinne des Herzustellenden und Her-gestellten]” (354). We thus see that nothing essential has changed in Heidegger’s interpretation: we have the same interpretation of i v i p y E i a and ivTEhiXEia in terms of production (Herstellen) and thus the same ignoring of the fundamental distinction between kvipyeia and K ~ V ~ O I S ; the only change is that now both i v i p y E i a and iv-rEhiXEia are identified with the product, the result, the “end” or “completion” of this process of production. In other words, the only change is an even greater eclipse of i v i p y E i a as

In an important passage of the Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle asserts in no ambiguous terms: “It is evident that i v i p y E i a becomes [ y i v ~ ~ a i l and is not a t hand like some possession [oirx ir-rrapx~i Bo.r r~p ~ ~ i j p 6 TI]” (NE 1169b29-30). It is as if Aristotle were here anticipating Heidegger’s misinterpretation and objecting to it. While Aristotle insists that i v i p y E i a is activity, even a t the cost of giving the equally erroneous impression that it is “becoming” in the sense in which motion is, Heidegger is determined to reduce its way of being to that of something produced and possessed.

We can therefore expect that the interpretation Heidegger proceeds to give of Aristotle’s definition of motion in the 1939 essay, like the account he initially gave in the SS 1924 course, will turn it into a definition of rest. This is indeed not only what happens, but Heidegger makes this consequence of his interpretation quite explicit. So many momentous and questionable moves take place in his brief interpretation of 1939 that , without the preparation provided by a reading of the SS 1924

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course discussed above, it must leave one completely bewildered. Consider first his translation of Aristotle’s definition of motion :as stated at Physics 201134-5: “The having-itself-in-its-end [Das 1Sich-im-Ende-Habenl by that which is apt [geeignetl insofar as i t is ap t ( tha t is, in i t s aptness) is clearly ( the essence of) rnovedness [Bewegtheitl” (355). The obvious objection to this translatiodinterpretation is that an ability that has reached its end, that has itself in its end, is no longer in motion, but rather i3t rest. The unprepared reader must assume tha t Heidegger cannot possibly mean what he says. How could he be defining motion as an ability’s fulfillment in i ts final end o r product when this would instead be the end (in both senses of the word) of motion?

That this, however, is exactly what Heidegger is doing is shown not only by the preceding interpretation of iv ipyaa cited above, but by the example with which he grounds and prepares his interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of motion.

The transformation [Umschlagenl of the apt wood into a table consists in this: that the aptness of the apt emerges more and more fully, fulfilling itself in the look [Aussehen] of the table and thus coming to a stand in the table produced, i.e., brought-into- the-unconcealed. In the resting of this stand (of what has come to a s tand) the emerging aptness (63vavis ) of the apt ( 6 u v a ~ ~ i ) gathers and “has” itself as in its end. (355)

It is thus clear that Heidegger means exactly what one otherwise would think he could not mean: t ha t what Aristotle’s definition of motion is describing is how the apt or capable has-itself-as-in-its-end in the sense of having-come-to-a-stand und being-at-rest in what is produced. But this is not motion. As Aristotle insists, motion, far from standing-at-its-end, is essentially ~ T E A ~ s .

Indeed, but this is why Heidegger is careful to remove motion as the object of Aristotle’s definition; on his interpretation1 paraphrase, what is being defined is not motion, but “movedness.” On the preceding page Heidegger has distinguished between motion (Bewegung) and movedness (Bewegtheit), characterizing the la t ter as the “essence” (Wesen) of the former (354). Heidegger’s paraphrase removes Aristotle’s definition even further from the sphere of motion by making its object not only “movedness,” but “the essence of movedness.” Of course, the essence of motion, and a fortiori the essence of the essence of motion, is not motion. Indeed, Heidegger argues, the essence of motion, movedness in the highest and most genuine sense, is rest (Ruhigkeit, 354). And it is precisely this rest, as the essence olf movedness, that Aristotle’s ostensible definition of motion is dlefining. Therefore, when Heidegger does mention the kind of K ~ V ~ O I S tha t is ~ T E A ~ S and tha t is distinct from rest , he

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describes it as a “narrower” sense of K ~ V T ~ I S , that is, narrower than, and distinct from, the K ~ V ~ O I S defined by Aristotle a t 201b4.

This interpretation of Aristotle’s definition is, unfortunately for Heidegger and fortunately for the future of philosophy, completely untenable. The motion that Aristotle’s definition attempts to define is beyond question the motion that is ~ I T E A ~ s and that is distinct from rest. To show this one need only cite a passage which has already been partly quoted above; it is also a passage out of which Heidegger in the 1939 text cites only one sentence, since citing the context would spell disaster for his interpretation. The passage reads:

Its appearing indefinite [ ~ ~ ~ I O T O V ] is the reason why motion can be classed among beings neither as GirvaHiS nor as ivfpyEia. For nei ther t ha t which is capable of being of a certain quant i ty [rroaov] nor tha t which is in actuality of a certain quantity is necessarily moved. And K ~ V T ~ C S I ~ seems on the one hand to be a kind of ivfpyEia and on the other to be ~ T E A I ~ ~ ; the cause of its being ~ T E A I ~ ~ is the capable of which it is the ivCpyEia. And this is the reason why i t is hard t o grasp what motion is .... What remains is the way suggested above, i.e., that it [motion] is a kind of i v f p y a a , but the kind we said it was [i.e., the ivipyEia of what is capable qua capable], one indeed hard to see, but nevertheless capable of being. (Phys. 201b27-202a3)

This passage makes clear that the aim of Aristotle’s definition of K ~ V Q O I S is precisely to explain i ts ~ I T E A ~ ~ and indefinite character, that is, that which prevents i t from being defined either as simply GirvapiS or as simply 6vipyEia. This problem is of course left completely unresolved if Aristotle’s definition is interpreted as being a definition not of ~ I T E A ~ s K ~ V ~ O I S at all, but rather of a rest and standing-in-the-end that are supposed to be the essence of motion.

Why does Heidegger misinterpret Aristotle’s definition of ~ I T E A ~ ~ K ~ V ~ O I S as a definition of rest in the sense of having- come-to-a-stand-in-the-work (or product)? He must do so because only a t this price can his characterizations of ivTEAiXEia as das Sich-im-Ende-Haben and of 6vipyEia as Im- WerkStehen be upheld. In other words, only at this price can he persist in denying 6vipyEia and iv-rEAiXEia the meaning of “act” or “activity” as distinct from K ~ V I - ~ I S . And note the significant lesson here: it is precisely the failure t o distinguish i v ipyEia and 6vTEhiXEia from K ~ V ~ O I S and the product of K ~ V ~ O I S that renders K ~ V Q O I S undefinable and inexplicable. But there is a further question: why does Heidegger persist in his fundamentally inadequate interpretation of ivipyEia and ivTEAiXEia? The answer has already become apparent: only in this way can Heidegger maintain his thesis that for the Greeks being meant

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producedness (Hergestelltheit) and presence. And it is indeed this thesis that Heidegger pulls out of his interpretation of the definition of motion, in a move that has become as stale and as predictable as the trick of pulling a rabbit out of a hat: “The having-itself-in-its-end (ivTEhiXEia) is, however, the essence of movedness (that is, the being of what is moved) because this rest [Ruhigkeit] satisfies most purely the essence of oGcsia, of the self-standing presencing in the look [der in sich standigen Anwesung im Aussehen]” (356) . Because Aristotle must a priori have had a conception of being a s visible presence (Aussehen) , the object of Aristotle’s definition must be transformed from ~ X T E ~ T ~ S K ~ V T J O I S into rest46 and from something “hard to see” into a stable and unchanging object of vision.47 But tha t this thesis regarding the Greek interpretation of Being can once again be maintained only a t the cost of misinterpretation and even inversion of what Aristotle says should be sufficient reason to reject it once and for all in favor of liberating the very different direction in which the texts can guide our thinking.

Heidegger could still be correct in maintaining that ordinary Greeks had an interpretation of being as “constant presence” born of the anxiety that what is would cease to be present (see GA 18, 289-90, 297, 367; also 353). Since this fear, however, can probably with equal justice be attributed to the ancient Egyptians and Chinese, as well as modern day Americans and Russians, rather than speak of a metaphysics of presence as a historical phenomenon beginning with the Greeks, we should probably instead see such a metaphysics as characterizing any immediate, unreflective experience of the world: a fear of insecurity and instability that leads to an identification of what is with what is had in such a way that it cannot be taken away, .what is possessed securely. In contrast, i t may belong to the essence of all philosophy, including tha t of the Greeks, to destroy this security and challenge all naive metaphysics of ,presence, to expose the indeterminate, potential, and kinetic character of being. I t is perhaps only in the modern period that ]philosophy ceases t o do that, and then because its essence is determined from without itself, t ha t is, by mathematical science. But whatever interpretation we wish to put in its place, the conclusion remains tha t Heidegger’s interpretation of ,4ristotle cannot stand.

This critique in no way means to deny the great importance of Heidegger for an understanding of the Greeks: in carrying out a continuous and intense dialogue with the Greeks, IHeidegger has enabled them to speak to us to today with extraordinary power, relevance, and immediacy. Through Heidegger we learn to engage the Greek thinkers, not with the self-com- placency of the historian who charts their primitive antici- pations of contemporary wisdom, but rather with the respect

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of philosophers convinced t h a t we can never escape the immense shadow of the Greek beginning and that philosophy can have no future outside of a constant dialogue with this beginning. Yet it is no denial of this debt owed Heidegger to suggest tha t some, and perhaps the most important, possibilities for future thought locked in the ancient Greek texts can be liberated only against Heidegger; on the contrary, those who simply repeat Heidegger’s reading of the Greeks are doing both Heidegger and the Greeks the greatest disservice. Since Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greeks is inseparable from his own path of thinking, we must ask if his misinterpretation of Aristotle’s fundamental concepts turned him aside too soon from a barely explored road at the beginning of the metaphysical tradition. What possibilities were missed in Heidegger’s insistent reduction of the Greek conception of being to presence, a reduction that required interpreting Greek ontology from the perspective of noiqois, instead of from the perspective of np&E,is and ivkpyEia? What is lost in reducing K ~ V ~ C S I S to rest, in failing to preserve its ontological distinctness in contrast to rest?48 The present critique of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle gives a special urgency to a question posed by Paul Ricceur: “One can in the end ask oneself if Heidegger perceived the hidden resources of a philosophy of being that would replace the transcendental of substance with that of act, as a phenomenology of acting and suffering demands.”49 I t is difficult at this point to resist the conclusion that this is precisely what Heidegger failed to perceive.50

Notes

Cited i n Dominique Jan icaud , Heidegger en France 1. Recit (Paris: Albin Michel, 20011, 470-1.

“Confronting Heidegger on Logos and Being in Plato’s Sophist,” in Platon und Aristoteles - sub ratione veritatis: Festschrift fur Wolfgang Wieland zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. by Gregor Damschen, Rainer Enskat, and Alejandro G. Vigo (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 20031,

Gesamtausgabe 18 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002); hereafter, cited in t h e text a s G A 18, followed by t h e page number.

Gesamtausgabe 33, 2nd ed. ( F r a n k f u r t a m Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990); hereafter, cited in the text as GA 33, followed by the page number.

Wegmarken (Frankfurt a m Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 19671,

A discussion of these texts , with t h e exception of t h e 1924 course then unavailable, is to be found in Franco Volpi, Heidegger e Aristotele (Padova: Daphne Editrice, 1984), 172-203. Volpi’s quick run-through, however, goes little beyond paraphrase and quotation a n d cer ta inly makes no a t t e m p t to judge crit ically Heidegger’s interpretations.

102-33.

309-71.

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Heidegger is reported in the Brocker Nachschrift of the SS 1926 course, Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie, as saying: “Die ivipyEia stellt die hochste Art des Seins dar, die der oiraia zukommt” (Gesamtausgabe 22 [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 19931, 331; hereafter, cited in the text as G A 22, followed by the page number). Jean Beaufret attributes to Heidegger a t Cerisy in 1955 the claim tha t i v i p y E i a is “la plus haute nomination de l’&tre qu’ait jamais Osee la philosophie des Anciens” (Dialogue auec Heidegger - Philosophie Grecque [Paris: gditions de Minuit, 19731, 120).

See also “Ruhe konstitutiv fur dieses Da, d.h. Bedeutsamkeit” (380); and 387 where Heidegger calls rest “uneigentliche Bewegung” because it conceals the T I P ~ T E ~ O V - G O T E ~ O V in the Now.

Yet Heidegger later in the course returns to a characterization of K ~ V I ~ I S as ”Gegenwart.” In Aristotle’s account of motion from the perspective of ~ ~ o i r p i s and TraOrpis in Physics r 3, Heidegger finds expressed the TIP& T I character of being-in-the-world and therefore the genuine definition of K ~ V Q O I S (clearly understood again a s Bedeutsamkeit) (327). The characterization of K ~ V I ~ S that Heidegger is working towards is made clear in the Handschrift: “Kivqoir die Gegenwart des Seienden, das ist in dem genannten Mitdasein des einen zum anderen” (392). Heidegger therefore now paraphrases Aristotle’s first definition of motion thus: “das Gegenwartigsein eines Seienden in bestimmtem Bezug zu einem anderen, so zwar, daB das erste ist als Seinkonnendes ‘durch’ das zweite” (394). This paraphrase is open t o the same objection tha t was made against Heidegger’s initial interpretation as well as to the objections that follow.

lo This distinction appears already suggested in the “Phanomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)” of 1922: “ W v a p i s , das je bestimmte Verfugenkonnen uber, i v i p y a a , das in gen[uine] Verwendung Nehmen der Verfugbarkeit, und ivrEhiXEia, das verwendende in Verwahrung Halten dieser Verfugbarkeit” (Gesamtausgabe 6 2 [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 20051, 396; hereafter cited in the text as GA 62, followed by page number).

l1 In the SS 1926 course, and again in the context of the account of motion, Heidegger defends the definition of i v i p y E i a as “Wirklichkeit” ( G A 22, 172, 3221, which he interprets a s “Vorhandensein als I m - Werke-Sein” (173). An interesting change, however, is his occasional translation of i v i p y a a as Zuhandenheit, so that the definition of motion can be stated as: “Zuhandenheit des Bereiten in seiner Bereitheit” (173). However, since he can a t the same time interpret the definition as “Anwesenheit des Vorhandenen in seiner Bereitheit und hinsichtlich dieser” (1741, Zuhandenheit is clearly being treated as a mode of Anwesenheit and Vorhandenheit (see also 320-21). Walter Brocker, on whose Nachschriften of the SS 1924 and SS 1926 courses the Gesamtausgabe editions of these courses partly rely, betrays the influence of Heidegger in his own book on Aristotle when, in explaining the account of motion, he .writes: “Aber wirklich, gegenwartig anwesend [my emphasis], i s t nicht nur das Rotsein des Seienden, sondern wirklich ist auch das Anders-Sein-Konnen des Seienden. Dies Seinkonnen dessen, was das ISeiende j e gerade nicht ist, gehort mit zu dem was es j e gerade wirklich is t” (Ar is to te les , 3rd. ed. [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio

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Klostermann, 19641, 80). l2 Heidegger can be seen making these quest ionable inter-

pretative moves in the following texts: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Gesamtausgabe 3 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Kloster- m a n n , 1982), 69; “Die Metaphysik a l s Geschichte des Seins,” i n Gesamtausgabe 6.2 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997), 368-9, 375; “Wissenschaft und Besinnung,” in Vortrage und Aufsatze, Gesamtausgabe 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, ZOOO), 43-4. At t h e s t a r t of t h e Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes a n explicit dist inction between i v i p y E i a a n d Epyov a s one between activit ies a n d products exis t ing a p a r t from t h e act ivi t ies t h a t produce them (1094a4-5).

l3 In t h e SS 1922 course, Phanomenologische Znterpretationen Ausgewahlter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik, Heidegger identifies i v ipyEia with “reinste Bewegtheit” and “reine Zeitigung,” apparently making no distinction between i v ipyEia and ivTEhiXEia ( G A 62, 102-08). At one point Heidegger i n cit ing t h e definition of t h e soul i n De A n i m a as t h e f i rs t ivTEhiXEIa simply inser ts K I ’ V ~ O I ~ in brackets after ~V-rEhgXEia, t h u s suggesting their equivalence (229; see also 336).

l4 Heidegger r ight ly defends aga ins t c i rcular i ty Aristotle’s definition of motion as ivTEhiXEia TOG K I V ~ T O G , fi K I V ~ T O V [of what is movable insofar as it is movable] (328). B u t h e here t r a n s l a t e s hrrEAgXEia as “Gegenwart,” a translation that , though creating other problems, at least avoids making the definition circular. If, on the other hand, Aristotle used the word i v ipyEia instead, as Heidegger earlier claims he should to be more precise, and we were to follow Heidegger in characterizing i v i p y a a as KivqaiS, then we would have a circular definition indeed: “ the motion of what is capable of being moved insofar as it is capable of being moved.”

l5 The same distinction is implied by the argument in the Nico- machean Ethics that j S o v i is not a K ~ V ~ O I S (1173a31-1174b14).

W. D. Ross comments on 201a10-11: “ivTEAiXEia m u s t here mean ‘actualization,’ not ‘actuality’: it is t h e passage from potentiality to actuality tha t is K ~ v I ~ ( ’ (Aristotle’s Physics [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19361, 537). But if actualization as t h e passage from potentiality to actuali ty is K ~ V ~ O I S , then this cannot be what iv-rEhiXEia means. In this case, the qualification, “of what is capable insofar as capable,” would be superfluous, since ivTEhiXEia would a s such be K ~ V ~ O I ~ , and the definition would be viciously circular. The problem with Ross’s reading is therefore much greater t h a n t h a t “Such a sense of entelecheia is ... unparalleled in Aristotle”: this is the objection of Edward Hussey, who himself t ranslates “actuality” (Aristotle’s Physics Books ZZZ and ZV [Oxford: Clarendon, 19831, 60). See also RBmi Brague: “L’acte qui intervient dans l a definition du mouvement est actualit6 e t non actualisation” (Aristote et la question d u monde [Par is : PUF, 19881, 500), a n d Pier re Aubenque: “Le mouvement est moins l’actualisation de la puissance, qu’il n’est l’acte de la puissance, la puissance en tan t qu’acte, c’est-a-dire en tan t que son acte est d’6tre en puissance” (Le probleme de I’Ctre chez Aristote [Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 20021, 454). B u t Aubenque nevertheless immediately proceeds to make the fatal mistake: “Le mouvement, dit ailleurs Aristote, est un acte imparfait, iv ipyEia ~ X T E ~ ~ S , c’est-u-dire dont l’acte m@me est de n’Ctre j a m a i s tout a fai t en acte” (454, my

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emphasis) . Brague, on t h e other hand , avoids th i s error: “I1 l’est I a ~ ~ h i r ] moins, precise ailleurs Aristote, parce qu’il serait lui-m6me u n acte imparfai t , que parce qu’il e s t l’acte (e t , en tant que tel, parfait) de quelque chose d’imparfait (Ame 111, 7, 431a6 s.)” (502, my emphasis). Yet the error remains persistent and widespread. In a recent book we find the following: “in welchem Sinne Heidegger und Gadamer energeia auffassen: als Sein, das nur im Werden sein Sein h a t . [This is more Gadamer t h a n Heidegger] Hingegen mein t tinergeia bei Aristoteles Werden zum Sein, genesis eis on” (Thomas Gutschker, Aristotelische Diskurse: Aristoteles in der politischen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhundert [Stuttgart: J . B. Metzler, 20021, 222).

l7 At Rhet. 1412a9 Aristotle does describe CvipyEia as a ~ i v ~ p i s , b u t i n t h e context Aristotle is clearly not using t h e word i n its strictest sense. The passage therefore does not support W. D. Ross’s conclusion tha t “ K ~ V I - ~ I S and CvipyEia are species of something wider for which Aristotle h a s no name, and for which he uses now t h e n a m e of one species, and now t h a t of t h e o ther” (Aristotle’s Metaphysics, vol. 2 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19241, 251).

Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, vol. 2, 248. l9 In this passage the definition of motion includes both terms:

whenever something “Cv-reAEXeia dv i v ~ p y f l ” not insofar as it is itself but insofar as it is movable, that is motion.

2o Heidegger presumably found support for his interpretation in Hermann Bonitz’s 1849 commentary on the Metaphysics. Bonitz also finds at 1048a30 and 1050a21-23 a distinction between ivipyEia and iVTEh6XEIa, claiming tha t while the two are very closely related and therefore often not dis t inguished, nevertheless t h e former most properly signifies “viam” while t h e la te r most properly signifies “finem viae” (Metaphysicu Commenturius [Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 3.9601, 387-88). Yet Bonitz can maintain such a distinction only by making the same mistake Heidegger makes: collapsing the distinction between CvipyEia and Kivrpis. Thus he sees ivEpyEiv as signifying “eam actionem e t mutat ionem, qua qui ex mera possibil i tate a d plenam perducitur essentiam” (387). This is obviously a definition of ~ i v q a i ~ and not of iv ipyeia. Yet this insistence on a sharp distinction between iv6pyEia and hrrEhfXEia and the mistake it presupposes have undoubtedly a n impressive pedigree since they can be traced back at least to Simplicius. After reporting t h a t Alexander, Porphyry and Themistios “converted evfpyeia into iv-rEhixEia in t h e definition of motion, as if they were the same for Aristotle” (Simplicii in Aristotelis I’hysicorum libros quattuor priores commentaria, ed. H. Diels [Berlin: 18821, 414, 20-211, Simplicius objects t h a t if Aristotle does sometimes use the word ~vTEh&Eia for ivipyEia, he does not mean just any kvipyEia but only the complete kind (TEhEia). The name ivTEhiXeia signifies “TGV TOG ~ v T E ) \ o ~ ~ . s auviXEiav” (414, 37), so t h a t it cannot properly be applied to the incomplete iv6pyEia tha t Simplicius sees a s characterizing motion. Simplicius thus insists on reading the word CvipyEia in the defintion of motion at 201a9-11: “Motion being of the incomplete, however, it is not i n vain t h a t he [Aristotle] directly called it iv ipyeia and not CvTeAiXeia” (414, 28-9). Behind this distinc- t ion is t h e same er ror made by t h e contemporary commentators criticized above (note 16): against Porphyry’s suggestion tha t ~ i v ~ p i ~ is a n CVTEhiXEia ~ I T E ~ ~ S and a n CvipyEia TEhEia, Simplicius objects: “But if it is the CvipyEia of what exists potentially (TOO WvaMEi) and

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what exists potentially is incomplete ( h ~ ~ h f s ) , then how could the kvipyEia of something incomplete (TOG ~ T E A o G ) be a complete ivfpyEia

21 I show elsewhere how Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the good in this course assimilates np&Ci< to noiqois: see my “Without Good and Evil: Heidegger’s Purification of Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Heidegger and the Greeks: Interpretative Essays , ed. by Drew A. Hyland a n d J o h n Panteleimon Manoussakis ( Indiana University Press, 2006), 127-56. Especially significant here is t h e following passage in which Heidegger, asserting tha t noiqoi~ is the resource for t h e quest ion “What is being?,” does not dis t inguish between noiqois a n d np&Cis: “Die Frage nach dem ~i ~b dv ist geschopft aus den Bestimmungen der noiqai~ und des Gegenwurtig- Daseins-noiqois als primare In-der-Welt-Sein, IT~&€,IS” (GA 18, 329). Robert Bernasconi has observed tha t “Heidegger focuses explicitly on praxis only rarely and his sights a re clearly set on poiesis. Futher- more, t h i s is not always t h e broad conception of po ies i s which includes praxis ...” (“The Fate of the Distinction between Praxis and Poiesis,” in Heidegger in Question: The Art of Existing [New Jersey: Humani t ies Press , 19931, 12). If Heidegger does not sharp ly dis t inguish prax i s from po ies i s , t h i s is because, according to Bernasconi, the characterization of praxis in terms of its distinction from poiesis still amounts to “a technical interpretation of praxis” (21; see also 22). Yet Aristotle’s definition of motion shows, I suggest, t h a t h e understands poiesislkinesis in the light of energeia lpraxis rather than vice versa. Bernasconi sees at Nic. Eth. VI ii 5 , 1139a35- b4 a characterization of praxis a s t h e goal of poies i s , a characterization which he sees as subordinating praxis to poiesis (8). But this passage can be in te rpre ted wi th at leas t equal plausibi l i ty as showing t h a t Aristotle interprets making from t h e perspective of praxis as an unfulfilled praxis.

22 See Paul Ricceur, “Negativite e t affirmation originaire,” i n Aspects de la dialectique (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 19561, 101-24; and Soi-m&me comme un autre (Paris: fiditions de Seuil, 1990), 364. In t h e former important essay, af ter a cri t ique of modern philos- ophies t h a t privilege negation and the nothing, like t h a t of Sar t re , for presupposing a limited and impoverished conception of being a s thinghood and essence (120), Riccleur concludes: “Sous la pression du negatif, des experiences en negatif, nous avons a reconquerir une notion de l’etre qui soit acte plutBt que forme, affirmation vivante, puissance d’exister e t de fa i re exis ter” (124) . See Dominique Janicaud’s description of Ricceur as proposing “une ‘ontologie de l’agir’ qui a pour fin le ‘bien vivre’ au sens d’hristote e t pour laquelle l’etre hi-meme se decouvre e t se definit comme agir” (471). Janicaud also notes how Ricoeur emphasizes t h e dunamis-energeia sense of being in Aristotle against Heidegger’s reduction of being to presence

23 Heidegger discusses briefly the characterization of j S o v i in the Nicomachean Ethics as not a KivqoiS and not existing in time (GA 18, 244-45), but he does not reflect on the peculiar relation of kvfpyEia to t ime and concludes: “Dieser Charakter , dalj sie keine ~ i v j o i s i s t , charakter is ier t sie a l s eine Best immung der Gegenwartigkeit des Daseins a l s solchen” (245). This inference from “keine K I V ~ U I S ” to “Gegenwartigkeit” is precisely t h e inference I want to bring into

(TEhEia)?” (415, 23-5).

(472-3).

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question. 24 This is understandably a text to which Ricceur attaches much

importance: see Soi-m&me comme un autre, 356 and 364 n. 1. For a n account of the strange history of this text’s transmission, see Brague, Aristote et la question du monde, 454-61. Brague’s is probably the best philosophical interpretation of this text currently available, at least in part because he recognizes the text’s crucial importance.

25We do find a t Phys ics 249b29 t h e phrase: “ a u a K i w i K a i K E K ~ V T ~ K E V . ” The context, however, is t h e continuity of motion as a process, not its relation to its T C A O ~ . This continuity shows t h a t motion is indeed a n CvCpyEia, but without collapsing the distinction between the two. See Wolfgang Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik, 3rd. ed. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 19921, 332.

26 This interpretation is the one advanced by Pierre Aubenque: ‘Dans le cas d’CvCpyEi, ce qui demeure pens6 9 travers la formation savante du mot, es t l’activite art isanale, plus precisement l’ceuvre (Zpyov). Certes, l’acte n’est pas l’activite, e t Aristote prendra bien soin de le distinguer de mouvement, mais il en est le resultat. I1 n’est pas le devenant, mais le devenu, non pas le bgtir, mais l’avoir-bgti, non pas le present ou l’aoriste du mouvoir, mais le parfait de l’avoir- mG e t de l’avoir-et6-mu” (Le probl6me de 1’6tre chez Aristote, 440). Yet Aubenque must admit in a note (440, n. 4) t h a t Aristotle does not actually say this . Ins tead , Aristotle claims t h a t CvipyEia is simultaneously p a s t perfect a n d presen t . So how can Aubenque interpret so against the grain of the text? Because, no matter what Aristotle might say, his “extension” of CvCpyEia to .rrp&$i5 “en contredit l’origine technologique, selon laquelle l a reference B l’aeuure e s t immediatement presente” (440-41, n . 4). Despite h i s cri t ique of Heidegger i n t h e next note (441, n . 1) Aubenque h e r e follows Heidegger in considering the etymology of a word more important to its interpretation than its actual use and analysis in the Aristotelian text. Some salutary words of Paul Ricceur a re worth citing i n this context: “Et cette proximite en t re LnergLia e t ergon n’a-t-elle pas (encourage maints commentateurs B donner un modele artisanal a la skrie entiere: entblkcheia, LnergLia, ergon? Ce qui, en banalisant le propos, rendra i t a peu pres inut i le tou te enterpr ise de reappro- priation de l’ontologie de l’acte-puissance a u benefice de l’&tre du soi” ( Soi-m&me comme un autre, 355, n. 2).

21 See paral le l passages a t Soph . e l . 178a9-11 a n d De sensu

28 Brague expresses well t h e paradox: “L’acte n’en finit pas de h i r , il cesse sans cesse” (470). At one point in his manuscript for the SS 1926 course, Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie, Heidegger appears to see this crucial point: “6vTEhfxEia: 1. nicht nur uberhaupt anwesend. 2. nicht nur beweglich, CITEAI~S, C I ~ ~ I U T O V , 3. sondern von ihm selbst her seinem Wesen nach n u r im Wirken seiend. CvtpyEia . r E A E i a , fer t ig u n d doch nicht Aufhoren d e r uordranglichen Anwesenheit; mipa5 und doch kein Aufhiiren, sondern gerade in ihr 1st Sein. Ich habe gesehen u n d so sehe ich. Ich bin glucklich geworden und bin es so gerade. Ich habe es erlebt und lebe jetzt SO” ( G A 22, 175). But Heidegger does not appear to see t h e extent to which this challenges a characterization of iv ipyeia as Zm- Werke-Sein ( 1731, a characterization of CvTEAixEia as Fertig-sein, and, finally, the characterization of both as modes of Anwesenheit and Vorhandenheit.

446b2.

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Similarly, Brocker, while rightly claiming that “das Sehen von etwas [ist] auch kein Aufenthalt, kein Stillstand, sondern ruhige Tutigkeit” (851, still proceeds to make the mistake of identifying it with the end of motion and thus with what Heidegger calls “Fertig-sein”: “die Energie in Gegensatz zur Bewegung sich bestimmt als Ruhe, u. z . nicht als Aufenthalt auf dem Wege zu einem Ende, sondern als Ruhe im Ziel und Ende einer Bewegung: Entelechie” (85). In the SS 1922 course, Heidegger, after citing 1048b19-21, interprets i t as speaking of a Bewegung “die selbst in ihrem Ende steht, am Ende gerade ist!- die noch oder gerade dann Bewegung ist, wenn sie an ihrem Ende ist! Am ‘Ende’ sein und gerade dann Bewegung sein” (106). But Aristotle in this passage is speaking of .rrp&E,is TEAEia, not of K ~ V Q O I ~ ,

and for a good reason: i t is precisely the fact that K I V T ~ C J I ~ comes to an end when i t reaches i t s end tha t dist inguishes i t a s such from iv ipyEia .

29 Capturing in a translation the sense of a p a is difficult because, as Brague rightly warns, “I1 faut se garder de la reduire trop vite a la contemporanite que suggerait la traduction par ‘en meme temps.’ ... Dans cet hama, le passe est integre au present non pour y &re aboli, mais en t an t que tel” (473). Does not this a p a then defy the conception of time to which Heidegger insists on restricting the Greeks?

30 Despite otherwise reiterating Heidegger’s view that Aristotle “s’est borne a suivre le Aoyo~” (108) and thus is led t o characterize being as I ~ T I O K E ~ ~ E V O V , Beaufret appears to go beyond Heidegger in seeing Aristotle a s recognizing the l imits of language and the categories in the face of the phenomenon of M p y E i a (118-19).

31 As Brague, for example, argues (474-92). 32 Heidegger’s interpretation, to the extent that it appears in the

Einfuhrung in d ie Metaphysik and other la ter texts, was already brought into question by Pierre Aubenque in an important note to Le probleme de l’Etre chez Aristote (first published in 1943): “Nous ne pouvons accepter l’interpretation que M. Heidegger propose du mot ivTEAiXEia. Voulant a juste titre eviter la mesinterpretation moderne de l’entelechie comme finalite, il en vient a eliminer du mot T ~ A o ~ toute idee de f i n , au sens d’achhvement, d’accomplissement de l’inacheve, pour ne plus retenir que le sens statique d’accompliss- ment toujours deja accompli de ‘pure presence de ce qui est present’ ... I1 s’agit, certes, d’une presence, mais d’une presence advenue, deuenue. La traduction moderne d’acte n’est pas un oubli du sens originel, mais lui reste, pour une fois, fidhle” (441, n. 1). Two aspects of this critique are on the mark: (1) the criticism of Heidegger’s elimination of all idea of “fin” from T ~ A O ~ , his insistence that ~ t h 0 5 “nicht Ziel und nicht Zweck, sondern Ende bedeutet” (Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, 3rd. ed. [Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 19661, 46; for a critique of Heidegger’s defense of this view in the SS 1924 course, see my “Without Good and Evil: Heidegger’s Purification of Aristotle’s Ethics,” 131-34; (2) and the defense of the translation of ivTEAiXEia as “act” against Heidegger’s interpretation of it as “das Sich-in-der- Endung (Grenze)-halten (wahren)” (Einfiihrung, 461, an interpretation Heidegger uses to support his thesis that for the Greeks being meant “Stundigkeit.” (In contrast, Jean Beaufret follows Heidegger in the translation of M p y E i a as “actus” claiming that it constitutes a wall between us and the Greeks [135].) But Aubenque’s critique of

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Heidegger is not radical enough because it follows Heidegger i n interpreting CvTEhfXEia and ivipyEia as moments within movement (i.e., as results or aims of movement) and thus in ignoring or greatly minimizing Aristotle’s distinction between ivfpyEia and Kivquis: see the critique of Aubenque on this point in note 5. In this respect, the interpretat ion of ivTEhiXEia as “presence having-arrived, having- become” is no better than the interpretation of CvTEAfXEia simply as “presence.”

33 Christopher P. Long’s otherwise very insightful account of the ontological significance of 1~ptic15 in Aristotle seems to fall into this error: he appears to assume tha t only potentiality and matter could prevent ivepyEia from being some “static actus purus,” thereby failing to note tha t the ivepyeia without matter tha t is the unmoved mover is interpreted by Aristotle as I T P ~ ~ I S , to the extent of being described as life, pleasure, a n d happiness (“The Ethical Culminat ion of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” in Epoch6 8 [20031: see 128 and 133). It is for t h i s reason t h a t Long, i n looking for a model of dynamic, nonuniversal knowledge t h a t can do justice to ivEpyEia, t u r n s to qp6vquis instead of to t h e v6qa15 V O ~ U E U S of t h e unmoved mover. Long provides a detai led defense of t h i s thesis i n The Ethics of Ontology: Rethinking an Aristotelian Legacy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004); but see my critique in “Form in Aristotle: Oppressive Univer- sa l o r Individual Act?” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 26, 2

34 Ricceur r ight ly s t resses t h e importance of preserving t h e tension between Grjvapis and Cvfpyeia and from t h i s perspective criticizes the reduction of ivfpyeia to “facticity” (Soi-m&me comme un autre, 364-5). In contrast, Heidegger in the 1930 course insists with regard to ivfpyEia t h a t “Unser Fremdwort ‘Energie’ im Sinne von Kraft h a t dami t nichts zu t u n . ivfpyEia bedeutet zumal a l s philosophischer Ausdruck fur Existenz, Wirklichkeit, Vorhandensein bei Aristoteles alles andere als Kraft” (GA 31, 67).

35 Heidegger at one point asserts tha t according to the Megarian position, “Nichtvollzug des Vermogens gleich Abwesenheit, gleich Nichtvorhandensein desselben” (184). Judging from what Aristotle wrote, what the Megarians are claiming instead is tha t “Nichtvollzug fdes Vermogens gleich Unvermogen.”

36 Heidegger at one point refers to “the emphasis [die Betonung] ‘of Grjvapiv E X E I V ” (188) in the text. What emphasis? What one finds in the text is Aristotle occasionally using this expression without calling a t ten t ion to it and without der iving from it a n y philosophical #conclusions for the argument. The “emphasis” is all Heidegger’s.

37 Even if it is legitimate to ask, as Heidegger does earlier in the Icourse, “In welcher Weise is t denn nun das 6 v (ETvai) pohhaX6s ~ E Y ~ ~ E V O V , das Sein a l s vielfach Gesagtes, K O I V ~ V TI , irgendwie gemeinsam f u r die Vielen?” ( G A 33, 311, t h i s cer ta inly does not justify t h e conflation of a categorial sense of being with being as ;&hapis .

38 Heidegger der ives t h e following character izat ion of being- capable from his excellent phenomenological description of t h e runner: “Wirklich-vermogend-sein ist das bereitschafterfullte Im- Stande-sein-zu, dem n u r noch die Enthemmung i n den Vollzug fehl t ...” (218). This character izat ion of being-capable is without question defensible and illuminating. The problem is tha t Heidegger

(2005): 179-98.

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does not stop here. Instead, he proceeds to bring this definition in line with the supposedly Greek conception of being by identifying Im- Stande-sein-zu with t h e having of a GirvapiS as something present (219). If we a r e to remain faithful to what Aristotle says even in going beyond what he says, we must insist tha t Im-Stande-sein-zu is GiwapiS itself, not the being-present or being-at-hand of a GhapiS .

39 Bonitz, though not seeing this as eliminating all the problems, suggests t h a t t h e viciousness of t h e circle i n t h e definit ion is minimized if “TO Gvva-r6v, quod definit , de qual i ta te quadam rei inhaerente, TO aGljvaTov, quod ad definiendum adscisit, de interna cogitandi repugnantia intellexerimus.. .” (387). Ross takes the same way out (245), though his comments appear to go fur ther in seeing the meaning of logical (im)possibility in both GvvaT6v and aGirvaTov, something t h a t seems hardly possible in t h e f i rs t case, given t h e context.

40 According to the editor of G A 33 (2261, Ross’s commentary is one of the texts Heidegger consulted for the 1931 course.

41 When Heidegger comes upon Aristotle’s example of aiaOqalS, he is forced to make the important concession tha t “EvEpyEiv, ivipyEia haben hier schon nicht mehr die urspriinglich ganz enge Bezogenheit auf Epyov, aber immer doch die Bedeutung des Vollzugs” (204). In this case one must of course even question the translation Vollzug, which suggests a process towards some outcome. Yet this concession does not stop Heidegger from translating i v ipye ia as Am- Werke-Sein.

42 At one point in the course, Heidegger asks how the Megarians can appeal to ivEpyEiv when they presumably, as Eleatics, denied the existence of motion (171-2). Perhaps the solution is tha t ivEpyEiv is not understood as motion. Heidegger himself raises the possibility, though only in passing and without pursuing it, tha t i v ipye ia , which he translate here as Vollzug, is perhaps something other than motion (“[ ... ist vielleicht etwas anderes?]”, 174).

43 Enrico Berti also makes this objection to Heidegger’s reading, rightly insisting that for Aristotle the primary meaning of i v i p y a a is not tha t according to movement, but tha t of “activity” (Aristotele nel Novecento [Roma: Laterza, 19921, 103, 110-11). See also Long, who for this reason finds in Aristotle an undermining of “the metaphysics of ‘productive comportment”’ (138, n. 39).

44 At one point in speaking of ivipyE!a, Heidegger writes: “Vollzug ist Ausiibung, also Anwesenheit von Ubung und Geiibtheit” (185). Here, as in other cases, t h e “also” expresses not what necessarily follows but, rather, what Heide,gger needs. Why must Ausiibung be interpreted as the presence of Ubung? Only to fit Heidegger’s thesis concerning t h e Greek conception of being. Heidegger himself sees t h a t t h i s in te rpre ta t ion is not necessary when h e remarks t h a t Vollzug i s not s imp ly Anwesenhe i t : “vielmehr ist d e r Vollzug Ausiibung und a l s solche, wenn i iberhaupt , Anwesenhei t von Einubung” (191, my emphasis). This possibility t h a t Vollzug is not Anwesenheit at all is quickly passed over and not allowed to interfere with Heidegger’s thesis.

46 Beaufret follows Heidegger’s la ter interpretation in affirming the synonymy of ivipyEia and iv-rEAiXEia only a t the cost of denying t h a t t h e former means “act” and identifying both wi th w h a t is achieved or completed: “C’est bien pourquoi LvipyEia, ou l’on entend Epyov, e t ivTEhiXEia, ou l’on entend T ~ ~ O S , sont synonymes, ~ i h 0 5

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n’etant pas plus un but qu’ipyov n’est une action ou un acte, mais les cleux d isan t l’un e t l ’autre q u e quelque chose e s t acheve e t non seulement ‘en cours’, ou mBme moins encore, a u sens ou l’ouvrage de la menuiserie ne peut pas mBme encore, dans l’arbre de la for&, Btre clit ‘en cours”’ (114). Beaufret therefore also follows Heidegger i n claiming t h a t ivipyEia a n d Girvapic a r e understood from t h e perspective of movement (1 14-5). Heidegger’s thesis t h a t being for the Greeks was presence is accordingly accepted without question: slee page 138.

46 Thus also in the Beitruge zur Philosophie Heidegger can claim tha t “Aristoteles begreift erstmals griechisch von Bestandigkeit und Anwesenheit her (oiroia) das Wesen der Bewegung . . .” (Gesamtausgabe 65, 2nd. ed. [Frankfurt a m Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 19941, 193) only by asserting that “ens ‘actu’ ist gerade das Seiende in der ‘Ruhe’, riicht in der ‘Aktion’, das Insichgesammelte und in diesem Sinne voll Anwesende” (194).

47 Brague rightly sees in the phrase “Xahmjv iGEiv” a surpassing both of t h e conception of knowledge according to t h e paradigm of vision and of a conception of being as what-is-there ( ~ ~ T T ~ ~ ~ x E I v ) as a th ing (K-rijpa) (502-6). He even writes: “le paradigme visuel qui domine une bonne partie de la pensee grecque y trouve l’accroc, peut- Eatre unique, o u i l commence a se dkmailler” (505). I would deny, however, tha t this paradigm dominates Greek thought to the extent I3rague suggests. Brague argues t h a t our only access to ivipyEia is riot vision, but A i y ~ i v (504-6), which he however distinguishes from both predication and naming (506). This is presumably because we can speak of ivipyEia only from within, as Brague suggests earlier: “NOUS comprenons l’acte, non pas du dehors, mais quand nous nous plaqons l’interieur de lui-formule d’ailleurs provisoire, car il faut comprendre que nous ne nous y sommes jamais mis, que nous y avons toujours Bt6, que l’acte es t ce dont nous ne pouvons jamais sortir” (495).

48 One text tha t demands reflection here is the Beitruge (293-4). Heidegger here uses the language of Aristotle’s definition of K ~ V ~ U I S , despite his characterization of it as “outlived” metaphysical language, to express the essence of Being. What needs to be considered here is what is lost in this appropriation. An answer is perhaps to be found i n Patocka’s cr i t ique of Heidegger from t h e perspective of a phenomenology of movement: for discussion and documentation, see Renaud Barbaras, “La phenomenologie du movement chez Patocka,” in Phdnomdnologie: un si6cle de philosophie, eds. Pascal Dupond and Laurent Cournaire (Paris: Ellipses, 2002), 129-37; especially 135.

49 “On peut enfin se demander si Heidegger a aperqu les ressources que pouvait receler une philosophie de 1’Btre qui mettrait le transcen- dlantal de l’acte a l a place de celui de l a substance, comme le dlemande une phenomenologie de l’agir et du pgtir” (Soi-m&me comme zm autre, 380, my translation). One of the “resources” Ricoeur has in mind here is a n ethical one. This is evident not only in Soi-m&me comme un autre but also in the much earlier essay cited above, where Flicoeur suggests tha t only an ontology of the act, as opposed to both t h e privileging of negation i n existentialism and a philosophy of essences, can ground respect for t h e o ther a n d t h u s ethics: “si l’existentialisme privilegie le moment d u refus, d u dkfi, d e l’arrachment a u donne, d u desengluement, c’est que d’une par t le

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moment de nbantisation du donnk est toujours obscurci par une volonte coupable d’annihilation d’autrui. ... Mais la position de l’existence par l’existence, de l’existence de l’autre comme condition de mon existence pleine e t entihre, ne me condamne pas a une philosophie des essences mais m’oriente vers une philosophie de l’acte d’exister. L’illusion de l’existentialisme est double: il confond la denegation avec les passions qui l’enferment dans le negatif, il croit que l’autre alternative a la liberth-nBant c’est l’etre petrifie dans l’essence” (“NBgativite e t affirmation originaire,” 119). One must wonder to what an extent such a criticism applies to Heidegger.

50This paper was wri t ten with the support of t he National Endowment for the Humanities and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.

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Whose Metaphysics of Presence - Heidegger's Interpretation of Energeia and Dunamis in Aristotle